UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

VIRUS RESEARCH LABORATORY
Terrace & Darragh Streets
Pittsburgh 13, Pennsylvania

25 February 1960

Miss Waxter
Secretary to
Mr. Edward Murrow
445 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Miss Waxter:

Dr. Salk would appreciate very much your forwarding the enclosed to Mr. Murrow. If we may have his address from you that would be most helpful.

Sincerely,

Lorraine Friedman

Secretary to
Jonas E. Salk, M. D.

lf

Enc.

Jonas Salk

March 7, 1960

Dear Miss Friedman:

Thank you for your recent note and for the enclosed letter from Dr. Salk, which I have forwarded on to Mr. Murrow as you requested.

For your information, Mr. Murrow expects to be at the Erawan Hotel in Bangkok from March 10th to 14th and at the Peninsula Hotel in Hong Kong for several days thereafter.

Sincerely yours,

Gabrielle Wachsner
Secretary

Miss Lorraine Friedman, Secretary
Jonas E. Salk, M. D.
University of Pittsburgh
Virus Research Laboratory
Terrace & Darragh Streets
Pittsburgh 13, Pennsylvania

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH
SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

VIRUS RESEARCH LABORATORY
Terrace & Darragh Streets
Pittsburgh 13, Pennsylvania

25 February 1960

Dear Ed:

I am in complete accord with your sentiments about administration. The decision has been made and much to my satisfaction we are to receive the land as a gift. The matter will be known publicly on 15 March when the proposal is to be submitted to City Council in San Diego.

I would like to write much more but will reserve my thoughts and sentiments about some of those you touched upon in your letter, and a great many others, until I see you--I hope that will be very soon.

My very best to you, Janet, and Casey.

Sincerely,

Jonas

Jonas E. Salk

lf

July 29, 1959.

Glen Arden Farm
Pawling, N.Y.

Dear Jonas:

Belated thanks for sending me a copy of your letter to O'Connor. I am naturally curious for more news as to what is happening.

I am off to the West Coast to see my mother next week, but will then be here or in New York until late August. Meanwhile I labor on the London piece on "Television and Politics". Both occupations appear to me to be increasingly ridiculous!

As ever yours,

Dr. Jonas Salk
University of Pittsburgh
Virus Research Laboratory
Terrace & Darragh Streets
Pittsburgh 13, Pa.

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

VIRUS RESEARCH LABORATORY
Terrace & Darragh Streets
Pittsburgh 13, Pennsylvania

13 July 1959

Dear Ed:

This is still another revision and just to let you know that not everybody is on vacation.

Do you yet realize what a wonderful year you have in store?

Sincerely,

Jonas E. Salk, M. D.

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Pawling
New York

~~Basil O'Connor~~
Jonas Salk

COPY

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

VIRUS RESEARCH LABORATORY
Bellefield & Terrace Streets
Pittsburgh 13, Pennsylvania

13 July 1959

Mr. Basil O'Connor
The National Foundation
800 Second Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

I have prepared this letter to outline the present state of our discussions on the establishment of an institute.

As you know, I have discussed with a number of colleagues, and with others whose opinion I value, the idea that we have been considering together, of an institute that will be concerned with problems of man as these can be approached by the methods of the natural sciences. The consensus, emerging from these discussions, is the existence of a need for an institute for those who are interested in man's problems, especially for study of their fundamental aspects, and as this may shed light on the processes and organization of life.

The time seems to be opportune for considering questions relevant to synthesis, growth, and adaptation in living systems. Deeper understanding of these biological phenomena is basic in consideration of problems created by malignant disease, virus infections, abnormal functioning of genetic and immunologic mechanisms, and problems in human development and behavior. Emphasis should change from time-to-time, and consideration should be given to important practical questions where new knowledge may be required or there is need to point the way for solutions that may not otherwise be undertaken.

An institute so oriented would provide an opportunity for close association of persons, in more or less related fields, who have demonstrated their ability to work productively in independent investigation but who share a common interest in the development

of man's potential. Such an institute would afford a further opportunity for the encouragement of selected young persons who have similar interests and show promise.

As we have considered together, and I have found many who concur, this institute should be self-governing but with closest intellectual affiliation with a university where there is likely to be interest in problems and questions of common concern.

The few to whom I have mentioned the desire of The National Foundation to support this idea have had a most favorable reaction. I have mentioned your intent that The National Foundation provide a minimum of one million dollars annually, over a period without limit, and contribute additionally at least one million dollars per year to a capital fund, until the fund has reached an adequate amount to be agreed upon. While it is contemplated that primary support will come from The National Foundation, it is understood that the institute will not be precluded from receiving support from other sources, either for its annual activities or for its capital fund.

The aspects that have evoked the warmest response have been The National Foundation's desire to help provide opportunity for selected individuals to pursue their own thoughts with respect to the problems of man, and its regard less for the immediate and more for the ultimate influence that the activities of the participants of this undertaking may have.

It is anticipated that in addition to those who would be in residence at the institute others would be joined as visiting members, in those instances in which affiliation would be of value but where the individual concerned would be of greater value in his own place of work. There should be, also, an advisory board of scientists and others who have distinguished themselves in areas related to the institute's interests.

You can appreciate that I cannot, at this time, give you names of people who will join actively in one capacity or another. However, I am sure you would like to know the names of persons whom I have in mind for those in residence; if they cannot join in such capacity at this time they would be asked to become visiting members and others would be considered. These are Puck (Colorado), Benzer (Purdue), Crick (Cambridge) and/or Watson (Harvard), Medawar (London); each would be expected to have his own group of associates and promising young people of his own selection. I should add that I expect to have an active laboratory myself. At this time I would prefer not to present

alternates to the above. The absence from the list of certain names, or of representation for certain areas of activity, is due to the possibility being considered of establishing this institute at Stanford where several basic areas are so very well represented.

If the idea grows and develops as we have discussed, and it becomes possible to consider problems in human development, behavior, and adaptation, I would hope that, in addition to persons working basically in neurobiology, that others like John Benjamin (Colorado) and Konrad Lorenz (Germany), or men with their orientation, might be willing to join at a later time.

I can assemble a list of persons from whom to select visiting members; however, for final selection, this would be influenced by the members in residence and by the questions under consideration. For illustration I will mention:

Burnet (Melbourne)
Dubos (Rockefeller)
Dulbecco (Cal Tech)
Heidelberger (Rutgers)
Horsfall (Rockefeller)
Hotchkiss (Rockefeller)
Klein (Stockholm)
Luria (MIT)
Mannot--Jacobs--Wollman (Paris)
Muller (Indiana)
Pauling (Cal Tech)
Sonneborn (Indiana)
Szilard (Chicago)
Tatum (Rockefeller)
Tiselius (Upsala)

The above is merely to illustrate the kind of persons desired. I discussed with Niels Bohr my desire that he join in some way and he expressed keen interest if he is still active. There are others, such as Huxley, whom it would be good to have come as visitors for as long or as frequently as they would deem profitable. We would also ask, as visitors, persons who are regarded as humanists, or have other special interests, but who are fundamentally concerned with the problems of man.

As you know, I have talked with Robert Oppenheimer, as well as with Bohr, and also with Puck, Benjamin, Medawar, George Klein, and a number of others, all of whom expressed great interest in the idea and encourtgement for its implementation.

I will be very happy to discuss the next steps with you as soon as you are ready to do so.

Sincerely,

Jonas E. Salk, M. D.

lf

Salk, Jonas E.

f

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

VIRUS RESEARCH LABORATORY
Terrace & Darragh Streets
Pittsburgh 13, Pennsylvania

16 December 1958

Dear Ed:

Unless another time is more convenient for you, I will be at your office at 2:45 Friday afternoon. Should you want to leave a message, I will be staying at the Waldorf.

Sincerely,

Jonas

Jonas E. Salk, M. D.

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

cc + orig and went to Fred Friendly
Jack, Jonas Dr

October 31, 1958

Dear Jonas:

I did not know we were not carried in Pittsburgh. I will try to find out what the situation is, and whether the educational station might carry SMALL WORLD. I fear it will be difficult to arrange.

Thanks for Eric Fromm's lecture. I will hope to read it on the weekend.

Don't forget we still have designs on you for SMALL WORLD.

As ever yours,

EEM:skh

Dr. Jonas E. Salk
University of Pittsburgh
School of Medicine
Department of Bacteriology
Virus Research Laboratory
The Municipal Hospital
Pittsburgh 13, Pa.

Sach, Jonas

September 14, 1956

Dear Jonas:

John Aaron has shown me your letter. I understand entirely.

I am just back from a week in Egypt - it was hectic and interesting.

I hope to see you when next you are in New York.

Sincerely,

Dr. Jonas E. Salk
University of Pittsburgh
School of Medicine
Pittsburgh 13, Pennsylvania

fc

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

DEPARTMENT OF BACTERIOLOGY

VIRUS RESEARCH LABORATORY
THE MUNICIPAL HOSPITAL
PITTSBURGH 13, PENNSYLVANIA

7 September 1956

Mr. John Aaron
Person-to-Person
CBS
Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Aaron:

I deeply appreciate Mr. Murrow's desire to do a Person-to-Person program with me. I will be very honest and sincere when I tell you that my personal feelings for Mr. Murrow make me desirous of doing this. But, after a year that has been anything but the kind that isconducive to contemplation and research, I have had granted to me a year when I am free from curricular and extra-curricular activities at the University--this to permit me to formulate and begin the development of a program of investigation that I hope will carry us into deeper and more interesting problems than ones with which we have been concerned. I know that people would like to know what these new problems are and since they are not sufficiently well formulated nor explored, I will, for the time being at least, try to remain out of the public eye to give me the necessary time to do what needs to be done before I once again take advantage of the kind of opportunity that Mr. Murrow has provided.

I am sure that you will convey this to Mr. Murrow and because I think you will do so I want to convey a message more directly by saying that I hope to have an opportunity to see him some time soon and will try to arrange to do so on one of my next trips to New York.

Sincerely,

Jonas E. Salk

Jonas E. Salk, M. D.

lf

Salk, Jonas

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH

SCHOOL OF MEDICINE

DEPARTMENT OF BACTERIOLOGY

VIRUS RESEARCH LABORATORY
THE MUNICIPAL HOSPITAL
PITTSBURGH 13, PENNSYLVANIA

22 February 1956

Dear Ed:

I would love to hear about your trip to Israel. Judging from your language I am not sure you may not also have been converted. I think the piece is "kosher" but it has a little "schmalz" and a little "bone" that could be trimmed away with good effect.

There are a few sentences or phrases that belong in the department of "things probably never said." Poetic license, to the contrary, notwithstanding, I would be tempted to draw my pencil through the following on page 5:

LANDSTEINER: This is only 1909. It may take another century to develop.

NARRATOR : Their aim: to cultivate a virus that can be safely used for a polio vaccine.

I think, also, that the text reads more smoothly.

On page 6, at the top, I changed the word bottom to walland for Enders' second speech on that page, I would convey the idea not merely of attachment to a living cell but the idea of getting inside a living cell.

On page 7, it is probably a typographical error, the first word should be Weller.

On page 8, in the doctor's speech near the bottom of the page, I changed the word only to primarily. The reason I am saying this is that it has

already been shown that the vaccine also prevents a certain proportion of non-paralytic polio and, after three doses will have been given, of proper vaccine, properly spaced, I think we will find still more evidence of the effect of vaccine not only on the paralytic disease but the non-paralytic disease, as well.

The thing referred to as the "bone" is in the doctor's speech that begins in the middle of page 9. If I were the doctor I would say the following:

> DOCTOR: Well, as with everything else, we're always striving for improvements. The full effect of this vaccine has never been tested with all three doses given over a proper interval. Since the effect with one dose, in 1955, was better than the three doses close together, in 1954, you can see that the vaccine is getting better every year. What we have now is the only protection we have against paralytic polio. We know that it is safe. We know that it is highly effective. So we ought to take advantage of it, don't you think?

Enders' speech on page 10 belongs in the same department of things I referred to on page 5.

I am a layman in these matters and if I have been of any help to you on this then I hope you will take those of my comments that are appropriate and disregard those that are not.

Sincerely,



Jonas E. Salk, M. D.

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

June 3, 1955

Dear Jonas:

For some reason, of which I know not why, Marlene Dietrich asked me to hand the enclosed to you.

I reckon she is only trying to prove that she was a laborer in the vineyard in London.

As ever yours,

Dr. Jonas Salk
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

rh

April 19, 1955

The following is from Miss Friedman in Dr. Salk's office:

Dr. Salk has been asked what he will do next, but before he can answer that he has asked for our help. He is disturbed because he is unable to reply promptly and personally to the many communications he has received; many invitations from those who would do him honor have had to be declined. These have been decisions of neccessity and not of choice. Certain moneys have been sent to Jonas Salk and to various instruments of communication. All these he regards as warm feeling, expressed each in their own way, to him they all have the same meaning. Of these he says he shall keep and cherish the spirit of the giving and will keep, but only in trust, the substance given. You have heard his philosophy, he is saying now what he said before the tests were completed. The polio vaccine came about as a result of contributions made one upon the other.
(Here is where Dr. Salk went 'blank')
He is examining his new problems with characteristic caution. Salk the scientist and Salk the man are but two sides of the same coin. He may have lost his anonymity, but not his humanity.

FIRST DRAFT Adners ??

DR. SALK

Dr. Salk has told us that he has been unable to respond to the many communications he has received. He has, of neccessity, declined many invitations from those who would do him honor. He has refused an automobile because he already has one. In short, he is determined not to receive a personal benefit as a result of his contribution and that of his colleagues and predecessors to this lightening of the load of fear. Certain moneys have been sent to Dr. Salk and to various instruments of communication. This has been a voluntary gesture of gratitude, just as the participation of the children and their parents in the mass tests was a voluntary gesture.

Dr. Salk's interest, training, and achievements lie in the field of preventive medicine, in achieving a position where such diseases as heart, cancer, and mental disease are no longer regarded as inevitable. Dr. Salk contemplates the creation of a National Foundation for Preventive Medicine, and such funds as may be received either directly or indirectly by him will be devoted to that purpose. He has lost his anonymity but not his humanity and continues to recognize the importance of the voluntary cooperation of an enlightened citizenry. Both in financial

and personal terms it is essential for the prevention of those diseases which continue to take such a fearsome and unnecessary toll.

As Jonas Salk said before the tests were completed, the polio vaccine came about as a result of contributions made one upon the other and the desire of people to help themselves. It is ~~the~~ his hope that ~~the~~ a National Foundation for Preventive Medicine may contribute to the continuation of that process.

Sandburg, Carl.

714 Normal Avenue
Normal, Illinois
April 13, 1964

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
580 Park Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow,

This is not a fan letter, although I do enjoy your work on both radio and television and miss you when you are not on.

I am seeking information about Carl Sandburg and understand that he is a friend of yours. I enjoyed your interview with him and know that you must have studied a lot about him before that time for I know one does not do that kind of thing without lots of preparation.

I am preparing for college teaching, and am finishing my work now by writing a thesis on Sandburg's Humanitarianism. I am covering three aspects: the roots and growth of it, evidences of it in his life and works, and its effect on his choice of materials. A fourth section of the thesis will be a collection of paragraphs about what others say about his humanitarianism. I am contacting many of the celebrities who have worked with him and have interviewed a number of poeple here in Illinois who know him. A similar thing was done in 1952 by the Illinois Historical Society, but on a more general basis. This work included tributes by Adlai Stevenson, Fanny Butcher, Robert Sherwood, and many others. I am trying to contact mainly those people who have worked with him since 1952.

If you have any information in the way of incidents, comments he has made, or other things pertaining to his love of common people, I would appreciate hearing of them. I would like to invite you to write a paragraph for the concluding section if you would care to do so. If this work is published, I will give full credit and promise to be completely accurate in any quotes, etc.

Should you be able to help me in any way, I will really appreciate it. I know I can never thank you properly unless, perhaps, you would consider my helping future college students in a similar way a means of showing gratitude.

Very respectfully yours,

Ella Mentzer

Ella Mentzer
Graduate School
Illinois State University

replied May 13, JHBM.

Carl Sandburg

CARL SANDBURG BIRTHPLACE
331 EAST THIRD STREET

The Carl Sandburg Association

Sandburg Birthplace, Inc.
~~Galesburg, Illinois~~

224 Tulpehocken ~~Street~~
Philadelphia 44, Pa
December 26, 1959

Officers:

ADDA GEORGE, Former President
MAX GOODSILL, *Vice-President*
MARTHA ROBERTSON, *Secretary*
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Neighborhood Committee:

IRVING BENDER
WALTER DEFORD
IDA KRAHN
LUCILLE MANGIERI
DAVID VILARDO
KARL WEINBERG

Mr. Edward R Murrow
care Edward R Murrow Foundation, Inc.
580 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Murrow:

The Carl Sandburg Association thanks you wholeheartedly for your hundred-dollar gift which makes you a Patron of the Endowment Fund for the Sandburg Birthplace. And I thank you with all my heart, too. I've had to give up most of my work on this project, so I'm doubly grateful.

And had we thank you for your wonderful programs which redeem TV! (How could they have taken off See It Now?!)

Gratefully yours,
Adda George (Mrs. J. E.)

Sandburg, Carl

June 12, 1958

Dear Miss George:

Thank you for your letter telling me about the "Sandburg Fund-in-Bank-of-Galesburg".

I wish very much that I might come to Galesburg on October 6 and 7 for the Celebration but fear that the pressure of my schedule will prevent me from doing so.

I am sending Mrs. Robertson my check for $100.00 toward the caretakers' cottage.

Sincerely yours,

Miss Adda George
258 North Academy Street
Galesburg, Illinois

fc

Check for $100

no (h) 7100

The Carl Sandburg Association

Sandburg Birthplace, Inc.
Galesburg, Illinois

Dear Mr. Murrow, Please see over →



CARL SANDBURG BIRTHPLACE
331 EAST THIRD STREET

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MAX GOODSILL, *Vice-President*
MARTHA ROBERTSON, *Secretary*
ERNEST LARIMER, *Treasurer*

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Neighborhood Committee:

IRVING BENDER
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IDA KRAHN
LUCILLE MANGIERI
DAVID VILARDO
KARL WEINBERG

Cordial greetings from the Carl Sandburg Association!

You may know that the Centennial Celebration of the Lincoln-Douglas debate is to be on the Knox College campus October 7 this year. October 6 has been designated "Carl Sandburg Day". That day his home-town will especially honor Lincoln's great poet-biographer, now in his 80th year.

If you have visited Sandburg's restored three-room birthplace at 331 E. Third St., Galesburg, as have thousands of people from distant places, you know what a landmark it has become, what a storehouse of Lincoln and Sandburg treasures it is, and how important it is that it should be preserved for future generations.

And that brings us to the reason for writing you at this time. To protect and maintain the Sandburg birthplace, there should be a caretaker living nearby. Across the street, a cottage at 348 E. Third is suitable; we have an option on it. If we can buy it and furnish rent-free to Mr. and Mrs. Lauren Goff, who are interested and competent, they will serve as caretakers for many years, with no other compensation.

The price of the cottage is $8000, of which amount $1275 is already on deposit in the Bank of Galesburg in an account named "Sandburg Fund-in-Bank-of-Galesburg". Will you help us complete this fund now? Gifts of any sizes will be welcome, and the names of all donors will be recorded on the walls of the birthplace. The names of those giving $100 will be placed on a permanent panel there headed "Patrons". Please send your check made to "Sandburg Fund-in-Bank-of Galesburg" in care of Mrs. Fred Robertson, Secretary, 860 N. Cedar, Galesburg.

We hope to see you here on October 6 and 7; and we hope to hear from you soon in regard to the caretakers' cottage. By early June we hope that the cottage will be a functioning part of the Sandburg birthplace project, made possible by the generosity of people like yourself.

With great appreciation for your consideration, I am
Most sincerely yours,

Adda George

Adda George
258 N. Academy St., Galesburg

Dear Mr. Murrow,

How many times I've wanted to tell you how much your presence on radio and television have meant to me! And now I do so when asking a favor.

May we see your name on the walls of the little Sandburg birthplace ~~cot~~ in connection with this project? And/or as a Sustaining Member of the birthplace? (The latter pay 2, 5, or 10 dollars a year in January.)

Would that your life could be prolonged as long as there is radio and television!

Sincerely,

Adda George

May 19, 1958

JUDSON 6-0800

I. Jerome Riker
562 Fifth Avenue
New York 36, N.Y.

December 5, 1958

My dear Mr. Murrow:

It was nice seeing you at Rosie Netcher's dinner party. I also enjoyed meeting Mrs. Murrow and your associates, John Aaron and Jesse Zousmer and their spouses. It was a delightful evening.

Incidentally, I thought you might be interested to know that the quotation by Carl Sandburg "shrouds have no pockets" may have been written originally by John Alexander Joyce in a poem which reads as follows:

You must leave your many millions
And the gay and festive crowd;
Though you roll in royal billions,
There's no pocket in a shroud.

Carl Sandburg may have added to this famous quotation in his own inimitable and philosophical way.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

Very cordially yours,

Jerry Riker

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
580 Park Avenue
New York, New York

Carl Sandburg Association

The Carl Sandburg Association

Sandburg Birthplace, Inc.
Galesburg, Illinois

CARL SANDBURG BIRTHPLACE
331 EAST THIRD STREET

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Neighborhood Committee:

IRVING BENDER
WALTER DEFORD
IDA KRAHN
LUCILLE MANGIERI
DAVID VILARDO
KARL WEINBERG

June 18, 1958

Mr. Edward R Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York, 22, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Murrow,

Our hearty thanks for your generous gift to the Sandburg Fund in the Bank of Galesburg. It became evident before our option expired on the caretaker's cottage, that a better long-time protection for the birthplace would be an endowment fund, the interest of which would pay directly for services rendered. So with the consent of donors, the money already raised will be transferred to an account for an Endowment Fund for Sandburg Birthplace. We hope this meets your approval. We shall assume it does, unless you protest.

Our endless gratitude for your radio and TV programs. The only reason I have a TV is to see and hear you. You make life worthwhile even for a very old, old lady.

Sincerely,

Adda George (Mrs. J. E.)

SPECIAL PROGRAM
YEAR END
JANUARY 1956

Dear Ed - A great panel of faces & voices & minds you quarterbacked yesterday. A privilege & experience to have fellowship with them over the phone. You are thoughtful about me as I move this week into my 78th milestone. See you Feb:

Carl

Sandburg -

Sandburg, Carl

February 1, 1956
(Dictated January 27)

Dear Carl:

I am just off for Israel and send this note to say how sorry I am I will miss your upcoming visit.

As ever yours,

Mr. Carl Sandburg
Connemara Farm
Flat Rock, North Carolina

rh

CONNEMARA FARM
FLAT ROCK, N. C.

January 19, 1956

Dear Ed:

Couldn't make it to see you at Charlotte--bad connections from here to there. Twas a nice broadcast with John Parris. Read a news story in a weekly paper from Askov, Minnesota about your sleuthing the farm problem. We will pray that you make it on every plane you ride.

Ever yours,

Carl

Ronalds, Francis

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

Morristown National Historical Park
Morristown, New Jersey

November 1, 1955

Personal

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Ed:

I believe you will enjoy Bruce Weirick's report on Carl Sandburg's Library and I am sure you will be amused by the account of Woodfield's Inn.

Bruce's report, which I spoke to you about at the Century, is an official one to the University of Illinois. Wish I could use it for a model for Government reports.

Sincerely,

Fran Ronalds

Francis S. Ronalds

Enclosure

Dear Frances Grace:

Here is my latest & probably last venture for the University. I retire come Sept. What about that leisure? Is it going to be fun? We shall see. I will stay on in Urbana - at least next year.

Mid aug off to Va. Beach - back mid Sept. Why don't you come see us some time? We'll lots of fun.

love

Bruce

REPORT ON THE CARL SANDBURG LIBRARY

BY

LESLIE DUNLAP AND BRUCE WEIRICK

July 4, 1955

REPORT ON THE CARL SANDBURG LIBRARY
BY
LESLIE DUNLAP AND BRUCE WEIRICK

SETTINGS; IMPRESSIONS; LOCAL COLOR

Flat Rock and Hendersonville, North Carolina, are lovely adjoining resorts some twenty-five hundred feet up in the Carolina mountains. They were founded before the Civil War by wealthy Charlestonians who came there summers from South Carolina to escape malaria and typhus. Connemara Farms, where Carl has lived since 1945, is the old Memminger estate. Memminger, a very picturesque figure, was Treasurer of The Southern Confederacy; and Carl's daughter, Margaret, if her health permits, has some notion of writing his life. The place is some two hundred and fifty acres of mountain, pine, and pasture, with a lovely view from the front porch of Mt. Mitchell and its range some ten miles away on the road to Asheville. The mansion is a rambling old white house of twenty some rooms, and there are perhaps ten out-buildings for laborers and stock down the road a piece. It is about three miles up a rather rugged road from Flat Rock, and there are no neighbors nearer than town.

The house is full of easy chairs, of tables piled high in great disarray with books, magazines, and what have you. It has an indefinite number of bed rooms, a civilized amount of modern plumbing, books everywhere from cellar to garret, filing cabinets everywhere; and, as one of the Southern ladies who drove us up one morning from our Inn remarked with horror, "no curtains" at any of the hundred and some windows. One room has the goat and cattle library, of which Mrs. Sandburg is master, and everywhere else is Carl's library. And in the dining room on the east wall from the floor to the twenty foot ceiling, are a thousand volumes of Carl's literary collections; and by the south windows, looking out on a mountain of enormous pines, Carl has a reclining chair and a record player, where after lunch he lets Beethoven or Bach encourage a brief siesta; a Lincoln hat and an old slave whip on a shelf just above him.

Connemara Farms is now a goat and cattle ranch taken over by perhaps the most picturesque invader in the State's history. There are about five laborers to keep things going, including the cook and house maid, Ella. Carl calls her "Eller," and

says she came "right out of the hills." Her hill-billy sturdiness alone enables her to cope with the Sandburg menage; and the goat-herder's wife has Titian hair. At eighty-five cents a quart these laborers keep the goat's milk flowing to the market; and on demand, Hendersonville sends up a truck for a cow to process it into steaks for the Sandburg freezers, and Connemara makes money. Mrs. Sandburg and the two girls now at home know by name and disposition each of the fifty goats, and Janet can even distinguish one kid from another, a feat Margaret envies. Mrs. Sandburg, with her Phi Beta Kappa key, has a highly professional eye for disease, breeding, and births, and may be up all night with the Vet. in time of sickness or trouble in the barns.

The day after we arrived there was a Goat Show at Tryon. Mrs. Sandburg and Janet were up most of the night currying, brushing, and loading, and looking after an inconveniently sick cow; and at dawn they took off with thirty-nine goats (in the truck), and a dozen kids (in the station wagon). At sundown they returned, tired but happy, with a silver bowl for the "best udder," (best color, best shape, and best attachment fore and aft), and with an indefinite number of blue ribbons for I know not what other goatish distinctions. We visited these prize animals on a tour of the farm one afternoon, and I found myself the object of embarrassing attentions from most of them. Mrs. Sandburg surmised that it was not love, but only the dacron suit I had on that they found good nibbling. She remarked, a little late I thought, that one must be careful what one wears in the goat pasture, or one may return wearing less than he entered with. I soon disengaged myself from the goat's caresses, and was content on the other side of the pasture gate to just watch. Goat butting, seemingly an endless occupation of goats, Dunlap noted, is done in a kind of ritual, but is, Mrs. Sandburg says, "only their form of play." Yet to the uninitiated, the way they draw back, rear up, take aim and charge, looks very dangerous. We feared that even with their nubs of horns they might injure each other; but Mrs. Sandburg reassured us by remarking that a mere sledge such as is used to knock out cattle, has no visible effect on goats.

Fortunately they usually confine their buttings to their own species. Bright eyed and friendly creatures, on the whole; though the Oregonian Dunlap, confessedly

shy of all animals, admitted privately that he did not like them much. But the unpasteurized goat's milk at the Sandburg's table we drank copiously at lunch and dinner, and in spite of mid-west warnings to the contrary, found it very tasty, and, we hoped, healthy. Let it be noted that Connemara milk does get pasteurized each day down in Hendersonville, but the portion reserved for the family receives no such effete attention. We will learn about two weeks hence, I learn from Senator Douglas, who is now he hopes recovering from similar unpasteurized drinkings, whether we too are to have undulant fever.

The Sandburgs are all animal lovers. Carl "likes to have them around." It is a real farm they have at Connemara; it takes work and intelligence, and is no rich poet's toy. They got started at it because Margaret as a child wanted a cow. "Why not a goat?" said Mrs. Sandburg, "they are so much cleaner," and so goats it was. The cattle are to afford a pleasing background for Carl's evening walks, and to supply meat for the table. I could not find that the cows had names, or were like the goats, a part of the Sandburg social life. The doberman pinscher and the Siemese cat find it tough going to get much of a play among these goat fanciers, and they strove eagerly for our more domestic attentions.

We slept and breakfasted at Woodfield's Inn, a beautiful plaything of Mrs. Joe Clemens who with her Yankee husband makes some of the money to keep it going from their three Miami restaurants. Mr. C. is said to dislike the place, and sticks usually to Florida, leaving her to the follies of Flat Rock for the summer. The season was just beginning, but there were a number of charming southern ladies who took us in, and made over us delightfully. I remember Mrs. Saunders remarking, after Dunlap had taught her the Yankee game of Red Dog, that she "didn't know that college professors could be so much fun." This was during an hour's leisure after a hard day with Carl in his library, when we were in need of relaxation.

Woodfields, taken over by these Floridian Yankees, had for ten years, so Mrs. Saunders told Dunlap, a difficult time in getting "received" by the Flat Rock-Hdnersonville aristocracy. But finally, Mrs. Robert E. Lee the Third sent over her negro butler with a note to Mrs. Clemens asking if it would be convenient if she came to dinner. Undaunted, Mrs. Clemens sent her own negro in livery back with a note

expressing her pleasure at this unprecedented honor; and Woodfield's Inn was no longer "off limits." Then Carl put up Ed Murrow and his gang at Woodfields, a blow that really shook with envy some of the older and more established Inns.

But not even Murrow could get Carl himself to the Inn for dinner. So when we called up and asked "if it would be convenient" if we brought the whole Sandburg family for a Sunday night dinner, the Inn, which serves dinner only at noon on Sundays, at once decided on that day to serve two Sunday dinners! Except to go to the Little Theatre, and to play his guitar and square-dance at the Goat Herders Festival, it seems that Carl has made no public appearance in Flat Rock. He appeared at the Inn in roust-about slacks and a colorful Bing-Crosby wind-breaker, with only a tie to show that he was "fixed up." But the guests were lined up to receive him, and the courtesy and charm with which he thanked Mrs. Clemens for being so kind to Mr. Murrow would have delighted even Mrs. Robert E. Lee the Third. We had mountains of fried chicken with all the fixin's, and Carl ate with his fingers. If Mrs. Clemens needed the money, she could now remove her Duncan-Hines sign, and simply substitute "Carl Sandburg Ate Here," and raise her prices.

Dunlap suspected the ladies of the Inn of thinking Carl important chiefly because such a great man as Ed Murrow thought it worth while to spend all those thousands to make a film of him. "How do they do it?" Dunlap remarked. "They never read a book. They don't know a line of Sandburg; and how they acquire their culture and charm God knows; but God knows they have it!" We lent them my book From Whitman to Sandburg in American Poetry, and showed them some of Carl's poems; doing our professorial best to instruct them in rudimentary Sandburgiana. But we had no confidence that our instructions "took," and somehow at the Inn, it didn't seem important. In all that charm, "Chicago, hog-butcher to the world" seemed much farther away even than Connemara.

This contrast of the Old South at the foot of the mountain with the life of goats, literature, and Lincolniana at Connemara, Dunlap, who doesn't know his Southerners as I do, found fabulously diverting. He soon became torn between the two loyalties. Suffice to say, it was a rich experience. Mrs. Saunders or Mrs. Clemens drove us each morning after breakfast up the mountain in spite of that

"awful road," and I don't believe that even Ed Murrow could have been more kindly treated. We were very grateful; and I hope that these few pages of introduction will give our readers some slight notion of the mood and setting of our four days visit. But let us turn now to the report we were sent to get.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ABOUT THE LIBRARY:

The four days we spent with Carl at Connemara going over his library, letters, manuscripts, and mementos, were, as may be imagined, a somewhat stunning experience. The first two days I took some fifty pages of notes. After that we just listened, retired to our hotel at night, and tried to sum up what we had learned,--an impossible task. Here in Washington we spent a day outlining a report. Dunlap has now gone back to his family and a well earned vacation, and has left me holed in here at the Roger Smith to, he says, "put some meat on those bones."

I do not know which was the more overwhelming, the library, or the man it represents, with his running-fire comment on this or that memo, letter, manuscript, and the fifty years of America there revealed. The gloat in Dunlap's librarian's eye at such a haul of loot was pleasing to behold. Let me say at once that after the second day we have had no reservations in recommending that the University buy it. The agreed price of $30,000 is, we feel certain, very much less than its worth in the open market, perhaps a third to a fourth what it might bring. Fortunately Carl can afford the loss, and he feels, as we do, that there would be a great lessening of its value if it were broken up; and that if it is to be kept together, the University of Illinois is the place to keep it. That a poet, ballad collector, singer, and biographer should have had the patience and foresight to collect and sort so much material,--a task to daunt ten librarians--reveals another side of Carl's genius. Dunlap suggests that there must be somewhere in him a strain of the pack-rat to account for it.

Without wishing to pay ourselves any undue compliments, we felt ourselves not unintelligent in listening to Carl: Dunlap in Lincolniana, and Weirick in literature. We were rather proud of being able to "get" Carl's short-hand discussions without having to ask for too many footnotes. Four days of going along with

Carl over his Lincoln library and manuscripts without getting lost is no mean feat. Though a bit more than an amateur in the field, I got lost very early. But Dunlap, who according to Dunlap, "professes no great knowledge of Lincolniana," the University may like to hear, "kept up," and Carl told me he was delighted and surprised at his learning. I doubt that there are many who have not spent their lives in the field who could have done it. I confess it left me somewhat flabbergasted! Since the Lincoln part of Carl's library is about two-thirds of the business, perhaps this stress on the competence of our Lincoln representative will not be thought out of place; and since Dunlap is gone on vacation, I can pay him this justified tribute if I want to.

DESCRIPTION OF THE LIBRARY:

It should be said at once that we both feel that we have only a cursory idea of what is in the library. It will take years to find out. We both doubt if even Carl knows. But after four days of looking and listening, we can say this:

I. BOOKS

A. Perhaps ten thousand volumes of Lincolniana, biography, history, political philosophy, encyclopedias, files of rare and important magazines, etc.

Along with these should be mentioned countless filing cabinets full of notes, memos, collections of things dug from odd places, files of old newspapers, the results of countless hours of leg-work and digging.

Carl says, and we see no reason to doubt him, that it contains the best working Lincoln library any where to be found; with many important things not to be found in one place elsewhere.

B. Probably five thousand volumes of literature; criticism, biography, poetry, essays; many of them signed by the authors, and some of them containing comments and informal racy criticism by Carl in the margins and in the front.....a mine of material for some future biographer.

II. MANUSCRIPTS:

A. Lincoln Manuscripts.
Complete typewritten copies, with corrections and changes for the printer of:
1. The Prairie Years (2000 pp.)
2. The War Years (6000 pp.)
3. The One Volume Lincoln (1500 pp.)

B. Manuscripts of Poems:
A file of manuscripts (about two feet thick) of various versions of his poems, with revisions, corrections, etc., and probably some two or three hundred poems never published, and some of them as good as anything he has printed!

(This section alone will keep Flanagan and his students busy for years.)

NOTE: The printer's copies of the following do not exist. (Carl hadn't learned their value that early): CHICAGO POEMS; SMOKE AND STEEL; CORN HUSKERS; SLABS OF THE SUNBURNT WEST; AND THE ROOTABAGA STORIES.

IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION: Carl will make us copies in his own hand writing of some forty of his best known poems for display, on especial paper with a broad feather pen. Only a half dozen of his peems so done have been made! Comment: WHAT A DISPIAY THAT WILL MAKE!

C. The Helga Collection

Manuscripts of the following books typed for the printer have been put in possession of Carl's daughter, Helga. He offered to buy them back for $10,000; but she refused--thinking them worth $50,000--probably wrongly; but who knows? Carl thinks their lack in his library will be "regrettable, but not crucial"; as we will have all the preparatory and revisionary manuscripts on which they are based; manuscripts of much more value than the final typed copies for the printer. Those books are:

GOOD MORNING, AMERICA; THE AMERICAN SONG-BAG; THE PEOPLE, YES; EARLY MOON; REMEMBRANCE ROCK; POTATOE FACE; LINCOLN COLLECTOR; MARY LINCOLN; THE COMPLETE POEMS; ALWAYS THE YOUNG STRANGERS.

(Note: We will have about half of the poems in the above section in early and revised manuscripts; and any collector would rather have these than the final typed printer's copies--so Carl says.)

GENERAL COMMENT ON II--the above section: We get the Prairie Years and the War Years and the One-Volume Lincoln complete-Oprobably the largest manuscript in existence. We get no printer's manuscripts of the final version of his poetry; but we do get what is more valuable, the early and revised manuscripts of about half of his poems since those of the first four volumes; that is, about half of those in the Helga collection.

D. MANUSCRIPT OF A NEW SONG-BAG never printed, and about as big as the original; some of them omitted from the original for lack of space, and some of them since collected. Such a "haul" speaks for itself.

E. LETTERS: No one knows how many letters Carl has, not even Carl; but they are a collector's paradise. He has reserved in files some of the more obvious show letters: those of Lincoln and his cabinet, none, perhaps very important, but originals and rare. A good many literary letters: one from Robert Frost which I read that is a gem, and a whole biography of Frost in little; one from Billy Sunday in his own helter-skelter hand calling down God's vengeance on Carl for his poem TO A CONTEMPORARY BUNK-SHOOTER. (And by the way, Carl has the original manuscript of that poem before the publisher toned it down. THAT must be a Lu-Lu!) Letters from Lindsay, Masters, Amy Lowell, Ezra Pound (some very amusing ones from St. Elizabeth's. I fear he is mad only Nor' Nor' West). Letters from Menken in his best gaudy vein; letters from Max Eastman of the NEW MASSES vintage; letters from FDR, Hopkins, and the World War II crowd; letters from "Stevie" Benet, from Wm. Lyon Phelps; letters and unpublished poems from Eddie Guest--the poem I saw a rather charming tribute to Carl--and several groups of letters from unknowns who attached themselves to Carl over a period of years, some of them very touching and poetic, and of great value to a biographer as showing Carl in intimate and helpful relations with persons he met only casually. Letters from his publishers with the usual arguments, most of which Carl won--an especially good one about keeping the one-vol. Lincoln distillation of the six volumes of the Prairie Years and the War Years to a limit of 250 pages! One shudders to think of the catastrophe of yielding to that blandishment!

Probably that volume alone will outsell and out pay all of Carl's other works. A gold mine! And only Carl's stubborn insistence gave it birth! Some family letters (perhaps) and most revealing, but which I do not care here to describe. Letters from Ben Hecht, Harry Hansen, Harry Justin Smith, Victor Lawson, and the Chicago crowd. Needless to say, we could only skim this field; but we saw enough to realize that it is a mine of rich ore. And one amusing item: two poems by Masters and Dreiser in regular verse form waving the flag for the Spanish-American War! They are poems that they both kept rigorously out of their "published" volumes; but Carl has "rescued" them. Also letters from Hemingway; letters from Faulkner. Name them, and probably Carl can produce. And somewhere or other is evidence showing that the Republican Party's High Brass had a meeting with Carl to get him to run instead of Wilkie! Needless to say, Carl pointed out that his record was sufficiently "subversive" from a Republican point of view to make that a mere fantasy. Result: they were stuck with Wilkie. I confess that this revelation rather stunned Dunlap and me! I do not believe that the Republican Party will like to remember that episode! Letters from Stevenson--very gay and human, and in his usual finished style. A gross of material on that election, and on Carl's part in it. But enough! I note just here on re-reading Carl's one page description of his own library, that he has mentioned many letters not here included--Truman - Harriet Monroe - Eric Sevareid - Ed Murrow - Bob Sherwood - Amy Lowell - Ida Tarbell - Helen Keller - a wonderful letter! and all the Lincoln crowd. But, as I said before, ENOUGH!

F. TO GO UNDER LOCK AND KEY: Lincoln stories and remarks, some private, and some in law courts, of a Rabelaisian nature, with the sources of their authenticity. Some of these have the true Lincoln ring; and as is usual with Lincoln stories, they are told more for the anecdotal moral, than for the mere desire to be off-color. Also, a large group of Rabelaisian ballads from bar-rooms, bar-racks, and labor camps that are most revealing of the common man released from respectability. Also, unpublished poems of some of our most respectable poets on their days off. The indefatigable historian in Carl evidently drove him to preserve these--"for the record." Though I do not ordinarily "go" for such anecdotes, I confess some of the Lincoln stories are still hilarious--especially those in court. And indeed, some of the ballads show more than a touch of genius.

May I add here a personal note. Carl, too, is none too fond of such material. He once spent a week or ten days with a group of Doctors fishing. They reveled in rather jejune pornographia. Carl "took it" as a good fellow, but thought them rather naive. Be it noted, that he did not loosen up and let them have "the real stuff" from his mine of, shall we say, superior pornographia. What that proves, I leave to the reader. Perhaps that even in pornographia there is a matter of good taste. The Doctors, I happen to know, thought Carl a "good fellow" and did not sense his boredom. I suppose this just shows what a poet of "the common man" may find himself up against now and then. Though I guess it is necessary to point out that he wouldn't cringe in the presence of such goings on among the common laborer--or from an evening with Lincoln and his gang. One wonders what Robert Frost's reactions would be to such shenanigans. Probably that too is down in Carl's records--somewhere.

G. RARE AND DE LUXE EDITIONS: Some hundreds of volumes of Carl's works that can go to make up a show corner, and can be exchanged to book sellers and other libraries for items we need. A mine of gold for a shrewd librarian--like, say, Dunlap, who knows what Lincolniana is worth. I divine that several of such "deals" are already cooking in his mind.

H. UNPUBLISHED ODDS AND ENDS: Carl estimates that he has more things lying around that are unpublished than those he has published. Every book, as we all know, is a distillation from about ten times its volume. Boswell used

only a fraction of his material, and recently Yale has been digging for gold in the remains. Carl's "complete" writings are here; including not only the above, but a large number of things he has just never offered for publication. Without writing a new line, I suspect he could keep in the ring easily for ten years more. Our University Press will undoubtedly be busy publishing Sandburgiana for some time.

I. FILING CABINETS; BOXES: MANILA FOLDERS. There must be hundreds, perhaps thousands of these; and what they contain will take several years to discover. We saw enough of their contents to realize something of their worth. They are a grab bag of literary and historical treasures. There are even magnums of liquor stached away in some of them, twenty years old--though whether the University inherits this treasure, we could not quite discover. Dunlap thought Carl knew perfectly wellwhere he had stowed such liquid sunshine; but I am of the opinion that he came on them as he did on a letter of Frost or Seward, quite by accident. But seriously, these folders and cabinets are stunningly impressive. When he ever found time to collect and sort them, and also to publish all his books, sing all those ballads, and engage in all his activities, was a constant source of wonder bo both of us.

J. MEMENTOS; DIARIES; MEMORABILIA. These begin with Carl's diaries, smudged and sweaty from his hobo days in Colorado; and include cartoons, thousands of pictures, some 200 sets of stereoptican views, rare poster displays, honorary decorations, slave canes, Lincoln hats, a bloody hair from Lincoln's head saved by Lincoln's negro servant and given to Carl by the negro that "inherited" it in a fine case, a piece of Lincoln's shawl, framed, perhaps a hundred walking canes, a goat library, with prizes and pictures, (very valued possessions in the Sandburg family), gifts and decorations from Sweden, a complete file of Carl's royalties--guess how much--Spanish War reliques and records, perhaps a hundred albums of musical recordings, Bach, Beethoven, and Boogie Woogie; many recordings of unpublished ballads by Carl; three guitars--very valuable type--Lincoln coins; a Volk Lincoln in bronze; hundreds of Steichen photographs; (we lacked the time to see much of this highly valuable collection. It deserves a place of its own; but neither of us would have been photographic conscious enough to estimate its worth); a slave whip; items by Henry Ford and Charlie Chaplin; in short, a whole museum of interesting and often valuable items.

K. INTERESTING LETTERS AND THEIR ANSWERS: this includes, I would guess, about a thousand letters, separated out and placed together in a unit. We didn't have time to look at them, but Carl thinks them some of the most interesting parts of his collections. I gather there is a book in them.

L. Rare EARLY PUBLICATIONS: including IN RESTIESS ECSTASY, pamphlets on Labor Riots, college publications, etc....material Carl keeps stored in a vault at the bank.

III. PRICE CONSIDERATIONS:

There was some wavering about a proper price. Carl had first suggested $30,000. Then he had, I guess in an expansive mood over the telephone said that he thought, maybe $25,000. For a day or so he played around with "what theywere really worth"--say, one hundred thousand; and wondered what the University might think of forty or fifty thousand. We did not argue; but Dunlap pointed out that processing and housing his library was going to cost the University quite a bit; details that seemed to surprise Carl. Then the third day of our visit, he greeted us with the final offer of $30,000, and "let's forget it." He did point out that the University of Indiana bought the Oak Leaf collection for $50,000; and that it was a far inferior collection to his. With this Dunlap agreed. So, if we want it, $30,000 is the price.

I think too it should be added that Carl made no stipulations as to when he was to be paid. Our suggestion that he take it in installments, with, say, five thousand dollars to "clinch the deal" met with his approval. Both Dunlap and I had the distinct impression that he cared far more about setting up the library as a going concern, than he did about the thirty-thousand. There is no question that his love of Illinois, its past, its future, and his being in a position to tie up so many significant ideals for the future of the region he loves, is what chiefly concerns him. He is about as much interested in his "fee" as Lincoln was. I gathered that he accepted the thirty-thousand more as a sign that the University really cared, and was not accepting just loot, than as the idea of getting more money in the bank.

SUMMARY

I fear that this attempt to sum up Carl's library is growing too long. I hope I have given some notion of its monumental size and variety. With the Lincoln collection, the library of literature, the manuscripts published and unpublished, with the great volume of letters, it has impressed Dunlap and me as the best buy of its kind any library has had an opportunity to secure. It not only has the Lincoln appeal, and the Sandburg appeal, but is in itself a kind of history of America on its imaginative side for the last fifty years. Illinois has had many famous sons; but few or none who can leave us so great and so significant a monument. The catching excitement of Senator Douglas and Scotty Reston, for example, when I mentioned its possibility is I think but a foretaste of what will come if we do go ahead with the project. And it will be no mean tribute to President Morey's wisdom and foresight that he has thought fit to initiate and encourage its purchase for the University of Illinois and for the inspiration and learning of generations to come. Without his encouragement, it is probable that there would have been no such venture.

But it may be said, granted we buy it, what will we do with it? We discussed this a good deal with Carl, and came to the following conclusions:

1. A stunning SANDBURG ROOM, or WORK-SHOP LIBRARY could be arranged from all the material. The displays could be varied almost endlessly. There could be State Days for this and that program, with speakers and guided tours; an inspiration to student and scholarly visitors, and a rare opportunity for University Showmanship of something more than the usual athletic lures with which we are somewhat dubiously over blessed. Carl has many ideas for its use, and has offered freely of his time and energy in helping us to fix it up

and plan its programming. Also, I have no doubt that Steichen will lend us his good offices in decoration and display. One suggestion of Carl's was to have now and then a Lloyd Lewis corner, a Barrett corner, etc., illustrated with books, pictures, manuscripts and letters recalling their roles in American life, as a happy way to remind ourselves now and then of a greatness gone by.

The public has heard so much about this famous library, out of which came those Lincoln biographies, that for decades people will like to get acquainted with the books that produced such a monumental work. There they will be, with the 300 biographies read and reread some of them several times, on view, and available for examination. And one happy consideration about Carl's library is that he has always been content with a "true copy," and for the most part didn't think it necessary to collect "untouchable" treasures. His is therefore, not only the most complete working library on Lincoln, but the most useable. I assure my readers that the impact of such a tour will be unforgettable. Dunlap, who is used to such collections, can still hardly believe what we saw.

The LITERARY part of the room should prove almost as interesting. It will contain most of the important books of poetry, criticism, essays, and biography of the last fifty years; and it may surprise the critics, also a very complete collection of classic and traditional authors before the nineteenth century. Not only are they there, but they show signs of being read, Manuscripts and letters will from time to time go on view, as well as some thirty or forty of Carl's best known poems written out in his own hand: CHICAGO; FOG; WASHINGTON MONUMENT AT NIGHT; a gift that will be the envy of all libraries. One display of TO A CONTEMPORARY BUNKSHOOTER with Billy Sunday's angry holograph answer, for instance, should excite a lot of visitors. Such a room with its varied displays and programs will undoubtedly get and retain national interest. It will be something that everyone of

intelligence will HAVE to see. Compared with the Amy Lowell-Keats Room at Harvard, or the Harriett Monroe Room at the University of Chicago, the Sandburg Room at Illinois will be vastly more interesting, more varied, and more significant. It will be something that Illini all over the world will come to be proud of. I can not see how it should be otherwise.

2. Another very important aspect of the library will be its possibilities for research and publication. Not only will theses and articles come out of it, but I foresee many fresh programs for WILL, and any number of books for the University Press. For instance, Carl now has the material for his autobiography arranged in six sections. This we will get when Carl is finished with it--and may that be many years away! THAT is an autobiography, says Senator Douglas, that you are to tell Carl I am waiting to read; as, of course, who isn't? But once Carl has taken a shot at himself, others will want to survey the field, and the Sandburg Room is where they will have to come to do it. Dunlap, may I say, at first was dubious as to the research value of the library; but by the second day of exploration, he had gone all out in seeing the possibilities of its use. Lincoln, of course, is an endless mine for reinterpretative delving, and for that, Sandburg's library will save many steps. And what is in all those letters will call for many hours of research and discovery.

LEGAL AND OTHER PROBLEMS OF TRANSFER:

The legal arrangements for the transfer of all this material will be the traditional ones. Mrs. Sandburg and Alfred Harcourt, Carl's publisher, are designated in Carl's will as his literary executors. They will retain the publication rights. The University will own the rights of display and possession. These, I am told, are the usual arrangements, and there should be no problem as to the legal uses of the material. I should suppose that our Legal Department in conjunction with Carl, Mrs. Sandburg, and Harcourt will be able to draw up an agreement that will satisfy everyone. I know nothing about such things, but Dunlap and Carl seemed to take it for granted that there would be no hitch there. Mrs. Sandburg, who, by the

way, once spent a year as a student at Illinois, be it noted, is in enthusiastic agreement with the plans to establish Carl's library at the University.

TIME OF TRANSFER: If the deal is to go through, Carl would like to have it do so at once. He wants the books, letters, manuscripts, and mementos that he isn't apt to use, and that means almost everything, to come to Illinois as soon as possible. There is for one thing, the danger of fire. They live in the midst of a pine forest. Then, big as the Memminger house is, it isn't big enough, and books are spilling all over it, from the huge basement where a dehumidifer is not too satisfactory, to various Swedish Houses and out-buildings of the estate. Carl spoke several times of "so little time," and I gather that he wishes to clear the decks for his autobiography. Indeed, we both felt quite guilty in consuming so much of his time and energy in our instruction. Probably we are the only ones ever to receive such a privilege; and Carl remarked that much as he too had enjoyed it, under no circumstances would he ever again submit himself to such an effort. Another consideration in getting the transfer over soon is so that Carl may be around to help in its planning. And one can understand that so large a possession might finally become more of a burden than a pleasure. "Eller," who makes a stab at keeping the books dusted, will, I think I may say, feel no regrets.

METHODS AND DETAILS TO BE CONSIDERED. Dunlap has suggested that early September might be a convenient time to start packing, labelling, annotating, and shipping. That, we found, will fit Carl's schedule. Dunlap will, I suppose, be asked to superintend it, and he has expressed his willingness to do so. As he already knows his way around in the library, he will certainly be less trouble to Carl than any one we could send. He has, too, suggested that he wants me along to help with the memos of explanation needed to make clear the significance of thousands of items that we have become familiar with, and that might otherwise remain a kind of Chinese puzzle. As I am retiring in September, there seems to be no reason for refusing, and I will, if asked, be glad to do so. It will, Dunlap estimates, be about a three weeks job; but if he gets it completed in that time, I shall be surprised. I shudder a little to think of the work involved. Carl and Mrs.

Sandburg and the girls, I am glad to say, felt kindly enough toward us, to wish us a speedy return.

Bringing that library to Illinois will, of course, cost something, and Dunlap has warned me to stress the necessity of some sort of appropriation to cover it; whether five or ten thousand he couldn't say. The books will have to be wrapped, boxed, the boxes inventoried and labeled, and insured trucks hired to bring them out; Dunlap thought three or four truck loads. He has the place in the library basement already in mind where they can be stored and locked up. He discussed with Carl the possibility of housing his library in a room adjoining the Horner collection. It seems that there are two adjoining rooms on the first floor of the library that could be so used, and a single custodian could look after both--but of that more--no doubt a good deal more--later. Carl is planning to be out here in late October--Iowa (Oct. 25th, a secret); Bement, perhaps; Don Brown's High School convention (800 of them) perhaps (Oct. 22); and, if we wish, a University convocation some time about then. He will be glad to give the University people concerned whatever time they wish in going over tentative plans for setting up the room; and, of course, if we are going to buy it, we should avail ourselves of that opportunity.

CONCLUSION:

In closing this report both Dunlap and I wish to express to the University, and especially to President Morey our gratitude for the privilege of this mission. The experience has been, even more than we could have anticipated, exciting and inspiring. Carl's wit and wisdom, seeing him unroll the panorama of the years from his hobo and socialistic days up to the present, when, as Senator Douglas remarked, "Carl has been famous so long that he has become respectable," and the chameleon changes of mood that enlivened it all, left Dunlap, who hasn't known Carl as long as I have, gasping. I am afraid that the experience will make his future library conventions seem very dull.

We both came away feeling more than ever that Carl is a truly great American, an original, whose genius we should not willingly let die. The purchase of the Sandburg Library will be a great venture. But it has been greatly conceived, and should be greatly used. We both feel that it is an opportunity that it would be incredible for us to reject.

Sandburg, Carl

September 1, 1955

Dear Miss Holleman:

I am deeply in your debt for the Report on the Carl Sandburg Library. I only spent three days there, but the Report took me back again to one of the most amazing and delightful spots I have ever visited.

Again, many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

Miss Emmit C. Holleman
Secretary to Mr. Reston
The New York Times
Washington Bureau
1701 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

rh

July 27, 1955

Dear Miss Holleman:

Your letter of July 15th arrived in Mr. Murrow's absence on vacation.

This is merely a note to tell you that I do not expect Mr. Murrow back until early fall, but will be glad to bring your letter to his attention at that time.

Sincerely yours,

Florence Crissan

Miss Emmit C. Holleman,
Secretary to Mr. Reston
The New York Times
Washington Bureau
1701 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

The New York Times
WASHINGTON BUREAU
1701 K STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 15, 1955

a

Edward R. Murrow, Esq.,
Columbia Broadcasting Company,
New York N.Y.

Dear Mr. Murrow,

I enclose the attached at the request of Professor Bruce Weirick "so that he can read of his conquest at Woodfields. 'Oh, such a fine man! And that Mr. Friendly, too!'"

Yours sincerely,

Emmit C. Holleman

(Miss)Emmit C.Holleman
Secretary to Mr. Reston

REPORT ON THE CARL SANDBURG LIBRARY

BY

LESLIE DUNLAP AND BRUCE WEIRICK

July 4, 1955

REPORT ON THE CARL SANDBURG LIBRARY
BY
LESLIE DUNLAP AND BRUCE WEIRICK

SETTINGS; IMPRESSIONS; LOCAL COLOR

Flat Rock and Hendersonville, North Carolina, are lovely adjoining resorts some twenty-five hundred feet up in the Carolina mountains. They were founded before the Civil War by wealthy Charlestonians who came there summers from South Carolina to escape malaria and typhus. Connemara Farms, where Carl has lived since 1945, is the old Memminger estate. Memminger, a very picturesque figure, was Treasurer of The Southern Confederacy; and Carl's daughter, Margaret, if her health permits, has some notion of writing his life. The place is some two hundred and fifty acres of mountain, pine, and pasture, with a lovely view from the front porch of Mt. Mitchell and its range some ten miles away on the road to Asheville. The mansion is a rambling old white house of twenty some rooms, and there are perhaps ten out-buildings for laborers and stock down the road a piece. It is about three miles up a rather rugged road from Flat Rock, and there are no neighbors nearer than town.

The house is full of easy chairs, of tables piled high in great disarray with books, magazines, and what have you. It has an indefinite number of bed rooms, a civilized amount of modern plumbing, books everywhere from cellar to garret, filing cabinets everywhere; and, as one of the Southern ladies who drove us up one morning from our Inn remarked with horror, "no curtains" at any of the hundred and some windows. One room has the goat and cattle library, of which Mrs. Sandburg is master, and everywhere else is Carl's library. And in the dining room on the east wall from the floor to the twenty foot ceiling, are a thousand volumes of Carl's literary collections; and by the south windows, looking out on a mountain of enormous pines, Carl has a reclining chair and a record player, where after lunch he lets Beethoven or Bach encourage a brief siesta; a Lincoln hat and an old slave whip on a shelf just above him.

Connemara Farms is now a goat and cattle ranch taken over by perhaps the most picturesque invader in the State's history. There are about five laborers to keep things going, including the cook and house maid, Ella. Carl calls her "Eller," and

says she came "right out of the hills." Her hill-billy sturdiness alone enables her to cope with the Sandburg menage; and the goat-herder's wife has Titian hair. At eighty-five cents a quart these laborers keep the goat's milk flowing to the market; and on demand, Hendersonville sends up a truck for a cow to process it into steaks for the Sandburg freezers, and Connemara makes money. Mrs. Sandburg and the two girls now at home know by name and disposition each of the fifty goats, and Janet can even distinguish one kid from another, a feat Margaret envies. Mrs. Sandburg, with her Phi Beta Kappa key, has a highly professional eye for disease, breeding, and births, and may be up all night with the Vet. in time of sickness or trouble in the barns.

The day after we arrived there was a Goat Show at Tryon. Mrs. Sandburg and Janet were up most of the night currying, brushing, and loading, and looking after an inconveniently sick cow; and at dawn they took off with thirty-nine goats (in the truck), and a dozen kids (in the station wagon). At sundown they returned, tired but happy, with a silver bowl for the "best udder," (best color, best shape, and best attachment fore and aft), and with an indefinite number of blue ribbons for I know not what other goatish distinctions. We visited these prize animals on a tour of the farm one afternoon, and I found myself the object of embarrassing attentions from most of them. Mrs. Sandburg surmised that it was not love, but only the dacron suit I had on that they found good nibbling. She remarked, a little late I thought, that one must be careful what one wears in the goat pasture, or one may return wearing less than he entered with. I soon disengaged myself from the goat's caresses, and was content on the other side of the pasture gate to just watch. Goat butting, seemingly an endless occupation of goats, Dunlap noted, is done in a kind of ritual, but is, Mrs. Sandburg says, "only their form of play." Yet to the uninitiated, the way they draw back, rear up, take aim and charge, looks very dangerous. We feared that even with their nubs of horns they might injure each other; but Mrs. Sandburg reassured us by remarking that a mere sledge such as is used to knock out cattle, has no visible effect on goats.

Fortunately they usually confine their buttings to their own species. Bright eyed and friendly creatures, on the whole; though the Oregonian Dunlap, confessedly

shy of all animals, admitted privately that he did not like them much. But the unpasteurized goat's milk at the Sandburg's table we drank copiously at lunch and dinner, and in spite of mid-west warnings to the contrary, found it very tasty, and, we hoped, healthy. Let it be noted that Connemara milk does get pasteurized each day down in Hendersonville, but the portion reserved for the family receives no such effete attention. We will learn about two weeks hence, I learn from Senator Douglas, who is now he hopes recovering from similar unpasteurized drinkings, whether we too are to have undulant fever.

The Sandburgs are all animal lovers. Carl "likes to have them around." It is a real farm they have at Connemara; it takes work and intelligence, and is no rich poet's toy. They got started at it because Margaret as a child wanted a cow. "Why not a goat?" said Mrs. Sandburg, "they are so much cleaner," and so goats it was. The cattle are to afford a pleasing background for Carl's evening walks, and to supply meat for the table. I could not find that the cows had names, or were like the goats, a part of the Sandburg social life. The doberman pinscher and the Siemese cat find it tough going to get much of a play among these goat fanciers, and they strove eagerly for our more domestic attentions.

We slept and breakfasted at Woodfield's Inn, a beautiful plaything of Mrs. Joe Clemens who with her Yankee husband makes some of the money to keep it going from their three Miami restaurants. Mr. C. is said to dislike the place, and sticks usually to Florida, leaving her to the follies of Flat Rock for the summer. The season was just beginning, but there were a number of charming southern ladies who took us in, and made over us delightfully. I remember Mrs. Saunders remarking, after Dunlap had taught her the Yankee game of Red Dog, that she "didn't know that college professors could be so much fun." This was during an hour's leisure after a hard day with Carl in his library, when we were in need of relaxation.

Woodfields, taken over by these Floridian Yankees, had for ten years, so Mrs. Saunders told Dunlap, a difficult time in getting "received" by the Flat Rock-Hdnersonville aristocracy. But finally, Mrs. Robert E. Lee the Third sent over her negro butler with a note to Mrs. Clemens asking if it would be convenient if she came to dinner. Undaunted, Mrs. Clemens sent her own negro in livery back with a note

expressing her pleasure at this unprecedented honor; and Woodfield's Inn was no longer "off limits." Then Carl put up Ed Murrow and his gang at Woodfields, a blow that really shook with envy some of the older and more established Inns.

But not even Murrow could get Carl himself to the Inn for dinner. So when we called up and asked "if it would be convenient" if we brought the whole Sandburg family for a Sunday night dinner, the Inn, which serves dinner only at noon on Sundays, at once decided on that day to serve two Sunday dinners! Except to go to the Little Theatre, and to play his guitar and square-dance at the Goat Herders Festival, it seems that Carl has made no public appearance in Flat Rock. He appeared at the Inn in roust-about slacks and a colorful Bing-Crosby wind-breaker, with only a tie to show that he was "fixed up." But the guests were lined up to receive him, and the courtesy and charm with which he thanked Mrs. Clemens for being so kind to Mr. Murrow would have delighted even Mrs. Robert E. Lee the Third. We had mountains of fried chicken with all the fixin's, and Carl ate with his fingers. If Mrs. Clemens needed the money, she could now remove her Duncan-Hines sign, and simply substitute "Carl Sandburg Ate Here," and raise her prices.

Dunlap suspected the ladies of the Inn of thinking Carl important chiefly because such a great man as Ed Murrow thought it worth while to spend all those thousands to make a film of him. "How do they do it?" Dunlap remarked. "They never read a book. They don't know a line of Sandburg; and how they acquire their culture and charm God knows; but God knows they have it!" We lent them my book From Whitman to Sandburg in American Poetry, and showed them some of Carl's poems; doing our professorial best to instruct them in rudimentary Sandburgiana. But we had no confidence that our instructions "took," and somehow at the Inn, it didn't seem important. In all that charm, "Chicago, hog-butcher to the world" seemed much farther away even than Connemara.

This contrast of the Old South at the foot of the mountain with the life of goats, literature, and Lincolniana at Connemara, Dunlap, who doesn't know his Southerners as I do, found fabulously diverting. He soon became torn between the two loyalties. Suffice to say, it was a rich experience. Mrs. Saunders or Mrs. Clemens drove us each morning after breakfast up the mountain in spite of that

"awful road," and I don't believe that even Ed Murrow could have been more kindly treated. We were very grateful; and I hope that these few pages of introduction will give our readers some slight notion of the mood and setting of our four days visit. But let us turn now to the report we were sent to get.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ABOUT THE LIBRARY:

The four days we spent with Carl at Connemara going over his library, letters, manuscripts, and mementos, were, as may be imagined, a somewhat stunning experience. The first two days I took some fifty pages of notes. After that we just listened, retired to our hotel at night, and tried to sum up what we had learned,--an impossible task. Here in Washington we spent a day outlining a report. Dunlap has now gone back to his family and a well earned vacation, and has left me holed in here at the Roger Smith to, he says, "put some meat on those bones."

I do not know which was the more overwhelming, the library, or the man it represents, with his running-fire comment on this or that memo, letter, manuscript, and the fifty years of America there revealed. The gloat in Dunlap's librarian's eye at such a haul of loot was pleasing to behold. Let me say at once that after the second day we have had no reservations in recommending that the University buy it. The agreed price of $30,000 is, we feel certain, very much less than its worth in the open market, perhaps a third to a fourth what it might bring. Fortunately Carl can afford the loss, and he feels, as we do, that there would be a great lessening of its value if it were broken up; and that if it is to be kept together, the University of Illinois is the place to keep it. That a poet, ballad collector, singer, and biographer should have had the patience and foresight to collect and sort so much material,--a task to daunt ten librarians--reveals another side of Carl's genius. Dunlap suggests that there must be somewhere in him a strain of the pack-rat to account for it.

Without wishing to pay ourselves any undue compliments, we felt ourselves not unintelligent in listening to Carl: Dunlap in Lincolniana, and Weirick in literature. We were rather proud of being able to "get" Carl's short-hand discussions without having to ask for too many footnotes. Four days of going along with

Carl over his Lincoln library and manuscripts without getting lost is no mean feat. Though a bit more than an amateur in the field, I got lost very early. But Dunlap, who according to Dunlap, "professes no great knowledge of Lincolniana," the University may like to hear, "kept up," and Carl told me he was delighted and surprised at his learning. I doubt that there are many who have not spent their lives in the field who could have done it. I confess it left me somewhat flabbergasted! Since the Lincoln part of Carl's library is about two-thirds of the business, perhaps this stress on the competence of our Lincoln representative will not be thought out of place; and since Dunlap is gone on vacation, I can pay him this justified tribute if I want to.

DESCRIPTION OF THE LIBRARY:

It should be said at once that we both feel that we have only a cursory idea of what is in the library. It will take years to find out. We both doubt if even Carl knows. But after four days of looking and listening, we can say this:

I. BOOKS

A. Perhaps ten thousand volumes of Lincolniana, biography, history, political philosophy, encyclopedias, files of rare and important magazines, etc.

Along with these should be mentioned countless filing cabinets full of notes, memos, collections of things dug from odd places, files of old newspapers, the results of countless hours of leg-work and digging.

Carl says, and we see no reason to doubt him, that it contains the best working Lincoln library any where to be found; with many important things not to be found in one place elsewhere.

B. Probably five thousand volumes of literature; criticism, biography, poetry, essays; many of them signed by the authors, and some of them containing comments and informal racy criticism by Carl in the margins and in the front.....a mine of material for some future biographer.

II.MANUSCRIPTS:

A. Lincoln Manuscripts.
Complete typewritten copies, with corrections and changes for the printer of:
1. The Prairie Years (2000 pp.)
2. The War Years (6000 pp.)
3. The One Volume Lincoln (1500 pp.)

B. Manuscripts of Poems:
A file of manuscripts (about two feet thick) of various versions of his poems, with revisions, corrections, etc., and probably some two or three hundred poems never published, and some of them as good as anything he has printed!

(This section alone will keep Flanagan and his students busy for years.)

NOTE: The printer's copies of the following do not exist. (Carl hadn't learned their value that early): CHICAGO POEMS; SMOKE AND STEEL; CORN HUSKERS; SLABS OF THE SUNBURNT WEST; AND THE ROOTABAGA STORIES.

IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION: Carl will make us copies in his own hand writing of some forty of his best known poems for display, on especial paper with a broad feather pen. Only a half dozen of his peems so done have been made! Comment: WHAT A DISPLAY THAT WILL MAKE!

C. The Helga Collection

Manuscripts of the following books typed for the printer have been put in possession of Carl's daughter, Helga. He offered to buy them back for $10,000; but she refused--thinking them worth $50,000--probably wrongly; but who knows? Carl thinks their lack in his library will be "regrettable, but not crucial"; as we will have all the preparatory and revisionary manuscripts on which they are based; manuscripts of much more value than the final typed copies for the printer. Those books are:

GOOD MORNING, AMERICA; THE AMERICAN SONG-BAG; THE PEOPLE, YES; EARLY MOON; REMEMBRANCE ROCK; POTATOE FACE; LINCOLN COLLECTOR; MARY LINCOLN; THE COMPLETE POEMS; ALWAYS THE YOUNG STRANGERS.

(Note: We will have about half of the poems in the above section in early and revised manuscripts; and any collector would rather have these than the final typed printer's copies--so Carl says.)

GENERAL COMMENT ON II--the above section: We get the Prairie Years and the War Years and the One-Volume Lincoln complete-Oprobably the largest manuscript in existence. We get no printer's manuscripts of the final version of his poetry; but we do get what is more valuable, the early and revised manuscripts of about half of his poems since those of the first four volumes; that is, about half of those in the Helga collection.

D. MANUSCRIPT OF A NEW SONG-BAG never printed, and about as big as the original; some of them omitted from the original for lack of space, and some of them since collected. Such a "haul" speaks for itself.

E. LETTERS: No one knows how many letters Carl has, not even Carl; but they are a collector's paradise. He has reserved in files some of the more obvious show letters: those of Lincoln and his cabinet, none, perhaps very important, but originals and rare. A good many literary letters: one from Robert Frost which I read that is a gem, and a whole biography of Frost in little; one from Billy Sunday in his own helter-skelter hand calling down God's vengeance on Carl for his poem TO A CONTEMPORARY BUNK-SHOOTER. (And by the way, Carl has the original manuscript of that poem before the publisher toned it down. THAT must be a Lu-Lu!) Letters from Lindsay, Masters, Amy Lowell, Ezra Pound (some very amusing ones from St. Elizabeth's. I fear he is mad only Nor' Nor' West). Letters from Menken in his best gaudy vein; letters from Max Eastman of the NEW MASSES vintage; letters from FDR, Hopkins, and the World War II crowd; letters from "Stevie" Benet, from Wm. Lyon Phelps; letters and unpublished poems from Eddie Guest--the poem I saw a rather charming tribute to Carl--and several groups of letters from unknowns who attached themselves to Carl over a period of years, some of them very touching and poetic, and of great value to a biographer as showing Carl in intimate and helpful relations with persons he met only casually. Letters from his publishers with the usual arguments, most of which Carl won--an especially good one about keeping the one-vol. Lincoln distillation of the six volumes of the Prairie Years and the War Years to a limit of 250 pages! One shudders to think of the catastrophy of yielding to that blandishment!

Probably that volume alone will outsell and out pay all of Carl's other works. A gold mine! And only Carl's stubborn insistence gave it birth! Some family letters (perhaps) and most revealing, but which I do not care here to describe. Letters from Ben Hecht, Harry Hansen, Harry Justin Smith, Victor Lawson, and the Chicago crowd. Needless tc say, we could only skim this field; but we saw enough to realize that it is a mine of rich ore. And one amusing item: two poems by Masters and Dreiser in regular verse form waving the flag for the Spanish-American War! They are poems that they both kept rigorously out of their "published" volumes; but Carl has "rescued" them. Also letters from Hemingway; letters from Faulkner. Name them, and probably Carl can produce. And somewhere or other is evidence showing that the Republican Party's High Brass had a meeting with Carl to get him to run instead of Wilkie! Needless to say, Carl pointed out that his record was sufficiently "subversive" from a Republican point of view to make that a mere fantasy. Result: they were stuck with Wilkie. I confess that this revelation rather stunned Dunlap and me! I do not believe that the Republican Party will like to remember that episode! Letters from Stevenson--very gay and human, and in his usual finished style. A gross of material on that election, and on Carl's part in it. But enough! I note just here on re-reading Carl's one page description of his own library, that he has mentioned many letters not here included--Truman - Harriet Monroe - Eric Sevareid - Ed Murrow - Bob Sherwood - Amy Lowell - Ida Tarbell - Helen Keller - a wonderful letter! and all the Lincoln crowd. But, as I said before, ENOUGH!

F. TO GO UNDER LOCK AND KEY: Lincoln stories and remarks, some private, and some in law courts, of a Rabelaisian nature, with the sources of their authenticity. Some of these have the true Lincoln ring; and as is usual with Lincoln stories, they are told more for the anecdotal moral, than for the mere desire to be off-color. Also, a large group of Rabelaisian ballads from bar-rooms, bar-racks, and labor camps that are most revealing of the common man released from respectability. Also, unpublished poems of some of our most respectable poets on their days off. The indefatigable historian in Carl evidently drove him to preserve these--"for the record." Though I do not ordinarily "go" for such anecdotes, I confess some of the Lincoln stories are still hilarious--especially those in court. And indeed, some of the ballads show more than a touch of genius.

May I add here a personal note. Carl, too, is none too fond of such material. He once spent a week or ten days with a group of Doctors fishing. They reveled in rather jejune pornographia. Carl "took it" as a good fellow, but thought them rather naive. Be it noted, that he did not loosen up and let them have "the real stuff" from his mine of, shall we say, superior pornographia. What that proves, I leave to the reader. Perhaps that even in pornographia there is a matter of good taste. The Doctors, I happen to know, thought Carl a "good fellow" and did not sense his boredom. I suppose this just shows what a poet of "the common man" may find himself up against now and then. Though I guess it is necessary to point out that he wouldn't cringe in the presence of such goings on among the common laborer--or from an evening with Lincoln and his gang. One wonders what Robert Frost's reactions would be to such shenanigans. Probably that too is down in Carl's records--somewhere.

G. RARE AND DE LUXE EDITIONS: Some hundreds of volumes of Carl's works that can go to make up a show corner, and can be exchanged to book sellers and other libraries for items we need. A mine of gold for a shrewd librarian--like, say, Dunlap, who knows what Lincolniana is worth. I divine that several of such "deals" are already cooking in his mind.

H. UNPUBLISHED ODDS AND ENDS: Carl estimates that he has more things lying around that are unpublished than those he has published. Every book, as we all know, is a distillation from about ten times its volume. Boswell used

only a fraction of his material, and recently Yale has been digging for gold in the remains. Carl's "complete" writings are here; including not only the above, but a large number of things he has just never offered for publication. Without writing a new line, I suspect he could keep in the ring easily for ten years more. Our University Press will undoubtedly be busy publishing Sandburgiana for some time.

I. FILING CABINETS; BOXES: MANILA FOLDERS. There must be hundreds, perhaps thousands of these; and what they contain will take several years to discover. We saw enough of their contents to realize something of their worth. They are a grab bag of literary and historical treasures. There are even magnums of liquor stached away in some of them, twenty years old--though whether the University inherits this treasure, we could not quite discover. Dunlap thought Carl knew perfectly wellwhere he had stowed such liquid sunshine; but I am of the opinion that he came on them as he did on a letter of Frost or Seward, quite by accident. But seriously, these folders and cabinets are stunningly impressive. When he ever found time to collect and sort them, and also to publish all his books, sing all those ballads, and engage in all his activities, was a constant source of wonder bo both of us.

J. MEMENTOS; DIARIES; MEMORABILIA. These begin with Carl's diaries, smudged and sweaty from his hobo days in Colorado; and include cartoons, thousands of pictures, some 200 sets of stereoptican views, rare poster displays, honorary decorations, slave canes, Lincoln hats, a bloody hair from Lincoln's head saved by Lincoln's negro servant and given to Carl by the negro that "inherited" it in a fine case, a piece of Lincoln's shawl, framed, perhaps a hundred walking canes, a goat library, with prizes and pictures, (very valued possessions in the Sandburg family), gifts and decorations from Sweden, a complete file of Carl's royalties--guess how much--Spanish War reliques and records, perhaps a hundred albums of musical recordings, Bach, Beethoven, and Boogie Woogie; many recordings of unpublished ballads by Carl; three guitars--very valuable type--Lincoln coins; a Volk Lincoln in bronze; hundreds of Steichen photographs; (we lacked the time to see much of this highly valuable collection. It deserves a place of its own; but neither of us would have been photographic conscious enough to estimate its worth); a slave whip; items by Henry Ford and Charlie Chaplin; in short, a whole museum of interesting and often valuable items.

K. INTERESTING LETTERS AND THEIR ANSWERS: this includes, I would guess, about a thousand letters, separated out and placed together in a unit. We didn't have time to look at them, but Carl thinks them some of the most interesting parts of his collections. I gather there is a book in them.

L. Rare EARLY PUBLICATIONS: including IN RESTIESS ECSTASY, pamphlets on Labor Riots, college publications, etc....material Carl keeps stored in a vault at the bank.

III. PRICE CONSIDERATIONS:

There was some wavering about a proper price. Carl had first suggested $30,000. Then he had, I guess in an expansive mood over the telephone said that he thought, maybe $25,000. For a day or so he played around with "what theywere really worth"--say, one hundred thousand; and wondered what the University might think of forty or fifty thousand. We did not argue; but Dunlap pointed out that processing and housing his library was going to cost the University quite a bit; details that seemed to surprise Carl. Then the third day of our visit, he greeted us with the final offer of $30,000, and "let's forget it." He did point out that the University of Indiana bought the Oak Leaf collection for $50,000; and that it was a far inferior collection to his. With this Dunlap agreed. So, if we want it, $30,000 is the price.

I think too it should be added that Carl made no stipulations as to when he was to be paid. Our suggestion that he take it in installments, with, say, five thousand dollars to "clinch the deal" met with his approval. Both Dunlap and I had the distinct impression that he cared far more about setting up the library as a going concern, than he did about the thirty-thousand. There is no question that his love of Illinois, its past, its future, and his being in a position to tie up so many significant ideals for the future of the region he loves, is what chiefly concerns him. He is about as much interested in his "fee" as Lincoln was. I gathered that he accepted the thirty-thousand more as a sign that the University really cared, and was not accepting just loot, than as the idea of getting more money in the bank.

SUMMARY

I fear that this attempt to sum up Carl's library is growing too long. I hope I have given some notion of its monumental size and variety. With the Lincoln collection, the library of literature, the manuscripts published and unpublished, with the great volume of letters, it has impressed Dunlap and me as the best buy of its kind any library has had an opportunity to secure. It not only has the Lincoln appeal, and the Sandburg appeal, but is in itself a kind of history of America on its imaginative side for the last fifty years. Illinois has had many famous sons; but few or none who can leave us so great and so significant a monument. The catching excitement of Senator Douglas and Scotty Reston, for example, when I mentioned its possibility is I think but a foretaste of what will come if we do go ahead with the project. And it will be no mean tribute to President Morey's wisdom and foresight that he has thought fit to initiate and encourage its purchase for the University of Illinois and for the inspiration and learning of generations to come. Without his encouragement, it is probable that there would have been no such venture.

But it may be said, granted we buy it, what will we do with it? We discussed this a good deal with Carl, and came to the following conclusions:

1. A stunning SANDBURG ROOM, or WORK-SHOP LIBRARY could be arranged from all the material. The displays could be varied almost endlessly. There could be State Days for this and that program, with speakers and guided tours; an inspiration to student and scholarly visitors, and a rare opportunity for University Showmanship of something more than the usual athletic lures with which we are somewhat dubiously over blessed. Carl has many ideas for its use, and has offered freely of his time and energy in helping us to fix it up

and plan its programming. Also, I have no doubt that Steichen will lend us his good offices in decoration and display. One suggestion of Carl's was to have now and then a Lloyd Lewis corner, a Barrett corner, etc., illustrated with books, pictures, manuscripts and letters recalling their roles in American life, as a happy way to remind ourselves now and then of a greatness gone by.

The public has heard so much about this famous library, out of which came those Lincoln biographies, that for decades people will like to get acquainted with the books that produced such a monumental work. There they will be, with the 300 biographies read and reread some of them several times, on view, and available for examination. And one happy consideration about Carl's library is that he has always been content with a "true copy," and for the most part didn't think it necessary to collect "untouchable" treasures. His is therefore, not only the most complete working library on Lincoln, but the most useable. I assure my readers that the impact of such a tour will be unforgettable. Dunlap, who is used to such collections, can still hardly believe what we saw.

The LITERARY part of the room should prove almost as interesting. It will contain most of the important books of poetry, criticism, essays, and biography of the last fifty years; and it may surprise the critics, also a very complete collection of classic and traditional authors before the nineteenth century. Not only are they there, but they show signs of being read, Manuscripts and letters will from time to time go on view, as well as some thirty or forty of Carl's best known poems written out in his own hand: CHICAGO; FOG; WASHINGTON MONUMENT AT NIGHT; a gift that will be the envy of all libraries. One display of TO A CONTEMPORARY BUNKSHOOTER with Billy Sunday's angry holograph answer, for instance, should excite a lot of visitors. Such a room with its varied displays and programs will undoubtedly get and retain national interest. It will be something that everyone of

intelligence will HAVE to see. Compared with the Amy Lowell-Keats Room at Harvard, or the Harriett Monroe Room at the University of Chicago, the Sandburg Room at Illinois will be vastly more interesting, more varied, and more significant. It will be something that Illini all over the world will come to be proud of. I can not see how it should be otherwise.

2. Another very important aspect of the library will be its possibilities for research and publication. Not only will theses and articles come out of it, but I foresee many fresh programs for WILL, and any number of books for the University Press. For instance, Carl now has the material for his autobiography arranged in six sections. This we will get when Carl is finished with it--and may that be many years away! THAT is an autobiography, says Senator Douglas, that you are to tell Carl I am waiting to read; as, of course, who isn't? But once Carl has taken a shot at himself, others will want to survey the field, and the Sandburg Room is where they will have to come to do it. Dunlap, may I say, at first was dubious as to the research value of the library; but by the second day of exploration, he had gone all out in seeing the possibilities of its use. Lincoln, of course, is an endless mine for reinterpretative delving, and for that, Sandburg's library will save many steps. And what is in all those letters will call for many hours of research and discovery.

LEGAL AND OTHER PROBLEMS OF TRANSFER:

The legal arrangements for the transfer of all this material will be the traditional ones. Mrs. Sandburg and Alfred Harcourt, Carl's publisher, are designated in Carl's will as his literary executors. They will retain the publication rights. The University will own the rights of display and possession. These, I am told, are the usual arrangements, and there should be no problem as to the legal uses of the material. I should suppose that our Legal Department in conjunction with Carl, Mrs. Sandburg, and Harcourt will be able to draw up an agreement that will satisfy everyone. I know nothing about such things, but Dunlap and Carl seemed to take it for granted that there would be no hitch there. Mrs. Sandburg, who, by the

way, once spent a year as a student at Illinois, be it noted, is in enthusiastic agreement with the plans to establish Carl's library at the University.

TIME OF TRANSFER: If the deal is to go through, Carl would like to have it do so at once. He wants the books, letters, manuscripts, and mementos that he isn't apt to use, and that means almost everything, to come to Illinois as soon as possible. There is for one thing, the danger of fire. They live in the midst of a pine forest. Then, big as the Memminger house is, it isn't big enough, and books are spilling all over it, from the huge basement where a dehumidifer is not too satisfactory, to various Swedish Houses and out-buildings of the estate. Carl spoke several times of "so little time," and I gather that he wishes to clear the decks for his autobiography. Indeed, we both felt quite guilty in consuming so much of his time and energy in our instruction. Probably we are the only ones ever to receive such a privilege; and Carl remarked that much as he too had enjoyed it, under no circumstances would he ever again submit himself to such an effort. Another consideration in getting the transfer over soon is so that Carl may be around to help in its planning. And one can understand that so large a possession might finally become more of a burden than a pleasure. "Eller," who makes a stab at keeping the books dusted, will, I think I may say, feel no regrets.

METHODS AND DETAILS TO BE CONSIDERED. Dunlap has suggested that early September might be a convenient time to start packing, labelling, annotating, and shipping. That, we found, will fit Carl's schedule. Dunlap will, I suppose, be asked to superintend it, and he has expressed his willingness to do so. As he already knows his way around in the library, he will certainly be less trouble to Carl than any one we could send. He has, too, suggested that he wants me along to help with the memos of explanation needed to make clear the significance of thousands of items that we have become familiar with, and that might otherwise remain a kind of Chinese puzzle. As I am retiring in September, there seems to be no reason for refusing, and I will, if asked, be glad to do so. It will, Dunlap estimates, be about a three weeks job; but if he gets it completed in that time, I shall be surprised. I shudder a little to think of the work involved. Carl and Mrs.

Sandburg and the girls, I am glad to say, felt kindly enough toward us, to wish us a speedy return.

Bringing that library to Illinois will, of course, cost something, and Dunlap has warned me to stress the necessity of some sort of appropriation to cover it; whether five or ten thousand he couldn't say. The books will have to be wrapped, boxed, the boxes inventoried and labeled, and insured trucks hired to bring them out; Dunlap thought three or four truck loads. He has the place in the library basement already in mind where they can be stored and locked up. He discussed with Carl the possibility of housing his library in a room adjoining the Horner collection. It seems that there are two adjoining rooms on the first floor of the library that could be so used, and a single custodian could look after both--but of that more--no doubt a good deal more--later. Carl is planning to be out here in late October--Iowa (Oct. 25th, a secret); Bement, perhaps; Don Brown's High School convention (800 of them) perhaps (Oct. 22); and, if we wish, a University convocation some time about then. He will be glad to give the University people concerned whatever time they wish in going over tentative plans for setting up the room; and, of course, if we are going to buy it, we should avail ourselves of that opportunity.

CONCLUSION:

In closing this report both Dunlap and I wish to express to the University, and especially to President Morey our gratitude for the privilege of this mission. The experience has been, even more than we could have anticipated, exciting and inspiring. Carl's wit and wisdom, seeing him unroll the panorama of the years from his hobo and socialistic days up to the present, when, as Senator Douglas remarked, "Carl has been famous so long that he has become respectable," and the chameleon changes of mood that enlivened it all, left Dunlap, who hasn't known Carl as long as I have, gasping. I am afraid that the experience will make his future library conventions seem very dull.

We both came away feeling more than ever that Carl is a truly great American, an original, whose genius we should not willingly let die. The purchase of the Sandburg Library will be a great venture. But it has been greatly conceived, and should be greatly used. We both feel that it is an opportunity that it would be incredible for us to reject.

Sandburg, Carl

June 3, 1955

Dear Carl:

We both know there is a vast chasm between Corporate and personal loyalty. I would be incapable regarding anything you said or wrote about television or radio as being in any way derogatory to myself. I am against silence, particularly silence by Sandburg.

Being just back from London I can contribute to you only one phrase which impinges a little upon radio. That ancient and venerable phrase-maker, Sir Winston Churchill in talking about a "female" who was permitted to broadcast doubting the existence of God informed me that he had informed the responsible officials at BBC that they were probably filled with a sense of well being and would have "given the same time to Jesus as to Judas."

I hope to bask in the sunshine of your countenance soon.

As ever yours,

Mr. Carl Sandburg
Connemara Farms
Flat Rock
North Carolina

rh

CONNEMARA FARMS
FLAT ROCK, N. C.

May 20, 1955

Dear Ed:

Often in my life, you should know, I have done foolish things with no bitterness about them. But when there is a color of treachery and betrayal in a foolish action of mine, I am in no health about it. When I wrote the F. C. C. a letter I was foolish enough (and why I can't fathom) to think it would be one more of many reposing in their files . My cue, if only out of loyalty to you, was silence. But a mood was on me about TV, from the only three stations we can receive here, and their steady deterioration from low standards to begin with. For a short time we did get Person-To-Person, Eric Sevareid, Chronoscope, Doug Edwards, to name a few that we like and want, but these are out, not shown, for a year and a half. In substitution has come a series of local shows or "features" with local advertising. I can name only three features of each week that we never fail to see: See-It-Now, You Bet Your Life, Ford Omnibus, if and when...Of course, I know that TV toll can lead to plenty of experiments and disasters. Meantime we feel helpless here about the many excellent things on a marvellous medium that we can't get. Also meantime, in the toll controversy my cue is complete silence though in the commencement address at the University of North Carolina June 6 I shall make more than passing reference to you and Fred. Also meantime, I expect on occasion to do foolish things with a low minimum of bitter aftermath.

Carl

Lochlair, Wriston

The Charlotte Observer

"THE FOREMOST NEWSPAPER OF THE CAROLINAS"

Charlotte, N. C.

March 29, 1955

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I was up at Flat Rock Thursday to pick up Mr. Sandburg for a lecture at Davidson College, about 20 miles from Charlotte.

One of the first things Mrs. Sandburg showed me was the recent note and picture from you, of Mr. Carl as President Eisenhower! He had gotten a good laugh from it.

And he had very warm words of admiration for you. He said, among other things, that you were working for the only network with a soul, and that, year in and year out, your broadcasts were the most stimulating in radio. He raised hell with the local CBS affiliate, WBTV, for not getting your "Person-to-Person" show!

I was able to get an exceptional story from Sandburg, for he was in a frame of mind to talk and to be sociable. I thought you might like to glace at a few paragraphs of it, and I took the liberty of quoting from your letter about the picture caption.

The Charlotte Observer

"THE FOREMOST NEWSPAPER OF THE CAROLINAS"

Charlotte, N. C.

I would like to say, too, that I admire so much your approach to the news and your evaluation of it.

It would seem a slight chance that you'd remember me, but you granted me a 15-minute interview in your office--about 5 p.m.--two years ago. We hope you'll be able to visit down this way sometime in the future. I believe you did stop long enough to change planes, after you did the Flat Rock interview with Sandburg.

Sincerely,
Wriston Locklair
Wriston Locklair
Book Editor



CARL SANDBURG . . . Arrives At Davidson

SANDBURG TALKS AND TALKS

Four Hours With A Poet

By WRISTON LOCKLAIR
Observer Staff Writer

Carl Sandburg usually gets up about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Yesterday, at his goat farm near Flat Rock, he got up at 1 o'clock to ride down to Davidson College—140 miles away — for a lecture.

About 1:30 o'clock, he stuck his head out a third-floor window and called: "You fellows from Davidson? Be down in 10 or 15 minutes. Just shaving."

The "fellows" were Donald Plott, chairman of the Davidson Artist Series, and Shaw Smith, director of the Davidson Student Union. They had gone up to drive him to the campus.

Earlier, the visitors had been cordially greeted by Mrs. Sandburg, by a daughter, Janet, and by a servant-cook, Ella Blackwell. "I been working for 'em since they come 10 years ago," Ella said. "When they first come, they stayed at Morley's Tourist Camp. I worked there 'til Miz. Morley dropped dead. The Sandburgs' nice people to work for."

THOUSANDS OF BOOKS

There were books everywhere—by the thousands. Every room in the large house looks like a library. There were pictures of famous men and women, awards and tributes to the celebrated Pulitzer Prize winner and Lincoln historian.

And letters. Edward R. Murrow enclosed a newspaper photo of Sandburg which, somehow, appeared with President Eisenhower's name underneath. "This from your underpaid press agent. I still hope to get you listed as Pope," Murrow quipped.

A member of the "Wordweavers" in Oregon sent the following letter: "I want to give a program on successful poets and to what they attribute their inspiration. If you could put into words, I would appreciate so much your opinion on from where you think your inspiration comes.

"Do you attribute your success in being able to express poetically to education, training, experience, technique, people, travel, nature, inate talent, the Infinite God, or what?"

Magazines and newspapers, including Variety, are in stacks. Many of the books are personally inscribed. On the fly leaf of "The Grapes of Wrath," John Steinbeck has written: "This book is one bound specially at the request of John Steinbeck for presentation to Carl Sandburg in memory of a good day and a bad horseshoe game. Received payment, 15 cents.

GOAT FARM TOUR

Guests are always taken on a tour of the goat farm. Goats are all over the house. There were a dozen or more in the basement. There is also a chicken house in the basement. It is probably the only chicken house in the world with four oil paintings on its walls. They were done by a Sandburg daughter.

The Sandburgs have 60 goats milking now. One of the buildings in the yard had more than 100 white Leghorns. There were some books with the chickens in the basement.

About 30 or 40 minutes after he yelled, Mr. Sandburg came down stairs carrying a guitar (he calls it a "gee-tar")' several briefcases and a raincoat. He was in a friendly, relaxed mood.

After settling in the back seat of a Cadillac, he suddenly looked out the window: "Oh, look at that Japanese quince. Isn't that something! A fine day."

He worked until 3 or 4 a. m. His breakfast had been left outside the door. One thing people at the farm do not do is disturb Mr. Sandburg in the morning. He has fresh tomato juice, orange juice, grapefruit, bread and butter, and milk. He drinks goat milk three times a day.

"Let me look at my mail," he said, to no one in particular, as the car moved into Hendersonville. He was wearing a black suit, blue bow tie, white shirt, and a hat that had been out in some March mountain weather. He opened his letters with a pocket knife.

LETTERS

He was willing to share the mail.

A letter from New York began, "Could I send you some of my poems and you could tell me your opinion on them as to improving my thoughts of writing." A student in the third year at a high school in Baltimore announced, "I have chosen you as my subject for my English paper. I do not mean to be presumption but it would be of great assistance to me to have any impressions or recollections you could send.

"I will appreciate hearing from you at your earliest convenience. I am very anxious to add to the material I already have."

Sandburg looked out the window at the streets. "Hendersonville. Hendersonville. A pretty orderly town in the main. Tourists sort of give it a Pasadena atmosphere."

He returned to the mail. "Questions and information. It never stops. Somebody is always writing did this or that happen to Lincoln? Was this in his life? The least they could write down at the bottom would be "I have read through your books on Lincoln and do not find this information,'" he said, and laughed, appreciately.

"My new one-volume Lincoln is 440,000 words. Cut from more than a million words in the other books." He cut a cigar in half and stuck a piece in his mouth without lighting it. He got around to a match 60 miles later.

STILL TIME TO WORK

"Let's see, now," he mused. "If I begin at 8:15 o'clock, I'll be through by 9:25. That means I can start back at 10 p. m. Can you arrange that? We'll get home about 1 a. m., and I can work for three hours or so."

The Davidson party had arranged for Mr. Sandburg to stay overnight in the guest house. But it was felt the return trip could be taken care of, if that was what Mr. Sandburg wanted.

Suddenly benevolent, he said, to no one in particular, "I like your car and I like the land and sky God has given us for today."

His attention for a while was divided between his briefcase and the scenery. "So many interesting cabins. You don't get that in the Midwest . . . Nearly everywhere these days there's a faint whisper of something coming along. You

See FOUR Page 21B, Col. 1

Four Hours With Poet Carl Sandburg

Continued From Page 1B

see a faint pink in the trees, here and there.

"At 77, you know what you want to do. I'm on a piece of drudgery. A lot of accumulated things. For the past few weeks I've been going through hundreds of letters from 1915 to 1925, and things I had forgotten. There was a letter from a convict, whos name I had seen in a prison paper. Robbed some grocery store of 24 dollars. Not a hard case but a good story.

"I want to use part of them to follow 'Always the Young Strangers.' This is the kind of drudgery I went through on the Lincoln book But it has a payoff," he allowed.

"Chimney Rock," he announced with pleasure. "I'm comin' up here sometime and buy a dime's worth of something in every store. Encourage them! My, they have a long main street. Because they can't have a cross-street," he opined.

Lake Lure had to be identified for him. "All sorts of conventions and gathering places, I guess. Tourists and filling stations can mess up a place," he grumbled.

The talk turned to Cornelia Otis Skinner's visit to Davidson last fall. Sandburg said "I recently came across some old records by Otis Skinner. Gee, what a ham! A classical ham! But I saw him on the stage and he wasn't too bad."

Next, Edward R. Murrow: "He apparently works for the only network with a soul. He started McCarthy on the downhill road. I guess, throughout the year, Murrow is the best you can find," Sandburg said, wrapping a silk handkerchief around his throat.

He admired a country church. "They have a Baptist church in West Asheville that's a monstrosity."

After a pause, Sandburg had a kind word for South Carolina. "I never had better friends in the North than Charlestonians. They come up to Flat Rock by the droves in summer, you know. Wonderful, kindly."

"Are we leaving the mountains now?" he asked, child-like His hair, the color and consistancy of cornsilk, was being rearranged by the wind from the window.

MORE ON ARCHITECTURE

He wanted to return to architecture. "The Catholics do better. Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick says the Protestants are shamed in comparison to Catholic architecture."

Later, Sandburg described himself as "a mystic beyond definition."

Further down the road, he said, tongue in check, "I must not forget tonight to pay my compliments to the motion picture industry and their propaganda over Europe."

More serious, he continued: "We've not made any picture that can compare with the ones the Russians have sent over. The Russians and Chinese have united in a circus. All the classical acts — horseback, clowns, half-Chinese half-Russian. Very well done, good propaganda. Every once in a while, they'll show a well-dressed Chinese or well-dressed Russian.

"The interest in Hollywood is gangsters, matters of sex, Westerns, crime and swank interiors. We're shown materialistic, living high on the hog.

Many of the movie makers, only several generations over here, are now millionaires. And yet they don't have the good sense to make a decent picture as to how this country came about."

"STILL STRONG'

He observed a beaten but still-used barn. "Look at it It seems to be saying, 'You see, I'm still strong. The sun and the rain ain't got me yet. Wanna see my Social Security card?" and he laughed.

He was in high spirits from then on. "I read the other day where Billy Graham says only 10 per cent of the people are playing golf. If Ike is gonna consider runnin' in '56 it might do him good to have a couple of pictures of himself made on his Gettysburg farm, driving a manure spreader."

The name of Archibald Rutledge poet laureate of South Carolina, was introduced by someone. "He's against the Declaration of Independence," Sandburg pronounced quietly. "He doesn't go along with the part about all men being created free and equal. But his nature writings are pretty good."

Gastonia was not far away. "Who's that fellow on the radio in Charlotte? Grady Cole? So stuck on the way he delivers Stuck on the way his mind works First time I heard him I thought he was drunk. I tune him in about once every six weeks to see if he's still as bad a case as he was the last time. He always is."

UNC ADDRESS

"I've been invited to come to Chapel Hill June 6 to give the commencement address. I think the man said it should be 20 minutes long. That's better than an hour-long baccalaureate. I haven't decided yet what I'll do," he said.

He said he knew something about the new owner of The Observer. "I know the Chicago Daily News. That's the milk train of the Knight newspapers. I haven't seen The Observer in years. But I know the Knights: lots of white space, no sentences longer than 19 words."

The car was out of Cornelius and into Davidson. "Pretty campus," the visitor observed. "Look how the windows are spaced. Not like that Baptist church we saw."

He posed for a picture as he left the car and talked to some radio and television people. As he prepared to get back in the automobile, a woman came charging breathlessly to the door, a thick volume in her hands.

"Mr. Sandburg Mr. Sandburg! Will you please sign this life of Lincoln please!"

Mr. Sandberg, unperturbed, looked up. "Dearie, you're irresistible. Gotta pen?"

March 8, 1955

Dear Mr. Wyatt:

Very many thanks for your letter of January 18 and for your thoughtfulness in sending me the clipping from the COURIER-JOURNAL's report on Carl Sandburg's visit to Louisville.

As you know, I am a great admirer of his and enjoyed reading this report very much.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Wilson W. Wyatt
Wyatt, Grafton & Grafton
Marion E. Taylor Building
Louisville 2, Kentucky

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The Courier-Jou

16 ******* Associated Press and Wirephoto LOUISVILLE, SUNDAY, JANUARY 16, 1955 N



Courier-Journal Photo

POET CARL SANDBURG AT STANDIFORD FIELD

Poet Sandburg Is Here And He Has A Secret

Writer Says He's 'Graduated' From Lincoln; He'll Probably Discuss It at U. L. Tomorrow

By PHIL HARSHAM

Poet-biographer Carl Sandburg arrived at Standiford Field last night tousled and seemingly aglow with some inner secret.

He's "graduated" from Abraham Lincoln, said the best-known Lincoln biographer.

But he'll probably make "a few passing references" to the Great Emancipator during his two talks tomorrow—morning and night—at the University of Louisville.

"After all," he said, "Lincoln's a rather well-known Kentuckian."

'Behold Yon Prologue'

And while he's waiting to make the speech, he'll be working on a prologue to accompany a photographic exhibit being prepared for New York's Museum of Modern Art by Edward Steichen.

"You know what a prologue is," said the white-haired individualist with a wry grin. "I'll say something like, 'Behold yon easel on which you'll see . . .'"

The Steichen exhibit, Sandburg said, will attempt to show that "the world is made up of people who are more alike than different."

"You know," he said, "there are people who still think the Chinese are not bipeds."

Sandburg Has Said It

The Steichen theme—the exhibit will be titled "The Family of Man"—might well have been suggested by Sandburg. A line in a Sandburg poem published in 1953 reads:

"There is only one man in the world and his name is All Men."

Steichen, who is to photography what Sandburg is to Lincoln, is Sandburg's brother-in-law.

"There are only three men who can tell me what to do," the poet said, "and he's one of them."

The other two, he said, are Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic presidential nominee in 1952, and Edward R. Murrow, a Columbia Broadcasting System official and news commentator. "They're great men," Sandburg said. "And they can tell me what to do. But I don't listen very well when anybody else tries to tell me."

Guest of Wilson Wyatt

The 77-year-old two-time Pulitzer Prize winner is the guest here of Wilson Wyatt, chairman of the University of Louisville board of trustees.

He'll address a U. of L. student convocation in the university's Playhouse at 11 a.m. tomorrow. He will speak again at 8:30 p.m. in the Playhouse. The evening address, part of the university's

Column 3, back page, this section

Rain or Snow

Furnished by The U. S. Weather Bureau

KENTUCKY—Increasing cloudiness Sunday with some snow or rain likely in afternoon or night. Highest 35 to 42. Monday cloudy and a little warmer with rain ending.

TENNESSEE — Mostly cloudy with highest 36 to 42 in east and 40 to 45 in west Sunday. Some rain or possibly snow likely by afternoon or night. Cloudy and a little warmer Monday with rain ending.

INDIANA—Generally fair and a little warmer Sunday, Monday rain or snow in north and rain in south.

Standiford Field Readings

7 A.M.	37	1 P.M.	40	7 P.M.	34
8 A.M.	37	2 P.M.	39	8 P.M.	32
9 A.M.	37	3 P.M.	38	9 P.M.	31
10 A.M.	37	4 P.M.	38	10 P.M.	30
11 A.M.	38	5 P.M.	37	11 P.M.	30
12 M.	39	6 P.M.	35	12 P.M.	30

Year Ago: High, 40; low, 34.
Sun: Rises, 6:58; sets, 4:48.
Weather map is on Page 27.

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New York Times Service, United Press

Poet Sandburg Arrives For Lectures

Continued from First Page

distinguished-lecture series, will be free to the public.

Sandburg, whose casual conversation suggests that he's composing poetry all the while he's talking, said he'll probably "tell the people at the university" how one goes about editing six long volumes on Lincoln down to one volume on Lincoln.

Actually, it was just such a job that kept him from appearing here last year. The finished condensation is "Abraham Lincoln—The Prairie Years and The War Years."

If Lincoln were faced with the presidency today, Sandburg said, he probably would remark:

"If we could first know where we are and whither we are tending, we could better judge what to do and how best to do it."

Lincoln made that statement in June, 1858, Sandburg said, when he had a few problems of his own.

Sandburg's convocation address was scheduled for Tuesday morning. It was changed to tomorrow after his arrival here.

He is the seventh speaker in the lecture series set up in 1952 by a grant from The Courier-Journal and Louisville Times and WHAS.

U. of L. President Philip Davidson said Sandburg asked for the change in the convocation date, "pleading greatness and old age." There were also indications that he was eager to finish the Steichen prologue in New York and then return to his goat farm at Flat Rock, N. C.

WYATT, GRAFTON & GRAFTON
LAW OFFICES

WILSON W. WYATT
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MARION E. TAYLOR BLDG. · LOUISVILLE 2, KY.

TELEPHONE - AMHERST 1881

January 18, 1955

Dear Mr. Murrow:

In connection with a lecture he was giving at the University of Louisville, Carl Sandburg has been our house guest for the weekend and many times has talked of his admiration for you.

I thought you might be interested in the enclosed clipping from Sunday's COURIER-JOURNAL. You will notice that he practically stepped from the plane talking about you.

I am delighted you are coming to Louisville this Saturday for the Junior Chamber of Commerce Dinner.

Cordially,

Wilson W. Wyatt

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

WWW/kh

March 7, 1955

Dear Carl:

As you know, I am your under-paid publicity agent in this benighted city of steam, scurry, and scamper. I do not often send you tangible proof of my tireless efforts on your behalf but I assure you that as a result of said efforts you are becoming quite well known.

It is not every press agent who can achieve this sort of thing, and I still hope to get you listed as the Pope.

As ever yours,

Mr. Carl Sandburg
Connemara Farm
Flat Rock
North Carolina

rh

Sandburg Carl

CONNEMARA FARM
FLAT ROCK, N. C.

March 11, 1955

Dear Ed:

You may have noticed the News Week statement that you "electronically canonized" me. I have looked it up and this means that you are a living Pope and I am a dessicated dusty cadaver dead and gone now for a long time...Lately you maintain your status as one of the best of the Liberty Boys.

Ever yours,

Carl

Sandburg

January 18, 1955

Dear Carl:

Many thanks for your note.

I am delighted to hear that you thought our boys from overseas did a good job. They all enjoyed very much being able to talk with you on the phone and felt it was one of the highlights of their trip home.

Herewith the script of my broadcast of January 3 which you asked for.

I am returning the two letters you sent me and which I enjoyed very much.

As ever yours,

Mr. Carl Sandburg
Connemara Farm
Flat Rock, North Carolina

fc

CONNEMARA FARM
FLAT ROCK, N. C.

January 6, 1955

Dear Ed:

It was like traveling with fine and keen companions last Sunday when you had your Liberty Boys around the table. The pleasant but definite little riffle between Schonbrun and Hottelot was pretty and like history. And what faces! There must have been some good folks saying, "Till now I have only seen overseas correspondents in the movies and I wasn't sure what they looked like. Now I know they look decent and thoughtful and they are good actors but no actors could talk so intelligent right off the cuff." Mobile faces, marked individual voices, what a ball team, Casey Stengel! Thank you for putting them on the phone for a lone Tar Heel down here. Ever yours -

Carl

Please send me script of your newscast Jan. 3 where you have both of Ezra Benson's shoulders pinned to the mat. You had him reductio ad absurdum.

Sandburg, Carl

CONNEMARA FARM
FLAT ROCK, N. C.

November 11, 1954

Dear Ed:

forget it: I'll arrive a day or two in advance & be seeing you: Your letter of Nov 5 came after this was written:

Try and be sure to remember me with all possible data on the overseas correspondents program. Miss McCarthy phones me that your office says the program is dated now for December 13. When I came home there was about a bushel of mail on our program. What interested me on going through it was the high percentage of housewives who apologized for not being able to write well and then going ahead and writing more vividly and keenly than most newspapermen and better than the average author. I am sure that the haystack of letters you received from the McCarthy telecast has here and there some wonderful writing. Not that you need it perhaps but we pray for you at our house.

Yrs,

Carl

November 8, 1954

Dear Carl:

About the Overseas Press Club Memorial Dedication the date has been firmly fixed for December 13th 8:00 to 9:30 pm in color -- NBC -- everybody working for AFTRA minimum scale including Bob Hope, Sinatra, Dick Rodgers, Bob Sherwood; probably Bing Crosby, Marian Anderson and last and best on the program about four to five minutes of real rare vintage Sandburg, you to do the actual dedication of the plaque bearing the names of correspondents killed in World War II and in Korea. You will talk, I hope, about the importance of news, the need for integrity, the responsibility of those who control and use the mass media. In short, the whole climax of the hour and a half will be Sandburg talking a little about the boys who were less lucky than the rest of us and about the need of an informed public.

I could send you a lot of dope about the individual casualties, but I don't think it will be of any help to you. The whole membership of the Club was unanimous in wanting you to do this, and I am personally deeply grateful to you for being willing to take it on. Please convey my warmest regards to everyone at Connemara Farm.

As ever yours,

Mr. Carl Sandburg
Connemara Farm
Flat Rock
North Carolina

rh

Sandburg, Carl

ES - Since you instigated this, here is the text - Carl

IN TRIBUTE

IN a time of world storm more wild and vast than ever before known to mankind, those who print and publish for readers, those who broadcast for listening millions, have a responsibility beyond calculation. This goes too for the new and strange breed of men and women who in global war gather the round-the-earth news.

TO the immense populations who read and listened, to the American homes of the more than eleven million young men and women who went into war service, the overseas correspondents reported, subject to censorship, national security and communications conditions, the struggles, slaughters, defeats, victories, the deaths of men and how they died and their names. They wore army and navy uniforms with their personal insignia. They were not marked "Expendable" but in the strictest meaning of that word they were It —Expendable. The record shows them having a high percentage of heroes, this in the sense that a hero goes over and beyond the expected toil and risk in the performance of assigned duty; they gave, in Lincoln's phrase at Gettysburg, "the last full measure of devotion."

THE meaning of this deepens in us when we look at the multiple mirrors of the changing chaos of global war, facts, flying rumors, official communiques, guesses, probabilities and possibilities, weaving crazy and dizzy patterns. "Never," wrote one, "never was there a war with so many known factors over-balanced by the unknown." A French marshal in the first World War said, "The controlling factor in war is the Unknown."

IN all weathers and on all continents and seas, the overseas correspondents sought the controlling factors, scented and hunted the dark Unknown. From winding and tortuous paths where the known faded into fogs of the unknown they did their best at sending home to press and radio the story of what was happening from day to day.

VALOR is a gift. Those having it never know for sure whether they have it till the test comes. And those having it in one test never know for sure if they will have it when the next test comes. No one knows better than the tested overseas correspondent how a brave man can be rash, can take such chances that he goes down and never lives to file what might have been his greatest story. The toll of those who took death, wounds, disease, suffering in rain, in cold and heat, in foul prisons — their names have a definite somber majesty.

WHAT some of them did is far past any flowers of tribute or wreaths of verbal salutation. The dust of these vanished men we memorialize tonight can be termed sacred. To name two or ten of them now would be unjust to scores of others. After calling the roll of their names let them have remembrance and the reverence of silence. To long sleep and deep silence they have gone, deep among the never forgotten.

13 December 1954

Carl Sandburg

Haverlin, Carl
SIN

October 14, 1954

Dear Carl:

Many thanks for your kind words about the Carl Sandburg half-hour on SEE IT NOW. It was indeed good of you to take the time to write.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Carl Haverlin
President
Broadcast Music, Inc.
580 Fifth Avenue
New York 36, New York

rh

BROADCAST MUSIC, INC.
580 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 36, N.Y.

CARL HAVERLIN
PRESIDENT

October 6, 1954

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Ed:

The sustained excellence of "See It Now" brings about a sort of casual acceptance of the splendid things that you and Fred Friendly are constantly giving us. We come to take things like this for granted.

Perhaps because I know Carl Sandburg better than I know any of those you have ever before handled in this program, I want to give you my warmest praise for a superlative job. Not only did you put Carl at his peak but you went right along with him.

I am going to Chicago tonight to be present at the luncheon given to Carl tomorrow by his friends. I shall take great pleasure in telling him personally that hereafter on all such occasions he should team up with Murrow.

Sincerely,

Carl Haverlin

Hausman, Louis

SIN

CBS-COLUMBIA

A Division of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

3400 47TH AVENUE, LONG ISLAND CITY 1, NEW YORK · EXETER 2-3000 · CABLE ADDRESS: COLSETS

LOUIS HAUSMAN
Vice President

October 7, 1954

Dear Ed:

Now that I am making them, I find little time to watch what comes over 'em. However, I did see your Sandburg show last Tuesday, and thought it was great. (Pardon the adjective.) It was a sermon in the best sense of the word.

I thought you would like to know how much it was appreciated. With all best wishes

Sincerely,

Lou

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Ave.
New York, N.Y.

ne ans

SJN

JULY 15, 1954

PRESS

COLUMBIA LONDON

FRIENDLY MURROW SAYS HAVE SHIFTED SANDBURG PROVISIONALLY TO LAST WEEK IN AUGUST STOP FIGURE ABOUT THREE DAYS SHOOTING STOP EVERYTHING HERE MARCHING SATISFACTORILY REGARDS

CHURCH

202-550-43

CBS RADIO

Office Communication

to: MR. SEWARD cc: Mr. Friendly

from: E.R.Murrow

June 15, 1954

I have agreed with Carl Sandburg that Fred Friendly and I will go to Flat Rock, North Carolina, the fourth week in July. We will do a record album for CRI--Jim Conkling has agreed to this--and we will prepare at least one television program for SEE IT NOW.

I have undertaken to provide Sandburg, as soon as possible and in the simplest language, the terms and conditions of payment for the album and the SEE IT NOW program, and for any subsequent use that may be made of the film we shoot.

Could you have someone prepare the document.

E.R.M.

dm

Jinishian, Mari

December 18, 1953

Dear Miss Jinishian:

This is a very hasty note to acknowledge your letter of December 7th. I am leaving for Korea tonight and shall be away about two weeks, but perhaps after my return we can discuss your ideas concerning the Carl Sandburg Tape Recordings you have.

Sincerely yours,

Miss Mari Jinishian
12 West 75 Street
New York 23, New York

rh

12 West 75th Street
New York 23, New York

December 7, 1953.

She called 1/7/54

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Re: Carl Sandburg,
Tape Recordings

I called your office last week and learned you were out. Due to a sudden death in my family, I had to go out of town and could not follow through on my call.

Inasmuch as Mr. Carl Sandburg holds you in great esteem, I would like to talk with you about the many hours of magnetic tape recordings I have made with him, over a period of several years.

They include readings from:

The People, Yes
Complete Poems
Rootabaga Stories
Remembrance Rock
Abraham Lincoln
and
Songs from The American Songbag
Miscellaneous Songs

The greater portion of these tape recordings have never been recorded elsewhere.

I would appreciate an appointment, at your convenience, to discuss my ideas with you.

Sincerely,

Mari Jinishian

Mari Jinishian

Please reply to:

Miss Mari Jinishian
12 West 75th Street
New York 23, N. Y.

Telephone: SU 7-5226

January 26, 1954

Dear Miss Jinishian:

I have tried several times to call you about the appointment you requested with Mr. Murrow, but you were not at home. I am wondering if it would be convenient for you to come in to see Mr. Murrow on Monday, February 8th at 3:00 pm. Would you please confirm this date with me.

Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Rebecca Holder
Secretary to
Mr. Murrow

Miss Mari Jinishian
12 West 75 Street
New York 23, New York

Sandburg, Carl

November 20, 1952

Dear Margaret Ligon:

It would require the eloquence of the ancients and Carl Sandburg to respond adequately to your request for some words of comment or tribute to Carl Sandburg.

I have, by accident and by design, had occasion over the last twenty years to meet a not inconsiderable number of men whose names make headlines as well as a few scholars and writers. It is part of a reporters duty to be no man's disciple and to inoculate himself frequently against the disease known as hero-worship. So far as Sandburg is concerned I am a disciple with the disease and regard my lot as most fortunate.

It would be possible, I imagine, for me to write at great length about this great man, but he would not approve for we both understand that "brevity is good both when you are and are not understood". Carl understands the depth and degree of my respect and affection for him, and he understands that I have insufficient command of the language for adequate expression.

Sincerely yours,

Miss Margaret H. Ligon
Pack Memorial Public Library
Asheville, North Carolina

dm

PACK MEMORIAL PUBLIC LIBRARY

MARGARET H. LIGON, LIBRARIAN
ASHEVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA

November 15, 1952

Dear Mr.Murrow,

Our neighbor Carl Sandburg is soon to celebrate his seventy-fifth birthday, and we are planning an exhibition to honor him. We hope you will send for our use some words of comment or tribute, together with your signature. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Margaret H. Ligon

Margaret H.Ligon

3/N.

March 20, 1952

Dear Carl Sandburg:

This is to say my best thanks for the photograph and, belatedly, for your excellent contribution to the program.

The picture is being framed and will be hung in an appropriately prominent spot in my office. I am extremely proud to have it and shall indeed cherish it.

As ever yours,

Mr. Carl Sandburg
Flat Rock
North Carolina

8/10

18 Jan 52

Dear Carl Sandburg,

To put our phone conversation down on paper:

1. We invite you to be in Washington, Sunday, 10 February, to appear on "See It Now," Ed Murrow's show. Air time is 3:30 - 4 PM, eastern time. Your portion will run about three minutes.

Program tentatively is this:

Murrow will talk of Lincoln's birthday. He will say we asked Carl Sandburg, where would Sandburg take us for memorable places in Lincoln's life. Thereupon film will be shown of: a) log cabin, Hodgenville, Kentucky, birthplace. b) New Salem, restoration, store Lincoln kept. We'll pick the Offut store. c) Springfield, Illinois, Lincoln's home, house he lived in. d) White House, looking from Lincoln's room to Potomac.

Behind these pictures will be Sandburg's voice which we will record ahead of time, possibly when you're in Chicago. A few words on each place. For instance, the birthplace picture ... "So came the birth of Abraham Lincoln the 12th of February in the year 1809, in silence and pain from a wilderness mother on a bed of corn husks and bearskins ..." Or, also from your Prairie Years, the commentary on the New Salem Offut store, Offut's remarks: "Some day he will be President of the United States ... he can outrun, outlift, outwrestle and throw down any man in Sangamon County." You may of course wish to write new commentary for eadh place. This is merely illustration.

2. For the actual broadcast time, we are thinking of having you speak some of your Lincoln poetry from the Lincoln Memorial

statue hall as our cameras pick up the statue and yourself. You may of course wish to write completely new lines.

3. Mr. Murrow's people have agreed that for your services they are to pay you five hundred dollars for the broadcast, plus travel expenses to and from Washington - Charlotte, North Carolina, plus hotel expenses here in Washington. I assume the method of payment will be worked out before broadcast time.

We will call you with complete details in sufficient time. Meantime, if you could work up four brief lines to describe the four places you've chosen, we could then arrange to record your voice speaking these lines, and dub the voice behind the film.

Take good care of yourself and we'll be seeing you.

Affectionately,

Joe Wershba

Carl Sandburg
Flat Rock, North Carolina

PSALM OF THE BLOODBANK

And hath made of one blood all nations
of men for to dwell on all the face of
the earth. -- The Acts, 17-26.

Scarlet the sunset, crimson the dawn,

Rising moongold red curves

through the night

to sinking moongold red.

Poppy red a singing woman's lips.

Ruddy red the blush of true love's rose.

Fleeting the flash of a birdwing red.

Red the cardinal's hat.

Red the communist flag.

Token red the corpsman's right sleeve cross.

Red the emblem cross

of surgeon, nurse, ambulance,

of hospital tent and ship--

crimson blood streams poured

together and together

blended into one likeness,

mingled in mute communions,

Catholic in flow with Protestant,

Nordic in flux with Negro.

Scoffers, sinners, denyers, in strength and rest

from blood of Christian believers.

Help and quiet to Christian believers from blood

of thieves, harlots, blasphemers.

Deep, oh deep, brother,
Deep, oh deep, sister,
The scarlet and crimson,
The human bloodbank red.

Dear Ed - this ain't long - worth your time - Carl Sandburg
show to Fred
noted long

A PRAYER

By Roark Bradford

Excuse me kindly, King Jesus, for settin' in dis cheer 'stid er gittin' on my knees when I'm tawkin' to You. But my back hurts and my knees is plum weary; I been washin' all day, tryin' to make a piece er change to pay de lawyer gem'man.

Jee-hoovah, dat lawyer man is a mighty kind gem'man. So please pleasure him good when Gabriel toots his trumpet. He de onliest man, white or black, which had a happy word for me when de Law got my little Henry dat time he kilt Brown Chawlie. So pleasure him heavy, Lawd; he was pyore good to my Henry.

And Henry? Well, Lawd, You know, Henry, he was kind er reckless. And traveled wid de wrong kind, too, drinkin' and totin' a pistol. Gamblin' wid spot cyards and dice, and pleasurin' hisse'f wid a strumpet. But Great-I-Am, I ain't hyar to low-rate my flesh and blood. Dat boy is good in he heart; he jest got wild and reckless.

Some say hit was de woman's fault, but I ain't blamin' Della. She wa'n't nothin' but a alley bat, and I don't see how he loved her.

Well, when Della up and quit and tuck up wid Brown Chawlie, hit pyore busted Henry's heart, so dat chile tuck his pistol and laid Brown Chawlie cold in death, full six feet on de marble! And dat's whar Mister Law comed in, and so I hired de lawyer.

Well, I swear, Lawd! Hyar I set, a-tawk-tawkin' and a-jawin'! Tellin' You what You knowed all de time! And bofe er us is busy! I ought to be in de house a-gruntin' and a-ironin', and cookin' stuff to take to jail for my boy's farewell breakfus'!

But what I meant to ax You, Lawd -- not tellin' You Yo' business -- jest cast Yo' eyes down twarge de jail at sun-up in de mawnin'. And when dey leads my Henry out and stands him on de gallows wid dat black bonnet on he haid and de rope around his goozle -- look down, Lawd. Look down and watch. And when dey trips dat trigger and snatch de floor f'm under his feet, den You reach down and grab him!

Don't let him hit de bottom, God. Jest snatch him to Yo' busom and keep him to my time is out, and I kin come and watch him.

Dat's er da is dey! I ought to be in de house a-churchin' and a-ironin', and cookin' stuff to take to jail for my boy's farewell breakfus'!

But what I meant to ax You, Lawd -- not tellin' You Yo' business -- just cast Yo' eyes down twarge de jail at sun-up in de mawnin'. And when dey leads my Henry out and stands him on de gallows wid dat black bonnet on he haid and de rope around his goozle -- look down, Lawd. Look down and watch. And when dey trips dat trigger and snatch de floor f'm under his feet, den You reach down and grab him.

Don't let him hit de bottom, God. Just snatch him to Yo' bosom and keep him to my time is out, and I kin come and watch him.

to be titled
Waters or request
- women for media
- interview Blanche
Wanderma

Well, I swear, lawd! Hyar I set, a-tawk-tawkin' and a-jawin'! Tellin' You what You knowed all de time! And bole er us is busy! I ought to be in de house a-grumblin' and a-ironin! and doubtin! stuff to bring to pass! Hyar I set, a-tawk-tawkin'

Mr Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New-York 22 N.Y. U.S.A.

Docteur Albert Schweitzer
Gunsbach. Haut-Rhin
France 1 déc. 61

Cher Monsieur Murrow,

Vous êtes bien aimable de me faire l'honneur de vouloir me faire parler sur les choses africaines. Mais, j'ai le principe de ne pas parler en public sur les ces choses là. Je suis un simple médecin qui vis depuis plus de 50 ans dans la forêt vierge, et qui travaille. Ce que j'ai eu à dire, je l'ai dit dans mon récit de mes activités Du Reste Lambaréné et Forêt vierge, il y a des longues années. Il me faut rester dans mon rôle d'homme de médecin et de ne pas parler des politiques et des [illegible] de partis. Excusez-moi, je vous prie.

Votre dévoué Albert Schweitzer

Veuillez excuser aussi le retard de mon réponse. J'étais en voyages et pendant des semaines et tout mon courrier est devenu un chaos.

Par principe je ne pose pas non plus pour la télévision et je ne fais pas enregistrer des discours. Je suis vieux et veux simplifier

Translation ---

Dear Mr. Munro,

You are very kind to
with your invitation to speak about Afric
But, helas, principally I do not speak p
about these things. I am a simple do
for more than 40 years in the equatorial
there I work. What I have had to say - I
in my book "On the Edge of the Primeval F
been many years. I believe that I have
my rôle as simple doctor and not spe
political African affairs. Excuse me, p
Yours devoted

Please excuse also the late reply to your le
travelling during several weeks and my corresp

to honor me
ican affairs.
publically
doctor who lives
l forest, and
I have said —
Forest" — it has
to stay in
speak about
, please
tically
A.S.
letter. I was
pondence is in a class.

By principe I also ~~pose~~ let myself not be taken by
televisionscamera or make soundrecordings
of speeches. I am old and want to simplify
life.

TCBS NEWS NY GA PLS

AMN CABLE & RADIO CALLING GM.

TWX/ACR E7 WEC1475/TD49

LONDON 48 OCT 31ST 1957 1059

PRESS CBSNC NEWYORK

BURKE FOR MURROW FROM CALMER INFORMATIVELY JUST TALKED WITH ALBERT SCHWEITZERS AMANUENSIS WHO JOINING HIM TOMORROW SWITZERLAND WHERE HE REMAINING THROUGH NOVEMBER STOP SHE TELEPHONING NORMAN COUSINS NEWYORK ABOUT POSSIBILITY YOU INTERVIEWING SCHWEITZERS WHO NEWLY ALARMED WORLD SITUATION AND COUSINS WILL CONTACT YOU REGARDS COLLINGWOOD

SENT JP/716AM.

(not included in Griffin Index) Schweitzer, Alb

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM

3-C-35

Office Communication

to: Mr. Gitlin

from: Mr. Murrow

November 12, 1957

I assume you have by now telephoned Norman Cousins about his suggestion to interview Albert Schweitzer.

fc

E.R.M.

TCBS NEWS NY GA PLS

AMN CABLE & RADIO CALLING GM.

TWX/ACR E7 WEC1475/TD49

LONDON 48 OCT 31ST 1957 1059

PRESS CBSNC NEWYORK

BURKE FOR MURROW FROM CALMER INFORMATIVELY JUST TALKED WITH ALBERT SCHWEITZERS AMANUENSIS WHO JOINING HIM TOMORROW SWITZERLAND WHERE HE REMAINING THROUGH NOVEMBER STOP SHE TELEPHONING NORMAN COUSINS NEWYORK ABOUT POSSIBILITY YOU INTERVIEWING SCHWEITZERS WHO NEWLY ALARMED WORLD SITUATION AND COUSINS WILL CONTACT YOU REGARDS COLLINGWOOD

SENT JP/716AM.

Schweitzer, A

THE ALBERT SCHWEITZER FELLOWSHIP

156 FIFTH AVENUE

NEW YORK 10, N.Y.

February 10, 1956

Edward R. Murrow, Esq.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Ave.
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Murrow:

With the warm assent of Albert Schweitzer I enclose herewith a booklet entitled "The Stature of a Man", by Addison A. Vestal, published by The Albert Schweitzer Fellowship with the cooperation of The Grant Foundation, a Pennsylvania corporation.

The booklet deals with the Hôpital Albert Schweitzer now under construction at Deschapelles, Haiti. More important, it deals with the story of how Albert Schweitzer and his life work in Africa have inspired Dr. and Mrs. William L. Mellon, Jr. to attempt to follow in his footsteps.

This address by Mr. Vestal has already generated many requests for copies. It seemed likely that others might also like to read what he had said in simple and sincere words.

If the booklet interests you, would you perhaps wish to send it, or have it sent, to others? Copies are available without charge.

Both as treasurer of The Albert Schweitzer Fellowship and as a trustee of The Grant Foundation I feel natural interest in the support of Dr. Schweitzer's work in Africa and of the ultimate success of this Christian hospital in Haiti. The two have no organizational connection whatever, but it is clear that Albert Schweitzer's life has directly influenced the creation of this new hospital in Haiti, the only one established thus far directly under such influence and for which Dr. Schweitzer has graciously permitted the use of his name.

This Haiti hospital gives fresh tangible evidence that Schweitzer's spirit of service for others, of reverence for life, is a high influence for good. Perhaps similar establishments may spring up elsewhere in the world.

The Grant Foundation seeks to develop its own direct contacts with as many interested persons as possible and is prepared to supply any further information that may be desired. Inquiries may be addressed to The Grant Foundation, 257 Fourth Avenue, New York 10, N. Y.

Sincerely,

Emory Ross

Emory Ross
Treasurer,
The Albert Schweitzer Fellowship

The Stature of a Man

by

ADDISON A. VESTAL



John Lord King, Architect, San Francisco

Hôpital Albert Schweitzer
at
Deschapelles, Haiti

THE ALBERT SCHWEITZER FELLOWSHIP
156 Fifth Avenue, New York 10, N. Y.

Visible evidences are to be seen in different parts of the world of the influence of Albert Schweitzer's philosophy, and of his quiet, modest, life-long efforts himself to carry out that philosophy in daily action.

It is a philosophy which, in its simple Christian directness, can be carried out in any circumstances, however modest, by any person who wishes — a reverence for life beginning with one's own life and what that life can be and do and mean for itself and for all other life. The powers of *life*, under God, are indeed limitless, are everlasting.

Addison Vestal tells simply herein the story thus far seen of the influence of Albert Schweitzer's philosophy and life upon Larimer and Gwen Mellon, and of what, for the last seven years, they have been preparing themselves to do with their own lives in quiet service for the lives of others.

On the initiative of the Albert Schweitzer Fellowship and with the aid of The Grant Foundation (a Pennsylvania Corporation) this address is now printed for such distribution as those interested in Dr. Schweitzer's philosophy and work may desire.

THE ALBERT SCHWEITZER FELLOWSHIP
156 Fifth Avenue, New York 10, N. Y.

The Stature of a Man

Today, I want to tell you a story. It is a story of giving and sharing. In the past two years, you have heard Dr. Parks (*) refer to the life and works of Dr. Albert Schweitzer on numerous occasions. We know, of course, that Dr. Schweitzer is now 80 years of age; that he was awarded the Nobel Prize for 1952, which amounted in money to about $35,000.00 and that he dedicated the entire sum to his hospital at Lambarene, French Equatorial Africa. We also know that the people of Norway set out to match this sum, dedicated to Dr. Schweitzer's use. There can be no doubt about it, Dr. Schweitzer is one of the great men living in the world today.

Prior to November 1947, only seven years ago, I had never heard of Dr. Schweitzer and I doubt if many of you had either. At that time, though, the editors of LIFE Magazine published a picture story of him and his hospital in the African jungle. It was a simple, factual story, showing something of the work of this man and his associates in Africa. It spoke of him as a philosopher, theologian, musician, physician, and scholar. I read the story and so did several million other people, I suppose. I thought it was a wonderful story. I probably wondered why a man of his age, who was already a world figure in music before he became a missionary, would give it up and start a hospital in Africa. With that mental notation, I passed on to something else.

A Man of Decision

There was another man who read the story, though, who did not pass on to something else. He stopped dead in his tracks. He was gripped by the story. He thought it over and decided to do something about it. His name is William Larimer Mellon, Jr. He

(*) Dr. E. L. Parks, Minister of the Ingomar Community Methodist Church, Ingomar, Pa., was on a preaching mission in Cuba, as a part of the International Missionary Crusade, on February 20, 1955, and Mr. Vestal delivered this address at both the 9 o'clock and 11 o'clock services.

was 37 years of age at the time and lived on a ranch in Arizona. It was a pretty good sized ranch and everyone connected with it was working hard, trying to build up the quality of the cattle and make it an efficient operation. I had been connected with the management of the ranch while he was overseas during the War. All of a sudden, I received word from him that he was going to sell the ranch and move to New Orleans, Louisiana, to enter Tulane University as a pre-medical student. He did just that!

He started to work immediately. It was difficult for him. He had left Princeton University after his freshman year to work for the Mellon National Bank and later the Gulf Oil Corporation before entering the ranching business in 1937.

His wife was just as interested. She sought no medical degree, but worked just as hard studying nursing and laboratory technique, hospital organization and hospital administration. Their four children continued their education, but I am sure they worked a little harder as a result of their parental example.

In Quest of an Opportunity

During the summers, he and his family traveled to South America, Africa, and Haiti, where he studied tropical diseases. During their trip to Haiti, he and his wife were impressed with the opportunity to be of service to humanity and with the need for a modest but adequate hospital for both clinical and teaching work with emphasis on community health and preventive medicine. The location was the Artibonite Valley. In the entire valley, with a half million population, or more, there was only one small hospital. Malaria and tuberculosis took a heavy toll of the people who lived in that valley. Here was the place they had been looking for. They decided to build a hospital and devote their lives to helping these people. It would be a Christian-spirited institution with the blessings and cooperation of the Republic of Haiti. It would be destined for eventual absorption by the local community, but in the mean-

time, it would be privately built, privately endowed, and privately operated.

The plan was approved by Haiti's President, Paul Magloire, and the proper governmental agencies. Plans were drawn up, funds were provided (at least in part), and construction was started. By 1956, it is hoped that the hospital will be in full operation. Haitian nurses, trained in the United States at the expense of The Grant Foundation, will be ready to assume their responsibilities by that time.

It was my pleasure to attend the cornerstone-laying ceremony on December 11th, 1954, at Deschapelles, Artibonite River Valley, Haiti, and to hear the hospital christened "Hôpital Albert Schweitzer." Every speech that was made and every official word that was spoken was in French. I don't know any French, so I mixed things up good by using my Texas accent.

Dr. Schweitzer could not be present at the ceremony, but sent the following message, and I quote in translation from the French: "Let me tell you how touched I am that your hospital carries my name. I am truly moved, more than I can tell you, at this expression of understanding. I send you my best wishes for your opening. The beginnings are always difficult. But you are courageous."

"The Miracle of the Fresh Opened Mind"

Dr. Emory Ross, Treasurer of the Albert Schweitzer Fellowship, New York, and one of the five trustees of The Grant Foundation which is building the hospital, delivered the dedicatory address. The last two paragraphs of his address seem to me to state very forcefully the Christian spirit that underlies the project. He stated it this way: "In all this, there is a miracle, nothing less. But it is a miracle of a nature which all may share, indeed which all may perform, with their Lord. There will be no workman, no patient, no doctor, no nurse, no friend of this beginning work but who can

in his own life perform the miracle of the fresh opened mind, of the lifted spirit, of the re-directed life, of serving better both one's self and others, the miracle of love, of Christian love, in the service of mankind."

He continued by saying: "He who gives, receives bountifully. Pressed down and running over is his portion. The changed, goodly life is the never ending miracle, the all powerful miracle. For in it God multiplies portions of His own divine power."

There you have the factual background, very briefly.

Now, at this point, I would like to raise a few questions about the hospital that people have asked me repeatedly — and then answer them. These are not the only questions that have been asked — far from it — but I believe they are asked most frequently. They are as follows:

Questions and Answers

Question 1 — How big will the hospital be?

Answer: Approximately 50 beds.

Question 2 — What will it cost?

Answer: Approximately $1,000,000.00.

Question 3 — Is it to be underwritten by the Republic of Haiti?

Answer: It is not. It is being built by The Grant Foundation of Pittsburgh, a non-profit corporation organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Dr. W. L. Mellon, Jr., is President of The Foundation. The Republic of Haiti provided the land on which the hospital is being built and granted tax exemption on materials, equipment and supplies that will be used in the erection and operation of the hospital.

Question 4 — Will it be self-supporting?

Answer: I am afraid not. We estimate that it will cost The Grant Foundation between $150,000.00 and $200,000.00 a year to operate it.

Question 5 — How did I get mixed up in it?

Answer: I am secretary-treasurer and a director of The Foundation. My main function is to help provide funds for use by The Grant Foundation as economically as possible — after taxes.

Question 6 — Are Dr. and Mrs. Mellon really serious about going to Haiti to live and devote their lives to this work?

Answer: They certainly are. I would like to give you the answer to that question in Dr. Mellon's own words. In closing his dedicatory address on December 11, 1954, after outlining the aims and purposes of the hospital, he said, and I quote: "To this task my wife and I humbly dedicate ourselves. May the spark of 'reverence for life' which came to us from across the Atlantic Ocean (meaning Dr. Schweitzer, of course) continue to burn until it has consumed us with the real and deep concern for every living creature that suffers."

Question 7 — What will Dr. and Mrs. Mellon get out of it?

Answer: The answer to that question is something that one will either understand thoroughly or he will not understand it at all. The answer is an inner peace — a peace in their hearts. I suppose, when you come right down to it, that one of the most comforting things on this earth is that inner peace that I just spoke of — the peace that one feels in his heart. I remember when I was a student at Baylor University we had one of the old grads return to the campus to address us at one of our regular chapel exercises. I do not remember his name now, but I do remember his message. He was a man who had made a lot of money in drilling for oil and then had lost it all, and had gone hopelessly into debt, trying to recover his losses. The President asked him to tell us what, in his opinion, was the greatest objective a man could have in life. He said, "That's easy. It is peace in one's heart. If one can have peace in his heart, that is the thing that really matters when all else is gone."

Question 8 — Why did Mr. Mellon insist on going through medical school? Why couldn't he be responsible for the hospital

and hire some outstanding doctors? He will have to do that anyway before it is over. He cannot personally treat everyone who comes to the hospital.

Answer: My answer to that question is this: When we are gripped deep in our hearts, with the idea of doing something to help others, we do not think in terms of short cuts. When Dr. Mellon stated in his dedicatory address on December 11, 1954, "To this purpose my wife and I dedicate ourselves," I am sure that he and his wife had not been thinking in terms of short-cuts. At this point, I would like to add, with all the emphasis that I have at my command, that I feel the same way about it. I am not looking for any short-cuts either.

Question 9 — Mr. Vestal, you are an experienced tax man, you are trained in investments. I assume that you are a practical-minded businessman. What do you think of this project as a practical matter?

Answer: First, let me say this. I hope that I am experienced enough to do a good job of this assignment. I hope I have the necessary experience, the technical knowledge, the patience, and the determination to do this job the way I think it should be done — but that isn't the point. If that is all there is to this project, we ought to drop it right now. Of course, a knowledge of economics, banking, accounting and Federal income taxation are all helpful tools in working out the details of this project. So are engineering, architecture, medicine, ranching, dairy farming, and a lot of other things. But they aren't very helpful when it comes to evaluating the possibilities of success of an idea such as this one. The only place you will find the answer to that question is in your Bible. It is a matter of faith. At Mark 9:23, the Lord promised us that "All things are possible to him that believeth." Nothing could be more clearly stated than that. In other words, we must have faith. Faith is one of the most powerful forces in all the world. We do not simply believe in ourselves. We have faith in God and He gives us power over ourselves and our problems. When you come right down to it, we do not change our lives

very much by our own efforts. A good environment and a good education may help us to become more respectable citizens, and vice versa, but the point I am trying to make is that the really basic and lasting changes that take place in our lives are brought about by faith in Jesus Christ. He tells us that He can do wonderful things for us if we have faith in Him, and we know that He can do and does do what He promises. We must also have the humility to realize that we can't do everything ourselves, and have faith enough to realize that the Lord will help us when we need help.

Question 10 — This seems like a tremendous undertaking. Isn't there a chance that the delays and disappointments and hardships and the threat of tropical disease may dampen the enthusiasm of these people and those associated with them in a few years?

Answer: I don't think so. Again, the Bible gives us an answer to that question that is good enough for me. At Luke 10:19, God tells us "Behold, I give you power to tread on serpents and scorpions and over all the power of the enemy and nothing shall by any means hurt you." Of course, that is stated in the picturesque language of the Bible, but the message is clear. Power over serpents and scorpions — that is, power over such things as fear and selfishness and indecision.

That does not mean that we will not suffer difficulties and disappointments and possibly sickness. It does not mean that we will not encounter a lot of day-to-day problems, because we will. We are already encountering them and have been for some time. Those things come to all of us and they are not to be minimized. You can be sure, though, that with this power which God has promised us, nothing will ever ruin us. No disappointment, no difficulty, no opposition will ever defeat us. Time and time again, I have been faced with a problem and at first glance have felt that there never was a problem like it. Everyone has experienced that feeling. It often carries with it the feeling that whatever decision one makes is going to be wrong. But

then, when I finally get myself collected and get down to business and think, it begins to clear up. It is then that you realize that no one ever has a problem that cannot be solved. God doesn't give us problems that we can't solve. The only question is whether we are big enough to face them squarely and with a firm belief that we can do the job. We all have a tendency to become neurotic on occasions and want to lean on someone else when we can. When we are finally forced to settle down, though, and face our problems squarely we find that we can solve them. Just don't get excited and panicky about them. Take things in stride. Put the matter in God's hands and practice calmness and in His own good time, He will give you the help you need. Don't think for one minute that I don't need that thought with me up here this morning. If you think that you don't need a little help in a situation like I am in right now, you ought to try it some time.

And now, if I may, I would like to add just one personal reaction to all this. It is this: God gives all of us a job to do. The question is: Are we willing to meet the challenge head on and see to it that nothing, absolutely nothing, interferes with our getting that job done? It may take a long time to discover the exact nature of the job, and the job itself may come as a terrific surprise to us, but that isn't the point. The point is this: Are we willing to settle down and get that job done?

In our own church, for instance, we get requests for World Service. Most of us don't know much about it. We do not think we know what is going on, and it all sounds so far away. I feel sure, however, that if each one of us could become well informed on just one project, such as this one — and I repeat, just one project — I am sure that a miracle would be performed in our hearts and in our thinking. The story that I have told you today shows what can happen when one acts on his own faith and his own convictions. Entirely too often, we ask ourselves, "What can religion do for me?" Well, it can do plenty — but that is another

story. The point that I am making here is that a far better approach would be, "What can I do for someone else? What can I do to extend the spirit of Jesus Christ to a needy and troubled world?"

I think the answer to that question boils down to our own personal situation. Everyone of us has challenges for clear Christian witness among our fellow men every day. Dr. and Mrs. Mellon will need help. Whether we help them or follow their inspiration in ways of our own, we can do our part and get a great inner reward out of doing it. That reward, my friends, is "Peace in our hearts."

Let us pray:

Heavenly Father, help us to realize that there is a lot that each one of us can do in our daily lives to extend the spirit of Jesus Christ, if we will only think in terms of helping others. Help us to think earnestly about these things and to realize that if we do not measure up to the proper standards it is our own fault. There is plenty that each one of us can do and that we ought to do. We thank Thee for these simple truths. Help us to practice them through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

He saw NO!

September 29, 1955

Dear Dr. Schweitzer:

This is a formal invitation, to accompany Dr. Bunche's letter, for you to participate in the ninety-minute documentary film on Africa for the television program SEE IT NOW. Specifically, I ask to come to Lamberene when you return there, or to Gunsbach, to sit down with you before a camera and talk with you informally about your work and your philosophy. This would become part of our presentation of the Africa of today, already being filmed by our camera-men in many parts of the continent. We believe our film will make a real contribution to an understanding by Americans of their African fellow-men, and of their difficulties and needs.

I know from Dr. Bunche and others how completely you are absorbed by your work, and must weigh every request for your time in the scales of its usefulness. Since our program will show Africa sincerely and soberly, I feel sure it would be an appropriate medium for a discussion of your work, with its hazards and triumphs.

But even more important, I think, is that you would have a vast and receptive audience, eager to learn of your philosophy. It would be an audience that would be touched by your spiritual leadership and respond to it.

As Dr. Bunche has said, I should be honored, in appreciation of your cooperation, to make a substantial payment to any of the enterprises to which you so usefully have dedicated yourself.

Hoping you will continue to be blessed by years of health and service, and in great respect, I remain,

Faithfully yours,

Dr. Albert Schweitzer
Gunsbach pres Munster
Alsace, France

L-B-5

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NEW YORK

9/29/55

CABLE ADDRESS · UNATIONS NEWYORK · ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE

FILE NO.:

Call Bunch

Dear Dr. Schweitzer,

My pleasant visit with you last month remains extraordinarily fresh and vivid in my memory and I take this opportunity to thank you once more for your friendly hospitality, the vast wisdom of your words and the inspiring experience of sitting beside you as you brought such beauty from the organ.

Knowing how full is your programme I would not intrude upon you now were the matter other than of unusual importance.

It may be that you have heard of Edward R. Murrow. He is America's outstanding telecaster - a man of complete integrity and of great wisdom and courage, who presents his television programmes with impressive restraint and dignity. The two current programmes for which he is best known are "Person to Person" and "See It Now". In these programmes he makes reporting, analysis and documentation artistic expressions while being faithful always to the truth.

I have been informed by Mr. Murrow and his associate in the "See It Now" programme, Mr. Fred Friendly, that at sometime during the next four months Mr. Murrow through his "See It Now" programme - a remarkably effective documentary presentation reaching a huge viewing audience - will do an hour and a half documented report on Africa. Indeed, I am told that the camera crews for this purpose are already on the African continent. The report will include Egypt, Ethiopia, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the Central African Federation, Kenya, the Belgian Congo, French Equatorial Africa, the Gold Coast and French Morocco.

It is the objective of Mr. Murrow and Mr. Friendly to make an honest, unsensational examination of and report upon the characteristic problems of Africa today with a view toward creating a maximum of understanding of Africa, its people, their life and their outlook.

Dr. Albert Schweitzer,
Gunsbach pres Munster,
Alsace, France.

COPY

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FILE NO.:

Mr. Murrow and Mr. Friendly in speaking to me of their African project, which has greatly excited their interest, have emphasized that such a report on Africa would be grossly incomplete and in fact a failure without adequate representation of you and your philosophy - in view of the world-wide recognition of your greatness and of your identification with Africa in your lifelong work. This view, you may be sure, I heartily share.

Mr. Murrow and Mr. Friendly, as personal friends, have asked me to approach you on this matter in their behalf. The suggestion is that as part of this report on Africa Mr. Murrow would come to Lambarene when you return (or to Gunsbach if you prefer it) to chat with you quite informally about your work in Africa, your hopes for Africa and your general outlook and philosophy - just as we chatted at lunch that fine day. The filming could be done out of doors, thus avoiding the use of lights. The programme would, of course, gladly make a substantial financial contribution to any cause you might wish to indicate.

I write to you in this vein only because I believe, as I stressed in our conversation, that it is vitally important for the lesson of moral philosophy which you express so well and live so uniquely to reach the largest possible number of people in our troubled world. The "See It Now" programme would be an unrivalled medium for achieving this purpose with a minimum of burden for you or disruption of your busy schedule.

I enclose with this letter a more formal invitation to you from Mr. Murrow himself.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Ralph J. Bunche

COPY

Dear Dr. Schweitzer,

This is a formal invitation, to accompany Dr. Bunche's letter, for you to participate in the 90 minute documentary film on Africa for the television program SEE IT NOW. Specifically, I ask to come to Lamberene when you return there, or to Gunsbach, to sit down with you before a camera and talk with you informally about your work and your philosophy. This would become part of our presentation of the Africa of today, already being filmed by our camera-men in many parts of the continent. We believe our film will make a real contribution to an understanding by Americans of their African fellow-men, and of their difficulties and needs.

I know from Dr. Bunche and others how completely you are absorbed by your work, and must weigh every request for your time in the scales of its usefulness. Since our program will show Africa sincerely and soberly, I feel sure it would be an appropriate medium for a discussion of your work, with its hazards and triumphs.

But even more important, I think, is that you would have a vast and receptive audience, eager to learn of your philosophy. It would be an audience that would be touched by your spiritual leadership and respond to it.

As Dr. Bunche has said, I should be honored, in appreciation of your cooperation, to make a substantial payment to any of the enterprises to which you so usefully have dedicated yourself.

Hoping you will continue to be blessed by years of health and service, and in great respect, I remain,

Faithfully yours,

September 29, 1955

Dear Dr. Schweitzer:

This is a formal invitation, to accompany Dr. Bunche's letter, for you to participate in the ninety-minute documentary film on Africa for the television program SEE IT NOW. Specifically, I ask to come to Lamberene when you return there, or to Gunsbach, to sit down with you before a camera and talk with you informally about your work and your philosophy. This would become part of our presentation of the Africa of today, already being filmed by our camera-men in many parts of the continent. We believe our film will make a real contribution to an understanding by Americans of their African fellow-men, and of their difficulties and needs.

I know from Dr. Bunche and others how completely you are absorbed by your work, and must weigh every request for your time in the scales of its usefulness. Since our program will show Africa sincerely and soberly, I feel sure it would be an appropriate medium for a discussion of your work, with its hazards and triumphs.

But even more important, I think, is that you would have a vast and receptive audience, eager to learn of your philosophy. It would be an audience that would be touched by your spiritual leadership and respond to it.

As Dr. Bunche has said, I should be honored, in appreciation of your cooperation, to make a substantial payment to any of the enterprises to which you so usefully have dedicated yourself.

Hoping you will continue to be blessed by years of health and service, and in great respect, I remain,

Faithfully yours,

Dr. Albert Schweitzer
Gunsbach pres Munster
Alsace, France

September 16, 1955

Dear Dr. Bunche:

Ed and I were in Philadelphia last night working at Independence Hall, and talked long into the night about the idea of a Schweitzer-Bunche conversation. He thinks it's a terrific idea - certainly I do.

These are some of the details about the program, and what you may want to cover in your letter to Dr. Schweitzer.

Sometime in the next four months, SEE IT NOW (you may want to amplify the stature of SEE IT NOW and Murrow, and I would not presume to furnish the language for this) will do an hour and a half documented report on Africa. We already have camera crews on the continent, and the report will include Egypt, Ethiopia, Anglo Egyptian Sudan, Central Africa Federation, Kenya, Belgian Congo, French Equatorial Africa, the Gold Coast, and French Morocco. It is our intention to make it an unsensational but honest examination of the many problems which contribute to making Africa one of the most complicated and, at the same time, fascinating issues of our time. The running undercurrent of these under-privileged people seeking their place in the sun and at the dinner table, their battle for their civil rights, and their battle against depression, will be the dominant thing.

Such a report would be incomplete and, in fact, a failure without the representation of Dr. Schweitzer. There is more interest and genuine curiosity about him than about any other single man in the continent. He is the great man of Africa and, of course, one of the great men of our time. We would want him to chat with you about his work, his plans, his purpose, and his general philosophy. We could do it out of doors, which would make it possible without lights.

We are prepared to make a sizeable contribution to whatever cause Dr. Schweitzer may direct. We are also prepared to pay all of the expenses of Dr. Bunche (and his wife, if desired) in making the expedition.

Ed was quite prepared to make the trip himself, but makes the point that the Bunche idea is a natural. First, you speak better French and German than he does; but more important, there is something almost inspirational about Albert Schweitzer and Ralph Bunche and humanity sitting on a bench in Lambarene.

Ed is quite prepared - more than that - anxious to discuss this further with you, should you have any questions, as am I.

Respectfully,

Fred Friendly

Dr. Ralph Bunche
United National Secretariat Building
Room 3853
New York, New York

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IN REPLY
PLEASE QUOTE NO.

September 21, 1955

Dear Mr. Friendly,

Enclosed is a copy of the letter I propose to send to Dr. Schweitzer. I invite any suggestions for change which may occur to you and Ed.

You will note at the end of the letter my reference to the enclosure. I think it would be useful to have your formal invitation in his hands at the time he reads my letter.

Frankly, I am none too optimistic about his response. He indicated to me his very great reluctance to do things which interfere with his work programme.

Sincerely yours,

Ralph Bunche

Ralph J. Bunche

Mr. Fred Friendly,
"See It Now",
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
485 Madison Avenue,
New York 22, N.Y.

Center for Information on America

Washington, Connecticut

TOWNSEND SCUDDER · *President*

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Chairman of the Department of American Civilization
University of Pennsylvania
Former President of the American Studies Association

December 23, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Thank you so much for your kind letter of December 18th, and of course it will be fine if you will let me know, when it is convenient, as to the day and time for a definite appointment.

With best wishes for a Merry Christmas and Happy New Year,

Sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

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Scudder, Townsend
ltr

F

December 18, 1958

Mr. Townsend Scudder
Center for Information on America
Washington, Conn.

Dear Mr. Scudder:

Thank you for your letter of December 11 and the thoughtful suggestion it contained. May I contact you at a future time about a meeting? At present, my calendar is so unsettled that it is difficult to make a definite appointment.

Sincerely yours,

ERM:skh

Center for Information on America

Washington, Connecticut

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University of Pennsylvania
Former President of the American Studies Association

Will let him know

December 11, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I have been catching up in my reading of back numbers of The Reporter, and have only just now run across your wise, witty, and soul-searching "A Broadcaster Talks To His Colleagues." Bravo!

I believe the Center, and the type of material it is able to assemble, could play a part in the renaissance period for television, if such a period is ever to dawn in its history. May I talk to you about this? If you would care to suggest a date at your convenience, which might be after the first of the year, may I confer with you in New York?

With the season's greetings,

Sincerely yours,

my Townsend Scudder.

Townsend Scudder

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Chairman of the Department of American Civilization
University of Pennsylvania
Former President of the American Studies Association

November 18, 1958

X

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

As you will see from the back page of this current VITAL ISSUES, our next one, scheduled for release on the first of December, will be on the railroads. Knowing how greatly this topic interests you, I shall get galleys or an advance copy off to you just as soon as possible.

I go on hoping something can be worked out in the form of an arrangement for use of some of Center's materials in connection with television.

With regards,

Yours most sincerely,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

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ROBERT E. SPILLER,
Chairman of the Department of American Civilization
University of Pennsylvania
Former President of the American Studies Association

August 19, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

You may care to see an advance copy of the Center's VITAL ISSUES on the subject of the Cost of Education, so here it is.

With regards,

Sincerely,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

TS:DVR
Encl.

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Vital Issues
"A DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR BETTER INFORMED AMERICANS"

A service of the
CENTER FOR INFORMATION ON AMERICA
WASHINGTON, CONNECTICUT
Volume VIII, Number 1

THE COST OF EDUCATION



Drawings by C. P. Meier

HOW MUCH? CAN WE AFFORD IT?

"The whole problem of education is one of its cost in money."

This puts it rather crudely.

Yet the remark was made by no less a person than Henry Adams, brilliant historian and commentator on America, and member of a family which has given the U. S. A. two Presidents.

Of course Adams didn't mean that all we have to do is fork out cash. He was well aware that education is a complicated process, a key to life and living that cash alone can't buy.

But teachers, a basic ingredient in the educating process, have to eat, and paying them costs money. If we pay our two million and a half teachers better, as many recent studies such as the Rockefeller Report on Education insist we must, the price of education is bound to rise.

This increase must be added to the other mounting costs. Why are they mounting?

In the first place, we are educating far more people. Everybody knows about our rising birth rate and has seen calculations that the student population is likely to double within a very few years. Furthermore, especially at the college level, courses undreamed of in the horse and buggy age need to be taught. Courses built around advances in science and technology are apt to be more expensive in teaching equipment. And we'll need more and better guidance courses and advisors if our young people are to make the most and best of themselves in this complicated age. Good guidance programs—now woefully scarce—come high.

Furthermore, as a recent issue of *Business Week* points out, inflation has about doubled the price of everything.

Most states and communities that have taken the trouble to figure ahead on their educational needs anticipate a staggering rise in costs.

Should we and can we pay more? In this respect, it's interesting to note that only around 3.5 percent of our gross national product (the value of what we produce) goes into education, and that this percentage has just recently started going up after a considerable period of actual decline.

A distinguished group of Americans, headed by Dr. Edward Litchfield, Chancellor of the University of Pittsburgh, recently returned from taking a look at Russian education. This is what impressed them most: "First, . . . an almost universal belief . . . in the value of higher education. Second, . . . willingness to pay the very high costs that are involved in money, in plant, in human effort."

For many years we have practiced the principle of free and universal education through high school, with continuing educational opportunity beyond that point.

The Russians have only just recently caught on to this idea. But what they already have been able to do with it comes

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Editor: Townsend Scudder, President of the Center

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to many Americans as a decided shock which began with the sputniks.

In the struggle between our cherished way of life and the ambitions of the U. S. S. R., we need to pay special heed to Dr. Litchfield's warning: Russian efforts, especially as to higher education, must "give very serious pause to any nation which finds itself in a competitive position." If we have not already done so, we had better wake up to the fact that the survival and well-being of our nation depend no less on the strength of our educational system than on that of our military defenses.

Sticking to our own educational ideals, we must do better than the U. S. S. R. The price may come high, but we still are a much richer nation than Russia.

How pay the costs to give Americans the best possible education? That's a vital issue which we need seriously to ponder.

WHAT WE'VE GOT

Before considering costs, let's see what we've got.

One of the characteristics of American education—and it has grown right out of our belief in individual freedom and each person's right to choose—is its great diversity. Diversity is an important safeguard against stifling uniformity. We have no rigid system, as Russia does, dictated from the top. Our tax-supported and gift-supported or "independent" schools and colleges function side by side. This is a real source of strength. As a competitive situation it helps keep education on its toes.

Public and Private Schools. At the broad base of our educational pattern are our locally run free public schools, started years ago in the traditional American belief that every youth, rich or poor, not only should have the opportunity to get an education but should attend school till reaching an age variously specified in different states. Russia now has this same system, but operated from the top. With us, control has always been vested in the people through local Boards of Education.

Increasing expenses of public education impose a considerable burden, and that's where state aid to local communities comes in.

There's also the possibility of more Federal aid. But American belief in the freedom of the individual, and our emphasis on private enterprise, make us distrustful of having the Federal Government assume too large a share of responsibility in the education of our children. There's an old story about an Arab who, one cold night, invited his camel to sleep with its head inside the warm tent. Pretty soon the whole camel had crawled in.

Paralleling the public schools, but serving a very small percentage of the total school population, are the private schools. They aim for high quality in education, and have a good record in helping prepare men and women who have later become leaders in various fields. The tuition they charge is rarely enough to keep them running, so they bank heavily on endowments and on gifts.

Junior Colleges. Free education in America stops at the twelfth grade, but the demand for education continues through life.

The number of junior or two-year colleges has increased greatly, and the increase seems likely to go on. These municipal, two-year institutions offer one means of taking care of the mounting surge toward college. Of the six to seven million students expected in college by 1970 or so, some two million should be found in the junior colleges.

But the growth of these two-year colleges and schools for technical training makes a further demand on the education dollar. The tax-supported ones—now over half the total, and increasing—naturally compete with the elementary and secondary public school system since they also draw on local taxes.

They are doing a major job, and are therefore an important part of our national responsibility.

Colleges and Universities. The four-year liberal arts college is a peculiarly American institution. Sometimes such a college is on its own. Sometimes it is part of a university. The liberal education it provides is as fundamental to American tradition as individual liberty itself. Seeking a liberal education means continuing the study of the basic subjects we took in school and adding others—English, foreign languages, mathematics, history, the natural sciences, and the arts—only in a more mature and thoughtful and comprehensive way. The aim of liberal education is to develop one's intellectual and spiritual values so that one may bring to both one's career and life the greatest possible assets of intelligence, resourcefulness, judgment, and character. It is interesting that a very large number of America's leaders in all fields and occupations are the products of colleges of liberal arts. Yet despite this, the 600 or so privately supported liberal arts colleges which are performing such an excellent service, faced as they are with rising costs and inflation, are having a tough time.

Our colleges and universities are the sources of America's greatest gains. They have become our principal gateway to opportunity, opening out on roads that lead toward good life and good living.

Judged strictly on the practical side, these statistics are illuminating—

At age 25, the earnings of the average college graduate have caught up with his non-college schoolmate who has been working all along. At age 30, he is 40% ahead. At 40 he is 85% ahead. At 50 he is 130% ahead. At age 60, because his earning power has not declined, he is 150% ahead.

Judged by non-material values, there's also the intangible contribution toward greater richness of life.

In accordance with the aims and ideals of a free people, our colleges and universities perform a role that is great, growing, and varied. Familiar examples of the tax-supported type are the state universities. They have grown enormously over the past seventy-five years. Thus they have brought educational service closer to the needs of many people in all walks of life. They have generally kept tuition and other fees low to let large numbers attend, notwithstanding sharply increased operating costs. No other nation in the world offers such opportunities for higher education. Most state universities make a very direct contribution to the welfare of their own citizenry. One example is the University of Wisconsin, whose scientists have greatly improved the dairy industry which has so much to do with the prosperity of that state.

But all this is expensive. Not all legislatures can keep up the pace. So land-grant colleges rely considerably on Federal funds as well as funds from the state. And often the difference between a fair educational program in a state university and an excellent one is brought about by private contributions from individuals, industry, and foundations.

Private colleges and universities, because they are not owned by the people—not supported by tax—feel they have greater freedom for action. Such freedom, at every educational level, is a stimulus to experimentation and improvement capable of conferring its benefits on all types of education both public and private. Most of our oldest institutions and many of our best known are privately controlled. They furnish a bulwark for freedom of enterprise in the U. S. A.

Fundamental research, the pursuit of knowledge, is central to the idea of a university. That is why some of the basic discoveries later applied to nuclear power were made in the laboratories of our great universities both public and private.

Research for its own sake is sometimes thought of as a luxury. But bear in mind Professor Michael Faraday's remark, one hundred years ago, when the Prime Minister of England asked him what practical uses his discovery of electricity might have. "Who knows?"—said Professor Faraday—"Perhaps some day you may tax it!"

Running a great university or a great technical school costs a great deal. All of them, public and private, find themselves hard pressed.

THE COSTS

There's little doubt about the fact that the pursuit of knowledge has become big business. Our annual expenditure for education in 1956 was fifteen billion as compared with thirteen billion for new automobiles. "Even allowing for considerably greater efficiency in the use of educational funds" —warns the Rockefeller Report—"it is likely that ten years hence our schools and colleges will require at least *double* their present level of financial support to handle our growing student population."

For the Soviet dictatorship such a prospect as a large increase in the cost of education presents no particular problem. As John Gunther remarks in his book, *Inside Russia Now,* the Kremlin regards education as of the utmost importance in order to make the most of this technological age. It therefore takes the cash it needs for education out of the product of the labors of the people, since the Russian people, because of the Soviet theory that they exist for the state, have nothing to say about it. "A few years after the Communists took over," says former Senator William Benton in his recent book about Russia, *This Is The Challenge,* "they threw themselves into the task of education with fervor. Their slogan seems almost literally to have become 'Education instead of butter.'"

But for us, because it is we the people who decide, the rising costs of education present a far more direct and complicated problem and responsibility. It's our right and privilege to figure out what education we need and want. Then we must make up our minds whether we're willing and prepared to raise the needed amount of money. Because of the many-sided nature of our educational effort, and the many sources from which our support of it comes, financing education in the U. S. A. has always been a confusing and intricate process. It's easy, also, to underestimate costs. The local community, with an eye on state and Federal aid, tends to pass part of the buck. When it comes to education beyond high school, the long established practice of charging less for tuition than the individual's education actually costs tends to keep us ill informed on the real price of educating people.

In this matter of costs, let's look for a moment at teachers' salaries, since the need to do something about them is given top priority by such recent surveys as the Rockefeller Report. In comparison with the rest of us, how have we treated our teachers? For the past several years, the cost of living has gone higher and higher. Teachers' pay hasn't in like degree. In fact teachers are among the nation's lowest paid professional groups.

During the prosperous period following World War II, the teacher's income—in terms of what it can buy—has actually gone down. During this time, real income for doctors has gone up over 80%. Lawyers have not done badly, either, with an increase of at least 10%. In terms of purchasing power, the teacher during this period has seen the "real wages" of industrial workers go up some 55%. But the teacher himself, who has played a major role in training each generation which thus reaps the rewards, gets a slimmer harvest. Most of the rest of us have done pretty well with the greatly increased opportunity to improve on our standard of living. Not only have we been able to buy lots of the things we require but probably we've also enjoyed plenty of things we did not really need. For instance, the total spent by the people of the U. S. A. on the recreation of fishing is greater than the total we spend for higher education. As Walter Lippman, well-known newspaper man and writer, remarks: "There is an enormous margin of luxury in this country against which we can draw for our vital needs."

Not all teachers are underpaid. But the carefully prepared career teacher who is seeking to do a good job can be seriously handicapped by insufficient pay. If this forces him to take a second job, such "moonlighting" tends to affect the quality of his teaching. He can't study in the summer, or afford to learn more about America and the world through investigation and travel, or write about his specialty, or do other things to improve his teaching and contribute to his professional advancement. The love of teaching is not enough to keep able men and women in the profession. Many quit because they can't afford to teach and are lured away by better pay. The odds also are against gaining capable recruits to enter teaching as a career.

Where We Raise the Money for Education, and Is the Effort Enough? Here are the many sources we now draw on. Could they and should they yield more? Are there other resources as yet untapped? These are questions, at the local, state, and national level, that we'll wish most seriously to think about, discuss, and act on after we've gone through the list.

Support for the Free Public Schools. As we've seen it is our theory and practice to regard public schooling as the responsibility of the locality from which each school's children come. This is based on our belief that the people themselves should decide what education they want at the public school level, and what they're willing to pay. With rising educational costs, as well as of costs of other local services, many communities are reexamining their tax structure. Should the property tax—the present chief local source of school revenue—be supplemented by other devices such as a local sales tax, the receipts from parking meters, or a local tax on admissions and amusements? Even the idea of lotteries has been suggested.

It has often been pointed out that it is easier for the state to decide on and collect most taxes than for the local community to do so. Should local proceeds of taxes for school support be collected by the state, then turned back to the local school unit? Is the administration of the local property tax in our community fair and efficient?

There are apt to be local debt ceilings imposed by the state, and other barriers that cut down what a local community can raise for its schools. Though they may have many children, some poorer communities haven't got the wherewithal to provide anything like adequate education.

There are many problems like these that we need to look into.

State aid is a considerable and increasing factor. The present average contribution by states to local school support is slightly better than forty percent. The amount varies substantially from state to state. Some states, like some communities, maintain they are unable to go higher. Yet many of the poorer states are spending more for education in proportion to their income than are the wealthier ones.

This unevenness in support means that the quality of public school education varies drastically, with plenty of underprivileged schools suffering from such ills as overcrowding, double sessions, and a general shortchanging of our children.

With an eye on all this, there's bound to be pressure for more support from the Federal Government. Should we revise our views that paying the costs of public education is mostly a local concern? Federal aid to education is no new thing. It goes back as far as the days of the Continental Congress. The Ordinance of 1785 bountifully helped the public schools.

Later land grants aided state colleges to get under way and led directly to many of our great state universities. But when the subject of Federal aid comes up, it brings with it the fear, mentioned earlier in this guide, that the bureaucracy of central government may take over. In the opinion of many people, the safest form Federal aid might assume, keeping its hands off such things as the curriculum, would be help with local school construction and with scholarships and fellowships. Through grants from such organizations as the National Science Foundation the Federal Government already is contributing considerable amounts toward the education of our top talent.

Education Beyond the High School. Beyond the line where our system of free education stops, the dual system of tax-supported and gift-supported institutions becomes especially noticeable. Remarks already made with regard to tax-supported secondary schools apply also in general beyond. These points, and the whole general question, deserve our continuing careful consideration.

The so-called "independent" institutions derive their income mostly from tuition, endowment, and gifts. But tuition, as we have seen, rarely meets the cost of educating the student. For those institutions that have endowment, the purchasing power of income from it has been cut in half by price inflation. Very heavy reliance therefore has to be placed on gifts. It stands to reason that in order to receive such gifts, each institution should see to it that it runs itself as economically as possible consistent with doing its job of providing the best in education.

Unrestricted gifts are the most helpful, since they permit free choice on the part of administration as to where the money can do the most good. Scholarships and fellowships from outside are exceedingly helpful to both student and institution if accompanied by a supplementary grant to the institution itself to make up the difference between tuition and the actual cost of educating the student. Grants from government or industry to do special jobs, like nuclear research, product testing, agricultural experimentation, unless they include also an allowance for overhead, can act as a drain on educational institutions, rather than a help.

The most obvious source of gifts is each institution's alumni. Because of our tendency to undercharge tuition, a gift to one's alma mater can be looked on as helping balance the score. The Yale Alumni Fund—the nation's oldest—annually pours in more than a million dollars as an unrestricted gift. But we have far from realized the full potential of alumni giving. At least half our colleges have no systematic plan of trying to get regular financial help from their own alumni. What's the situation in institutions that we, as individuals, are familiar with? What should be done?

Other sources of gifts include churches, service clubs, labor unions, and industry. In the past, churches have been an important source of support and seem likely to continue as such. Service clubs and similar organizations are a growing channel of scholarship support. Labor unions also are a source for such support, mostly with scholarship programs for children of their own membership, though their interest in general support of education is increasing. Support from industry represents a source with very important possibilities.

Through taxes, industry has always contributed the lion's share to publicly supported schools and colleges. Because companies can now deduct five percent of their income before taxes for charitable and educational contributions, their gifts to independent institutions of learning are on the rise. There's good reason for this. As *Business Week* remarks in a recent article urging industry to contribute more freely: "Corporations are directly dependent on higher education to staff their growing, increasingly complex, and exacting operations. And the private liberal arts colleges, hardest hit financially, are playing a key part in supplying trained men and women for business."

"Business"—reads a resolution passed by the Board of Directors of the National Association of Manufacturers—"must find a way to support the whole educational program, effectively, regularly and now."

This means, of course, that business should do what it can to supplement, not to replace, support which institutions are already receiving. Up to now, the aggregate corporate contribution amounts to only three percent of the total costs of higher education.

We stand on the threshold of what could be mankind's greatest opportunity for richness of life, at the dawn of an age of tremendous scientific and technological progress which demands the best in education if we are to make the most of it. In all its diversity, such education requires money—lots of money.

What shall we do about Henry Adams's remark, "The whole problem of education is one of its cost"?

In preparing this guide, the publications of the Council for Financial Aid to Education, Inc., 6 East 45th Street, New York City, have been heavily drawn on, as have those of the National Citizens Council for Better Schools, 9 East 40th Street, New York City, particularly its ***How Do We Pay For Our Schools?*** *and* ***Financing Public Education in the Decade Ahead.*** *As a start on further investigation, write these organizations for their lists of publications.*

COMING: Our Foreign Service—How Good Is It? Can We Improve It?

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Scudder, Townsend

July 10, 1958

Mr. Townsend Scudder
Center for Information on America
Washington
Connecticut

Dear Mr. Scudder:

Thank you very much for your letter of July 9 and the enclosed papers on Alaska and Hawaii.

Mr. Murrow is at present away on vacation, but I shall ask him to read this correspondence as soon as he returns in the autumn so that it can be borne in mind when future plans are made.

Very truly yours,

Secretary to Mr. Murrow

skh

Center for Information on America
Washington, Connecticut

TOWNSEND SCUDDER *President*

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July 9, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

There was one cheering note in the public announcement which the Times ran on the ending of the "See It Now" series: namely, that you and Mr. Friendly might do a few longer documentaries, nevertheless, in the same general style. I can think of no accomplishment in television which has done more to give real stature and importance to the medium than this series, and I know that in saying so I am echoing the sentiments of hundreds of thousands of other viewers.

When it comes to doing those "few longer documentaries," I am wondering if you might be considering Hawaii, now that it seems more than likely this remaining territory may achieve statehood next year? Last year VITAL ISSUES dealt with statehood in its number on Alaska, and this year in the January number on Hawaii. Copies of both are enclosed, just to recall what this organization has done about this subject.

With thanks for a wonderful series, and the hope that, at some future date, it may be resumed in full,

Most sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

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Map and drawings by C. P. Meier

HAWAII--
New Star for the Flag?

Two thousand miles off the California coast, on a cluster of small Pacific isles, a half million Americans think they have found a second Garden of Eden.

Every year more than a hundred thousand other Americans drop in to check this claim. Clearly the word is spreading that Hawaii *is* something of a paradise.

But every year Hawaii's residents are also interested in something besides the praise of tourists. They want to see an end to what they call their "second-class" citizenship. They want their islands to become a full-fledged State.

The Hawaiian Islands have been a part of the United States since 1898. Their inhabitants speak English, salute the stars and stripes, serve in our armed forces, and pay taxes to Uncle Sam.

Yet they cannot vote for President. They have no representatives in the Senate. Their one Delegate in the House of Representatives can make speeches but has no vote. And their chief local officials and judges are appointed from Washington.

All this is because Hawaii is still a Territory and not a State.

Back in 1763 American colonists on the Atlantic seaboard challenged King George III with the slogan, "No taxation without representation!" Hawaii's complaint today is somewhat the same. But Hawaii's Americans don't want independence. Nor do they seem to want tax exemption. On the contrary, they want to join up — to become a member of the Union on equal terms with the other states.

They want a star in the flag for the Garden of Eden.
How good is their claim to it?
What sort of a place is this island group?
How "close" to us is it, in every sense of the word?
And how did we get involved with it, anyway?

Geography. Look at a map of the Pacific. A third of the way across that vast ocean, just south of the Tropic of Cancer, is a string of islands stretching 1500 miles to the northwest. They are literally the crossroads of the Pacific. Shipping routes from our West Coast to both Australia and the Far East touch at Hawaii. So do routes from South America. Sailors from the Americas have stopped at this island outpost for nearly two centuries.

The Hawaiian Islands are actually the summits of an enormous underwater mountain range, belched up from a great fissure in the earth's crust. Originally they were all volcanic. Even the thousand miles of rocks, reefs, and shoals which lie to the northwest of the eight larger islands like the tail of a comet are the remains of eroded mountains.

But today only the newer of these mountain tops are inhabited. Together they make up the largest group of

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islands in the central Pacific—6,423 square miles of land, or more territory than that of Connecticut and Rhode Island combined.

And they also boast the highest peaks in the Central Pacific area. Indeed, Mauna Kea, Hawaii's 13,764-foot giant, can be said to be the highest mountain in the world. It rises

from a great plain 18,000 feet below the sea and thus soars 32,000 feet from its actual base.

Technically, the Territory of Hawaii also covers the uninhabited westerly islands as well as a coral atoll far to the south. Most of these reefs are an ornithologist's paradise, and they were declared a bird sanctuary in 1909. One big exception is the Midway Island group which is under separate management because of its vital importance as a cable station and air base.

But when people speak of Hawaii they are usually referring to the eight major islands. That is where Hawaii's 551,537 residents live.

These are the islands, too, where the original Polynesian explorers landed and settled some fourteen hundred years ago.

They called the biggest and easternmost island Hawaii — and so the archipelago got its name. It is the island of Hawaii which boasts the great Mauna Kea as well as the world's largest active volcano, Mauna Loa. This island combines the grandeur of snow-capped mountains with tropical beaches and the weird lava formations of the Hawaii National Park. Its port of Hilo is the second city of the Territory.

Across a 27-mile channel from Hawaii lies Maui, the second biggest island, which forms a close pattern of land dots with the smaller islands of Molokai, Lanai, and Kahoolawe.

Maui's extinct volcano, Haleakala, has the world's largest crater, 20 miles in circumference, full of awesome reddish cinder cones some of which are nearly a thousand feet high. Nature blessed all these islands with fantastic rock formations and breath-taking views.

Molokai is also mountainous, but it is sparsely populated. Lanai is a privately owned pineapple plantation with a model city in its interior. And Kahoolawe, the forbidding "Island of Death," was once a penal colony and is now used only as a target for naval and air bombardment.

It is the island of Oahu, with the territorial capital at Honolulu, which contains four-fifths of the Territory's people. Here you find many of the landmarks which history and picture books have made famous — the naval base at Pearl Harbor, the surf of Waikiki Beach, the jutting Gibraltar-like rock of Diamond Head, and the windswept Pali — the precipitous pass which connects one side of the island with the other.

Honolulu is a commercial metropolis, a thriving port, and an international air station. It is also the home of the University of Hawaii, with over 7,000 students. The city itself, with a population of 292,179, is about the size of Rochester, N. Y.

The last two islands are separated from Oahu by a 63-mile channel. Kauai, the oldest and most disintegrated of these mountain summits, is also the lushest in vegetation. Time has eroded its rock, producing rivers, waterfalls, precipices, and a colorful canyon of vast proportions. Kauai is the fourth of the islands in terms of population, while neighboring Niihau is a privately owned sheep ranch once fabled as the original home of the Hawaiian fire goddess Pele.

Climate. When we think of Hawaii, we think of coconut palms, surfboards, hula skirts, and *leis* — the flower garlands people wear around their necks. All these things mean sun. And Hawaii gets plenty of that.

On the map these islands clearly lie in the same latitude as Havana, Cuba, and Calcutta, India. Considering this, what is surprising about Hawaii's climate is its relative coolness.

Here is where the mountains come into the picture again. They serve to break up the face of the land and make for a great deal of diversity in temperature and humidity. This means, for instance, that the average rainfall at Honolulu can be 28 inches a year while four miles away (and a thousand feet higher) the average is 155 inches.

Another thing that gives Honolulu a mean annual temperature of 74.6 degrees is the prevailing northeast trade wind from cool ocean currents which breathes across the island chain.

Such a climate sounds ideal for man and his agricultural needs. Sun, rainfall, and rich soils have made for a tremendous variety of flowers and plants — many of them unique to Hawaii. There are more than four hundred different kinds of ornamental trees. Hibiscus is the Territory's official flower. In a recent year the islands earned $1.5 million from marketing its orchids.

The Territory's fruits read like a mouth-watering excerpt from a tropical gazetteer — coconut, breadfruit, banana, avocado, mango, papaya, guava, grape, and fig, to name a few. And one can't overlook, of course, Hawaii's fabulous wealth in sugar cane and pineapples.

History. What is man's history in these islands?

The question takes us back to about 500 A.D. Polynesia, on whose outer fringes the Hawaiian Islands lie, was the last habitable part of the globe to be occupied by man. Its original settlers were brown-skinned people of a mixed Aryan make-up from the continent of Asia.

The Polynesians were insatiable sailors who traveled across the expanses of the south Pacific from Malaya by literally island-hopping in great sea-going canoes.

For five hundred years these first Hawaiians lived in relative peace and seclusion. They fished and gardened. They lived in wood-frame, thatched-roof houses with stone, mat-covered floors. They pounded the root of the taro plant into a paste called *poi* which they cooked as their main food.

From the beginning, religion played a dominant part in their lives. They worshipped such gods as Kane, Kanaloa, Ku, and Lono. The life of the Hawaiians became increasingly regimented through complex religious tabus. As late as 1819 women were put to death for eating bananas, coconuts, pork, turtles, or certain fish.

But the Hawaiians had a lust for their life in the richness of sub-tropical nature. They made decorative use of the islands' exotic flowers. They developed an expressive kind of dance, the *hula,* which later shocked the missionaries of the 19th century. They fashioned musical instruments and passed

on folklore through chants and songs. They swam, boxed, wrestled, and competed in every form of athletic contest.

The first recorded discovery of Hawaii by the outside world did not come until a January day in 1778, when Captain James Cook, an Englishman searching for a passage through America to the Atlantic, sighted the islands of Oahu and Kauai.

The natives who greeted Cook and exchanged food for iron nails were certain that he was the god Lono. His reception was jubilant, and he made friends with the island chieftains. Unfortunately Cook's return visit the next year was marred by a misunderstanding with islanders during one landing expedition, and in the ensuing foray he was killed.

Cook's visits coincided with the rise of a native leader named Kamehameha, who learned much from the ways of the white men.

Oppressive political and religious rule had brought much bloodshed and civil war in the preceding decades. It was Kamehameha — "The Lonely One" — who gradually emerged as Hawaii's first great unifier and brought order out of chaos.

Hawaii's tough old king was able to do this despite a large influx of foreign influence in the wake of Captain Cook's discovery. Foreign influence was not necessarily good influence. Whaling vessels and trading ships soon began to make the islands a regular port of call for provisioning. They brought with them the multiple scourge of disease, pirates, convicts, and firearms. Still, Kamehameha more than held his own against the men of the West.

Hawaii's history in the 19th century is just what one would expect of such a busy crossroads. Thousands of people of every race and nationality passed through it. First came the whalers and fur traders. Later came the sandalwood shippers — who rapidly depleted the islands of their supply — and the missionaries. Later still came imported laborers from Europe and Asia to work in the sugar and pineapple fields.

Many stayed briefly, some much longer. One of the world's most homogeneous populations was destined to become the Pacific's most diversified melting pot.

A crossroads could hardly escape political importance. The result was inevitable: Hawaii's independence was threatened successively by the Spanish, the Russians, the British, and the French. Meanwhile, America's involvement deepened as we began to look westward and follow what seemed to be our "manifest destiny."

Against such a background of turmoil the first Kamehameha and his successors fashioned a surprisingly stable island state. They did this sometimes through the aid and advice of trusted foreign assistants, most of them Americans. Sometimes, less successfully, they did it through anti-foreignism and an attempted return to traditional Hawaiian ways.

Meanwhile, great changes were taking place in the once quiet and isolated islands. One of the century's most important dates was 1820, when the first shipload of Congregational missionaries from New England arrived.

Their imprint was great. Within two years they had set the Hawaiian language in writing for the first time in history. In the 1830's the Bible was translated, and the islands experienced a religious "revival." Significantly, the first convert was Kamehameha's head queen herself.

The missionaries found Hawaii a fertile field and soon stimulated public education through mission schools — a tradition which has given Hawaii today one of the nation's finest school systems.

The effect of the missionaries on the government itself was probably greatest of all. The Hawaiian kings persuaded several able Americans to detach themselves from the mission and become government advisors. One key result was a Declaration of Rights and an Edict of Toleration, both issued by Kamehameha III in 1839, and the island's first constitution in 1840 — modeled on American democratic precedents.

These first steps towards revolutionizing the Hawaiian government were followed by much activity in the next fourteen years. New law codes for the islands were carefully compiled, and in 1852 a more up-to-date constitution was promulgated. The liberal revolution, in fact, went so far and so fast under Kamehameha III and his American advisors that a treaty of annexation to the United States fell through only because of the King's death in 1854.

In the 1870's Hawaii concluded a trade treaty with the American mainland which made the islands' economy very much geared to the American market. A decade later a new treaty gave the U. S. exclusive rights to the use of Pearl Harbor as a naval coaling and repair station.

It was the attempt by King Kalakaua and his sister and successor, Queen Liliuokalani, to re-establish an absolute monarchy which caused some descendants of the missionaries, banded together as a "Committee of Safety," to depose the Queen in 1893 with the help of a U. S. military force. Then they applied for outright annexation to the mainland.

When President Cleveland learned that the "revolution" had been something of a put-up job, he withdrew the annexation treaty prepared under his predecessor. Thereupon Hawaii declared itself a Republic under the presidency of Sanford B. Dole.

Not until the Republicans returned to power in 1897 was Dole's renewed offer accepted by President McKinley, who defended the annexation by bluntly asserting, "It is manifest destiny." On August 12, 1898, Hawaii became a part of the



United States by joint resolution of the Congress. And in 1900 it was officially organized as the Territory of Hawaii under Governor Dole.

Population. Polynesians and missionaries were the only two elements in Hawaii's expanding population during the 19th century. Today their descendants are so mixed in with a score of other peoples that it is possible to find forty to fifty races or interracial mixtures represented in some Hawaiian schools.

How did all these people get there? Mainly, it seems, as a result of conscious attempts by plantation owners to find men to work in the sugar cane and pineapple fields. Sugar cultivation got under way on a large-scale basis as early as 1835. By 1859 plantation owners were interested in introducing a new labor force. They tried all sorts of experimental immigration schemes. From each new group a good many stayed, and their descendants make up a large part of the Hawaiian Americans of today.

They live together in an extraordinary degree of harmony. The Territory's largest racial group is the 37 percent who are U. S. citizens of Japanese ancestry. The so-called white Caucasian group has risen from 17 percent in 1900 to 23 percent in 1950. Other racial blocs are the native Hawaiians (17 percent), the Filipinos (12 percent), and the Chinese (6 percent).

Through various instruments — the English language, fine schools, a commonly shared history and future — these people of every race and color have all become Americans — 84 percent of them by birth, much as millions of children of immigrants from all parts of the world have become Americans throughout the mainland. They buy American cars from Detroit, they wear American clothes from New York and Los Angeles. They go to American movies and read American books.

Furthermore, they fight in American wars. In World War I, for example, the record of Hawaii's American troops had been first rate. But it took World War II and the Korean War to offer the most vivid proof of Hawaii's devotion to the common cause of the 48 states.

America's participation in World War II began in Hawaii's front yard — with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. If there was to be a time for Hawaii's citizens of Japanese descent to show their disloyalty, this would be it. The Army and Navy imposed strict martial law, and Hawaii's Japanese-Americans, under heavy suspicion, received some pretty harsh treatment despite their citizenship.

Yet after the war U. S. authorities had to admit that "not a single act of sabotage was committed by any resident of Hawaii before, during, or after the attack on Pearl Harbor." Furthermore, the war record of the Japanese-American soldiers — the "Nisei" — was phenomenal. The 100th Infantry Battalion and the 442nd Combat Team fought with great heroism — and appalling casualties— first in Italy, then in France.

When the Nisei soldiers got back to America, the 100th Infantry Battalion had become the most decorated unit of its size in American military history. The President, reviewing the great victory parade at Washington, had this to say to the survivors of both Nisei outfits: "You are now on your way home. You fought not only the enemy, but you fought prejudice — and you have won."

Later, during the Korean War, the Army's Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, was moved to comment that "the splendid part played by Hawaii in the Korean War is entirely in keeping with the distinguished record it established in World War II."

Industries. It is not surprising, with its luxuriant plant life, that Hawaii is something of an agricultural gold mine. Nor is it surprising that some of the more canny American missionaries soon changed vocations and headed for the life of the plantation owner. A gentle climate and shrewd management have established the unchallenged supremacy of two of Hawaii's agricultural industries — sugar and pineapples.

Sugar boomed first. Unlike pineapples, there was no need to create a mainland market. It was already there. Sugar has led the field ever since, with its first great rise after the reciprocity treaty of 1876. Today Hawaii's average sugar yield is 7¼ tons per acre — the highest in the world. In 1957 the islands produced over a million tons, earning the whopping total of $148.5 million from all the products of the sugar cane.

For sugar, as well as most other products, the mainland is by far Hawaii's best customer. Sugar is a big business in every sense. It requires a great deal of heavy machinery and an intricate system of irrigation. Nor is much cane wasted. The fibrous residue of the stalks — bagasse — is used both as fuel for the sugar factories, as the basis of a kind of wallboard, and as chicken feed.

The Territory's second great source of wealth is the pineapple industry, with an annual crop worth well over a hundred million.

For some years Hawaii's third great industry has been the tourist business. In 1956, however, tourism was displaced, appropriately, by a thriving construction industry worth more than $94 million. The appropriateness comes from the fact that one major item of construction has been hotels and houses to accommodate the rising tourist tide.

Other contributors to Hawaii's annual income are such products as coffee, fruit, nuts, and vegetables, and livestock and poultry products.

Against such a background, it is no wonder that Hawaii is a billion-dollar enterprise, that its per capita personal income compares favorably with that of the states, and that Hawaiians pay more than one hundred and fifty million dollars annually in taxes to the U. S. Government. As a Congressional committee report commented in 1955, "These figures make it plain that, as a business associate, the 48 States could take in no more responsible partner than Hawaii."

Transport and Communications. The air age has transformed Hawaii in more ways than one. In the 19th century Honolulu was twenty days from San Francisco, 146 days from New York.

Today the plane trip from the West Coast takes 7½ hours, and air travel has been boosted 50 percent by the inauguration of tourist fares.

Honolulu's International Airport has become to airlines what Honolulu's port has long been to shipping. In 1955 it was the tenth busiest airport in the nation. Seven international airlines connect it with the mainland, Canada, Australia, and the Far East. And four more lines fly among all fifteen of the archipelago's airports on inter-island service.

Airplanes may have cut into the passenger liner traffic between Hawaii and the West Coast. But the freight volume carried by the many steamship lines which regularly stop at Hawaii increases every year. Trans-Pacific steamers to the Orient and the South Seas make Honolulu a steady port of call.

As for communications, the islands are much like any other American state. Last year they supported seven daily newspapers and fourteen weeklies; fourteen commercial radio stations and one non-commercial one; and three TV stations at Honolulu, with three satellite stations on other islands.

The Statehood Question. The first petition to change the Territory into a State was sent to Congress in 1903 after passage by both the upper and lower chambers of the Legislature of Hawaii.

Ever since, Hawaii has been knocking at the door that leads to statehood.

In 1950, the people of Hawaii took a big step towards final preparation for admission to the Union. They ratified, by a 3 to 1 margin, a proposed state constitution drawn up by 63 elected delegates the year before—a constitution which the National Municipal League of New York said "set a new standard in the writing of a modern state constitution by convention."

We can be sure that proponents of statehood for Hawaii will intensify their efforts as never before during the next sessions of Congress. Since statehood is an irrevocable and final act, their case as well as the case for the opposition should be carefully examined.*

What should Congress do?

**Write your representatives in Congress for the latest Hearings and Statehood Bills.*

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ALASKA- 49th State?





Art. by C. P. Meier.

Alaska, in Aleut language, means "The Great Land."

It's just that.

It is twice the size of Texas, with enough over to make a couple of dozen Delawares. Alaska has seven major river basins, with the Yukon the largest. It's got America's tallest mountain—Mt. McKinley. Its coast line is longer than that of "Stateside" U.S.A.—longer than the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts combined.

The latest U.S. census check gives Alaska 209,000 inhabitants. In the past ten years Alaska has lead all States percentagewise in population gains. That's not a new situation. Between 1929 and 1939, Alaska also beat out all except Florida and New Mexico. Thousands of homes recently built show Alaska's growth.

But the elected representatives of these U.S. citizens—two Senators and a Congressman—still wait to be seated by Congress.

Alaska is so big and there are so many things to think about concerning it that we better duck preliminaries and get down to business.

Geography. Look at the map. There's Alaska's huge interior, largely undeveloped, but with natural resources in rich abundance. This interior is known as the Central Area, with the city of Fairbanks, Alaska's second in size, serving as supply point.

There's the Southeastern Area, the Panhandle, which, besides its mainland, is made up of hundreds of islands—the channel between forming the Inside Passage familiar to tourists from U.S. West Coast ports and Canada's British Columbia. At the start of the Panhandle is Alaska's third largest town, Ketchikan, with its new 55 million dollar pulp plant and its fleet of 2,000 fishing vessels which supply the nine canneries of this salmon canning capital of the world.

In the Panhandle are such other towns as Sitka, capital during Russian ownership, and Juneau, capital now.

Westward, where the Panhandle joins the pan, lies the South Central Geographic Area, where Anchorage, Alaska's largest city, is located. The South Central Area includes the Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian Islands, stretching in a nine hundred mile crescent between Bering Sea and the North Pacific. The end of the chain is near enough so that Japan had little trouble, at the start of World War II, in taking over Kiska and Attu Islands, the only part of the American Continent to suffer occupation. It cost 2,500 American lives to drive the invaders out.

Fourth and final area is the Northwestern, facing the Arctic Ocean at the top, and with Siberia, to the west across Bering Strait, only fifty-four miles away. Nome, former gold rush town, is the major port for the Arctic Region, being accessible by sea from June to October. Point Barrow, northernmost community on the American Continent, can be

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Editor: Townsend Scudder, President of the Center.

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reached from the sea for only a few summer weeks, but defense, needs, particularly the installing and operating of DEW-line sites—units in our radar Distant Early Warning system to guard against air attack—have created something of a boom for Barrow as supply point for the icy, windblown arctic coast.

Climate. Three-fourths of Alaska lie in the north temperate zone. Only one-fourth is beyond the Arctic Circle. Thanks to the Japan Current, which flows along the western coast, most of Alaska's principal towns have the same sort of winters as Maine, Vermont, and much of Massachusetts. Sitka's and Ketchikan's winter averages approximate those of Philadelphia and Washington; Juneau's those of New York City. Mean average January temperature for Anchorage is 20° above, which puts it on a par with Concord, New Hampshire. Fairbanks and the region around it are the only substantially populated areas where the thermometer occasionally dips to 60 or more below. But like many parts of the U.S.A., Fairbanks can be warm in summer, cold in winter. Scotland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark lie in similar latitudes and have similar climatic conditions, yet manage to support prosperous populations. The only novelties which new residents have to get used to are long hours of summer sunlight and short winter days. In this land of the midnight sun, at the height of summer, there are from 18 to 24 hours of daylight. With 20 hours of night in mid-winter, residents of Fairbanks are thankful for their municipal street lighting system.

Life in Alaska. It is perhaps surprisingly like what we're used to. In the towns, where most Alaskans live, think of Main Street, U.S.A. A glance at the Fairbanks *Daily News Miner** shows that the P.T.A. will meet at 3:30 P.M. at the Aurora School. There'll be a food sale of the American Legion Auxiliary on Thursday. The American Association of University Women is to hold its annual meeting. The Community Presbyterian Church will conduct a Bazaar at the University. There's a little theater group, Service Clubs—Lions, Kiwanis, Rotary, etc.—Boy and Girl Scouts, and 4-H.

Cost of living is high, because many of the necessities have to come from far away, and transportation is expensive. A differential of 25% isn't unusual compared with prices "Stateside." But Alaskan wages help balance things up.

Though they have fun, and ways to get recreation, Alaskans work hard. Work is essential in order to build homes, local communities, and a State.

Alaska's people have been drawn from every State of the Union. There's a great deal of the pioneer spirit. A considerable number of recent settlers are former soldiers, sailors, and airmen who were stationed in Alaska, grew to like the North, and settled there after their tour of duty. These days, at Tok Junction, site of the U.S. Customs Station on the Alaskan Highway, it is not uncommon to see family cars and trailers piled high with personal belongings. These newcomers are looking for the same kind of government which they lived under in the States. They'd like to help elect the President, have representatives in Congress to look after their interests, and keep as free a hand as possible in running their own affairs. Like previous settlers, they have to get used to the fact they're denied these privileges—since a territory is in many ways like a colonial possession.

Alaska has its Indians and Eskimos too—some thirty-thousand in all. They've come a long way in learning to take part in the white man's plan of living. Eskimos at Point Barrow, along with fishing and hunting, get good jobs in defense work. Indians and Eskimos have served with distinction in the Alaska legislature.

Cities and towns. Alaska's towns—small by Stateside standards—tend to think of themselves not in actual population but in terms of the area they serve as marketing, business, and education centers. Thus Anchorage, the largest, likes to measure its size not according to its 27,500 inhabitants but according to the 60 to 90 thousands in addition which it serves as a trading center. These include U.S. armed forces personnel from nearby Fort Richardson and Elendorf Air Force Base.

Anchorage, overlooking Cook Inlet and with the spectacular Alaska range, including Mt. McKinley, to the North, planned carefully for its wide streets. It has several fine hotels, good shops, and modern stores. Two daily papers supply news. It has three radio and two TV stations.

Anchorage dreams of itself as the air crossroads of the world. The shortest flight distance from New York to Tokyo passes over Alaska.

The town first came into existence in 1914 as a transportation center—the tidewater base of the railroad planned for the Interior. Since then, for motor travel, the 330 mile Glenn Highway has come, linking Anchorage, via Tok Junction, to the rest of the U.S.A. In 1923, when its airfield was started, the whole town turned out to help—men, women, and children. They cleared sixteen acres of stumps and undergrowth in a single day. Now Anchorage has a multi-million dollar international airport. It has a fine modern library—gift of a pioneer Anchorage businessman—and a five million dollar High School.

Alaska's school population is 28,000, predicted to double within the next five years. Two-thirds of Alaska's territorial budget go to education. Alaska prides itself on one of the best school systems anywhere. The level of pay recognizes the worth and importance of teachers.

Fairbanks, second largest city, is thus far Alaska's only important community not on salt water. It's on the Chena River, and the Tanana, which flow into the mighty Yukon. It is the interior railhead of the Alaska Railway. Fairbanks also has an international airport that rivals Anchorage's claims.

The citizens of Fairbanks have had to tackle many tough problems in their wish for comfortable year-round living. Temperatures tumble, here in the interior, and how keep water mains from freezing? The city fathers met the dilemma by installing a loop system which keeps the water circulating.

Alaskans show keen interest in municipal government, with council sessions well attended. Fairbanks is working fast to clear away the shacks of its earlier pioneer past. Its urban redevelopment program includes commercial and residential areas and a city park. The ten story Polaris Building, with apartments and offices above and stores below, is the city's particular pride.

Servicemen from nearby Ladd Field and Eielson Air Base help keep the tills jingling on pay days. Near-by University of Alaska has an on campus population of close to six hundred, with an increasing non-Alaskan enrollment. Its community branches serve thousands.

Information about Alaska's other towns may be obtained by writing to the local Chambers of Commerce, or the Alaska Resources and Development Board, P.O. Box 2391, Juneau, Alaska. Among them are Seward, named for the man most influential in getting Alaska. Seward serves as the southern terminus of the Alaska Railroad and base for the Alaska Steamship Company operating from Puget Sound in the State of Washington. Besides Ketchikan, there are such fishing and lumbering towns as Haines, which also has a newly completed thirty million dollar oil pipeline waiting for interior development. There's Kodiak, one of Alaska's richest canning areas, headquarters for the U.S. Navy in Alaska. And there's Palmer, in the Matanuska Valley, where the annual Alaska State Fair is held.

**The* Daily News-Miner, *on Wednesday, November 7, 1956, published its seventh annual Progress Edition. Copies of this 144 page issue on Alaska have been sent to college and community libraries all over the U.S.A., and may be looked at there. For detailed, 600 page, well and interestingly written study of Alaska, see* The State of Alaska, *by Ernest Gruening, 1954. Former Governor, and pending Senator Elect, it should be borne in mind for judicious reading that the author favors statehood.*

Agriculture. Visitors from Stateside to the country fairs held at Palmer, Fairbanks, Homer, Skagway, and Juneau are apt to be surprised at the size and quality of the produce. Agriculture isn't easy and, as true elsewhere, there are special conditions that have to be studied and met. In favorable regions like Matanuska practically all crops of the northern states can be grown. Good vegetables include potatoes, cabbages, and broccoli. The shorter season is made up for by longer hours of daylight. The Matanuska-Tanana Valley Farmers Co-operative advertises home produced homogenized and chocolate milk, ice cream, cottage cheese and other dairy products. Experts maintain there are hundreds of thousands of acres which, if opened for homesteading, could support an agricultural industry in Alaska. Since Alaska today imports 90% of its perishable produce—adding considerably to living expense—the promise of agricultural development is great.

But it is industrial development which holds the largest potential.

Industries. Alaska's traditional sources of income have been mining and fishing. The Klondike Gold Rush, which presently spread to Alaska, soon petered out. But gold still is mined and by modern methods—great dredges that do the job of hundreds of men—though the pegged price of the metal cuts sharply into profits. Other mineral resources, virtually untapped—uranium, iron, coal, nickel, limestone, copper, oil—are waiting. Lack of ways to get at them and high transportation costs are among the difficulties. But another problem, almost without realization on the part of those in charge in Washington, has been growing through the years. It is summed up like this in a recent Congressional Report from the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, recommending statehood for Alaska: "Federal policies of the last half century . . . have withdrawn . . . from public use many of the more valuable resources of the Territory through . . . creation of tremendous Federal reservations . . . It appears to the Committee that this tremendous acreage . . . might well embrace a preponderance of the more valuable resources needed by the new State to develop flourishing industries with which to support itself and its people." The Committee recommends that Statehood legislation should work out ways to correct ". . . the present distorted land ownership pattern . . . under which . . . the Federal Government owns over 99% of the total area . . ."

By 1925, Alaska had become the world's top salmon producer—but this wasn't a cause for rejoicing among Alaskans. Alaska's canneries were owned and operated by Stateside companies, and as the official U.S. Census Report remarked as early as 1890, "the vast sums paid out every season by the salmon canning companies . . . fall . . . almost entirely into the hands of non-residents of the territory." Stateside companies found it cheaper and easier to import and board help—both white and Chinese—than to hire resident labor. This wasn't Alaskans' only gripe. Right from the start, the Stateside companies set fish traps in Alaskan rivers that threatened the extinction of the crop—since salmon spawn upstream. Because the Federal Government controlled such matters in the territory, Alaskans found themselves powerless to resist, except through protests of their voteless delegate to Congress. "The whole policy of these fish trusts"—said delegate James Wickersham—"is to take everything out. . . . They are robbing the territory."

When Federal regulations were presently set up designed to let some fish past the traps, a distant Congress, not able to see the problem at first hand, failed to appropriate enough funds for adequate enforcement. California, Oregon, and Washington, as States, soon passed laws of their own abolishing fish traps. Alaska, as a Territory, lacked the right to do so. When the 1953 salmon catch skidded to its lowest point in thirty-two years, President Eisenhower found it necessary to declare Alaska a "disaster area."

Since then, the salmon crop has again started up. But Alaskans feel that only the powers of Statehood can serve to safeguard the industry.

Meanwhile, the manufacture of pulp promises to become an Alaskan major industry, with year-round plants talked about for Juneau, Sitka, Wrangell, and Petersburg to keep pace with the one at Ketchikan.

Alaska's timber resources, both for pulp and lumber, are very great, and responsible Alaskans mean to keep them an asset to the forty-ninth State through foresighted modern techniques and conservation.

Alaska's power resources are huge. With its imposing mountain ranges and abundant water, Alaska has hundreds of sites for industrial hydroelectric power.

Transportation. That's always a problem in pioneering, and for big and rugged and distant Alaska, in the earliest days, it was particularly rough. Once dog teams were the chief reliance. Today, thanks to aviation, not a village in the remotest region lacks transportation.

Since the start, Alaska has depended on supplies by sea. For quite some time, certain parts of the interior have been served by rail. And, as a highway system develops, following Alaska's recent incorporation into the Federal highway program, there should also be more transportation by car and by truck.

Alaskans have long been sensitive about the relationship between cost of living and cost of transportation. Therefore the monopoly in Alaskan shipping long held by a single Stateside company, with resulting high freight rates, has led to repeated protests. In 1947 the Alaska Legislature told Congress: "High freight rates have obstructed Alaska's development for over thirty years." As a territory, Alaska could do nothing about it. What's more, this situation, adverse to Alaska but profitable to the company, had been made possible through laws passed by Congress and by Supreme Court decision. Today, the situation is a good deal better, with two companies—Alaska Steamship and Alaska Freight—carrying supplies from Puget Sound. There are Canadian ships from Vancouver and excursion steamers from the U.S. Pacific coast. There's a new combination truck van and sea piggyback route. Very presently, the same sort of thing will be moving railroad cars to Alaska from Stateside and Canadian lines. And, providing increasing competition, there are planes.

Air transport has proved a Godsend to Alaska. Everything from dog teams to mining equipment for remote developments goes by plane. Practically all major Alaskan cities receive year-round perishable foodstuffs from Stateside by air. Alaskans are amazingly airminded. They fly from thirty to forty times as much as other Americans—measured either by flights or by passenger miles. Many own planes.

It all started with the bush pilots. They carried supplies anywhere. They flew in medicine or took the injured and sick to hospitals. Their landing places were river sand bars, lakes, and any small clearing. Equipped with skis in winter, they needed only a patch of snow. What bush pilots lacked in navigation aids they made up through skill—for Congress did not at once extend to Alaska help in the form of radio range stations and beacons which the Air Commerce Act of 1926 brought to Stateside aviation. Presently, through its own pilots and its own financing, Alaska had a commercial transport network that was all its own. Wien Alaska Airlines maintains service to Point Barrow, farthest north, daily except Sunday and Monday. You can go to Chalkyitsik—Eskimo village—every third Saturday of the month on regular schedule. Wien and competing airlines fly to practically every inhabited point.

Requiring substantial capital and counting on Federal support, Alaska's air link with the forty-eight states lagged behind territorial enterprise. In June, 1940, regular scheduled flights began from Seattle.

Testimony at hearings before the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board presently brought up the fact that because of competition between Stateside lines, freight and passenger rates to Alaska are being kept at reasonable levels.

In the Fall of '56, Pan American World Airways assigned double decker Strato Clippers to its regular daily Fairbanks

run. In 1957, Scandinavian Airlines plans to open its Oslo to Tokyo route with a flight stop at Anchorage.

Past, Present and Future. From dog-sled days to jets—past, present, and future play a part in the question of the forty-ninth State.

Let's take a quick scamper through Alaska's history.

1741 — discovered by Vitus Bering, a Dane by birth and officer in the Imperial Russian Navy.

1867 — sold by Russia to the United States for $7,200,000. Five weeks after purchase, U.S. citizens at Sitka held town meetings, drew up a charter, elected a city council and mayor, started a school, and established a court. But Uncle Sam had failed to take any Congressional action to provide for government. So what Sitka's citizens did was strictly on their own, and with no certified legality. Actually a settler couldn't acquire title to land or be sure his marriage was legal. Though Secretary Seward, visiting Sitka, recommended Congress give Alaska government, nothing happened. Under these circumstances, Sitka's pioneering boomlet wheezed out. Petitions asking Washington to take notice got lost in the Congressional Committees to which referred.

1884 — Congress passed the Organic Act giving Alaska a government. The laws of the State of Oregon—said the Act—were to apply. Federal district courts were to be formed, a governor appointed by the President, and the capital moved to Juneau from Sitka. The fact that not all the laws of Oregon fitted Alaska's circumstances was something Alaskans were left to face. The Act specifically prohibited a legislative assembly or delegate to Congress, and excluded Alaska from Stateside general land laws. There could be no homesteading, yet.

1885 — Governor A. P. Swineford, the President's appointee, called the attention of Congress ". . . to the unjust withholding from Alaska of political rights never before denied to any section of territory or any fraction of the American people since the adoption of the Federal Constitution."

1903 — Homestead Act extended to include Alaska. Catch was that regulations O.K. Stateside not suitable to Alaskan conditions.

1906 — Congress authorized Alaska to send a delegate to Congress—but voteless and not to serve on committees.

1912 — Congress allowed Alaska to elect a legislature—but with no say as to resources, and with such laws as it passed subject to cancellation by Congress or Governor's veto.

1914 — Railroad, Seward to Fairbanks, authorized by Congress.

1923 — Railroad—470 miles of track—almost completed. Warren G. Harding, first President to visit Alaska, drove the gold spike. His death, soon after, lost Alaska probable support for statehood.

1935 — Matanuska Valley Federal Settlement project, with colonists assisted by government loans. Experiment started agriculture as practical industry there.

1940 — U.S. begins construction of Alaskan military bases, bringing fresh impetus to Alaska's growth. Defense also brought assistance through federal funds to help communities near bases build utilities like sewer and water works. Prior to 1940 nothing in the way of defense really done. Proposal for Naval Station on Kiska Island, as early as 1902, never acted on, so Japanese invaded and occupied Attu and Kiska in '41. Today Alaska recognized as strategic defense barrier for Canada and U.S.

1949 — Legislature sets up a basic tax program, making Alaska better able to take care of activities State must carry on in behalf of its people. Alaska's income tax geared closely with Federal, licking problem of having yearly to compute two widely different forms. As Territory, Alaska long been paying Federal taxes without representation, a practice which "Senator Elect" William A. Egan, in 1957, has pointed out "our forefathers found . . . distasteful."

1955 — Congress puts Alaska under Federal Aid Highway Act, Territory having previously been excluded. As Governor Heintzleman pointed out, "This great forward step assures a sustained program for the construction of the roads and highways we so badly need."

1956 — Alaska's Constitution ratified by its people. It awaits our O.K.

Alaska—Forty-ninth State? Alaska's new Constitution is considered by experts a model document. Constitutional Convention delegates, in writing it, bore in mind America's one hundred and eighty years experience in self-government. Their aim was to incorporate the best features of America's most adequate State Constitutions, and at the same time take into account Alaska's special problems and needs. The end result, Alaskans hope, will foster the growth, development, and welfare of the forty-ninth state and its people.

A recent House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee report says that "The committee is convinced that statehood for Alaska at the earliest possible date will promote the best interests of the nation as a whole as well as those of the Territory," and adds that, "by historical standards, Alaska is ready and qualified for statehood now." These standards it lists as:

(1) Belief by the inhabitants in the principles of democracy as exemplified by the U.S.A.
(2) Wish for Statehood.
(3) Sufficient population and resources to support State government, and at the same time carry a fair share of the cost of Federal Government.

But since 1916, when the first Alaskan Statehood Bill was introduced, Congress hasn't fully opened the door. After all, admission to the Union is a serious matter and not to be lightly bestowed. The minority declaration of the recent report of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, differing from the favorable majority report, has advocated this:

"Statehood for both Hawaii and Alaska should be deferred pending the adoption of an appropriate constitutional amendment to provide for representation in the United States Senate on a basis proportionate to population."

"Statehood for both Hawaii and Alaska should be deferred pending some other satisfactory solution of the problem . . ."

President Eisenhower, referring to statehood in his January 16, 1957 budget message said: "I . . . recommend the enactment of legislation admitting Hawaii into the Union as a state, and that, subject to area limitations and other safeguards for the conduct of defense activities so vitally necessary to our national security, statehood also be conferred upon Alaska."

For the Alaskan part of the statehood question, what should the answer be? Shall Alaska be admitted to the Union and

its elected representatives seated? "The basic arguments for and against have been presented," says E. L. Bartlett, voteless delegate from Alaska, "over the years." We have plenty of comments and statements by public officials to help us decide. We have a crop of bills before Congress. What should Congress do? Why?

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Washington, Connecticut

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ROBERT E. SPILLER,
Chairman of the Department of American Civilization
University of Pennsylvania
Former President of the American Studies Association

June 9, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Of course I am disappointed that, because of an alteration in the format of SEE IT NOW, it will not be possible to go forward with the collaboration involving VITAL ISSUES which we discussed.

I shall await with keen anticipation news from you, in the autumn, as to whether something can be worked out in connection with a new program that is being contemplated.

With thanks and regards,

Sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

TS:DVR

An independent educational corporation, non-profit and non-partisan, dedicated to furthering the knowledge and understanding of America by Americans through informational publications, radio, films, television, and conferences.

Scudder, Townsend

June 3, 1958

Dear Mr. Scudder:

I regret to tell you that the format of SEE IT NOW is to be altered in such fashion that it will not be possible to go forward with the collaboration we discussed.

It may be that something can be worked out in connection with a new program that is being contemplated, but I won't know about that until autumn.

Sincerely,

Mr. Townsend Scudder
Center for Information on America
Washington, Connecticut

fc

Center for Information on America
Washington, Connecticut

TOWNSEND SCUDDER *President*

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Council Member and former President of the
American Studies Association, a national society
for the study of American civilization.

May 26, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Thanks again for the opportunity to discuss with you the possibility of using VITAL ISSUES in conjunction with your television presentations. We have placed "The Problem of the Railroads" on our list for Volume VIII, starting in September, and, as I remarked, our schedule is sufficiently flexible to fit in with any plans you may decide to make. The same thing goes for "Latin America," which already was on our list for the coming year.

I shall look forward with keen anticipation to hearing from you toward the end of June, when I understood you to say a decision might be ready.

Meanwhile, I take pleasure in enclosing herewith our most recent number, on the subject of Exchange of Persons.

With regards,

Sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

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

Drawings by C. P. Meier

EXCHANGE OF PERSONS-
Back Door to Peace?

An American theatrical troupe puts on "Porgy and Bess" in Moscow and wins enthusiastic ovations.

An American pianist gains top honors in a Soviet musical contest and is wildly applauded.

A Soviet ballet company performs Russian folk dances before packed and approving audiences at the New York Met, and, by way of encore for its American tour, swings into the Virginia reel to the tune of "Turkey in the Straw."

That's "exchange of persons."

International exchange—a chance for better understanding based on closer acquaintanceship—takes place, too, when a U.S. farm boy or girl lives and works for a time with some farm family abroad in Denmark, in France, in India, or wherever it may be, and the son or daughter of that household comes to America for a similar experience.

Exchanging students, exchanging teachers, exchanging athletes for international contests, exchanging scientific missions are all parts of the same idea.

In the broad sense, a very important element is made up also of ordinary tourists. "As you travel abroad"—suggests President Eisenhower to the several million Americans expected to be touring during 1958—"the respect you show for foreign laws and customs, your courteous regard for other ways of life, and your speech and manner help mold the reputation of our country. Thus, you represent us all in bringing assurance to the people you meet that the United States is a friendly nation and one dedicated to the search for world peace and to the promotion of the well-being and security of the community of nations."

During this same year, around seven hundred thousand visitors will be within our borders.

It seems likely that exchange of persons will exert an increasing influence on the course of international relations. That's one reason why the idea has become a part of U.S. foreign policy.

"The most fabulously successful investment ever authorized by the United States Congress"—that's how a Government official has described the U.S. State Department's exchange of persons program which in the last ten years has sponsored exchange of more than 50,000 people between this country and eighty foreign nations.

The number is swelled by other U.S. programs and by the thousands of exchanges conducted by private organizations. In 1955-56, according to a count by the Institute of International Education, there were over 36,000 foreign students in the U.S.A.

We've been participating in exchange of persons programs not just to step up the flow of scientific or technical knowledge. Our recently signed agreement on exchanges with the Soviet Union states that the primary purpose is "the improve-

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Editor: Townsend Scudder, President of the Center.

First Printing, June, 1958
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ment of mutual understanding between the peoples of the United States and the U. S. S. R."

Can greater progress toward better understanding and a more peaceful world be made in the atmosphere of meetings among ordinary people from all walks of life than in the rarefied diplomatic air of "the Summit"?

How well does the idea work? What advantages, what disadvantages or dangers are involved?

What about the backgrounds and foregrounds of the entire movement?

It's a vital issue, all right, since each of us, as an individual American, may play a role, either at home or abroad, in this approach to world peace.

EXCHANGE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

While negotiations for a Summit conference have sputtered and stalled, the few months since the signing of the U.S.-Soviet agreement on cultural exchanges have seen a startling upsurge of unofficial and non-diplomatic good will between East and West. Speaking of Van Cliburn, who won the Tschaikovsky International Competition in Moscow, correspondent William J. Jorden, in his dispatch to *The New York Times,* wrote that "A young pianist from Texas has done more to promote good relations with the Soviet people than any American for a long time."

"According to reports from New York," the *Times* correspondent added, "Moscow's Moiseyev Dance Company are creating the same sort of good will for their country in the United States."

"You have done better than the politicians," remarked Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan, as the young pianist was receiving the congratulations of Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev himself.

Track squads, weight lifters, chess teams, and wrestlers are swelling the list of participants meeting this year in East-West competition. The basketball squads we sent over played before enthusiastic standing room only crowds who applauded as the Russian men's team lost to the visitors and the Russian women's team won.

Before the year is out, there'll be further exchanges, including students, delegations of industrialists, scientists, farmers, college professors, and others in many fields. American experts on East-West relations, without discounting the importance of such individual triumphs as young Cliburn's, feel that group exchanges will in the long run prove more steadily effective in producing good relations between the peoples of the two countries.

That's why it is worth watching the start of student exchanges this year.

Three separate groups thus far are taking part. More are anticipated for 1959. During May, five student editors and their Russian counterparts exchanged visits. This summer, forty Americans and twenty Russian students are visiting each other's countries. The major part of the program begins in September, with an exchange of twenty students from each country for the entire academic year.

And this year there'll be something else added. For the first time since 1947, a U.S. Cabinet officer will visit the U.S.S.R. There may be other Government officials, too, along with Senators and Congressmen who, in increasing numbers, are planning to take a personal look at the Soviet Union. Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, accepting an invitation first extended by Vladimir Matskevich, Soviet Minister of Agriculture, when Mr. Matskevich was touring here in 1955 with a delegation of Russian farm experts, plans to visit agricultural research centers and farms in the Soviet this summer, with a look also, during his ten day stay, at the All-Union Agricultural Exhibition in Moscow.

Why this surge of interest?

One reason is that for a long time there has been an almost complete lack of normal communication between the two countries. Nearly twenty years ago Winston Churchill described Russia as "a riddle wrapped up in a mystery inside an enigma." The intervening years have not measurably improved the puzzle. The simple fact is that Americans don't know very much about the people of the U.S.S.R., and the Russian people have had almost no opportunity to learn about us except through their government's controlled propaganda.

If we are to deal realistically with the challenge that the Soviet Union poses we need to know more about the U.S.S.R.

As for Russian knowledge of us, we'd like to break through the Soviet curtain of censorship and propaganda designed to distort for the Russian people the picture of America.

The Immediate Background

Negotiations for exchange of persons with the Soviet Union date back to the period during which the United States and Russia had been allies in World War II. But American efforts to maintain this wartime friendship were frustrated by the Soviet "cold war" policy of the later 'forties, and by the hot war in Korea during the 'fifties. After Stalin's death, hopes were renewed at the Geneva Summit meeting in 1955 that the U.S.S.R. might change its uncompromising tactics and take a more liberal attitude toward exchanges. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles summed up American policy in a seventeen point proposal on the subject. Among the things the U.S. wanted were removal of travel restrictions, a free exchange of printed matter, the halting of censorship and jamming of American radio broadcasts, and "freer exchange of information and ideas."

A few exchanges did result. One was of medical missions. The other was the well publicized exchange of farm delegations.

The medical mission exchange grew out of a request made by the Soviet Government for a visit by U.S.S.R. doctors to study our methods of combating polio. The Russian delegation arrived on January 18, 1956. Among places visited was the University of Pittsburgh, where the Soviet doctors conferred with Dr. Jonas Salk. On February 25—the day the Russians left for home—an American delegation of medical men set out for a month's visit to Russia. After their return, they made a report:

"Members of the American Medical Mission . . . believe that it would be arrogant, stupid, and even dangerous for the United States to ignore Soviet medicine and research. They recommend that all appropriate steps be taken to develop channels of communication between the medical scientists of the Soviet Union and the United States by exchange of . . . literature, materials, and personnel. . . .

"It should be remembered that our ignorance of the Russian medical literature is not entirely due to language barriers; even more important is the psychological barrier of considering this literature not worthy of attention. . . .

"There seems no risk of consequence to the United States involved in getting a clear picture of Soviet medicine and medical research. The benefits to the United States seem real."*

Further U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. negotiations on exchange were

*Quoted from Public Health Monograph No. 50, 1957, U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

interrupted by the strained relations rising out of Russian suppression of the Hungarian revolution in 1956. In the fall of 1957, negotiations were formally resumed. On January 27, 1958, the exchange agreement was signed.

What advantages, what disadvantages or dangers are involved in exchange of persons with Russia?

Russia's reasons in consenting to the exchange agreement are of great interest and importance to us in our quest for peace and security. They present a problem deserving careful thought. What conjectures can we make as to Russia's motives?

THE EXCHANGE OF PERSONS IDEA

Exchange of persons, or as it is sometimes called, "cultural exchange," is nothing new. Whenever trade between nations is carried on, whenever students study abroad, whenever people travel in foreign countries, then cultural exchange takes place.

What is new is the idea that such exchanges might be used, not just to gain specific knowledge or to promote trade, but to build international understanding.

The United States, with its citizenry composed as it is of a number of nationalities, owes a great deal to cultural exchange. We have never been "isolated" from the rest of the world. Our heritage includes what we've gotten from the people of many lands.

One of the first formal exchange programs is that of the Rhodes Scholarships. For more than fifty years these scholarships have enabled Americans and the citizens of the British Commonwealth to study at Oxford. It is noteworthy that Cecil Rhodes, a private citizen of Great Britain, in setting up the program, specified that the scholarships were to go to young men who were not merely scholars but all around persons and potential leaders who would truly represent their countries and would benefit from personal contact with English culture.

The first step by the U. S. A. to foster international exchange was taken in 1908 when President Theodore Roosevelt authorized an act enabling Chinese students to study in this country.

World War I and the experience of global conflict greatly

emphasized the need for international understanding.

In 1921, Herbert Hoover, who had been administrator of Belgian War Relief, sponsored an exchange of students between Belgium and the U. S. By 1929 there were in Europe alone over 700 organizations, both national and international, that fostered exchange of persons. This post World War I period also saw a great increase of exchange programs in the United States. In 1923, the University of Delaware started the Junior Year Abroad program, since adopted by other colleges. By 1925, there were 115 U. S. exchange programs. The great majority were non-governmental. They were designed more to give opportunities for foreign study than to promote the cause of peace and understanding.

But awareness of the need of exchange programs as an instrument of our foreign policy was also growing. In 1938, on the eve of World War II, our representatives in Congress passed the Act For Cooperation With Other American Republics. This act was designed to cement the ties between this country and our neighbors in the hemisphere through a program of cultural exchange. It was the first to emphasize international cooperation as its primary goal and was the forerunner of the present exchange program administered by our State Department and other governmental agencies.

It was after World War II that the cornerstones of the present U. S. exchange program were laid.

The first came in 1946 when Congress passed the Fulbright Act. This act provides that the proceeds from the sale of surplus war materials abroad be used to finance the education of

American students in foreign universities and also enable foreign students to come for study to the U. S. A. This act was supplemented by the G. I. Bill, under which some 50,000 American veterans studied abroad.

The second cornerstone was laid in 1948 when Congress passed the Smith-Mundt Act. The general goals—to quote from this Information and Educational Exchange Act itself—are to "create a better understanding of the United States abroad, to develop a greater knowledge of other countries in the United States, and to advance the frontiers of learning through the exchange of knowledge."

Assistant Secretary of State William Benton, part of whose job it was to set the program up, felt that ". . . exchange . . . is the most important single activity . . . for the long pull. There is greater long-range value out of face to face contacts, and the intimate knowledge that comes through exchange of professors, students, technicians, than in the more transitory or temporary results gained through information activities."

The program centers around the interchange between the U. S. A. and other countries of persons who, by virtue of their interests and careers at home and their activities and contacts while abroad, can best explain our institutions and be of mutual benefit to us and to peoples in participating countries.

The tenth anniversary of the Smith-Mundt Act was celebrated in January, 1958, by the signing of the exchange agreement with the Soviet Union. At the ceremony, President Eisenhower referred to the Smith-Mundt Act as "the basic legislation of our Government's overseas information and cultural exchange programs" and added that "these programs are an important part of our effort to convey to everybody in the world a simple, basic truth: America wants peace."

Support from the People

Though part of a national program, a very large share of what's being done is carried on and paid for by private organizations and people.

For example, Van Cliburn and Joyce Flissler, an American violinist who placed seventh in the now famous Moscow competition, traveled to the U. S. S. R. on a grant from the Martha Baird Rockefeller Aid to Music Program. A third American contestant paid his own way. Once inside Russia, the Soviet Government took care of contestants' expenses. Bob Hoffman, an American bar bell manufacturer and enthusiast for the sport, is underwriting the $20,000 cost of staging the U.S.-Soviet weight lifting competitions going on in this country and is coaching the American team. The visit of the Soviet farmers to Iowa and elsewhere in 1955 was sponsored by a newspaper, *The Des Moines Register.* A group of American veterans of the Elbe River crossing during World War II have annually raised their own funds for reunions with Russian veterans of the same historic campaign and meeting.

The American part of this summer's exchange of forty American and twenty Russian students is under the auspices of the Council of Student Travel. The Council is made up of five sponsoring agencies,† paying about one-third of each student's costs, with the individual student responsible for the rest. Costs of the visit by the Russian students are being taken care of by their government.

A statement included in the U.S.-Soviet exchange agreement comments as follows on the differences in situation in either country:

". . . On the United States side, the exchanges will, for the most part, be carried out by private persons and organizations. In the United States, private persons cannot, of course, be directed to participate in such activities. During the course of the negotiations the various persons, firms and corporations concerned with the proposed exchanges were consulted, and they have expressed their willingness and desire to participate."

This statement expresses our fundamental philosophy as a nation and our belief in the right of individual freedom. But it also indirectly brings up the problem as to whether our government should foot more or less of the bill for the exchange program. Should costs be borne mostly by private organizations and individuals, or by the Federal Government? What are the advantages, what the disadvantages, either way?

Private Enterprise Doing a Job

There are a great number of private organizations on the job. Most of their programs are described in the two handbooks listed in the box on this page.

Programs are being sponsored by such organizations as the Boy Scouts, Kiwanis, Rotary International, and the National Federation of Women's Clubs. Several American copper companies with large holdings in Chile provide fellowships for Chilean students in this country. Several air lines offer free travel for certain scholarship winners coming to America. Virtually every American university offers scholarships for foreign students, as do such foundations as the Rockefeller, Ford, Guggenheim, and Carnegie. Foundations also sponsor foreign study grants for Americans, thus supplementing the Government's Fulbright program.

In the limited space of this guide, it is possible to mention only a handful as examples of the rest:

The Institute of International Education, 1 East 67th Street, New York 21, New York, a private organization which acts as a clearing house for different programs, both governmental and private. It coordinates and administers these programs at home and abroad.

The International Farm Youth Exchange (IFYE), conducted by The National 4-H Club Foundation, 8561 Fenton Street, Silver Spring, Maryland, enables 150 young people to come to the U.S. to live and work on farms for four to six months, while sending 150 young American farmers abroad for a similar period.

The American Field Service International Scholarships, 113 East 30th Street, New York 16, N.Y., enable several hundred foreign teen-agers each year to spend a year in the U.S., living with American families and attending American high schools.

The Experiment in International Living, Putney, Vermont, sends American students abroad for summer visits in a foreign country, including up to a month's stay in a private home.

The American Friends Service Committee, 20 South 12th Street, Philadelphia 7, Pennsylvania, undertakes public service projects in foreign countries with the help of American teen-agers. Typical projects have included repairing earthquake damage in Greece and aid to flood devastated countries in North Europe.

The English Speaking Union, 19 East 54th Street, New York 22, N.Y., supports a program whereby American and English students are exchanged for a year of study in preparatory schools.

ANTA International Exchange Program, ANTA, 1545 Broadway, New York City, sponsors tours of American stage plays abroad, and participates in international drama festivals.

People-to-People, Inc., 45 West 45th Street, New York, N.Y., concerns itself with the friendly reception of foreign visitors and with what Americans can do to cultivate friendliness abroad.

†Sponsors are the Committee on Friendly Relations, the Experiment in International Living, the Lisle Fellowship of the University of Michigan, the National Student Councils of the YMCA-YWCA, and the Ecumenical Voluntary Service of the United Student Christian Council.

FOR REFERENCE

About Exchange Programs in General

Handbook on International Study — The Institute of International Education, 1 East 67th Street, New York 21, New York.

Study Abroad — International Handbook, UNESCO, United Nations, New York.

About U.S. Government Sponsored Programs

Write for information to:

The Office of Educational Exchange, U. S. Department of State, Washington 25, D.C.

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April 7, 1958

May 20 May 23 '58

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Your and Mr. Friendly's program on Atomic Fallout was wonderful and should make a tremendous contribution toward the understanding, and the thinking based on understanding, which we so desperately need if we are to survive and prosper and not become victims of our scientific progress misapplied.

As I watched the program, I trust you will forgive me if I say again that I was reminded that the Center's VITAL ISSUES, in many of the subjects it treats, could and should lend itself well to the same sort of presentation on television.

I keep thinking that such presentation could render interesting and valuable service in itself, and I know full well that once VITAL ISSUES gets on the television screen, we will have the means of getting the discussion guide itself widely known for both school and adult use. I don't mind saying that, with our necessarily very limited budget for promotion, the struggle, otherwise, is pretty heartbreaking!

I am uncertain how to proceed, and would like to turn to you for your suggestions and advice. Would you be so kind as to let me see you at your convenience? I feel that getting VITAL ISSUES on television offers perhaps the very best chance for the Center's present continuance and could give it that opportunity for growth which, in the opinion of its many well-wishers, can make it, through its various programs, a truly significant factor in American education and in the cause of good citizenship.

With regards,

Sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

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

Drawings by C. P. Meier

AIR AND SPACE TRAFFIC:

What's the Problem?

Traffic control beyond earth's atmosphere may seem like the least of the many problems we face as mankind begins venturing into outer space.

But a look at what's happened in the atmosphere between earth and space since 1903, when the Wright brothers had the air all to themselves, should convince us that outer space, too, will have its traffic hazards.

As for regulating flight traffic within the earth's atmosphere, news stories about collisions should be proof enough that our present airways traffic management system hardly seems geared to cope with what's to come.

Statistics on near misses, quite aside from collisions, indicate that under present conditions the air already is overcrowded.

What will the situation be by 1975, when it is estimated that ten times as many aircraft will be in operation?

For a variety of reasons, our methods of handling air traffic haven't kept pace with enormous advances during the past ten years made by our Air Force and our aviation industry. In this age of automation, our system of air traffic control still remains to a considerable extent in the primitive "control tower to pilot" conversational stage of guidance and direction. The system is virtually unchanged in its essentials from what was in operation in the '30's to take care of the far slower planes of that day. Existing and future technological advances for air traffic control, and the governmental set-up for managing national aviation affairs, will need to get more closely together if we're to use our vanishing air space with greater safety and efficiency.

The present chief cause of overcrowding is not just because there are more and more planes. Patterns of traffic concentration tend to follow population patterns. Thus congestion builds up over large metropolitan areas and on the routes connecting their air traffic hubs. In addition, adding to the hazards, military air bases tend to be located almost exclusively near communities with air line stops because of the need for civilian support for the military facility.

Who's to control space, and air traffic control, are all parts of a vital issue.

First let's consider air traffic control.

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Editor: Townsend Scudder, President of the Center.

First Printing, April, 1958

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WHO'S IN CHARGE?

Congress has assigned to the Civil Aeronautics Administration the job of seeing that air traffic shall flow in safe and orderly fashion. The Federal airways system set up by the Civil Aeronautics Administration consists today of a network of visual and electronic aids to navigation marking over

158,000 miles of airways. There are also supporting air-ground and point-to-point communications systems. For approach to airports, and for landing, facilities include radar, approach lights, and air traffic control systems at large airports and on charted airways. A number of large airports also have instrument landing systems.

Flying is governed by two alternative sets of rules enforced by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Under Visual Flight Rules, the pilot, to avoid collisions, relies solely on what he sees. This is normal flight procedure for most planes in good weather. Under Instrument Flight Rules, which go into effect automatically when visibility falls below certain minimums, air traffic control takes over the responsibility of assuring "positive separation" — longitudinal, lateral, and vertical — to each plane under its surveillance. Under IFR conditions, the pilot is assigned a specific altitude which he must maintain.

Instrument flight is possible and traffic control service available along all the nation's established airways, in areas around terminals, and in broad areas where intersecting routes create problems in air control. When IFR go into effect, this designated controlled airspace is specifically reserved for controlled flight.

But present air traffic control facilities haven't merely got more planes to cope with. They're also trying to provide

guidance for planes flying faster and faster. Beginning in 1959, civil jet airliners with cruising speeds of 600 miles per hour and better will join the thousands of military jets already using the airways. By 1975, it is figured that turbojet and turboprop planes will account for 90% of the domestic airline fleet. Supersonic carriers may arrive between 1970 and 1975. At the same time, and for most of the next two decades, large quantities of piston engine aircraft will operate along with the jets.

Higher speeds require a larger block of protective airspace around each plane. Faster closure rates call for faster action to eliminate collisions. The mixture of fast and slow aircraft produces special problems. And traffic is building up in areas where airspace is still uncontrolled.

More than anything else, higher speeds are creating a need for traffic control in good weather as well as bad. Human eyesight is doubtful protection against collision at jet speeds. As of December 1, 1957, the Civil Aeronautics Administration initiated a program to control all airspace — but not all traffic — above 24,000 feet. This floor lowers to 15,000 feet in the spring of 1958.

One highly complicating factor faced by air traffic control is the difference in civil and military requirements. It's always been our national policy that there shall be a common system of navigation and traffic control for all users. But air traffic controllers have to cope with such military operations as getting interceptors up through traffic, large scale training missions, and the like.

HOW WE'RE DOING

To its credit, the present system of traffic control manages to insure a very high margin of safety. Between 1948 and 1956, there was a total of 140 mid-air collisions involving civil aircraft. Of these, only two were between air carriers in passenger service, and only 17 involved any carrier aircraft. But the Grand Canyon disaster on June 30, 1956, which took 128 lives, graphically illustrates the fearful potential for fatalities in mid-air collisions. As traffic and speed increase, so does the danger.

In order to maintain a high safety level under present methods of traffic control, restrictions on traffic movements are frequently imposed to the point where they defeat the very purpose of an airways system. They slow things up and cause exasperating delays. The control apparatus covering high density areas becomes saturated and many planes are daudling



and kept circling in the air, or never get off the ground.

To meet an increasingly critical situation, the Civil Aeronautics Administration, with the approval of Congress, launched a six-year modernization program in 1957 to meet the most urgent deficiencies of the present system. One of the key objectives of the Civil Aeronautics Administration plan is the integration of the civil and military electronic short-range navigation systems into a common network to serve both civil needs and military tactical requirements, providing track guidance and aircraft position information at all times. Resulting improved navigational accuracy should considerably increase air traffic capacity. Plans also call for a 75% increase in the number of instrument landing systems.

Another major aim of the Civil Aeronautics Administration program is the installation of a far larger amount of radar equipment to perform a variety of jobs, such as permitting closer spacing of aircraft or enabling a plane to make a landing under conditions of poor visibility.

Though an ambitious and expensive plan, the Civil Aeronautics Administration program does not go beyond 1962. By general agreement it is at best a stopgap and a "catching up" process.

WHAT NEXT?

The crucial question remains: what next?

As a help in considering it, we might take a look at recent history in an effort to find out why the nation's Federal airways system finds itself in such an antiquated condition. One explanation seems to be that there's a lack of clearly defined Federal responsibility for the management of our aviation affairs. And underlying this indecisiveness, there's the phenomenon of repeated conflict of interest between military and civil authorities.

In passing the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938, Congress specified that "the Administrator shall give full consideration to the requirements of national defense." But in that pre-war era, military air operations were insignificant and uncomplicated. With the growth of the air services by the end of World War II, a Federal airways system capable of meeting military requirements, along with those of civil aviation, became of crucial importance. The need for a military voice in common system development was felt.

In 1946 came the first of several attempts to improve the situation. By executive order, the President set up the Air Coordinating Committee. This Committee was to facilitate communication between the nine government agencies with a major interest in aviation so that conflicts could be ironed out and joint decisions taken on mutual problems. The Committee succeeded in resolving thousands of controversies, but mostly on a local level, concerning such things as airspace use and navigation facilities. Because unanimous consent of the Committee members was required for action, many major policy problems, however, never got satisfactorily settled.

In 1956, President Eisenhower appointed Edward P. Curtis, an Air Force General in World War II, as Special Assistant for aviation facilities planning. His assignment was to conduct a long-range study of the nation's requirements and to draw up recommendations and a comprehensive plan.

Mr. Curtis and his group reached the conclusion that the chief reason for previous failure to modernize aviation traffic facilities lay not in any lack of scientific ideas or promising technical developments but in the inadequacy of "organizational arrangements . . . intended to set the goals, and to develop and to select the systems and methods which will meet these goals."

Legislation was drafted for the immediate creation of an Airways Modernization Board "to develop, modify, test, and evaluate systems, procedures, facilities, and devices, as well as to define the performance characteristics thereof, to meet the needs for safe and efficient navigation and traffic control of all civil and military aviation except for those needs of military agencies which are peculiar to air warfare and primarily of military concern, and select such systems, (etc.) . . . as will best serve such needs and will promote maximum coordination of air traffic control and air defense systems."

On August 14, 1957, the bill became law.

Let's keep alert for the Board's findings, and be prepared to exercise our citizenship through informed thinking, discussion, and decision.

GRASS ROOTS AIRPORTS

Though an integral part of the national aviation facilities system, airports are designed, financed, built, and operated by local authorities. Many will need lengthened and strengthened



runways to handle long-range jets. Equally important will be special fueling facilities, revamped loading areas, and greatly expanded passenger accommodations. It is estimated that airport capacity must be doubled by 1975.

Mr. Curtis, in his report, suggests that the Federal Government should conduct an airport research program as a guide to sound local planning.

What's our opinion as to that?

IS A NEW FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY NEEDED?

The Curtis report also favors the creation of an independent Federal Aviation Agency. Within it, according to the Curtis plan, would be consolidated "all the essential management functions necessary to support the common needs of the military and civil aviation of the United States." These are now scattered here and there. As Mr. Curtis puts it, "The Government and the public should be able to look to one agency for the management and the responsibility for our national aviation affairs." If the plan goes through, the present Civil Aeronautics Administration would be absorbed within the new agency. Several other functions important to the national aviation facilities system, but now located in other organizations, would be transferred to the new Federal Aviation Agency.

The Curtis report feels that the creation of such an agency could be of particular importance in improving civil-military cooperation for the solution of mutual problems. Chief among these is competition for airspace. To quote Stuart G. Tipton, President of the Air Transport Association, "Airspace restrictions, largely imposed by real or fancied — and that is the issue — military requirements, are blocking off altitudes to the point where it is very difficult for civilian operators to move." As an editorial in *Aviation Week* puts it, what rankles is not the fulfilling of legitimate military requirements, which no one begrudges, but the attitude of the military that it has top priority over any and all airspace which it fancies.

What are our views as to the advisability of setting up a new Federal Aviation Agency, and what are our reasons for holding them?

AND NOW — SPACE!

The conquest of space is perhaps not yet far enough along for us to do much more than think about it. Yet as Senator Lyndon Johnson said, in proposing a Senate special committee to frame legislation concerning the development of outer space, such exploration "will dominate the affairs of mankind

just as the exploration of the Western Hemisphere dominated them in the 16th and 17th centuries."

When senatorial debate on such legislation begins — doubtless with measures for space traffic regulation included — we'll wish to follow it closely.

The immediate question facing our legislators is: Who's to handle America's space development program?

Should the Defense Department do it? We know that proficiency in space could be absolutely essential to national survival. Space ships armed with devastating, annihilating weapons and equipped with cameras, television, and electronic devices to keep tabs on other military activities could enable any one nation to control the world. It is imperative to have defenses against attack from space — and defense is the primary duty of our armed forces.

But ever since the founding of our Republic, we've had a fundamental belief in civilian control, and this belief is sure to play an important part in the ultimate decision as to who's to have charge of our program in space.

Should the Atomic Energy Commission be given the job? Present liquid and solid fuel for propelling rockets and space ships may soon seem as primitive as the sails that drove the ships of early navigators like Columbus, Americus Vespucius,

and Magellan on their pioneering explorations. Atomic power seems far more likely to have what it takes if we are to explore the trackless distances of space. Therefore, should the Atomic Energy Commission, already skilled in the potentialities of this titanic force, be put in charge of our development of space? Or should some brand new agency, perhaps along the lines of the Atomic Energy Commission, be set up instead?

Which alternative, if any, do we prefer, or what else would we suggest?

The Senate Special Committee that was voted into existence with only one Senator dissenting has set June 1, 1958, as the date on which to have legislation on space policy ready. In helping it to shape such legislation, it will seek to draw on the best available knowledge and advice. This will include the counsel of the National Science Foundation. It will include the findings of the Special Committee that has been set up by the Administration under the chairmanship of Dr. James Killian, President Eisenhower's scientific advisor. It will include testimony and suggestions brought out by closed and public hearings.

But meanwhile, there's a problem — a huge question mark — involved which we've been painfully aware of since the first beep of the original Russian Sputnik.

Is a struggle for sovereign control of space about to break out among the nations of the earth — a struggle which, if it resorts to force, would be suicidal to the human race? Or will peaceful development of the potentialities of these vastly expanded horizons bring the benefits of great achievements and advances to all mankind?

How high up does the present sovereignty of a nation go? The major indication as to that which we have right now seems to be the first article of the ICAO agreement which declares that each signatory nation has "complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory."

ICAO stands for International Civil Aviation Organization, which is an agency of the United Nations. It was started in 1944, when representatives of twenty-six nations met and agreed that, for the sake of greater safety and more efficient and beneficial use, there should be an international code of air traffic control. Each signing nation agreed to abide by certain rules of the sky. The International Civil Aviation Organization, as the supervisory body, was set up in 1947. Today some seventy nations belong — but they don't include the USSR or Red China.

The ICAO agreement, however, in its comment on sovereignty, doesn't define what is actually meant by "airspace." The generally accepted idea seems to be that "airspace" consists of the blanket or envelope of atmosphere which surrounds the earth to a height of fifty miles. Within this envelope there's enough density of air to allow for flight by winged aircraft. So the first article of the ICAO agreement would seem to imply that the bounds of each nation's sovereignty lie within this atmospheric envelope.

Beyond lies outer space — which, up till very recently, has received little attention from experts in international law, or from the officials of government who will make the decisions as to what's to be done about space.

In this new age of space, John C. Cooper, legal consultant to the International Civil Aviation Organization, has suggested that the sovereignty of each nation should extend upwards 600 miles. But there's plenty of disagreement as to that. In 1956, before the launching of the first Sputnik, two Soviet lawyers, A. Kislov and S. Krylov, unofficially declared that "there's no limit to the height. The USSR has the right of the skies over their country to infinity." There are people in all nations, including the U.S.A., who also feel that way about space over their own particular country.

President Eisenhower, in a letter to Nikolai Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, has made this suggestion: "I propose that we agree that outer space should be used only for peaceful purposes. We face a decisive moment in history in relation to this matter. Both the Soviet Union and the United States are now using outer space for the testing of missiles designed for military purposes. The time to stop is now." Chairman Bulganin's reply was noncommittal. Consideration of the matter, he indicated, should be part of the whole question of limitation of armaments.

Rocket development, as Secretary Dulles has remarked, is still in an elementary enough stage so as to be "readily subject to be controlled." But once a rocket armament race really gets going, control, as Secretary Dulles points out, becomes increasingly "impossible."

Sir Leslie Munro, of New Zealand, President of the UN General Assembly, has indicated that the next General Assembly meetings will devote much time to the question of international control of outer space. Dr. Oscar Schachter, legal director of the UN, has also warned, "the time to act is now. Questions about space rights are not far-fetched — they're immediate and practical."

What are our views and what are our reasons for holding them, as to whether the right to space should be exercised by each nation individually or should go under some form of international control?



COMING: The Present State of the Economy — What Are Its Troubles and Needs?

Vital Issues

"A DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR BETTER INFORMED AMERICANS"

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CENTER FOR INFORMATION ON AMERICA
WASHINGTON, CONNECTICUT
Volume VII, Number 7

URBANIZATION--

Cover by Stuart Judd, Jr.

Blight or Blessing?

It's still within our power to choose which it shall be.

But our chances of being able to do anything constructive about it, without prohibitive cost, get smaller and smaller with every moment of our countryside's enormous and haphazard growth.

There's nothing wrong about growth, especially when quality accompanies it. In fact it's an American characteristic to take pride in it.

Our faith in the future is shown by the big families we go in for. On the average, there is a new baby born every seven and one-half seconds. Houses to live in, schools to get educated in, factories and offices to work in, buildings to worship in, are all part of the overall picture of our expanding industrial civilization.

We work from specifications and blueprints when we build a church, factory, or school. Individual units are carefully planned. There's a tendency, too, toward extending such forethought to include particular areas.

But how about the whole picture? Take a journey by plane, and what we'll find ourselves flying over is a panorama of runaway growth.

Below sprawls the spreading city. Very likely it is already merging with neighboring cities and towns. In the distance we glimpse the downtown business area, where tall buildings rise from old-fashioned narrow streets which once served residential areas many of which long since have turned into swarming slums. Our attention is caught by intricate cloverleafs and other traffic devices which daily pour their streams into the already congested heart of the metropolis.

Like a patchwork quilt, the vast panorama of urbanization stretches far and wide. Over there is a hodgepodge of suburban expansion with older towns and villages imbedded in it. We see block after block of little houses that look all alike. Mile after mile, along established highways, lie uneven ribbons of haphazard growth—filling stations, restaurants, garages, factories, junk yards, shopping centers, schools, dwellings, and so forth. New, low, landscaped factories are springing up in what used to be cornfields.

Already the eastern coastal region has become so urbanized between Boston, Massachusetts, and Newport News, Virginia, that this six hundred mile stretch is, in short, one gigantic strip city—a "megalopolis," if we want a fancy name for it. Other regions are heading in the same direction. Every year we are converting over a million rural acres into built-on land.

Thus most Americans, present and future, seem destined to live their lives in an urban environment.

That being so, it makes sense to see to it that urban life shall be pleasant and rewarding.

That's not likely to happen if we simply permit our explosive urbanization to go on spreading helter-skelter. If we intend to make the best and most of what's ahead, there are

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Editor: Townsend Scudder, President of the Center.

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political, economic, and social problems to be studied and met.

Because it is bound to affect so many lives, now and in future generations, there's no domestic issue more critical, challenging, or vital.

BACKGROUNDS

In 1800, only 6% of the U.S. populace lived in urban places—in towns of any size. We were mostly farmers, and lived on the land. Since then, we've shifted. A major reason is industrialization, which has played so important a part in making us a mighty nation.

Contrasted with what's happening today, the original city pattern was simple enough. It's been compared to a solitary fried egg in a pan. The yolk was the central city with its dwellings, tenements, factories, and shops. Shops and factories could be reached on foot, by trolley-car, or later, by subway. The egg white surrounding the yolk held the suburbs. Beyond lay the countryside with its villages, farms, and woodlands.

But what happens when several eggs—several metropolitan areas—are dropped into the pan and jiggled around?

In the first quarter of the twentieth century, the automobile brought a spectacular change. People could get to where they worked from much further away. Trucks, too, made industry more independent of older methods of distribution like railroads or shipping by water. Factories could move to the nearby countryside where they had more room. Inevitably, housing followed the factories. Old roads not necessarily suited to motor traffic got heavier and heavier use.

The fried egg pattern was shifting to scrambled eggs.

Mostly this change hasn't been part of a plan. It just more or less happened. It's a change which, in some of its features, has been welcome; in some, not so good. For example, take one of the older suburbs. Probably it was first settled by city people well-enough off to afford the higher cost, those days, of suburban living. The work hours of relatively few persons fitted in with commuting by train. Suburban living of this sort was almost like country living, permitting escape from city tensions and crowds.

Then the auto brought the suburbs more nearly within everyone's reach.

These new suburbanites, too, are looking for fresh air and room to stretch in. They want to live not far from their work yet have homes of their own to improve through do-it-yourself puttering.

They also expect to find services to which the city had accustomed them. New stores move in. Shopping centers spring up. More and more cars on the roads mean more and more people. Mass housing extends urbanization far beyond municipal lines. Nearly half the urban population now lives outside the central city.

Thus the basic character of suburban living is being threatened by the suburb's rapid and largely haphazard growth. When there's mass construction without enough provision for getting around, for local recreation, for schools, sanitation, and so forth, something's got to give.

Some suburbs, of course, manage to avoid getting drowned under a tide of urbanization. In these, children are safer than they were on congested city streets. They go to better schools in up-to-date buildings. Life is more relaxed; neighbors more friendly. There are locally-based interests—civic, social, and educational—in which to take part.

But the luck of many a suburbanite isn't that good. Standup commuting adds an extra strain. Or there's the traffic jam, morning and night. There's also added expense. On top of payments due on the house, property taxes keep mounting. Yet often a rising mill rate doesn't mean better schools. Unable to cope with the flood of youngsters, they remain understaffed and forced to hold double sessions.

If not guarded against, all the ills that plague cities move also to the suburbs.

Meanwhile, cities run further into trouble. In addition to such problems as dwindling water supply, below-par schools housed in ancient buildings, air pollution, and narrow streets choked with traffic, there's the matter of slums. Vacated housing deteriorates as city dwellers become suburbanites and lower-income groups move in—sometimes whole families to a single room. Such low-income groups are apt to require outlays for welfare out of all proportion to the meager tax returns which a slum brings in.

Urban decay spreads like a fungus growth. In some cities, despite renewal programs in cooperation with the state and Federal governments, new slums form faster than old, rundown areas can be put in shape.

As Luther Gulick, President of the Institute of Public Administration, remarks, "up till about the beginning of 1954, nobody would admit that America had a 'metropolitan problem.'" But recently we've been waking up to the fact "that the problem is serious and growing, and that something effective must be done about it, and fast." Otherwise we shall be past the point of no return as the haphazard spread of urbanization intensifies problems which old-fashioned municipal government is less and less able to solve.

PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

It seems no longer a question of "Is planning necessary?" but of "How best shall such planning be done?"

Where planning takes place, it is apt to be piecemeal, so that a community may suddenly wake up to the fact that what its neighbors are doing tends to wreck its own intentions.

Planners—it should be added—are by no means in accord on how to get best results. But probably most would agree that the main idea, for our own and future generations, is to bring useful, usable order to the metropolis, livability to the suburb, and satisfactory land-use to the rural areas left.

An obstacle to all this is human indifference.

If we are to get anywhere, it must be through consent of the people. Consent is based on an understanding of what needs to be done. This means that we owe it to ourselves and future generations to look into the problems of urbanization* in order to meet them with the power of our broad resources and with the backing of our good will. Through the many studies being made from the local small-town level right up to the White House, we are already working toward much greater understanding. Many universities are taking part, besides civic and government agencies. Where metropolitan problems cross state lines, as has happened with New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut, an interstate commission is likely to be formed.

The most striking examples of what's being done are to be found in big cities—though some of the smallest communities may be working on their problems, too, in ways that other towns might follow.

New York is doing a spectacular job—although as Robert Moses, Chairman of its Committee on Slum Clearance, says: "It is unrealistic to imagine that the worst slums . . . can be absolutely cleared and entirely new structures substituted in a foreseeable time. The cost would be simply staggering."

We might also take a look at Penn Center in Philadelphia, or the Back Bay area of Boston. Milwaukee, Baltimore, Denver, the Fort Worth Redevelopment, Detroit, are among other examples.

But perhaps the best way to see how the problems of urbanization can be met is to turn to some city of moderate size.

New Haven's redevelopment program has been called by

**Further reading might begin with "Metropolis in Ferment," the November, 1957, issue of* The Annals *of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.*

Albert M. Cole, U.S. Housing and Home Finance Agency Administrator, "a model for urban renewal in the cities of America . . . spectacular, imaginative, exciting, comprehensive."

The New Haven idea took shape in 1941 when Professor Maurice E. H. Rotival, of Yale University, drew up original plans. These proved too ambitious for the times, but their influence still is felt and the University's cooperation continues.

Mayor Richard Lee sparked the present program into action after the war.

Mayor Lee knew how important to success popular support of the program would be. He wanted it examined and discussed by the largest possible number of people. Presently a Citizens Action Committee shaped up, non-partisan and representative of as many interests in the town as could be drawn in. The Committee's 600 members set themselves the job of finding out why New Haven, seventh oldest city in the United States, was on the skids, and how it could be brought back. They split up into sub-committees and set to work. The population, they found, had shifted to the suburbs, letting the core of the town decay. Shops were strangling on narrow streets cluttered with traffic. With commerce and industry running down, New Haven's importance as a city—not just as the site of a famous university—was on the way out. More and more old residential districts were degenerating into rat-riddled slums. So the Committee and the local officials pitched in. They got busy on all phases of rehabilitation—slum-clearance and housing, industrial construction and renewal, traffic improvement, health, recreation, more efficient public service and government.

A campaign of redevelopment like that can cost plenty, but New Haven's is being managed with only slight added expense to the local taxpayer. This is because most of the money comes from federal programs for rehabilitation, and from private funds. As in other places, investors have become convinced that New Haven is a good risk and that its reconstruction will bring in worthwhile returns. The city, too, expects to gain through considerably increased tax returns when impoverished areas again become productive. There will also be returns to the city through improved parking facilities—several within easy walking distance of the downtown shops—and other services for which users are willing to pay.

The State, too, has helped. From its new turnpike along the shore, it is building an eight-lane, $14,000,000 connecting link. Besides eliminating bottlenecks, this unit seems likely to gain increasing use as the city's crop of modern office buildings goes up on more spacious blocks, and its new housing, new schools, shopping centers, new playgrounds, and parking areas are completed.

Nearly all former residents of slums so far torn down, which are providing much of the space for the reborn city, have already been taken care of in public or low-cost housing that's attractive yet rents at figures often lower than those of the slums.

Thus New Haven, with more adequate housing, improved services, and a revitalized downtown business area, seeks to live up to its name. It can look forward to tomorrow with interest and faith.

A glance at that tomorrow is worth taking, bearing in

mind what risky business prophecy is and how readily upset—particularly by such catastrophies as depressions, or, infinitely worse, another world-wide war.

IN THE CRYSTAL SPHERE

It is no longer so fashionable to predict that big cities are on their way out. Men have made cities since earliest times and cities seem likely to continue as a manifestation of our characteristics and needs. But since change is a law of life, and improvement is what man hopes for, we may expect our great cities of the future to take on a new look.

To reach them we shall pass swiftly through or over suburban satellite towns with up-to-date housing, recreational and educational facilities, shopping centers, and industrial parks.

The metropolitan living of the future may be less urban and more spacious, including farms, forests, and recreational areas. As we approach the central city, we'll be apt to see beautiful landscaping. There is likely to be grandeur and unity to the city itself—perhaps a varied, park-like pattern of super-blocks, eliminating former miles of narrow streets. The main effort will be toward furthering the greatest enjoyment of urbanism's social, cultural, and economic advantages without the crowding, unhealthiness, congestion, danger, and ugliness which characterize too many present-day cities.

The shift from jet-propulsion, wings, or wheels to feet, once we reach the city, will be smoothly and readily made. The present primitive idea that human bodies need to compete with swiftly moving machines through use of the same areas will be done away with. For short hauls, such devices as belt walkways, moving at various speeds, will supplement sidewalks. City transit systems will be greatly expanded and improved with little resemblance to present noisy, uncomfortable, jam-packed subways. Street, highway, and airway collisions will be almost eliminated by automatic radar brakes and other engineering improvements. For longer family trips, a combination air-ground vehicle, with vertical take-off, is likely to be the thing.

People will want to come to or live in the cities for much the same reasons as today. Besides offering the widest opportunity for making a living, the city will continue to have concentrated facilities for culture and fun. This should prove increasingly so as automation cuts into the working day and allows for more leisure. Such proposals as New York City's Lincoln Square Project for the Performing Arts show what's probably coming. A spacious concert hall, a music school and opera house, a play and ballet theater, can thus all be grouped conveniently in landscaped surroundings.

The city of the future may well become a living and dynamic symbol of civilized man.

IN THE MEANTIME

But before any such hopeful prospects can be realized, we must settle down to solving the quandaries of urbanization. Laws and methods to facilitate good government and permit constructive action by private enterprise, by civic organizations, by public agencies are the basic tools through which the citizens of a democracy get things done. We need to study local political institutions to see which are still adequate and where political innovation seems called for to handle the problems which increasing urbanization keeps bringing up. For instance, long-established official boundaries may have very little relationship to area needs. This circumstance alone can throw the proper functioning of local government out of kilter.

Here is a quick run-down of some of these major problems demanding our action:

Housing. This involves slum clearance, relocation of residents, new developments, the fight against blight, and a multitude of factors including enormous costs. These may grow lower through improved building methods including prefabrication.

Congestion. Here we face one of the gravest problems, particularly where metropolitan areas overlap to form vast urban complexes where homes, factories, and commerce seem hopelessly intermingled. In residential areas, this situation breeds slums. In old-fashioned downtown business districts, it causes traffic strangulation.

Schools. We are still being swamped by a rising birth-rate and not enough teachers. Inadequate schools are also the direct result of congestion and overcrowding. They are products of stagnation and decay—whether of the urban, suburban, or country variety.

Water. We have been receiving plenty of warning that presently there won't be enough water. This could amount to a colossal disaster. One remedy would be changing salt water into fresh by methods cheap enough so as not to wreck the economy.

Sanitation. An especially critical problem in suburban areas where an over-concentration of septic tanks produces a costly mess. Here's a threat to health, as well.

Air Pollution. Air currents and smog are no respectors of municipal boundaries. Dangerous gases and smoke can wander far from their source, blighting vegetation, discoloring paint, and sometimes causing death through respiratory and other ailments.

Transportation. Whether by car, plane, truck, ship, or city and suburban transit system, transportation presents plenty of woes. One trouble is that in spite of studies designed toward integrating all forms of mass transportation into a cohesive network, each type still tends to operate as though off by itself. There's an intricate criss-cross of movement that causes delays and a general slow-up. Traffic jams, it's been figured, cost the nation over five billion dollars a year. Constructive thinking and better highway engineering are needed at every level—federal, city, and state. Airdromes capable of handling greatly increased air traffic are a must.

Recreation. Recreation is of considerable importance to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The better kinds help to keep us mentally and physically fit. Yet the National Recreation Association reports that picnic, boat, and playground facilities are "very inadequate" in the vicinity of most cities of over 50,000 population.

Government. Government is the essential ingredient in helping solve each of the problems of urbanization. It needs to be geared to modern conditions and needs. Its officials should be competent and alive to what's going on, and it is part of the voters' job to see that they are. Urbanization brings with it problems in political science that range from developing a merit system for municipal employees to such matters as the proper role of the federal government toward municipalities, and likewise the role of the state. Should the federal government create a Department of Urbanism—just as there's a Department of Agriculture—or would that be the wrong move? Should more states set up bureaus to furnish municipalities with technical services and advice? How can a city get sufficient funds through taxes and other devices to perform what's called for by its residents? Should a share of the financial responsibility be borne by suburbanites who daily work in the city? Are "authorities"—commissions set up to handle specific services—the best device for managing water supply, transit, bridge and airport construction and maintenance, and similar functions which can be paid for out of fees and tolls?

Most overwhelming question of all is how to handle the huge urban complexes that pay no attention to municipal boundaries, straddle rivers, and spill over into several states. In such metropolitan areas, there may be all sorts and types of governmental jurisdiction, including federal and state as well as municipal, with some even counteracting the function of others. New York City's greater metropolitan area furnishes a striking example. It presents probably the most complicated governmental pattern in the world, involving three states, twenty-two counties, numerous boroughs, and various authorities. One reason why this conglomeration works pretty well is because it is developing a degree of voluntary cooperation among its parts. Each type of government or management involved sends members to regular meetings at which what's being done and what's going on are discussed. This body sets up working committees on specific problems. Thus, though there is no authority to enforce decisions or carry out plans, and less cooperative units can slow things up, the well-being of the whole metropolitan area is at least kept in view.

A further logical step might be federation, with a legislative body designed to bring together all major units concerned with the affairs of the metropolis. Each unit would still manage its own business, preserving the principles of democratic self-government. But legislative decisions having to do with the metropolis as a whole would be made by the federated legislature. At the head, as the responsible executive, we may some day see an elected official—a "metrogovernor"—who may take his place in importance alongside the present governors of the states.

Thus far, the metropolitan area of Toronto, Canada, is the only place where such a federation is now actually functioning —but we're likely to see others follow soon—with the Miami-Dade County area of Florida, and also the area of Greater Detroit, moving in that direction.

Taking the list of problems raised by this guide and considering them on the basis of our own neighborhood and also as representative of the national picture, how do we feel about each? What's being done? What do we believe is still needed? Is or isn't there an intelligent pattern of development?



Drawings by C. P. Meier

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Center for Information on America

Washington, Connecticut

TOWNSEND SCUDDER *President*

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February 24, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

As a progress report, it gives me great pleasure to send to you this just-released booklet on the Center, with your generous comment on VITAL ISSUES included in the section entitled "A Sampling of Opinion". Your encouragement has had a great deal to do with bringing the Center to the point where it promises to become an increasingly significant and important force for education and democracy.

With appreciative regards,

Sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

TS:DVR
Encl.

THE CENTER FOR INFORMATION ON AMERICA

WASHINGTON, CONNECTICUT

The medallion on the cover was drawn for the Center by Clare Leighton of the National Institute of Arts and Letters.

WHAT IS THE CENTER?

The Center is an independent non-profit educational corporation established in 1951. It seeks to heed an admonition by President Washington in his Farewell Address that "in proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened."

The Center believes that the future of freedom in the United States — and ultimately throughout the world — will largely depend on an informed, and a thinking, citizenry.

WHY DOES IT EXIST?

In today's world-wide civil war, testing whether men shall govern themselves or submit to being governed, freedom itself is at stake. The more the American people can cultivate in themselves an intelligent understanding of public affairs, the more likely it is that freedom will survive.

Citizens of all ages — especially those who are themselves well-informed — must renew their faith in the idea of a responsible electorate and exert themselves on its behalf.

The Center is dedicated to this objective.

HOW DOES IT WORK?

In order to improve the climate for a responsible electorate, the Center encourages widespread discussion as a prerequisite to wise decisions in national and international affairs. Its activities and aspirations embrace several programs.

"Vital Issues"

VITAL ISSUES seeks to present impartially the background and facts that will enable readers to reach their own conclusions about what should be done. It discusses problems selected by the Center's Editorial Advisory Committee as matters of vital national interest. Editorial policy is based on the belief that one should usually underestimate a reader's knowledge but never his intelligence.

During 1958 VITAL ISSUES is focusing attention on such subjects as presidential disability, our foreign service, possible Statehood for Hawaii, and the non-military uses of nuclear energy. It is published 10 times a year, September through June.

VITAL ISSUES has proved a valuable service to citizens in every State of the Union who wish to keep well informed, to club, church, and other adult study groups, to the employees of business and industry through company reading racks, and to teachers and students in secondary school and college.

In publishing VITAL ISSUES the Center has no axe to grind — other than its basic objective of encouraging individual citizens to focus their attention on public affairs and to form their own opinions grounded in fact.

Institutes in American Studies

One of the Center's important objectives has always been a program of institutes in American studies. Within this field the need for summer sessions for pre-college students has demanded first attention.

Beginning with a three-week Pilot Institute for 40 students in the summer of 1958, the program is planned to take place over a five-year period with subsequent sessions for larger groups in various locations. Mobility will thus be an inherent feature helping the idea of pre-college institutes in American studies to spread and take root.

The Pilot Institute will be held in Washington, Connecticut, the Center's headquarters, using the facilities of The Gunnery, an independent preparatory school, which have generously been made available. In selecting faculty from the ranks of both school and college teachers, the Center is fortunate in having access to excellent sources of counsel, including the Society of American Historians and the American Studies Association, both of which — as well as other groups — are represented on the Center's advisory committees.

Tangible benefits may be expected to result as this program develops, both for education generally and for the individual teachers and students who participate. In ad-

dition to the summer deployment of both facilities and teachers, the Pilot Institute — and increasingly so in the case of subsequent Institutes — may be looked on as presenting promising educational opportunities. Outstanding among these are bridging the gap between school and college, and bringing back to local communities — through the students and teachers returning from the Institutes to their own schools and colleges — a further enrichment of educational purpose and processes.

The Institutes will be devoted to generating a deepened comprehension of the meaning of America, in keeping with the Center's fundamental purpose.

Television and Other Media

The people of the United States are rapidly acquiring new means of mass communications that can be used to enrich their education. How we exploit this opportunity will undoubtedly have a decisive effect on the future of human freedom and public knowledge.

The Center believes that the idea of VITAL ISSUES can be adapted for effective use in films, radio, and television. Although thus far only a start has been made toward developing the use of these avenues of communication, the Center is confident that the time has now come when this goal can, and should, be translated into reality.

HOW IS THE CENTER FINANCED?

The Center started with a gift of $30,000 from an individual who wishes to remain anonymous. Since then generous support has been provided by a number of interested persons and the following foundations:

THE DORIS DUKE FOUNDATION
THE FORD FOUNDATION
THE GRANT FOUNDATION
THE NEW HAVEN FOUNDATION
THE SCHIFF FOUNDATION
THE SPANEL FOUNDATION
THE ALBERT H. WIGGIN FOUNDATION

While the Center's income includes revenues from subscriptions and sales of VITAL ISSUES — which were more than 100 per cent higher in 1957 than in the previous fiscal year — it is unlikely that income from this source will ever be adequate to meet the Center's total operating costs.

Principal reliance must therefore be placed on the support that individuals, foundations, and other sources see fit to provide. During 1958 the Center's operating needs will require in the neighborhood of $78,500, of which approximately $37,500 will be met from VITAL ISSUES revenues and gifts in hand. The balance of $41,000 for all purposes must be raised before the end of 1958.

Contributions to the Center are deductible for federal income tax purposes in accordance with Section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.

February 22, 1958

A SAMPLING OF OPINION

. . . about the Center

Detlev W. Bronk, President of The Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research and of the National Academy of Sciences: *"I have followed with great interest the vigor of the Center for Information on America as evidenced by its steadily expanding services. Perhaps never before has it been so important that Americans should know their country and its institutions, for with this knowledge they will better understand the significant role their country has in the larger community of the world. This you are advancing in a typically American way, mobilizing the resources of technology and mass-communication to bring to every citizen the means for reaching intelligent and fully informed personal and public decisions."*

Richard M. Nixon, Vice President of the United States: *"I have followed with interest the work of the Center for Information on America during the past few years . . . . It is vitally important to the welfare of the nation that we have an alert and well-informed citizenry. I wish you continued success in your efforts to bring knowledge and understanding of national and international affairs to the greatest possible number of people."*

Adlai E. Stevenson, former Governor of Illinois: *"The Center is doing an important job by broadening the public understanding of both our national and international affairs, and I wish it and VITAL ISSUES all possible success."*

. . . *about the Institute program*

William G. Saltonstall, Principal, The Phillips Exeter Academy, Exeter, New Hampshire: *"I strongly believe that these institutes will stimulate a further knowledge and understanding of America by Americans."*

Martin Essex, Superintendent of Schools, Akron, Ohio: *"The procedures and proposals for the Pre-College Summer Institutes in American Studies are very encouraging. In my opinion the proposal has unusual possibilities."*

George E. Shattuck, Principal, The Norwich Free Academy, Norwich, Connecticut: *"I consider the proposal a most challenging program and one in which there will be great interest on the part of the participants."*

Allan V. Heely, Headmaster, The Lawrenceville School, Lawrenceville, New Jersey: *"The Institute I think would be particularly timely in these days when the whole educational system of the country is under increasingly close scrutiny, for the project seems to create an awareness of, and to reaffirm the country's basic tenets of freedom of thought and action."*

. . . *about "Vital Issues"*

Edward R. Murrow, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.: *"I think this is an eminently useful, well-edited, and stimulating contribution to the current literature of our time."*

Brendan Sexton, Director of Education, United Auto Workers: *"They seem to me to be extraordinarily well-edited . . . . Yours looks like a very interesting and useful program."*

Sister M. Madeleva, President, Saint Mary's College, Notre Dame, Indiana: *"This publication from the Center for Information on America will be of great value because of its compactness, its timeliness, and the authoritative qualifications of its contributors."*

Robert L. Johnson, President, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: *"It seems to me that the work you are doing is very important and I want to compliment you and your staff on the highly palatable manner in which you are attaining your objectives."*

Francis Parkman, Executive Secretary, National Council of Independent Schools: *"This is the kind of venture which I like to bring to the attention of our schools."*

Ben M. Snyder, Assistant Headmaster, Cranbrook School, Bloomfield Hills, Michigan: *"This has become an important teaching device and we thank you for your unique contribution to the study of current problems."*

Louise E. Mills, Head of Business Department, Senior High School, Winthrop, Massachusetts: *"I don't know how much advertising you are able to do or how widely VITAL ISSUES is used but it should be in every school and in as many classes as time permits."*

James T. Patterson, U. S. House of Representatives: *"It is seldom that one is privileged to read material on pertinent national issues which is truly objective, well written, and extremely factual in content. This service is the rule rather than an exception when applied to the offerings of The Center for Information on America."*

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TOWNSEND SCUDDER *President*

February 13, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I note with interest that the question of statehood for Alaska and Hawaii is to be on "See It Now" on Sunday, March 2. This calls to mind several conversations we have had in the past on the idea that the printed word and television presentation might well complement each other, and my suggestion that perhaps the Center's VITAL ISSUES might serve in that respect. We have had guides on both topics--in fact that on Hawaii was our January issue. I enclose copies of both.

I am delighted you are taking up this question for it is most important, it seems to me, and for many reasons, that Americans become better informed on it.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

TS:ahb
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cc: Mr. Fred W. Friendly

Center for Information on America

Washington, Connecticut

Scudder, Thomas (with prev Corres.)

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TOWNSEND SCUDDER Executive Director of the Center

December 10, 1957

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Thank you so much for your considerate and extremely helpful letter of December 6.

All of us connected with the Center are deeply obliged to you for your good opinion of its work and of VITAL ISSUES, in its discussions program.

With regards,

Sincerely yours,

per Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

TS:DVR

A non-profit non-partisan educational corporation dedicated to furthering the knowledge and understanding of America by Americans through informational publications, radio, films, television, and conferences.

Scudder, Tom

December 6, 1957

Dear Mr. Scudder:

Thank you for your letter of December 4th enclosing a descriptive brochure of the services of the Center.

I think this is an eminently useful, well-edited, and stimulating contribution to the current literature of our time.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Townsend Scudder,
Executive Director
Center for Information on America
Washington, Connecticut

gw

Center for Information on America

Washington, Connecticut

TOWNSEND SCUDDER *Executive Director of the Center*

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Council Member and former President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.

December 4, 1957

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

In a campaign to draw wider public attention to the services of the Center, we are presently issuing a descriptive brochure. We have asked a few distinguished citizens in various occupations and professions to permit the use of their estimates of the Center as part of this brochure. We already have brief statements, with permission to quote, from such persons as Dr. Detlev Bronk, President of the Rockefeller Institute, and Vice-President Richard Nixon. We should be deeply appreciative if you would care to furnish us with a statement for this purpose.

You are already familiar with VITAL ISSUES, in the Center's Discussions Program which, as you know, has Ford Foundation support. I enclose the two most recent issues for your further inspection. You are also aware, I believe, that the Center's plans and services are by no means confined to its Discussions Program. We are making real progress, for example, toward inaugurating Pre-College Summer Sessions in American Studies as part of our Conferences Program. Should you care to look more closely into our plans in this respect, I am sending you, under separate cover, a report on the proposed curriculum for a Pilot Session in the summer of 1958. The two-page preface presents current developments and a brief history of the idea. Further reading is entirely optional!

Your estimate of the value of what the Center is doing, for inclusion among those I have mentioned, would be of the greatest help in furthering the work of the Center.

With kind regards,

Sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

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Center for Information on America

Washington, Connecticut

TOWNSEND SCUDDER *President*

Scudder, Townsend

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University of Pennsylvania
Council Member and former President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.

October 3, 1957

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

It occurs to me you may care to see the two most recent numbers of VITAL ISSUES, so here they are.

By the way, you will be interested, I think, in a comment from a letter recently received from the Enoch Pratt Free Library of Baltimore, Maryland, concerning their activities for adult education. Referring to their use of VITAL ISSUES, they remarked: "We bought the Vice Presidency issue in quantity to have on hand at showings of the Murrow Vice Presidency film, which were held at the main library and several branches."

I still trust that a way may be found in which VITAL ISSUES might be made systematically useful as an adjunct to your work.

With regards,

Sincerely,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

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Vital Issues

"A DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR BETTER INFORMED AMERICANS"

Published by the
CENTER FOR INFORMATION ON AMERICA
WASHINGTON, CONNECTICUT
Volume VII, Number 1



Drawings by C. P. Meier

THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE--
Set It Up On a Permanent Basis?

The Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, by unanimously recommending Senate passage of the following Resolution, looks with favor on the idea.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 7 (legislative day, JANUARY 3), 1957

Mr. SPARKMAN (for himself, Mr. HILL, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. KEFAUVER, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. CASE of New Jersey, Mr. WILEY, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. FLANDERS, and Mr. JAVITS) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

JULY 16 (legislative day, JULY 8), 1957

Reported by Mr. SPARKMAN, with amendments

RESOLUTION

Whereas the United Nations emergency force, created pursuant to resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly of November 3 and 4, 1956 (A/RES/391 and A/RES/394), has made an important contribution to international peace and security in the Middle East; and

Whereas the need for such a force appears likely to continue; and

Whereas such a force could be an important instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security not only in the Middle East but also in other areas of the world:

Therefore be it

Resolved, That the Senate welcomes the establishment of the United Nations emergency force.

SEC. 2. It is the sense of the Senate that—

(a) ~~the force~~ *a force of a similar character* should be made a permanent arm of the United Nations;

(b) ~~the~~ *such a* force should be composed of units made available by members of the United Nations: *Provided*, That no such units should be accepted from permanent members of the Security Council;

(c) consideration should be given to arrangements whereby individuals would be allowed to volunteer for service with ~~the~~ *such a* force: *Provided*, That individuals who are nationals of permanent members of the Security Council should not be acceptable;

(d) equipment and expenses of ~~the~~ *such a* force should be provided by the United Nations out of its regular budget.

Do we say O. K., too?

Should the idea of establishing a permanent United Nations force receive official U. S. approval?

To help us decide, let's take a close look at what's been going on and on what seems to be developing.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: Dr. James W. Fesler, Professor of Government, Yale University; Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C.; Dr. Allan Nevins, Professor of American History, Columbia University, President of the Society of American Historians; Dr. Robert E. Spiller, Chairman of the Department of American Civilization, University of Pennsylvania, Council Member and former President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.

Editor: Townsend Scudder, President of the Center.

First Printing, September, 1957

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WHY AND HOW THE U. N. E. F. WAS SET UP

It was set up at a moment of intense world crisis* that looked to plenty of observers like the beginning of World War III.

It was set up after the shooting had actually started.

In the Middle East, armed forces of France, England, and Israel were blazing away at separate Egyptian positions. The



English and French were attacking at Port Said, on the Mediterranean end of the Suez Canal. The Israeli army was sweeping across the Israeli-Egyptian boundary into the Gaza Strip and Sinai. In Sinai, Israeli forces speedily took over Egyptian fortifications at Sharm-al-Shaikh, which up to then had been barring Israel's shipping from use of the Gulf of Aqaba as her means of reaching the Red Sea — since Egypt would permit no Israeli vessels to pass through the Suez Canal.

And as almost always happens when the shooting begins, other nations, on either side, were showing signs of being drawn in. The most serious threat of an expanding war was coming from Russia, which had already been supplying Egypt with arms. Russians were reported to be volunteering for service with the Egyptians. There was also an official threat from Bulganin that "modern and terrible" weapons would be

used unless the Anglo-French forces, and the Israelis, pulled out.

And, as in almost every shooting crisis, there had been a complicated build-up over a considerable time before the guns went off.

In 1948, Israel had declared herself an independent state. A majority of U. N. members recognized the new Republic, the U. S. A. being among the first to do so. But U. N. member states who belonged also to the Arab League refused to acknowledge what had happened. They started marching in an army to put Israel down. Instead of a push-over, they met with such effective resistance from the Israelis that the new Republic was even able to add more territory to what was originally allotted by a U. N. committee. At this stage of the game, the United Nations persuaded Arabs and Israelis to agree to an armistice.

But this 1949 truce has been an uneasy affair, with Egypt, as leader of the Arab bloc, refusing to admit that her state of belligerency with Israel had ended. It is because of this claim that Egypt has all along denied Israel the use of the Suez Canal and has tried to hold up Israeli shipping that sought to reach the Red Sea through the Gulf of Aqaba past the forts of Sharm-al-Shaikh.

When Colonel Nasser, head of the Egyptian state, in 1956 nationalized the Suez Canal, his action came as a great shock to England and France. Both had been hoping for some form of international control to safeguard their use of it. Nasser, because the Canal goes through Egyptian territory, argued he had the right to run it.

So when Israel, on October 29, 1956, after enduring repeated raids year after year by Egyptian feedayan or commandos from across the Gaza Strip, at last struck at Egypt in offensive self-defense, England and France, regarding the right of passage through the Suez Canal as also essential to themselves, struck too.

The Israelis launched what became a hundred hour blitzkrieg which shattered the Egyptian Army. Israeli forces took over the Gaza Strip, moved swiftly across Sinai toward the Canal, and at the same time seized the fortifications at Sharm-al-Shaikh.

At the Mediterranean end of the Canal, the French and English landed troops at bombed-up Port Said. This action looked as though it would not stop till after taking over the whole waterway.

It was at this point that the United Nations, dedicated to the preservation of world peace, stepped in.

The General Assembly passed a resolution calling on Israel, France, and Britain to withdraw. Russia and the U. S. A. were included among the nations that voted "yes."

Though the General Assembly of the United Nations has no power to enforce its requests, this one had the power of world opinion behind it.

As to those volunteers from Russia, who looked as though they might swell the fighting into a big war, the U. S. A. warned the U. S. S. R. that there was to be nothing like that. A rapid concentration of U. S. naval forces in the Mediterranean caused the "volunteers" to lose interest, and the Soviet press let the subject drop.

England and France announced they would bow to the U. N.'s efforts to restore peace in the area. But — declared the British representative in the General Assembly — U. N. police action, to keep things quiet during the troop withdrawal, was a must.

Next day, over the protests of Britain and France, a "cease-fire" resolution, proposed by the U. S. A., was voted by the General Assembly. Then the Assembly adopted a Canadian proposal creating the U. N. E. F. "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities."

The General Assembly decided that the Great Powers should be specifically excluded from furnishing contingents. Moreover, no power directly connected with the dispute was to supply men for the Force, which was to be made up of

volunteer units drawn mostly from the smaller nations. To make sure that there would be no lopsidedness to the Force, national units were to be of battalion size or under. Major General E. L. M. Burns, of Canada, who was already in charge of the U. N. Truce Supervision Organization along the Arab-Israeli border, was named Commander. The direction and organization of the Force itself was to be the responsibility of the U. N. Secretary General and not of any designated member nation. The one restriction the U. N. felt impelled to place on itself in creating the U. N. E. F. was to the effect that the Force could not "be stationed or operate on the territory of a . . . country without the consent of the government of that country."

**For backgrounds to the crisis, see Vol. VI, No. 5 of VITAL ISSUES, "The Middle East — What Goes On?"*

The U. N. E. F., when in operation, would be something new in international practice: a body of men armed not to fight but to prevent fighting. When the shooting stopped, it was hoped that the questions under dispute could be settled by means other than force.

THE U. N. E. F. IN ACTION

Given the green light to organize the U. N. E. F. and put it to work, Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations, got busy.

A staging area for the Force was offered by the Italian republic and set up at Capodechino Airport, near Naples. First unit to arrive was that volunteered by Denmark. The Danes were flown in by U. S. Skymasters and flying boxcars stationed at Wiesbaden, Germany. Almost at the same time

a contingent of Norwegian ski troopers arrived the same way, and Capodechino began taking on the look of a busy military base, with preparations in full swing to take care of new arrivals. These included tall, sinewy, brown-skinned paratroopers from the republic of India — members of one of her most famous regiments, striking to look at in their colorful red turbans. Their journey from India was as noteworthy as the men. Pacific-based American Super-Constellations had picked them up at Agra for the flight to Capodechino — negotiating successfully what was perhaps up to then the longest military air lift in history. The Colombian unit, from Latin America, also came in U. S. Super-Connies which picked them up at Bogota. Only the Canadians — units of the Queen's Own Rifles, a regiment dating back to the French and Indian Wars before the American Revolution — flew themselves in, arriving aboard Royal Canadian Air Force North Stars.

Dag Hammarskjold stopped off briefly at the staging area to inspect his forces, still only several hundred strong, but with more arriving almost every day. A force of 4,500 — he explained to newsmen — was being planned on, with an ultimate strength of perhaps 6,000. Then the Secretary General hurried on to Abu Soueir for talks with the French and English commanders, then to Cairo for negotiations with Nasser.

The British and French announced themselves "in full agreement" that company-sized units be assigned immediately to Port Said. As for the Egyptian Government, it was eager for this to be done as a starter toward the withdrawal of the French and English from Egyptian soil.

But just how this peace-keeping wedge of U. N. soldiers would make out as it took up positions between the fighting forces on either side was anybody's guess.

Flown in without charge by Swiss transport planes, an advance unit of 192 Norwegians, under their commander, Major Wiik, landed on November 15 at Abu Soueir airfield. Lightly armed with rifles and machine guns, they moved cautiously into the battered city of Port Said. They had no orders to shoot, explained Colonel C. F. Moe of Norway — U. N. E. F. Deputy Commander — though the time might come when they would have to use weapons. "When the local population sees the U. N. troops here with the approval of their government" — added the Deputy Commander — "tensions will probably be eased."

That's exactly what happened. As this and later units of the U. N. E. F. patrolled Port Said, then crossed the cease-fire line and took up positions further along the Canal between British and French forces and Egyptian positions, they transformed a narrow strip along the Canal into an international barrier against war. Under these conditions, the French and English withdrawal began to be carried out as agreed on and no major disturbances got a chance to take place.

After the English and French were out, but before the Canal itself was cleared of wreckage or any settlement of the dispute as to the Canal's use had been reached, Dag Hammarskjold withdrew the U. N. E. F. from the immediate Suez Canal area. As the Secretary General explained, the use of the U. N. E. F. "must be impartial, in the sense that it does not serve as a means to force settlement, in the interests of one party, of political conflicts or legal issues recognized as controversial."

An agreement for use of the Canal that will secure "freedom of navigation" for all — in the words of a U. N. resolution — has still to be reached.

In the Sinai desert-Gaza Strip-Gulf of Aqaba area, the U. N. E. F. still holds its positions.

The Israeli Army, in its withdrawal at the General Assembly's request, was in no haste to leave. Israel was determined to block Nasser from again attempting to set up an Arab offensive which, according to evidence they had collected, was designed to wipe out the Jewish state in Palestine and drive its inhabitants into the sea. It was this threat, with action reportedly planned for the early spring of 1957, Israel maintained, which had prompted their own offensive in self-defense. As they withdrew, they saw to it that no roads useful to an invading Egyptian army remained intact. No staging areas for an attack on Israel were left in usable condition.

While the Israelis methodically pulled back, the U. N. E. F. began taking up positions between them and the badly mauled Egyptian forces. The distinctive white jeeps of the U. N. observers became familiar sights as they directed U. N. E. F. units to strategic positions. The Yugoslav battalion, which had brought its men and materiel direct by ship to Port Said, was ready to move forward by means of its own mechanized equipment. Road barricades, flying blue United Nations

flags, and illuminated at night by floodlights, went up as the U. N. forces moved in. A United Nations resolution, passed February 2, 1957, declaring that the U. N. E. F. should station itself along the Egyptian-Israeli armistice line, served considerably to strengthen General Burns' hand.

The Israelis had clamped a tight curfew on the entire Gaza Strip. Would the thousands of Arabs under house arrest burst out violently as soon as the U. N. forces were sighted? U. N. loud speaker trucks blared out pleas for calmness and order.

It worked. No real trouble flared up as U. N. units, wearing the uniform of ten different nations† but marching under only

†List of nations contributing units to the force: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden, Yugoslavia.

one flag, moved into the area.

It was nip and tuck as the Israelis completed their withdrawal back into Israel. Would Nasser order the tiny U. N. E. F. out of Gaza so that he could prepare for another build-up of Arab forces? If that were to happen — warned the Israeli Government — the army of Israel would strike again.

But though Nasser set up his own civil government in Gaza, he has not requested the U. N. E. F. to pull out. Probably he is glad to have it as a shield against the well-trained Israeli Army. So the U. N. E. F. remains in Gaza as a police force and border patrol. It has set up a series of observation posts several hundred yards apart along the two to three foot deep ditch that the Israelis dug to indicate the demarcation line. On the Gaza side, one can watch Palestinian Arabs, who left Israel mostly in 1948, tending their lands with camel-drawn plows and crude implements of a type used by their ancestors thousands of years ago. Within sight, across the line, Israeli farmers, whose ancestral stock dates back like that of the Arabs, work their fields with modern American tractors and equipment. And each spring, millions of red poppies rise from fields that have often been stained with human blood.

In the Gulf of Aqaba area, other U. N. E. F. units are stationed to keep the waterway to the Red Sea open for Israeli shipping.

With the U. N. E. F. serving as the buffer between, there's a lull along the Arab-Israeli contact points of the Middle East.

How long this may last, nobody knows. Perhaps Nasser, when he's had time again to build up his army, will release the whirlwind. Perhaps something else will. Yet perhaps — so long as the U. N. E. F. stays on the job — nothing explosive will happen.

WHAT FUTURE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FORCE?

It's only natural, considering how things have worked out with the U. N. E. F., that suggestions keep coming up to make it permanent.

Early in the Middle East crisis, U. S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "I would be glad to see, myself, some more or less permanent character given this force." If made permanent, he felt, it could take on similar functions as other crises developed. "It raises quite complicated problems," he warned, "but in principle the idea of such a force is good."

Judging from bi-partisan resolutions before the Senate and House, many congressmen, too, are for the idea. Senator John J. Sparkman (D), who introduced the Resolution given on page one, predicts that the U. N. E. F. will become the nucleus of "a permanent, small, highly mobile U. N. force that could move quickly into any area."

The Twelfth General Assembly of the U. N., meeting in the fall of 1957, also has on its agenda the question of a permanent force.

All this gives us plenty of opportunity, based on plenty of public discussion, to form and express our own opinions as to what should be done.

Do we, or do we not, agree with Section 2 of the Resolution (see page 1) that "a force of a similar character (to the present U. N. E. F.) should be made a permanent arm of the United Nations"?

If we agree, how about Section 2b? What are our views on exclusion of units from permanent members of the Security Council? What arguments might be presented pro, what arguments con?

How about 2c? Are we for or against a force that would contain individual volunteers? What might be the advantages, what the disadvantages, of adopting this idea?

What about d? The probable 1957 deficit of six or eight million dollars will have to be made up by voluntary contributions from member nations. What to do about the costs for 1958, estimated at twenty-five million, is something the Twelfth General Assembly, including our own delegates, will have to decide.

There are many other problems likely to come up, among them the following:

1. Shall the strength of the force be only sufficient to serve to quell mobs, prevent looting, and keep raiders out during an international crisis until local authority can be restored?
2. Shall it be made powerful enough so that when a crisis comes, the force can serve within a state or states regardless of whether or not those states consent to its presence?
3. In working out plans for the new force, shall Article 43 of the U. N. Charter be considered, or be ignored and scrapped? Article 43, like the rest of the Charter, was written in 1945 when there was hope that the five Great Powers that made up the permanent members of the Security Council could keep on working together as they had during World War II. Article 43 calls on U. N. members to hold "armed forces" in readiness in case the Security Council decides to use force. Article 47 set up a military staff committee to work things out, with the U. S. A. and U. S. S. R. both represented. But the committee has never been able to see eye to eye and the cold war seems to have put an end to the whole notion.

What do we think should be done about problems like these?

Where we go from here is a very vital issue.



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COMING: Crisis at the College Level

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

Cover by Stuart Judd, Jr.

Education Beyond the High School-Crisis at the College Level?

"We must assess, with painful anxiety, the penalties we will suffer if we permit Soviet Russia to outstrip us in the education of her people."

That's what Senator Prescott Bush told the New England Conference of State Federations of Women's Clubs in a recent address.

For Russia's attitude on education, he cited a memorandum from a report being made by Dr. Finis E. Engleman, Executive Director of the American Association of School Administrators, and Chairman of the U. S. Delegation to the Twentieth International Conference on Education at Geneva: "The Soviets put schools ahead of almost everything else in their mad scramble for world domination."

America's belief in the value of education stands as one of our oldest and firmest traditions. It's a tradition which has played a potent part in bringing us the blessings we enjoy today. A well informed and educated people is a must for the continuing success of our democracy and the preservation of our way of living. That is why, as Senator Bush puts it, "We must give sober and careful consideration to whether we are doing enough for education at all levels of government."

And that, of course, applies to all levels of education as well.

Many indications, including crowded schools and a scarcity of teachers, emphasize the crisis over the past few years at the secondary education level.*

This crisis now is threatening the college level as well.

For 1957-58, the largest number of students ever is enrolled in our institutions of higher learning. According to the U. S. Commissioner of Education, the figure stands at around three and one-half million—some two hundred thousand more than last year's record crop. Or put it this way: one out of every three young persons between eighteen and twenty-one is now going to some university or college.

According to the people who deal in population statistics, this is only about half the story if we look ahead to 1970. By 1970, students in higher education will number at least six million—if not nine million as some estimators believe. If present trends persist, by 1970 one out of every two young persons will wish to go to college.

Proportionately, that's a far greater rise than the expected increase in population itself.

If the facilities for taking care of this flood of students threatening to overwhelm the colleges don't keep up with the demands and needs at the college level, we'll be faced with a truly critical and wasteful situation. As Senator Bush points out, it is a vital issue which calls for our "sober and prayerful consideration."

**See the Center's "Crisis in the Public Schools: What's Up? What's Needed?" (Volume IV, Number 8 of VITAL ISSUES).*

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How Did This Crisis Sneak Up On Us? There are several reasons for this gathering rush to the colleges.

The most obvious is the greatly increased number of young

people ready and wanting to go.

Ever since the end of World War II we've had bumper baby crops. After flooding into our secondary schools, a large number of these young Americans now are pushing forward into college. They wish to go because they and their elders believe there are many advantages. For one thing, this jet-propelled age of atomic energy and automation puts a high premium on college education and specialized training. It calls also for the type of training for life and leadership which a liberal education is believed to give.

Overcrowding and lack of facilities haven't yet quite reached the point of acute crisis. Most young applicants, this year and next, will get into college—though not necessarily the college they'd prefer. Most still will find pretty fair facilities for education.

But can we afford to ignore ominous signs of trouble ahead? Can we neglect to give serious attention toward seeing what needs to be done?

It is for the purpose of stirring people into thoughtful planning and action (since education is everybody's business in a democracy) that the President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School has issued its most recent report.†

Drawings by C. P. Meier

The Committee has this to say about the U. S. A. and education: "America would be inexcusably blind if she failed to see that the challenge of the next twenty years will require leaders not only in science and engineering and in business and industry, but in government and politics, in foreign affairs and diplomacy, in education and civic affairs . . . World peace and the survival of mankind may well depend on the way we educate the citizens and leaders of tomorrow."

The Committee's assignment was to uncover the problems of education beyond high school and suggest how to meet them.

So while there's still time, let's get on with the business. Let's plan to read the report. And let's now consider at least the major recommendations of the Committee that concern themselves with education at the college level—the level that generally leads to the B.A. and B.S. degrees.‡

Top item on the Committee's list is the pay teachers get at the college and university level.

College Teachers — and Faculty Salaries. Without teachers to do the teaching, colleges couldn't educate. They're the indispensable factor, more vital to successful higher education than up-to-date buildings, laboratories, or anything else.

Have we enough teachers now, and if not, why not?

We now have about two hundred and thirty thousand college teachers. That's a ratio of around one to every thirteen students. If we want to keep this ratio where it is, we'll have to add at least 115,000 additional teachers to meet the needs of the additional students pouring in. By 1970, the number of teachers would have to be doubled.

Yet a survey of the present situation shows that fewer instead of more people are going into college teacher training or are taking graduate work with a view to entering college teaching. In fact many are leaving the profession because

elsewhere they have a better chance for advancement and more pay.

Money isn't everything—but teachers must live. Most are dedicated to their profession—but is it fair to take advantage of that? In these days of a higher and higher standard of living, and higher prices, too, inadequate pay really hurts. By professional standards—and a college teacher's preparation ranks with the toughest in difficulty and in length of time that it takes—college teachers are drastically underpaid. Only about thirteen percent of all college teachers can expect to earn as much as $7,500 or better per year. More earn considerably less.

College pay is out of whack with the current rise in the cost of living. In the past fifty years, the average instructor in a large university has increased his purchasing power by about forty percent. But people in manufacturing have found theirs increasing by as much as 130 percent.

So the President's Committee recommends that average faculty salaries be doubled within the next five or ten years, and that fringe benefits, such as retirement funds, parallel what's being done for employees in industry. Action like this, the Committee feels, will help place college teaching on a competitive footing equal to that of comparable professions. Better pay should help to keep able teachers in the teaching profession and attract high caliber young people into it.

Of course the need to recruit the most able prospects is regarded as imperative by the Committee, along with seeing to it that they get top-notch training.

What are our views on this problem of getting enough good college teachers, and how do we feel about the Committee's recommendations on pay? In our own locality, what's being done to recruit good people into college teaching? Do we, or do we not, agree with the Committee that faculty improvement, and increase of faculty salaries, should come ahead of development of the physical plant? What's the tendency

†*The Chairman of the President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School is Devereux C. Josephs, Chairman of the Board of the New York Life Insurance Company. The membership is comprised of other distinguished citizens from education, business, publishing, law, public life, and labor. The report referred to may be ordered from the President's Committee on Education Beyond the High School, Health, Education, and Welfare Building, South, Washington 25, D. C., at no cost.*

‡*There will be later guides in the VITAL ISSUES series on other phases of education beyond the high school, such as adult education.*

as to which comes first in institutions with which we are familiar? Do we or don't we approve?

The Students. Students are the obvious other and all important human side of the fundamental college equation.

The fact that some of our best potential college material never gets to college at all means that there's a waste of talent which America, right now, can ill afford.

Nearly half of the upper twenty-five percent of all high school graduates are not entering college. There are various reasons for this. Everyone knows that tuition is apt to come high, and that stops a good many. But a sizeable number of these brighter students don't go simply because they have not learned about and planned for the opportunity of getting a college education. Therefore the Committee recommends that guidance as to college possibilities be considerably stepped up in the schools. It suggests that more information as to colleges be made available by such government agencies as the U. S. Office of Education.

What are our views as to these recommendations? Locally, is or is not such counselling and information adequately available? What locally do we feel should be done?

As to tuition costs, it should be borne in mind that high as they may seem, the amount paid by a student is only part of what it actually costs the institution to put him through college. Even if he has a full tuition scholarship, the institution will still be out of pocket unless it receives gifts to supplement tuition—whether paid by the student or met by scholarship funds.

For the college, the Committee urges that sufficient funds be made available so that they can do a satisfactory job.

For parents faced with the expenses of putting young people through college, the Committee suggests revision of income tax laws to ease the burden.

For qualified but needy students, the Committee recommends that increasing help be given in the form of loans, jobs, and scholarships.

If long term loans are made available to able students unable to get enough scholarship funds, the young men and women receiving such loans can pay them back in installments as they earn money after college. As for programs of jobs



within colleges—a spot where the Committee feels the Federal Government could help—they not only give the student extra money to finance his education but also help the colleges themselves. Pay checks to regular hired hands can mount up to sizeable expense.

There's been considerable increase in the money available for scholarships. Foundation programs on a nation-wide basis are providing a great stimulus. Industry, by granting scholarships and setting up scholarship programs within individual companies for the company's personnel, are making a mounting contribution. On the ticklish question of federal scholarship aid, the Committee's advice is to go slow. Help for education from the Federal Government is regarded by many as dangerous lest it lead to Federal control. The Committee feels that federally granted scholarships, in most instances, should only be set up if private resources don't provide enough.

What are our views as to each of these points?

Expansion of Facilities. If more students are to be taken care of in the colleges, expansion of facilities becomes a must. This means dormitories, laboratories, classrooms, and the rest. It also, of course, applies to increased college teaching personnel.

The President's Committee believes that before new colleges are set up, those already in existence should be given the opportunity to expand their facilities.

What are our views on the subject of expansion?

Efficiency. Any operation can be improved through greater efficiency. The President's Committee urges that colleges and universities make every effort to get the most and best out of what they have.

The individual states, the Committee feels, could trade information as to the use of facilities in the state universities. Some excellent state universities, geared to take care of more students, could drain off some of the surplus from already overcrowded institutions.

Federal efficiency also gets a searching look. There are many government programs aiding education in one way or another—the report records—without much coordination among them. The Committee feels that the Office of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare could do something to improve this situation. It could also make available more information on college education than is now readily at hand.

Non-accredited Colleges. A considerable number of colleges, because of insufficient funds, can't hire enough teachers with graduate degrees, like the Ph.D., or maintain well enough equipped laboratories, to gain what is known as "accrediting" —official certification that they are able to provide for their students the grade of education required to earn the B.A. or B.S. degree. The Council for Financial Aid to Education suggests that, if worthy colleges in this category can be helped to raise a little more money, they could improve their facilities enough to win accreditation. This should enable them to take on 100,000 or so additional students.

How do we feel about that?

Junior Colleges. Another suggestion for relieving the strain is to up the number of two year colleges. At present there are relatively few and their total enrollment is small. But the President's Committee believes that they well may be "the next logical step in filling in and rounding out our educational system." They have the merit of providing at least a fair amount of training for students who wish to go on beyond high school, but perhaps not four years beyond.

From the local community's point of view, such colleges are not overly expensive, since costly laboratories and campuses are not necessary and students can live at home.

But the President's Committee warns that the junior college idea should not be overworked, lest it weaken itself and also cut into the financial support going to local elementary and secondary schools. Communities expecting a big student population growth are in the best position to set up successful junior colleges. Only a community that really wants one, and is ready to support it, should try to make a go of such a project.

What's the junior college situation in our neighborhood? If any exist, of what type are they and what do they teach? Do we or don't we feel there's a need for further development of the junior college idea in our community?

Television, and Education Beyond High School. Here's a gimmick which may well prove of great value. Television

is still in the experimental stage in providing education that

merits awarding the B.A. or B.S. degree. Yet already, here and there, about half a dozen experiments are going on to teach regular college courses by TV. There are twenty-two educational TV channels in operation.

Going to college by television is a development that justifies careful watching.

What's the situation with regard to educational TV in our vicinity? What's our opinion of what goes on?

Financing Education at the College and University Level. That's the rock-bottom problem—because college education comes high.

As William G. Carr, Head of the National Education Association, says, "The high quality of education that Americans need and will get in the next twenty years cannot be bought in the bargain basement."

In 1957-58, running the colleges and the universities of the U. S. A. will cost close to four billion dollars. If we build up the plant to take care of expected enrollments, and raise teachers' pay in the amount suggested by the President's Committee, the total sum should double by 1970. This represents a staggering amount of cash.

So staggering, perhaps, that recent sessions of Congress have seemed in no mood to vote substantial federal benefits to education.

As for the states, faced with the rising cost of running their affairs, they, too, seem slow to act. Higher education appears to have less voter appeal than some of the other services that draw on state revenue. But some well-off states, the President's Committee feels, could do more for higher education than they at present are doing—and that goes also for local governments, particularly metropolitan areas.

One source of support for higher education that has increased immensely is revenue contributed by industry and business. The hundred million dollars given this year is four times the amount of five years ago. Labor, too, the Committee feels, though making contributions, can and should make more. And then, of course, there are the alumni and the general public.

It's Up To Us. Whether it is through taxes, or direct or indirect contributions, it's the citizen who pays the costs. It is we, the people, who must decide what we're willing to pay for higher education.

To help us make up our minds, the President's Committee strongly recommends that each of the states (as some already have done) hold fact-finding and plan-making conferences on education beyond the high school. Local communities are likewise urged to do so. Such conferences, the Committee feels, offer the best chance to stir up public interest and help lead the way to sensible solutions.

Adequately meeting the crisis in education beyond the high school, the Committee believes, offers "an enormous and unprecedented opportunity to develop the human resources of this nation to a broader and fuller degree than even our most optimistic forebearers ever dreamed of."

What the Crisis at the College Level Means to Young People. In practical terms, what it means is that it's becoming harder and harder to get into college.

If it's a private institution, such as the Ivy League and other older colleges, chances of getting in aren't much better than one out of three. What's more, the odds will go up. These privately supported universities and colleges feel that they will best serve the purposes of education if they expand their programs of small classes, seminars, individual instruction, and research, rather than greatly increasing enrollment. Looking for quality, they feel they can afford to be picky and choosy on admissions. What we're trying to do, remarked one Ivy League Dean of Admissions, "is to find candidates of high academic and personal promise. In the vernacular, we want brains and character." While the tax-supported state universities have to be more responsive to admissions demands, and will probably expand enrollments from fifty to one hundred percent, they, too, are looking for best qualified students.

That being so, pointers listed below on how to gain admission may come in handy and helpful.

HELPFUL HINTS ON HOW TO GET INTO COLLEGE

1. In your high school sophomore year, see your guidance counselor about which courses to take in your last two years. Find out also course and other requirements to fulfill before graduation in order to get into the college of your choice. Learn to study hard. Plan your time. College isn't easy and people who don't know how to study don't stay.

2. In high school junior year, write the Director of Admissions of the college or colleges of your choice to ask for entrance and scholarship blanks (if you need the latter). Ask him which, if any, college entrance examination board tests you should take and when and where to take them.

3. Also in your last two years, take part in some outside activities such as sports, band, debating, student government, and so forth. Colleges are looking not only for good students but also for good citizens in the school community.

4. See as many colleges as you can. If you like what you see, attend classes, find out what the costs are, and so forth. Tuition will vary from about $600 for public to $2000 for private colleges, including room and board and general fees. About $400 extra will be needed to pay for books, laundry, entertainment, and so forth.

5. If you have an interview with a college Admissions Officer, dress properly. Be at ease, but polite. Do your best to give an idea of why you want to come and what you want to do.

6. Be businesslike. Write letters to Admissions Officers neatly, dating and signing them clearly, and include your address. If accepted by more than one college, tell the others you have decided to go elsewhere.

7. Make sure you want to go to college. Perhaps, if college doesn't appeal to you, college isn't your dish. Perhaps you should enter the Armed Services before going to college. Think it over, and get opinions from people you respect.

8. If you've decided to go, be grown up. Find out all you can about your college and its opportunities and plan to make the most of them.

COMING: Preservation of Wild Life and the Wilderness

October 1957
Scudder, T.

Center for Information on America

Washington, Connecticut

Check for T.

TOWNSEND SCUDDER *President*

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CONFERENCES PROGRAM

PRE-COLLEGE INSTITUTES

PROPOSED CURRICULUM

FOR SUMMER SESSIONS IN AMERICAN STUDIES

AT THE SECONDARY SCHOOL LEVEL

October, 1957

A non-profit non-partisan educational corporation dedicated to furthering the knowledge and understanding of America by Americans through informational publications, radio, films, television, and conferences.

PREFACE

Since 1951, when the Center began developing its services dedicated to furthering the knowledge and understanding of America by Americans, a program of Institutes on American Civilization has been an important objective. Within this conference field, the need for summer sessions between high school and college demanded first attention.

In 1954, the Trustees of the Center authorized a preliminary survey at the pre-college level. This survey, released as a report in September, 1955, confirmed the need, found that "duplication hardly enters the picture," and recommended holding a three-week summer session in American Studies for selected high school students.

The preliminary report's suggestion that a syllabus for such a pilot session be prepared has now been carried out. Thanks to the generosity of the Grant Foundation, which also made possible the preliminary survey, the curriculum proposed in the present Report is herewith presented. It is the work of Mr. Van R. Halsey of the Department of American Studies, Amherst College, and of Mr. Thomas J. Johnston of the Lawrenceville School, chosen by the Center's Advisory Committee to serve as Curriculum Committee for the project.

A first draft of this syllabus was submitted to a reviewing group which met at Washington, Connecticut, during August 24 and 25, 1957. A list of those attending is included in the Appendix, together with certain earlier memoranda bearing on the project. Summaries of the discussion of the reviewing group are available on application.

This Report in its present form has had the benefit of the suggestions made at the reviewing session. It is not to be regarded as final, since it is being mailed in the present form to the reviewing group for possible further comments and suggestions. This procedure is likewise being followed with other interested persons.

One need hardly point out that curriculum planning never comes to an end. The most satisfactory teaching by competent teachers is achieved when a syllabus is regarded mainly as a useful guide, not as a rigid pattern for procedure.

The enthusiastic response to the idea of pre-college Institutes conducted by the Center which was manifested by those attending the reviewing session prompted the Center's Advisory Committee to recommend to the Trustees that ways and means be developed to hold a pilot session, and that the Center's program

of Pre-college Summer Institutes in American Civilization be planned to extend over a five year period.

The pilot session will use the excellent facilities available through the hospitality of The Gunnery, a preparatory school for boys at Washington, Connecticut. For subsequent sessions, facilities in other parts of the country have similarly been offered. Mobility of this sort seems desirable as a means of helping the idea of these pre-college summer sessions in American Studies to spread and take root.

As the Curriculum Committee points out in its introductory comment to the current Report, benefits from the project should accrue not merely to students attending but to education in general. Current plans for student recruitment call for at least one-third to be drawn from truly able young people between their junior and senior high school year. Returning to school after their summer's experience, such students should carry back stimulating ideas, useful to education at the secondary school level. The same thing goes for instructors drawn from secondary education, while those from the colleges should gain a better understanding of the problems of the teachers who prepare young people for education beyond the high school. For those students who have already graduated from high school, the pre-college Institute can well become an important experience in bridging the gap between high school and college.

Townsend Scudder,

Townsend Scudder
President

October 1, 1957

PROPOSED CURRICULUM

Introductory Comments

The Curriculum Committee, in the development of this syllabus, has operated on four general hypotheses:

1. That the summer session be more than a mere discussion group in current events.

2. That the first conference be three weeks long and be thought of as a pilot session; initially inviting forty students with the intention of increasing the numbers of students in multiples of ten or twenty over a five year period.

3. That at the start the session can assume, on the part of its students, very little acquaintance with "American Studies" beyond a reasonable knowledge of American history, and that it is unrealistic to hope that the students would have the time to complete any significant amount of background reading before coming to the conference.

4. That the initial session, and increasingly, that subsequent sessions be looked on:

   (a) As an opportunity for growth toward maturity on the part of the individual student through a confrontation with one or more areas of what we call American Civilization.

   (b) As a means, during the five year period, for bringing together able young people from various regions and backgrounds not only to study together but also, through association with one another, to add still further to their comprehension of the meaning of America. For the faculty, this same opportunity would exist, with emphasis on the chance to become better acquainted with other teachers and with teaching at the high school level and beyond, in both public and private institutions.

   (c) As an opportunity, through the experience of both students and faculty, to bring back to local communities - to schools and to colleges - a further enrichment of educational purpose and processes.

Recommendations

The utmost care and attention should be paid to the selection of the seminar and discussion leaders. We recommend that the primary qualification be that of experience and ability in face to face dealings with small groups of young people. We

do not recommend that these leaders be chosen specifically because of either their proficiency or eminence in a particular field of American Studies.

We further recommend that at least during the first week, the lectures proposed be given by one or another of the conference staff rather than inviting widely known scholars or writers to participate. These "experts" should be reserved for the second week where they would be invited to give lectures relating to the specific problems currently being discussed in the particular seminars.

Seminars should be limited to ten students. They should be offered on a series of announced subjects, each one an outgrowth of the session's topic or theme. Their choice should be voluntary, the student selecting the one which best suits his interest and needs, and the staff should be prepared to offer a seminar on any valid topic on student demand. Students will be required to write at least one paper in their seminars, and it is suggested that time be set aside near the end of the session for the presentation of some of the best student papers. It is also suggested that papers be fully commented on by the staff members concerned, for the student is entitled to know how his efforts have been received and the process of judgment furnishes a stimulus to good work.

Besides the obvious evening activities such as guest speakers and panel discussions on subjects related to the topic or theme, the Committee feels very strongly that a great deal can be accomplished by means of entertainment. Good motion pictures, such as Flaherty's Louisiana Story, are fine examples of American creative energy and imagination. The Grapes of Wrath, Dead End or On the Waterfront would be good too. A folk singer (Josh White, Pete Seeger, Tom Glazer, Richard Dyer-Bennett) would give a worthwhile and relevant evening.

Approach

At the outset of the reviewing session held on August 24-25, 1957, it was stated that the program offered should be immediately stimulating to the student as well as to the staff, whether the approach be thematic or topical. By way of suggestion, the Curriculum Committee had proposed "Education in a Democracy" as a topical device for entering into the study of American Civilization, and "Individualism and Conformity" as a possible thematic approach. The reviewing group favored the latter, and accordingly it becomes the basis for the following syllabus and plan for work.

Syllabus and Plan - First Week

The first week is one of exploration of his fellows by each student, of his discussion group by each teacher. In order that the Institute may succeed, it is of prime importance that a proper atmosphere be created. While "atmosphere" is intangible, it is nevertheless real and necessary. The discussion groups of the first five days are designed to help the students get to know one another, to enable the teachers to draw the students out on the subject of individualism and conformity, to break down the natural reluctance of students to discuss openly and subjectively their own problems and experience in the general area of the conference theme. The discussion groups will not have formal syllabi; rather they will be meetings in which the teacher will attempt to present the ways in which conformity plays a part in modern American life, but this is to be done not by lecturing, but by the skillful handling of discussion within the group. The teacher is attempting to create an atmosphere of free discussion and exchange of ideas which will lead naturally into the seminars course, but this direction will be subtle and flexible enough to enable the student to discuss his own views and feelings freely enough so that he will not feel that he is being subjected to any preconceived plan.

At the same time that these discussion groups are being held, there will be reports to the whole student body, by designated representatives of each discussion group, on the ideas and material which have arisen in each group. This step is planned so that all students may be aware of what is going on in other discussion groups and so that there is a feeling of uniformity of awareness and concern.

It is a necessary function of the discussion groups to cover, during the course of the first week, and in an introductory way, the problems posed by each of the seminars offered by the Institute. In this manner, the student becomes aware of the ways in which the various problems of individualism and conformity interrelate, and he also sees that his own experience with individualism and conformity is not unique, that it forms part of a pattern which concerns many people.

The schedule of the first week, then, would shape up as follows:

Sunday: Arrival, registration, room assignments. Students to be present by 6 p. m., when supper will be served.

7:30 General meeting followed by introductory lecture by member of the staff.
(This lecture, the most crucial one in the three

week session, will concern itself with a statement of the theme of the Institute, it will show students the ways in which this theme manifests itself daily in the lives of us all, and it will pose, but not attempt to answer, some of the problems which the whole matter of conformity presents. These problems will be selected to (1) provide material for the first week's discussion groups, and (2) lead logically into the seminars of the second and third weeks.)

9:00 Free time with activities designed to help students get acquainted.

10:45 Quiet.

11:15 Lights out.

Monday through Thursday:

7:30 Rising.

8:00 Breakfast.

9:00 - 9:45 Series of four talks by staff members, these to be merely expository stories of particular incidents in history illustrating aspects of main theme. (Suggestions: The story of Sacco and Vanzetti, Galileo's trial, what happened to the State Department's 1947 tour of an art show, F.D.R. and pre-World War II public opinion, one person's experience with the McCarthy investigating committee.) The speaker should be as objective as possible, leaving judgments to the students in their discussion groups.

10:00 - 11:30 Discussion groups. Perhaps using the preceding talk as a take-off point, but emphasizing the student's personal experiences until such time (time will vary with groups) as a link can be made between his own problems and the opening lecture. At this point the leader tries to bring students from the particular and personal problem to an awareness of its connection with the larger issues and to begin lining up student interest in a special area seminar (e.g. from a personal student problem of writing for school literary magazine to question of the writer's role in society).

12:15 Lunch.

The period after lunch provides the student with a time of day when he can relax, rest, write letters, etc. It also is designated as a period in which he can work on assigned reading, background reading for discussion groups and lectures, reading for seminars.

3:00 Free time for recreation (tennis, swimming, softball, and other, planned by the Director of Activities).

5:00 - 6:00 Informal meetings of discussion groups. Teachers will be available during this period in announced places so that students will be able to continue the day's discussion, seek advice on reading or papers, or merely talk.

6:15 Dinner.

7:30 Evening meeting. Reports to entire student body by representatives of each discussion group so that the whole student body may know what is going on in each group. These reports will be followed by a period of general discussion. On alternate evenings there will be student reports on outside reading (e.g. The Organization Man, The Caine Mutiny, Civil Disobedience).

9:00 Free time.

10:45 Quiet.

11:15 Lights out.

(NOTE: The evening meeting is devoted during the first week to the reports cited. In the ensuing weeks, it will be used for guest lecturers, panel discussion by visiting and student panelists, and for entertainment relevant to the theme of the Institute.)

Friday:

7:30 Rising.

8:00 Breakfast.

9:00 General meeting. The purpose of this meeting is to have the leader of each of the various seminars explain briefly what his seminar plans to cover, the problems it proposes to explore, the

questions it will expect students to answer for themselves. As with the entire conference, the emphasis is upon having the student make up his own mind after having been faced with a question or problem.

Faculty members will be available for the rest of the morning for consultation about seminar choices. Students will be expected to turn in a list of three choices of seminar topics by lunch time.

12:00 Lunch.

1:00 - 3:00 Assigned reading for individual seminars to be read before opening seminar on Saturday, or general reading of assigned titles in library.

3:00 - 5:00 Recreation.

6:00 Dinner.

7:30 Evening meeting. A faculty member can review the various student reports of the week and can point out, in a brief lecture, the community of interest and idea which exists within the student body. In this way, a kind of unity or homogeneity can be fostered, giving students the feeling that they are not alone in their ideas, that they have much in common with others.

8:30 Free time.

10:45 Quiet.

11:15 Lights out.

Saturday:

7:30 Rising.

8:00 Breakfast.

9:00 - 10:30 Seminars begin. They will meet at this hour through the second week and up to and including Thursday of the third week.

The topics of some of these seminars will have been announced in advance for publicity reasons, but the staff should be prepared to offer seminars in other fields if there is a demand expressed in the discussion groups. The seminars should

adopt a problem approach: that is, the topic will be in the form of a question which all the students in each seminar will have to come to a decision on in a paper due the middle of the third week. The papers will be based on outside reading, the lectures, and the seminar discussion.

Suggested topics:

1. What role should the arts play in modern society?

2. What is the responsibility of the writer to society?

3. Is social and intellectual conformity a necessity in secondary school?

4. Does business have a social responsibility or should it be concerned solely with profit maximization?

5. Should the President of the United States lead the public or should his actions be guided by public opinion?

6. Does mass communication mean conformity to standard ideas and behavior?

7. How can individuality be maintained in an age of large corporations and labor unions or sprawling suburbia?

8. What role should advertising play in modern American society?

11:00 Hike and picnic lunch.

7:30 Evening entertainment. Motion picture which is relevant to the conference in that it concerns itself with some facet of modern American life. Suggested titles: Louisiana Story, Grapes of Wrath, Dead End.

9:15 Free time.

10:45 Quiet.

11:15 Lights out.

Sunday: Sunday is a free day so far as formal meetings are concerned. However, reading assignments will

be posted by the various seminar leaders. It is expected that students will do some reading on this day in preparation for the seminars on Monday. Religious services are available in Washington and neighboring communities.

Second week:

Monday:

7:30 Rising.

8:00 Breakfast.

9:00 General meeting for announcements followed by seminars. Seminars are to run for roughly one and a half hours. The time immediately following the seminar, before lunch, may be used by the seminar if the group wishes to continue. It is also to be used as a period for reading, for library work, and for consultation with faculty.

(NOTE: Because, obviously, the time for the general meeting will vary somewhat, the times listed for the morning schedule are suggestive.)

9:15 - 10:45 Seminars.

10:30 - 12:00 Reading, library work, consultation, paper writing.

12:15 Lunch.

1:30 Lecture to all students.

A series of four pairs of lectures by guest speakers on alternate days are proposed; one at this hour and its successor at 7:30 the same day. Each pair would deal with opposite points of view regarding one of the four seminar topics. For example: The Monday lectures might deal with the problem of the writer's role in society, if that were one of the seminars currently in progress. The morning talk would be by a social critic such as John Marquand and the evening one by Faith Baldwin. If one of the seminars was considering advertising, the morning lecture would be by a Madison Avenue representative, while the evening talk would be by a critic.

Since the seminar topics will not be definitely

fixed until after the staff is selected, the choice of speakers must remain somewhat uncertain.

3:00 - 5:00	Recreation.
6:00	Supper.
7:30	Lecture and question period.
9:30	Study time.
10:45	Quiet.
11:15	Lights out.

Tuesday:

7:30	Rising.
8:00	Breakfast.
9:00 - 10:30	Assigned and supplementary reading.
10:45 - 12:00	Seminars.
12:00	Lunch.
1:00 - 3:00	Conferences with seminar leaders, and work on bibliography for papers.
3:00 - 5:00	Recreation.
6:00	Supper.
7:30	Evening meeting: Entertainment. A folk singer of essentially American music in a concert of American and English and Scottish ballads and folk songs. (Suggested artist: Richard Dyer-Bennett)

(NOTE: The conference staff would try to get an artist who would be willing to do some explaining of his material as he went along so that he would describe and demonstrate the American debt to English and Scotch balladry and the development of American folk song, the emergence of the work songs, the songs of the Revolution, of the Frontier, and, later, of labor.)

9:15	Rest of evening on usual schedule.

Wednesday: Daily schedule the same as Monday with two more invited speakers.

Thursday: Daily schedule the same as Tuesday with the exception of the evening meeting.

7:30 Evening meeting - student panel discussion: Conformity in Pre-college Society. A completely student run panel with the moderator and panelists chosen by the faculty. This panel is designed to give the students an opportunity to draw together some of the ideas which have found expression in the discussion groups of the first week and in the seminars, in the informal talks among students, and as a result of some of the lectures. It will help to preserve something of the sense of unity which the conference requires.

Rest of the evening on usual schedule.

Friday: Daily schedule the same as Wednesday.

Saturday: Daily schedule the same as Thursday except that the whole afternoon is free time.

8:00 Square dance.

Sunday: Free day. Although there are no regular appointments, it is expected that students will work on seminar papers, avail themselves of the library facilities, and continue with required reading.

Third week: This is the capstone week in which the papers prepared for each seminar will be completed, and painstakingly analyzed. The final two days are to be devoted to a presentation of the best student papers and a series of reports by representatives of each seminar. These reports will sketch, for the whole student body, the work done by each of the seminars so that each student may be aware of what has been going on in seminars other than his own, and so that he may at least be aware of the ramifications of the conference theme in terms of American Studies. The presentation of papers and the oral reports will once again bring the whole student body into contact with the conference theme and help to conclude the conference with everyone again considering common problems and ideas.

Monday: Daily schedule the same as Friday with the final pair of lectures presented.

Tuesday: Daily schedule the same as previous Thursday.

7:30 Evening meeting - concert of recent American music, "live" if possible, recorded if not. This concert is designed to acquaint students with what is being done in modern, serious music in this country. (Composers such as Piston, Hanson, Barber, Copland) with commentary by staff member.

Wednesday:

7:30 Rising.

8:00 Breakfast.

10:00 Papers due at seminars meeting.

10:30 All day outing (Mystic Marine Museum, or Sturbridge Village).

7:30 Movie.

Thursday:

7:30 Rising.

8:00 Breakfast.

9:15 Seminars. The papers will have been read and commented on and this final seminar will be a critique of the arguments presented in the papers and selection of those to be given by students to whole student body.

12:00 Lunch.

1:00 - 3:00 Two student papers taking opposing points of view will be presented by their authors from two of the seminars - four papers in all.

3:00 - 5:00 Recreation.

6:00 Supper.

7:30 Concert of American Jazz (live if possible) exploring the evolution from New Orleans Dixieland to Modern - with commentary.

Friday:

7:30 Rising.

8:00 Breakfast.

9:15 Four more papers delivered by students.

10:30 - 12:00 Free time.

12:00 Lunch.

Afternoon: Student-faculty baseball game.

6:00 Supper.

7:30 Dance and student entertainment.

11:15 Lights out.

Saturday:

8:00 Breakfast.

9:00 Final conference meeting: A review of the conference, its aims, an evaluation of the extent to which the aims have been met, its prospects for the future. To be delivered either by the Conference Director or an officer of the Center.

12:00 Conference ends after lunch.

Respectfully submitted,

Thomas J. Johnston (Lawrenceville School)
Van R. Halsey, Jr. (Amherst College)

Curriculum Committee for the Center's Conferences Program--Summer Sessions in American Studies at the Pre-college Level

Center for Information on America
Washington, Connecticut

List of Those Attending August 24-25 Reviewing Session

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Mrs. Adeline H. Banker, Bridgewater, Connecticut (Administrative Assistant, Center for Information on America)

Mr. John D. Briscoe, Lakeville, Connecticut (President, Connecticut Citizens for the Public Schools)

Professor Stuart Gerry Brown, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York

Dr. Hennig Cohen, Executive Secretary, American Studies Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Mr. Lawrence Duryee, Middlebury, Connecticut (Trustee, Center for Information on America)

Miss Elaine Exton, Correspondent, American Schoolboard Journal, Washington, D. C.

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Professor Maxwell H. Goldberg, Executive Director, Humanities Center for Liberal Education in an Industrial Society, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts

Mr. Harold M. Gore, Jr., Roger Ludlowe High School, Fairfield, Connecticut

Mr. Dalton K. Gray, Business Manager, The Gunnery, Washington, Connecticut

Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C.

Dr. Van Rensselaer Halsey, Jr., Department of American Studies, Amherst College, Amherst, Massachusetts

Mr. Fred Hechinger, President, Education Writers Association

Mr. Thomas J. Johnston, English Department, The Lawrenceville School, Lawrenceville, New Jersey

Miss Caroline Keeler, New Milford High School, New Milford, Connecticut

Mr. D. Day Lee, Second Century Office, The Gunnery, Washington, Connecticut

Mr. Fred Luddy, Hopkins Academy, Hadley, Massachusetts

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Center for Information on America

CONFERENCES PROGRAM

Memorandum on Staffing

Nothing is more important to the entire program (Summer Sessions in American Studies at the Secondary School level, Sessions for Teachers, and Sessions for Non-Teacher Adults) than excellent staffing. Utilizing the services of the most qualified, inspiring, and capable teachers should be a primary aim. Because evidence of their ability is in many respects intangible, good teachers are harder to locate than good scholars (though a combination of these attributes makes for the ideal).

One source of supply open to the Center is suggested by the presence on its Advisory Committee of the President of the Society of American Historians and of a former President and present Council Member of the American Studies Association. Groups of this sort naturally contain individual teachers of the type which we seek. Already various professional organizations, in addition to the two mentioned above, have been informally sounded out, among them the American Historical Association, and the College English Association. Officers of each have expressed a friendly desire to be helpful in the matter of staffing. As soon as our Conferences program is ready for this step, more formal cooperative arrangements might well be entered into with such organizations, with a view to building up a pool of teachers available as the Center's conferences program develops and expands.

Townsend Scudder

November 29, 1956

Center for Information on America

CONFERENCES PROGRAM

Summer Sessions in American Studies at the Secondary School Level

Memorandum on Student Recruitment

The Preliminary Report on these sessions, June, 1956, suggests that "as a working basis for a pilot conference, 100 students - 50 boys and 50 girls - might be assembled."

Subsequent thinking, based on further conversations with well-qualified advisers, suggests that this number be made up of a boy and girl from each state, with four foreign students in American schools to round out the total.

The objective would be to seek from every state truly outstanding representatives - young people of noteworthy intellectual endowment, fine character, and a marked potentiality for growth and leadership. Mens sana in corpore sano is a painfully trite phrase - but it still expresses an ideal very well worth aiming for. With young people of such qualifications at the pilot conference, selection for attendance at subsequent sessions should become an honor and opportunity much sought after, with the states themselves increasingly interested in the quality of the young people named to attend.

This brings up a second aspect of recruitment: How should the candidates be selected and designated? Dr. Abraham Flexner has strongly urged us that if this can be made the concern of the individual states, it would hold various advantages. From the point of view of interest on the part of state governors, the only state executive thus far consulted, Governor Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut, has endorsed the conferences idea in a letter dated August 2, 1956, and in a later conversation has indicated his willingness to go along with a suitable plan for selection and designation when it is ready. Various official and unofficial organizations and groups have been suggested to do the screening and make the nominations: Each state's Board of Education, the State Association of Secondary School Principals, State Associations of School Administrators, State School Boards Associations, Parent-Teachers Associations, and so forth. Further investigation and consideration is needed to help evolve workable plans for choosing the right boy and girl from each state - young people serving, in a sense, as the states' representatives, and above all, qualified to gain the greatest benefit from attendance. Such selections would in turn contribute to the usefulness and success of the sessions through what they themselves would bring to them.

Comments on this memorandum, and suggestions, will be very welcome and are earnestly solicited.

Townsend Scudder, President

November 29, 1956

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WASHINGTON, CONNECTICUT

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Chairman of Committee on American Civilization
University of Pennsylvania
Council Member and former President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.

October 23, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

With election fever mounting, perhaps this effort on the part of the Center to explain the use of platforms may afford you a little diversion. At any rate, we hoped it would have a cooling effect on partisanship!

With regards,

Sincerely,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

P. S. I thought I had sent you a copy earlier, but discovered I had not.

A non-profit non-partisan educational corporation dedicated to furthering the knowledge and understanding of America by Americans through informational publications, radio, films, television, and conferences.

Scudder, Lorenzo

Center for Information on America

Washington, Connecticut

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Chairman of Committee on American Civilization
University of Pennsylvania
Council Member and former President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.

September 17, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Thanks for your letter of September 14, saying you will let me know your plans and decision on Latin America when formed.

I am sorry you can't fit in the Alaskan piece this year, for I do believe it is an excellent opportunity. By the way, how about automation? You mentioned that as a subject you would do this year, and I am very anxious to do a VITAL ISSUE on it.

Sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

A non-profit non-partisan educational corporation dedicated to furthering the knowledge and understanding of America by Americans through informational publications, radio, films, television, and conferences.

Center for Information on America
Washington, Connecticut

TOWNSEND SCUDDER *Executive Director of the Center*

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Council Member and former President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.

November 27, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I still hope it may prove possible to work out some sort of an arrangement with you at CBS whereby we can bring out a discussion guide on a topic which you will be dealing with. Meanwhile, here are our two most recent issues.

It is good to have you back from the Middle East ! I must admit, when I heard your excellant reports from there, I had my doubts as to whether you would come away all in one piece, and I am sure a great number of your other worried hearers did, too!

Kindest regards,

Sincerely,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

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

Drawings by C. P. Meier

AUTOMATION: What's Ahead?

Our country owes its remarkable economic growth and its unsurpassed standard of living to the skill with which we've dreamed up and put to practical use technological advances on our farms and in our factories. Our ability to find faster and better ways of doing things has become a national trait. We pride ourselves on our "Yankee ingenuity."

Even so, plenty of people aren't so sure that further technological progress will prove an unmixed blessing. They particularly wonder about that feature of it which we call "automation." Yet automation is only a new word for something we've always believed in — inventing ways of making things quicker and cheaper so that there will be greater abundance for everyone.

Why then is there fear of automation along with approval? The answer is that we have learned how to make machines that are entirely automatic.

Doesn't this mean that machines will be taking over many people's jobs? Going a step further, a few imaginative persons have prophesied a streamlined world run by robots — a world in which the human spirit with its love of freedom and its belief in the worth and dignity of the individual will no longer count.

But experts on the subject, both from a practical and theoretical standpoint, insist that automation will mean more jobs, not fewer. They insist that it will enrich our lives, not degrade them. They point out that in the next ten years we will need 40% more productivity than we now have, while, in the face of this, our labor force will increase by only 13%. They maintain that unless this serious labor shortage is counteracted by an increase in automation, we will be confronted by a declining standard of living.

From this point of view, it looks as though automation is sure to come. Already many types of manufacture have introduced plenty of it. As the trend goes on, it's bound to bring its own particular benefits. And it's also bound to raise serious social and economic problems.

What about those factory and office workers whose present jobs will be taken over by machines? In new work, won't they have to acquire new skills in order to fit successfully into the new scheme of things?

Moreover, won't our present management, production, distributional, and marketing systems become increasingly obsolete? Doesn't this mean that businessmen will have to develop and master new techniques and concepts?

The truth is that the progress we make in receiving the benefits of automation will depend, not just on technological advances, but on what we can do to overcome social and economic stumbling blocks along the way.

This is the true vital issue we must solve.

To most of us automation still seems shrouded in mystery. How is it used? What are the facts we must face?

EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: Dr. James W. Fesler, Professor of Government, Yale University; Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C.; Dr. Allan Nevins, Professor of American History, Columbia University, President of the Society of American Historians; Dr. Robert E. Spiller, Chairman of the Department of American Civilization, University of Pennsylvania, Council Member and former President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.
Editor: Townsend Scudder, President of the Center.

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IS AUTOMATION SOMETHING NEW?

Automation is both new and old. It is a new tool in mankind's agelong search for better ways to produce the things he needs. Man invented the plow — and moved further ahead

from his primitive hunting stage. He devised the wheel —one of his greatest inventions—for moving carts, for making pottery, for milling and spinning. He invented the loom for weaving cloth. He learned the use of copper, bronze, and iron, and in some places there appeared handicraftsmen of superb artistry and skill. We still marvel at early Egyptian jewelry, Greek pottery, and Etruscan bronzes. Thus man helped himself to get civilized through making things he and other men could use.

But in ancient days goods were produced in a large degree by slave labor. And in early medieval times they were produced by serfs — men who were bound to their land and their jobs by feudal overlords. Neither situation was much fun for the average human being. He had little real incentive to produce. He did not fully enjoy the fruits of his labor.

As commerce picked up, towns began to grow, and the number of freemen increased. Goods were manufactured by independent craftsmen who sold them right at their shops. Each trade banded together into a guild and strictly controlled the number of members and the quality and price of the articles they made.

The guild system of production worked fine while towns were practically little governments unto themselves. But as great nations came into being and the modern world was born, the craftsman guilds couldn't provide enough goods for home consumption or international trade. Enterprising men began to farm out raw materials to groups of workmen in their homes. This method of production was known as the domestic system.

Around 1750, there came a quickening of men's ingenuity to build machines — run first by hand, then by waterpower — which increased the productivity of the individual worker. In 1764, Hargreaves, an Englishman, invented the spinning jenny which enabled a single operator to spin several threads at one time. In 1785, Cartwright invented the power loom.

By 1788 Watt had perfected his steam engine. An American, Eli Whitney, in 1790 invented the cotton gin. In doing so, he hit on the idea of interchangeable parts — the key to mass output. So the stage was set for a new type of production — workers under one roof operating power driven machinery. Thus the factory system was born.

The Industrial Revolution brought about by the factory system raised many problems, such as a shift of workers from the farm to the factory, child labor, city slums. These had to be faced — and not all have been satisfactorily met even yet.

With the tremendous economic expansion that followed the Civil War, the American Industrial Revolution moved into full swing.

By the end of World War One, we were the most heavily mechanized country in the world.

And with the growth of the automobile industry during the twenties, the assembly line came into its own. But at the same time, work became more and more routine. Lightening the repetitive drudgery of much of it became one of the problems calling for attention.

The enormous demand for military equipment during World War Two speeded the development of high-production machines. They became semi-automatic. The operator turned the machine on and off, fed in raw stock, took out finished parts, and watched for slip-ups.

Also during the war our scientists and engineers designed new electronic devices that would automatically guide guns and airplanes. After the war it was obvious that these electronic controls could be applied to semi-automatic production machines to make them fully automatic. Automation was



here. Some people have called it the Second Industrial Revolution.

HOW IS AUTOMATION USED?

Automation has two principal uses — shaping materials and processing information. The first applies to manufacturing, the second to management.

In Manufacturing

In manufacturing, automation means the use of machines which are self-correcting. Through the "feed-back" principle, the machine is designed to check itself, to compensate for its own errors, and to follow through a sequence of logical operations. Human "brain power" is not needed.

A further aspect of automation in manufacturing is the automatic transferring of materials (solids or liquids) from one machine to another. The raw material enters one end of the plant, goes through a continuous process untouched by human hands, and comes out as a finished product. This is the ideal of the automatic factory.

While the automatic factory is still largely theoretical, many successful automatic machines are already in use in manufacturing — lathes, screw machines, milling machines, drills, punch presses. In addition, there is automatic inspection, testing, sorting, weighing, and packaging. In some industries (notably refining, but also bottle making, tin cans, paper, light bulbs, radio tubes, cigarettes) the continuous process — or the automatic factory principle — has been developed to a high degree. And through the development of punched paper tapes, on which blueprint designs can be recorded and fed directly into the machine, the future of automation in manufacturing looks bright indeed.

In Management

In management, automation means the use of computing machines or "electronic brains" to process data. In a matter of minutes, these machines can make accurate tabulations and computations that would take skilled human beings hours of hard work to complete. Automation in management also means the instantaneous selection of this information and the delivery

of it to the appropriate places by electronic communications.

Although this aspect of automation has not been advanced to any great degree, electronic computing machines are being adopted widely for tabulating and processing information in all types of industrial corporations and in railroads, banks, and insurance companies, not to mention government offices and mercantile companies.

Automation is certainly here, and it is here to stay.

WHY AUTOMATION?

But why have people concerned with manufacturing and management problems adopted automation?

The answer is simple. It pays.

The main problems in manufacturing are volume and cost per unit volume. Automation helps solve both of these. As the number of articles a single machine can produce each day goes up, the cost of each article comes down. But cost also involves the wages of the operator, the number of parts that are spoiled, the time it takes to make adjustments. Automatic machines eliminate the operator, have little or no spoilage, and adjust themselves. Thus they produce more parts more accurately.

The same applies to computing machines. They turn out more information more accurately. Businesses today must handle a vast amount of figures just to carry out their routine work such as payroll, taxes, and billing. They also need all kinds of data to make decisions and plans — production and inventory figures, sales and market statistics. Automation speeds routine bookkeeping and enables management to give better service. In addition, the accurate and quick information it provides, some of which was never available before, enables management to make better decisions and sounder, more reliable plans.

Besides merely computing, automation can add to the efficiency of management by instantly transmitting processed data to those who need it. A good example is what one stock brokerage firm does. When a branch office customer buys or sells a stock, all the arithmetic involved is computed in a few seconds on a giant "electronic brain" located in New York.



This information is transferred to a punched paper tape, fed into a teletype machine, and flashed to the customer's office almost instantly, no matter how far away it might be.

HOW WILL AUTOMATION AFFECT WORKERS?

We have seen how and why automation is used. But what about the people it displaces? Will it create a serious unemployment problem?

In the long run, it shouldn't. Quite the reverse, automation should make for more and better jobs, rather than fewer. But till there's been time for adjustment, automation can bring hardship, especially to older people who have done routine factory or office work for years and find it hard or impossible to learn new ways.

But once automation becomes established, it should help to make factory and office life more pleasant, for it will eliminate tedious routine jobs and will increase the demand for highly skilled technicians. Although machines will be doing the work, more and more people will be needed to keep the machines working, to build them, and to set them up for the work they have to do.

Since there is already a scarcity of labor of this caliber, management will have no choice but to train the technicians needed. For the worker, greater skill means better pay. Thus automation should upgrade labor.

Also because with automation more goods can be made more cheaply, the market for many types of things should expand. As a consequence, corporations will grow. Hence



more jobs — not fewer — should be created.

Yet though automation promises labor a higher status, more opportunity for self-government, more pay, and more jobs, unions are inclined to fear that automation may reduce their bargaining power. But manufacturers who may introduce automation for this reason are fooling themselves. Automation costs money. It also tightens competition. These circumstances make it pretty expensive to allow a strike to close a plant down. For these reasons, labor's bargaining power is not likely to be impaired. The refining industry, for example, which is highly automatic, has a very stable labor record.

Finally, as far as labor is concerned, the greater productivity of automation will increase the possibility of getting a shorter work week and give the working man more leisure.

WHAT ABOUT AUTOMATION AND MANAGEMENT?

As we have seen, automation is helping management solve some of its problems by speeding bookkeeping and providing better analytical data. But it is also raising newer and, in some ways, tougher problems. Factory production systems are having to be changed to utilize automatic machinery. Products are having to be redesigned. Training programs for technicians and even for engineers and designers are becoming a necessary cost.

Besides these problems within the plant, management is having to revise its techniques of marketing and distribution, since automation will allow much less fluctuation in output. The market will have to be much more predictable and definite than it ever has been.

All of this indicates that automation will bring some radical changes to the economics of the average business firm. The managers of our free enterprise system are coming up against one of the biggest challenges they have ever faced.

HOW WILL THIS NEW WAY OF MAKING THINGS AFFECT US?

Because of the great expense of installing it and because of the nature of automatic production equipment, it seems likely that in the coming years we will have to accept even more standardization in what we use than we have now.

However, though this may be a drawback, automation will



benefit us with a more stable economy. Today, when a businessman finds goods piling up in his warehouse, he cuts production and lays off workers. But as automation advances, he is going to find that he can't save money by shutting down

part of his plant, and he will have to reduce his inventory by harder selling. Thus we will tend to move away from the "boom and bust" cycles that have always troubled us. We'll have more job security.

But the greatest boon of automation is that by its remarkable capacity to make more things available at a lower price it should bring us a better living standard. Moreover, with machines taking over much of our work load, mankind at last may be achieving what he has always yearned for — the leisure for living itself.

This however will bring us squarely up against still another problem. What shall we do with our leisure time?

We're a nation of workers. We look upon work as a virtue to be cultivated and idleness as a sin. Yet aren't many of our social ills aggravated by the fact that we have too little time left over from our work for other important things? Parents need more time to be with their children. We need more time to take part in worthwhile civic and cultural activities.

If we learn to use the coming increase in our leisure wisely, we can become a happier and better society.

If we don't, boredom may become a source of national frustration and instability.

HOW FAST WILL AUTOMATION BE APPLIED?

While the application of this new technique of producing the things we need should give us a sounder, more abundant economy, we certainly are not going to have it overnight. For one thing, industries which have invested millions of dollars in plant equipment and have spent years in developing their manufacturing methods are not going to scrap everything for something new. They will introduce automation gradually, wherever they think it will pay. Also some industries simply do not lend themselves to automation, particularly those which produce in small lots.

Another drag on automation is the lack of trained technicians and of instrument, design, and production engineers. Lack of knowledge and experience is still another barrier, for there are many technical problems involved in the advancement of automation, and they will take time to solve.

Finally, there is always the matter of money. The high cost of automatic machinery means that industry will have to raise large amounts of capital. And until the public becomes more interested in buying stocks and bonds, to finance such installations, this will not be easy to do.

No matter how perplexing the obstacles in the way of automation may seem to be — the inertia of management, the distrust of labor, the lack of personnel, of know-how, and of money — they are all things we'll be called on to help overcome. Our population is growing rapidly — more rapidly than our ability to produce what it needs. Unless we are willing to accept a lower living standard, automation looks like a must.

Here are some of the questions raised by automation which deserve being thought about and discussed:

1. What shall we do with regard to factory and office workers displaced by automation who may be too old to learn new skills or who do not have the aptitude to do so? Would some sort of pension plan be one solution? What are others?
2. What means can we suggest to train new technicians and engineers? Should we persuade more people to attend technical and engineering schools? What about government scholarships or scholarships from industry?
3. Can we think of more ways to increase the amount of money available to industry for investment in automatic equipment? If so, let's consider them. Should our tax laws be changed, or would this be favoring "big business"?
4. Do we, or do we not, believe that the shorter work week is a good thing? What do we suggest for the use of leisure time? Are there any important things we have neglected because work has used up most of our time and energy?
5. How do we feel about our present system of distributing and marketing our products? Is, or is not, the difference between the factory price and the store price too much? Why does automation lead us to think about these things?

COMING: The Middle East—What Are The Long Range Problems Involved? What Are The Solutions?

Drawings by C. P. Meier

Vital Issues

"A DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR BETTER INFORMED AMERICANS"

Published by the
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THE PUZZLE OF PROSPERITY

What Can We Do To Safeguard Our Economic Well-Being?

Outside of our freedom, there is nothing we Americans are more proud of than our high standard of living. We like to think of ourselves as an industrious and inventive people who have transformed our vast natural resources into an abundance everyone can enjoy.

Today we are in the midst of the greatest industrial boom of all time. Never before has the world seen a society capable of producing so much for the benefit of so many. But even more amazing is the fact that in addition to all this, we are able to build a big national armament for our defense and to provide surplus food and equipment in order to support and strengthen the economy of other nations whose friendship we need.

But how long can such prosperity be continued? Will the expansion of our gigantic industrial machine get out of hand? In order to build it and in order to buy what it produces, are we running into too much debt? Already we have seen various cut-backs, such as in automobile production and in housing. Farm prices have sagged. By no means all of us feel as well off or secure as the rest of us. Could a recession be on the way?

The answers to these questions are complex — full of all kinds of *ifs* and *buts*. Yet that should not scare us away from the problem.

Because our country is now a world leader among free nations, safeguarding and continuing our economic prosperity is one of the most vital issues of our times.

We have already heard a lot about it during the presidential campaign. We need to keep right on thinking about it.

Let's study the facts.

Let's see how we gained our prosperity.

Let's examine the problems we face in maintaining it.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: Dr. James W. Fesler, Professor of Government, Yale University; Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian, United States Army, Washington, D. C.; Dr. Allan Nevins, Professor of American History, Columbia University, President of the Society of American Historians; Dr. Robert E. Spiller, Chairman of Committee on American Civilization, University of Pennsylvania, Council Member and former President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.
Editor: Townsend Scudder, Executive Director of the Center.

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OUR ECONOMIC GROWTH UNTIL 1860

A glance at our economic past should shed some light on what to look for in the present. It should also help prepare us to take care of the future.

It's at once apparent that our economic development since the start of our nation has been characterized by amazing

growth. But it is also apparent that this growth has been attended by periodic disruptions and distortions that have brought suffering to many of our people and have at times checked our progress.

Outside of military matters, the most serious problems between 1774 and 1788 that faced the Continental Congress were economic ones — how to pay for winning the war and running the government. After the war, there was a sudden deflation (falling of prices), which ushered in a long depression.

The new Congress set up by our Constitution in 1789 benefited from good leadership and especially from the financial brilliance of Alexander Hamilton. It was on his recommendation that we established a mint and adopted a national coinage system. Slowly the new nation began to acquire some financial muscles and to get on its feet.

But for a long time we remained dependent on imports, and our economy was subject to sharp fluctuations due to European wars.

After 1812, the most upsetting factor in our economy was speculation in the new Western lands. Periodically, as in 1819 and 1837, rapid expansion would run up against the limits of our supply of cash and credit. The land bubble would burst, and there would be a depression.

Yet, in spite of such obstacles, the overall trend went vigorously upward. We were busy building turnpikes, canals, steamboats, and connecting markets and waterways with railroads. We were in the midst of developing an interdependent economy. It soon became possible for Western farmers and Southern planters to sell their crops in the East and to buy manufactured goods in return. Waterpowered and steam-

driven machinery made large factories possible. New England became the center of the textile industry. And through the ingenuity of such men as Eli Whitney (who also invented the cotton gin), we were learning the value of making things with interchangeable parts — the key to mass production.

By the 1850's we were a thriving nation and becoming an industrial power. But we tended to move too fast. Our optimism caused us to bite off more than we could chew. Every big step forward was apt to cause half a step backward, like the economic crisis of 1857.

CAPITALISM COMES OF AGE

Though the economy of the South was ruined by the Civil War, the country as a whole, when the war ended, entered on a phase of intense economic expansion, centered in railroad building. The public began to invest its savings in the stocks and bonds of large corporations. Everybody wanted to get rich quick, and there was a vast amount of speculation, especially on the New York Stock Exchange. Financial speculators and promoters such as Jay Cooke, Daniel Drew, Jim Fisk, Jay Gould, and Cornelius Vanderbilt engaged in ruthless wars for the control of the railroads. They had devious ways of manipulating the stock market, and again and again the gullible public found itself out in the cold.

The greed of this group was their own undoing. After 1873, when Jay Cooke's investment house collapsed, a more responsible type of financier appeared — the organizers of giant corporations. These men were sincerely interested in seeing the corporations they controlled prosper. But there was still severe competition among them, and sometimes it caused trouble. For the most part they concentrated on consolidating their railroads into large, area-wide systems and building their steel mills and oil companies into efficient organizations. In the process, the small, independent manufacturers were often forced out of business. The public began to fear the power that was accumulating in the hands of such men as John D. Rockefeller and J. Pierpont Morgan.

THE GOVERNMENT TAKES A HAND

In 1890 the Sherman Act was passed against monopolistic restraint of trade. But through the device of the holding company (a corporation formed to buy the stocks and bonds of other corporations), large combinations continued to grow. By 1904 there were over 300 big industrial combinations with an aggregate capitalization in excess of $7 billion and controlling over two-fifths of the manufacturing in the country.

From time to time, such as in Teddy Roosevelt's administration, there has been "trust busting" activity against big business. But whether we like it or not, we can hardly enjoy the benefits of mass production without the productive capacity of large industrial corporations. They are a characteristic of our economic life. The Department of Justice keeps a close watch on what they do. In addition to the Sherman Act, through the Clayton Anti-Trust Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act, the government tries to protect the public against the danger of monopolistic practices.

The stupendous development of our national wealth up to the outbreak of World War I was not achieved without plenty of headaches. One of our greatest weaknesses was a shaky and inflexible banking system. There was a depression in 1893 and another in 1907, both attended by the usual bankruptcies and bank failures.

In 1913 Congress passed the Federal Reserve Act, which tied the National Banks into a membership system of 12 regional banks. The Act has given our financial structure a measure of stability and unity. The Federal Reserve Board sets the percent of reserve funds that members must carry, and, by changing the amount of this reserve and setting interest rates, strives to keep credit within safe bounds and gives our money supply considerable elasticity.

Had the Federal government used the financial instruments of the Federal Reserve more wisely, it is possible that the stock market crash of 1929 would not have been as severe as it was. The primary cause of the crash was the hectic speculation in stocks and bonds rising out of the prosperous 1920's — a period which saw the growth of the auto industry and a boom in building. Our whole economy became fantastically over-inflated. The crash was the prelude to the darkest and longest depression in our economic history, the low point of which was the disintegration of our entire banking system in 1933.

Up until this time, the public felt pretty much that the government's attitude toward business should be *laissez faire* – a policy of non-interference which assumes that the "natural

laws" of economics will work best for the welfare of free enterprise. But in 1933 many people began to wonder if our free enterprise system alone would be able to get us out of the depression. The New Deal adopted a policy of deficit spending, the theory of which was that if people had money to buy things, business would get the lift it needed and soon be able to carry on alone. It was called "pump priming."

There is no doubt that many of the policies of the New Deal were wasteful and ill-advised. But the depression was a time of great suffering for millions of our people, and new ways had to be tried to set our stagnating economy once more in motion. Despite considerable floundering, many good things have come to us from that trial-and-error period. Among them are the Banking Act of 1933* and the Securities Exchange Act†, both of which have given us a sounder financial machinery.

While the New Deal approach to our economic problems has been modified with time, it is still fundamental to the viewpoint of the Democratic party. The Democrats hold that the welfare of our people depends on the broad distribution of our wealth. They believe that if the working man has good wages and the farmer has a good income, business conditions will remain favorable. They have been friendly to labor, have subsidized farm prices, and tended to keep high taxes on corporate earnings.

The Republicans, on the other hand, believe that the long-run well-being of all our people is best served by allowing industry a profit large enough to encourage further growth. Also they believe that the severely graduated income tax has prevented savings from being invested in productive enterprises and brought about a scarcity of "risk capital." They maintain that the stronger and more productive business becomes, the more things there are for everyone — more jobs, more pay, more things to buy. Free enterprise — they feel — is the best asset our nation has. The government should interfere as little as possible.

Whatever theory one agrees with, this much is clear: our swift and amazing economic growth has been subject to frequent and violent fluctuations. In its effort to correct the causes of these distortions, combined with the total mobilization of recent wars, the Federal government has acquired a permanent role in our handling of our economic life. Almost everyone agrees that for some time to come we will have a "mixed" economy, with both private business and the Federal government working side by side in the effort to sustain our growth and prosperity. The question is only a matter of degree: how much shall the government do? How much shall be left to private industry?

Let's open our national account books and see how we stand. Are there any dangerous soft spots? What problems will government and business leaders need to consider in the vital issue of avoiding a depression and maintaining our economic progress?

HOW IS BUSINESS?

1956 will probably be the most prosperous business year on record, with a gross national product of more than $400 billion.

But a good many business leaders are not comfortable about the way things are going. They are worried about the slump in the auto industry and in housing and the slow-up in textiles. Goods standing unsold on the shelf and in the factory have piled up to around $85 billion. Competition is getting much tougher, and at the same time it costs the manufacturer more to make things. This means his margin of profit is starting to be squeezed — a condition no businessman likes.

If industry finds that the market for what it produces is getting tight and that it has less money in the till at the end of the year for expansion and improvement, the rapid growth our country has enjoyed since 1940 will slow down. The boom could even come to a halt and turn into a recession.

What is happening is that at the present time we cannot

consume all the things industry produces. After World War II industry geared itself with remarkable speed to fulfill the demand for goods made scarce by the war and also to meet the needs of our growing population. But production increased so fast that supply tends to exceed demand. This is especially true in automobiles and appliances. If industry cuts production to reduce the supply, this will mean fewer jobs. And with less money going around, everybody will feel the pinch.

Yet, except for some auto makers and a few others, almost all businesses are spending more money than ever before for new factories and machines — over $44 billion this year. They are planning to produce *more* goods instead of less. This seems contradictory indeed. But the fact is that most businessmen are optimistic that America is in the midst of a long growth phase. It will not be as rapid as it has been, but it will be steady and continuous. Our population is expected to increase by 55 million in the next 20 years. And this in itself will create new demands for all kinds of goods — appliances, housing, clothing, automobiles. Businessmen who have an eye to the future want to make sure their particular companies will be ready to share in our growing national market.

Meanwhile, the money which industry is spending for new factories and machines is helping to buffer the effect of the slow-down in other fields. Other things which are giving our prosperity a sturdy basis are the billions the government expends for defense, the recent rise in farm income, and our vigorous foreign trade. For the forseeable future — barring a serious inflation — business looks good.

WHAT ABOUT INFLATION?

Our prosperity has been creeping toward a somewhat inflationary condition. Inflation means that the value of our

dollar in terms of what it will buy becomes less and less.

Inflation is possibly the biggest single threat to an expanding economy. If we are not extremely careful on this matter, business could take a bad tumble.

For a while at least, all of us would be in for hard times. We have seen how the land speculation in 1837, the boom

**This Act makes it illegal for commercial banks to deal in stocks and bonds like an investment bank. Also set up the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to insure bank deposits up to a fixed sum.*

†Requires registration of all new issues of stocks and bonds and full disclosure of all information. In 1934 the Securities and Exchange Commission was created to prevent manipulation and fraud on the securities exchanges.

in railroads after the Civil War, and the speculation in the stock market in 1929 all brought about sharp inflations that suddenly resulted in severe depressions.

We don't want it to happen again.

Our dollar will now buy only 51% of what it would in 1939, and it looks as if it may buy even less in the future. The cost of living hovers around an all-time high. In the past few months, due partly (but not entirely) to the steel strike, the price of almost everything has risen — clothing, food, housing, autos, appliances. Salaried workers (whose raises are generally slow in coming) and people living off the income from money they have salted away will have to cut corners. Factory workers are not so badly off. Many of them have "escalator" clauses written into their union contracts. When the cost of living goes up, their wages automatically rise. But even this contributes to inflation, for businessmen are prone to pass along higher wages in the form of higher prices.

The inflationary pressure we are now feeling is the result of too rapid an expansion. Industry has had to pay high costs for scarce labor and materials, but in doing so, it has not only had to pass the costs on to us, it has also been forced to incur a huge amount of debt. The supply of credit (lendable funds) is getting slim, and currently money is "tight." Though industry is now overproducing in some fields, it still needs money to get ready for the future markets. This has made interest rates higher than they have been for 25 years.

The Federal Reserve Board believes that "tight" money is a good check on inflation. In some districts it has raised the interest rate it charges for funds it lends to member banks (the "discount rate") to 3%. When banks have to pay more for their money, they naturally charge more for the money they lend. The "prime rate" (the interest banks charge their best customers) is now 4%. The Federal Reserve expects that this high cost of borrowing will act to put the brakes on inflation.

But meanwhile, because money lenders can now do better than the 4 ½% interest on Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration mortgages, people are having difficulty borrowing money to buy homes. This is one of the reasons why the housing industry is feeling pressed.

It is also an example of why the Federal Reserve will have to be careful not to squeeze the credit supply too tightly For if industries find it too expensive to borrow, they may cut back their expansion programs drastically and push the whole economy off balance. The fight against inflation is a tricky business.

Thus far we are still somewhat ahead of the game. The purchasing power of the average factory worker has advanced 35.2% since 1950, while the cost of living has risen only 14%. Though office workers and farmers are relatively not as well off, generally speaking, Americans have never had it so good.

But if we are not careful to control the push toward inflation, all our gains could be wiped out, and once more we would take half a step backward.

We are justly proud of our prosperity. Our free enterprise system has given us an abundance that has confounded the economic theories of the Communist world. However, our wealth also brings critical problems. The more money we earn, the more we have to pay for the things we buy. And the higher the cost of badly needed schools and roads, the more taxes we will have to pay.

Our economy proves to be a highly complex machine. The delicate relationship between all its parts has to be carefully balanced in order to keep it moving smoothly and steadily forward. The overly selfish actions of any one group could easily jam our economic gears and cause our prosperity to stall. The solution of the puzzle of our economic progress will require the cooperation of all parties and groups for the welfare of all of us. That, after all, is the meaning of good citizenship.

1. What do we think is the best way to control inflation? Could prices be kept down by fixing a ceiling on them? Would this be consistent with our ideals of freedom?
2. In our opinion, what things can businessmen do to keep prices down? How could they reduce the cost of the things they make? Could they take a smaller profit? How would this affect the stockholders?
3. If every time workers get a raise, the cost of the things they buy goes up, what is the good of the raise in the first place? Could this lead to a "spiral" of constant wage and price rises?
4. Do we or do we not agree with the "tight" money policy of the Federal Reserve Board as a way of maintaining our prosperity? What are the advantages? Are there any dangers?
5. In a country proud of its freedom, what role should the government take in regulating our economy? Should it keep "hands off" and let things work out by themselves? Or should there be more regulation than we now have? Where?

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for the study of American civilization.

January 21, 1957

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I thought you might care to see this. It goes on proving itself, I think, as one way of helping people remember what they have heard at first hand from the source itself!

Kind regards,

Sincerely,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

TS:mr
encl.

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

Map and drawings by C. P. Meier

THE MIDDLE EAST -- What Goes On?

The subject's so big and the problems so mixed up we'll skip the introduction and get down to cases.

Area. The Middle East spreads southward from the Black and Caspian Seas to the Arabian Sea that forms the upper part of the Indian Ocean. The simplified map at the left gives a rough idea of it — but there's nothing like looking at a globe to grasp its importance.

The places in the Middle East we've been hearing about — Port Said, Suez Canal, Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, Israel, Syria — lie along the eastern edge of the Mediterranean.

The bulk of the Middle East includes Asia Minor, bordered at the north by the Soviet Union, and the Arabian peninsula, between the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Within it lies a large section of the Mohammedan world.

Past and Present. The Middle East has known powerful ancient empires — Babylonian, Egyptian, Assyrian, Persian, and that of Alexander the Great. Today, though the armed might of the world has shifted elsewhere, the area contains a dozen or more kingdoms, principalities, and republics which tend to keep alive the hatreds and the clash of purposes which have made the story of this area violent for its own inhabitants and dangerous for the rest of the world. For various reasons it has great strategic importance. It's like a bomb with several sputtering fuses.

The Part Geography Plays. For centuries the Middle East has been a bridge between Europe, Asia, and Africa. Across it moved caravans carrying the goods of East and West. Northern and southern trade converged over the Isthmus of Suez. Armies fought one another for these trade ways and also to control the sea lanes on either side.

Presently modern man began improving nature's routes. In 1869 the Suez Canal made possible a water route direct from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. More recently, airways to India, China, the Malay States, Australia and beyond required bases in the Middle East. This intensified its importance to outside nations.

Oil. Above all, the oil fields of the Persian Gulf and of the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys in Iraq have made it imperative to keep communications open. American companies have provided a considerable part of the investment that developed these oil resources — the largest present reserves in the world. Industries and transportation in Western Europe and in the British Isles are dependent on the oil of the Middle East.

But this strategic resource is not merely essential to people outside. The states of the Middle East in which it is produced or through which the pipe lines and Suez Canal pass are dependent on oil for revenue. It's the oil of Arabia, Iraq, Iran that will pay for roads and railroads, electrification, power.

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Editor: Townsend Scudder, President of the Center.

Second Printing, January, 1957

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Money from oil can dig artesian wells for agriculture in arid districts. It can build hospitals, schools, and public improvements which the Middle East needs and wants.

Which Are the Nations of the Middle East? What's known as the northern tier is made up of Afghanistan, Iran (Persia), Iraq, and Turkey. Then come Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the British colony of Aden, and the sheikhdoms on the coasts of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Then Israel and Egypt.

Afghanistan and Iran. Afghanistan has close relations with the Soviet Union, along which its northern border lies.

To the west of Afghanistan, Iran also borders the Soviet Union. It is part of the Middle East by reason of its history, its Mohammedanism, and its oil fields. These oil fields have caused serious difficulties between the United States and Great Britain on the one side, and the Soviet Union. Iran is at present an adherent of the Baghdad Pact for defense against the Soviet. Other pact signers are Pakistan (more a part of the Far East than of the Middle East), Iraq, Turkey, and Britain. The United States encouraged this agreement and has given aid to these states.

Egypt. Egypt belongs among the predominant nations of the Middle East. It owes part of its importance to its strategic location on the Red Sea, the Isthmus of Suez, and the Mediterranean. The fertility of its Nile valley is a considerable asset. Cairo and Alexandria are world famous cities. And Egypt enjoys intermittent political and cultural leadership in the Mohammedan world.

The story of Egyptian nationalism needs to be studied for an understanding of the present crisis over Suez. When Britain in 1875 bought the Egyptian shares in the Suez Canal Company and then took control of the whole country to protect the "life-line" of the British empire to the Orient, Egyptian nationalists after World War Two turned increasingly against the British protectorate. Britain hung on. It would have liked to retain a Middle East Command at the Suez Canal, in which all nations interested in defending the canal against Soviet or other encroachment might participate. Egypt insisted that Britain's forces should be removed entirely. Mobs of nationalists, with Communists among them, played hob in Cairo. Guerrilla warfare required Britain to keep some 80,000 troops guarding the canal. This burden, along with changes in defensive warfare because of long-range aircraft and the atomic bomb, caused Britain, urged by the United States, to withdraw, setting up its main base on the island of Cyprus. Nationalism since then, in both Egypt and Cyprus, has continued to make headline news.

Nasser climbed to dictatorship in Egypt at the expense of shrinking British prestige, and with the threat of Soviet arms to aid him.

Turkey. The Sultan had fought on the losers' side in World War One, and thus lost much of the Middle East which the Turkish Empire had controlled for centuries. Out of the wreck came an assortment of states including the republic of Turkey. Although Mohammedan in religion, Turkey has taken to western ways. Political reform has moved in the direction of free elections and truly representative government. Because of its fear of Soviet Russia, Turkey's foreign policy is more Western than Middle Eastern. Turkey is a member of NATO and signed the Baghdad Pact. But the island of Cyprus needs to be borne in mind in understanding Turkey's possible future attitude. If Britain were to settle the troubles there more to the advantage of the Cypriote Greeks, the majority, rather than to the advantage of the Turkish minority, Turkey's foreign policy might swing away from the West.

Syria — Trouble Spot. Below Turkey on the eastern Mediterranean shore is the Arab republic of Syria. Wealthy feudal families dominate a country which has little industry but depends on agriculture, sheep, and goats. The mandate over Syria which France got after World War One was never pleasing to Syrians. Because of their experience with American educators and missionaries, the people would have preferred American trusteeship if they could not have immediate independence. French arms defeated the expectation of Emir Faisal that he was to be king of Syria, but could not break the Syrian spirit of nationalism.

During the Second World War, British troops overpowered those of Vichy France and the Syrian Republic emerged. Its many squabbling parties, including a Moscow-supported Communist faction, have fallen before successive military dictators. The power of the army is expressing itself again through Colonel Serraj, an ardent Arab nationalist who appears to be relying on Soviet arms from Czechoslovakia. But the decision in Syria is not yet clear. Will Syria turn instead toward alliance with Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan against Soviet infiltration and for protection of pipe lines passing through its territory to the markets of Europe? Or will Syria move into closer relationship with Egypt and Saudi Arabia? That's what the Arab League would like. The Arab League, founded by the British and now turned against them, hovers on the verge of a holy war against the West, against Christians and Jews, against what it regards as imperialism and colonialism.

Lebanon — Conservative Arab State. Lebanon, fellow republic enveloped geographically by Syria, is another agricultural state but with a chance for power development in the Litani River, and with one of the world's cosmopolitan cities, Beirut, for its capital. Lebanon too shook free from the mandate of France. Because of its Christian population, and perhaps such influences as the American University in Beirut, Lebanon enjoyed unusual autonomy even during the Turkish empire. It is more stable and secure against pressures than Syria. Although there are more Christians than Mohammedans in Lebanon, the Arab minority of Mohammedan faith is always represented in the government. The President is usually Christian and the Prime Minister Moslem.

But Lebanon is, after all, an Arab state, a member of the Arab League, and therefore opposed to the Jewish state of Israel — though Lebanese opposition does seem milder than most. It's possible that Israel and Lebanon can come to some agreement for use of the Litani River. It runs entirely within Lebanon, but rainfall makes a surplus of much of its water, which Israel needs for irrigation.

Iraq and Jordan. The two inland Arab kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan owe their existence mostly to Britain. Both are under rulers chosen from the Hashimite dynasty, descendants of Mohammed. Iraq with its oil fields and Jordan lying between Saudi Arabia and Israel are in position to alter the course of events.

When negotiating with France and Czarist Russia during World War One to dismember the Turkish empire, Britain insisted on keeping the Mesopotamian area (now mostly present Iraq) apart and under arrangements of its own. The British placed the Arab warrior Faisal, who had done so much to help them defeat the Turks, on the throne of Iraq at Baghdad. Since then, despite some wavering expressing Arab nationalism, and a pro-Nazi government when it looked as though Hitler's forces would break through to the Persian Gulf, the kingdom of Iraq, with its oil resources, has remained on the side of Great Britain and modern Turkey.

As an Arab state, Iraq took a sharper attitude than Britain

against the rise of Israel to statehood, going so far as to send troops into the Palestinian War of 1948-49.

Though representatives of Iraq declaim officially against Israel and deplored the military action which Britain and France took in Egypt regarding the Suez Canal, Iraq still adheres to the Baghdad Pact. The ambassador of Iraq to the U. S. has openly joined with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan in proposing to Secretary Dulles that the Baghdad Pact be linked with the North Atlantic Treaty and with the Southeast Asia Pact for defense against Communist encroachment. It seems pretty clear that the will to maintain the Baghdad Pact against Soviet power will persist in direct relation to the equipment to do so provided by the U. S. A.

Jordan, the other inland kingdom, is the most artificial of the Arab states built on the ruins of the Turkish empire. Britain created Transjordan in the area of its mandate from the League of Nations. The kingdom of Jordan had grave weaknesses which have become more apparent since the assassination of Abdullah, whom Britain helped place on the throne. It has neither agriculture nor industry nor mineral resource. It has been dependent on subsidy from Britain. It has as great need as Israel for irrigation and waterpower. Moreover, Jordan is altogether too vulnerable to invasion by the desert army of Saudi Arabia which under Ibn Saud drove into exile Abdullah's father Hussein, Sharif of Mecca.

Pressed by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Abdullah's successor has dismissed the British commander of Jordan's Arab Legion, taken over the airfields, and denounced the treaty with Britain. He has gone completely, it would seem, to the side of Nasser against both Israel and Britain regarding Sinai and the Suez Canal.

Saudi Arabia — the Rise of Ibn Saud. As guardian of Mecca, sacred to Moslems everywhere, and possessor of great wealth in oil, the kingdom created by Ibn Saud in the Arabian peninsula stands in the strategic spot of being capable of becoming leader of the Arab League. The philosophy of the League opposes as infidels and unbelievers all Christians and Jews. Its ultimate weapon is the jihad or holy war, which could summon all Moslems against what it regards as Western imperialism. Its prime objective would be to eliminate the Jewish state of Israel from Palestine.

Ibn Saud, strongest chieftain in Central Arabia among the desert tribes, rose to power by conquering his neighbors one by one until he had extended his sway from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf. His strongest following lies among the tribes of the Wahhabi sect, who interpret the Koran far more strictly than do the more urbane Mohammedans of India and Egypt. Ibn Saud cultivated the friendship of the British overlords along the Persian Gulf and in Mesopotamia, but he took advantage of their shaky situation in the First World War to turn a quarrel over a border oasis with their favorite Hashimite ruler, Hussein, into conquest of Hussein's realm.

Between the two World Wars, Ibn Saud skillfully strengthend his prestige in the Mohammedan world. Then, in el Hasa, on the Persian Gulf, Ibn Saud came on unexpected wealth. He struck oil — or rather, Americans in 1933 did it for him.

Absolute ruler of Arabia from Persian Gulf to Red Sea and exalted in the Mohammedan world, Ibn Saud declared his neutrality in the Second World War. But as a result, his revenues from pilgrimages to Mecca and from oil sharply declined. He needed cash. So he demanded thirty million dollars from his American friends on the threat of cancelling their lease. He got his money, but it arrived indirectly from funds which the U. S. had allocated to Britain for use in the war. Ibn Saud did not believe, as many other Arab leaders did, that Hitler and Mussolini would win. So he compromised his neutrality further by giving permission for the U. S. to build an airfield at Dhahran on the Persian Gulf, one of the largest and most strategically placed.

Saudi Arabia and the West. Ibn Saud protested in 1946 when President Truman urged Britain to admit 100,000 Jewish immigrants into Palestine. His son, who presently succeeded him, has taken a leading position in the Arab League against the State of Israel. He has supported Nasser in Egypt. He has encouraged Arab resistance to France in North Africa and has opposed the Baghdad Pact. Thus the present King Saud's influence is joined with Nasser's on the side of the nationalists in Syria against Iraq and Turkey.

It would appear that King Saud is conscious indeed of his place in the Mohammedan world and his power to affect the course of the Arab states.

The Holy Land. It is the vortex of all grudges and grievances in the Middle East. Palestine and Jerusalem are sacred to Mohammedan, Christian, and Jew. When the British and French made a secret agreement in 1916 to divide the Turkish empire among Czarist Russia, Italy, Greece, and themselves, they ignored the wishes of their Arab allies in Palestine. They made room for Arab states between the spheres reserved for France and Britain in Syria and Mesopotamia, but they also reserved the Holy Land for an international organization of some sort.

The Zionists had begun long before, with Turkish consent, to establish colonies in Palestine, immemorial land of their fathers. Zionists looked to the day when there would again be a Jewish state. But Arabs had lived in Palestine as long and were of no mind to be dispossessed. Jews could live there as they always had, in a fair amount of living and let live. But Mohammedans did not wish to have the Jewish colonies grow into an independent state.

Britain's Balfour Declaration of 1917 assured the Jews that they were to have a "national home" in Palestine. It also stated that nothing should be done which might interfere with the rights of existing non-Jewish communities. To Zionists, the Declaration meant that Jews were to take charge of the government. To Arabs, it meant that Jews were just to be allowed to live there. For more than a quarter of a century British statesmen tried to find between the conflicting ideas a course of action that somehow would reconcile the pledges given to Arabs and Jews during World War One. At the same time, Britain wished to keep British dominance in the Middle East and to protect the Suez Canal, "lifeline" of the British empire.

To this end, Transjordan was set up as a curb on Jewish expansion toward Saudi Arabia and the Zionists were notified in a memorandum of 1922 that the British Government did not mean to have their national home in Palestine become a Jewish state. Finally, as World War Two approached and Nazi propaganda penetrated the Middle East, Britain's white paper of 1939 proposed an end to the British mandate. Instead, there should be a Palestinian state bound by treaty to Britain. Jewish immigration into it would be limited to annual quotas of 75,000 for three years.

During the Second World War, Britain kept the lid on an upheaval in Palestine, but trouble was brewing, with Zionists and Arabs preparing to organize. The Arab Mufti of Jerusalem had fled to Germany and was looking for help from the Nazis.

The demands for Jewish immigration swelled as victims of Nazi brutality increased in Eastern Europe. President Roosevelt spoke in favor of the Zionist cause. Contributions poured in, supporting Palestine as a refuge for the Jews.

Two successive Anglo-American commissions studied the problem. The first proposed a trusteeship of the United Nations and admission of a hundred thousand victims of Nazi and Fascist persecution. The second returned to the original British idea of a federalized Jewish and Arab Palestine, with further Jewish immigration determined by Jewish and Arab consent. There was no agreement. Then, at Britain's request, the United Nations took charge. The majority of its special committee constructed a plan for dividing Palestine into an Arab state, a Jewish state, and Jerusalem under international authority.

Territorial separation, however, was as difficult as cooperation to accept. The Zionists wanted all of Palestine with such Arabs as remained a political minority. The Arabs favored the suggestion of the special committee's minority because it provided for a single Palestine state in which there would be an Arab preponderance and a limit to Jewish immigration. The U. N. General Assembly accepted the majority plan. The United States and Soviet Union voted for it. Great Britain abstained.

The State of Israel. The British withdrew their forces on May 14, 1948. The Zionists proclaimed the State of Israel within the area set by the special U. N. committee. The U. S. A. gave recognition to the new republic. The Mohammedan states of Turkey and Iran later also recognized it. But the Arab League gave notice that its forces would move into the "vacuum" created by British withdrawal.

The Arabs found no vacuum but a Jewish army that treated all their forces except the British-trained Arab Legion of Jordan to ignominy in defeat. There was little coordination and direction to the Arab attack. Saudi Arabia sent only a token force. Israel dispossessed nearly a million Arab inhabitants and seized more territory than allotted by the U. N. committee. But Egypt still held the Gaza Strip on the Mediterranean, and Abdullah's Arab Legion controlled East-Central Palestine including old Jerusalem.

Truce — and the Aftermath? The United Nations, if they could, had now to persuade the warring nations to make peace. The first U. N. Commissioner, Sweden's Count Folke Bernadotte, was assassinated. His successor, the American Dr. Ralph Bunche, managed to obtain separate truces between Israel and the members of the Arab League. But raids and reprisals continued. Living on the borders of Israel was a constant invitation to death.

In the struggle, Egypt turned to economic warfare, closing the Suez Canal to Israeli goods. On July 26, 1956, six weeks after the last British forces quit Egypt, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, taking over its management from the private international company under British-French control which had been running it. Nasser gave a boost to Egyptian military strength, when the West refused to sell him arms, by making a deal with Moscow for military equipment. Britain and France considered their chances for use of the Suez Canal growing dimmer and dimmer. Along the Israel frontier, volunteer commandos, known as Fedayeen, were stepping up raids into Israel, which led to further reprisals. Then, on October 29, units of Israel's army crossed the border into Egypt's Sinai desert and the Gaza Strip. Israel — said Prime Minister Ben-Gurion — had moved to protect the nation's security. Next day, Britain and France delivered an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel. They must stop fighting, or else. When Egypt rejected the ultimatum, British and French forces began trying to seize and hold Britain's old bases in Suez.

At this point, the United Nations managed to assert itself once more, reflecting majority world opinion and condemning independent action by individual nations. A tiny international police force, hastily formed, filled in as British and French and Israeli forces withdrew.

But the fundamental, long-range problems are still there, demanding solution lest they plunge us all into war.

Newspapers, magazines, TV, and radio have kept us posted through this latest crisis and what's coming out of it. What goes on, and what may be developing, we may perhaps be better able to understand against this vital issue's background of the clash of purposes which dominate the Middle East. As citizens, we have a responsibility for U. S. foreign policy. Here are just a few of the many questions we need to think about and discuss.

1. Under what control and arrangement might the Suez Canal best serve world commerce? Could or should this also apply to the Panama Canal?
2. With the people of the Middle East, for the most part, suffering from poverty and its attendant ills, what are our views as to technical assistance, U.S. and/or U.N., and economic aid and development for the nations that need it? Military aid?
3. How may the needs and aims of Arabs and Jews most fairly be served?
4. What should be done about Jerusalem and the Holy Land?
5. What methods might be used effectively to preserve the Israel-Arab truce?

A reading list on the Middle East may be purchased from the Center. Handling costs necessitate a charge of 25 cents each, prepaid.

COMING: *Alaska — Forty-Ninth State?*

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Scudder, Townsend

September 14, 1956

Dear Mr. Scudder:

We have still not yet firmed up our plans for Latin America; I will let you know when we do.

I am afraid there is no possibility of our undertaking the Alaskan piece this year, much as I would like to do it. I shall be in New York fairly regularly after the 1st of October and hope to see you again.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Townsend Scudder
Center for Information on America
Washington, Connecticut

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Center for Information on America
Washington, Connecticut

TOWNSEND SCUDDER *Executive Director of the Center*

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Council Member and former President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.

August 21, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I have a suggestion to make.

The Center is going to include a guide on Alaskan statehood in its VITAL ISSUES, Volume VI. We feel, in view of developments, that this will be a very lively topic indeed. Because the Territory is going right ahead with the election of a congressional delegation in November and its two senators and one representative without seats will be in Washington when Congress assembles, there will be a dramatic aspect to the whole question even over and above the interest previously shown. I recall your saying that Latin America would be in your schedule for the coming winter. How about adding Alaskan statehood? It seems to me that such events as Alaska's nominating conventions for these candidates, then their campaigns, and the Alaskan election itself would make very interesting on-the-spot material. From there on the activities of Alaska's "representatives" in Washington should certainly continue to furnish first class television material.

If you feel that the idea has merit, I should welcome an opportunity to discuss it with you and see if we could work out something jointly here also.

With regards,

Sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

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Scudder, Townsend

Center for Information on America

Washington, Connecticut

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July 27, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Thanks for your letter of July 27.

We shall keep several slots open in our schedule for a possible issue on automation, pending word from you in October as to your own plans on this subject.

You will be interested to hear, I think, that the guides, in their editorial policy, don't seem to be losing their balance on the tightrope they are walking. We have just received a substantial order from the Guaranty Trust Company of New York for their personnel rack program, and today this letter - of which I send a copy - came in from the Education Department of the UAW. If the Center can go on increasingly being of some use to good Americans of various points of view, it will be very gratifying indeed!

Sincerely,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

TS:mr
enc.

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July 24, 1956

Mr. Townsend Scudder
Executive Director of the
Center for Information on America
Washington, Connecticut

Dear Sir:

Thank you very much for your kind note and for sending me the copies of your little bulletin.

I would like to order sixty copies of each of these for circulation among members of the Education-PAC staff of our union. I think it may be that they will find these useful and may, in fact, be able to secure a wide circulation for them among members of the union. They seem to me to be extraordinarily well edited and I think that our staff people at the very least will find them very useful. Yours looks like a very interesting and useful program.

I cannot say in what way we could be concretely and specifically helpful to you but if you think that we might be of assistance in some way, I hope that you will not hesitate to call on us.

Thank you again for your interest and kind regards.

Yours truly,

Brendan Sexton

Brendan Sexton
Director of Education

BS:nh
opeiu42afl-cio

Scudder, Townsend

July 27, 1956

Dear Mr. Scudder:

Thank you for your letter of June 29th.

This is just a note to tell you that we will not be able to make a decision until early October. We will let you know at that time.

Sincerely,

Mr. Townsend Scudder
Center for Information on America
Washington, Connecticut

fc

Center for Information on America
Washington, Connecticut

TOWNSEND SCUDDER *Executive Director of the Center*

EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

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Washington, D. C.

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President of the Society of American Historians

DR. ROBERT E. SPILLER,
Chairman of Committee on American Civilization
University of Pennsylvania
Council Member and former President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

June 29, 1956

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Our conventions issue, as you will see, is meeting with sufficient demand to call for a second printing. This gave us an opportunity to make a slight change to cover President Eisenhower's second illness.

We are now making up our schedule of Vital Issues for Volume VI, and it seems to be filling up rapidly. Could we get together sometime at your convenience and talk about an issue on automation? I recall your saying we might be able to work out something which would be usefully supplimental to your program on that topic, and if so, I should much appreciate knowing approximately what month we should be scheduling it for.

With regards,

Sincerely yours,

per Townsend Scudder.

TS:MW

Townsend Scudder

A non-profit non-partisan educational corporation dedicated to furthering the knowledge and understanding of America by Americans through informational publications, radio, films, television, and conferences.

Keep this Guide—with the handy chart on the back page — near your TV set and radio for ready reference when the Conventions start.

Vital Issues

"A DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR BETTER INFORMED AMERICANS"

Published by the
CENTER FOR INFORMATION ON AMERICA
WASHINGTON, CONNECTICUT
Volume V, Number 10—Bonus Issue

Drawings by Stuart Judd, Jr.

GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING CONVENTIONS:

HOW DO THEY WORK?

Chicago for the Democrats and San Francisco for the Republicans will be where the conventions take place. The starting dates, respectively, are August 13 and 20.

As the time draws near, thousands of delegates and party leaders will begin pouring into each city.

In addition, there'll be a swarm of newspaper men and women and of magazine and other writers to report what goes on. Press photographers and newsreel cameramen will be out in force. Hundreds of commentators from the various networks will be giving their analyses. And, exceeding even the coverage of four years ago, television and radio will make it possible for citizens everywhere to sit in.

Very literally, what takes place at Chicago and San Francisco will be monitored by the eyes and ears of America. We, the people, will be there. That's all the more reason to brush up a bit on what we'll be hearing and seeing.

At convention time, there'll be a good deal of a carnival look to both cities. Flags and welcoming banners will flutter. The "Cow Palace" at San Francisco and the International Amphitheatre at Chicago will be all dressed up. The delegates themselves, by their excitement and anticipation, will add to this holiday spirit. There'll be jovial greetings, laughter, and much slapping of backs. Even after the convention starts, there may be times when speakers on the rostrum high at one end of the hall will have trouble making themselves heard. Interruptions, demonstrations for this or that candidate, and parades—impromptu or staged—are sure to disrupt the proceedings.

But nothing of all this should obscure our realization that what's taking place is part of a very serious business. Out of all possible candidates, just two nominees, for the first and second spot on the national ticket, are being picked at each convention. During the campaign that follows, we'll be making up our minds as to which pair we prefer. And when, in November, we make our choice at the polls, the standard bearers of one or the other of our two major parties will become President and Vice President of the United States.

In view of the magnitude of the President's job and the importance of the part he must play in making ours an effective government of, by, and for the people, we owe it to ourselves and to democracy to improve our understanding of how the nominating conventions go about their business.

Let's turn the page. It's a vital issue worth looking into at once.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: Dr. James W. Fesler, Professor of Government, Yale University; Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian, United States Army, Washington, D. C.; Dr. Allan Nevins, Professor of American History, Columbia University, President of the Society of American Historians; Dr. Robert E. Spiller, Chairman of Committee on American Civilization, University of Pennsylvania, Council Member and former President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.

Editor: Townsend Scudder, Executive Director of the Center.

Second Printing July, 1956

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HOW NOMINATIONS WERE MADE IN THE PAST

Almost from the beginning of our federal government in 1789, there have been two major political parties seeking every four years to elect one of their members as President. Down to 1828, and the election of Andrew Jackson, party candidates were chosen by congressmen of each party. That method was known as the congressional caucus.

Jackson had difficulty getting nominated by his party's caucus, so he invented another method. He devised the national party convention—the system we still use today. "King Caucus," as the old method was called, had fallen into disfavor because it was considered undemocratic. Jackson had little trouble replacing it with his national convention idea. By 1840, both major parties were nominating by the new method.

HOW NOMINATIONS ARE MADE AT PRESENT—THE CONVENTION SYSTEM

Before we consider the nominating convention system itself, we might make sure that we understand how the political parties operate. Each of the two major parties has a national committee made up of a man and woman from every state and from Hawaii and Alaska, plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.* Though the method of picking members is complicated by various procedures in different states, it pretty much boils down to the practice of having each state delegation choose or name its two members at the close of the national convention. The new committee (many members of which, of course, will have served before) then takes over for the next four years to the end of the next nominating convention. The committee's chairman, whose first big job will be to run the coming campaign, is picked by the Presidential nominee himself, though the national committee goes through the motions of saying O. K.

The national committee that's been in office for the past four years sets the date for, issues the call for, and makes the preparations for the nominating convention.

Each party's convention will draw delegations from all the states and from the other areas represented on the national committee. There are two kinds of delegates. A district delegate represents a state congressional district. A delegate-at-large represents a whole state. There are alternate delegates who vote in case regular delegates are absent.

The number of votes and the size of each delegation are determined by rules adopted by the last convention—the one that met four years earlier. The general idea is for states and other areas to be given votes on the basis of their political importance from the point of view of the party, determined by the number of congressmen and the number of votes for party candidates cast in the most recent election for President, Governor, or Congressman.

The two parties differ as to their specific rules about the number of convention votes, delegates, and alternates. In 1956, the Republicans will have 1,323 delegates, each with one vote. They will have one alternate for each delegate, totalling 2,646 persons in all. The Democrats, with 1,372 votes to be cast, will have 2,744 delegates present, each with half a vote. Adding in the alternates, the Democrats will have 4,640 persons all told.†

Delegates and alternates for either party's convention are picked in different ways: by state primary election, by state party convention, or by the state party committee. Some states use a combination of these methods.

With regard to the delegates themselves, both parties have one rule in common. They must pay their own expenses. Not infrequently, they are also expected to contribute money to help take care of the costs of the convention. Perhaps this fact will lead us to view more tolerantly the antics which from time to time take place. These not only afford a little relaxation in the serious business that's being carried on but actually play a significant part in bringing about the result for which the delegates have assembled—the nomination of the two standard bearers on the national ticket.

If it is to get its business done, every gathering must have organization and leadership. Therefore each convention has its officers. The table at the bottom of the page lists the key officials and what they do.

As for organizing the convention so that it can get on with its work, that is the job of the so-called standing committees. Each convenion has four of them.

It's the temporary chairman's business, shortly after taking over, to see that these standing committees get set up. This he does by asking the chairman of each delegation for the names of the persons picked by that delegation to represent it on each of the committees. Thus every delegation is represented on all four. The way the chairman gets the word from each delegation is by a method which soon becomes monotonously familiar to TV viewers and radio listeners. He asks for a roll call of the delegations, in alphabetical order, beginning with Alabama and closing with Wyoming for the states, followed by the other areas represented. Each delegation chairman in turn speaks up for his group till every delegation has been heard from concerning the particular business on hand.

As soon as the four standing committees have been named, their members get to work—while the great mass of delegates and alternates (and the radio and TV audience) listens to the keynote address and otherwise passes the time till the standing committees are ready with the reports which, as soon as accepted by the delegates as a whole, make it possible for the convention to get down to its major purpose—the selection of the party's Presidential and Vice Presidential candidate.

The four standing committees, with their membership and functions, are as follows:

Committee on Credentials

(One member from each delegation)

1. Hears disputes on contested seats. Sometimes differences and splits in the party within a state result in rival individuals or groups going to the convention, each claiming to have been duly and properly chosen. It is up to the national committee to say which shall be seated, but in case of protest or appeal, the committee on credentials takes the question up from there.
2. Puts into its report to the convention its findings on such disputes and its recommendation as to who shall be seated. All this has to be done in order to draw up an official and permanent

CONVENTION OFFICERS

Office	*By Whom Chosen*	*Function*
Temporary Chairman	National Committee—though delegates go through the motions of formally electing him after the national chairman has called the convention to order	Presides until Permanent Chairman is chosen
Permanent Chairman	Nominated by convention's Committee on Permanent Organization, which presents his name for election by the delegates	Presides during rest of convention
Keynote Speaker (Always a person of national prominence—often the temporary chairman himself)	National Committee	Delivers the "Keynote" address which is supposed to arouse the fighting spirit of the party for the coming election campaign

**The Democrats also include the Canal Zone.*

†Like the Republicans the Democrats allow one alternate for every delegate-at-large. But they allow only one alternate for every two delegates from the districts. This tends to hold the grand total down so that it is not quite twice that of Republicans.

roll of delegates qualified to cast their votes during the rest of the convention. Till the report of the committee on credentials is heard by the convention and its recommendations acted on in one way or another, no further business can be carried on.

Committee on Permanent Organization

(One member from each delegation)

1. Nominates officers for the convention, including the permanent chairman.
2. Presents its nominations to the convention for action.

Committee on Rules

(One member from each delegation)

1. Draws up a set of rules for conducting the convention.
2. Presents them to the convention for action.

Committee on Resolutions—the "Platform" Committee

(One man and one woman from each delegation)

1. Draws up the platform—a statement of the principles and objectives of the national party for the next four years. Generally the separate planks are the work of subcommittees, and then there's a drafting subcommittee which fits them together. The whole committee passes on the result.
2. Presents the platform to the convention for action.

As soon as the reports of the four standing committees have been adopted, with or without changes, the delegates are ready to get down to the all-important business of nominations. This, like everything else, is handled by the roll call method. Each delegation is entitled to make a nomination and seconding speeches, and Alabama leads off. But if it wishes to, any state may yield its time to a delegation further down the list in case both have agreed they favor the same man.

When the end of the list of delegations has been reached, and all nominations made, balloting begins. The roll of the states again is called. The chairman of each delegation announces the vote of his group for one or another or several of the nominees. The tally clerks record the votes. Keeping score lets us know how close any nominee is to winning the required number to clinch the nomination—a simple majority according to the present rules of either party: 687 votes in the Democratic Convention; 662 votes in the Republican. Failing a majority, the balloting must be repeated until a majority is reached. The person receiving it triumphantly emerges as the party's candidate for President.

In the Republican Convention, if President Eisenhower runs again, renomination is likely to be almost automatic. If he doesn't, the four days originally scheduled may have to be stretched to give time enough for the Convention to choose the ticket.

In the Democratic Convention, because there are several leading contenders, making the final selection is almost sure to be a lengthy process.

In the first place, the convention may have a large number of nominees to vote for. Delegations like to honor some party member from the home state by nominating him. Such a person is called a "favorite son." His delegation may vote for him on several ballots, even though he has small chance of winning.

Delegates from at least 17 states will be told how to vote by "the folks back home." Preferential primaries, in which party members‡ show their preference for President, take place during quite a long period before the convention. In some states, because there is no requirement for the state's delegates to support the winner, the preferential primary is not much more than a popularity contest. But other states require their delegates during at least several ballots to vote for the winner of the primary, unless he "releases" the delegates pledged to him.

At the start of the voting, each of the stronger contenders will have a considerable number of pledged delegates. But seldom does one contender have a majority behind him to begin with. The effort to get a majority calls for trading votes and for similar "deals."

Not infrequently, the convention deadlocks. No contender is able to get that necessary majority, and none is willing to withdraw in favor of another. This is where the "dark horse" or "compromise candidate" enters the picture. Unable to agree on any of the leading nominees, the party leaders pick someone who has not been a strong contender but who seems acceptable to a considerable number of the delegates. The "dark horse" under such circumstances may run away with the race.

Repeated ballotings bring tense drama to a nominating convention. When no candidate is able to muster the winning number of votes after repeated roll calls, the next move is likely to be a recess, so that party leaders can confer and bargain. One such pause may not be enough, so the process goes on: roll call, tabulation of votes, recess—time after time. First one candidate gains a few votes, then another.

Suddenly there's a break in the deadlock. A large state delegation has switched its votes.

Delegation after delegation jumps on the bandwagon. Vote after vote is changed.

When the result is obvious to everyone, the Chairman will ask: "Shall the nomination be made unanimous?" A thundering chorus of "yeas" answers him.

WHAT TO LOOK FOR DURING A CONVENTION

Much of the excitement of a national convention is not open to the public eye. Most of the committees work in executive, or private, session. Bargaining for votes is often a personal affair between no more than a handful of people. And the business of selecting a compromise candidate, when necessary, is a matter for the "smoke-filled room."

Even so, we can work like Sherlock Holmes or Ellery Queen by searching for clues, and knowing what they mean when we find them. That adds to the interest and excitement of listening in on the conventions.

Here are some of the more important clues to be watching for:

Disputed Nomination for Chairman. This may begin before the convention opens. As with any presiding officer, both the temporary and the permanent chairmen have important powers of recognition when members ask to speak. The permanent chairman is so important that every strong contender for the nomination tries to get a friend elected to the position.

Look for pre-convention struggles over the chairmen, and especially over suggestions as to who's to be permanent chairman. What candidate, if any, has the chairman favored before convention time?

Contested Seats. The question of contested seats is raised when more than the authorized number of delegates from a state or other represented area is reported to the National Committee. That committee, as we have seen, decides the claims, subject to appeal to the Credentials Committee. In turn, the decision of the Credentials Committee can be appealed to the convention itself. Seats usually are contested by delegations supporting different contenders. A contender may win or lose the nomination depending on whether or not his delegation is seated.

Remember the struggle in 1952 between the pro-Eisenhower and the pro-Taft delegations from Louisiana and elsewhere?

Changes in Rules. As we have also seen, until it can adopt its own set of rules, which is after hearing the report of the Rules Committee, a convention must operate under the rules of the convention of four years earlier. Usually the old rules are adopted with little or no change.

Once in a while, however, there are suggestions for drastic changes. What's generally back of such efforts is an attempt to take power away from one group and give it to another. Naturally this can lead to a first-class political fight which may even force delegations to walk out of the convention.

Planks in the Platform. Delegations will fight tooth and nail to prevent the inclusion of planks which they feel are objectionable to the voters back home or to the candidate they favor.

‡*In certain states, however, like Minnesota, Republicans and Democrats if they wish can vote in the other party's primary. Variations like these in the primary laws of the states tend to make the pre-convention political scene very confusing.*

A contender for the nomination will oppose a plank which runs counter to what he stands for.

The outcome of a fight over platform planks may be important as to who gets the nomination. We should try to discover the real reason for any such struggle. Does it only involve contenders for the nomination, or does it go beyond that? Does it mean a struggle, perhaps, for control of the national party?

The Schedule of the Convention. If the Convention is not ready to begin nominations and balloting at the time set by its original schedule, the chances are that trouble is brewing. Probably a fight has broken out in one or more of the committees.

When the Convention falls behind schedule, look for a trouble spot. This may be the point where a battle for power has begun. The result may change the whole course of the Convention.

CHOOSING THE VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE

So much for the way conventions pick the party's candidate for President.

What about the Vice President?

The procedure for nominating the second man on each ticket is the same as for the Presidency, and is the next thing turned to by the Convention.

But in 1956, in both Conventions, much more attention seems likely to be paid to the Vice Presidency than in the past.§ That's a development we'll wish carefully to keep an eye on.

HOW ABOUT IT?

After we've had the chance, by watching them, to see how the conventions work, we may wish to ask ourselves this question: is the present system adequate, does it need improvement, or should it be scrapped for some other method▲ of picking the nominees for President and Vice President of our United States?

§*See the* ***Vice Presidency****, Volume V, Number 9, of* ***Vital Issues.***
▲*See Volume I, Number 6, of the Center's Guides.*

VOTES AND DELEGATES—1956

STATES AND AREAS	REPUBLICAN	DEMOCRATIC	
	VOTES AND DELEGATES	VOTES	DELEGATES
Alabama	21	26	52
Arizona	14	16	32
Arkansas	16	26	52
California	70	68	136
Colorado	18	20	40
Connecticut	22	20	40
Delaware	12	10	20
Florida	26	28	56
Georgia	23	32	64
Idaho	14	12	24
Illinois	60	64	128
Indiana	32	26	52
Iowa	26	24	48
Kansas	22	16	32
Kentucky	26	30	60
Louisiana	20	24	48
Maine	16	14	28
Maryland	24	18	36
Massachusetts	38	40	80
Michigan	46	44	88
Minnesota	28	30	60
Mississippi	15	22	44
Missouri	32	38	76
Montana	14	16	32
Nebraska	18	12	24
Nevada	12	14	28
New Hampshire	14	8	16
New Jersey	38	36	72
New Mexico	14	16	32
New York	96	98	196
North Carolina	28	36	72
North Dakota	14	8	16
Ohio	56	58	116
Oklahoma	22	28	56
Oregon	18	16	32
Pennsylvania	70	74	148
Rhode Island	14	16	32
South Carolina	16	20	40
South Dakota	14	8	16
Tennessee	28	32	64
Texas	54	56	112
Utah	14	12	24
Vermont	12	6	12
Virginia	30	32	64
Washington	24	26	52
West Virginia	16	24	48
Wisconsin	30	28	56
Wyoming	12	14	28
Alaska	4	6	12
District of Columbia	6	6	12
Hawaii	10	6	12
Puerto Rico	8	6	12
Canal Zone	0	3	6
Virgin Islands	1	3	6
	Total.....1,323	Total.....1,372	Total.....2,744
	Number needed to nominate **662**	Number needed to nominate **687**	

COMING IN VOLUME VI: ***vital issues of the election***

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Washington, Connecticut

TOWNSEND SCUDDER *Executive Director of the Center*

Scudder, Town

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University of Pennsylvania
President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.

Mr. Edward R. Murrow

485 Madison Avenue
New York, 22, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Along the line of supplementary material about which we were speaking yesterday, here are the advance copies of the Center's June printing of VITAL ISSUES, which I said I would send, on the subject of the nominating conventions. I shall be interested to learn whether they fit in with your concept.

It was a great pleasure seeing you yesterday. Naturally I regret your not joining our advisory committee but I respect the reason for your present decision and very deeply appreciate your continuing kind interest in the Center and the services which it is seeking to perform.

Sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

A non-profit non-partisan educational corporation dedicated to furthering the knowledge and understanding of America by Americans through informational publications, radio, films, television, and conferences.

Scudder, Townsend

CBS TELEVISION

Office Communication

to: Mr. Friendly

from: Mr. Murrow

May 28, 1956

This guy has got $105,000 from the Ford Foundation. He is a responsible individual, the material he publishes is, so far as I can tell, accurate and strictly non-partisan. He has an appetite to try to coordinate his publications with SEE IT NOW programming. I think it might be worthwhile to have someone on the shop keep him informed of what we decide to do when.

E.R.M.

rh

Townsend Scudder

565

Center for Information on America
Washington, Connecticut

TOWNSEND SCUDDER *Executive Director of the Center*

Scudder, Townsend

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a national society for the study of
American civilization.

January 3, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22
New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Here is the January number of the Guides.

Would you by any chance have a few moments available on January 12, when I expect to be in New York, as I should ever so much appreciate the opportunity to see you. However, knowing how busy you are, may I add that it would be possible, I am sure, for me to come to New York any day in the latter half of January or early in February, if an appointment can be squeezed in. I shall call your office before the 12th, and if that date is not convenient, perhaps your secretary may be able to suggest another date.

With all good wishes for the new year,

Sincerely,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

TS:MW
Encs.

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A non-profit non-partisan educational corporation dedicated to furthering the knowledge and understanding of America by Americans through informational publications, radio, films, television, and conferences.

THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE 48 STATES

Vital Issues
FOR BETTER INFORMED AMERICANS

Published by the
CENTER FOR INFORMATION ON AMERICA
WASHINGTON, CONNECTICUT
Volume V, Number 5

Drawings by Stuart Judd, Jr.

ARE THEY DOING THEIR JOB?

The forgotten area in government of, by, and for the people is that of the forty-eight states.

Especially in years of Presidential election, what goes on in the way our own state carries out its job gets very little notice.

All eyes are on the race to see who'll occupy the White House at Washington, and it's mostly national issues that catch our attention.

Yet what our own state, with our local community as a part of it, does for and to us is pretty apt to affect our daily lives more directly and frequently than does our national government.

Public school education, for instance, is a local and state concern. Our state system of highways is indispensable to our citizens. How the state police function has a great deal to do with our personal safety. Through its various services connected with public health—running its welfare institutions, inspecting local hospitals to see that standards are kept up, analyzing local water supplies to make sure they're not contaminated—our state very directly contributes to our personal well-being.

That's just part of the list. More and more, state services in great variety are expected by the people. In the last twenty-five years, state expenditures on highways alone have increased more than six thousand percent; expenditures for education by six hundred percent.

That's like space mathematics.

Not counting the nation's outlay for defense, the annual expenditure of the forty-eight states about equals that of the national government.

State government is too big and important to be foggy about —yet most of us are pretty ignorant of the subject.

Have we even glanced at our state's constitution—the rules and regulations covering how it's run? Can we give the name of one other state official beside the governor's? Do we know whether our legislature represents us fairly—the very heart of our self-government? The chances are, it doesn't. The various systems in the forty-eight states for apportioning seats in the legislature tend to over-represent some elements of the population and under-represent others.

Let's start with a look at our own state. But we've got to bear in mind that what's done and what goes on in the forty-seven others may be considerably different—just as are the states themselves. Each one is important to us who are its citizens. All are important to us as citizens of the Union. The success of our federal system depends to a great degree on the performance of the forty-eight states.

Are they doing their part of the job? Are they carrying on their appropriate functions democratically, responsibly, intelligently, and efficiently?

It's a vital issue, all right, which we better look into.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: Dr. James W. Fesler, Professor of Government, Yale University; Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian, United States Army, Washington, D. C.; Dr. Allan Nevins, Professor of American History, Columbia University, President of the Society of American Historians; Dr. Robert E. Spiller, Chairman of Committee on American Civilization, University of Pennsylvania, President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.

Editor: Townsend Scudder, Executive Director of the Center.

First Printing January, 1956

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FAMILY HISTORY

Years before our Federal Union, the original states were functioning as governments. As former British colonies, they had united in a loose confederation to win the War of Independence. With the Revolution ending, they wrote constitutions, putting into them what they and mankind had learned about self-government, and setting up safeguards against tyranny from without and within.

After a stormy trial period as a league of independent states, a more perfect union seemed essential. The new Federal Constitution drew freely on useful provisions in the constitutions of the original states.

The earliest state constitutions—because their framers remembered the tyranny of governors sent over from England—had been inclined to cut down and hem in the chief executive's job, making the legislature the more powerful and important branch of state government.

From 1776 to 1912, when the forty-eighth state—Arizona—was admitted to the Union, state constitutions were being written, amended, and revised. The process continues. It makes comparisons difficult and generalizations as to what's best hard to agree on.

With regard to the Federal setup, states have one big ad-

vantage in running their affairs. They can do anything that's not forbidden by the U. S. Constitution. The national government, on the other hand, can only do what the Constitution permits.

Because there's no provision against it, states can:

(1) make and change their constitutions;
(2) raise and spend their own funds;
(3) enact and enforce their own laws;
(4) run their public education system;*
(5) license occupations, charter corporations, regulate utilities, insurance, and other business, and thus keep an eye in general on what's going on;
(6) set up and regulate all sub-divisions within them—counties, municipalities, townships, and what have we. All owe their creation to an official o.k. from the state.

What this amounts to for the states is pretty broad freedom to run their own affairs.

The things that the U. S. Constitution forbids the states to do form a rather short list. They can't:

(1) make treaties with foreign countries;
(2) coin money;
(3) do anything that would break up a contract;
(4) tax imports or exports;
(5) deny equal treatment to any individual;
(6) though not expressly stated, the National Constitution also frowns on any member of the Union putting up barriers in the way of commerce between the states.

As state after state entered the Union, and state constitutions continued being written, amended, revised, certain broad patterns developed which help explain what goes on.

By 1800, all but one state had adopted the two chamber ("bicameral") legislative system.

This was probably in imitation of the national government. But it also came about during a time when many persons believed that wealth and position were entitled to extra consideration. Special privilege could thus be given through setting higher eligibility requirements both for voting for and sitting in the senate of a state.

When Andrew Jackson, in 1828, became President, starting the era of the common man, this undemocratic notion petered out—but the bicameral system stuck.

Because people saw that the office of President was working well, they became readier to give their state governors more importance. It became the regular thing for him to be popularly elected.† Like the President, he had veto power.‡

As time went on, states began taking more and more social responsibility: toward education, toward public health and welfare, and so forth.

After the Civil War, the government of states, like that of the nation itself, fell into a downward spiral. Greed, graft and corruption had a heyday. Boss rule made abuses hard to combat. When reform at last began, it took various paths. Direct primaries spread from state to state to get rid of boss-ridden nominating conventions. A cleanup of corrupt practices in voting included adoption of a ballot giving the names of all candidates, to be marked in secret at regular polling places that could be watched for violations of the state's election laws.

The right to vote was spreading. By 1900, women were allowed to take part at least in school elections in fourteen states. By 1920, the nineteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution gave all women the vote.

In various states, particularly the newer ones in the West, plans to give the people an even more direct say in state government began to be put into effect. By 1921, initiative, referendum, and recall were adopted in nearly half of the states. "Initiative" meant that if the required number of voters petitioned for it, a legislative bill or constitutional amendment would come directly before the people for a vote—bypassing a balky legislature. "Referendum" meant that the people, also by following prescribed procedure, had the chance to veto an act passed by the legislature. "Recall" was a way, by direct vote, to toss out an undesirable elected state official.§

By the 1920's, an "executive budget" for the legislature to pass on—a budget which makes the governor responsible for figuring out what the entire business of state government will cost and where the money is to come from—became part of regular operations in over half of the states. Today, it's universal.

Recent plans to tidy up and improve the machinery of the Federal Government have led to the same idea in the states. In 1955, the U. S. Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, "the Kestnbaum Commission," in its report, o.k.'d the following suggestions made in 1949 by a committee of the Council of State Governments:•

(1) strengthen the office of governor.
(2) reduce the number of independent agencies and administrative boards and commissions used in the running of the state, and group them into major departments.
(3) Give the governor greater power to appoint or remove department heads.
(4) Strengthen control over budgeting, accounting, purchasing, managing state property, and so forth, for which the executive branch is held responsible.
(5) Revise legislative procedures to make for greater efficiency.

The reasons for these recommendations are pretty obvious, but we might consider each in turn, particularly with reference to our own state.

**In all the states, the actual management of public schools is in the hands of local boards of education. But though locally elected or appointed, and therefore locally responsible, these boards are agents of the state.*

†Election of the governor from and by the state's assembly was fairly common in earlier days.

‡The President's veto applies only to the whole of a bill. He can't veto certain parts which he doesn't like, and let the rest go through. Most governors, however, have the right to veto individual items they object to, if they're willing to have the rest of the bill become law.

§By and large, these three measures have been disappointing as reforms. What's the situation in our state?

•Established in the 1930's, the Council has been valuable in helping states to work together and in presenting points of view of the states at Washington, D. C. The annual governors' meeting is part of its activity.

OUR OWN STATE

Naturally what we expect from our state is good government.

(1) If our legislature represents us fairly, (2) if our governor is a leader in shaping needed policies and carrying them out, (3) if our officials recognize it is the citizenry's right to be kept fully and honestly informed about the public business —then we have reasonable cause for confidence.

Some states are doing a real job. Others are showing progress towards gearing themselves to handle their growing responsibilities. A large number are still poorly prepared to meet the many problems which they—and we as their citizens—face.

What's the situation in ours?

Perhaps the basic obstacle blocking progress for better government in our state is our own ignorance and indifference to what goes on and how the state operates. If we ourselves don't take interest in government by us, of us, and for us, what can we expect in our state?

There's one explanation of our neglect which should be looked at before we consider some of the actual problems. It's the fact that—most of the time—not much goes on in the affairs of our state that really captures our attention. What catches the eye and gets in the news is usually something at the national or at the strictly local level—what's going on in the country and world, or right in our own home community.

Much of the time, the functioning of our state government is pretty much out of the picture. Besides those we've already noted, there are obvious reasons for this, such as the fact that most state legislatures meet only once every two years and for short sessions at that.

Either now or later, we may wish to consider just what could be done to improve the low visibility which keeps us from paying much attention to what's taking place in the state.

State Constitution

Nearly all our state constitutions are ancient. Brand new ones, like New Jersey's streamlined replacement, are the exception.

But just because a constitution is old doesn't necessarily mean it's no good. Our U. S. Charter—though an 18th Century model—is the greatest document ever written for democratic government. It so happens, however, that the years between 1800 and 1900 showed a lack of knack for constitution writing. The constitutions of most of our states fall within that period.

Though most state constitutions haven't been recently revised, many have been amended so much that the tail wags the dog. Counting amendments, the average state constitution is four times as long as that of the Federal Government. This clutters them up to an extent fatal to efficiency. Instead of basic documents for the conduct of government, like the U. S. Constitution, many are loaded with complicating details. Many contain specific provisions and limitations which don't belong in codes for government. They should go, instead, among the laws of the state. The Kestnbaum Commission, June, 1955, reports that it " . . . finds a very real and pressing need for the States to improve their constitutions."

What's the situation with us? Some homework to find out about our state constitution and how it functions, along with a look at the document itself, is a must if we want our answer to be informed and constructive.

The Party System

It's our habit to think of the U. S. Government in terms of the two party system.

But as plenty of us know from the situation at home, this doesn't apply to the government of a considerable number of states. In about eighteen, just one party has power—thirteen Democratic, five Republican.

In the government of the nation, each party in the two party system, in an effort to persuade voters and win elections, brings up issues and offers plans for carrying them out. Thus the people get a chance to decide which party they think will best serve them. If a state has only one party, issues in state elections generally are nowhere near as clearly defined. Various factions within the party say they're for this or for that—but the situation is apt to shift and be confusing.

What's the situation with us? How about it?

The Executive Branch and Governor

Compared to the President and his chance to get things done, the executive branch of state government is pretty generally weaker. Many states elect a half-dozen or so state officials (instead of just President and Vice President as in national elections). This tends to split up authority. In many states, a number of semi-independent boards, along with the various departments and other agencies, have a hand in running affairs, thus splintering executive authority and responsibility even further.

To add to his difficulties, the governor is usually in for a short term—two years in nineteen of the states. In a short term a governor has little chance to build on experience.

On each of these points, what's the situation in our state? Any other problems? What do we feel should be done? Do we want our governor to furnish the principal leadership in deciding what's needed and in getting things done, or would we rather keep him in check, following the traditional attitude in many states of distrusting a strong executive?

The Legislature

With any state legislature the big question is: does it really represent us?

The fundamental idea back of democracy is that the people be fairly and equally represented. When groups of just a few people are represented by a considerable number of legislators at the state capital, while other much bigger groups have only two or three representatives, the very principle of democracy is violated. Yet that's how it is in most state assemblies. Estimates figure that urban centers, with almost 60% of the total population, elect only 25% of the lawmakers of the states. That means that three-quarters of the legislators come from rural areas, where only some 40% of the people live. What's back of this situation is the way the states are districted—a district being a subdivision entitled to elect a specific number of representatives. Such subdividing has always been a regular part of the democratic system. But even where a state may originally have been fairly divided in order to give equal representation to the citizenry, shifts in population, along with

growth of cities, have upset the pattern. In addition, such devices as gerrymandering foul up the balance. "Gerrymandering" means laying out a district in such a way as to give one party an advantage out of all proportion to its strength in the state.

State constitutions often provide that redistricting, to ensure continued equality of representation, shall take place after every census.

But since redistricting is the legislature's job—which got itself elected through the way things were—legislators much prefer to sit tight.

What's the situation as to representation in our state? How long ago was it redistricted or reapportioned?

As to how the legislature works, the pattern differs in each

state. The questions listed below may at least give us some guidance in looking into and checking on the job being done.

1. How many representatives in each houseΔ in our state? Is that about right, too large, or too small?
2. Do we, or do we not, favor changing to a unicameral system? What are our reasons?
3. What pay do our legislators get? Should it be lower or higher?
4. How often does our legislature meet? Do we, or do we not, favor more frequent sessions? Why? Does the constitution set the frequency and length of sessions? Do we favor such regulation, or not? For what reasons?
5. Are representatives from the rural areas more numerous than those from the cities? If so, what's the effect?
6. How many standing committees does our legislature have? Are there joint committees of both houses? Do we, or don't we, favor such an arrangement? Why? Do committees schedule public hearings on important bills before submitting them to our representatives for legislative action? How can we keep posted, in our state, on legislative action?

Pressure Groups

In considering legislation, there's one situation we should be very much aware of. We can get at it by asking ourselves this: do our wishes as individual constituents determine how our representatives vote, or are they influenced more by pressure groups?

Pressure groups are organizations of citizens banded together because they have common interests which they want to have looked after. In nearly every state, important groups include farm organizations like the Grange, the Farmers' Union, the Farm Bureau, the National Council of Farmer Co-operatives. Labor has its pressure groups, too, as does business and industry. So do the veterans.

Because such groups represent big blocks of votes and have staff members at the state house who know how to talk to legislators, they're in an advantageous position to get what they want. Many of the things they advocate may be greatly needed. But let's think about it this way, too. The organized bird lovers and organized cat lovers are apt to tangle in their views. What comes out in the way of legislation may be good for neither birds, cats, nor people. What if one group is organized, the other isn't?

There's nothing to prevent us joining such groups. Yet we might ask ourselves some questions about them. For instance, should provision be made to see to it that they operate more openly? Is there anything else about pressure groups we should look into and recommend?

People at Work

In trying to figure out how good a job our state is doing, we need to consider people: what kind of people are working for us, and how well do they work?

In our state's elective offices, that's up to us. We, the voters, put the candidates in.

For the other job holders—who are in the great majority—it's something else again.

In state government, the merit system, though growing, is still in its infancy. "To the victors belong the spoils" is still the way many state officials look at it. They go right on appointing their friends to government posts as rewards for political service rather than because they're qualified for the jobs.

What's the situation in our state?

We've nearly reached the end of the page, yet we've only just scratched the surface of the subject. There's lots we've had little chance to think or talk about—the judicial branch of state government, for example, the most effective organization of which, in most states, is a subject of continuing debate.

State government is a complex and complicated business. It concerns us closely. We should make a real effort to look into it further.

How can state government's capacity to do its job responsibly, democratically, intelligently, and efficiently be improved?

ΔOnly Nebraska has a unicameral system.

HELPFUL FOR LOOKING INTO THE QUESTION FURTHER

The Forty-eight States, research reports and background papers prepared for the use of participants in the Eighth American Assembly, October 13-16, 1955. Copies furnished on request to interested individuals, organizations, agencies, and officials. Write to The American Assembly, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York 27, New York.

For information on our own state, turn to its official manual.

For comparisons with other states, turn to the Council of State Governments' biennial Book of the States.

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(Chronological list of comments, continued)

Mr. Wallace Irwin, Jr., Director, Office of Public Affairs, United States Mission to the United Nations, in a letter dated September 12, 1955, with reference to the Guide on U.N. Charter revision: "... up to your usual high standards."

Miss Olga B. Gechas, Assistant to the Director, United States Committee for the United Nations, in a letter dated September 15, 1955, with reference to the same issue: "It is an excellent job of directing some very complex and comprehensive material."

Dr. Robert L. Johnson, President, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa., October 17, 1955: "VITAL ISSUES is excellent, and I am wondering if it would not be a good idea to devote one of your new issues to the Hoover Commission recommendations."

Mr. J.L. Blair Buck, Coordinator of Teacher Education, State Board of Education, Commonwealth of Virginia, in a letter dated October 21, 1955: "I have just finished your excellent treatment of Disarmament in the October, 1955, issue of your very valuable publication. It is an excellent summary which should be very helpful in supplying perspective for considering next steps in the search for an acceptable disarmament plan.
The issue on schools was another exceedingly valuable contribution."

Miss Lillian Lehman, Editor, Kentucky School Journal, in a letter dated November 21, 1955: "I have just received Volume 4, Number 8, of Vital Issues, ... I am very much interested in ... 'Crisis in the Public Schools: What's Up? What's Needed?' I am considering publishing this article or excerpts some time in the Kentucky School Journal, if permission will be granted by your editorial board. This is an article which would be most timely for our readers during the approaching session of the General Assembly of the Kentucky Legislature."

Mrs. T.L. Johnson, 1 Breckenridge Road, Palmer, Mass., a supporting subscriber to VITAL ISSUES, in a letter dated December 6, 1955: "I am finding Vital Issues very informative, and pass each one along to sincerely interested persons."

Dr. Detlev W. Bronk, President, The Rockefeller Institute, New York City, in a letter dated December 12, 1955, with reference to a Report on the activities of the Center: "I was much impressed by what you have accomplished and I send you my warmest best wishes for the continued success and further development of your important and significant undertaking."

Center for Information on America

Washington, Connecticut

TOWNSEND SCUDDER *Executive Director of the Center*

Scudder, T

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Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22
New York

November 30, 1955

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Along with the current issue of the Center's Guides, I am enclosing a Memorandum which I feel will interest you.

A question of great importance to the future of the Center has come up on which I would greatly value your advice and counsel. I promise not to take more than ten minutes of your time, and, if possible, would ever so much appreciate the chance to see you before the middle of the month. I expect to be in New York on Wednesday the 7th, but could rearrange my schedule for almost any other day to suit your convenience.

Sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

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Cover by Stuart Judd, Jr.

Vital Issues

"A DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR BETTER INFORMED AMERICANS"

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AMERICA'S MANPOWER RESOURCES -

ARE WE MAKING THE MOST OF OURSELVES?

In democracy, nothing is more important than men, women, and children. That's our belief. That's what our Declaration of Independence, Constitution, and Bill of Rights stand for.

Nothing counts more than making the best of ourselves—for our own sakes as individuals, and for the benefit of all of us. Our happiness, our well-being, our liberty and security, depend on ourselves. The sum of the training, skills, and abilities of us all adds up to America's manpower total. That's what makes us what we are; that's our greatest resource.

So, the thing is to see that our human resources are given the best chance to develop. Thomas Jefferson thought that each citizen should have available the highest level of education for which he was qualified. Our belief in "educational opportunity for all" accounts for the American public school system to help prepare young people for life and for work.

Nevertheless, there is a good deal of evidence that, in the training and use of our human resources, there's room for improvement. In this technological age, we're still the furthest advanced nation. But our technological development—so directly responsible for our high standard of living and our security—depends on having enough skilled scientists and engineers, and enough trained technicians, to keep it progressing. We're waking up to the fact that here's one place where we're running very short. We're running short elsewhere, too—short on teachers, for example. The importance of having plenty of good teachers is clear. It's not just because they teach but because part of their job is to build character so that young Americans can make the best of life in general. They help prepare us in the fundamentals of good citizenship on which the quality of our government depends. Inspiring teachers stimulate able students to seek further training to increase their chances of making the most of themselves.

Are we shortchanging ourselves in the preparation and use of our human resources in general? What's the effect on our economy of the fact that it is tougher for certain citizens, because of color, to get training to develop their best abilities? What's the total result of the reluctance to hire older workers? How about drop-outs of young people in school? Because two-fifths yearly leave high school before graduation, isn't there a tremendous loss of potential manpower?

We should look into these things.

They're important for each of us.

We ourselves are the vital issue.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: Dr. James W. Fesler, Professor of Government, Yale University; Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian, United States Army, Washington, D. C.; Dr. Allan Nevins, Professor of American History, Columbia University, President of the Society of American Historians; Dr. Robert E. Spiller, Chairman of Committee on American Civilization, University of Pennsylvania, President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.

Editor: Townsend Scudder, Executive Director of the Center.

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HOW GOOD IS THE SELF-STARTER?

Becoming a working part of the nation's manpower is a bit like getting a car going in cold weather. The engine needs to warm up.

For a great number of young people, choosing one's work is a haphazard performance. Many take the first job offered. Rather than as the result of painstaking search, very likely the opportunity is heard of casually through a relative or friend. Usually, because that's more convenient, it's something near home. The idea of looking farther afield, or hunting up better opportunities elsewhere, doesn't dawn very quickly. Instead, there's considerable floundering around—trying various things. Meanwhile a little valuable know-how is picked up, along with a better notion of the market for jobs and what's needed to get good ones.

If the young job hunter hasn't graduated from high school, he's almost sure to find himself under a handicap. Employers are coming to regard a high school diploma as standard equipment—proof that the applicant has acquired a certain amount of necessary knowledge and has successfully seen one task through. At a time when, as a nation, we're short on manpower, that may mean some good material is passed by—since many young people with intelligence and other desirable qualities never finish school.

WHAT DOES GETTING READY CONSIST OF AND WHAT ARE THE JOBS TO BE FILLED?

Our system of free education for all (education paid for by the citizenry through taxes) extends through high school. The program is in the hands of all of us. It is as good as we make it—no better, no worse. There's plenty of criticism of what goes on in school—not a bad thing if we know what we're talking about. These are among the comments heard. Several contradict one another or get in one another's way.

1. The typical high school gears its program to the average student. As a result, bright students are neglected.* This means they don't get a real chance to develop. Some of the best get bored and drop out—a serious loss of talent.
2. Not enough is done to work out ways of training for the below-average student, who simply endures school because the law won't let him leave till sixteen.
3. Gifted students often find the schools they are in do not offer the type of training they need for professional study at the university level.†
4. There's not enough vocational training. Since the majority of high school students doesn't go to college, every student should learn some skill so as to be ready to make a living.‡ There should be more business training, too.§
5. The three R's aren't thoroughly taught. Too many students don't learn to understand what they're reading. Too many can't explain what they mean—either through talking or writing. Too many can't spell. Too many haven't really learned even the fundamentals of math—can't add or subtract.
6. Not enough able high school students are encouraged to take science or higher mathematics.●
7. The program offered in high school should be broad and general—with history to acquaint young people with man's past and to furnish a yardstick for the present, with courses in music and art, with good reading to let young people know about man's aspirations.
8. Religion should be taught in public schools.
9. Religion shouldn't be taught in public schools.
10. There ought to be more citizenship training. A key purpose of secondary education in a democracy is to prepare each individual to be a good citizen.
11. There ought to be more emphasis on guidance, both for choice of work and for problems faced in life. There should be more courses acquainting young people with opportunities ahead.

What about each point? What, if anything, is needed? How achieve these needs?

What we want, and what an awakened public interest is striving to get at the free level, is the best possible education for all to help prepare for life and for work. It's traditional with American parents to hope that their children will do better than themselves—and it's good to see how often, in our U.S.A., this belief works out.

As for jobs waiting to be filled, they scale all the way from the unskilled laborer's to Albert Einstein's. If we consider the general job-holding situation during or at the end of high school, here is how it stacks up. A semi-skilled worker—and for our work force of over sixty-five million, it's less and less likely for any job to require no skill at all—picks up what he has to know from his foreman and by watching those around him.

Skilled Labor

There are roughly about eight to nine million in the skilled labor force. Included are electricians, tool and die makers, machinists, and a lot of others. Typically a good machinist can use various machines, and hand tools also, to turn metal into objects our industrial civilization needs—parts of a car, of a watch, a plane. He has to be able to follow written specifications and blue-prints. He needs to be able to work out problems for himself.

At least three out of every five skilled workers and technicians get that way through informal training. Starting as beginners, many grow more and more skilled as they move from one work assignment to another or shift from job to job. The climb up the ladder depends on such things as performance, the desire and ability to make the most of training opportunities, and seniority (how long you've worked with the same outfit).

Formal training comes in various ways. It may be offered you. You may make your own opportunity to get it. Recently there's been a noticeable increase of formal training programs for promising workers by big industrial concerns. These are sometimes of the night-school type, with classes designed to improve the general skills of the work force. You sign up if you're interested. Sometimes they're intensive courses to develop specialized, selected groups of workers.

Unions have traditionally taken great interest in the education and training of their memberships. In cooperation with employers, or on their own hook, they have set up trade schools and run training programs. The apprenticeship system is largely union-made. It operates mostly in the construction trades. Sometimes it just means that those who ask for it will be given a chance to learn a trade. More usually, these days, apprenticeship consists of a formal training program. Uncle Sam recognized that fact some twenty years ago by setting up the Bureau of Apprenticeship. Most apprentices are in programs registered with the Bureau. It encourages the formation of joint employer-employee committees to administer programs. The Bureau and the committees are interested in establishing standards: (1) what shall training requirements be? (2) at what age shall apprenticeship begin? (3) to become an apprentice, what aptitudes should be asked for; what educational backgrounds? [the three R's are pretty much of a must, and most formal programs include applied mathematics and some science training], (4) apprenticeship means learning on the job—so, what shall the hours of work be; what the pay? (5) who shall be selected for apprenticeship and how many? [It's an old complaint that first claim goes to sons and relations of union members]. Some or all of these matters customarily form part of the agreements concerning employment drawn up between unionized labor and management. Apprentices generally receive better than half the standard pay of skilled workmen. Depending on the industry, apprenticeships run from two to five or more years—

**Dr. Hilton C. Buley, Chairman of a Committee on the Gifted and Bright appointed by the Commissioners of Education of eight states, has said: "You just can't take it for granted that a gifted child will reach his full potential without special attention. We have to make better utilization of the brains of . . . gifted children."*

†53% of the nation's high schools do not offer courses in physics. Half do not offer courses in chemistry.

‡In high school, the tendency is to confine vocational programs to the last two years. Most such training is given in regular high schools. Vocational high schools make up only a small percent of our total public school system. Such courses are to teach skills in trades, industry, home economics, and agriculture. Nearly half our high schools offer "vo-ag" courses. They make a valuable contribution, but only a relatively small proportion of our graduates go into farming. For years, more children have been born on farms than could be absorbed into agriculture.

§Over half of all high school students take commercial courses: typing, shorthand, accounting, bookkeeping, office procedure, etc.

●Within the last 50 years the proportion of high school students studying algebra has dropped from fifty percent to twenty percent, physics from twenty percent to four percent. But a far larger proportion of students today attend high school.

two for construction iron workers; five for certain types of electricians.

Even though about half those entering registered apprenticeship programs get out before finishing, they've made a start at learning an occupation, rather than just catching the hang of a particular job. They're that much better off to meet the challenge of new problems. The traditions of apprenticeship tend to create in the trainee a sense of responsibility and pride in his work.

A chance to begin learning a trade is open to every qualified young man (qualifications include a good high school background) faced with the obligation and duty of military service. Many aren't aware of these opportunities for acquiring skills which, when young soldiers become civilians again, can give them a boost up the job and salary ladder. Around half of those entering the services get some type of technical training. Of these, around half are given the advantage of extended school and on-the-job instruction in such varied fields as aircraft maintenance engineering, foreign languages, photography, and jet mechanics. The difficulty is that, as a general thing, the services have only two years or less of a man's time to work with. And the main idea is to make good soldiers for the nation's defense.

Then there's the United States Armed Forces Institute—providing through classroom and correspondence courses the largest adult education program in the world. Through the Institute, men in uniform can work for high school and college credits—though again, because of limited time, far fewer complete courses than begin them.

The G.I. Bills of World War IIΔ and Korea gave many service men, who for financial reasons would otherwise have been left out, the chance to continue their education right through graduate school if they had the ability.

This brief survey shows there's not much rhyme or reason in the way we train for skills. Is that for the best and in closest accord with our belief in the individual's right to choose his occupation, or is there room for improvement?

The means we've looked at are for free. But education costs money, and beyond high school, unless training takes the forms we've considered, the chap who wants further education has to hunt up ways to pay.

Technicians

Along with an increased demand for skilled labor, there's been an enormous rise in the call for technicians. In our total manpower, there are about four hundred thousand of these. Technicians include engineering aides, draftsmen, laboratory assistants—besides many other sorts. Their jobs usually bring them into close contact with professional personnel—doctors, scientists, engineers, and others—who can be seriously hampered in their work if there aren't enough technicians to help. Though, like skilled labor, future technicians may develop their knacks through work experience and informal training, formal post-high school courses are more and more heavily relied on. Depending on the degree of expertness involved, such programs may be carried on in technical institutes during one, two, three, four or more years, or in two-year junior or regular four-year colleges. Correspondence schools also offer training. Technical schools are expensive to run, and tuition often comes high.

The Professions

For the professions themselves, the costs are highest of all, and the preparation longest. That's one reason why the shortage here is greatest and most acute. Our country's economic strength, its social, moral, and spiritual well-being, depend to a critical degree on the small group of highly trained men and women who work in scientific and professional fields. We look to them for solutions of the still unsolved riddles of how to master diseases which have not yet yielded to man's medical skill. To them we turn for the answers—ranging from how to conquer space to how to live in peace on earth. Among our needs, scientists and engineers are at present in dangerously short supply. Because of this lack, the armed forces have had to cut down on certain research and development work. In private enterprise, shortages are critical in the petroleum, metal, food, paper, aircraft and electrical industries. Three to four times as many specialists in peacetime development of the atom will probably be needed each year than are presently being trained.

It's also hard to get enough good executives—both in business and government—for all that needs to be done in managing our expanding economy.

The inadequate supply of highly educated people in various fields is hard to fill for a number of reasons. Top training takes time. Next, a lot of America's potentially best talent doesn't get the chance to get trained. We've looked at the drop-outs in school. In college there's a sizable drop-out rate too—around forty to forty-five percent—much for financial reasons. Particularly during freshman year and especially in science and engineering, drop-outs occur because of inadequate preparation. Better science programs in secondary school and better teaching would help. But good science teachers are hard to keep—they get paid more elsewhere.

This all adds up to serious waste.

How about the form and quality of college and graduate school training? Is an adequate job being done? One argument concerns itself mostly with the undergraduate level. Influenced by this technological age, specialization tends to begin early in college. The existing shortages put the pressure on. When undergraduates see senior engineering and science majors being offered jobs at high starting salaries, they naturally wonder whether it's wise to pay much attention to the liberal arts—history, literature, philosophy, and so forth.

If able students are channeled into scientific studies, the humanities and social sciences tend to lose out. Those who feel there's danger in this argue as follows. In the humanities may best be discovered the intellectual, moral and spiritual resources of the human race. For the most effective leadership, for the best success, knowledge of the humanities is a vital element. Courses which seem to have little to do with one's success in industry, business, or government, may, in the long run, prove very important.

What are our views on this problem of specialization vs. broad liberal training?

As for specific training, more and more large industrial concerns are running their own programs for the management and research personnel which they recruit from the colleges and universities.

Graduate professional schools, as their title shows, concern themselves directly with preparation for a profession—but the candidate has to be well qualified to get in.

At the top level, the lack seems likely to remain acute for considerable time. In order to relieve the scarcity and save waste, the National Manpower Council believes that "nothing short of a determined cooperative effort involving government, industry, the educational institutions and professional and other groups" will do. An informed public opinion is needed to understand the crucial role "brain power" plays in the nation's welfare. That includes awareness of the fact that pure science and learning (searching out knowledge for its own sake) lead often to the advances made in applied science (research for some definite purpose, like developing better aircraft engines).

To achieve more efficient manpower use—says the Council—we should:

1. Develop more reliable knowledge about our human resources.
2. Strengthen . . . institutions which educate and train our scientists and professionals.
3. Maintain . . . a continuous, large flow of students through our colleges and universities.
4. Expand . . . opportunities for capable young persons to secure a higher education.

That's a large order. Let's think about and discuss ways and means to fill it.

GUIDANCE

Even the ablest and best-adjusted young person when trying to decide what to do can make mistakes. Wrong choices waste potential abilities and weaken by that much the nation's manpower resources. Obviously anything which will be of help in

ΔThis bill provided education and training for more than 7,800,000 veterans.

picking a vocation should be all to the good. At the same time, the American tradition that the individual shall be free to make his own decisions as to the kind of education he wants, and the career he hopes to follow, needs to be carefully guarded.

By and large, not much *is* being done about guidance, and the average young person gets relatively little usable information. Good guidance programs require money, people, and time.

Various social agencies are doing what they can. Outstanding is the work of the Y.M.C.A.—because of its excellence and because it reaches so many. The Veterans Administration also concerns itself with guidance. So, among others, do different church groups.

Where programs are especially needed is in school—not just for the eleventh and twelfth grades, but when young people are getting ready to enter high school. That's when important choices must be faced. Shall it be the general college preparatory course, or something leading more directly toward a vocation? What *are* the job opportunities ahead? How do I find out what I'm qualified for? What should I do to get ready?

A special reason for guidance in school is because, once teenagers see how important education can be for a successful life, they will be more willing to study and more anxious to do well.

At present many high schools, if they have guidance programs at all, offer only makeshift counseling services. Often the teachers assigned are not prepared to give sound guidance advice. The mistakes they make bear directly on the lives of the students. There's always the risk that, in advising young people to fill serious shortages in a particular type of skill or profession, there'll presently be overproduction of manpower and not enough jobs to go around.

The National Manpower Council recommends that schools, professional societies, governmental agencies, and other interested groups get together to strengthen the information and counseling services in high school and college. The Council suggests that school guidance programs should help:

1. to clarify a student's understanding of his own interests, aptitudes, and vocational goals [Tests now given more and more generally in schools are proving a considerable help in solving these questions—but many educators warn that their findings should only be taken as an indication];
2. to let students know about the range of occupations, not only locally but in other communities. [A difficulty with what guidance data there is lies in the fact that the best deal with national rather than neighborhood situations];
3. to cause students to relate their present schooling to future work and careers;
4. to inform students about opportunities for further education and training.

What are our own views on vocational guidance? What should be done?

PAYING FOR FURTHER EDUCATION AND TRAINING

There's the rub.

Lack of cash or credit accounts in large measure for the following figures and facts:

Many who have the ability to go through college never consider doing so because they don't know about opportunities for financial help. Tuition costs are steadily rising.⊙ That forces plenty of good students to drop out. It has been estimated that these circumstances each year prevent from 100,000 to 150,000 superior high school graduates from going on. There's real danger that young people from the average income bracket will be priced out of college.▲ Let's consider what's involved in all this, and what needs to be done.

Are there other solutions than scholarships? If so, what?

The American Council on Education finds that scholarship aid has been concentrated on the top five percent. Should the base be extended to include the top quarter of students?

Should the level of free education be raised from the twelfth grade to include two years of junior college? College itself?

On education in general, we are spending about two percent of our national income for secondary schools. One percent goes to higher learning. By way of comparison, over four percent is spent for recreation and fun. In recent years, though, there has been a marked rise in the number and value of scholarships and fellowships. They come from the higher institutions themselves; from private sources such as foundations, industry, unions, fraternal and professional organizations, and individuals; from cities and states; from the federal government.

What should our national policy be concerning America's manpower resources?

⊙*Tuition fees cover only a minor part of what it costs most institutions of higher learning to give each student an education. The largest part of the expense must be raised elsewhere.*

▲*A survey by the American Council on Education shows that a substantially higher percentage of high school graduates attend college from the higher income levels than from the middle and lower levels. Here is another figure which the survey turned up: half of the top 25% of high school graduates don't continue to college.*

FOR FURTHER READING

A Policy for Scientific and Professional Manpower, 1953.
A Policy for Skilled Manpower, 1954.
Improving the Work Skills of the Nation, 1955.
All published for the National Manpower Council and sold by the Columbia University Press. Copies of the Council's statement and recommendations, reprinted from its publications, are available on request to the National Manpower Council, Columbia University, New York 27, New York.
The Uneducated, by Eli Ginzberg and Douglas W. Bray. An investigation by the Conservation of Human Resources Research Project. Columbia University Press, 1953.
Manpower in the United States, prepared by the Industrial Relations Research Association, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1954.
America's Resources of Specialized Talent. Report of the Commission on Human Resources and Advanced Training, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1954.

FOR FINANCIAL AID

At your local library, consult the most recent available issue of **Scholarships, Fellowships, and Loans,** by S. Norman Feingold, Bellman Publishing Company, Cambridge, Mass. There's a large and growing number of national scholarship programs. Ask local high school superintendent or principal for further information on how and where to apply. Individual colleges have their own programs, and will send literature on application. Such scholarships are customarily awarded on basis of ability and promise, with amount adjusted to financial need of students and their families.

FOR GUIDANCE

Occupational Outlook Handbook, U.S. Department of Labor, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. $3.25. Describes 433 occupations, giving summary of prospects for employment in each for next five or ten years, description of nature of work, earnings, training and other qualifications needed.
Education for the Professions, issued in 1955 by Office of Education of U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Government Printing Office. $1.75. Three hundred and seventeen pages of facts about preparing for and practicing each profession, alphabetically arranged.
Your Life Plans and the Armed Forces. Prepared by Defense Committee of North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. Designed to aid high school students to plan their further education and careers while fulfilling their military obligations. Available in school and college libraries.

COMING: ***Our Mental Health—are we doing enough to keep it good?***

If there is demand for a guide on womenpower resources, we'll prepare one. Please let us hear from you.

Center for Information on America
Washington, Connecticut

TOWNSEND SCUDDER *Executive Director of the Center*

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November, 1955

MEMORANDUM TO THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES AND ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROGRAM OF SERVICES READY FOR DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION.

Introductory Comment

As a non-profit educational corporation dedicated to furthering the knowledge and understanding of America by Americans through informational publications, radio, films, television, and conferences, the Center is attracting the interest and approval of an increasing number of persons in positions of responsibility, in universities, on state boards of education, in schools, in learned societies, in organizations like the National Education Association, in government and in industry. Below is given a brief resume of our present and projected activities.

Discussion Guides

Circulation and Distribution

Up to now, the guide program may be described as having been on a pilot basis. Without benefit of organized promotion and with limited manpower and facilities, the Center's Discussion Guides have made their mark, with distribution and circulation increasing. For the concluding issue of Volume IV (May, 1955), 3,317 copies were needed to take care of regular subscriptions. At present, over 4,000 copies are required. Judging from past experience and present indications, 5,000 or more of each issue will need to be kept in reserve to fill special orders. An increasing number of these come from libraries wishing current and back numbers as permanent reference material. Of regular subscriptions, 534 new ones have directly resulted thus far from the Book-of-the-Month Club's "Bookmark" calling attention to the work of the Center, with more coming in daily.

Particularly gratifying is the fact that, from the Bookmark group, supporting subscribers (those contributing $5.00 or more above regular subscription price) are running around eight to nine percent of the total. This degree of support of the Center and its purposes would seem to hold out promise that there is reason to look for a broad basis of support.

What has taken place without benefit of promotion raises interesting conjectures as to what could be accomplished with adequate promotion from here on out. The current response to VITAL ISSUES adds further evidence that the Guides are proving acceptable and useful at various age levels from the 'teens on up. The time seems ripe for launching a full scale promotional campaign for VITAL ISSUES and for further development of the Center's discussion guide service.

Development

The adjuncts to the discussion guide service suggested in the January, 1953 memorandum to the Trustees should be put in practice and tested. Such preparations as are possible are already under way. With the supply of certain issues nearly exhausted, and others coming into increasing demand, reprints become imperative. Here two courses are open - straight reprinting, or revision. The background material of all Guides (as repeated reorders indicate), remains up-to-date. But the device used in many to stimulate immediate attention by reference on the front page to pending questions of immediate national or international concern means that a certain portion of each Guide becomes "dated". Here revision in reprinting is called for. In November, 1953, the Center brought out an issue on the farm problem. It is still in demand. Work on a revised issue is now being carried on by Terrance Keenan, of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Beane, New York City. Keenan is one of the many able young men who on a part time basis have carried on research and done other work for the Center. The Guides on Atomic Energy, Natural Resources, Neighborhood Betterment, and several others are in need of present reprinting.

A special issue (not to be included as part of the regular monthly schedule) on how to conduct mock presidential nominating conventions, designed particularly for use in schools, is now being worked on by Richard Clopton, a former graduate student under Dr. Fesler at Yale and now a budget examiner with the state government, Hartford, Connecticut.

With regard to school use, it is time for another survey of the questionnaire type, to subscribers, like that made in 1952 at the conclusion of the first test run of the Guides. As on the first occasion, this should include a request for suggestions to make the service of the greatest possible value to teachers and students. A manual for most effective group use of the Guides, taking due account of present successful practices, should be developed. In making this survey, personal contact with as many subscribing schools as possible would be desirable.

Though the Center has never advised it, the Guides are employed in a number of schools at the eighth grade level. An investigation should be made as to whether a special edition for junior high school, based on the regular text, but in simplified language, would be desirable.

With regard to use by industry, for distribution to employees in reading rack programs, and to customers also, the same sort of investigation should be made, along with promotion.

Promotion

As is apparent, it is time for a well directed, long-term campaign for subscriptions. Equally important for the sake of wide distribution are special orders. Thus far the largest of these was for 50,000 copies from the National Citizens Commission for the Public Schools, for the issue, Crisis in the Public Schools. This order, like those for other issues which have met with continuing demand, came without benefit of any special promotional effort. The Center, at the time, lacked funds for that. It is only in the last few months that the Center has begun to avail itself of the very real opportunity for wide distribution of individual issues. The firm of Glick and Lorwin, 1790 Broadway, New York 19, New York, has been retained, at a modest figure, to engage in a limited campaign to gain special orders for the two most recent issues, Disarmament, and Neighborhood Betterment. Their expectation of selling over 100,000 copies of the last named issue awaits realization. Future candidates for this type of promotion would seem to be the forthcoming numbers on Manpower Resources and Mental Health. The brief, highly condensed, yet meaty and readable presentation of topics like these furnishes an inexpensive means for broad distribution of information and findings often difficult to lay hands on because available only in various and far longer reports.

Conferences

Since the Center's founding in 1951, conferences have been on the list of its projected services.

Summer Sessions for 'Teenagers.

Made possible through the generosity of the Grant Foundation, of New York City, a preliminary study of the idea of summer sessions in American Studies at the secondary school level was conducted this past summer, and the report completed late in September.

On the basis of the findings, and of responses to the report thus far received, the holding of a pilot session in 1956 seems a justifiable next step. This would call for careful planning and preparation which should begin at the earliest possible moment. If a pilot session is to be held this coming summer, it is imperative that a director be appointed at once, to work out details and assemble his staff. The Advisory Committee has already been asked to suggest candidates, and names are coming in.

Once established through practice, these summer sessions at the secondary school level could be held in various parts of the country. A pool of competent conference leaders, from all over, would be building up, along with practical experience in conducting the sessions. And, to quote from the Foreword of the Report, "In the field of curricular development alone, such sessions, unimpeded by the formal requirements of the regular school year, could have far reaching influence. They could make a contribution to education in general, to a better understanding of America, and to the cause of good citizenship."

Summer Sessions for Teachers

As the 1951 Brochure of the Center states, there should be secondary school teacher summer sessions " ... devoted to the study of America and to discussion of what America is." Already the Center has an accumulation of ideas and suggestions, taking into account needs in many respects not now being satisfied. But as with the 'teen age sessions, a preliminary study and report should be made, followed by a pilot session.

Summer Sessions for Non-Teacher Adults

Summer sessions for non-teacher adults, as "refresher" sessions on America, including what constitutes good citizenship, consideration of the form and function of government, foreign relations, trade, production, industry, and so forth, and also, and highly important, on the accomplishments of America in literature, art, and music (the humanities), are a further natural development of the Center's conference program. These sessions, like the types already mentioned, would utilize the Center's VITAL ISSUES for informal discussion, spreading the realization that interchange of ideas, and consideration of even very serious topics, can be fun (something many youngsters have already found out, but which grown-ups are apt to forget), besides being so necessary if democracy is to prosper.

These non-teacher sessions would meet the growing need and demand for interesting and worthwhile use of vacation and leisure time. They would help satisfy the urge felt by so many Americans "to be back at college again" - if only for two weeks. Utilizing the best teacher resources accessible through the presence on the Center's Advisory Committee of the Presidents of the Society of American Historians and of the American Studies Association, the Center is in a unique position to conduct and manage such sessions and recruit for their faculties the best teaching talent available.

Places for holding these conferences which obviously suggest themselves are Colonial Williamsburg, Old Sturbridge Village, and other places of historical interest. But the question of location has very wide possibilities, such as the campuses of colleges idle in the summer and the lodges in the National Parks system. Under the guidance and supervision of the Center, a nationwide program could be developed.

A study should be made and pilot conference held.

Booklet Program

This also has been a projected program from the start. The idea of it was first touched on in the 1951 Brochure. The potential significance of the Center's paperbacks project was commented on as follows in a letter from Professor William L. Langer, of Harvard University, in January, 1953. Commenting on the Guides, he adds, "I am even more impressed, however, with your pamphlet program which promises to strike at the main issue I had in mind in so far as it aims to review all the major aspects of modern American thought and activity and thus lay the foundation for a better understanding of what our culture involves."

Backed by the experience gained through the Discussion Guides, preliminary steps toward realizing this particular service are in order. There should be a study to determine need and demand, and the preparation of a sample paperback to begin establishing standards for the series. These standards are of the greatest importance today, when there is danger that, in the flood of material, objectivity and impartiality can all too readily be lost sight of. The Center, both in the material it can furnish through its Discussion Guides and the Booklet program and because of the editorial standards to which it is dedicated can - besides being useful to schools, colleges, and individuals - make a very telling contribution to industrial reading rack programs which, according to a survey made by Industrial Relations News, 230 West 41 Street, New York City, " ... are a worthwhile method of getting ideas to workers."

Television and Radio

The Guides have already been used for television and radio presentation by groups and organizations other than the Center. It is time the Center itself played a part. Development of a program good enough to merit sponsorship by advertisers should be the objective. Mr. Parker Wheatley, general manager of WGBH - FM, Cambridge, Massachusetts, has suggested that the material of each Guide, throughout the month of its issuance, could be divided up for presentation once a week. Mr. Edward Sherburne, program manager at the same station, suggested the lecturer type of presentation as inexpensive and effective. Dr. James Fesler, Professor of Government at Yale University, has said he felt panel discussion would be the best method.

The need now is for study to develop ways and means.

As a natural by-product, the development of tapes and filmstrips should be also undertaken.

# # # #

Agenda

Enlargement of Board of Trustees.

The stage the Center has reached in its development suggests the time for enlarging the Board, and getting wide national representation, has come. Accordingly, the President of the Board has appointed a nominating committee consisting of Judge Carroll C. Hincks, Helen Kenyon, and Ogden Miller. Already a number of candidates have been suggested, by the Trustees themselves, and by the Advisory Committee at its meeting in July, 1955. An early session of the nominating committee is planned to place names before the Trustees at the next meeting.

Staffing.

For the Center to develop its wide potentialities, adequate staffing is a must.

Thus far, part time help has been the chief reliance.

During the summer of 1955, hoping that funds might very presently be available, promising candidates were lined up for the positions of business and promotion manager, and of editorial assistant. Though these persons presently had to be notified that appointments could not at once be made, and they are in other positions, their interest continues. The fact that candidates also continue to apply for jobs with the Center strengthens the belief that with the aid of the Center's Advisory Committee, the right persons for these and other positions as they develop can be found. Getting the right people is of greatest importance, and the Center's Trustees are well aware of that fact.

Conclusion

With its broad program of present and projected activities, the Center is prepared to fill a vital American need and to perform an important national service.

Scudder, Townsend

Center for Information on America

Washington, Connecticut

TOWNSEND SCUDDER *Executive Director of the Center*

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American civilization.

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22
New York

October 28, 1955

Dear Mr. Murrow:

On the back page of the current guide which I enclose, you will notice that a forthcoming issue is announced on the subject of "Seeking a Vice President (Is the Way We've Been Doing It Adequate?)." This is a topic we have long had in mind, and with your own fine contribution to a deeper understanding of the Vice Presidency, the time seems opportune for bringing out this issue, though we are still somewhat undecided as to just when this should be and also have not yet formulated our general outline and plan of emphasis. Your advice would be ever so much appreciated. I shall call your office early next week in the hope that I may see you some day early in the month to get your advice.

Sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

A non-profit non-partisan educational corporation dedicated to furthering the knowledge and understanding of America by Americans through informational publications, radio, films, television, and conferences.

NEIGHBORHOOD BETTERMENT-

Vital Issues

"A DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR BETTER INFORMED AMERICANS"

Published by the
CENTER FOR INFORMATION ON AMERICA
WASHINGTON, CONNECTICUT
Volume V, Number 3

OR BLIGHT?

What **is** blight?

When the neighborhood in which we have our homes, or the places where we work—schools, offices, shops, farm buildings, factories, and what surrounds them—begin running down at the heels, **that's** blight.

It's a disease which can happen anywhere—country, suburb, or city. Because it's apt to sneak up on us, we may be threatened by blight right in our own back yards without knowing it. Then something drastic happens like a fall through a cellar stair that's been quietly rotting away.

Blight's later symptoms, when it's too late for anything but costly cures, are familiar enough—dilapidated buildings, yards and alleys littered with rubbish, streets bumpy, full of holes, and crumbling away. In the country, signs are broken-down homesteads and abandoned farms. In the suburbs, there's a hodgepodge of dwellings, shops, factories, junk yards, filling stations, used car lots, and so forth. In urban regions, the city itself is sick, with crowded, congested downtown areas and slums.

Blight gives a black eye to our American efficiency. It's a roadblock to progress. At its worst, it is a breeder of delinquency, crime, misery, and disease. It becomes an enemy of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Fortunately our wealth of natural resources, the bountifulness and beauty of our land, the industrial know-how which has brought to our nation the highest standard of living in the world, all help to keep blight from taking over.

Rapid, haphazard growth, as well as neglect, can cause trouble. Even the neatest, trimmest neighborhoods—whether long established villages and towns or brand new suburbs—may suffer from growing pains. How about traffic from everywhere else tearing through what used to be quiet, safe streets? That's just one of many problems which a little forethought and planning could take care of. Left alone, sooner or later such conditions cause blight.

An increased awareness of the need to fight blight has launched the nation on its biggest campaign for neighborhood betterment.

In metropolitan areas ambitious programs are under way, including slum clearance and well designed housing projects for people who can't afford much rent. All over the country, communities of every size are working on plans for improvement. Such programs can be for the long haul or to meet an emergency. Flood rehabilitation in New England and elsewhere is part of the picture. When disaster causes sudden blight, there's an unusual opportunity to plan and build better than before.

How about our own community—large or small? How about where we live? What are the needs? Have we taken a careful look lately?

What should **we** do about neighborhood betterment?

EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE: Dr. James W. Fesler, Professor of Government, Yale University; Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian, United States Army, Washington, D. C.; Dr. Allan Nevins, Professor of American History, Columbia University, President of the Society of American Historians; Dr. Robert E. Spiller, Chairman of Committee on American Civilization, University of Pennsylvania, President of the American Studies Association, a national society for the study of American civilization.

Editor: Townsend Scudder, Executive Director of the Center.

First printing November, 1955

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A STITCH IN TIME . . .

saves nine!

A mighty good place to heed this old saying is right at home. It is better and usually costs far less to head off blight than to check it once it gets started. Forethought and planning are habits worth cultivating. That goes for home owner, tenant, or landlord. Take a look around. Paint job needed? Roof leak? Any other repairs?

But how about blight in the neighborhood, where we don't have direct control?

That's where community spirit and community action come in. A successful fight against blight is essentially a community problem.

THE LOCAL COMMUNITY

It is at the local level—whether in a big metropolitan city, medium sized town, or little village—that the job itself must be done.

Circumstances will differ in different places. But the most satisfactory ways to get started remain pretty much the same. When there are problems connected with the manner in which a community occupies the land on which it stands, including the condition and use of buildings, a sensible approach is to size things up.

Let's bear our own neighborhood in mind as we consider how a community might go about looking itself over. If we're part of a group, let's discuss each point that applies.

First, Self-Analysis

What does a community wish for itself?

Ideally, it wants residential neighborhoods that are good for family life: well kept dwellings (whether for single families or for multiple family use); safe streets with no through traffic or heavy trucks.* It wants schools and playgrounds easy for children to reach. It wants nearby churches. There should be convenient places for shopping and diversion—downtown areas free from congestion. Handy shopping centers are a help, with plenty of off-street parking. A civic center, perhaps, to include the town offices, recreation facilities, and a hall for meetings. If there are factories, they should be up-to-date in construction. They should occupy land apart from residential areas and best suited to industrial needs, with plenty of room in which to grow.

There's apt to be quite a gap between what we'd like and what we've got.

To know what's what, one of the first things to do is to count noses. What is the exact population in terms of men, women, and children? Where, precisely, do they live? Are any dwellings overcrowded, rickety, and unsafe? Do they lack toilets, baths, kitchens, or heating? For the children—present and expected—what kind of school buildings? Is there space enough in all classes? For how long?

How and where do the people of the community earn their living? Is the present setup able to take care of the movement to and from work? How hard is it for people to get around? What about parking?

If there are factories, what are they like? Which ones require room for expansion? Are any showing tendencies to fold up and wither away, creating areas of blight?

And how about the topography of the town? Are there hills and valleys to cause present and future problems? What about streams which may flood?

To get such statistics into usable shape, a big help is maps—a separate map for each purpose and use. One would show the exact location and extent of land being occupied by the entire community for residential, commercial, industrial, civic, and other purposes. Another would chart the existing system of major thoroughfares, along with all other streets and roads. A third would indicate the location of schools, parks, playgrounds, and so forth.

When the analysis is complete, it may reveal various surprises, good and bad, in addition to what we'd expected to find. But whatever turns up, it will all help show what's needed if we're to get a better community. For instance, over here, in this area—once a "good" neighborhood—we find that families which used to occupy single dwellings have been moving out and other families moving in on every floor. Overcrowding results, with wear and tear on buildings never intended to shelter so many. That means wear and tear on people as well. Over there, business has been infiltrating into converted houses, causing a mixture that's a danger sign for blight. Heavy trucks passing, as stores and factories crowd into what before was mostly a residential area, add up to further trouble.

Next, A Plan, and Action

No matter what its problems, any community, after making a thorough analysis, is in a good position to identify the extent and damage of blight—if blight there is, and few communities are without it—and is better prepared to map out the future.

Planning means drawing up a guide for community growth. The plan's purpose is to promote with the greatest efficiency and economy the coordinated development of a municipality and the general welfare and prosperity of its people. Experience has pretty well shown that planless development—just leaving a community alone—simply doesn't work for the best. Misuse of the land we build on and work on—mostly unintentional misuse and often not realized as bad at the time—can raise hob with economic development and blight our hopes for decent living conditions.

HOW TO GET NEIGHBORHOOD BETTERMENT

Plans are no good unless acted on. For successful action, popular interest and support are a must.

Popular Support

It may start in a very small way with a few neighbors gathering to talk things over at somebody's house. The idea grows and spreads, enlisting the interest and cooperation of more of the community. Arranged for by neighborhood leaders and local officials, there may be meetings and discussions open to all. An informed public is the best basis for going ahead. Questions can be asked, views expressed, doubts and misgivings gone into, misapprehensions cleared up. The chances of getting something done are sure to increase if the idea gains the support of representative citizens' organizations—the local Chamber of Commerce, service associations like the Rotarians, Kiwanians, or Lions, Veterans' groups, the PTA and various educational bodies and church societies. Schools too—civic classes and such—can play a part. Perhaps a citizens' advisory committee will be formed to help the officials whose job it is to carry out the actual work.

Is there anything we could or should do to gain popular support for neighborhood betterment?

Laws and Ordinances

Rules and regulations, passed by the people through their representatives, are the tools by which democracy gets things done. These range from Federal Housing Acts, through state legislation, to the building and housing codes, zoning regulations, and health ordinances of our own local community.† As

See the Center's Guide—Our Highways, Streets, and Roads** (Vol. IV, No. 5).*

†Zoning is the division of land into districts and regulating the use of each for agriculture, residence, business, and industry. Its rules include such things as location, height, and land coverage of buildings permitted in each area. Generally, zoning, as set up, is a compromise between existing community conditions, as revealed by analysis, and the way the citizens would like to have the whole locality develop.

Codes and ordinances serve to set up safe, adequate standards and to combat the spread of blight. They cover such things as construction, fire prevention, plumbing, and electrical installation. If a structure doesn't come up to standards, it can be declared illegal for occupancy.

Local officials and elected or appointed planning and zoning commissions have direct responsibility for attending to these matters.

informed citizens, we need to study the laws we've got to see what tools are available for handling neighborhood development and improvement. On the local level, the community may find additions or changes will need to be made. Enforcement also requires looking into. If it's slack, the best plan becomes useless.

Help and Advice

In this technical, complicated age, professional help from trained experts‡ is really necessary if a community is to make good plans for its neighborhood and successfully carry them

out. Big cities hire full time staffs for the job. Smaller communities may be able to get along all right by seeking help on a part time basis. An able traffic consultant can suggest plans which may save a community plenty of trouble and money. An expert planner can prevent all sorts of costly mistakes. Local expert volunteer talent can also be a big help. It's wasteful to neglect it.

Financing

Neighborhood rehabilitation and betterment often cost plenty. Though much of the expense must be borne directly by the citizens themselves, city, state, and national government,

and various lending institutions, help in a number of ways.

Private capital is used for new construction, mortgage loans, and the purchase of bonds (guaranteed by the federal government) to build public housing and other improvements.

Financial help from government all comes originally, of course, from taxes we pay and similar revenues. It takes various forms, sometimes several being used at the same time. A typical example of public low-rent housing would be where local government buys up slum land, then, with the federal government's help, builds new housing and pays the difference between the tenants' modest rent and the monthly cost of operations. Or government—local, federal, or both—helps assemble the land, then sells it to private builders or cooperatives at a reduced level.

Of great importance is the indirect assistance offered by government insurance of mortgage loans. Such insurance makes it possible for lenders (banks and insurance companies, for instance) to advance up to 95 percent, in some cases, of the private builder's costs. Government insurance also guarantees repayment of home improvement loans made to private citizens.

What do we think of these types of government help? Should they be extended or cut back?

If a local community looks either to its state government or to Uncle Sam for help, there are definite requirements it must meet and live up to, including the making of careful plans for what it intends to do. Details as to what's needed before an application can go through are available for the asking.§

Even though it must spend its share of money, many a local community has discovered neighborhood betterment is not all a matter of shelling out. By clearing slums and checking blight, metropolitan areas have found that they have increased their municipal revenues. Business becomes better, industry thrives, more tax money comes in. In residential areas, property values go up. In fewer years than anticipated, bond issues and other obligations that helped pay for the job can be cleared off.

HEADACHES

Of course problems, too, may develop during rehabilitation. Progress is seldom completely painless. In rehabilitation and slum clearance, what's to be done about people dispossessed of their homes? There are solutions—but they've got to be looked into.

New developments, too, can raise all sorts of headaches. Almost at once they can become a breeding ground for blight.

Suppose, in a mostly rural community near some big town, there's suddenly a great deal of fresh building. Let's take a look at what may happen if things are allowed to get out of hand.

Probably it begins when real estate prices rise because of increased demand, and owners begin selling off parcels of land. These in turn are further subdivided. Many homes spring up. Local schools cannot accommodate the surplus of children. Classroom shortages are only one of the many problems. What about water supply? How about sewage disposal?

Here is what's apt to happen in haphazard development. First, the lots are cut small, so that there will be more of them to sell. Because it's cheaper and easier, streets may be laid out in gridiron fashion, with little regard to the lay of the land. Since the community water system hasn't yet reached that far, each house must have its own well. If these dwellings are built close together down a slope, the septic tank or cess pool of each is likely to contaminate the well of the next house below. The new owner or tenant—who is apt to be a former city dweller used to the municipality's handling such things—finds himself stuck with a whole lot of problems including a garbage pail with no one and no place to dump it.

For new developments, this is where foresight and planning come in, under the supervision of publicly elected or appointed commissions. By proper regulation, difficulties can be headed off before they start.

Without planning, there is a good chance that what's being

developed is a future blighted area. With proper planning, such developments will have safe and usable street layouts and grades, reasonable lot sizes, and provisions for utility improvements. If the new neighborhood is big, the need for schools, for playgrounds and parks and perhaps a community recreation center, will be taken into account.

‡*Because the demand is great and the supply of experts small, planning is a good profession to go in to. To date only twenty-seven North American colleges and universities offer advanced degrees in planning, but the number is growing.*

§*See Box on back page.*

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Good use of the land we live on is a sign of the pioneering enterprise of the human spirit. Look around. There are encouraging examples.

There's Morningside Heights in New York City. Less than six years ago, much of this northwest portion of Manhattan Island, dominated by the buildings of Columbia University and the gothic towers of Riverside Church and the Cathedral of St. John the Divine, was a mess. Having taken over in various portions, blight—unnoticed or ignored at first—was spreading fast. Its ugly flood was rolling right up to the doors of the educational, scientific, and religious institutions, which, along with Columbia, had been living almost a separate life on the Heights, not paying much attention to what was going on in the vicinity. Once started, blight on so large a scale is hard to stop. But a combination of neighborhood private initiative and public financing has begun turning the tide. Sponsored by the educational, religious, and medical institutions of the neighborhood, Morningside Heights, Inc., was formed to carry on a program for community regeneration. Study and analysis form the background to plans now well under way. Residents of the spoiling areas, suspicious at first and indignant because they feared they would lose even the poor homes they had, have been won over. Through meetings and other means, full explanations were given of the beneficial, humanitarian nature of the work going on. Assurances were also made that, one way or another, dispossessed residents would be taken care of till they could move into the low-rent public housing or cooperative middle-income developments now building or about to be built in the place of former slums. Plans include much more than honest-to-goodness nonsegregated inter-racial housing. Greater public safety, better recreational facilities, all-around development of the means for decent existence, are resulting from this enterprise which has enlisted the cooperation of people from all walks of life and various creeds and colors who live on the Heights—Negroes, Puerto-Ricans, and Whites. Intellectuals, white-collar workers, and labor. Morningside Heights has become an inspiring example of human beings working together for the improvement of their neighborhood.

Though big slum areas still exist in New York City, huge projects to get rid of them are shaping up.

In other cities, too, there's the same story. Chicago, for instance, has a long history of fighting against blight. Efforts there, as elsewhere, have grown into a comprehensive, coordinated, city-wide program of urban development. A noteworthy example is the Hyde Park—Kenwood area, north of the University of Chicago, where over 72,000 people widely different as to race, training, and income have learned to live satisfactorily as a community largely through neighborhood spirit and action. By means of a well-organized association of block groups—spreading block by block—the people have improved the whole area—setting up playgrounds in vacant blocks, improving property, campaigning for sidewalk repairs, better street lighting, zoning and building enforcement, good schools. So successful has this experiment been that it has become a guide followed by many other communities.

A unique feature of rehabilitation in Philadelphia is the "do-it-yourself" program being carried on by the Quakers. The American Friends Service Committee convinced Philadelphia's Redevelopment Authority that a "do-it-yourself" plan should be tried. The city helped make a slum block available. As part of the down payment, owner occupants contribute a share of their labor. Skills needed in carrying on the work are taught by the Friends Service Committee. Through community effort, buildings not too far gone are being reclaimed. Interiors are getting spruced up. Outdoors, worn old fences have been torn down and rubbish cleared away. There will be room for a large court in the center of the block for a children's and adults' recreation ground and open air social center.

In a democracy, when we come right down to it, everything begins with cooperation and self-help. Country, small town, suburb, or city—it's up to us.

What are **we** doing or going to do about making our neighborhood better? If we decide on further action, what plans shall we make for carrying it out?

WHERE TO GET FURTHER INFORMATION AND HELP

READING MATTER

100 Selected References, a bibliography, published by ACTION. Single copies 25 cents; no orders for less than one dollar. Write to 2 West 46th Street, New York City, N. Y., for list of ACTION'S other reports.

PUBLIC AGENCIES

Housing and Home Finance Agency, Washington, D. C. Responsible for housing functions of the Federal Government. Write directly or get in touch with the nearest branch office to learn what's required of a community in order to get financial aid. Also provides technical and professional assistance. Its publications may be purchased through the U. S. Govt. Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.

State and Other Agencies. Most states have housing and development commissions that fill the same general functions. Along with financial and other aid, many states furnish staff members for speaking engagements. They also supply visual aids such as color slides, sound-on-film motion pictures, "before and after" scale models useful to organizations and for study in schools. Many sponsor clinics and workshops for municipal officials or anyone interested. Write to your state's capital to find out what it's got.

Local. Larger cities generally have housing commissions or authorities in charge which can also supply services similar to those rendered by the state. In smaller communities, municipal officials, planning and building commissions, citizens advisory committees are sources for information.

PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS

American Council to Improve our Neighborhoods, Inc. "ACTION." 2 West 46th Street, New York City. Non-profit, non-partisan. It gathers and makes available facts useful for home and neighborhood improvement. Provides expert technical assistance to individuals and communities to help plan and carry through an effective local program.

National Association of Home Builders, 1625 L Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C. This association of around thirty-five thousand members, in cooperation with others, intends to set up housing service centers in every major American community. Each will have a full-time staff, advised by an operating committee of builders, realtors, bankers, and others.

U. S. Chamber of Commerce, 1615 H Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

National Association of Real Estate Boards, 1737 K Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C.

American Society of Planning Officials, 1313 E. 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois.

National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, 1313 E. 60th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois.

These national organizations, along with many others, are interested, and will help. Get in touch with national headquarters, or, if there is one, the local branch.

Our own neighborhood **Bank** and local **Savings and Loan Institution.** Good sources for advice. For instance, consult them as to what's required to get a federally guaranteed Home Improvement loan.

Help in preparing this issue has been received from many sources. The editors wish especially to thank Dr. Christopher Tunnard, Graduate Program in City Planning, Yale University, and the staff of ACTION, New York City.

COMING: ***Our Civilian Manpower Resources (Have we enough and of high enough quality to meet America's needs?); Picking a Vice-President (Is the way we've been doing it adequate?).***

Scudder, Townsend

CENTER FOR INFORMATION ON AMERICA

WASHINGTON, CONNECTICUT

September 7, 1955

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Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22
New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I take pleasure in sending you these copies of the first issue of Volume V of the Center's Discussion Guide, sent out to subscribers on August 31. In view of what the flood did to Waterbury, where VITAL ISSUES is printed, this maintenance of schedule was something of a triumph.

On July 14 the Editorial Advisory Committee gathered for what will probably be the only session this year. We all expressed the hope that when next we meet, you will be with us.

Sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

Townsend Scudder

THE UN CHARTER:

Vital Issues
"A DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR BETTER INFORMED AMERICANS"

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CHANGE IT, OR LEAVE AS IS?

"If . . . a General Conference of the United Nations for reviewing the present Charter . . . has not been held before the tenth annual session of the General Assembly . . . , the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly."

Boiled down from Article 109 of the UN Charter.

This suggestion to take a second look at the Charter, written into the Charter itself back in 1945, becomes a vital issue which concerns us all. On September 20, 1955, the tenth General Assembly begins.

According to Senator John L. Sparkman, the problem actually has two parts. Senator Sparkman is a member of a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations holding grassroots hearings to find out what Americans everywhere are thinking about the UN.

Senator Sparkman, presiding at one of the Hearings, puts the two parts of the UN problem this way:

"We are out . . . to ask the people this question:

(1) Do you believe that there ought to be such a conference for the review of the Charter?

(2) If you do, or if there is such a conference, then what ideas, what suggestions, do you have as to how the Charter ought to be revised?"

The first is largely the concern of the delegates from the sixty member nations gathering for the tenth annual General Assembly at UN headquarters in New York.

For the second part, it is up to us to decide what proposals, if any, we as a member nation should come up with or support.

The Senate Hearings showed how intense our interest has become. As Senator Alexander Wiley, former chairman of the Committee, remarked, the UN is " . . . a subject which arouses strong and sometimes conflicting passions in the communities of the U.S."

Testimony ran all the way from plans to enlarge the authority of the UN so it could function along the lines of a federal world government to proposals that we scrap the organization entirely. The range of suggestions stretched from those which would require a virtual rewriting of the Charter to those which could be carried out with little or no change in the Charter itself.

Most of the witnesses seemed to bear pretty closely in mind the constructive hope of increasing the effectiveness of the UN in preserving the peace and improving the lot of mankind.

"Regardless of their viewpoints," said the Senate subcommittee chairman, complimenting our fellow citizens for speaking up, "they are performing a valuable and useful public service."

If we're to do the best possible job in helping form U. S. policy in this matter, we must know what we're talking about. To aid us, many sources of information are at hand.

Let's start with the San Francisco Conference of 1945 as a background to the foreground of the question: shall the Charter be left as is or revised?

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Editor: Townsend Scudder, Executive Director of the Center.

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UP TO NOW

On April 25, 1945, when delegates from fifty nations began the Conference at San Francisco which they hoped would head off future fighting among nations and make a better world for all of us, World War II still was raging in the Pacific. Fighting in Europe was only just dying down, with the United Nations triumphant over Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, ending Hitler's and Mussolini's ambitions to dominate mankind. In Germany, American, British, and Russian troops were occupying bombed-out Berlin.

These three allied nations, together with Chiang Kai-shek's China—still battling to throw out the invaders from Japan—were the sponsors of the San Francisco Conference.

The invited delegates came with an acute awareness that their peoples, exhausted from years of bloodshed and suffering, yearned for an enduring peace. They gathered in the hope that a rational pattern of living could be worked out among the nations that would replace the barbaric spectacle of war which had so often muscled in on a world where force counted heavily and aggression was hard to stop. They were prepared to make those compromises necessary before any plan which all are prepared to back can be put in practice.

The Conference's sponsors, and the invited nations, had stood side by side, as the united nations, in this latest struggle against dominance. Though little can be certain in this changing world, the delegates hoped that the general unity which had held their countries together to win the war would keep right on to help assure peace. They assumed that peace treaties with the enemy nations—Germany, Italy, and Japan—could be readily drawn up through cooperation of the victors.

History has proved both these expectations wrong.

The 1945 way of looking at things naturally influenced the delegates as they drew up a Charter for an organization aiming at these four objectives:

(1) To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war;
(2) To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights;
(3) To establish justice and respect for international obligations;
(4) To promote social progress and better standards of life.

President Harry S. Truman, addressing the Conference's closing session, declared:

"This Charter, like our own Constitution, will be expanded and improved as time goes on. No one claims that it is now a final or a perfect instrument. It has not been poured into any fixed mold. Changing world conditions will require readjustments . . . "

What emerged was an association of sovereign states pledged to help the United Nations achieve their objectives. And the Charter specifically states that the UN is not authorized to deal with matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state—*i.e.*: hands off when it comes to private household affairs.

In the Security Council, a sort of executive group of eleven member nations primarily charged with the job of maintaining world peace, any action, including that of calling on the armed forces of member nations to help stop aggression, can be blocked by the veto—a safeguard of the right to control their own actions on which both Russia and the United States* insisted—though many smaller nations felt this provision might stand in the way of the Council's carrying out its assignment.

The General Assembly, made up of delegates from every member, can recommend action—but has no veto provision to block an affirmative vote. If a proposal rallies enough votes, it will pass. Whether or not to act on the proposal, and to what degree, remains the decision of each individual member.

Disputes, says the Charter, should be settled "in conformity with the principles of justice and international law."

Some of the delegates at San Francisco wished the UN's International Court of Justice to have compulsory jurisdiction over members in legal disagreements. But this suggestion was turned down and didn't get into the Charter, which, like all such documents, including our Constitution, is the result of compromise. It was because of these concessions made by various nations in order to get the UN set up at all that Article 109, calling for a review conference as one of the ways to consider amending the Charter, was put in.

Had the Charter not been a living instrument, capable of adapting itself to changing conditions, it and the UN would by now most likely have suffered the fate of the Dodo bird and become extinct. Under few national constitutions could such dramatic and rapid developments in handling problems have taken place without formal amendment of the rules. And the Charter as originally written has served during a period which has seen such colossal and unexpected happenings as the explosive birth of the atomic age, and, in international politics, the breaking out of the cold war. Another major development has been the upsurge of nationalism and a demand for a better life on the part of the peoples of Asia and Africa.

Our own Constitution, though also born into a changing world, had it no tougher. As Chief Justice Marshall, one hundred and fifty years ago, said of the Constitution: "It was intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises in human affairs." Already, in the brief span of ten years, the Charter permitted UN action in ways not foreseen at San Francisco. While there are defects disappointing to the hopes of many, unsuspected virtues and resources have also turned up.

A striking circumstance about the U. S. Constitution, over the past hundred and fifty years, is that it has served for the most part without drastic changes in text. By and large the rather difficult amending process has been called on only now and then.

Like the Constitution, the Charter has proved flexible enough to adapt itself to new situations without formal amendment—a process even more difficult than under the Constitution. Just how such evolution has taken place comes out as we take a look at history since the hour when A bombs ended the war in the Pacific forty days after the conclusion of the San Francisco Conference.

Several years were to pass before the overwhelming seriousness of the atomic age as regards the survival of the human race was fully to register.

Meanwhile the machinery of the UN, guided by the Charter, set the organization in motion. The Economic and Social Council set to work carrying out the fourth purpose of the UN: the promotion of social progress and the betterment of standards of living for the peoples of the world. During this same period the Security Council was having difficulty cutting its teeth. These teeth were to be a police force for preserving the peace, to be made up somehow among member nations. To this day, the members of the Security Council have been unable to agree on how to go about raising this force—so that Article 43, under which it would be set up, hasn't come to life in any practical form.

A big reason for the stalemate in the Security Council lies in the fact that, instead of the expected one world, with cooperation among the great powers, we were waking up to the

**Without the inclusion of the veto power, the U. S. Senate—many qualified observers felt—would never have approved American participation in the UN. With the veto provision, the Charter was approved in the Senate by an almost unanimous vote: 89 to 2.*

realization that we were living in two—our own, and Communist Russia's.

The resulting disagreement showed up sharply in futile efforts to control atomic energy as a threat to world peace. No plan offered in the UN by either side could get past the objections of the other. As the cold war worsened, Russia went on a veto spree to make up for her lack of votes. Resulting stalemates in the Security Council threatened to bring to a halt much of the work of the UN. If the organization was to go on performing its basic function of preserving the peace and insuring the security of its members, other ways of doing so, outside the veto-clogged Security Council, would have to start developing—and that's just what happened.

The way was shown when the U. S. Senate, on June 11, 1948, passed the Vandenburg Resolution. While this act resolved to " . . . reaffirm the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations," it also had an eye on insuring for us a more trustworthy bulwark against aggression—particularly Communist aggression—than the stalemated Security Council seemed likely to furnish. It advocated the "progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter."† Such arrangements are the Rio Pact linking the Americas, NATO for the North Atlantic, and the recently concluded Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. These operate free of the Security Council veto, giving us a greater sense of safety. They're one example of what can be done because of the flexibility of the Charter.

By 1949, a very special serious crisis was coming to a head—a situation which few of the delegates could have foreseen at San Francisco. China was undergoing a political upheaval. Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government, signer of the UN Charter in 1945 and one of the four permanent members of the Security Council, was caving in under the onslaught of Mao Tse-tung's communists.§ The U. S. and its western allies in the cold war found themselves faced with the hard fact that China, whose friendship had been heavily counted on, was going over to the communist side. With Chiang and his government pushed off the mainland and in control only of Formosa, Mao's Reds claimed China's place in the UN, including her seat in the Security Council. Russia and her satellites backed Red China's claim.

But the Communist block in the UN could not come anywhere near to mustering enough votes to unseat Chiang's representatives and get Red China in. So Andrei Gromyko, head of Russia's delegation, staged a "walk-out." Starting January, 1950, the U.S.S.R. began a boycott of the UN. This gesture had one result not expected by Russia. When at one o'clock in the morning of June 24, 1950, the army of Communist North Korea launched a surprise attack across the 38th parallel on the South Korean Republic, set up under the auspices of the United Nations, and the Security Council called for " . . . urgent military measures . . . to restore international peace and security," no representative of Russia was on hand to kill the resolution by a veto.

To head off future stalemates in the Security Council—for Russia quickly ordered her delegates back into action in the UN—the vetoless General Assembly, on November 3, 1950, passed the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution. This enables the General Assembly to meet and act promptly in any crisis which threatens the peace, if action by the Security Council is tied up by the veto.

What was happening, and without any formal amendment to the Charter, was a shifting of the all-important job of "keeping the peace" from the Security Council to the vetoless General Assembly. As one result, during the past five years, the once very important Security Council, meeting less and less often, has, at least for the time being, faded into the background.

In other ways, too, the UN has been adapting itself to meet changing times. These include the creation of further special organs and agencies, such as UNICEF, heavily backed by the U. S., which looks out for the needs of children all over the world. They include a gathering list of interpretations of how the UN and its agencies shall work, and a slowly growing set of decisions‡ by the International Court of Justice helpful in focusing attention on the question of international law.

CHANGE IT, OR LEAVE IT AS IS?

That brings us pretty much up to now.

With few exceptions, our responsible leaders, irrespective of party, have supported the UN and backed up the idea of its importance in conducting our foreign policy. But in practice, while we've regarded the UN as an organization to be supported, we've relied little on it for help in settling major international problems.•

How do we stand on a possible Charter review conference?

The official State Department attitude, as expressed by Secretary Dulles, is to favor holding it.

Such a conference doesn't necessarily imply formal changes, since amendments to the Charter involve the veto, which could be used by either Russia or us or any other Security Council member, and also ratification by two-thirds of the member states. Whether formally changed or not, the Charter is likely, as in the past, to keep right on growing. But such a conference would give us a chance for getting better acquainted with everything about the UN.

Anticipating a possible review conference, studies are being made, and have been for quite some time: officially by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and by our State Department, by the UN itself, and by many member nations; unofficially by foundations, colleges and similar organizations, by various groups of citizens, and by us in general. Back of the entire question, among those in favor of the UN, stands this purpose: what will best help the UN carry on its job?

As to possible changes, there is at least one which seems likely to gain official U. S. support.

It's a **proposal to drop the veto power as regards admission to UN membership.**

As the Charter now stands, admitting new members is something in which the General Assembly and Security Council must concur. But quite a few applicants, though able to muster the required two-thirds vote in the General Assembly, have been blackballed by a Soviet veto in the Security Council. Because of the cold war, admission has turned into a political football, with each side anxious to keep out candidates which might add to the voting strength of the other. As a result, less than half of those applying have been let in. The UN, as originally thought of, was to be open to all peace-loving nations willing to accept the obligations in the Charter. In the

†*These individual and collective arrangements, or "pacts"—most UN members agree—come within the scope of Articles 51 - 54 of the Charter. But there are those who disagree and attack these "pacts" as not in harmony with the purposes of the Charter. It is a problem worth looking into.*

§*See the Center's Guide: "Our Asian Policy: What Should It Be?" (Vol. IV, No. 9).*

‡*While not binding, the Court's decisions, like the recommendations of the General Assembly, bear considerable moral weight. Heads of governments think twice before going against them.*

•*The "summit" conference at Geneva, for example, took place on its own. An instance where we used the UN is Korea. As Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., our Ambassador to the UN, testified before the Senate Hearings: we couldn't permit having " . . . this finger of Korea pointed right into the middle of Japan in Communist hands." The statement — continued Ambassador Lodge — "that the UN . . . sucked the U. S. into Korea is not true. If anybody sucked anybody in, it was the U. S. that sucked the UN in, and quite rightly." Study of the time table of U. S. and UN moves bears out this comment.*

last ten years, former enemy states have returned to the family of nations and are asking to come in. Particularly in Asia, many Eastern peoples have gained their freedom, and, as new states, are also knocking for admission. Yet many, though they meet the requirements, are being kept out by the veto. Our Ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., favors dropping the veto in the Security Council in this special matter of membership.

How do we feel about the question, and what are our reasons?

Mixed up with the idea of **universal membership** is the question of **Red China's claim to a seat.**

What are our views as to that?

Then there's the question of **voting in the General Assembly.**

At present each member, big or small, has a single vote. Is this the fairest arrangement? The General Assembly, as the UN develops, is assuming greater responsibilities. Therefore should there not be some form of weighted voting, so that nations which, because of weakness or smallness, can't assume military or financial responsibilities, won't have an equal say in wishing such responsibilities on other nations?

What are our views as to that? How will the problem look to other countries? (With regard to every suggested change, that's a consideration we'll need to bear in mind!)

Then there's the matter of **international law,** which, at the Charter Conference, quite a few delegates from other countries felt had not been given attention enough. Quite a few Americans, too, have been wondering. Back in 1951, Robert Taft wrote that a fundamental defect in the UN Charter " . . . is that it is not based primarily upon an underlying law and an administration of justice under that law." And Chairman Walter George of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee warns that "the development of rules of law to regulate the conduct of nations in their relations with one another . . . is perhaps the most important single task man can perform in his eternal quest for peace." As compared with the growth of national bodies of law, international law is still in its babyhood. Article 13 of the Charter calls on the General Assembly to start studies and make recommendations to encourage the development of such law—but so far, little's been accomplished.

Should or should not more be done to build up and strengthen international law? If we feel such legal aspects have been neglected, what do we recommend?

As for other views already expressed by our fellow citizens, they also are to be found in the published Hearings of the Senate's subcommittee on the UN Charter. Let's think about and discuss some more of them, adding any of our own that may occur:

Curbing UN Authority

1. The police force powers assigned to the Security Council should be eliminated.
2. The veto power should be kept intact.
3. The right of the General Assembly to make recommendations should be further checked.
4. Regional security pacts should be further expanded and encouraged, deemphasizing the collective security role of the UN.
5. The right of member nations to handle their own internal affairs should be further safeguarded.
6. More care should be taken to keep down UN costs.
7. We should get out of the UN.

Enlarging Authority

1. The veto power should be curbed to permit wider and more frequent positive action.
2. Membership should be made universal and compulsory.
3. An international police force should be set up and the collective security powers of the UN strengthened.
4. Armaments and atomic energy should be under the control of the UN.
5. To carry out its functions, the UN should be given the right to levy taxes.
6. The International Court of Justice should be given authority in all international disputes, and, like our Supreme Court, should serve as interpreter and guardian of the Charter.
7. The UN should be given control over the development of dependent territories toward independence.
8. The UN should have the power to see to it that human rights in all countries are established and preserved.

Further Suggestions

1. The great powers should agree among themselves not to use the veto in such matters as admission to membership, or the consideration of plans for the peaceful settlement of international disputes.
2. The recommendatory powers of the General Assembly should be further strengthened.
3. Closer coordination and supervision should be developed between the UN and the specialized agencies.
4. Voluntary programs for cultural and humanitarian purposes, and for technical assistance, should be further encouraged.

In conclusion, let's see if we can draw up a statement or list of recommendations covering what we feel our national position should be, and what changes in the UN, if any, we most favor.

WHERE TO GET FURTHER INFORMATION

The United Nations Charter, ten cents.

Guide to the United Nations Charter, latest revised edition, 25 cents. (Both are UN publications—write to Department of Public Information, United Nations Headquarters, New York City, N. Y.).

The Constitution of the United States, with a detailed clause by clause analysis, by Philip Dorf, latest revised edition, published by the Oxford Book Company, 222 Fourth Avenue, New York 3, N. Y., 70 cents.

Hearings, Subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on proposals to amend or otherwise modify existing International Peace and Security Organizations, including the UN, Parts 1-12, 1954-55, 2032 pages (A big undertaking to read. See in your library or get from your Congressman).

Interim Reports, Jan. 26, 1955 (5 pages) and Aug. 2, 1955 (4 pages). The Hearings boiled down. Final Report when ready. Copies free on application to the Senate Subcommittee on the UN Charter, Washington 25, D. C.

Studies by the Staff of the above Subcommittee. "A very remarkable set of background and working papers . . . helpful to the general public"—Clark M. Eichelberger, Executive Director, American Association for the United Nations. Apply to Subcommittee for copies.

"Reviewing the United Nations Charter," by Lawrence S. Finkelstein, in **International Organization,** vol. IX, No. 2. Obtain reprints from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, United Nations Plaza at 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.

The U. S. Stake in the UN: Problems of Charter Review, background papers prepared for use of participants at the 5th American Assembly, Arden House, 1954, by Research Staff authorities, and conclusions of the Assembly, published by the American Assembly, Graduate School of Business Building, Columbia University, New York 27, N. Y. Individual copies available on request.

"The Future of the United Nations—Issues of Charter Revision," in the **Annals** of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 296, Nov., 1954, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia 4, Pa., $2.00.

Should the UN Charter be Reviewed or Revised? United States Committee for the United Nations, 816 21st Street, N.W., Washington 6, D. C., June, 1955, ten cents.

For reading and commenting on the text of this issue, the editors wish to thank Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and U. S. Delegation staff member at the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco Conferences.

For maintaining printing schedules in the face of difficulties caused by a disastrous flood, they wish to make acknowledgment to Nelson Typesetting Service and to Speed Photo-Offset and Printing Company, both of Waterbury, Connecticut.

COMING: ***Our Civilian Manpower Resources (Have we enough and of high enough quality to meet America's needs?); What About Disarmament?***

Scudder, Townsend

CENTER FOR INFORMATION ON AMERICA

WASHINGTON, CONNECTICUT

June 28, 1955

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Here are the two additional guides that you mentioned you would care to see. We were still using the title "Future Voters" in 1953, but are shifting to "Vital Issues," which better takes care of both school and adult readership.

It was a great pleasure meeting you, and I shall look forward to hearing from you on your return from Geneva. I earnestly hope that your answer will be "yes."

Sincerely yours,

Townsend Scudder

TS:CB
encs.

Townsend Scudder

A Service of the Center for
Information on America,
Washington, Connecticut.

May, 1953 Vol. 2, No. 9

IMMIGRATION
"WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME?"

Immigration means coming to a country to settle—coming to make it one's home.

Ever since the first little groups of colonists set foot on these shores, immigration has had a great deal to do with building America.

There are always two points of view on immigration—that of those who wish to come in; that of those already in who are considering whether or not to receive the newcomers. Furthermore, those already in are apt to have various answers to the question, 'Whom shall we welcome?'

There's the traditional American answer based on the declaration that "all men are created equal" and have the right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Mindful of the new world as a refuge from the tyrannies of the old, George Washington summed it up thus: "The bosom of America is open to receive not only the opulent and respected stranger but the oppressed and persecuted of all nations and religions, whom we shall welcome to a participation of all our rights and privileges if by decency and propriety of conduct they appear to merit the enjoyment."

Washington was spokesman for a sparsely populated seacoast nation with a vast empty continent to spread out in. Since then our physical situation has changed. Have our attitudes toward immigration changed also?

That immigration remains a hot issue is clear from the nationwide controversy that goes on over the McCarran-Walter Immigration Act.

In his State of the Union message, President Eisenhower said:

> It is a manifest right of our Government to limit the number of immigrants our nation can absorb. It is also a manifest right of our Government to set reasonable requirements on the character and the numbers of people who come to share our land and our freedom.
>
> It is well for us, however, to remind ourselves occasionally of an equally manifest fact: we are—one and all—immigrants or the sons and daughters of immigrants.
>
> Existing legislation contains injustices. It does, in fact, discriminate. . . .
>
> I am therefore requesting the Congress to review the legislation and to enact a statute which will at one and the same time guard our legitimate national interest and be faithful to our basic ideas of freedom and fairness to all.

We the people are vitally concerned with what's to be done. To help us decide whom we shall welcome, let's start with the history of immigration in America.

Illustrations by Stuart Judd, Jr., Yale '56.

IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA

Taking into account the need for strengthening and settling the nation, the Declaration of Independence, in its list of grievances, charges that King George the Third " . . . has endeavored to prevent the population of these states, for that purpose obstructing the Laws of Naturalization of Foreigners (and) refusing to pass others to encourage their immigration hither . . . ".

George Washington, looking for men to work on his plantation, thus described the kind he was seeking: "If they are good workmen"—he wrote—"They may be of Asia, Africa, or Europe. They may be Mohametans, Jews, or Christians of any sect."

But other Americans had their doubts and reservations. Already they were a bit disturbed by the arrival of newcomers of Scottish stock who, because of oppression abroad, began seeking America in large numbers. What troubled them even more was a growing tide of strangers from Germany. Most of these immigrants couldn't even speak English. Wouldn't they fail to mix in? With their foreign habits, wouldn't they upset the way things were? Wasn't it time to draw the line?

If barriers had been placed in the way of these German speaking peoples, what well-known Americans might not be here because they or their ancestors might have been prevented from coming? What contributions to American life can we ascribe to this particular tide of immigration?

By the authority of the Constitution, Congress has the right to control immigration. But for over a hundred years Congress took no action. During this period, the idea of America as the welcoming land of refuge, freedom, and opportunity became traditional at home and abroad.

On top of the continuing German tide, a wave of Irish began to arrive.

From 1820 to 1850 or so, Ireland was suffering from crop failures and very hard times. In America, there were canals and then railroads to build. Irish brawn played a very important part in laying the steel network which speeded the development of the continent.

Like the Germans, the Irish were at first regarded with suspicion and distrust. But like the Germans they won their way into the American pattern, gaining success in America's many and varied activities.

Let's name some well-known Americans of Irish origin or descent and discuss the Irish contribution.

Overlapping and following the German and Irish immigration came a tide from the Scandinavian countries. Swedes, Danes, and Norwegians found the pine forests and lakes of Wisconsin and Minnesota much like those they had left. So they settled and helped build the Northwest.

Let's name some well-known Americans of Scandinavian origin or descent and discuss what's been contributed to American life.

By 1900, because times were better, making a living was no longer so hard at home. So the tides from Germany and Scandinavia fell off.

Emigration (leaving the homeland) seems to go by waves, with bad conditions (hard times, over-population, or military and political crisis) launching the wave, and the tide subsiding when conditions improve. Of course conditions and opportunities over here also have a good deal to do with it.

The earlier tides had flowed and ebbed mostly from the northwest part of Europe. From around 1880 on, circumstances shifted the source to the south and east parts of Europe. The next great flood came from Italy.

Let's name some well-known Americans of Italian origin or descent and discuss what's been contributed to American life.

The size of this tide from Italy, before it was stopped, was pretty close to the five million from Ireland—though it could not match the seven million of Germanic origin.

These were the bigger waves, though the Statue of Liberty in New York Bay and the Golden Gate in California have welcomed to our shores immigrants from practically every nation on earth, including Switzerland, Holland, France, Poland, Portugal and Spain, Russia, Czechoslovakia, China, Greece, Japan, Lithuania, Finland, and the lands to the north and south of us in our own western hemisphere.

Before we go on, let's name well-known Americans from some of these lands, or discuss what's been contributed to America by these stocks.

As is bound to happen where people are concerned, there were some misfits and undesirables among the thirty-five million or so immigrants who have sought our shores. But our nation today is proof that immigration in general has worked all right. To describe America as the land of opportunity and as the melting pot remains one of our proudest boasts.

The chief credit for turning the newcomers into Americans must go to the public schools. In our schools, the children of those who have sought our shores adapt themselves—as children readily do—to American ways.

Not till 1882 did Congress use its constitutional power to regulate immigration. An influx of Chinese on the West Coast led to the first Federal immigration act.

The earliest Chinese to arrive were a few merchants. Then, with laborers needed to work on western railroads, thousands of coolies were brought in to supply the demand. Without them, declared Leland Stanford and other railroad builders, the transcontinental lines could never have been built. But other Americans saw the situation differently. They were alarmed by this oriental tide. These Chinese working at low wages and able to live on a cheap diet of rice—they insisted—were being used to bring down pay and were threatening the American standard of living. Opposition led to riots and bloodshed. So Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act barring Chinese labor.*

Once Federal regulation began, the problem was—what form shall it take?

The general law of 1882 provided that no convicts, no idiots, and no persons who might not be able to support themselves should come in. This started a national policy

**When Japanese exclusion was also about to be enacted, the Japanese Ambassador pointed out it would be a serious blow to his people's self esteem. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes urged Congress not to "affront a friendly nation."*

of selection.

But one test for choosing acceptable immigrants had to wait quite a while before becoming law. This was the literacy test, requiring all adults to prove they could read. President Cleveland, vetoing the idea in 1897, called it too drastic a departure from our national policy of letting all decent people come in. At last, in 1917, though President Wilson declared such a provision would not be a true test of character, since many immigrants who might become good citizens had thus far had no chance to learn, the literacy test passed over the President's veto.

In 1921 we turned another corner. The end of World War I found the American people wishing to have as little as possible to do with Europe and its troubles. Wouldn't a new flood of immigrants pour in? Wasn't the country full?

As a way to check the tide, Congress passed the immigration laws of 1921 and 1924. The Act of 1921 provided that the number of aliens admitted from each country be limited to 3% of the number of persons of that nationality already in the United States according to the 1910 census. The Act of 1924 continued this national origins quota provision, but cut the percentage figure to 2% and based each nation's quota on the census of 1890.

The general effect was to restrict total immigration to 350,000 a year for 1921; 165,00 a year from 1924 on.

What effect would the national origins quota system as based on these years of census have on immigration from various countries?

What might be the benefits, what the disadvantages, in thus greatly curtailing immigration?

Between 1924 and the passage in 1952 of the McCarran-Walter Act, this has been done:

The basis for determining national origins quotas has been shifted to the census of 1920.

In 1943, when China was our ally, the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed, with a Chinese national quota of about 100 a year.†

In 1946, the same thing happened with regard to India.

In 1948 and 1950, emergency legislation was passed to help solve the problem of the "D.P.'s." (We'll go into that on page 4).

Emergency legislation has also taken care of the entry of war fiancees and war brides, including Korean girls.

The McCarran-Walter Act, passed June 27, 1952, over President Truman's veto,‡ in general continues present U. S. policies, with eighty-five national quotas based on the census of 1920 and with a top annual total of 154,-657. It greatly tightens security measures against subversives.

The highly detailed, complex act covering one hundred and nineteen pages may be characterized as liberalizing the immigration laws in some respects, and in other respects increasing existing discriminations and adding new ones. New features which have been singled out for public comment include the following:

1. A provision making naturalized citizens liable to revocation of citizenship for certain actions which native-born citizens are free to perform without punishment.

2. A provision setting up a special racial quota for what is defined as the "Asia-Pacific Triangle," instead of separate quotas for Japan, China, and other Asiatic nations, arrived at on the same basis as are the quotas for European nations. By the new provision, those with oriental blood are counted as coming from the Asia-Pacific triangle, regardless of where they were born.

3. A provision whereby Jamaicans no longer come within the British quota but are processed under a quota of their own. The general result is to cut the number of Jamaican immigrants (mostly colored) from 1,000 to 100 a year.

What do we think about each of these provisions?



Now—how about the whole question: 'whom shall we welcome?'

To touch off our general discussion, we might consider the following two statements—one in support of present policies and the McCarran-Walter Act, the other opposed:

1. The national origins quota system is " . . . not based on the premise of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon races but . . . on the sound proposition that a preponderance of the population of the United States, its cultures and institutions . . . stem from Northern and Western Europe and therefore . . . should be from Northern and Western Europe."§

2. "We have today an American policy on immigration which is completely outmoded, out of harmony with our ideals and actions, and completely at variance with the foreign policy which we are pursuing in accordance with such ideals."•



To be specific, here are two suggestions that have been made for changes in the 1952 Act. What do we think, pro and con, of each?

1. Raise the present number for yearly admission from 154,657 to 250,000. How do we feel about this figure? Could, or could not, the nation absorb that number? Could it absorb more?

2. Abolish the national origins quota system and put in its place an overall quota without regard to national origin, race, color, or creed. How do we feel about this suggestion? If this should be done, on what considerations should the admission of immigrants be based?

†*The McCarran-Walter Act itself repeals Japanese exclusion, for much the same reasons and with much the same results.*

‡*The vote to override the veto, in the House, was 278 to 133; in the Senate, 57 to 27, just one more than the necessary two-thirds majority.*

§*Statement by Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada.*

•*Statement by Monsignor Edward E. Swanstrom, Executive Director of War Relief Services, National Catholic Welfare Conference.*

THE D. P. PROBLEM

"We say—and we sincerely believe—that we are on the side of freedom; that we are on the side of humanity. We say—and we know—that the Communists are on the side of slavery, the side of inhumanity.

Yet to the Czech, the Pole, the Hungarian who takes his life in his hands and crosses the frontier tonight— . . . this ideal that beckoned him can be a mirage because of the McCarran Act."

General Eisenhower, during the Presidential Campaign, in a speech on Oct. 17, 1952.

War can sear the land like a flood of lava from an erupting volcano. Some people in its path seek refuge in flight, only to find themselves homeless in already crowded neighboring countries. Others are forcibly transplanted, or "displaced," by the conquering armies. Still others, after the conquest of their homelands, escape to what they trust will be a friendly welcome beyond the frontier.

These are the displaced persons and escapees—homeless through no fault of their own—who look especially to America as the traditional refuge for the oppressed and the land of opportunity. Many possess skills and knowledge which, before they became war's victims, brought them success—good farmers, machinists, carpenters, engineers, doctors, scientists. The vast majority hate the Communist tyranny that drove them from their homes.

Probably never since our nation was founded have old political or religious tyrannies victimized more people than have the new tyrannies of Nazi brutality and Communist cruelty. Never before has there been a greater need for giving the victims of tyranny a chance for a new start.

Yet on account of our national origins quota system, most of these people cannot come to the United States as settlers and prospective citizens. They are debarred because before the war not many persons from their lands —Poland or Czechoslovakia, for example—had yet come here to settle. As a result, their national quota is much smaller than that of other countries where the tides of immigration, for one reason or another, began at an earlier date.

To help take care of the plight of the D.P.'s—who are the responsibility of the entire free world—the United States Congress, in 1948 and 1950, sidestepped the national origins quota system by passing special legislation to admit a maximum of 400,000 D.P.'s. Stiff provisions were set up for careful screening to guard against possible subversives. Only the best prospects for citizenship were let in.

In 1952, with the arrival of the last of the 400,000, this special legislation stopped.

But the need and problem go on.

Daily we hear of daring escapes from behind the iron curtain. Some, like the account of the Polish pilot who flew a Mig to freedom, or of the train from Czechoslovakia which continued right past the guns of the guards at the border, sound like television thrillers. Often we learn these escapees risked their lives as the result of listening secretly to our radio broadcasts. And they keep coming in. Western Germany, for instance, has many more such refugees than she can possibly take care of.

On April 22, 1953, President Eisenhower, commenting on the steady flow of escapees from behind the Iron Curtain and on European concern over population pressures, asked Congress as soon as possible to enact emergency legislation admitting 240,000 refugee immigrants to the United States during the next two years.

Should, or should not, such emergency legislation be passed? (In discussing the D.P. question, we might consider, among other things, how D.P.'s we actually know of in our neighborhood have made out.)

If we pass such legislation, how about the President's figure of 240,000 D.P.'s? Is it too many, or too few?

What other remedies for the whole problem might we suggest?

WHAT SHALL WE READ?

Our discussion makes it clear there's a great deal to learn about the entire topic. As a starter we might turn to:

WE WHO BUILT AMERICA, by Carl Wittke, 1939. Professor Wittke is Dean of the Graduate School at Western Reserve University and an authority on Immigration.

WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME, Washington, D. C., January 1, 1953. This is the report of a commission appointed in 1952 by President Truman "to study and evaluate Immigration and Naturalization Policies of the U. S."

Its membership consisted of seven distinguished citizens familiar with the subject as churchmen, laymen or public officials. The Report may be obtained from the U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. for 75 cents.

ALL ACCOUNTS of present and contemplated action in Congress. All other comments in the papers.

Discussion Guide for September: "What Should our National Policy be Towards Latin America?"

Scudder, Tomm

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MR. TOWNSEND SCUDDER
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
CENTER FOR INFORMATION ON AMERICA
WASHINGTON, CONNECTICUT

AM MOST REGRETFUL BUT DUE TO MR. MURROW HAVING TO BE OUT OF TOWN ON WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22 MUST RESCHEDULE YOUR APPOINTMENT TO MONDAY, JUNE 27 AT 3:00 pm PLEASE CONFIRM. THANK YOU.

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Future Voters
DISCUSSION GUIDE

A Service of the Center for Information on America, Washington, Connecticut.

April, 1953 Vol. 2, No. 8

WHOSE OIL?

"The biggest untapped bonanza we possess."

That's what the oil deposits have been called which lie in the submerged lands beneath the seas that surround our country.

These untold millions of gallons, geologists believe, may prove our richest future source for all the petroleum products so necessary to keep us in high gear or jet propelled: gasoline for our cars and planes, fuel for our battleships. We all know how vital oil is for our progress and comfort, and how imperative it is for our national defense.

With the oil under our dry land running short of our needs, here's this great reservoir of it under the sea.

But a hot dispute has been raging as to who has the primary right to the submerged oil fields.

The seaboard states of California, Texas, Louisiana, and Florida claim the oil off their shores is theirs.

Should it belong alone to the people of these coastal states?

Or should it belong to the people of the entire nation?

Whether we are citizens of the four states most concerned or are citizens of inland states which could benefit from nationwide ownership, the decision is important.

If the oil rightfully belongs to the seaboard states, it would be an injustice to take it away.

Texas, for example, has been financing its public school system from revenues received through leasing to various producers the submerged oil fields off its coast.

If the oil belongs to the U. S. citizenry at large, then all the people should have the use of the revenues for worthwhile purposes.

That's in brief what is known as the Tidelands Oil question which for fifteen years and more has been calling for a showdown.

But the problem is complex. Tidelands oil, for instance, isn't even the correct name for the subsea oil deposits involved.

The nation, including its future voters, will have to do some careful investigating and thinking to solve wisely and fairly this question: "whose oil?"

Illustrations by Stuart Judd, Jr., Yale '56.

WHAT'S BACK OF THE PROBLEM

A blackish fluid called petroleum has long been around. Found here and there in smelly, greasy pools, it was regarded by early American settlers as worthless. Then they noticed that the Indians daubed it over cuts and bruises so they tried it too. This was its only usefulness.

Not till about a hundred years ago did men find out that petroleum could be distilled into kerosene, a clear inflammable oil excellent for lamps.

Before this discovery, people mostly went to bed with the birds—for candle-light was dim, and whale oil, which gave a somewhat better glimmer, was expensive. Abundant and cheap, kerosene banished darkness from people's homes and changed the whole pattern of living.

Fifty years later came a second revolution in how we live. American productive genius began making combustion engines. The further refining of petroleum was supplying the fuel necessary to usher in the new age of power and speed. To meet its demands, more and more oil was drawn from the earth.

Presently cars began swarming like ants on the roads. The need for petroleum products multiplied fantastically. In 1909, for instance, the United States Navy, to propel its ships, converted from coal to oil. So important to the safety of the nation had this driving force become that in 1912 President Taft set aside the first naval oil reserve. By the peak of World War II our armed forces were using one million five hundred thousand barrels a **day**—nearly a third of the total **daily** use by the whole nation.

Now we no longer have quite enough to go round. To meet total demands, we bring in oil from such nations as Mexico, Colombia, and Saudi Arabia.

No wonder the oil in the ground under the waters bordering our shores—this "biggest untapped bonanza"—is important.

Undersea oil deposits first were found off California. Next the Gulf of Mexico, bordering on Texas, Louisiana, and Florida, promised rich supplies. Assuming it controlled this oil and had the right to such revenues, each state leased to various drilling companies these underwater fields off its coast.

Soon American engineering and business enterprise began producing results. Putting millions of dollars into exploration and development, oil companies started building special barges to search out the oil. They bought old LST's, many of them veterans of Pacific invasions from Guadalcanal to Okinawa, and turned them into dormitories for the drilling crews. In the Gulf of Mexico, operations began as far out as one hundred miles from the shore. One oil company has put up a man-made island over the greenish blue Gulf. In fifty feet of water eight miles off Grand Isle, Louisiana, where Jean Lafitte the pirate used to terrorize crews of wooden sailing ships a century ago, this island stands on one hundred steel pilings. Hurricane proof and completely equipped for the comfort and safety of its inhabitants, it is big enough for the drilling of seven wells.



Up to the discovery of the underwater oil, the land beneath the sea around our coasts was of little interest to anyone. After the discovery, things became different.

Whose oil? Does this "untapped bonanza" belong to the seaboard states lucky enough to have it off their shores? Does it belong to the entire nation?

In 1946, Congress passed a bill "to confirm and establish the titles of the states" to the submerged lands off their shores. The President, insisting these lands with their immensely valuable resources belonged to all the people, vetoed the bill. The House failed to muster the necessary two-thirds vote to override the veto.

Seeking to establish its own claims by charging that the State of California, in making leases and collecting the rent, was poaching on Federal land, the Government took the case to the Supreme Court.* California's defense rested on the contention that the boundaries of the colonies which became the thirteen original states included the land off their shores. When they won their independence from England, they naturally won the right to their land, including the underwater area which presently was defined as running out to a three mile limit. California, admitted to the Union on an equal basis with the original states, contended such land also was hers.

On June 23, 1947, by a vote of 6 to 2, the Court decided for the Federal Government and against California.

But points were raised in the verdict which left the general question of undersea oil still open.

In the first place, only the three mile belt of water (and the land beneath it) that parallels the country's coastline — the Court declared — was involved in the case. The actual tidelands (the land exposed twice a day when the tide goes out) were not under dispute—these had always been regarded by state and federal government alike as belonging to the state. The rights to the rich lands of the continental shelf† running out beyond the three mile limit had also not entered the

**The Constitution (Article III, Section 2) provides that in all cases where there's a dispute between a state and the federal government, the U. S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction to settle it.*

†The under water plateau, rimmed by deep ocean, on which our continent rests. Along much of the Atlantic seaboard it runs from twenty to fifty miles out from shore. On the Pacific coast, where deep water lies close, the shelf stretches to about five miles. In the Gulf of Mexico, the shelf runs way out: from ninety to over one hundred and twenty-five miles.

case. What to do about that still remained to be settled.

In the second place, according to the Constitution‡—said the Court—the United States Congress has the power to dispose of public lands. The Court's decision did not affect that right. Congress merely had not passed the necessary legislation in this matter of the three mile belt. It had not mustered the necessary two-thirds vote to pass such a bill over the President's veto.

In the third place—as Justice Hugo L. Black, delivering the majority opinion, indicated—though California's claim to ownership of the three mile belt off its shores on the basis of historic precedent was not allowed by the Court, neither had the Court declared that the Federal government owned this land. It just had "paramount rights and powers"§ over it. When the Nation first won its independence—Justice Black pointed out—such statesmen as Thomas Jefferson were anxious to establish a definite zone off our coasts to help guard our neutrality. Before that, though at various times Spain, Portugal, and England made sweeping claims to dominion over wide expanses of ocean, the notion of a fixed three mile zone around each country had not been thought of. Thomas Jefferson set up such a three mile protective zone around the shores of our country, and notified England he had done so. The idea soon gained general acceptance. It was reaffirmed as international law for each country at the Hague Conference of Nations in 1930. It has been maintained against such claims as Russia's for an extension of sovereignty twelve miles off its shores. It is especially important today. As Justice Black pointed out, "the very oil about which the state and nation here contend might well become the subject of international dispute." It's not the job of the individual states of the Union, but of the armed forces of the whole United States to keep enemy ships, planes, and rockets from coming in over the ocean to attack us. Since the United States thus has this "paramount responsibility" over the three mile zone—Justice Black's opinion concludes—it also has a paramount right to the oil or other resources in the soil beneath.

One result of this Supreme Court decision was greatly to slow up the production of the oil. If companies applied to the Government for leases, suppose Congress, as it has the right to do, were to pass and uphold a law giving title to the seaside states? And what about the oil in the rich coastal shelf beyond the three mile limit? This land is of interest especially to Texas, Louisiana and Florida. Both Texas and Florida held that according to Spanish law, which had applied to them long before they came into the Union, they owned the continental shelf to ten and a half miles out.

The next case to come up involved the title of the Gulfside states. But though the Texas decision was closer (six to three)—since Texas maintained that having applied as an independent nation for admission to the Union she should have the right to hang onto what she owned before—the decisions of the Supreme Court, handed down on June 5, 1950, followed the line taken in the California decision.Δ

Thus production lags and the tug of war goes on.



It raged all through the Presidential campaign last year, with General Eisenhower supporting the claim of the individual seaboard states, and Governor Stevenson supporting the opposite position.

Just before he left office, President Truman issued an executive order setting aside all the offshore oil lands as a naval oil reserve.•

Bills have been introduced into the present Congress (1) favoring the claims of the individual seaboard states, (2) favoring the Federal Government. There is also an amendment providing that the revenue from leases be used to pay the costs of schooling and education throughout the United States. It would give to the Federal government 62½% of the revenue from oil leases within the three mile limit, with the other 37½% going to the respective coastal states. It would allot to the Federal government all of the revenue from such leases beyond the three mile limit. The plan would provide that this revenue should go to the support of schools, colleges, and other educational purposes in all the states. During the present emergency, the plan would provide that these funds be used to help pay the bills for national defense.

Hearings on these measures began this February.

Testifying on the "oil-for-education" amendment, Dr. John K. Norton, Head of the Department of Educational Administration at Columbia University, has declared: "The fact is that we do not have good education for everybody in this country today. If I were to make the best estimate I could—and this on the basis of over



thirty years of very careful study and intimate association with public education in this country—I think I would say that we have about a 50% educational system in the product it's turning out and in the support which it receives today."

Testifying on the main issue—whose oil?—Secretary of the Interior Douglas McKay has urged that Congress give title to the coastal states "out to their historic boundaries," with the Federal government to keep control from there to the far edge of the continental shelf. Attorney General Herbert Brownell has urged that Congress should grant the states "developmental" rights to the undersea lands which they claim but should not cede actual title. He foresees major complications, he said, involving further Supreme Court cases and also international law if title is ceded formally to the states. This would seem to suggest that all issues involving offshore oil will not be settled, no matter what immediate legislation is passed.

Proponents of the idea that the oil within the three mile limit and beyond belongs to all of the people also presented their views.

‡*In which Article is this Congressional power set forth?*

§*But "paramount rights and powers," said Justice Frankfurter, in a dissenting opinion, really amount to proprietary interest or ownership. "Proprietary interest (by the Federal Government) has not been remotely established," he contended, "except by sliding from absence of ownership by California to ownership by the United States."*

Δ*In dissent, Justice Frankfurter wrote: "The Court now decides that when Texas entered the Union she lost what she had and the United States acquired it . . . How that shift came to pass remains for me a puzzle." Are any of us puzzled, too? On what grounds?*

•*If he chooses to, President Eisenhower can countermand this executive order by issuing one of his own.*

WHOSE OIL?

Definitely, here's a very complicated problem solvable by no easy decision between obvious right and obvious wrong. All sorts of considerations, ethical as well as geographical and political, are involved. Before we try to make up our minds as to what should be done, we might weigh these words of a recent editorial‡ on the subject: "To reconcile the course of prudent statesmanship with the strong desires of the states whose interests are at stake is a task requiring wisdom on the part of both the legislative and executive branches. . . . A strong disposition to favor local rule, local responsibilities and local rights characterizes the Eisenhower administration; this represents, we believe, a healthy reaction to the overcentralization of the last twenty years. But it is a President's task to see the interest of the nation as well as the interest of the states. . . . When all sides in this case have been brought out by the studies of his advisers and by debates in Congress, it will be time enough for . . . President Eisenhower . . . to take a final stand."

Of course the big question is: "Whose oil?"

But it has so many sides to it that, for our discussion, we may wish to break it up into parts such as these suggested below:

Which arguments on historical grounds do we feel are stronger—Those favoring the seaboard states? Those favoring the entire nation? On what basis?

In considering this and other parts of the entire question, we should not lose sight of the fact that two geographic regions are involved: The lands beneath the waters within the three mile limit (Senate Joint Resolution 13, giving title to the states, would allow Texas, Louisiana, and Florida their claim to boundaries extending ten and a half miles out); the lands of the continental shelf.

How about the international problem?

How about the "oil-for-education" idea?

Would the production and conservation of offshore oil be more effectively carried out by private interests under federal control or by private interests under state control?

From the point of view of the good of the country, what do we favor? Why?

From the point of view of fairness, which position do we favor? Why?

If the seaboard states are given title, should inland states having public lands within them (such as national parks) be given rights to the mineral resources within those public lands, on the basis that "all states should be treated alike"? **Such an amendment is being proposed.**

Can, or can't, a bill giving seaboard states title to the oil beneath the three mile belt (ten and a half mile belt for Florida, Louisiana, and Texas) be reconciled with the Supreme Court decisions?

Do we find our arguments, on the basis of these various approaches, tend to make us inconsistent as to what we believe should be done? If so, what stand might we take about consistency?

Are we ready for the question? "Whose oil?"

‡*New York Herald Tribune, March 11, 1953.*

Next Discussion Guide: Immigration—Whom shall we Welcome to our Shores?

Selden, Gilbert

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On the contrary, Ed, my biographer is completely fascinated by our correspomdence and I am sure yours will also be in good time.

Anni

Seldes, Gilbert

August 24, 1957

Dear Gilbert:

If you desire my abrasive voice on tape reading certain excerpts from the Brandeis effort (I notice you call it an address, you old snob) I shall be delighted to do it.

If you can find a passage or two that will parse, I shall try to utter the words.

Incidentally, I am told my my sentiments were not unanimously applauded in the television industry, but what care I.

I am just back from a fishing trip with Casey across the country and not even network precedent is of any help while wrestling with a muskie or a salmon.

As ever yours,

Mr. Gilbert Seldes
Truro, Massachusetts

fe

(Dictated but not signed by Mr. Murrow)

Truro Masss
5 July

Dear Ed:

Clinton was entirely admirable and the judges could do no other. All my associatipns with you are pleasurable.

About the editorial : I didn't write it. I wrote one of my regular department pieces emphasizing the point Meany brought out--that TV is felt to be so infinitly more persuasive than radio.

My copy got to the editors just as I got to Mass Gen'l Hosp to have a diverticulum removed from my esophagus! (Mighty interesting, too, and I'm all the better for it.)

Pete Ritner of SR phoned me, said they wanted to run it as an editorial, with some changes--and as I couldnt hope to discuss the changes with them from under a blanket of anaesthesia, I gave them carte blanche. Actually Ritner wrote most of the piece and I've sent on to him your letter to me.

NOW, dear colleague, I have a request to make. Would you, some day when near a tape recorder, read into it certain passages of your Brandeis address and give me the tape?

I have prepared a manual for discussion of the Mass Media for The Fund for Adult Education. I am trying to get a few people to record interesting ideas or basic principles. Frank Stanton has agreed to let me interview him so as to present to the discutants a straight broadcasting point of view. Arthur Schelsinger, jr., is going to record a couple of paragraphs similar in nature to your talk. (He said we're coming to such a point ofconformity even among excepional people that soon we'll have the bland leading the bland.)

I have the text of your speech and if you'll undertake to do this, any timewithin the next four months or so, I'll mark the passages I want.

Benedictions (whchh obviously means blessed speech) to you.

Gilbert

Gilbert Seldes

Seldes, Gilbert

June 28, 1957

Dear Gilbert:

I say you my thanks for your very gracious letter.

I must tell you that you wrote the most sensible words I have seen on the subject of the Khrushchev interview and to quote Carl Sandburg, "What's wrong with the country ain't you."

As ever yours,

Mr. Gilbert Seldes
125 East 57 Street
New York, New York

fc

(Dictated but not signed by Mr. Murrow)

Truro
Mass
7 June

Dear Ed:

I'm sorry not to be present at the awarding. At this moment--the moment you get this--I shall be getting out of Mass Gen'l Hospital after a bit of unimportant surgery.

I want you to know--as you might have guessed--that the award to you not only had my enthusiastic vote, but gives me a special satisfaction. I think all of the judges felt that while they singled out one program, they were testifying to their admiration for the many exceptional things you have done, for being (if I may quote myself) the conscience of the industry.

Best wishes to you always.

Yours

Gilbert

Gilbert Seldes

~~Seldes~~
Seldes, Gilbert

March 5, 1958

Dear Gilbert:

I am distressed that you are aggrieved. My only suggestion is that if you do not desire a candid answer, then do not pose questions in what you choose to call "a semi-public place."

I suggest we terminate this correspondence since I doubt that it will be of any major interest to historians and suspect that it reflects no considerable credit upon either of us.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Gilbert Seldes
127 East 57 Street
New York, New York

mcc

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NYC 22
Mar 1

Dear Ed:

For the record:

When I wrote you yesterday, I did not have the text of the paragraph which offended you in front of me and based my answer on the quote from it contained in the letter written to me by your colleagues.

I have looked at the text. The theme is stated in the first line, the operative word is "formula." That is what I am writing about. I did not think it necessary to repeat the word later.

I suggest to you that if I criticized the isolation booth on a quiz show I would not be implying motives to the producer.

Also I remind you that my request for a recording was made in connection with an enterprise of the Fund for Adult Education. It would have been possible for you to send the tape directly to the Fund and thereby prevent me from making any use of it whatever.

Because I had criticized the formula of your program, you said in a semi-public place, in front of a group of people including men with whom I work and with whom I couldn't work if my integrity was in doubt, that you couldn't be sure what use I would make of your recording. My own feeling--that this was said in jest--was not shared by them. Your implication was that I was dishonorable.

It seems to me that, between us, I have the better right to be aggrieved.

Everything essential I said about your program repeated what I had said in The Public Arts. After that book, dedicated in part to yourself, was published, you said to me that it made you re-examine your own work. Your words were, in effect, "I have to get up from behind my desk and go round and look at the person who's been sitting there." It was the most flattering thing ever said to me about my work --but more than that, it seemed to me to indicate something rather great about you. Something I persist in thinking you possess.

Faithfully yours,

Gilbert

Edward R. Murrow, Esq.

Gilbert Seldes

125e57
nyc 22
feb 26

Dear Mr Zousmer
Dear Mr Aaron

It's nice of you to attribute my remarks about Person to Person to a temporary state of being out of sorts. But the brief note you read in The Saturday Review only repeated what I had written in The Public Arts--a book dedicated in part to Edward R. Murrow.

I'm sorry that your letter didn't reach me a little earlier, but there are people on your side and one of the most effective of them has written a letter of reproof to SR which is being printed with my reply in the issue out next Tuesday.

It would be useless for me to recapitulate here the argument I make there. One point, scantily made in print, I can make to you : of course I didn't mean that you tried--or could--reduce the whole of your roster to nonentities. But I have to stick by my own experience : I've never seen one person on the program (except Krishna Menon) who came off as an impressive or interesting human being and (this is in the reply) every guest I've myself known has been from 25 to 50% less of a human being, a total person, than I've known him or her to be.

I think the drive and emphasis of your program tends to make people trivial. I do not think that you two and Ed have a low concept of humanity, but that you've let your program get out of hand--or possibly that the formula and the mechanics are wrong.

And you will not, never, nohow, shame me out of saying so. Morris Ernst, the defender whose letter is being printed, implies that I'm not a good critic. I am a good critic.

Faithfully yours,

Gilbert Seldes

Re-reading your letter I am troubled by your reference to "a speaking acquaintance with only one member" of your staff. The only man I know on P-tp-P is Ed and if you like I'll show signed letters from him indicating something more than a speaking acquaintance.

gs

Seldes.

125e57
nyc 22
feb 27

Dear Ed:

I was of course aware of an undertone of displeasure in our brief conversation at the Century Club yesterday but the one thing I felt sure was not seriously meant was the imputation that I would make any use, beyond the one I described to you, of the recording I had asked you to make. I still can't believe it although you have put it in writing.

And I have to take this in a context you do not yet know--the attack I've been forced to make on Person to Person in reply to Morris Ernst's letter--which will appear in the next issue of The Saturday Review.

It is not agreeable to me to dislike anything you do because, as you know, I have a superlative opinion of the best things you do. As I note in the new SR piece I've called you the conscience of the industry. But I have my own professional conscience and must say what I believe. I believe P-to-P is not only a bad program, but one which lowers the standards for others--precisely because <u>you</u> are doing it.

I do not find any attribution of motives in the brief paragraph I wrote. I find a judgment on the effect of the program and a judgment on the concepts behind it. The only motives I can think of in connection with any TV program which some people might consider unworthy are the desire to be popular and the desire to make money. I approve of both of these. I do not approve of all the methods by which these ends are achieved. It is the degree of intelligence behind the program I challenge and, as I wrote to your colleagues, I think you have been betrayed by your mechanisms.

You have yourself, in conversation with me, contrasted the seriousness of See it Now with the lightness of P-to-P. In your interview with Pete Martin you indicated that other people--you mentioned your wife--once had a low opinion of the program. They have changed their minds, I have not. I do not think this goes beyond the bounds of legitimate criticism.

I am profoundly disturbed by your imputation that I would act dishonorably in regard to you. Even assuming that I have been intemperate, I have given you no cause to think so. And nothing you do or don't do will alter my judgment that you are one of a tiny handful of people who can, and do, bring honor to your profession.

Faithfully yours,

Gilbert

Gilbert Seldes

Edward R. Murrow, Esq.

February 25, 1958

Personal

Dear Gilbert:

I would prefer not to do the recording you request.

Never have I raised my voice in public about any criticism of programs with which I am connected. I am not now about to do so. However, I am obliged to tell you privately that in your piece on PERSON TO PERSON you attributed motives to my colleagues and myself that went far beyond the bounds of legitimate criticism.

Your language was so intemperate that I cannot be sure what use you would make of any recording I might produce.

Sincerely,

Mr. Gilbert Seldes
125 East 57 Street
New York 22, New York

fc

30 January 1958

Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

Dear Ed:

I am taking out after you again and before my totally ill-informed and uncalled for attack on you appears in print I think I better remind you that you promised to record for me some excerpts from your talk at Brandeis. I am enclosing the text with those pages marked which I would most like to have in your own voice.

This would be preceded by one of two statements, the choice being yours. One, I would say that the following is a recording made by the most thoughtful of all broadcasters expressing his misgivings about some of the present trends in the business--with a few additional * uncomplimentary remarks about yourself and identification of the occasion when the remarks were originally made, and, two, you could do this yourself saying what is perfectly true "This is Edward R. Murrow" and proceding to say that I had asked you to record a portion of your remarks, etc.

I figure that somewhere around C.B.S. the facilities for recording could be made available to you. You will be in good company because Frank Stanton has also agreed to put something on tape for me. In case you have forgotten, the recording will be used at sessions of discussion groups under the auspices of the Fund for Adult Education.

I was glad to see that your Marian Anderson program was so well received because I thought it was as absorbing as it was important.

Faithfully yours,

Gilbert Seldes

125 E. 57 St.
New York City 22

* a secretarial error

heard the remark: "He's the one who really started me reading", or, "He taught me to doubt", or "That's the one who really stretched my horizon". I can only add that my own small part in this operation has given me more satisfaction than anything I have ever done.

As I understand it, this Award that I am to receive is in the general area of the Humanities. In radio and television circles that's a pretty high-brow term. And yet the mass media must be concerned with it. It was Joseph Wood Krutch who said: "The humanities as opposed to the sciences are concerned with whatever is important to man but cannot be measured and is not susceptible to valid experiment." So radio and television must concern themselves with the Humanities, unless they chose to limit themselves to the function of entertainment. Television is growing so fast that those in charge of it have hardly time to administer it well, let alone to think of its place in civilization. If these instruments are to survive, they must strengthen and affirm the values that are the essence of our civilization. This being true, it is not enough to entertain the greatest numbers; there also must be full appreciation of our historic heritage, wise understanding of our institutions and traditions, familiarity with our classics in literature and the arts, and persistent attention to our ethical principles. I am well aware that the bulk of the money that pays for television and radio comes from a relatively small number of corporations. Hence the thinking of the executives in these corporations will have a profound influence on what happens in television and radio. And that is saying that they will greatly influence and could possibly decide the course of our civilization. And it is insisting that they cannot abdicate this responsibility by assigning it to an advertising agency.

We now know that our civilization can be snuffed out overnight. We know that while we ourselves did not create it, we ourselves can lose it. It is committed to us. We also know that we can save ourselves from nuclear destruction by "buying" a different civilization, one that does not include our

values of freedom, or cherish like ours the dignity of the individual. We know we are not making this bargain. We value our civilization. So we begin to know that we must value it if we are not to lose it. But if we are going to survive as a nation and a civilization we must do so consciously. This means that the mass media must pay more attention to the humanities. The Humanist is one who cares, and is preoccupied with what is worth caring about. Another characteristic of the humanist is that he is preoccupied with the mystery of personality. People for him are always persons, and in these days that often makes him lonely. Preoccupation with science turns persons into people - a statistic on a chart - tendencies and "characteristics symbolized by curves neatly drawn on graphs." The Humanist is concerned not with manipulation but with understanding. He is interested not only in events but in character.

All too often in radio and television audiences are conceived and treated as people, not as persons. Quantitative response is consequently made the measure of quality. There is a willingness, and indeed eagerness to answer the questions, What? and How? But not enough attention is paid to the Why?

T.S. Eliot said: "Teach us to care and not to care. Teach us to sit still." It might be helpful if those who control television and radio would sit still for a bit and attempt to discover what it is they care about. They have great belief in the power and future of their instruments. But all true belief is rooted in doubt, and there is not enough doubt in high places in the field of mass communications. There is a disposition to take us for <u>what</u> we are, and that in turn is likely to keep us <u>where</u> we are. If these devices are to be used in an effort to entertain all of the people all of the time, then we have come perilously close to discovering the real opiate of the people. If in dealing with events we concentrate on what and how, and ignore the why, then we are not really searching for anything.

Our commercial television and radio systems appear to be the alternative to state-operated and financed communications. By and large we have freer

speech, more information than any state-operated system. We have vastly more money to spend. The system is practically universal. It is, for the individual, both a privilege and a peril. And it is, for those who finance the system, and those who select the programs, a responsibility in the field of communications never before borne by such a small group of men and corporations. I think it was Bernard Shaw who said: "You must get what you want, or you will come to want what you get."

Albert Einstein Award
May 5, 1957

You have done me great honor, and as Shakespeare said: "Beggar that I am, I am even poor in thanks."

To have his name linked, however remotely, with that of Professor Einstein is honor enough for any reporter. "A hundred times every day I remind myself that my inner and outer life are based on the labors of other men, living and dead. And that I must exert myself in order to give in the same measure as I have received and am still receiving." Those words were Albert Einstein's, but he spoke, I think, for every worthy man and woman who deals with information in the mass media. To him a disinterested love for facts was not enough. He had to care about the bearing of those facts on hopes, fears and destiny. He realized that fear, bigotry and intolerance will not command the land unless most of us are silent accomplices.

By freedom he understood, "Social conditions of such a kind that the expression of opinions and assertions about general and particular matters of knowledge, will not involve dangers or serious disadvantages for him who expresses them. He believed in what might be called "a reign of reason" which most of us have carelessly enjoyed without buttressing its foundations.

Professor Einstein would, I think, have agree with Milton who said: "If the waters of truth flow not in a perpetual progression they sicken into a muddy pool of conformity and tradition." He was conscious of the truth of what Lord Acton wrote in 1877: "There are in our day many educated men who think it right to persecute." There are indeed many men in our day who so believe.

Perhaps you will permit me a personal digression in order to apologize for my lack of formal attire. It is not due to persecution or lack of a dinner jacket, but rather to the fact that I have but just come from a television program where such clothing would have been inappropriate. I am without embarrassment and seek refuge in another quotation from Professor Einstein:

Seldes, Gilbert
Sat Rev
Feb. 8.
Selde

equally as large. He should fly across northwest Nebraska over the Sand Hills region to see herds of beef on the hoof.

"Time permitting, he should stay long enough in Yellowstone Park to see its more spectacular offerings. He should stand among the Redwoods in California. He must go to the Top of the Mark in San Francisco; see both Bay bridges; and visit Golden Gate Park.

"If it could be arranged, he should eat a meal with the lumbermen in a lumber camp in the Pacific Northwest and fish for salmon at the mouth of Juan de Fuca Strait. He might land a king salmon.

"For pure scenic splendor, he might take the Coastal Drive down to Los Angeles, but the road is narrow and the way is long. He must see Los Angeles from the air, however, both at night and in the light of a clear day. He must be escorted through Paramount Studios or one as extensive; be present to watch Jack Benny's Sunday night show when Jack is broadcasting; meet a couple of the older M.C.'s such as Groucho Marx or Walter O'Keefe. Visit the Farmers' Market. Disneyland? No! He would be addle-headed.

"His return swing across the nation should include a breather at Hoover Dam; a look into Grand Canyon to reckon his own stature in the world. He could visit the Great Salt Lake and the endless salt flats surrounding it. He should have a couple of whiffs of the air in Arizona and New Mexico, if only briefly when the plane stops.

"He must see a ranch in Texas; a field of oil-wells; eat in New Orleans; note the moss-hung trees of the old Southland; and go on to Florida for deep-sea fishing and a gander at their hotels. For sheer novelty, he might sail back to New York on a banana boat, touching at ports along the way thus viewing the docks and the dockworkers.

"This is a quick trip. If he had more time, he could go through the Big Smokies, see the Ozarks in summer and the Minnesota woods in the autumn; and our Niagara Falls. He might visit Boston, Richmond, and Philadelphia, where our history began. He might have one look at Detroit and an automobile assembly line; one ride in an Edsel.

"His head would probably be swimming without having attended a football game or a race-track; but he would have a picture of a way of life and a few natural and man-made wonders to fill his soul for the rest of its natural time.

"This is sort of long. I am sorry."

I'm not. —F SUTTON.

TV AND RADIO

Notes from a Wheel-Chair

IT IS an established fact that people like me who fracture their ankles (on New Year's Eve it happened) see more television than anyone else. Some of the things they see are untrue.

• • A few weeks ago the formula of Edward R. Murrow's "Person to Person" was, as always, pulverizing some people into nonentities when the incredible happened. Urged—more exactly chuckled—into activity by Mr. Murrow, a man helped his wife into a fur coat and she went out to the terrace of their penthouse and began pointing out the sights. A droning noise was heard—I thought, at first, I was snoring. Then the woman said, "That's a plane up there" and Mr. Murrow replied, "I can hear it."

Now, it isn't sensible to suppose that the program arranged for the plane to be overhead at that moment, so we arrive at these conclusions:

1. That people on "Person to Person" are capable of independent observation and unplanned remarks.

2. That Mr. Murrow knows this.

Adding 1 and 2 together we come to

3. The reduction of individuals to nobodies on "Person to Person" is not inevitable. It is intentional, calculated, and indicates a low and contemptuous estimate of human values.

The Edward R. Murrow mentioned above is not to be confused with the man of the same name who is co-producer and star of "See It Now." One of them is an impostor.

• • Year after year "Omnibus" gets an award for being the best educational program on the air, and once at least Alistair Cooke expressed as much surprise as gratitude in his acceptance. I would say that it is an entertainment program using cultural materials and would say that, as it gives information and plays with ideas, it does educate. I would say this with greater assurance and happiness if "Omnibus" hadn't produced a whatnot publicized as a lighthearted report on suburbia which was wrong-headed in conception and disastrous in execution. Except for some archly presented introductions, nothing in the program was germane to the announced subject; and except for Bert Lahr's familiar, but immortal, answer to "What Do We Chop, When We Chop a Tree?" nothing was first class.

Like Mr. Murrow, the producers of "Omnibus" stand for intelligence and responsibility—responsibility toward the medium in which they work. Others have the God-given right to be second-rate. Not they.

• • A third responsible producing group is The Theatre Guild, which creates the U.S. Steel Program. I know nothing of the arrangements between the Guild and the actual sponsor of the show, but external evidence indicates that the kind of independence Murrow had when Alcoa sponsored "See It Now" is not given to the Guild. The programs have varied from good to indifferent. It is a pleasure to report on one that was excellent: "The Bromley Touch." It takes courage to tackle any *New Yorker* story by Edward Newhouse, and this one was peculiarly prickly. It was concerned with the cult of success and the milieu chosen was the dead center of the cult: the publicity racket.

• • In the same week "Playhouse 90" used another *New Yorker* story, Irwin Shaw's "The Eighty-Yard Run," which in a way reversed the theme. Here we had the adolescent hero who lived on his fame and then on his wife and was finally driven to live off himself, to do what he really wanted to do: be a football coach at his college. The whole thing was astonishingly consistent: nothing in it seemed true. I would say that for the wife of the perpetual boy-hero a love affair was a psychological necessity, but it was turned into nothing more than a dramatic device. I didn't believe a word of it, or in the reconciliation either. (I understand that the play did not faithfully follow the original story. I assume, then, that Mr. Shaw surrendered all his rights to the producers. He is in good company: Somerset Maugham and Ernest Hemingway do it, too.)

• • Some time ago I predicted that Hans Christian Andersen or the Brothers Grimm would win the Peabody Award for the best original stories of the year. If there was anything snooty in that idea, the utterly ravishing appearance of Claire Bloom in "Beauty and the Beast" makes me apologize for it and to put in nomination for special distinction the name of Joseph Schrank, who made the loving adaptation of the story.

—GILBERT SELDES

Seldes, Gilbert
(not included in
Griffin index)

March 28, 1952

Dear Gil:

My belated thanks for your note on the Christmas show. If these pieces have merit I am sure it's because I have succeeded in picking up some knowledge of the medium from kind friends, particularly you.

As ever yours,

Mr. Gilbert Seldes
125 East ~~57th Street~~
New York 22, New York

(Signed in Mr. Murrow's absence)

dm

125 East 57
NYC 22
Sunday

Dear Ed:

It gave me a sudden additiannal quantum of pleasure to remember that you had once lived in the room in which I have just seen your Christmas program.

And as you ended with the school to which my children went, some twenty years ago, with the pageant in which they took part, it was altogether a satisfactory day.

And apart from my personal feelings, what a beautiful and wise and generous and intelligent program it was! We're all grateful to you for it.

Always yours,

Gilbert

Gilbert Seldes

Ed

from ~~[illegible]~~ DA SELDES
Gilbert

(not included in Griffin Index)

Thanks, Ed, for trying to get the Omar Bradley...

Next time I quote you it will be inrregard to "the inch"--I enjoyed that broadcast very much...

Also for lack of time I haven't run part of your album on my show...may get it in next week...

Most of all I'd like your comment on the Atlantic piece and to talk to you as always...

GS

Practitioner as well as critic of popular entertainments, GILBERT SELDES *proclaimed himself their champion with the publication in 1924 of his trenchant book,* The Seven Lively Arts. *In the 1930's he wrote for the* Atlantic *a pair of prophetic articles on the errors of television, which led to his being appointed Director of Television Programs for the Columbia Broadcasting System. After considerable work in radio, and a brief spell in Hollywood, he is now working on a book dealing with those popular entertainments known as "mass media."*

HOW DENSE IS THE MASS?

by GILBERT SELDES

BOTH the movies and radio are losing their audiences. The process has been going on for a long time in the movies; it has just begun in radio. The immediate causes are different, but the fundamental reason is the same; and the same simple, drastic step will save both these useful servants of the public. I am not predicting immediate bankruptcy for either, but if it comes, I would trace it to a kind of intellectual bankruptcy in the past.

For ten years, at least, nearly everyone in the field of popular entertainment has been hypnotized by two words: "mass media." The producers have said in effect, "We are mass media, we must produce for the mass"; and the critics, conceding the point, have complained, "What you produce isn't much good, and haven't minorities some rights, too?" The sponsor cynically giving the people what they like and the intellectual, unable to break the sponsor's argument, have both been under the spell of an abstraction: for the mass doesn't exist. And now, when the entertainments concocted for the mass have demonstrated their weaknesses, we can examine the concept of the mass medium and provide, I think, a new approach, with a sounder commercial basis, to the problem of the audience.

"Mass medium" is, of course, used as a shorthand symbol for "any form of communication and entertainment intended for a very large number of people." It parallels mass production and consumption and has some of the same characteristics: repetitive gestures on the producing end and passive enjoyment for the consumer. A network executive once described the mass, negatively but graphically, when he said, "There's a lunatic fringe that doesn't listen to radio." We see the great central mass, a sort of heartland of solid citizens bounded by a glacial fringe, a polar icecap, of non-listening highbrows.

In the mind of the sponsor, the audience is a large pie and all the programs on the air at a given moment are trying to get bigger and bigger slices — because there is only one pie, and success depends on "the share of the total audience." If the slice is too small, the sponsor has to drop out of the contest; consequently, the only kind of program worth putting on is the kind that gets the big slice. On this commercial basis an entire philosophy has been erected, of which the first principle is: Radio ought *never* to serve any interest except that of the mass; every hour taken from this purpose deprives the majority of something to which they are entitled, in favor of an intellectual minority.

When women's clubs, educators, or New Deal bureaucrats criticize radio programs, the answer of the industry is usually a table of the many kinds of entertainment provided, the many hours of cultural broadcasts, the varied and different interests served: quizzes and grand operas, news and drama; hot music and classics — sometimes they omit daytime

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serials and horror stories for children. Radio's sweep of interest is, in fact, impressive when compared with the short tether of Hollywood, but the plea of "variety of interests" is unacceptable because, with a few exceptions, all these varied programs and interests are substantially of the same kind, appealing to the same people. Intellectually and emotionally, they lie within the same parallels of latitude, and the wide world of human interests outside this narrow zone is left untended. The major sponsored programs, the ones that give radio its essential character, all flourish in one climate.

The exceptions are illuminating. Under a variety of pressures, the broadcasters have been compelled to create and "sustain" programs they believed to be lacking in popular appeal. The wide open spaces between sponsored hours dismayed them; and since "no one was listening anyhow," this was a golden opportunity to show enthusiasm for "the public interest." All sorts of worthy cultural programs came to the air and many of them became good commercial properties, permanent elements in radio programing: extensive news coverage, such forums as "America's Town Meeting of the Air," and symphony orchestras.

In all of these, radio departed from the lump-mass concept of the audience. The somber analytical commentaries of Raymond Swing required attention differing in kind from passive listening to familiar songs; hearing the Jupiter Symphony produced an effect unlike that of a melodrama. The listeners to Swing and Mozart probably followed other programs, too, perhaps comedy or sport; they brought different responses to different programs and got different satisfactions from them. They proved, in fact, that our society is not a monolithic mass; it is, and has been from the start, pluralistic.

And just when the true concept of the pluralistic audience began to pay off in sponsorship, the networks abandoned it. They have themselves gone into the business of putting programs on the air for the declared purpose of sale to a sponsor. CBS, for instance, which gained prestige by sustaining the Philharmonic for ten years, now prides itself on the number of programs it creates and sells each year for commercial sponsorship. There is, of course, nothing reprehensible in this; the programs range from harmless to excellent; but they lie within the established zone of interest, as do the programs prepared by other networks for the same purpose.

The broadcasters' present nod toward the public interest is usually in the form of sporadic documentaries on thorny subjects like venereal disease and Communism. Produced in an awe-struck and portentous style, they make no bid for popularity, as if to say, "This is too good for the average man." Partly this defeatism goes back to the days when Norman Corwin led radio up a rhapsodic byway which did honor to both, but left the documentary so romantic that no sponsor wants to make an honest woman of her. Until the documentary is produced at regular hours it will not gather many listeners; the other non-sponsored programs, except for educational and religious periods, are specifically intended for the mass audience.

At this moment "the mass" is beginning to drift away. Surveys made for the radio industry show that the top-ranking programs drop half of their pulling power if there is a television set in the home; a reasonably good dramatic transmission can take away the greater part of a top comedian's audience; and nine out of ten set owners habitually choose whatever television brings them even if it is in conflict with their favorite radio program.

This is not radio losing its audience to itself; many television stations are not radio-owned and those run by newspapers will probably develop a kind of television which will have little to do with radio except for taking away sponsors. The television programs that attract audiences are hardly entertainment in radio's sense; if the present ratio of listening is kept up, television may take up the major part of the radio audience without developing any first-class entertainment of its own. It is hard to think of radio withering on the vine — but that is precisely what broadcasters, especially those without television stations, must think about. For the television programs that today take listeners away from the most expensive radio entertainment are third-rate local wrestling matches, variety shows of small charm and less talent, old Western movies, news events, a play, and then sports and more sports far into the night.

This is happening while television has little money to spend for talent and radio has much. When sponsors have to divide their appropriations between television and radio, when the quality of radio goes down and that of television goes up, the flight from sound-without-sight will be headlong. Then radio may ruefully remember that it might have created audiences which wouldn't have deserted so promptly to such an ignoble rival.

2

Before we consider what radio can do, let us see what has happened to the movies. In Hollywood the mass concept is enshrined in the words "Everybody goes to the movies" and on this premise Hollywood continued to build long after its own researchers had fished up the contrary truth: "Nearly everybody stops going to the movies." Even the great bankers who finance the movies were apparently as bemused by the concept of the mass audience as the producers were.

Every year more people went to the movies — or at least more money was taken in at the box office. No one bothered to ask whether the increased receipts represented higher prices or more tickets sold or in what proportion; no one asked whether any

increase in attendance corresponded to the over-all increase in population or had any relation to the fatter take-home pay of the American worker. The age-level was rising: were the movies holding their share of the mature or were they living on the increment of about a million boys and girls of movie age per year? Eventually some of these questions were asked — and the answers were ignored because the answers totally annihilated the fixed illusion of the mass audience. The inescapable fact about the motion picture audience is that 65 per cent of it is under the age of 30. The merciless tale of the statistics continues: beginning at the age of 19, people begin to fall out of the habit of going to the movies; they still go, but less often; they pick and choose more carefully, acting in fact as adults, and this process of going less and less to the movies is never reversed. Audience Research, Inc., has estimated that if all the people between the ages of 31 and 60 should go to the movies only once a week, the box office receipts after taxes would rise by 800 million dollars a year, and this does not count those between 19 and 30 who might be persuaded to go as frequently as they used to when they were younger. It has cost Hollywood a lot of money to kill off its own audience.

For when all allowances are made for new interests and altered economic status, the fact still remains that the movies have not provided the kind of entertainment that the average adult feels he must have. The people who stay away from the movies are not a lunatic fringe of intellectuals; they are the people who used to go regularly, they are average grownups no longer satisfied by the infantile myths of the movies. In their astounding miscalculation of the audience, studio executives not only recognized no difference between children and adults: they thought of maturity as a purely intellectual quality. Neither the movie-makers nor their bankers are peculiarly sensitive to the varieties of human experience; they keep thinking of the mass man and seem not to know that regardless of intellectual level the texture of a man's life is more intricately woven in the years when he is finding his place in the world, starting a family, going to war, buying a house. The same is true of a woman's life in that period.

Someone, an intellectual perhaps, accused the movies of being an escape mechanism. The movies were enchanted, they had a mission in life. It was decided that there is only one universal desire, to escape, and that escape is always in one direction. Like radio, but with far less justification, the movies spoke glowingly of their "variety": the Westerns, the comedies, the musicals, the mysteries; but the moment they touched new material they turned it into old, keeping it always in the mass zone of interest. So their dabblings in psychology came out as mystery-melodrama, all the biographical films were the story of Jack the Giant Killer, and their historical films could only be distinguished from the Westerns by the fact that "the hero signs his name with a feather."

The movie equivalent of radio's sustaining time is the B picture, but movie practice was different. No new ground was broken in the B's — no experiments to engage the interests of groups outside the regular movie audience or to give that audience greater variety. Variation came when a studio rewarded a big money-maker by letting him make a picture without too much interference from the front office. Pictures like *The Informer*, *The Lost Weekend*, *Treasure of Sierra Madre*, and in recent years half a dozen exceptional British films proved that pictures satisfying to the adult mind are not necessarily the highroad to bankruptcy.

But audiences are not created by exceptions; they are created by people getting, with some regularity, what they want. The studio managers, aware that something was going wrong, took a characteristic step: they pre-tested their pictures, asking sample audiences to decide, in advance of production, between a happy and a tragic ending. The vote was in favor of the happy ending and the producers sat back and said, "See!" because high-brow critics had always implied that the tragic ending, as a sign of maturity, would not be offensive to a large section of the audience. The happy endings were continued and the audiences continued to dwindle, steadily, by age brackets. When the 75-million-dollar income from Britain was suddenly cut off, the industry went into an unmanly fit of protestation and scolding and threats. No one mentioned the fact that by concentrating on their imaginary mass audience, the movies had lost a net income four times as great in the United States alone.

3

WHAT we imagine, we create. Our great entertainment industries are creating before our eyes a cultural *proletariat:* the intellectually disinherited, the emotionally homeless, whose function is only to answer the telephone and say what program they are listening to. Mass media are not the only forces working toward that end, but they are the most powerful. Every imitative sterile picture or program, however "harmless," enlarges the passive audience, brushes more and more stragglers into the central robot mass, and so "justifies" the next series. Movies and radio entrench themselves by creating the kind of audience they want, the audience which does not grow, makes no demands, is dumbly grateful — the ideal audience in a totalitarian nightmare.

If this process is to be stopped in time, our entertainments will have to accept the natural alternative to their concept of the mass audience. I have already suggested what this alternative is: we are a pluralistic society. Our entire history has made us

so. We are not only a nation of many nations: we have as many climates as all of continental Europe, we are an economic and intellectual composite; our laws refuse the minority no right except the right to rule the majority; our minorities are many and so vigorous that it takes a world war to give us even the appearance of unity; we pioneer and go off center as often as we dig in; we are unruly and act badly when we are regimented.

Opposed to the mass picture of an enormous central group with minority fringes of people who are totally unlike the mass, the pluralistic picture is this: many large groups, many small ones, and individuals belonging to several major and several minor groups at the same time, so that the people in any minority group are in many vital ways the same as the people in the majority groups. We all live simultaneously in a dozen worlds and the happy ones are those whose worlds are integrated and harmonious. The economist, the psychologist, the vocational guide, the intelligence-tester, and a dozen other people can find categories into which we fit, but we move in and out of large and small groups freely so long as we do not become part of a mass, so long as we live in a free society which recognizes our attributes as human beings.

The mass-and-minority concept whittles the individual down to size, so that he can be fitted into one of half a dozen compartments. In practice this leads to the principle of "the ruling passion" and ends, in radio, with the abstraction of the Laughing Man. Networks cancel news broadcasts and juggle their programs around to get "three solid hours of laughs," convinced that the Laughing Man will instantly turn to another station if you try to touch any other of his interests or concerns. It is known that he will laugh at the same thing at the same hour every week, that he will laugh at anything if he is told to laugh, and there is some proof, not yet conclusive, that he will laugh just as loudly at nothing at all. Corresponding to him is the Weeping Woman of the daytime serials. In between the day and night hours, a little time is found for the Shrieking Child. Television is developing its own abstraction ("Hiya, Sportlover!") and in the movies, of course, everything is lumped into the one universal abstraction of People Escaping.

A special appreciative word should be said for the program type which in 1948 demonstrated the workings of the mass concept so perfectly that even the National Association of Broadcasters, usually so indulgent to success on the air, got frightened — the big "giveaway," the program that asks nothing of you except that you answer the phone for a chance at a fortune. For the long pull it didn't seem good to the NAB that Fred Allen should lose his audience to *Stop the Music!* As entertainment this program was a void; its music was mangled, there was no comedy, the handling of the contestants was awkward. People listened for a chance at the money and to enjoy the pains and pleasures of other people's chances. The audience was not only paid for listening, it was paid to surrender all its individual qualities, all its interests, even its radio-induced habit of laughter; it was paid to stop asking for entertainment on the air. The giveaway has shown us how far in the creation of mass man radio can go.

The purpose of entertainment is to make people listen to the commercial; when entertainment has reduced the listener to a passive, noncritical state, the announcer moves in with his clubs or machine guns or soothing syrup and finishes the job. No matter what is said about program content, the commercial is sacred — it's the sponsor's private property. (I recall a network executive on the verge of hysterics because there was no way to stop the maddening reiteration of "Lucky Strike Green has gone to war.")

So it is peculiarly appropriate that a commercial announcement should demonstrate, beyond all question, the fallacy of the mass concept. Man-in-the-mass must be hammered and howled at; the name of the product must be repeated ten times, and spelled out, and surrounded by adjectives in triplicate; there is no room for candor or simple communication when you come to sell the product to mass man.

For the past two years a program has been on the air which carries the following identification: "The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company presents . . ." The people who hear this program remember it, they connect the program with the product, they say they are influenced *by the program* to buy the product, not by the commercial, because there is none; and the audience response is from 20 to 50 per cent better than it is for programs using the technique of repetition. The program is *The Greatest Story Ever Told*, a scrupulous presentation of Christ's teachings; it impresses people by its content and method and its difference from other programs. It sells tires without ever praising a tire or asking the listener to buy one.

Reason totters at the suspicion that the sponsor may be wrong about the audience. That is sheer heresy.

4

WITHIN the range of their dominant ideas, both the movies and radio have made money and produced admirable entertainments. Obviously I am not preparing a balance sheet of the good and the bad and I am omitting the profoundly important question of the communications function of these media. I am concerned here only with one major explanation of the weakness and inadequacy which critical people too hastily ascribe to "commercialism." To make my own position perfectly clear, I would add that I think the standard product of radio and the movies is generally underrated by intellectual critics; and, on the other hand, no roster

of exceptions can excuse what is socially deplorable in the average product. I believe that the error of thinking which produces an enormous quantity of insipid works can be corrected within the framework of ordinary profit-making, and that when this correction has been made, audiences can be created to take the place of those that are deserting; I believe that with a proper concept of the audience new areas will be open to inventiveness and enterprise; and finally that we dare not wait too long for the machinery which is creating mass men to reverse itself.

The hope of profit is most important because the sponsors can take prompt and effective steps to vary the program structure of radio and no one but the managers can do anything about the movies. There isn't actually time for experiments from the outside; and outsiders might try to turn radio and the movies into high-brow art which they should never be. What needs to be done in the movies is relatively simple: make pictures for grownups. This does not mean, as Hollywood pretends, grim, slow-paced European films. The mature mind takes satisfaction in comedy, too, and in farce. The one thing adults require is as easy to recognize and as hard to define as the smile of a friend. It is the sense that something real is happening — as real as *Alice in Wonderland* or *Show Boat* or *Hamlet;* it is also the sense that something real is being said about human beings — as the Marx brothers say it in *A Night at the Opera* or Robinson Jeffers in *Medea.*

In radio, the brief experience with television while alarming is not decisive; its lesson is, however, reinforced by radio's earlier figures: there has always been a large non-listening group. About half of the women who listen to radio do not care for daytime serials; there are vast numbers of both men and women who listen for brief periods, selectively, without the radio habit; there are even off nights, when the total listening audience is known to be small. Everything indicates the existence of potential audiences, not yet touched; and the early experience of radio, with its sustaining programs, suggests that these non-listeners are waiting only to be interested. They are, moreover, not the people who will be seduced away from radio by the meager fare television is now providing.

For nearly a generation sponsors have been in competition for the mass audience, badgering the same people with the same kind of commercials, selling the same goods. Now they see that audience drifting away and can stop to think that 20 per cent of an audience that doesn't listen habitually might be far more profitable than a dwindling 10 per cent of the audience that does.

As for material, every program director in the business has a dozen projects he cannot get on the air so long as he has to aim for a section of the mass audience. Many of these are variations in the documentary style and some are imitations of the Third Program of the BBC, which is intentionally high-brow. There is little place in American commercial radio for programs which deliberately invite the audience not to listen, nor would they be particularly useful in solving the present problem, which is to create multiple, overlapping audiences of considerable dimensions. For this sponsors and broadcasters must coöperate.

We can ask the sponsors to end the constant iteration of one joke per comedian per year; to vary the range and improve the technique of dramatic programs; to restore the candor and simplicity of audience participation; to revamp the entire racket of guest appearance; to begin the slow process of salvaging what's good in the daytime serial; and, most important, to bring the accent of truth into the speech of radio. The networks which have recently threatened to throw out certain sponsored programs if their ratings failed to improve should surely demand a little improvement in quality also. There is no proof that this would reduce the appeal of a program.

For the networks, the problem is complex. If they want to improve the structure of the audience, they can do it by creating programs for sponsors which will attract new audiences, and programs for new audiences which, after a longer interval, will attract sponsors. There is little point in the networks looking for new ways to attract the audience the sponsor already has. That audience should have a chance to hear programs intellectually and emotionally more varied than those now offered; and such programs cannot be tried out if the objective is immediate sale to a sponsor. Nor can they make their way if they are presented only on special occasions, for prestige; they have to be offered regularly, at attractive hours, over a fairly long period of time, to find their audience.

It is inevitable that the documentary will be incorporated into the commercial program structure, and here the duty of the network is plain: to develop and set standards for this form, broadening the audience that cares for it, so that it will not be debauched when a sponsor takes it over. Another job for pioneers is to develop new ways of handling fiction, since radio drama has sunk into formulas and sound-effects. Still another is to bring confidently to the listener the materials now hidden in educational programs.

In these and dozens of other ways portions of the mass will be attracted to new things; the mass will break up and reassemble into many shifting groups; it will no longer be a mass. And this is of course the most important result of all. The fragmentation of the mass can only be accomplished by radio and the movies; if they do it, they will not only save themselves but all of us as well. For where there is no mass, there is no danger of a master.

Photographs of the U.S.S. Pennsylvania *in a recent issue of the* Naval Institute Proceedings *carried the caption that this grand old veteran of the seas "survived both atom bomb tests at Bikini and finally went down off Kwajalein more from the after effects of war damage at Okinawa than from atom bomb damage."* DAVID BRADLEY, M.D., *one of the team of medicos who were sent to Bikini "to see that no one got hurt," wrote down in his Log testimony of a very different sort, for he and his fellow scientists detected with their Geiger counters that not only the warships at Bikini but the fish in the atoll, the oil flecks washed ashore, even the water itself, were contaminated with radioactivity as a direct result of the underwater bomb. How deadly was this contamination will be seen in the pages that follow. This is the second of three articles drawn from Dr. Bradley's forthcoming book.*

NO PLACE TO HIDE

Did Any Ships "Survive" Bikini's Underwater Bomb?

by DAVID BRADLEY, M.D.

1

TUESDAY, *July* 2. — Rumors from the big fleet indicate a general disappointment over the bomb. The lagoon is still full of ships, and most of them have been safely boarded. Few have been sunk and not many are seriously damaged. Doubtless many people who have been fed on the current fantasies regarding the bomb will find Test Able something akin to K rations. Anything short of a second Krakatao would have been a letdown.

Actually, of course, what has happened is about what one would expect from an air-burst of the 1946 Model atomic bomb. The damage done to the ships should be largely to the superstructure, not to the vital parts. The radioactivity now present on board is probably mainly that induced in the metal by the burst of neutrons at the moment of explosion. Neutrons, like any other projectiles, have a limited range — about 2000 yards in air, which is considerably less than the area covered by the target fleet.

It would appear that at least for the time being we have escaped from the real threat of atomic weapons: the lingering poison of radioactivity. The great bulk of highly dangerous fission products was carried aloft into the stratosphere, where it can be diluted to the point of insignificance in its slow fall-out. In this sense, therefore, Test Able is very similar to the Hiroshima-Nagasaki shots. The bulk of the damage will be from the blast wave, and probably only those experimental animals exposed directly to the neutrons and gamma rays at the moment of explosion will show the effects of "Atom Bomb Disease."

WEDNESDAY, *July* 3. — Back to Bikini and the *Haven*. Able plus Two — already the lagoon is packed with shipping, as though where the bomb had struck down one ship two had risen in its place. The shore, the water, and most of the ships are now considered to be radiologically safe. Having got off so lightly on Test Able, everyone seems to be in a festive mood. The beaches and bars were packed all afternoon; the poker games, enshrouded in a penumbra of smoke and profanity, have settled down for the night, and even the worst of pictures in Hollywood's dismal repertoire is acclaimed.

THURSDAY, *July* 4. — I had a lucky assignment today, that of accompanying a group of Navy photographers while they took pictures of the entire target fleet. We went aboard no ships but had a chance to examine at close hand the superficial damage obvious on deck.

One sees plenty of evidence of the fury of that blast wave. The light carrier *Independence* is an impressive edifice of junk: its flight deck exploded, its hangar deck caved in, and all the complicated gadgetry of gun mounts, gangways, and electronic gear blown away or left dangling overside in fantastic disarray. The ancient battleship *Arkansas*, lacking most of its superstructure aft of the bridge, looks well on the way to being modernized. It wouldn't take more than an ordinary bomb to turn her into a carrier. Similarly, the cruisers *Pensacola* and *Salt Lake City* have their superstructures torn loose and wrenched half overside. The decks of these ships are a shambles. Overturned airplanes, wrecked lifeboats, and all sorts of debris are strewn

AA

I feel that I am up against the deep insoluble mysteries of life--like why does a studio audience laugh. The other day I heard the following--

"and in came Patrick Mulvaney--the Hungarian fella--"

and there followed a roar of Gragntuan laughter. It mademe feel sad, somehow until I remembered a story about a comedian, I think it was Bob Hope, who was talking to a man in the studio audience and remarked that this man looked like someone named George Barber--at which the entire audience shrieked with laughter--although no one except a pal of Hope's had any idea who George Barber was. Obviously studio audiences will laugh at anything. But its still news that they'll laugh at nothing.

Another mystery is why radio interviews all sound so phony. You all know the type where the MC does all the talking. He says, "You're Mr. Whooziz and you live in Burlington isn't that right and you are the man whose four children all want to grow up to be delinquents and you're seventy-six years old, is that true?" And Mr.Whoosiz says, after a pause for self-identification, "Er-uh- I guess so."

At least that way you get the facts.

The other type is the "gotta-keep-em-talking" type. From my notes I find that a few weeks ago a pioneer American aviator--was it Glenn Martin?--was being interviewed and the MC asked him,"The plane you're flying now is a lot different from the one you flew thirty years ago, isn't it?"

He said "Yes."

It gets them all. Edward R. Murrow --a supremely fine craftsman at his job, in addition to being a man able to walk with kings and statesmen, had one of the Boswell sisters on his show the other day, to talk about raising turkeys. It was the most reluctant, fumbling talk between two people that you can imagine--it positivly had Ed Murrow doing that little embarrassed giggle that is the fatal mark of insincerity.

(BB)

I used tothink that radio interviews were bad bec ause they were rehearsedin advance and then the people tried to pretend they were spontaneous. Now I'm not so sure. I've heard ad lib interviews that sounded just as spurious as the rehearsed ones.

And the final mystery is why a song called 160 Acres in the Valley is going to be popular--which I am sure it will be. It's one of those yearning and foolish sentimentalities about the simple life that are guaranteed to make you sick if youthink about them. But you won't.

I first heard this song, bythe way, on Bob Crosby's program- not Bing's--and the Andrews sister who had to ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ introduce it was apparently so nauseated by what she was given to read that she suddenly said, "Honestly I didn't write this." She has my symapthy.

Corrected Copy

The Lively Arts Gilbert Seldes WNEW Feb 13 10 PM

For Ed Murrow

Pages 1-3

ANNCR:

In the next fifteen minutes Gilbert Seldes will make his weekly tour of The Lively Arts... correcting the great American handshake with some peculiarities in the newsreels...looking into minor matters as well... but chiefly reporting on the planting of a delayed action bombshell under the American movie industry. What is that bombshell, Gilbert?

CLOSING

ANNCR:

The tour of The Lively Arts will continue a week from now and, as usual, Gilbert Seldes will observe and report to you whatever is fresh and important or amusing and exciting in the field of entertainment... in the theatre or the movies, in radio or comic strips... in night clubs or popular song... sooner or later you will get to all of them in The Lively Arts...with Gilbert Seldes...at ten o'clock on Sundays... This is station WNEW...

The Lively Arts Gilbert Seldes WNEW 10 PM Feb 13

I'll tell you about that in a moment, Dick. First I have to correct a mistake I made last Sunday.

Maybe you remember I was talking about the new rules announced by the Committee on un-American Activities. Under these rules, the only reporters admitted to hearings would be newspaper men, armed with pencil and paper. No microphones, no newsreel cameras, no television... not even flashlight bulbs. No new inventions - only pencil and paper.

And I said that this new ruling, this limitation on the American press in the widest sense of the word, was not popular with radio and television and newspapermen.

My friend Edward R. Murrow, who has been leading a brilliant attack on the rule, has pointed out to me the slip of the tongue I made. I meant to say that newsreel men objected - I didn't know how newspapers felt about it.

The reason Ed Murrow took the trouble to correct me is interesting. He went into the matter last Tuesday when he pointed out that this infringement on a basic American liberty was either passed by as unimportant or was actually praised by newspapers. In other words, which he didn't use, newspapers seem to be willing to sacrifice a lot of the freedom of the press in order to get rid of their more rapid and effective rivals. Several papers were gratified and the Christian Science Monitor looked ahead, warning its readers that "Americans are likely to hear that the barring of any media of public information violates freedom of speech and of the press." As if the idea is too silly for words.

And Mr Murrow went on sarcastically to note that :

"Here in New York...the Times and the Herald Tribune made no editorial comment, although their editorials did deal with such subjects

1-45

as movie stars' earrings, winter driving, a wise woodchuck...fragrance in February...and other matters that are presumably engaging the attention of metropolitan newspaper readers."

Those are Mr Murrow's words. They indicate that the press in general is not exactly watchful of its own liberties.

~~Actually,~~ Mr Murrow also reported that the head of the committee has now grave doubts about the ruling and that ~~the new media of communication~~ radio and the others may ~~come~~ be back ~~to~~ at the hearings. ~~While corrective measures will be taken in the proceedings of the committee itself~~ Presumably the committee will take other steps to see that publicity is not abused.

~~And it~~ This might be a good opportunity for newsreels and radio and television to look into their own methods and see whether they, too, need to exercise new restraints, not applied ~~fmr~~ from outside, but from within. ~~To~~ They, too, can make sure that nothing they do will prejudice the case against any man. The right of the press is sacred and the right of the ~~ind~~ individual so less. As I said last week, these two rights seem to conflict, and no slogan, no appeal to abstractions is going to solve the difficulty.

Since I have mentioned newsreels, maybe I can share with you some doubts I have had about the way they dress up the news. When a newsreel camera is placed in a committee room and takes whatever happens there, you get the actuality--some fragment of the truth is left with you after the cutting and editing is done. ~~The only xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx opportunity for~~ Of course it is possible to falsifying the record comes when one side of a story is given full treatment and the other is either omitted or scantily delivered. And, of course, the spoken commentary writer-in can slant the picture in any direction.

On the whole newsreels seem to me to reflect the prejudices of the average man--but the prejudices of the average man are often created by

3-05

what he reads and what he sees and hears.

There is another kind of faking which is less important, because it does not deal with politics--only with human beings. It comes when the newsreel man get people to repeat something they missed--and this can be the way a woman fainted when she draw a ticket sweepstakes, or it may be--it actually has been--the signing of an important document by the President of the United States. Everyone is happy to do it over again for the cameras--and it's always a little phoney.

You can tell a phoney by two things. When the people in the picture keep looking a little sideways--they're wondering about the camera--that's one.

The other is the handshake.

Someone ought to make a study of the great American handshake. It's really an American institution; Englishmen are always surprised by the way we constantly shake hands--as if we had to reassure one another all the time that we're not carrying concealed weapons.

At least in the old days one man would face another, look into his eyes, and shake his hand. It may have been unnecessary, but it was honest.

Nowadays people shake hands sideways. Look at news photographs in the papers, look at the newsreels, and recently at television and you'll see that people shake hands on the bias; you'll see two people sitting side by side, their right hands crossing over for a handshake, not looking at each other because their eyes are fixed resolutely on the camera.

Sometimes a clever guy can jockey his opponent out of position so that he gets the full face and the other only a miserable profile. That counts ten for him. But in general the cameramen see to it that when people shake hands it looks as human as dummies in a department store window. And as intelligent.

In itself this is an irritating trifle, but it's part of an irritating big thing--

5-45

and that is the constant flow of faking in a hundred different places, high and low, the regular exploitation of little frauds and falsehoods conditioning us not to expect the truth, not to look for it, not to know it when we see it.

There was an advertiser out on the West Coast who had a lot of fun with that sort of faking. His radio commercials were the most honest in the world. He said : We sell more ~~furlined bontops~~ fur in California than anywhere else in the world.

He didn't feel called on to add that ~~the commodity in question~~ this fur was for sale only in California.

Of course television is young yet and its additions to the flow of phoney are still a mere trickle. I have reported one or two in this place. I think it would be a good thing to watch the development of the gentle fraud in this new medium. It will tell us a lot about where television is going.

Having used delayed action myself I am now coming to the planting of a delayed action bomb under the American movie industry.

I refer to the arrival in this country last week of a man named Filippo del Giudice, known simply as Del. As his name suggests he is of Italian birth, he comes here from London, and he is, to put it mildly, interested in the movies.

He talks--he talks a lot and with a kind of internal violence--and he says vehemently that a lot of people are no longer going to the movies because the right kind of movies aren't being made to attract them.

He says also that when the head of a studio has okayed a story and handed it over to the writer and director and the actors, he should leave these people alone to do their job. His pet phrase is "divorce production from sales."

7-25

In short, Del talks like an American critic, like lots of writers and directors in Hollywood--and he talks like no responsible head of an American producing studio with the occasional exception of Sam Goldwyn.

The only difference between Del and an American intellectual critic who has never met a studio payroll is this : Del is the producer of some thirty pictures including--it is hard to believe it but he is responsible for all of these : Hamlet, Henry the Fifth, Odd Man Out, In Which we Serve, Blithe Spirit and several new pictures which haven't reached America yet but are already sensatio nally successful in England.

In short, he has piled up one of the few distinguished records of production in the whole industry and his greatest pictures have all made great sums of money.

For a long time, the finest pictures sent to this country by the J. Arthur Rank organization were made by the Two Cities company--and Del was Two Cities. He is now an independent producer again, and I think his first picture coming here will be The Guinea Pig.

He is not here to revolutionize the American film industry. He thinks Hollywood's product is the kind of super-fiction that the British cannot make.

But he knows by his experience that you can make movies to draw in millions of people who hardly ever go to the pictures and that this can go on side by side with the other kind of production. He is a specialist in the problems of exhibiting--and he is in America to find perhaps a dozen theatres where his superior films can run for months at a time--as his Hamlet has been running at the Park avenue--perhaps for a year.

Whenever an outsider--a term of honor now--makes a suggestion about

9-05

Hollywood he is told that the men out there know their business and that they're making millions anyhow, so shut up.

Well, they're not making as many millions as they want to--and the basic reason is not television --it isn't even bad pictures. It's because the movie audience dies away... People go several times a week -- boys and girls--up to the age of twenty or so--and then they taper off--and presently when they are grownup they go only once in a great while. And the reason is that all the regular run of pictures are aimed at the same audience.

Hollywood has always said that this is the only big chunk of the total audience that it can get.

If Del's system works out here, as it has in the past in a smaller way, we will have the proof that you can make money out of pictures which will keep the mature audience coming also. And gradually the lesson will sink in -- no pictures have to be as bad as the worst, most pictures can be a little better than they are.

That is - the majority of the people, instead of the minority.

Nothing will happen fast. The other day in Hollywood Jack L. Warner went over the old ground--artistic pictures don't make money. "The arty stuff," he said, "is great for the critics, but My Wild Irish Rose did three and a half million and Sierra Madre, with all its raves grossed only one and a half."

Worse pictures than My Wild Irish Rose have grossed five million--to tell the truth. But a picture like The Treasure of the Sierra Madre, voted the best of the year by the New York Critics, brought people back to see movies--it enlarged the audience. And the people who paid to see My Wild Irish Rose are precisely the ones who will stop going to the movies within the next five years.

The command at Warner Brothers is to cut out the art stuff. In other

words, keep playing for the same audience that is deserting the movies, keep on doing everything you have done to bring the movies to the edge of disaster.

I wish all the luck in the world to Filippo del Giudici--not only for himself. I happen to like American movies, too; and I think when his bombshell explodes--when it is proved that good pictures can make a lot of money--the American industry will have a last chance to save itself.

There are many other things in the lively arts this week on which I'd like to report. For instance, Superman has found a way to appear both as Clark and as Superman, simultaneously--but we'll have to wait developments in that field. In the moment that's left, I'd like to make a semi-personal comment.

You have certainly heard a program called The Spoken Word on this station. The man who thought up the simple idea of letting radio do what it does best--I mean transmit the spoken word--has now gathered about a hundred items, all of them except the Gettysburg Address and a few others are poems, into a book : A Treasury of the Spoken Word, and to each of the poems he has appended a note on how it can be read, sometimes telling how the poem was read for a successful recording.

He is not dogmatic. He doesn't say that there is only one way to read, that the emphasis must be on this word and not on that. He has only indicated how much more there is in these poems than you might suspect--how much you can get out of them. And the selections range from The Kids Last Fight to Shakespeare.

I am myself a silent reader of poetry, which means that I am a little frightened of recitations. But recently I have been listening to recordings and have found an unusual pleasure in them. They may be

12-J-J

a little fancied up for every day use--but they put ideas into your head. And that is what this book does.

I said this was a semi-pesonal word. The editor of the book is Ted Cott--he also works at this station. He is in charge of programs and therefore of me.

But--making an atrocious pun which I will not repeat--he indicated that I could say anything I wanted about his book--as I am permitted to say anything I feel to be true on any other subject. For that I am grateful. The spoken word--even as I speak it--has to be a true word or it had better not be spoken at all.

Good night.

13-40

Louis Seltzer

August 12, 1959

Dear Louis:

I remember some months ago promising you that I should come to Cleveland in September and now I write regretfully to tell you that I must renege. We are sailing for Sweden on August 25 and hope to be away on our travels for the rest of this year and until July 1960. I shall hope to see you some time after my return.

As ever yours,

ERM:skh

Mr. Louis B. Seltzer
The Cleveland Press
Cleveland, Ohio

February 20, 1959

Dear Mr. Editor:

I have decided not to take legal action but to appear in person in Cleveland sometime during September and denounce you for irresponsible writing and wastage of newsprint.

Seriously, you have laid a great responsibility upon me, not the least of which is that Casey has decided to keep your editorial. This means that, in due course, he will decide one, whether you are anything of a prophet and, two, how much of a bum his old man turns out to be.

As ever yours,

ERM:skh

Mr. Louis B. Seltzer
The Cleveland Press
Cleveland, Ohio

The Cleveland Press

OFFICE OF
LOUIS B. SELTZER
EDITOR

Mister Murrow:

For any contemplated legal redress, please consult my counsel, Baker, Hostetler and Patterson, 1924 Union Commerce Building, who, I must however advise, have been instructed to resist on the ground I have told the truth.

-- The Editor

May 5, 1959

Dear Louis:

I tried to call you to shout my congratulations on the Lincoln piece. I agree wholeheartedly, and enjoyed your clearcut prose.

As ever yours,

ERM:skh

Mr. Louis B. Seltzer
The Cleveland Press
Cleveland, Ohio

The Cleveland Press

OFFICE OF
LOUIS B. SELTZER
EDITOR

April 28, 1959

Dear Ed:

Perhaps you won't agree altogether with the reflections contained in the attached piece but it occurred to me nevertheless you might be interested in reading it.

Cordially

Louis

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y.

nevertheless by a conscientious effort to do a good job.

Ward 18: JOHN W. KELLOGG, an especially energetic and intelligent incumbent.

Ward 33: JACK CLEARY, in the insurance and real estate business, would give fresh and energetic representation to this huge ward on Cleveland's southwest side.

Three teen-age girls stepped up and, as resentatives of the most recent class of

Unrest in Faculty Row

An underlying yearning for greater recognition, respect and community esteem could be detected in the Western Reserve University professors' report, detailed by Press Reporter Bud Weidenthal.

Why not? Why shouldn't these men on whom the community has suddenly thrust great, new "crash" demands ask something in the way of appreciation in return?

The report, published by the Reserve chapter of the American Association of University Professors, specifically called for reduced teaching loads, more time for research and higher professorial pay.

But this would not seem to be the significant part of the report, in view of the fact that in recent years great sums have been poured into research at Reserve. And faculty salaries have been raised appreciably (15%) although there is still room for improvement.

The report raised the question—are professors really regarded by the university (which includes the community) as scholars or simply as hired hands, robots that spiel instructions in front of faceless rows of students, hour after hour, semester after semester?

Limited housing and parking facilities, too, have irritated the professors enough that they were included in the report. Here again are items that stem from a desire for greater recognition as individuals, as leaders of learning and culture instead of being relegated to routine employee status.

DAVID DIETZ—

Sun Has Worst Rash

Old Sol appears to be in a worse dither than at any time in the past 200 years during which astronomers have kept tab on its behavior.

The Mt. Wilson Observatory reports that there have been more spots on the sun in recent months than have ever been recorded before.

Sunspots have been recorded for the 200 years and on a daily basis for the past

The significance of the sudden increas the rash of spots on Old Sol has not yet determined, Dr. Thomas Cragg of the Mt.

What Would Lincoln Think of His America Today?

During the past few weeks, Editor Louis B. Seltzer has traveled widely throughout the country—south to Texas and Florida, to gatherings of editors in New York, Washington and historic old Williamsburg in Virginia. Everywhere, he found an intense kind of self-examination going on among people, a nagging concern that the moral underpinnings of our society are eroding away. In this article written for all the Scripps-Howard Newspapers, he describes this mood as he has sensed it throughout the country.

Abraham Lincoln is America's foremost name. His stature grows with time. His words take on greater meaning.

In Springfield, Ill., when this nation was young, dynamic, laboring to strengthen itself, Abraham Lincoln spoke these prophetic words:

"—at what point then is the approach of danger to be expected?

"I answer, if it ever reaches us, it must spring up amongst us. It cannot come from abroad. If destruction be our lot, we must ourselves be its author and finisher.

"As a nation of free men, we must live through all time, or die by suicide."

What would Abraham Lincoln say of the United States of America today?

Would he say that the point at which "danger" is to be expected has been reached in America?

Would Abraham Lincoln say that our political morals have fallen to an all-time low?

Would he observe that in a land of free citizens that abstinence from voting in such great numbers as has characterized our elections, local, state and national, for the last half century forebodes the inner danger against which he was solemnly warning?

Would Abraham Lincoln conclude that our singular preoccupation with the physical comforts of our fabulously prosperous industrial society betoken a complacency and indolence that suggests internal deterioration?

Would the immortal president interpret the spectacular increase in the nation's divorce rate as symptomatic of an easy and disquieting subversion of the sanctity of marriage and an erosion of the family, around which he believed the country needed to be built enduringly?

Would he view with apprehension the scrambling of values among the youth of America by making available to such large numbers of them high-priced automobiles they had no part whatever in earning, and which literally by the thousands they park around schoolyards and campuses only blocks from their homes rather than exercising their limbs by walking?

Would he express concern over the interlocked and reciprocal relationship of our American society which inhibits its citizens from freely expressing their opinions about whatever they honestly believe for fear the backlash might adversely affect their economic or social positions?

Would he wonder about the conspicuous absence of America's old-fashioned capacity for indignation in the presence of corrupt or wrongful behavior, and construe it as an indication of an underlying willingness of the American people to compromise with what formerly were considered the elementary principles of right and wrong?

Would he look over our American political landscape and upon seeing the least capable among our citizens occupying the most formidably important positions of political influence while the ablest and most capable are in private endeavor—and, looking, be oppressed with his prophetic sense of danger?

Would Abraham Lincoln examine the best sellers on the bookstands, the plethora of sex-filled magazines, the obscenity-riddled scripts of the most successful plays, the curious music of our times, and furrow his brow in perplexity as to its meaning for the mood of the American people in the middle of this unpredictable 20th Century.

Abraham Lincoln would find much in modern America about which to be proud. The high percentage of home ownership and the tendency of a very high number of families to do things together. The social and welfare concerns of the American people, their insistence upon treating all of its citizens as even-handedly as possible and assuring opportunity for everyone without regard to status or geography.

The ingenuity and extraordinary resourcefulness of its industrial machine, the improvement in the lot of the workingman, the controls of excesses of many kinds which formerly beset the nation in its more formative periods. Its ability in time of national emergency to rise above and beyond its normal interests and give the country its utmost of blood and substance and patriotism.

The ledger has two columns. It is on debit side that many are being alarmed these days.

And one cannot help but wonder what Abraham Lincoln would think of his beloved America today—and how he would relate the America of today to his prophetic utterance in Springfield, Ill., on Jan. 27, 1838.

—*L. B. S.*

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dreds of new residents are flocking back to the Solon suburban area.

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son Observatory says.

Sunspot groups in recent months have ranged in size from small clusters up to groups 100,000 miles in length.

It has long been known that sunspots go through a cycle, reaching a maximum approximately every 11½ years. The International Geophysical Year was timed to coincide with a sunspot maximum and it was believed that this was passed about the middle of 1958.

It is believed that sunspots are whirlpools in the gaseous surface of the sun. They are frequently associated with the appearance of great eruptions of gaseous material known as prominences.

These prominences are great tongues of hydrogen gas. Astronomers in recent years have made motion pictures of them with the aid of special types of telescopes.

Two types of prominences are known. One variety is associated with sunspots and forms a great loop in the solar atmosphere.

The other type appears like a huge flame that arches its back sometimes as high as 100,000 miles above the solar surface. This type does not always occur near a sunspot.

Both types of prominences, however, eventually collapse and fall back into the sun. They may live, however, for days or even months.

Another solar activity that seems to be associated with sunspots is the sudden outbreak of a burst of ultraviolet light. This is known as a solar flare.

The International Geophysical Year established that solar figures are connected with the ejection of great masses of hydrogen gas from the sun. As a result of this, the earth is sprayed with electrified or ionized hydrogen atoms.

Flares on the sun are followed by magnetic storms on earth that upset the compass, interfere with radio and long-distance telephony, and create spectacular displays of the Aurora Borealis.

An unusually large flare appeared on the sun just a few days before the start of the IGY on July 1, 1957.

Grin and Bear It **By LICHTY**

"It'll be worth the money! At least, it won't discuss every one of last night's television programs before starting the day's work!"

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B.S.

Take my advice ... his half.
end up where you don't w... you may

Wherever you drive, be sure you are right so you can return to your home at night.

MRS. W. B. CLULEY, 10221 Bernard Ave.

Dads Are Best Audience

Fathers are needed in attendance at all baseball games involving their sons.

All juveniles will try their darndest in all games when the head of the family is cheering

on their efforts.

To a boy his father is his idol, especially if the father has taught him how to throw a fast ball, how to hit, what kind of glove to wear and the hundreds of tricks that only a loving dad can impart to his son.

Little Leaguers are the future major leaguers —while they are minors, the dads ought to be glad to see them circle the bases, always emulating the family breadwinner.

Encouraging boys to play baseball will make the United States of America the greatest of all diamonds in the world!

PAUL BROCK, 12127 Erwin Ave.

Good Editorial, No Results

Your editorial captioned "Why Should Public Pay for Lawyers' Problems?" was well taken.

As to your advice to legal brethren that the expense of investigation should be carried by the merchants in law themselves, in all probability will not be followed, since no profit will ensue to the lawyers doing the legal work. Hence the taxpayers should naturally become the benevolent grandparents to latest exercise in civic virtue by the two legal brotherhoods.

I further respectfully submit for your further consideration that in any event, the entire investigation will be much ado about nothing at all, since any legal advice gratuitously bestowed is not a subject for punitive action.

RALPH P. MONROE, 5239 W. 50th St., Parma.

JOE NEWMAN'S

FRYING PAN

► ITEM: "Tom Ireland, mayoralty candidate, wears a vest, high shoes and a derby hat."—*It's the last word in Republican fashions, kiddies . . . circa 1910.*

●

► COUNCILMAN Kellogg accuses Tony Celebrezze of "playing politics."—*Sure he does! Wouldn't anybody if he could play for keeps and win all the marbles?*

●

► ITEM: "The Port of Cleveland can't yet accommodate the biggest ship that entered the Seaway over the weekend."—*The weak end, obviously, is Cleveland.*

April 10, 1958

Dear Louis:

Your agents serve you well and this miserable reporter almost failed to recognize you at LaGuardia on account of your wearing a hat, and hereby bows low in apology.

Should you be sufficiently reckless to pursue your project for 1959 I will produce the best speech of which I am capable which will probably be good enough to qualify me for the semi-finals in the sophmore class of a remote high school.

Incidentally, have you seen the current issue of Foreign Affairs? It is the best they have produced in many a year.

As ever yours,

Mr. Louis B. Seltzer
THE CLEVELAND PRESS
Cleveland, Ohio

fc

The Cleveland Press

OFFICE OF
LOUIS B. SELTZER
EDITOR

March 24, 1958

Dear Mister Murrow:

All right, on the subject of public speeches, and coming to Cleveland for that purpose. The book is closed on it forever so far as I am concerned -- or, at least until reopened by you. I understand the reason for it, and, in fact, completely sympatico therewith.

However, and here I pick a very large bone with you. My espionage agents, of whom I have a surprising number scattered around the American landscape, advise me that you scotched an idea proposed by the obtuse writer hereof for a well deserved and long overdue orchid for your work in practical brotherhood.

That one, if I am privileged to express a stout demurrer, was in order, and should have gone forward, the Murrow modesty to the contrary notwithstanding. Granted that you may be surfeited with awards, recognitions, etc., etc., nevertheless it would have been good not only for yourself, but for the cause itself, and in this jumbled up country of ours it jolly well needs a hell of a lot more help than a good many allegedly knowing associates of ours in communications realize.

Therefore, while quietly acquiescing to any further invitations to speak, either in Cleveland or elsewhere (and I was almost tempted to invite you as the Friday, April 18 speaker for the ASNE, following by a day President Eisenhower), I will with perhaps unadmirable persistence pursue the Waldorf-Astoria topflight Murrow Award dinner for 1959. It could easily be one of the country's No. 1 events and furnish you with an opportunity to do a truly wonderful job that would push inter-racial and inter-religious understanding forward a considerable distance -- an objective highly desired by the Murrow I know and admire.

For the time being, and perhaps the many months ahead, you will not find your mail complicated by yeasty communicative ferment at this end.

Affectionately,

Louie

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

March 19, 1958

Dear Louis:

I must, in the vernacular, "level with you."

I can't come to Cleveland and the reason is this: a year ago, I made a flat rule that there would be no speeches of any kind. Since then I have been beaten over the head by Ford, the Hamm's Brewing Company, and American Oil Company to go to various meetings of their's and open my mouth in public. I have refused them all. If I were to come to Cleveland the pressure would become irresistible.

This sounds pompous but that's the way it is. I can only hope that you will understand and believe that I am deeply appreciative of the invitation.

As ever yours,

Mr. Louis B. Seltzer
THE CLEVELAND PRESS
Cleveland, Ohio

fc

The Cleveland Press

OFFICE OF
LOUIS B. SELTZER
EDITOR

February 6, 1958

Dear Ed:

In a very real sense you bring this upon yourself. If this editor did not so profoundly respect you both professionally and personally -- and believe you to be the standout of our times -- he wouldn't risk being such a persistent cuss.

How you manage to do only a small percentage of all the things you are called upon to do is a mystery to everyone who knows you -- including myself. But the fact is that you do and additionally appear, by some curious physiological alchemy, to thrive on it.

For me to add any extra burden induces an acute twinge of self-consciousness, and I apologise therefore. But --

Would it be possible for you, not being able, for good reason, to make the March 20 engagement, to do it for April 17 or May 15?

Even though I am this year program chairman for the American Society of Editors meeting in Washington, on April 17, 18 and 19, I would step aside from that important responsibility on April 17 to be here to present you with great pride to this tremendous audience on that day.

By the way, speaking of the ASNE meeting, we already have lined up Bernard Baruch, have a tentative commitment from General Gavin, and Beaverbrook is persuading Churchill to come over for this meeting -- and, of course, Saturday evening, April 19, Ike will conclude the 1958 session for us.

It might interest you, also, to know that Senator Jack Kennedy of Massachusetts will open our Book and Author project on February 20, and that Dick Nixon is coming here on February 27 at a big brotherhood banquet honoring George Humphrey for which the inept de-hirsuted writer hereof is toastmaster.

Have you ever attended any of the ASNE sessions? -- and, would you be interested in being my guest at the Ike banquet Saturday evening, April 19th?

I do really feel a sense of guilt coming back at you again in this matter, Ed, but it is a great hope I sincerely treasure that, under auspices of our paper, and its awkward editor, to present you in the living and vital personality you are to my fellow-townsmen and women from this special rostrum and for this special purpose.

Marion sends along her warmest regards and is unceasingly impressed by the fact that no letter which passes between us fails to mention her. She is a really "set up" girl for that thoughtful characteristic of the fellow we both admire so much.

Affectionately,

Louis

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Seltzer, Jan

FEBRUARY 5, 1958

MR. LOUIS B. SELTZER
THE CLEVELAND PRESS
CLEVELAND, OHIO

DEAR MR. EDITOR AND CHERISHED FRIEND: YOUR JUNIOR REPORTER REGRETS HE CANNOT ACCEPT YOUR GRACIOUS INVITATION FOR MARCH 20 STOP HE RE REGRETS TOO THE DELAY IN ANSWERING AND BEGS YOU TO CONVEY HIS WARMEST REGARDS TO MRS. SELTZER.

EDWARD R. MURROW

514-43
fc

The Cleveland Press

OFFICE OF
LOUIS B. SELTZER
EDITOR

January 13, 1958

Dear Ed:

You will recall, distinguished sir, that I made a very earnest attempt to get you out to Cleveland about a year ago. Because of the continuous pressures under which understandably you are laboring it was impossible for you to do it at that time. You did, graciously, leave the door slightly ajar for the future.

Without engaging in any long-winded obliquities I am again approaching you.

The Cleveland Press three years ago inaugurated a BOOK AND AUTHOR project.

From the very moment it was launched its success was astounding.

We have been having audiences approximating 1100 and 1200 at each of our noon-hour meetings. It is the most successful of all of these projects around the country.

This community knows my virtual adulation of Ed Murrow.

I take special pains to make sure they know how I do feel.

Since this is a project created and sponsored by the newspaper of which for now going into the thirtieth year I have been its editor, nothing — literally nothing — could be more blessed than the presence of Ed Murrow on this year's BOOK AND AUTHOR program, even if, as you might quickly assert, this year is not an Ed Murrow book year — or so, at least, I am advised.

Is it at all possible, Ed, if I send a plane, pick you up, return you to New York, or whatever other destination you wish, all within a matter of hours on March 20 you could come out here for the purpose I am outlining?

I intend to cross my fingers, kneel in prayer, and express a devout hope that this time it will be possible for you to say yes.

Affectionately

Louis

Mr. Ed Murrow
New York 22, N.Y.

Seltzer, Lou

January 9, 1958

Dear Louis:

Whether or not you have seen my piece on Marian Anderson's trip through Asia, I don't know, but anyway, I am sending you an album of it which I hope you and Marion will enjoy.

As ever yours,

Mr. Louis B. Seltzer
THE CLEVELAND PRESS
Cleveland, Ohio

fc

The Cleveland Press

OFFICE OF
LOUIS B. SELTZER
EDITOR

December 12, 1957

Dear Ed:

Not in many years have I experienced so bouncing a belly-laugh as from the first sentence of December 9 letter.

If providence had endowed me with only a microscopic fragment of Ed Murrow's ability to write my joy would be unbounded.

By this time it must be evident to you that the hard-crusted fellow at this end has formed a thoroughly grounded admiration for you --- which he is at some pains, in and out of our mutual field of communications, and on numerous public occasions, to express as articulately and emphatically as he can.

So, now, may I, on Marion's and my own behalf, wish for you, and yours, both a Merry Christmas, a Happy New Year, and wider, higher and more rewarding accomplishments in '58, and the years ahead.

Cordially,

Louis

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Seltzer

December 9, 1957

Dear Louis:

I wish like hell that I could write as well as you do.

Sometime, somehow, we are going to try our hand at the program you suggest, provided, of course, that one Seltzer will lend his talents to the discourse.

I don't think it will be very effective, but I don't suppose we are entitled to condition our actions to a prior belief of effectiveness.

In speaking of that, let me share with you a not too ancient quote by one Richard Nixon (attached) which is, I think, the complete definition of political opportunism.

As ever yours,

Mr. Louis B. Seltzer
The Cleveland Press
Cleveland, Ohio

fc
enc.

THE NEW YORK TIMES - September 6, 1955 - By Russell Baker (9/5/55)

Denver: Then, the Vice President gave this interpretation of what he suggested had been Senator Joseph R. McCarthy's fatal error.

There was, he said, a political adage to the effect that "you must not strike a king unless you kill him."

"Politically," he said, "you could say you must not strike a leader unless you destroy him. I think that our political history shows that when you have a great issue and an individual decides to take on the top man, if he wins out on the issue he gains in popularity, but when you make a frontal assault on somebody bigger, you'd better be sure you win. If you lose, you're through."

The Cleveland Press

SCRIPPS-HOWARD

OFFICE OF
LOUIS B. SELTZER
EDITOR

November 25, 1957

Dear Ed:

Your note the other day intrigued me. I have been thinking a great deal about it.

Nothing concerns me more than the blight on our thought and speech in this country during the past forty years.

So long as America could keep her communications wide open nothing could happen to her. She was then alert, flexible, vital.

This is not so today. We have done a great deal of bartering away in return for economic, academic, and social securities. We have become fat in the head as well as the behind.

The erosion is serious.

Always we have argued that democracy could out-think and out-last autocracy. In the long stretch freedom out-lasts, we argue, the dictator, because one holds up the people, the dictator holds down the people.

A paradox is present nowadays. The dictatorship is loosening up, i.e., turning its scientists, technologists, students free to think and act for themselves in the ultimate interest of their country. In our democracy a sequence of circumstances has shriveled and thwarted us in these areas.

There is a kind of twilight of freedom in our country to which not too many - excepting a guy like Murrow - are alert. The bright sun of American freedom has been setting.

The process by which it has been happening is a long, tedious one -- a complex of industrial reciprocities, of government concealing itself behind "national security", of the phenomenal growth of the middle-man between the American public and the free press, of campus fears and mediocrities, of the immature attitudes between the press and electronic communications, of many other elements.

Lately I have been spending even more of my time than usual among all kinds of people. They sense these things. They are concerned. They are far ahead of those of us in communications. They wonder why we don't do something about them. They believe we are all afraid. They think we are inhibited because of our unwillingness to disturb either the national economic pattern or for fear it might swing around and injure us specifically.

The tragedy is that they - the people - are righter than they know. They think a lot of people are letting them down, government, business, communications.

Which gets me around, Ed, to saying that you in particular could do no greater service for communications or the country than some day set up a well-advertised-in-advance program centered around the theme of "The Right Of The People To Know."

As you alone would do it there is no question but what it would be the most significant and widely discussed program of our time.

That's all the fellow can say to you for the time being.

Affectionately,

Louis

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
c/o Person To Person
485 Madison Avenue
CBS - TV
New York 22, New York

Seltzer, Louis

November 12, 1957

Dear Louis:

Thanks for yours of October 31.

I wish that we might sit and talk through a long night. I am becoming less sure and more concerned everyday - not concerned about Sputnik or ICBM's, but about the climate of opinion in this country.

There is, I think, a real chance that the NATO meeting may demonstrate to the moderately perceptive that our foreign policy is bankrupt and the alliance coming unstuck. I plan to go over for the meeting, but don't expect it to be a very joyous occasion.

Thanks for being your usual thoughtful self and suggesting Lawrence and Lee for PERSON TO PERSON. I will discuss the technical problems with my colleagues and let you know what we are able to do.

My respects to Marion please, and my continued admiration and affection for you.

Sincerely,

Mr. Louis B. Seltzer
THE CLEVELAND PRESS
Cleveland, Ohio

fc

The Cleveland Press

OFFICE OF
LOUIS B. SELTZER
EDITOR

October 31, 1957

Dear Ed:

Knowing how deeply devoted you are to "Person to Person" and how tenaciously you adhere to the high standard you have fixed, I have been very sparing of any gratuitous suggestions for it -- preferring to make an occasional one only when thoroughly convinced it is good enough.

Before, however, offering this one, I want to extend to you both Marion's and my own warm and affectionate regards and, at the same time, urge upon you once again to safeguard yourself in the multiciplicity of demands upon your reserve strength.

How in God's world you manage to do all of the things you do and do them so well, I am at a complete loss to understand. It can be no secret, young man, by this time, that this journeyman editor holds you in higher personal and professional esteem than any other in the field of communications. And that, I might add, is not restricted to electronic communications.

Now, about this suggestion.

Jerome Lawrence and Robert E. Lee, as you know, put "Inherit The Wind" on a four-year successful stretch on Broadway. It is really a great play.

Last night Marion and I attended the Cleveland opening of "Auntie Mame" with both Jerry and Bob -- the company in which Connie Bennett stars. It, too, is a great job.

Now these extraordinary young fellows are in the midst of producing a play centered around the life of a U. S. president which, when finished and put on Broadway, will exceed anything they've done, I am sure.

They are able, personable, articulate, and fascinating young men. They are both Greater Clevelanders. They lived on opposite sides of the town and, without knowing it, went to the same places, partook of the same literary and cultural stimuli, and it was not until they left Cleveland

that their paths crossed. Now they are an inseparable team. It is a great human interest story as well as a team accomplishment of substantial and growing proportions.

Both are so lively, so excited about life, its problems, the world, that a "Person to Person" with your skilled techniques would, I thought, make one of your best evenings. Thus I write. Thus I offer the suggestion. Thus I end this note -- once more urging strongly, in the interest of all of us who treasure you and your works so highly, that you take good care of yourself.

Affectionately, as always,

Louis

Mr. Ed Murrow
CBS - 485 Madison Avenue
New York City, New York

Seltzer, Louis

January 25, 1957

Dear Louis:

I am truly flattered by your invitation, and believe me this is not a "form letter"; but the fact is that I have television film commitments which preclude entirely the possibility of my accepting.

I have some hope that next year the schedule will ease a little, and maybe you will give me another chance. I harbor an appetite to say a few things about you to your fellow citizens.

As ever yours,

Mr. Louis B. Seltzer, Editor
The Cleveland Press
Cleveland, Ohio

rh

The Cleveland Press

OFFICE OF
LOUIS B. SELTZER
EDITOR

January 21, 1957

Dear Ed:

On knee bent in earnest supplication I come to you with hope in my heart and a prayer on my lips.

I know you are overwhelmed with infinite obligations.

Richly and extraordinarily endowed as you are, the physiological formula of dividing yourself into several parts in order to be that many places simultaneously is one even you have yet to accomplish -- although from mutual friends I am persuaded to believe you are imminently close to doing so.

In what I am writing herewith Ohio's new governor, Bill O'Neil, its new Senator, Frank Lausche, and Cleveland's mayor -- among many others - join me.

It is, as you by this time suspect, an invitation to come to our home town of Cleveland.

I hasten to say that if it is humanly possible for you to do this, and of course I profoundly hope it is, we will send a plane to New York for you, bring you out, and return you to New York. The plane will be equipped with all of the conveniences -- writing room, etc., and accommodations both for yourself and for anyone you might wish to have accompany you.

With this as a preface, the specific purpose is this --

Last year The Cleveland Press inaugurated a Book and Authors Luncheon program. The first year it exceeded in attendance and popularity any similar venture anywhere in the country, New York, Philadelphia and Chicago included. It was amazingly successful.

While I am mindful that you are literally swamped with such invitations it is nevertheless my hope that you might do us the great honor of being here as the Number One personality of our 1957 program.

Nothing would give me more personal or professional pleasure than to be able to present you to the great crowd of fellow-townsmen on that occasion. (The date is at noon on Thursday, Feb. 21 -- and the place the Rainbow Room of Hotel Carter, largest in Cleveland, and attendance 1200.)

Both Senator Lausche and Governor O'neil have advised me they will be present should you find it possible to be here.

That's my story, Ed. I don't want to labor it too much because the Mt. Everest of correspondence confronting you at all times calls for being brief, but the brevity of this note cannot possibly convey the earnest hope you will find it possible to accept.

Affectionately,

Louis

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Seltzer, Louis

October 23, 1956

Dear Louis:

Thanks for your gracious note. I still contend that I can find persons more interesting than myself to interview. I am, in the vernacular, near the bottom of the barrel.

As ever yours,

Mr. Louis B. Seltzer, Editor
The Cleveland Press
Cleveland, Ohio

rh
[redacted]

The Cleveland Press

SCRIPPS-HOWARD

OFFICE OF
LOUIS B. SELTZER
EDITOR

October 10, 1956

Dear Ed:

I don't know whether it is your own modesty that has thus far held off making possible the notion Mrs. Hodges and myself and others have - or some other reason.

In any event, I am with joyful malice putting a bright, burning bonfire under the idea.

I would like to see it come to pass.

Cordially,

Lou's

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N.Y.

ED

Accept Regret
Appropriate action
Background?
FYI File
Note & return
Phone FS
Reply direct
Return to sender
Status?
Suggest reply
To discuss
Comment or recommendation
Copy to FS
URGENT f/u

How about it?

The Cleveland Press

OFFICE OF
LOUIS B. SELTZER
EDITOR

October 10, 1956

Dear Frank Stanton:

Enclosed is a letter which is self-explanatory.

It is a thought which has many times crossed my mind.

Other people have likewise shared it.

Ed Murrow, in my opinion, is the Number One TV personality in this country.

I say that without any personal qualification whatever.

He has done more to put dignity, courage, and impact into this electronic phenomenon than anybody else.

I sincerely hope that CBS one day works out the suggestion Mrs. Hodges makes.

With best personal wishes,

Louis

Dr. Frank Stanton,
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N.Y.

GERTRUDE A. HODGES
1391 Churchill Road, Lyndhurst 24, Ohio

Oct. 8, 1956

My dear Mr. Seltzer,

I have always looked forward to Ed. Murrow's "Person to Person." The thought came to me recently, why not have him with his family, on the other end of the line for a change. I am sure all who watch his program would enjoy it. If you think this is a practical idea, could or would you promote it. As interviewer, how would our own Dorothy Fuldheim be, or on second thought, you.

Sincerely,

Mrs. Gertrude A. Hodges

Tel. Hi-2-3912

October 16, 1956

Dear Mr. Seltzer:

Thank you for your October 10 note and its enclosure, which we are holding for Dr. Stanton's return from abroad later this month.

I know he will appreciate your thoughtfulness in writing as you did, and will pass Mrs. Hodges' and your suggestion along to Mr. Murrow for his consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Secretary

Mr. Louis B. Seltzer
Editor
The Cleveland Press
Cleveland, Ohio

ww

Seltzer, Louie

January 11, 1955

Dear Louie:

Please forgive the belatedness of this note. I got bogged down in holiday programs and am only now catching up with my correspondence.

Many thanks for sending me the report on "People and National Defense" which I read with a great deal of interest.

Thanks also for your very kind comments on the SEE IT NOW program we did on the Truax Air Base. I am delighted to hear that you thought it good.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

Mr. Louis B. Seltzer
THE CLEVELAND PRESS
Cleveland, Ohio

fc

The Cleveland Press

OFFICE OF
LOUIS B. SELTZER
EDITOR

November 23, 1954

Thanks

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Ed:

May I add my voice to others in telling you that your "See It Now" program of Tuesday, November 16th, in which you dealt with the relationships between the Madison, Wisconsin, community and the Truax Air Base was exceptionally good. I am convinced that one of the things which we in this country are going to have to get used to is living with the military and, for that matter, the military living with the civilian community. Programs such as yours are a real contribution to this nation-wide adjustment.

In this connection I think you will be interested in the enclosed report on "People and National Defense", a report which is just being issued by an organization - the United Community Defense Services - of which I am Chairman of the Board. The report is an analysis of the social aspects of defense with particular regard to the responsibility of the federal government. I think it is an excellent job and I know Arthur Flemming and several other people in Washington would like to see it get top level consideration.

As you will note from the copy of my letter contained in the report, I have transmitted the report to the President and suggested that he call a conference of representative private citizens and government officials to develop a comprehensive federal policy and program covering the government's responsibility in this field.

We would not feel hurt if a review of the report suggested a basic idea for one or two "See It Now" shows in the future.

Keep up the good work!

Sincerely yours,

Louis

Louis B. Seltzer
Chairman of the Board
United Community Defense Services

Public Relations Department
UNITED COMMUNITY DEFENSE SERVICES
345 East 46th Street
New York 17, N. Y.
OXford 7-3270

Outside of Office Hours
Call: R. E. Pumphrey
Fairfield, Conn.
CLearwater 9-2953

For Release: In A. M.'s of Nov. 30

URGE PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO CALL MEETING OF SOCIAL WELFARE LEADERS ON DEFENSE PROBLEMS

NEW YORK, Nov. 29 -- President Eisenhower has been urged to "call together a group of leading citizens and government officials -- federal, state, and local" -- to assist the federal government in the development of a comprehensive federal policy and program with respect to "human problems created by the national national defense effort".

The proposal was made in a letter to the President from Louis B. Seltzer, editor of the Cleveland Press and Chairman of the Board of United Community Defense Services, a federation of national non-profit health and welfare organizations. The letter accompanied a 36-page report, "People and National Defense", which analyzes the federal government's responsibilities for the problems of social adjustment intensified by the national defense effort.

"Time after time," Mr. Seltzer's letter asserted, "United Community Defense Services has observed that defense communities, faced with serious problems resulting from the nation's defense program, are severely handicapped by the lack of a comprehensive federal policy with respect to human problems created by the national defense effort.

"We believe that this lack of a positive federal policy is hampering the national defense program by preventing the full mobilization of those human resources which are the heart and soul of national security.

(MORE)

ADD 1 PEOPLE AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

"The experience of UCDS in several hundred defense communities led us to conclude that the preparation of the attached analysis of the social factors in the national defense effort might prove of value to those responsible for the nation's security.

"We urge the early development by the federal government of a comprehensive policy and program with regard to these matters. As one step in this direction, we respectfully suggest that you call together a group of leading citizens and government officials -- federal, state, and local -- to consider this important aspect of the defense program."

The full report, the first comprehensive analysis of the social impact of the defense effort, ended with three major conclusions:

1. "There is urgent need for clarification of federal policy with respect to the social aspects of defense and for the establishment of coordinating machinery for this purpose both in Washington and throughout the country."
2. "There is need for a clear affirmation of long-time federal-state-local cooperative relationships in the social field. It would seem incredibly foolhardy to scuttle or weaken with uncertainty the existing structure of federal-state relationships at the very time when national interests and federal defense responsibilities make the federal government must peculiarly dependent on existing state and local governmental machinery in these fields."

(MORE)

3. "It is apparent that the full contribution to the defense program by states, voluntary organizations and individual citizens cannot be mobilized until federal goals and policies are clarified."

The UCDS Board of Directors, at its November 10 meeting, adopted the report as an official statement of its position. Consultant to UCDS for the year-long study was Elizabeth Wickenden, former Washington representative of the American Public Welfare Association. Miss Wickenden has also held a number of executive positions in the federal government.

Among the specific recommendations in the report:

-- "The Office of Defense Mobilization appears the logical staff arm to asst the President in... reconciling immediate and potential defense requirements with continuing civilian programs."

--"The Department of Defense and all other agencies with major defense responsibilities should have a high level office, staffed with persons qualified by experience and professional competence, to handle the social aspects" of the defense effort.

--"The federal government must assume a direct responsibility toward those it employs... Responsibility toward members of the military forces and toward veterans is a primary federal obligation... Toward its civilian employees... in its own interest, as well as in fairness to its employees, it must assume the same measure of responsibility... as any other employer."

"There appears to be a serious need for clarification of federal policy in this regard: first, as to the degree to which it is considered desirable that federal employees be treated as a part of the surrounding civilian community, and second, as to the extent to which the federal government should assist such communities in

(MORE)

meeting the costs involved."

--"Payments in lieu of taxes... would appear a logical obligation in view of the extra services required of such communities as a result of federal activities and the influx of new employees."

--"The definition of allowable costs for purposes of reimbursement under cost-plus contracts should be sufficiently broad as to allow such contracting agencies to fulfill the normal welfare obligations of employers toward their employees and the communities in which they function."

--"Use of the states and their political subdivisions as the instrumentality of federal defense policy in the social field offers the widest range of possibilities for the discharge of federal defense responsibilities with the least disruption of normal political relationships and safeguards."

The philosophy underlying the UCDS study is explicitly stated in these words "People are both the end and the means of national defense. It is their freedom, national independence, culture, and physical survival which are at stake; at the same time they are themselves the means through which these ends must be achieved. No form of push-button warfare will ever be devised which can change this basic truth, for the machines of war must be made by people, paid for by people, operated by people, and their destructive power -- if they are used -- borne by people."

---o0o---

PEOPLE
AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

An Analysis of Federal Responsibility

UNITED COMMUNITY DEFENSE SERVICES

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This is the report of an analysis prepared by United Community Defense Services. Elizabeth Wickenden was consultant to the project. After committee consideration, the Board of Directors of UCDS, at its meeting of November 10, 1954, adopted this report as an official statement of the UCDS position regarding federal responsibilities toward social welfare needs related to the national defense program.

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Over 25 copies: 25 cents each

UNITED COMMUNITY DEFENSE SERVICES
345 East 46th Street, New York 17, N. Y.
OXford 7-3270

To the President of the United States

NEW YORK, N. Y.
November 19, 1954

THE PRESIDENT
The White House
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

Time after time United Community Defense Services has observed that defense communities, faced with serious problems resulting from the nation's defense program, are severely handicapped by the lack of a comprehensive federal policy with respect to human problems created by the national defense effort.

We believe that this lack of a positive federal policy is hampering the national defense program by preventing the full mobilization of those human resources which are the heart and soul of national security.

The experience of United Community Defense Services in several hundred defense communities led us to conclude that the preparation of the attached analysis of the social factors in the national defense effort might prove of value to those responsible for the nation's security.

We urge the early development by the federal government of a comprehensive policy and program with regard to these matters. As one step in this direction, we respectfully suggest that you call together a group of leading citizens and government officials – federal, state, and local – to consider this important aspect of the defense program.

United Community Defense Services will be happy to assist you in any way that we can.

Respectfully submitted,

Louis B. Seltzer

Chairman of the Board
United Community Defense Services

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Highlights of This Report:

The Social Factors

NATIONAL DEFENSE IN THE MODERN WORLD IS A CONTINUING EFFORT, INVOLVing all aspects of the national life. It imposes inevitable sacrifice and heavy burdens of adjustment on all.

In a democracy social measures are as essential to the success of national defense as individual patriotism. These social measures serve the national defense program by helping to:

- spread the burden of its sacrifices more fairly;
- facilitate and speed the adjustments if necessitates;
- prepare for the implicit possibilities of war.

Social services, by helping individuals and families adjust to the requirements of national defense, substitute for the force and terror with which totalitarian governments implement their national policy.

In the United States defense responsibilities basically rest with the federal government, both constitutionally and in the nature of modern warfare. However, insofar as these responsibilities involve aspects of human welfare, many of them can be most effectively carried out through the established channels of state and local government.

For these reasons, the report concludes:

➧ *There is urgent need for clarification of federal policy with respect to the social aspects of defense and for the establishment of coordi-*

# of National Defense

nating machinery for this purpose both in Washington and throughout the country. The absence of such policy and such machinery at the present time is the source of confusion, inefficiency, and grave potential danger.

There is need for a clear affirmation of long-time federal-state-local cooperative relationships in the social field. It would seem incredibly foolhardy to scuttle or weaken with uncertainty the existing structure of federal-state relationships at the very time when national interests and federal defense responsibilities make the federal government most peculiarly dependent on existing state and local governmental machinery in these fields.

It is apparent that the full contribution to the defense program of states, voluntary organizations and individual citizens cannot be mobilized until federal goals and policies are clarified. Our experience convinces us that there is a vast reservoir of eagerness to participate in and contribute to this heroic effort of our own generation to safeguard for those of the future the values, institutions, and aspirations that form our heritage from the past. The federal government, charged by the Constitution with responsibility for the national defense, can by clarifying its own role liberate this powerful force that resides in a free people and their institutions.

1 The Nature of Today's Defense Challenge

NATIONAL DEFENSE HAS BECOME FOR THIS GENERATION A CONTINUING CONDITION OF LIFE. So long as the present world situation continues to be one of trigger-balanced tension between democratic concepts and aggressive communism, so long will the defense program continue to dominate the political, economic, and social policies of the United States. It is a reality of our time and one that imposes a heavy burden of adjustment on all our institutions. Some of these have already been made, but many lie ahead of us.

The Continuing Effort

For there is no reason to believe that the adjustments of the future will be achieved with less effort, difficulty or sacrifice than those of the past. It is, in fact, the very essence of national defense to be *prepared* – in terms of arms, men trained in their use, social institutions, and national psychology – for whatever future adjustments may be imposed, including the ultimate possibility of actual warfare. Those preparations that are directed toward facilitating the adjustment of people, communities, and social institutions to the anticipated or potential necessities of a defense situation are as basic to modern defense as arms and armies. The devotion of people to the defense of democracy, powerful asset that it is, cannot do the job unless the nation gives it the support of both military strength and social adaptability.

Dimensions of the Problem

The current federal budget shows 68 cents of every dollar spent by the federal government going into our national security programs. The Congress has made available approximately seventy-five billion dollars which may be expended for national defense in the next fiscal year, of which thirty-five billion is available for the procurement of military necessities. Over three million Americans are currently serving in the armed forces. For the first time in the history of the country peacetime military service is imposed by law on our young men and on the doctors needed to serve them.

Even more significant than these outward evidences of defense-mindedness is our unprecedented awareness of danger. This arises from three new developments in our national life: the accessibility of our country to attack as a result of modern air-transport, the existence of new weapons whose destructive power exceeds the capacity of the human imagination, and the emergence of a politically-motivated en-

emy with agents in all countries of the world, including our own.

It is no longer safe to assume that the decision between peace and war lies exclusively within our power. We can only prepare ourselves against such a threat, and in so doing, seek to minimize it. The totality of this danger requires an equal totality of defense preparation.

In these realities of the modern world the problem of assuring the national defense cannot be segregated from any aspect of the national life. It involves as immediate inter-related objectives the following:

Components of a Defense Program

1. An over-all strategic plan.
2. The production of an adequate supply of weapons.
3. The training of men in their use.
4. Preparation for the potentialities of actual warfare, including an enemy attack.
5. Protection against subversion, including the maintenance of a high morale.
6. The strengthening of resistance to aggression throughout the world.

Basic to all of these defense objectives is the ability of people to change their way of living, their ideas, and their social arrangements to meet the challenge of the danger confronting them.

2 The Welfare Role in National Defense

PEOPLE ARE BOTH THE END AND THE MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. IT IS THEIR FREEDOM, national independence, culture, and physical survival which are at stake; at the same time they are themselves the means through which these ends must be achieved. No form of push-button warfare will ever be devised which can change this basic truth, for the machines of war must be made by people, paid for by people, operated by people, and their destructive power – if they are used – borne by people.

Immediate vs. Long-Time Goals

Moreover, it would be delusive not to recognize that national defense means that immediate benefits must be sacrificed to long-time objectives. The slogan "guns and butter too" is a good spur to increased effort but the same amount of effort would produce much more civilian goods if it were not diverted in part to the production of guns.

Two basic questions are involved here in determining the relative share of national effort (or productivity) to be devoted to the ultimate objectives implicit in guns and to the immediate benefits implicit in butter:

1. What is the relative urgency of these two goals?

2. How much sacrifice can be imposed in the interest of these ultimate objectives without endangering the immediate effort on which their successful realization depends?

The first question clearly involves the total national policy, including such strategic questions as the relative strength of the potential enemy. But the second question has inherent welfare aspects and is, therefore, a proper subject for this particular inquiry. For the welfare function in society is essentially a means of sharing burdens, equalizing sacrifice, and facilitating those adjustments imposed on individuals in the common interest.

In a democracy people willingly accept and courageously adapt their lives to the sacrifices, adjustments, and burdens of national defense when its objectives are understood and these hardships are shared by all. It is, therefore, a part of governmental defense responsibility to adopt those policies and programs that will bring about this common base of shared burdens and shared measures to ease them.

Three different but related objectives are involved in this welfare concept and are discussed individually:

Aspects of the Welfare Function

1. *There must be a maximum equalization of sacrifice in the interest of national morale.*

2. *There must be facilitating measures to speed individual and community adjustments to the practical requirements of defense.*

3. *There must be plans and machinery to provide for the staggering welfare needs which would result from possible enemy attack.*

Before turning, however, to the specific nature of these social factors in effective national defense it is necessary to consider the political and institutional framework within which they must operate. For democracy is both the value we seek to preserve and the means of its own preservation.

3 The Organizational Basis of Defense

HUMAN BEINGS, LIKE ALL LIVING CREATURES, POSSESS HEROIC CAPABILITIES FOR QUICK adjustment and unusual effort under the pressure of immediate danger. When the house is actually ablaze, all hands pitch in to rescue the baby and subdue the fire. Today's challenge, however, requires a different kind of heroism. The effort and adjustments it imposes are of prolonged duration; the danger against which they are directed is diffused and difficult, if not impossible, to visualize. Yet should a hydrogen bomb destroy New York or Washington it would already be too late for purely spontaneous heroism.

The only useful heroism in the face of a danger of this dimension is one which seeks by advance action to prevent its occurrence; the only means of assuring national survival in the actual event of such an attack is the advance preparation of the total population for the adjustments and losses involved. Thus people are called on for heroic effort and adjustment in a time when they lack the spur of instinctive reaction to actual overt danger.

The Social Institution As an Instrument of National Defense

Man, from his earliest history, has turned to his own peculiarly human invention, the social institution, whenever his biologic heritage has failed to meet his practical needs. Thus he has developed forms of social organization, laws, plans, programs, division of function, and customs to supplement his basic instinct for survival. So in the present situation men are obliged to rely on social institutions to assist them in the undramatic but nonetheless heroic adjustments of a peacetime defense program. They rely, for example, on a selective service law to impose the obligation of military service with equity and fairness on all. They support continuance of burdensome tax laws in order to finance the defense program at home and abroad. They develop a civil defense organization to prepare themselves for an eventuality which they hope will never materialize.

Through these and many other measures people seek to use the common instrumentality of government to see that the sacrifices of the defense program are fairly distributed, its heaviest burdens eased wherever possible, and its functioning facilitated.

In this country the development of an adequate supporting system of social institutions for the defense program must take

Constitutional Limitations

into account the limitations placed on governmental power by our political concepts in general and our Constitution in particular. Some governmental powers are delegated to the federal government; others are reserved to the states; some functions are considered appropriate only to voluntary enterprise; certain rights are guaranteed to individuals. In time of actual war people are willing to make some temporary adjustments in this delicate balance of power but the long-time nature of the current defense program makes such emergency arrangements unacceptable. Ways must be found to meet defense needs within our long-time governmental structure.

Under the Constitution of the United States responsibility for the national defense is one of the powers placed squarely upon the federal government. This is spelled out in the following powers assigned to the federal Congress: appropriating funds for defense purposes, raising and supporting an army, providing and maintaining a navy, utilizing in the national defense the militias of the several states, declaring war. Over the years, through legislative enactment and judicial interpretation, many related powers have been derived from these basic powers. For example, in the actual presence of war the right of the federal military authorities to establish martial law as a matter of military necessity has been legally recognized. The Constitution specifically denies to the states the right to wage war and subordinates their militias to federal control insofar as national defense is concerned.

By contrast, governmental responsibility in the field of individual and social welfare was originally left largely to the jurisdiction of the states. In recent years, however, as the Constitution has been interpreted, the federal government has come to share in this responsibility under its powers "to lay and collect taxes . . . to provide for the . . . general welfare of the United States" and, to a somewhat lesser extent, under its power to "regulate commerce . . . among the several states".

The Federal-State Relationship

Many of the programs developed under the general welfare clause of the Constitution have operated through the grant-in-aid device; that is, federal funds have been made available to the states, under certain stipulated conditions and standards to stimulate and support their own programs in such fields as health, welfare, education, and services to farmers and workers. This arrangement has the advantage of reconciling the values of decentralization made possible by state and local administration in these sensitive areas of human need with the nationwide coverage and broader taxing power of the federal government. It has, however, come under some criticism in recent years as centering too much authority in Washington and is, therefore, a major point of study by the Commission on Inter-Governmental Relations and related state groups. Other long-time welfare programs are federally operated (as in Old Age and Survivors Insurance) or function through aids to private enterprise (as, for example, in some aspects of the housing program).

A Question of Policy

Thus the Constitution as presently interpreted gives the federal government broad legal authority under which it may, if such policies seem desirable, help to meet the human needs related to its program of national defense. Some programs for this purpose may be based directly on the defense authorities of the Constitution. In other cases it may appear better national policy to meet these needs through the long-time programs and devices established under the general welfare or interstate commerce provisions of the Constitution.

The problem is not at present so much a question of constitutional authority as of national policy. The question here is essentially this: How can social needs related to the national defense program, which is essentially federal in character, best be met without endangering the long-time values that lie in the decentralization made possible by state administration, the high productivity of non-governmental enterprise — whether for profit or community service — and the protection to individual liberty implicit in the constitutional separation of powers?

In the three sections that follow the welfare aspects of national defense are analyzed in terms of their basic purpose. Where programs exist to meet the needs discussed, these are mentioned; where no such program is now in operation past or possible methods of meeting these needs are cited. The very spelling out of these objectives, needs and programs makes clearer than any affirmation the complex challenge that confronts our democracy.

4 The Sharing of Sacrifice

COLLECTIVE SACRIFICE IS IMPLICIT IN NATIONAL DEFENSE BUT IT FALLS UNEQUALLY ON individuals. Citizens in a democracy will freely and courageously make such sacrifices when there exists (1) belief in their necessity, which in turn depends on the imminence or recognition of danger, (2) conviction that such sacrifices are imposed as fairly as circumstances permit, and (3) the fullest possible use of common resources to distribute the burdens and compensate for disproportionate losses.

In a democracy these three factors must be treated not as a desirable accompaniment of the defense program but as an organic part of defense policy, since absence of popular support for the necessary legislation would automatically doom the entire program to failure. This is especially true with respect to our present type of peacetime, long-range, defensive program of preparedness when the primary purpose of the defense program is to avert rather than meet actual attack.

Welfare measures undertaken for these purposes cannot be viewed as competitive with the defense program, either in terms of cost or policy. If there is a competitive claim against the national economy, it is not between the defense program and social measures undertaken to ease its sacrifices but rather between those making major and those making minor sacrifices. Thus, for example, it might conceivably be said that those seeking relief from high taxes were in competition with those requiring servicemen's dependency allowances or benefits, but not that the welfare concept, as represented by the dependency allowances, was in competition with the defense program.

Much of the discussion of what we can "afford" in a defense economy reflects this basic conflict between the obligation placed on some to make major sacrifices in the interests of national defense and the natural desire of all groups to keep their own sacrifices at a minimum level. As in all such conflicts of interest in a democracy, it is important that they be resolved in terms of the highest denominator of common interest. In national defense the common interest lies clearly on the side of equalization of sacrifice. This is especially true in the face of a danger which is political and psychological as well as military.

We have seen in many parts of the world the tragic results — in terms of susceptibility to subversion and unwillingness to make sacrifices — of policies which do not recognize as basic to a defense program the element of fairly-shared responsibility and burdens.

Some of the sacrifices imposed by the defense program and actual or possible measures to ease them are discussed in the following paragraphs.

PEACETIME MILITARY SERVICE

a. *Peacetime military service* imposes the heaviest sacrifice on young men, who are asked to give up, for two years at a crucial period of their lives, freedom to choose their occupation, place of residence, and way of life in order to serve in the armed forces. In a measure this sacrifice falls also on their young women contemporaries, who are thereby deprived of a normal and important factor in their lives. Many of these young people marry, have children, and struggle to establish some semblance of family life even against these heavy odds. Often young wives with their children follow their servicemen husbands about the country in an understandable if socially disruptive effort to keep the family together. Others who would normally have depended on these young men — widowed mothers, for example — are likewise deprived of their support.

Our peacetime defense program also imposes disproportionate sacrifices on those members of the medical profession subject to compulsory military service. For many this service means a very real sacrifice in loss of income, impairment of practice, and family disruption.

It is impossible to compensate in any real measure for the sacrifices involved in compulsory peacetime military service. The loss of this time, which would normally be devoted to the continuing processes of social and economic adjustment, is widely accepted — so long as it falls fairly on young men of draft age — as a part of the price of national security. However, certain provisions are made directly by the federal government, either through the armed services or the Veterans Administration, to compensate for specific losses or handicaps. The individual serving in the armed forces is maintained, equipped, furnished with medical care, and paid a small sum in cash. His dependents receive a dependency allowance and, in some instances, medical care. Families of officers and non-commissioned officers may be furnished housing. It is now proposed* that medical care be extended on a more adequate basis to all dependents of servicemen wherever they may live. It has also been proposed that peacetime military service be covered on a permanent basis for social security purposes.

Provisions are also made for the religious and many of the recreational needs of men in the services. An apparent weakness in the present provisions in the armed services, however, is the absence of well-organized social services to assist servicemen and their families with personal problems growing out of or aggravated by their military service. Such social services exist at present only within the medical services of the Army and, to a lesser degree, the Air Force. During the war years welfare officers were generally available to assist servicemen with personal problems growing out of or aggravated by their military service. The availability of such welfare personnel can be a major factor in locating and easing situations of unusual personal hardship.

Of equal importance is the availability

* S 3363, introduced in the 83rd Congress, was not acted upon, but a smiliar bill will undoubtedly be introduced in the 84th Congress.

of a network of social services to those left behind by the serviceman's departure from home. Even though such a helping hand may never be required the very fact that aged parents, dependent wives and young children have a place to turn in case of crisis can be a major factor of reassurance. While the Red Cross Home Service and other voluntary agencies provide this type of aid to the limit of their facilities, the local public welfare office must also be relied on as the only governmental social service agency of universal coverage.

On leaving military service many problems of readjustment to civilian life may again constitute a special hardship. Provisions are, therefore, made to assist the young veteran complete his education, locate a job, establish himself in business, or secure housing. If he has suffered injury or impairment of his earning power, medical treatment and financial compensation are made available to him. A program of veterans' benefits and services to compensate for specific handicaps caused by military service is a major aspect of any defense program.

ECONOMIC DISLOCATION

b. *Economic dislocation* resulting from national defense imposes peculiar sacrifices on certain individuals, business enterprises, and communities. People may lose their jobs, their homes, and their whole way of life as a result of changes brought about by the defense program. They may be obliged to move to new locations, learn new skills, and accept a reduction in the general level or certain aspects of their standard of living. Businesses may lose their market or the raw materials needed for existing products, be obliged to convert to wholly new types of production, or incur heavy costs for a defense market of uncertain duration.

Communities with a concentration of defense activity may find their facilities overwhelmed by an influx of population at the very time when their tax base is reduced by their inability to tax property acquired by the federal government. Should compulsory dispersal of strategic industries become an aspect of defense policy, other communities might find themselves deprived of their major economic base.

Many of the actual or potential measures for easing the disproportionate burdens resulting from economic dislocation are discussed in the next section on the facilitation of adjustments necessary to the defense program. It is, however, important to give recognition to the factor of equalizing sacrifice as well as to facilitating government objectives. For example, the farm tenants who were dislodged from their homes and their source of livelihood in the development of the atomic energy facility at Savannah River suffered heavy losses but received no compensation from the federal government beyond their actual moving expenses. Some of the charges involved in economic dislocation must be regarded as a simple question of fairness and equity. Not only would this involve reasonable compensation for the economic losses involved but also positive help in becoming constructively re-established. Unemployment as a result of defense dislocations would fall into the same general category.

COMMUNITY LOSSES

c. *Some community losses* can likewise be directly attributed to the defense program and impose a disproportionate collective sacrifice on those who make up the community. While defense activity may bring economic benefits to the communities in which it is centered, it may also impose handicaps. These need to be weighed in the balance in the interest of equity. The withdrawal of large property holdings from the tax base by reason of federal ownership involves such a sacrifice

and warrants compensation in the form of payments in lieu of taxes.

At the present time virtually the only compensatory aid given such communities relates solely to the education of children whose presence in the community results from federal defense activity. Since the families of these children would doubtless not remain were schooling not available to them, this aid is more in the nature of "facilitation" than compensation. Communities also deserve full protection against any special hazards involved in the location of a defense activity in their midst.

THE COST OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

d. *The cost of national defense* is inevitably heavy and its burdens must be fairly distributed. This is partly a question of general economic policy, partly a question of taxes, and partly a question of social services. Since inflation constitutes by all odds the least equitable way to finance a defense program, economic policies must be such as to maintain a reasonable balance between current income, savings, and prices. Wartime economic controls in the form of rationing, price and rent control, wage stabilization, foreign exchange and raw materials control belonged in this category. In peacetime governmental fiscal policies that maintain economic stability are basic to a successful defense program.

The principle of graduated taxation is generally accepted in this country today, and most Americans recognize that in time of general sacrifice the range of disposable income left to all individuals inevitably will narrow. But the more people are asked to share their personal income — through taxes — for the common good, the more they must likewise depend on each other for insurance against personal disasters and emergencies. This same principle may also be stated in this way: people will more willingly pay taxes which reduce the surplus in their current income, if they know that they have at least minimal assurance through governmental measures against the needs of their own old age and other hazards. In this sense social security, public assistance, health, and other social measures are basic to the defense program.

5 Facilitation of Necessary Adjustments

WHILE SOME SOCIAL MEASURES CONTRIBUTE TO THE GENERAL MORALE ON WHICH DEMOcratic support of the defense program depends, others contribute to its purposes in a more immediate and direct way. As we have repeatedly seen, the essence of national defense is the achievement of a variety of rapid adjustments at a time when people lack the goad of immediately felt danger. This can be facilitated in a democracy through organized measures that offer inducements to change and minimize its difficulties. Especially is this true in a long-range, peacetime defense program when people are properly reluctant to disturb the balance of political power discussed in Section III by imposing change through compulsion. Thus in a democracy social measures take the place of that imposition of change through force and terror which characterizes a police state.

Some of the changes and adjustments essential to the success of the defense program are described herewith.

MILITARY MORALE

a. *Building an adequate peacetime military establishment* involves more than the equitable application of the Selective Service Act. Equally essential is a permanent career service, composed of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men to serve as a nucleus and source of leadership and training for our shifting citizen military force. Moreover, the extent to which the efficacy of both the career and citizen components of the military establishment depends on morale factors has recently been recognized by a number of studies* made for those concerned with national defense policy.

If men and women are to be attracted to military service as a career, it must offer them inducements comparable to those available to them in civilian life. These include: respect and standing as an occupational group; suitable compensation, including provision for such related benefits as medical care, retirement income, and protection against disability; satisfactory

* e.g. *Medical Care for Dependents of Military Personnel,* Report of the Citizens Advisory Commission on Medical Care for Dependents of Military Personnel appointed by the Secretary of Defense, Washington, Department of Defense, June, 1953. Also the "Womble Report," a memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel), constituting the *Final Report – Ad Hoc Committee on the Future of Military Service as a Career That Will Attract and Retain Capable Career Personnel,* J. P. Womble, Jr., Rear Admiral, U.S.N., Chairman, 30 October 1953.

living arrangements including housing, education for their children, recreational opportunities, social services and a good community environment; and reasonable opportunities for civic participation.

The present situation in the armed forces appears far from satisfactory in some of these respects and extremely spotty in others. For example, the availability of medical care for dependents of those in service depends at the present time on their proximity to a military installation providing such care. This would be remedied by the enactment of the type of legislation proposed by the Department of Defense which would permit the purchase of medical and hospital care for such dependents from civilian sources if military facilities were not available. Housing for the dependents of career military personnel is extremely uneven, especially in those installations undergoing rapid expansion. Private housing for such personnel, constructed under the government mortgage insurance provisions of the Wherry Act, is often located on federal property and seems to fall into a No Man's Land insofar as responsibility for related community services is concerned.

Community Relations

The relationship between career military personnel and the civilian communities on which they depend for many aspects of their lives is one which could benefit by clarification generally. In a large peacetime military establishment it is important that there be a minimum of isolation between the military and civilian communities; military personnel should be encouraged to participate fully in community life and communities should assume responsibility for the needs of military families on the same basis as any others. Such a close reciprocal relationship has the double advantage of minimizing the handicaps of military service and contributing to civilian knowledge of, identification with, and support for the defense program. Government policies to promote such a relationship and the assignment to this task of specific qualified personnel within the military establishment, as has been done in the case of the Air Force, would seem a good investment. Such policies should recognize and encourage the unique role of voluntary agencies in bridging the gap between civilian and military life.

The Morale of the Draftee

The situation with respect to those serving under the Selective Service Act is somewhat different in that their service is assumed to be temporary in duration and is not subject to the veto of their own free choice. Nevertheless, morale is an important factor in the degree to which they are able to concentrate their full energy on their training and assigned tasks, as well as in its effect on the civilians to whom their state of mind is important. Components of morale in their case would appear to include the following: full acceptance by the civilian population, including the community in which they are living; opportunities for recreation outside the military environment; freedom from worry about the welfare of dependents and others at home, including a channel of communication and help through social service in case of need; knowledge that jobs and other opportunities will be available to them when their service is completed.

Some of these factors of morale are dependent on governmental policies: adequate financial, medical and other provisions for dependents of men in service depend primarily on governmental programs, as do measures for their readjustment after their service is completed. Others are recognized to depend primarily on voluntary measures and community attitudes: here again, however, the designation of morale and community relations

officers can do much to facilitate closer ties to the civilian community and civilian programs. Re-establishment of a civilian advisory and liaison committee at the top level in the Department of Defense on these morale factors in the armed services might likewise be desirable.

DEFENSE PRODUCTION

b. *Expanding or converting to defense production.* While people remain as always the indispensable instrument of national defense, modern technology has placed at their disposal a complex array of weapons and other equipment, ranging from the simplest necessities of life to the hydrogen bomb itself. The production of these elements of modern defense involves major changes and expansions in the industrial structure. In some cases existing plants must be converted from the production of civilian consumption items to defense necessities. In other cases new plants must be constructed and new equipment purchased to make products the future market for which may be extremely uncertain. In some cases production may be undertaken directly by the federal government. In all cases careful planning is necessary to assure the most efficient possible use of productive resources, including manpower, and a minimum of social and economic dislocation. At all times the problem of future flexibility, security, and adaptability to developing technology and changing conditions must be considered. The resources of government must be used as required to facilitate both the economic and social adjustments involved.

The Defense Contract

The principal method of securing defense production is through the defense contract, either awarded on a low bid basis, or negotiated by a governmental agency such as the component units of the Department of Defense or the Atomic Energy Commission with a private individual or enterprise. Such contracts may involve the purchase of a product on either a fixed or actual cost basis, or they may involve the performance of a particular job or service (as in the construction of a federal plant, power dam, or military installation), or they may involve an arrangement with a particular private contractor to operate a plant for the federal government as in many atomic energy installations.

Location

Several social factors enter into the letting of defense contracts. Location is often a major consideration. When a particular job involves a large expansion of the labor force, on either a permanent or temporary basis, it is important that labor either be available locally or that the community be capable of absorbing additional population. Efforts have been made to place defense contracts, other factors being equal, in communities having a labor surplus as a result of economic dislocation. Efforts have also been made to avoid too tight a concentration of defense production, both for social and strategic reasons.

Labor Policy

Defense contracts also involve questions of labor policy: under the Walsh-Healey Act minimum wage stipulations are made a part of federal contracts and under existing executive orders race discrimination in employment policy under defense contract production is precluded. In both these cases the federal government uses its enormous economic power as a consumer to influence the policies under which defense production is carried forward.

Social Services

During World War II the federal contracting agencies permitted the inclusion under defense contracts of many social services as a part of the cost of production. Health programs, extensive recrea-

tional activities, day nurseries, and a variety of social services were often developed in this way under company auspices. Present policies do not appear to encourage such practices, partly as a matter of economy and partly on the assumption that tax-supported social services should operate under governmental auspices. However, the growth of fringe benefits, especially with respect to medical care, as a common industrial arrangement and the broadened concepts of personnel management have undoubtedly been reflected in production operating under defense contract.

Tax Concessions

Plant expansion for defense production has been encouraged by tax concessions permitting a more rapid amortization of capital investment for this purpose. This policy is an example of the use of governmental authority to facilitate adjustments to defense requirements on the part of one factor in the economy and, therefore, corresponds roughly to the provision of social services to facilitate personal adjustments.

Government-Owned Defense Plants

Some defense production has been undertaken directly by the federal government, as for example in military ordnance plants. In this situation the federal agency assumes the role of employer and carries the same obligations to its employees and the communities in which its operations are located as any other large-scale employer.

The discharge of this responsibility to its employees is somewhat complicated by the relative inflexibility of governmental procedures and policies, as well as by the difficulties of applying to industrial production personnel policies designed for the regular civil service. The discharge of a normal employer's responsibility to the community is virtually impossible until some method of financial contribution is devised, either through property taxes or some form of payment in lieu of taxes. While some defense communities formerly received aid for such basic facilities as water and sewage systems, at the present time such contributions are limited to the single purpose of education. It is likewise essential that representatives of the employing federal agency participate fully in community planning and social projects, both governmental and voluntary, affecting the efficiency and welfare of their employees.

Transitional Unemployment

Large scale conversion to defense production can often produce temporary unemployment during the transition period or the displacement of workers whose particular skill is no longer required. Adequate unemployment compensation to carry workers through the transitional period and help in getting relocated for those displaced should, therefore, properly be considered an intrinsic element in the conversion process. Similar provisions to cover ultimate reconversion to civilian production are likewise an inherent aspect of national defense. Such assurance would go far to overcome any reluctance to shift into and remain with defense production in a mixed economy situation.

Control Measures

In a tight economy where civilian and defense production are in competition for a limited supply of strategic raw materials, capital equipment, foreign exchange, or manpower, governmental allocations and controls might become necessary. Measures to ease the hardships and adjustments imposed on individuals by such controls would contribute directly to their acceptance in the common interest by those affected.

MANPOWER ADJUSTMENTS

c. *Manpower adjustments* are a major factor in defense mobilization. With de-

fense production superimposed on civilian requirements and several million potential workers diverted into the armed services efficient use of the country's full labor potential becomes a primary defense necessity as well as a matter of desirable social policy. In order to achieve this objective many people must be encouraged to move to new locations, often changing not only their jobs but also their way of living; others must acquire new skills and still others must be drawn back into a labor market from which they had—whether through choice or necessity—retired. In addition the efficiency and productivity of each individual worker must be enhanced by all possible means; unnecessary labor turnover must be discouraged and each worker used at his highest skill.

The very fact that the countries of the world at present aligned against the democratic concept of life have at their command greater *numbers* of people than we makes it imperative that each individual American be encouraged and enabled to function at his highest level.

Migration

Migration, with all its attendant problems of individual and community adjustments, presents the most conspicuous social problem of the defense program. Large new installations like the atomic energy plants at Savannah River in South Carolina and Georgia, and at Pike County, Ohio, require large crews of temporary workers for their construction. Over twenty thousand are currently employed in the Ohio development and Pike County alone has increased in population from 14,576 to nearly 30,000 within two years. School enrollment has jumped from 3,900 to 7,525. Other cities, as a result of a concentration of defense activity, have experienced a very great acceleration in their normal rate of growth. For example, Augusta, Georgia, doubled its population in one year; Moses Lake, Washington, doubled in two years; Richmond, California, is five times bigger than in 1940.

Fortunately, migration is a traditional and continuing aspect of American life so that individual and community adjustments are more easily achieved than in more settled cultures. Nevertheless it is important that available labor be quickly directed to the places where it is needed and that conditions in defense employment and defense communities be such that needed workers and their families will remain to complete the job that needs to be done. Many instances can be cited of delays and increased costs in defense activity owing to difficulties in securing or retaining workers with the needed skills either locally or through in-migration. Other cases have been reported of difficulties created for defense communities by the voluntary in-migration, again often with their families, of workers not qualified for available defense jobs.

Directing the Labor Force

An effective policy in directing labor on a voluntary basis to needed defense employment would appear to involve three elements: (1) full utilization of the available local labor supply, (2) directed placement of workers from outside the labor market area (including the converse discouragement of unqualified workers through public information measures), and (3) assurance of suitable living arrangements and related community services to absorb the additional workers needed in the defense communities and thus create an effectively stable labor supply.

The direction of labor to needed defense employment is essentially a job for public employment offices and requires a nationally coordinated system. In some

instances social services of various kinds can also do much to facilitate constructive migration and to minimize the disruptions in family life it entails. Such social services are often provided by voluntary agencies like the Travelers Aid, by the public welfare departments, and — in at least one notable instance* — by the public employment office. The provision of loans and other financial aids to facilitate migration might prove a worthwhile investment in certain cases of defense dislocation.

In time of war or extreme emergency it might well become necessary to direct the labor supply to essential employment by a system of compulsory labor service as was done in England during World War II. In such a situation the same obligation to equalize burdens and compensate for unusual hardship would apply as in the case of compulsory military service. In a peacetime effort to direct labor by voluntary methods, social services and aids can often serve as a facilitating factor and thus achieve defense objectives without resort to compulsion.

Expanding the Labor Force

Another method of meeting manpower needs is through policies to encourage the expansion of the local labor force. Full utilization of all available workers without arbitrary restrictions based on age, sex, race, national background, or creed is essential to a succesful defense program. Use of handicapped workers at jobs within their capabilities is also important and can be widely facilitated through rehabilitation programs. Many workers retired because of age can be effectively drawn back into employment, especially on a part-time basis. This is likewise true of those married women whose household duties do not require their full time and energies. Generally speaking, however, the mothers of young children cannot be effectively used as a means of expanding the total labor force, since experience has shown that virtually an equivalent amount of substitute labor must be found to care for their children. This might, however, be worthwhile in a few cases where the mother possessed a badly needed skill — as, for example, in the continuing acute shortage of trained nurses. Moreover, in those situations and localities where a substantial number of mothers have voluntarily gone to work outside their homes there is still need for day care and other measures for the protection of children as a matter of public social policy.

Training

Training in the skills needed for local defense production is also an important means to assure effective use of the nearby labor supply, minimize defense dislocation, and reduce migration. Training allowances or on-the-job training arrangements might in some situations be necessary to facilitate such retraining by individuals.

AID TO COMMUNITIES

d. *Aid to communities.* Manpower requirements related to defense require individual adjustments if they are to be met, but many of these individual adjustments are in turn dependent on community adjustments. Thus a community or cluster of neighboring communities cannot absorb large additional numbers of people in their capacity as workers without also preparing to absorb them as residents. People will not come to man defense jobs unless housing, schools, a healthful environment and reasonable opportunity for recreation are available to them.

Recent experience has demonstrated

* The Employment Service of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico provides a variety of social services to facilitate the migration of Puerto Ricans to the mainland.

that even temporary jobs cannot be filled without provision of the basic elements of family living. The days when construction work could be carried on by single men or workers willing to leave their families behind seem to be relegated to a less domesticated era. Such family solidarity connotes a healthy national life but it does impose a special burden of adaptation on communities requiring a temporary or permanent expansion of their working force for defense purposes.

This problem of community adjustment is complicated by many factors, some economic, some political, some social. Most communities, given sufficient time, would ultimately make all necessary adjustments through the operation of normal political and economic evolutionary pressures. In a defense situation, however, the national interest requires that those adjustments be accelerated and that they take place without excessive profits on the one hand or exploitation of individuals on the other. Moreover, the federal government itself is inevitably an interested party in this process since the success of the defense program, for which it is responsible, depends on community adjustments involving political responsibilities reserved under the American Constitution to the states and — by delegation — to their political subdivisions. Except in such rare cases as federal towns like Los Alamos and Oak Ridge (themselves unpopular because of their departure from the traditional American pattern of community responsibility) the federal government can only assist in this process; it has not the direct means of bringing it about.

Facilities

People working in defense communities need such direct facilities, benefits, and services as: a place to live, schools for their children, a place to worship, preventive and therapeutic health services, places for their children to play, police and fire protection, and ready access to their place of work. Often, however, communities are not equipped to assure these basic amenities of modern urban life without a complete overhauling of their own structure and authority. This is especially true when a community hitherto rural in character is suddenly expected to take on urban functions or where old political subdivisions are rendered functionally obsolescent by a new pattern of defense-related growth.

Here the first need is often for planning commissions, new patterns of taxation, revised zoning provisions, redistricting for school or other public administration, and frequently reorganization of the basic structure of local government as through incorporation. These fundamental political prerequisites to change are frequently (and understandably) resisted by the old-timers, who feel their own control to lie within the old political mechanisms, thus complicating and delaying adjustments which are ultimately inevitable and in the interest of all.

Facilitating Social Change

Frequently it requires an outside catalytic agent to break through the impasse created by these conflicts between new pressures and old adjustments, and thus speed the normal evolutionary process. Similarly this process often requires a specialization of knowledge and a degree of technical competence not normally available in such a community undergoing an explosive transformation from rural to urban condition. It is primarily in terms of this latter need that the national voluntary organizations affiliated with the United Community Defense Services have been able to facilitate social change in the areas of their specialization. State agencies, like the public welfare and health departments, normally perform this type of service for

their local counterparts. In at least one state (Pennsylvania) special state funds are available through the state planning commission to assist communities undergoing rapid expansion and adjustment. Such services can be extended on a broader scale with the special planning funds for small communities provided by recent federal housing legislation.

The Federal Government and Defense Communities

The relationship of the federal government to these communities takes several forms. In some communities it must assume the usual community responsibilities of any large property owner or employer, if not legally at least morally. Even though the federal government is exempt from state and local taxation under the Constitution, as an employer and property owner it is dependent to a considerable degree on local services and benefits. Rarely, even in strictly military installations, is it able to provide housing for all its employees. As a matter of policy their children are expected to attend local schools. Their shopping is done and spare time spent in these nearby communities. Thus the existence of a safe, healthful, and functioning neighboring community is essential to a federal installation. At the present time federal aid is available to such communities only in the form of special funds for school construction and school maintenance and in the form of special insurance to private builders constructing housing for military and other defense personnel.

In other defense communities the role of the federal government is less direct. When a defense contract is placed with a private concern, the federal government assumes the role of customer or client rather than employer. However, since its work or order cannot be promptly and efficiently executed if community conditions are unfavorable, it is necessarily concerned with these conditions. In some cases such community conditions might in themselves be a determining factor in deciding where a defense contract is to be placed. In any case the contracting federal agency is directly concerned with the speed and success of necessary community adjustments.

Federal Measures

Several methods have been used in the past to further this federal interest. Special measures have been instituted to stimulate the provision of housing and related community services for defense workers, either through direct grants to governments or through federal mortgage insurance for private construction. During World War II under the Lanham Act federal funds were extensively used for the construction of needed local facilities, including schools, hospitals, recreational facilities, day care centers, sewer and water systems, and other public works. Federal agency field staff, both those assigned to regular federal programs and those especially employed for the purpose, extended technical help to defense communities in order to facilitate these adjustments. The field offices of the former Federal Security Agency were particularly active in this respect, but this function has not been assumed by its successor Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In fact there appears to be no federal agency extending this type of field service at the present time even though the problems of defense communities, as observed by UCDS field workers, continue to be acute.

6 Preparations Relating to the Possibility of War

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES IS DIRECTED TO THE OBJECTIVE of preventing war by a mobilization of such defensive power as to make war unattractive to any potential aggressor. On the other hand the very existence of a national defense program presupposes the possibility of actual hostilities. Preparations directed toward minimizing the dangers implicit in such hostilities and meeting the actual needs that could be expected to result from such hostilities must, therefore, be regarded as an essential aspect of national defense.

Moreover, it has been repeatedly demonstrated in recent years in other parts of the world that people will neither make the effort and sacrifices required by national defense nor take the risks involved in firm resistance to aggression and Communist conspiracy unless they are convinced that their government is taking all possible measures to protect them in the event of actual warfare. This presents a complex problem in this age when atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons subject the civilian population to unprecedented danger. Effective civilian defense must be highly organized and built around a continuing institutional framework; neighborly mutual aid can only be effective when related to such a solid core of governmental responsibility.

People need the knowledge that provisions and plans have been made; they need sufficient knowledge of those plans and policies to resist panic, protect themselves, and participate in the total mobilization of national recuperative effort an enemy attack would demand. They need to feel that a responsible government has taken all possible measures for their protection. This protection involves two types of action: those steps which can be taken in advance to minimize danger and those which are planned, on a stand-by basis, to be put into effect should an enemy attack occur. Each of these involves social factors.

MINIMIZING DANGER

a. *Measures to minimize danger* in the event of attack are an essential part of national defense. In view of the known accessibility of our cities to possible enemy attack one such measure might involve the dispersal of potential defense targets. Undoubtedly holders of strategic defense contracts have been encouraged to disperse such operations but there is little indication that such action has been compulsory with respect to already estab-

Dispersion

lished plants or that cities have been required to disperse their essential facilities or the residences of their population. Should such action be instituted on a widespread and compulsory basis, it would undoubtedly have to be accompanied by measures to facilitate the adjustments involved, compensate for individual losses, and equalize the sacrifices imposed on individuals in the total public interest.

Training

A second type of activity directed toward minimizing the dangers of possible enemy attack involves the immediate training of the civilian population in terms of the necessary knowledge, skills, and plans to meet such attacks. Under present arrangements the basic structure of such civilian defense rests within the regular units of government, aided by established community agencies. Citizen participation is related to this nuclear structure on a voluntary basis. The government, as the agent of shared responsibility, must or should, however, meet two costs involved in this training of the civilian population. To the extent that such training involves risks to the individual, there should be a sharing of that risk through governmental insurance protection. Moreover, for those who supervise such training as a part of their professional assignment financial compensation is essential and it seems reasonable that the federal government should share this cost.

Stockpiling

A third area of preparation involving the minimizing of potential danger covers the general category of stockpiling. Stockpiles are generally thought of as referring to the advance accumulation of strategic raw materials but some conditions might require also the stockpiling of such consumer items as clothing, food, medical supplies, bedding, and emergency shelter. The accumulation of adequate stores of such items is essentially a part of the emergency health and welfare programs covered in the following section. Any concerted effort at stockpiling may, however, result in social problems, either through the concentration of workers in the production of such materials or through the concentration of consumer shortages. An example of the former has been seen in certain communities affected by a concentration of uranium prospecting or the large scale exploitation of uranium deposits.

STANDBY PROGRAMS

b. *Standby programs for actual war conditions* are fundamental to national security in the modern world. Not only is our own country now accessible to enemy attack but available weapons make possible a measure of destruction that defies the imagination. Preparations against such attack cannot be left to individual initiative and voluntary enthusiasm but must be centered in governmental agencies, both those established for that purpose and the regular functioning departments of the federal, state, and local governments.

Moreover, it is important to recognize the extent to which problems created by enemy atomic attack on centers of civilian population would be essentially welfare problems. People who survived such an attack would be largely deprived of their normal ways of meeting their own needs. Such welfare problems as homelessness, joblessness, family separation, and lack of money, food, clothing, and medical care might well overwhelm all of the surviving population of a metropolitan area.

Obviously planning directed to meeting welfare needs on such a scale must embrace a wider area than the normal jurisdiction of local or even state government.

Plans and relationships must be established and maintained which combine the broader base of the federal and state agencies with the operational machinery and experience of local departments. To the extent that federal and state direction in this planning process can be supported by facilitating financial aid, it will be that much more effective.

A complete analysis of the problems of civil defense is clearly beyond the scope of this document which can only outline in broad terms the range of social factors involved in modern defense. Plans for civil defense must, however, be broad enough to cover the following possibilities, all of which involve a complex array of social problems:

1. Maintenance of law, order, and governmental processes.
2. Movements of people, either before or following enemy attack.
3. Loss of life, injury, and property destruction.
4. Maintenance of essential production, military operations, and services.

Each of these is briefly discussed from a welfare point of view in the following sections.

Maintenance of Law and Order

Present civil defense organization and policy place upon the regular governmental instrumentalities the responsibility for coping with emergency conditions following an enemy attack. However, it is conceivable that should an atomic attack or series of attacks be successfully carried out on centers of civilian population the disruption of normal governmental processes might be so complete as to require the imposition of martial law.

In this situation a serious welfare responsibility might devolve upon military government authorities in order (1) to bring to bear on the immediate needs of the devastated area or areas the complete welfare resources of the country, including those of nearby states, national welfare organizations, and any other possible sources of aid and (2) to re-establish the normal welfare responsibilities of state and local government. While operating within the framework of military authority and the military organization, such a function would require the highest possible measure of professional competence.

Evacuation

Movements of people on a large scale would be an inevitable accompaniment of enemy attack. To the extent that such attack could be anticipated the movement of people out of the target area would be a defense measure to reduce the extent of casualties. Such advance evacuation might take place in several stages: early evacuation of those in a peculiarly vulnerable condition, such as children, the elderly, and the handicapped; possible evacuation on a wider scale of all those not engaged in essential work; and conceivably the ultimate total abandonment of a doomed city.

Welfare problems involved in any program of large-scale evacuation are staggering in scope and complexity. In the first place any evacuation or movement of population assumes a destination. People must be *received* as well as removed. Those who are removed because of their particular vulnerability would by that very reason present peculiarly acute welfare responsibilities. Children must be assured adult care, preferably that of a member of their own families; persons institutionalized because of physical or mental disability would require similar institutionalization at their point of destination. Persons deprived of their normal

source of support by reason of their removal from target areas must have some substitute means of subsistence. Family separation and separation of individuals from their normal supportive social institutions are themselves welfare problems of the first magnitude. Carefully organized plans to anticipate these needs would be essential to prevent or minimize the danger of panicky, disorganized movements of people, a situation which would produce the most devastating welfare needs of all.

Enemy Attack

While the welfare problems of advance migration are complex and acute, those which would follow should an actual enemy attack occur in a heavily concentrated center of population are almost impossible to imagine. The extent of injury, loss of life, and destruction of property is limited only by the enemy's choice of weapon, the extent to which people had been successfully removed from the target area, and our hope for defensive weapons which either have not yet been invented or revealed to us.

Present planning must assume a potential devastation in which the extent of death, injury, and destruction would be incalculable. In such a situation health and welfare measures would become the predominant factor in efforts to save survivors, restore social organization, and share the weight of the disaster on the broadest social base. The provision of medical care for the injured, the identification and disposition of the dead, the housing and feeding of the homeless and destitute, protective care for children and helpless adults are all emergency health and welfare services of the most compelling nature. On a longer time basis the reuniting of separated families, relocation of the displaced, making provision for orphaned children, rehabilitation of the injured, and provision of a compensatory source of income for those deprived of their breadwinner or their own earning power are all examples of the contingencies for which plans must be made.

Economic Losses

The purely economic losses of such an enemy attack might be shared to a limited extent through a standby program of government-underwritten insurance against loss of property, life, or injury as was done during World War II. Economic assistance to meet immediate needs on a completely flexible basis would also be essential and its financing, in an emergency of such dimensions, would have to come from the federal government.

Restoration of Production

Among the many problems requiring personal service that would stem from such a catastrophe the probable loss of all types of personal – and in many cases official and business – records would loom large. Insofar as these records involved problems of personal identification and relationships this too would constitute a welfare problem.

The maintenance and restoration of essential production and services following an enemy attack would also involve social factors. Meeting the welfare needs of people in such a devastated area is obviously a pre-requisite to the re-establishment of any semblance of social organization or production. The injured, the dazed, the homeless, the hungry, and – above all – those obsessed with anxiety about lost children or missing members of their families cannot be expected to pick up the threads of their own social and economic responsibilities. Their own needs and anxieties must be dealt with – at least to some extent – before their social usefulness can begin to be restored.

The restoration of economic production would also involve the problem of coordinating available labor supply with surviving productive facilities. In some cases this also might involve the removal of people to undamaged centers of production; in other cases it might be necessary to make emergency arrangements to house workers needed for a defense plant that survived enemy attack. Restoration of essential facilities damaged by enemy attack would likewise involve provision for the temporary housing of the workers involved as well as many related services.

Basic to the successful restoration of a functioning community would be the restoration of normal governmental services and agencies, including those performing social functions. Careful advance planning could help to facilitate the transition from emergency to continuing programs, especially if federal planning and responsibilities were built upon the foundation of a long-time working relationship with established state and local agencies.

7 The Nature of Federal Responsibility

IN THE PRECEDING SECTIONS THE WAYS IN WHICH SOCIAL MEASURES AND WELFARE PLANNING are essential to a successful defense program have been briefly analyzed. In this section we examine specifically the role of the federal government with respect to these needs and the various methods available to it in meeting them.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR OVER-ALL DIRECTION

a. *Responsibility for over-all direction.* The Constitution places the basic responsibility for national defense clearly upon the federal government. Thus, whatever specific methods or instrumentalities are used in carrying out particular components of this responsibility, the responsibility itself cannot be delegated. This is as true with respect to the social factors of national defense as it is of the economic and military. For example, in the economic field the federal government may place with a private company a contract for some particular defense necessity, but it is the federal government itself that must write the specifications, pay the bill, and relate this particular item to an over-all national defense plan. So also with respect to the social factors of defense the federal government must draw up the plans and provide the measures necessary to putting them into effect as they are needed. Some of these measures may involve direct federal operation, some may be carried out through private enterprise, including the voluntary social agencies, and many in this field may involve the cooperation of state and local governments. But the responsibility for over-all planning, coordination, and direction is clearly federal.

The centering of such responsibility for the social aspects of defense is complicated by the fact that the basic welfare responsibility of the federal government lies outside the normal focus of defense responsibility. Moreover, these social responsibilities, while now concentrated primarily in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, are also diffused through other federal agencies such as the Department of Labor and the Housing and Home Finance Agency. Scattered and extensive as the social programs of the federal government are, they involve a concept of responsibility limited by specific legal provisions: the more general responsibility is assumed to lie with the states and many of the federal social programs are in fact carried out by state and local operating agencies. Thus federal defense policies, involving basic social poli-

cies and operations, must be superimposed on a highly decentralized administrative structure in which the factor of federal responsibility is normally minimized or at least regarded as contributory rather than primary. Clearly this requires a high measure of coordination and a sharply defined system of relationships.

An Effective Plan of Coordination

An effective plan of coordination and direction of the social aspects of defense policy would seem to involve the following elements:

1. The necessity of reconciling immediate or potential defense requirements with continuing civilian programs places the central coordinating responsibility upon the President and his immediate staff. The Office of Defense Mobilization appears the logical staff arm to assist the President in the discharge of this responsibility.

2. The Department of Defense and all other agencies with major defense responsibilities should have a high level office, staffed with persons qualified by experience and professional competence, to handle the social aspects of these responsibilities.

3. A continuing plan for coordination of policy and working relationships among the federal agencies concerned with the social aspects of defense is a practical necessity. Responsibility for liaison with other operating agencies on defense-related matters should be centered at a single point in each agency. The individuals charged with this responsibility, or their superiors, would logically constitute a coordinating and planning committee on the social aspects of defense policy, functioning under ODM sponsoriship. These agencies would include the Departments of Defense; Health, Education, and Welfare; Labor; the Federal Civil Defense Administration; Atomic Energy Commission; Housing and Home Finance Agency, and others on specific matters.

4. Major responsibility for the coordination of most of the social aspects of defense policy in relation to state and community programs and needs would appear to lie logically with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. This responsibility should include not only the interpretation of federal policy to the states and to local agencies but also the reporting back to the federal government of unfavorable local situations and developing welfare problems that might impede the defense program.

5. Through these operating and coordinating mechanisms a total program should be worked out comprising the following elements: (a) immediate measures needed to meet immediate situations, (b) measures enacted on a stand-by basis to be put into operation should the need arise, and (c) an emergency plan, which could be activated in case of full mobilization, immediate danger, or surprise attack.

RESPONSIBILITY AS AN EMPLOYER

b. *Responsibility as an employer.* The federal government must assume a direct responsibility toward those it employs. In a defense situation many of these persons have been obliged to become federal employees – as members of the armed forces – involuntarily and are subjected to unusual hazards in the national interest. Toward these persons the federal government must assume full responsibility not only during their military career but also – to the extent they have suffered a permanent or temporary physical impairment and social dislocation as a result of military service – after it is finished. Responsibility toward members of the military forces and toward veterans is a primary federal obligation. That of the states, local

governments, and voluntary organizations is supplementary to this primary federal responsibility.

The federal government's responsibility toward its civilian employees, whether in regular civil service or in defense production, is also a direct responsibility even though less extensive than that toward its military personnel. In its own interest, as well as in fairness to its employees, it must assume the same measure of responsibility toward its workers as any other employer.

RESPONSIBILITY TOWARD COMMUNITIES

c. *Responsibility toward communities.* The federal government also has a direct responsibility toward the communities in which it functions as a large-scale employer or property owner. The discharge of this responsibility is, however, complicated by the fact that the federal government is not subject to local jurisdiction with respect to tax and other laws. Three types of situations appear to exist here:

1. In a very few cases, notably Oak Ridge, Tenn., Los Alamos, N. M., and Richland, Wash., communities have been developed wholly on federal land and within federal jurisdiction. In such an arrangement, not generally regarded as a very satisfactory one in terms of American concepts of social organization, the federal government itself assumes all normal community responsibilities.

2. In a typical military reservation and other types of federal installations the federal government assumes many normal community responsibilities toward those of its employees residing on federal property.

3. In the majority of cases nearby communities are expected to furnish normal community services to federal employees. In the case of an unusual burden in the field of education special federal grants are made to such communities. Payments in lieu of taxes are authorized (though not actually made) in the case of the Atomic Energy Commission and would appear a logical obligation in view of the extra services required of such communities as a result of federal activities and the influx of new employees.

There appears to be a serious need for clarification of federal policy in this regard: first, as to the degree to which it is considered desirable that federal employees be treated as a part of the surrounding civilian community, and second, as to the extent to which the federal government should assist such communities in meeting the costs involved.

RESPONSIBILITY AS A CONTRACTOR

d. *Responsibility as a contractor.* The negotiation and execution of large contracts by the federal government also involves certain responsibilities with respect to the social aspects of defense. The location in which such contracts are to be carried out is a major factor in minimizing many of the social problems discussed in the report. The labor and hiring policies of such contractors are of proper concern to the contracting federal agency. The definition of allowable costs for purposes of reimbursement under cost-plus contracts should be sufficiently broad as to allow such contracting agencies to fulfill the normal welfare obligations of employers toward their employees and the communities in which they function. In a few cases of excessive isolation from normal community services (as, for example, in the construction of off-shore bases or the assignment of American labor to contracts on foreign soil) it might be necessary for the contracting agency itself to provide services usually available in the typical American community and this too should be considered in the process of contract negotiation.

USE OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

e. *Use of private enterprise as the agent of federal policy.* Private enterprise can also serve in other ways as the medium for the discharge of federal defense responsibilities of a social character. In some cases a federal defense agency might well contract with a private enterprise, agency, or individual to carry out functions which it might otherwise be obliged to perform itself. Should the proposal to utilize private physicians and hospitals in furnishing medical care to dependents of servicemen — in situations where federal care was not directly available — be adopted, this would be an excellent case in point. Another situation in which private enterprise has been encouraged to meet a recognized federal social responsibility involves defense and military housing, where a substantial part of the cost of such housing is underwritten through federal mortgage insurance.

CONTROL MEASURES

f. *Control measures.* Private enterprise might also be subjected in some instances to federal control in the interest of defense requirements involving social factors. Federal rent control in defense-crowded communities was an example of the use of this method.

REGULAR FEDERAL PROGRAMS

g. *Use of the regular federal programs.* Defense functions of a social character carried out through the regular programs of the federal government is also a method used in some instances in the past. For instance the Old Age and Survivors System was used during World War II as a means of administering special insurance against losses incurred as a result of civilian defense activity.

FEDERAL-STATE COOPERATION

h. *Use of the states and their political subdivisions* as the instrumentality of federal defense policy in the social field offers the widest range of possibilities for the discharge of federal defense responsibilities with the least disruption of normal political relationships and safeguards. State and local agencies in the fields of health, welfare, education, and related social services are uniquely equipped with the structure, coverage, personnel, and authority to perform governmental functions of a social character. In the defense field this can be done in a number of ways:

1. Special federal assistance can be offered to states or local communities in meeting defense-related problems, such assistance to be made available under specified conditions at the request of the recipient. Present grant-in-aid programs for school construction and operation in defense-impacted areas belong in this category.

2. Regular grant-in-aid programs can be adapted to meet defense-related needs. Thus the public employment offices are used for defense placement, the public health program assists communities adapt to rapid urbanization, grants by the Children's Bureau to state welfare departments assist in extending child welfare services to areas affected by defense-related social problems, etc.

3. The appropriate state department — with its local affiliates — can be designated as the *agent* of the federal government in carrying out certain defense responsibilities. This method was used during World War II in the Civilian War Assistance program. Under this program a contract was drawn between the administering federal agency (then the Federal Security Agency) and the state public welfare departments whereby the latter agreed to fulfill specified functions and expend federal funds in meeting certain needs directly attributable to war or defense conditions. This method, however, presupposes the prior existence of a continuing working relationship between these federal and state agencies in terms of a related grant-in-aid program.

8 *The Summing Up*

Free people will resist with all the means at their command the threat of forceful aggression or conspiratorial subversion on the part of nations motivated by totalitarian political concepts even though their resistance imposes heavy burdens. These burdens will be willingly accepted and courageously borne when they are fairly shared by the whole people and their hardships eased by the supportive and facilitating strength of a common democratic government. Thus facilitating social services substitute in a democracy for the terror and compulsion used by totalitarian nations as an instrument of government policy in achieving defense objectives.

This analysis of the social factors involved in the defense program and the possible methods available to the federal government in dealing with them is necessarily an oversimplification of a complex process involving every facet of our national life and social organization. From this total picture, however, three broad observations clearly emerge:

➡ *There is urgent need for clarification of federal policy with respect to the social aspects of defense and for the establishment of coordinating machinery for this purpose both in Washington and throughout the country.* The absence of such policy and such machinery at the present time is the source of confusion, inefficiency, and grave potential danger.

➡ *There is need for a clear affirmation of long-time federal-state-local cooperative relationships in the social field.* It would seem incredibly foolhardy to scuttle or weaken with uncertainty the existing structure of federal-state relationships at a very time when national interests and federal defense responsibilities make the federal government most peculiarly dependent on existing state and local governmental machinery in these fields.

➡ ***It is apparent that the full contribution to the defense program of states, voluntary organizations and individual citizens cannot be mobilized until federal goals and policies are clarified.*** Our experience convinces us that there is a vast reservoir of eagerness to participate in and contribute to this heroic effort of our own generation to safeguard for those of the future the values, institutions, and aspirations that form our heritage from the past. The federal government, charged by the Constitution with responsibility for the national defense, can by clarifying its own role liberate this powerful force that resides in a free people and their institutions.

AN EXPLANATORY NOTE

About UCDS and This Report

United Community Defense Services (UCDS), since it began work in 1950, has assisted the people of hundreds of communities to meet health, welfare, recreation, and planning needs intensified by the national defense effort.

Some of these communities felt the impact of defense industries. Others found their community facilities overburdened by nearby military posts. More than a fourth of the communities helped by UCDS felt the effect of both types of pressure.

All of these communities had one thing in common: *they were vitally affected by the defense goals and policies of the federal government.*

A year ago the UCDS Board of Directors decided that this organization's first-hand observations and experience in working with people in defense communities cast a new light on many facets of the national defense program, and that this material should be made available to the appropriate government officials in the form of an analysis of federal responsibilities toward social welfare needs related to the national defense effort.

Elizabeth Wickenden was engaged as the consultant to prepare the analysis. She brought to her task the experience of many years in dealing with governmental activities in the social welfare field. After occupying a number of executive positions in the federal government (including the Office of Community War Services during World War II), Miss Wickenden was, for ten years, Washington representative of the American Public Welfare Association. She is currently serving as a consultant to several national organizations.

UCDS is a federation of national non-profit organizations (*see list on back cover*), established when our country embarked on its present defense program. The purpose of UCDS is to provide a means whereby national agencies can work together in a unified approach to help defense communities set up their own health, welfare, recreation, and planning services.

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United Community Defense Services

Participating Organizations

American Social Hygiene Association
Child Welfare League of America
Committee on Careers in Nursing
Family Service Association of America
National Board of the YWCA
National Catholic Community Service
National Committee on Social Work in Defense Mobilization
National Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers
National League for Nursing
National Probation and Parole Association
National Recreation Association
National Travelers Aid Association
National Urban League

Not Receiving Funds
American Federation of Labor

UCDS is financed by the United Defense Fund (UDF) as an integral part of a united program of service for those affected by the national defense program. The United Defense Fund in turn is supported chiefly through community chest and united fund campaigns.

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MARION JOINS IN HOPE YOU HAVE BEST OF ALL YEARS IN ~~1954~~ 1955. WE WILL BE TOASTING YOU AND YOURS AT MIDNIGHT.

BEST REGARDS.

LOUIS B. SELTZER

END 1119AM

ACK PLS

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Shaw, Charles

March 17, 1959

Dear Charlie:

I say you my thanks for your kind and generous letter.

It was a difficult decision to take mainly because it inconveniences a considerable number of cherished colleagues, but I felt I had no alternative.

I have been feeling for a number of years exactly what you express in your letter, namely, that most of us in broadcast journalism are merely middlemen handling some pretty shoddy goods without the opportunity even to examine their quality.

I haven't a clue as to what the year off will bring, but I'm sure it will not diminish my affection for you and your family.

As ever yours,

Mr. Charles Shaw
WCAU
City and Monument Avenues
Philadelphia 31, Pennsylvania

ERM:jmi

W
C
A
U

Philadelphia 31, Pa. / city and monument avenues · greenwood 7-8300

February 26, 1959

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Glenarden Farm
Pawling, New York

Dear Ed:

I have no reason for writing other than to congratulate you on your decision to take time for reflection and to express my envy of you. I have been terribly upset since my return from Cuba. I keep wondering if the reporting we get from all over the world is as bad as we got from such eminent reporters as Larry Allen and Bill Ryan. If it is, how can I remain in my job and maintain responsibility for passing on such information to a few million who listen to and watch our stations? Worse yet, how can I possibly do news analysis if I cannot trust the "news" I am supposed to analyze?

I am hoping I can get out. I am very interested in the possibility of trying to help the Cubans consolidate their revolution. I have had considerable correspondence and conversation with Cuban leaders about such an undertaking. After Cuba, there's Paraguay, Santo Domingo and Nicaragua. All of Latin American beckons with stories of great pith and moment.

Maybe I shall have to remain on after you have started on your sabbatical. Maybe I shall be at the same old stand when you return. But what will you return to? Do you see any hope that our business - print as well as broadcast journalism - will be any better in mid-1960 than it is now? Is there not the possibility that it will get worse?

Will you reflect on what can be done and how it may be done? I see no hope, and I am sick. I thought something could be done from within; but one is really trapped when he's inside. My fellow News Directors either smile at me or ask my aid in fighting for the repeal of Canon 35. Get the Bell & Howells into the courtrooms and all will be well!

As I said, I had no reason for writing you except that I wanted you to know how I feel. But my cowardice probably will keep me in this rather financially comfortable spot far too long.

Sincerely,

Charlie Shaw

Shaw, Charles

February 12, 1959

Dear Charlie:

Thanks for your letter of January 29 about Barry Nemeoff. I shall bear your remarks in mind.

Thanks again for that fine piece you did for me on Cuba. I shall feel free to call upon you again if ever the occasion arises.

With all good wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Charles Shaw
WCAU-TV
City and Monument Avenues
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

mcc

WCAU-TV

The Philadelphia Station for the CBS Television Network · CBS Owned

CITY & MONUMENT AVENUES, PHILADELPHIA 31, PA. · GREENWOOD 7-8300

January 29, 1959

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Ed:

My colleague Barry Nemcoff, who is television news editor, has applied for one of the CBS Foundation fellowships. This note is to let you know that his application has my full backing and that I think the broadcast industry, as well as Barry, would benefit from the additional education he would receive through this fellowship. His application will tell you that, having been born in China of Russian parents and having lived there until he was thirteen, he is fluent in Russian and Chinese as well as English. He got his bachelor's degree at Temple after a hitch in the Navy and now is an Army reserve officer in a branch that required top secret clearance.

I would very much regret losing his services for any length of time, but I would not want to stand in his way.

Thanks again for letting me do the bit for you last Friday night. There's a lot more I could say, but I might get maudlin.

Sincerely,

Charlie

Charles Shaw

CS:mr

Show, Chas.

November 20, 1958

Mr. Charles Shaw
WCAU-TV
City & Monument Avenues
Philadelphia 31, Pa.

Dear Charlie:

Thank you for your letter about Ed Randall's tape. I had already received the invitation from Mrs. Roosevelt, but unfortunately had to decline. I am working an eight-day week these days, and spare time is a rare commodity.

As ever yours,

WCAU-TV

The Philadelphia Station for the CBS Television Network · CBS Owned

CITY & MONUMENT AVENUES, PHILADELPHIA 31, PA. · GREENWOOD 7-8300

November 18, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Ed:

My colleague, Ed Randall, tells me that he has learned secondhand that Eleanor Roosevelt has invited you and Dr. Hutchens, or plans to invite you, to join her next Friday afternoon while Randall plays a tape he recorded with prominent white leaders in Norfolk, Virginia, for distribution by Friendly World Broadcasting, which Randall heads.

If you have received the invitation, I can tell you as the result of my long and most impressionable friendship with Randall that you will find this a valuable experience. I'm not going to run at length about Randall's background and what he's trying to do because I know you would want to find that out for yourself in conversation with him. The only reason for this note is to recommend that you try to accept Mrs. Roosevelt's invitation simply because I know this would be the kind of occasion which you relish.

If you're tied up at that time, I know that Randall would go far out of his way to let you hear the tape on another occasion, and explain not only what he is attempting to do but what he already has done - in my opinion an awful lot of good.

I have a lot of personal things to tell you but I'll write about that later on.

Sincerely,

Charles Shaw

CS:mr

Shaw, Charles

September 19, 1958

Dear Charlie:

Thanks for your note. You and yours will always be welcome at the farm or here in town.

I will look forward to seeing a chunk of the manuscript at your convenience.

As ever yours,

KRM:skh

Mr. Charles Shaw
WCAU-TV
City & Monument Avenues
Philadelphia 31, Pa.

WCAU-TV

The Philadelphia Station for the CBS Television Network · CBS Owned

CITY & MONUMENT AVENUES, PHILADELPHIA 31, PA. · GREENWOOD 7-8300

September 17, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Ed:

I haven't felt like writing you my thanks for your hospitality until Nancy had written the three of you, and she couldn't write until she had obtained the thing that she wanted to send along to you. Now that that has been safely dispatched, I join her in thanking you and Janet and Casey for the highlight of our year.

The changeover here at WCAU has been accomplished with very little commotion and I remain - although no formal announcement has yet been made to that effect - as head of an integrated News Department. The new television manager, Jack Schneider, seems like a very capable young (32) man, and he seems to have much more respect for news than did Vanda, who had very little. I remain on television at 1:00 p.m., Schneider having rejected network suggestions that we go back to Cronkite at that time, and I shall move from 9:55 a.m. to 8:55 a.m. with a five-minute roundup of regional news following a ten-minute network show. Starting October 11, I shall do a half-hour weekly show called The Face of Philadelphia, which will be a grab bag of problem-type Philadelphia stories "in depth!" We have already started producing a half hour of news at 7:00 a.m. daily and, while I am not involved on the air, I am kept hopping by supervision. There is talk also of my doing a Sunday show; so I won't have much time to spend in poolrooms. Of course, my nightly radio commentary continues.

You asked me to remind you by letter of my suggestion of Mayor Dilworth as a possible Person to Person guest. I was reminded of that yesterday when, in seeking film to back up a telephone report which Marion Anderson gave us on her United Nations job, I used the film of you and Miss Anderson together with Dilworth which we shot last year. My thought was, as I told you, that Dilworth would be a likely prospect because (1) He is perhaps the nation's outstanding "apostle of the big

city," about which he has tangled with such anti-city people as Frank Lloyd Wright; (2) he has a very interesting new house on Philadelphia's "society hill," facing Washington Square hard by Independence Hall, and he hopes to persuade other prominenters to return from suburbia or exurbia to city homes, and (3) he is one of the most progressive, controversial, gutty and telegenic men on the American political scene. You may recall that he was a bit of a hero in the Andrea Doria-Stockholm collision. I haven't approached him on this, but would be glad to do so if you desire.

I haven't had a moment to re-examine my book manuscript, but I certainly want to avail myself of your offer to show it to Mrs. Knopf. I want to make sure that it is good enough to show you before I send it along.

We move into our new house next Tuesday, and that will ease our burden somewhat. I suppose I will use any extra time to work with my Cuban friends, who seem to be progressing very well and who may be making some important news before next spring turns into summer.

All the best.

Sincerely,

Charlie

CS:mr

Shaw, Charl

August 13, 1958

Dear Charlie:

Thanks for sending me the Cuban piece. You haven't lost your touch.

When can we expect you and your family at the farm?

As ever yours,

Mr. Charles Shaw
WCAU
City and Monument Avenues
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

mce

W
C
A
U

Philadelphia 31, Pa. / city and monument avenues · greenwood 7-8300

August 8, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Pawling
New York

Dear Ed:

I remember a conversation you and I had at 49 Hallam Street between my return from France and my jaunt to Sweden, in which I said, "Wonder what we'll all be doing after the war," and you said, "Well, there'll be lots of revolutions, and they're always fun to cover."

The closest revolution I could find as my feet became itchy a few weeks ago was the one in Cuba; so I went there. This is what The Bulletin did with my report, which I also did in televised version - a half hour last Sunday with film I shot myself, the first I ever shot. Additionally, I milked seven radio shows and a small magazine piece out of the junket.

I also had much fun earlier this summer doing a half-hour television conversation with Professor Toynbee, whom I regard as one of the two or three greatest men alive. We arranged the conversation by correspondence; then we did the half-hour film show, using one camera with a 1200-foot magazine running all the time in one position and a second 400-footer taking closeup and reaction shots, in a total of 45 minutes from his arrival until his departure. And I've never been more satisfied with that sort of show; and, until I did the Cuban thing, I considered it my best ever.

I asked Toynbee if he and you knew each other, and he replied, "No, we have never met, but I would very much like to meet Mr. Murrow. I have the highest regard for him, especially for the work he did before the United States got into the war, and my regard has been increased by what he has done since."

Nancy, Kip and I continue to look forward to seeing you later this month. Kip does well at camp - he's on the tennis and other athletic teams and he's in the girls' chorus for a Gilbert and Sullivan show, which should have some psychological meaning of which I am unaware. We here at WCAU are awaiting our absorption into the CBS family, I with great eagerness and some others with apprehension. I may be wrong, but I feel that those who deserve to stay will stay.

Sincerely,

Charles

The Sunday Bulletin

News & Views

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EDITORIALS
WASHINGTON FRONT
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
INSIDE CITY HALL
TRAVEL & RESORTS

PHILADELPHIA, PA., AUGUST 3, 1958 VB

A Visit to Raul Castro's Rebel Hideout in Cuba

CHARLES SHAW

Charles Shaw, news director of Station WCAU, here reports on a recent trip to the rebel-held territory in Cuba.

Censorship has blacked out much of the news of the rebel movement, but Shaw's report shows that the rebel forces are still strong.

Shaw will also discuss his trip this afternoon at 3.30 P. M. over Channel 10.

By CHARLES SHAW

One of the most fateful revolutions in all the world today is being fought in the island Republic of Cuba, 90 miles from Key West, Florida; a little more than a thousand miles from Philadelphia.

A revolution against the government of President Fulgencio Batista was launched by a young lawyer named Fidel Castro and a handful of followers on July 26, 1953, and it seemed to die a-borning.

Ill-Starred Attack

Most of the rebels were wiped out in their ill-starred attack on the army barracks in Santiago de Cuba that July day. Castro was

year. Late in March, he proclaimed an April offensive to topple Batista.

On April 9, the rebels struck in Havana, Santiago and other cities; orders went out from the Sierra Maestra for Cuban workers to stage a general strike. The offensive failed; the strike call met with little response, and it looked like July 26, 1953, all over again.

Told of Kidnapings

I listened respectfully but doubtingly to Philadelphia members of the movement as they told me story after story of Fidelista activities, and they finally suggested that I go to New York to talk with Dr. Mario Llerena, Castro's personal representative outside of Cuba.

Dr. Llerena, a graduate of Princeton Theological Seminary and an ordained Presbyterian minister, spoke convincingly about the growing strength of the 26th of July movement in Cuba. And in the midst of my conversations with Dr. Llerena came news that rebels under Fidel's brother, Raul, had kidnaped 47 Americans and two Canadians.

Still in Business

That news, deplorable as it was, provided proof that the Cuban rebels were very much in business, so much so that they could kidnap not only American and Canadian businessmen at their isolated establishments, but American sailors and marines within sight of the U. S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay.

On the morning of July 14, armed with a short note from Dr. Llerena to a member of the 26th of July underground in Havana, I flew out of Philadelphia for the Land of the Secret Revolution.

Cuba welcomes tourists, but not reporters; so I went to Havana as a tourist. For the first few hours in Havana, I pretended to be interested in the usual tourist attrac-

Senora Gomez was expecting me; and with her was a man—let's call him Jose—who also was a Protestant churchman but of a different denomination from that of Senora Gomez.

They questioned me and I questioned them at great length. They wanted to know what I wanted to do, and I wanted to know how they proposed helping me do what I wanted to do.

And as I sat in that church, even realizing that Fidel Castro was reputed to be a dedicated Catholic, I began to wonder, especially as I recalled Dr. Llerena's Presbyterianism, if perhaps the 26th of July movement might not be essentially a Protestant effort to seize power in a predominantly Catholic country.

Outline Plans

But I said nothing about any such thoughts as Senora Gomez and Jose outlined their plans for me to travel the underground railroad to the Sierras and meet with either Fidel or Raul Castro and their fighting men. Jose excused himself, and Senora Gomez explained: "He go to bring the next man—how you say?—'up the ladder,' the man who next take charge of you."

As we waited, we talked about the religious life of Cuba, and Senora Gomez explained that Cuba is, of course, a Catholic country but its six-million population includes about 250,000 Protestants divided among Episcopalian, Methodist, Presbyterian, Baptist, Seventh Day Adventist, Pentecostal and other denominations. There are several synagogues in Havana, and many of the city's 50,000 Chinese attend Buddhist services.

"And," said Senora Gomez, "we have the very best relations . . . as you will see very shortly."

Priest Enters

I didn't have time to ask her to

CHARLES SHAW BOARDED a bus in Havana for the 600-mile journey to Santiago, capital of Oriente province, in eastern Cuba. He traveled all night. In Santiago, he made contact with the rebels, who took him by jeep to Raul Castro in his mountain hideout.



RAUL CASTRO

Castro, 27, younger brother of Fidel Castro, leader of Cuban rebel forces, was interviewed in his Cuban stronghold.

DEBORAH

Member of the top-level rebel Council of Twelve, Deborah is 28 and serves as interpreter for Raul Castro.

honest labor leaders, intellectuals, students, clerical workers . . . what

bet you he'd be insisting that I go to Santiago."

read one story about fighting in Cuba—a short item reporting that

Cuba on July 26. Castro was arrested and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Released 19 months later under a government amnesty decree, Castro went to Mexico and tried to reorganize his revolution.

With 82 followers, Castro returned to Cuba in December, 1956, to be met by government troops who killed all but 12 of the Fidelistas. Those 12, led by Castro, limped to safety in the towering, jungly Sierra Maestra, a mountain range which forms an almost impenetrable wall along the southeastern coast of Cuba.

There and then they began the revolution in earnest, a revolution conducted under the name of the "26th of July Movement." They named their movement for a failure which they hope will turn out to have been the beginning of success.

Off to Revolution

Three weeks ago tomorrow, after four months of secret negotiations with 26th of July representatives here in Philadelphia and in New York, I went off to see this revolution for myself.

Philadelphia members of the 26th of July Movement had argued with me that the Fidelistas were growing in numbers and enlarging the territory they controlled week by week but that the Batista government's censorship was so effective that hardly a word about the revolution was now reaching the outside world.

There had been quite a bit of news about Castro earlier this year, when he had been interviewed by Herbert Matthews of the New York Times. Castro was arrested in the usual tourist attractions. I hired a driver suggested by the hotel, one Armand, who showed me the sights, and I finally maneuvered him to a spot about a quarter mile from where I was to meet my first contact.

Out for a Walk

At that point, I told him I'd like to walk around awhile, and told him to return to the hotel. He grinned knowingly and let me out of the cab.

I walked away toward what Armand most certainly thought was a romantic rendezvous arranged beforehand but which actually was one of the dozen or so Protestant churches in Havana and its suburbs.

It was in that church that I began ten days of association with the Freedom Fighters of Cuba — fighters in uniform in the rugged mountains of Oriente province and fighters in mufti in cities like Havana and Santiago de Cuba.

Nameless Heroes

I had expected to find a lot of heroes in Cuba, but I expected to find them only in the mountains. Find them there I did; but I found even greater heroes—and heroines —outside the Sierras, nameless men and women, who daily risk their lives as members of the civilian underground.

At the church, I met a woman whom I shall call Senora Gomez, whose husband is one of the leading Protestant laymen in Cuba.

A TYPICAL SCENE in rebel-held Oriente province. Followers of Castro brothers keep on lookout for government troops amid thick foliage of their hideout.

I didn't have time to ask her to explain that remark; because there was a knock at the door, and Senora Gomez opened it to reveal Jose and the "next man up the ladder."

He was a cassocked priest of the Roman Catholic Church, who had come eagerly to a Protestant church to take charge of the *reportero* who had been sent to Cuba to "learn the truth."

Under a Sallman painting of the head of Jesus they sat: Senora Gomez, a member of one Protestant church; Jose, member of another Protestant church; and the priest of the Roman Catholic Church, whom I shall call Padre Gonzales.

All Are United

I remarked, perhaps ineptly, on Padre Gonzales' presence in that building, and he replied, without offense:

"In Cuba today, we are Catholics and non-Catholics only in matters of dogma, and there we differ as much as Catholics and non-Catholics in any country. But where liberty and decency and human dignity are concerned, we are merely Cubans. We are obeying the great commandments of Our Lord, and there is no place I will not go to do Our Lord's work."

I asked Padre Gonzales about charges that the Communists dominated the 26th of July Movement. With Senora Gomez and Jose nodding vigorous assent, the priest denounced the charges as ridiculous, but then he said:

"The next person you meet will be able to convince you of how false those charges are even better than I. Tomorrow morning, you will go to the Cathedral and ask for . . ." and he gave me the name of a church official whose identity I dare not even try to approximate.

Denies Red Charge

He was not the Cardinal; he was not a Bishop; but he was a churchman of considerable position. As for the charge of Communism, which has been made by the Batista forces, the churchman at the Cathedral said this:

"Do you think that we of the Catholic Church would support a movement about which there was the slightest suspicion of Communism? You know what a Communist government in Cuba would do to the Church. Don't you think we have investigated Fidel Castro and his brother, Raul, to our satisfaction?

"As you meet more of our people, you will see that they are people to whom Communism would be anathema. They include Catholic priests, leaders of your Protestant groups, men and women of property, honest business leaders, students, clerical workers . . . what I like to think is a cross-section of Cuban decency."

The churchman then gave me instructions for my next step. I was to go to a Catholic church and meet a man who would arrange for my trip to Oriente province.

Contact in Church

That meeting took place in the sacristy of the church. The layman who was waiting for me with the pastor of the church was a handsome young man, garbed in a long white linen shirt called a *guayavera* which hung outside his sharply creased tan trousers.

This lean and vital young man, whose cover name was something like Captain Bradley, had one of the most dangerous of all jobs in the 26th of July Movement. He traveled regularly between the Sierras and Havana as the adjutant to the Movement's national delegate for Havana, and he acted as if he felt he would be captured by Batista men long before the revolution had triumphed.

Receives Letter

Captain Bradley gave me a letter, which he suggested I secrete between the bottom of my right foot and the sock; but I suggested another hiding place which he immediately approved. Then he showed me a name and an address in Santiago, which he had me repeat until my pronunciation of the street and section names was satisfactory.

"Can you remember this?" he asked. Assured that I could, he tore the strip of paper into tiny pieces and distributed them among three wastebaskets in the sacristy.

Then, as I expected him to tell me how I should proceed to Santiago, he asked me how I proposed to get there. Unexpected as the question was, I replied immediately, as if something unseen was dictating my words:

"I think it would be most effective if I went to the Cuban government's Tourist Department and got them to suggest a trip to Santiago. I could tell them I had seen enough of Havana and wanted to see some of the countryside.

Uncle at San Juan

"I could act most interested in Pinar del Rio (in the exact opposite direction from Santiago) or Cienfuegis (to the south and west of Havana) and then (ad libbing as I went along) I could mention something about my uncle's having been with Teddy Roosevelt at San Juan Hill and ask how far that was and where it was.

"And when he mentioned Santiago, I'd say something about Hobson and the Spanish fleet, and I to Santiago.

Captain Bradley's eyes danced, and the priest grinned, and the courier in the *guayavera* said simply, "I'm not worried about you. I hope I'm still around when you get back."

I didn't quite have the nerve to go to the Tourist Department in person, lest my facial expressions or other mannerisms betray me.

I joined an American couple at lunch in my hotel so that I might complain about the so - called attractions of Havana within earshot of waiters, any one of whom might well be one of the hated *chivatos* (the word literally means "goat," but it is the equivalent of our "stool pigeon"); then I took my problem to the room clerk and had him put me in touch by telephone with somebody who spoke English at the Tourist Department.

Tourist in Havana

The man at the other end of the line soon was aghast that I, the nephew of a man who had fought at San Juan Hill, hadn't thought of Santiago right off. I worried lest he might have a list of the Rough Riders and would ask me for the name of my uncle.

But I never had to supply the name of my imaginary relative.

As I walked and rode around Havana to while away the time before my bus left, I reflected on what I had seen and heard.

On buildings fronting the Prado, on walls along the Malecon drive and elsewhere were dozens of posters soliciting votes for candidates in a presidential and congressional election scheduled for November 3. I had asked members of the 26th of July underground, bellboys, taxi drivers, waiters and others about the elections. They all scoffed, some more than others.

Hand-Picked Man

The consensus of the Fidelistas was that the elections probably would be postponed; but if Batista did decide to go ahead with them, the election of his hand - picked presidential candidate, Dr. Andres Rivero Aguero, was assured.

The feeling was that Batista then would reassume his old status of "strong man," the power behind the President, or become head of the armed forces, which wield the power in Cuba today.

Rivero, at the moment, has opponents, among them former President Ramon Grau San Martin, but the guessing is that they'll withdraw at the last minute if they're convinced the government is going ahead with the elections, their withdrawal to be a dramatic protest against the rigged elections.

The newspapers were filled with stories from and about the Middle East. But in ten days, I Cuba—a short item reporting that eight rebels had been killed in a skirmish—and one story reporting the arrest of several so-called "saboteurs."

Censorship is complete. The regulations require that Cuban newspapers report government activities only by publishing government handouts. The handouts must be used textually; they are to be played up or down as the government indicates.

Cables Censored

All outgoing cables are censored, and the correspondents are never told what happened to their cables — whether they were killed altogether or what parts may have been deleted.

Most Cuban newspapers are government-subsidized, and they can be killed simply by withdrawal of the subsidy. But, if necessary, they can be killed by being suppressed by the army and the national police.

Everywhere in Cuba — not just in Havana — boys and men hawk tickets for the National Lottery, drawings for which are held every Saturday. Customers are assured that the drawings are honest by the fact that the numbers are drawn by little girl inmates of an orphanage, who announce each number on a national radio network.

Batista's Fortune

Nobody doubts the honesty of the actual drawing; what everybody wonders is how much of the money is pocketed by government officials and how much is distributed among the holders of winning tickets.

Tourists returning to Havana after only a few years' absence are struck by the changing face of the city. New public buildings, new highways, new monuments are springing up throughout the city and its suburbs.

Batista's enemies say this is how he has accumulated a personal fortune estimated at between $200 million and $300 million stashed away in United States, Swiss and Spanish banks: the rakeoff on public works projects.

Talk of Corruption

Batista's foes talk about corruption; but, of course, they can't really document their charges with the sort of evidence that would stand up in court. Whether you believe the specific stories or not depends largely on your opinion of those who tell the stories. But even before you hear such stories, you sense corruption, and corruption as the dictionary defines it: "the state

Continued on Page 2

A Visit to Raul Castro's Rebel Hideout in East Cuba

Oriente Province Center Of Fight Against Batista

Continued From First Page

or effect of decay, impurity, taint, depravity, moral deterioration.

Havana reeks of such corruption; it is personified by the procurers on all the principal streets; the purveyors of pornography; the shills for obscene entertainment; the streetwalkers; the child beggars, two of whom threw stones at me when I refused them money; the shortchange artists.

Few Leave Havana

Unfortunately, only a very small percentage of American tourists ever see more of Cuba than Havana. Small wonder they have a low opinion of Cubans in general, that they can't get excited about a revolution which, they may have concluded, merely is an attempt by one gang of crooks to supplant the crooks in power.

But in Havana I had met people who bore all the earmarks of being as decent and honorable as any I had met anywhere: Senora Gomez, Jose, Captain Bradley, the priests, their superior in the Cathedral.

Even so, I had doubts about the character of the Fidelistas as a group, because the fetid atmosphere of Havana was overpowering; and within only a few hours after leaving the church where I had talked with Captain Bradley and the priest, I was assailed with doubts about the people of Cuba.

Bus on Schedule

The bus for Santiago de Cuba, 600 miles east of Havana, left on schedule, at 10.30 P. M. and was due to arrive at 11 the next morning. It was a most comfortable carriage, of the same type as our Greyhound buses, air-conditioned and with soft reclining seats.

It carried a crew of two—a driver and conductor, who punched the long triplicated tickets until they looked like strips from a player piano roll. There were about 50 passengers aboard, and I was the only one who spoke English.

The bus rolled out of garish, neon-lighted Havana into the darkness of the countryside, and I could see only the shadows of the palm trees, the banana trees and other tropical flora against the starlit but moonless sky. The headlights of the bus revealed a two-lane highway in fairly good condition.

10 Minute Halt

The driver gestured with his hand to indicate that I should rise, then said to the young soldier "Americano." The soldier smiled—it seemed apologetically—and waved his hand, palm outward, like a metronome to say that he would not bother me.

Procedure Repeated

The procedure was repeated outside of Holguin, and again I was spared.

At Cauto Cristo, between Holguin and Bayamo, we were halted at an Army post, and a mustached civilian in panamà hat and shirt sleeves came aboard, cursorily inspected the baggage racks, then took a standing position at the front of the bus, and he rode to Bayamo, about 20 miles along.

Between Holguin and Bayamo, the highway runs due south; and straight ahead one could see the forbidding Sierra Maestra. Somewhere in those mountains, I thought, is Fidel Castro, deploying his forces against a government offensive which, I had been told in Havana, had been going on for more than a month.

No Looks of Victory

How was he doing? There was no way of telling; but the government soldiers along the roadside and the ones who boarded our bus bore no expressions of victorious jubilation. It may have been my vivid imagination; but they all looked nervous and frightened to me.

Another search at Bayamo, this one more thorough than the others. But the driver's magic word "Americano" again kept my person and my combination attache case and overnight bag inviolate.

At Bayamo, the road turned east again, and we rode parallel with the Sierra Maestra. The mountains which had been only purplish silhouettes in the distance now assumed definition—some of the peaks were bare rock, others were verdant.

Somewhere in that vastness was Fidel Castro, perhaps relaxing this late forenoon with the works of Jose Marti, the poet-philosopher apostle of the 1895 revolution who, on the verge of the revolution's triumph, had been killed in the Battle of Dos Rios in Oriente province while advancing toward Havana.

Marti died at the age of 42;

Rebel Forces Operate on Three Fronts in Cuba



Fidel Castro, rebel commander, directs operations on the First Front deep in the Sierra Maestra mountains. His younger brother Raul, who was interviewed by Charles Shaw, of Station WCAU, commands the Second Front in Sierra Cristal area. A Third Front is near Santa Clara. There also is guerilla fighting at Holguin.

most primly, knees together, hands folded in her lap. A breeze flicked the hem of her dress, and she gathered it tightly under her. Other girls came in and out, and they gave me friendly smiles. One of them suggested coffee, and I resumed the beverage routine of my bus trip.

With a mixture of halting Spanish and English, I learned that one had not yet finished high school, another was a secretary, one was a teacher, still another was a nurse.

And the difference between their actions and attitudes and those of the run-of-mine Havana women whom the average American tourist sees was the difference between day and night.

Asks for Letter

A great babble of voices heralded the arrival of Yolanda, a 21- or 22-year-old in white blouse, pedal pushers and sandals. Her hair was cut boyishly short; she wore shell-rimmed glasses. She was brisk and direct. The others cleared out of the room, and Yolanda said to me: "You have letter?"

I took Captain Bradley's letter from its hiding place, and you might express the wish that your association with this young lady extends over a period of several days. The people at the hotel, I'm sure, will be most *simpatico.*"

At the hotel desk, I began to inquire about the location of San Juan Hill when I was addressed by a tall, thin dark-skinned Cuban, a genial fellow who introduced himself as Herbert, "the hotel's official interpreter." He was at my service, to help me in any way.

I thanked him and explained that a friend at our Havana Embassy had arranged an escort for me.

Avoids Americans

"What's his name?" Herbert asked quickly. "I know a lot of people from the Embassy. There are two of them out on the porch right now."

"Look," I told him, "do me a big favor, will you? Don't tell them I'm here. This is the first city I've ever been in that wasn't crawling with Americans, and I like it that way. I can see Americans at home; let me enjoy this, will you?"

I handed Herbert a deposit for his services, and he grinned. And he kept his promise of not introducing me to any Americans.

more friends has Castro," somebody replied. "It's like—how you say?—he sows the teeth of *dragones.*"

"How about the priests in the Cathedral?"

Gift From Batista

"Batista, he tries to make friends. He gives $100,000 and his wife give $100,000 to fix up the Cathedral. But the Archbishop, they say, is a friend of Castro. He save Castro's life on the 26th of July in 1953. He hide Castro until he's promised that Castro won't be killed; then he give him up to Batista, and Batista keep his promise."

"But Batista's men do a very bad thing after Castro come back. They hear that one priest is helping Castro; and they go right in the Cathedral after him. Never before was a Cathedral in Cuba violated.

Arrested a Priest

"They arrest the priest, Padre Sardinas, and they hold him 74 hours. But they finally let him go . . . so much trouble was caused. They let Padre Sardinas go, and the Padre go to the Sierra Maestra. There he is now, with Fidel. Fidel also has a Protestant minister with him . . . they hold services all the time."

that he had expected my friend in the Embassy to have arranged something a lot fancier for my companionship.

Outside, the women pointed to a jeep, at the wheel of which a man was waiting. The younger woman, Dolores, climbed into the back seat and beckoned for me to follow; the older one, Luisa, sat beside the driver, whom I call Juan. He drove me to Yolanda's neighborhood, but to a house other than Yolanda's, ushered me into a bedroom, bade me open my case and helped me select some picnic-type clothes.

Juan knew a few words of English; and it wasn't long until we seemed to be conversing fluently with his little English, my little Spanish and gestures by the armload.

Attired in lightweight trousers, a pullover sport shirt and rubber-soled shoes, I rejoined Dolores in the back seat of the jeep. Juan got behind the wheel, and we headed out of town.

Takes a Wife

A half a mile out of town, Juan stopped suddenly, having remembered something important. He pointed to Dolores and said, "Wife."

his belt. On his left arm, a brassard with the words "26 de Julio." His pants were tucked into paratroopers boots.

Climbs Into Car

He seemed to know Esposa, and the two of them chatted a while; he shook hands with me heartily, and climbed into the front seat beside Luisa. He escorted us for several miles, leaving us to join a half dozen other rebel soldiers who were mingling with the local peasantry outside a thatched hut.

We now were well within rebel territory, and the soldiers became more numerous. They waved and smiled as we passed by.

By this time, the road was a road only because it was called a road. It was slashed every few miles by streams, some of the ruts were two or three feet deep and Juan had to pick his way along as best he could. He played with the brake and clutch pedals as he changed gears and shifted in and out of four-wheel drive like a pipe-organist.

Higher and higher we climbed, the hardy jeep responding to seemingly impossible commands, and we crawled along for at least several more miles.

Time Out for Lunch

No point in my asking how much farther we had to go, because not even Esposa knew where we were to meet Raul. All she knew was that his headquarters were a good ten hours out of Santiago, but she hoped that he would come part way to meet us.

"Soon we eat," said Juan, and that was the best news I had had all day. With that, he turned off the road and traveled down a narrow lane that led to a veritable village of rebel soldiers and civilians.

The center of this community was a large wooden building, probably once a barn, which served as the command post for Compania A, Ejercito Revolucionaria, 26 de Julio (Company 3, 26th of July Revolutionary Army).

The building, its one floor containing a center hall which served as a mess hall, an office for the company commander and four other rooms, was teeming with people. There were dozens of young women, busy making and altering uniforms, cooking and performing other chores.

A 14-year-old Soldier

Soldiers arrived and departed by jeep; others conferred with the captain. Everybody was laughing . . . except one boy—he

like woods to visit a small building where the rebels manufactured grenades and crude but effective bazooka shells, which were fired from Springfield rifles. Every command post had an arms factory, some of which made mortars, the heaviest weapons the rebels have.

Raul Arrives

As Hector and I strolled back toward the building, we heard a great commotion from the direction of the front, and Hector explained, "The commander has arrived. Ah, yes, Deborah is with him. You will be able to talk much."

The new arrivals were about a hundred yards away, and I strained my eyes to pick out Raul and the mysterious Deborah.

In the distance, I could see two persons with long hair—hair hanging a good six inches below their shirt collars, and apparently smooth faces. One of them wore a cowboy hat and striped shirt; the other a plain grey shirt and pillbox-type peaked cap. It wasn't until I was quite close and saw the wisps of beard on the face of the one in the striped shirt that I picked him as Raul and the other as Deborah.

Both were interesting, but Deborah more so. She was a young Dolores del Rio—tall, slim, with straight jet black hair pulled back tight and caught in the back to form a pony tail. She wore ankle-height flat-heeled boots as if they were dancing pumps.

A Daring Leader

Raul's face, in repose, was the face of a boy, almost the face of a young woman. But when he talked, his face became that of a young man. He gave the impression of gentleness and softness, which, I was told by everybody who knew him, was not a correct impression. He was known by his men as one of the toughest, most daring of all the rebel leaders.

The rebel soldiers were clustered about Raul, who shook hands, slapped backs and shouted like the class president at a college reunion. The girls just stared, and when Raul smiled at them, I expected them all to swoon. They smiled back in ecstasy.

Hector took my arm and started elbowing through the group, but I stopped him.

"Let them finish," I asked. "This is great for them."

I meant what I said, but I also wanted to observe the way the men acted toward Raul. . . . I feel that you often can judge

fairly good condition.

10-Minute Halts

Once every two hours we would halt for ten minutes, the bus to get gasoline and the passengers to refresh themselves. It would give me time for two cups of cafe con leche—hot milk with about an ounce of syrupy coffee so strong that it colored the milk medium to dark brown, and whatever kind of solid food I could order with my halting Spanish.

Abont nine minutes after we halted, the driver would start the engine, honk the horn, and he would be off promptly.

I followed our progress on a gasoline company's road map; but I needed no map to tell us when we were nearing Oriente province. Floodlights ringing army posts bathed our bus as we drove by at reduced speed; more and more government soldiers appeared. All this a good 150 miles west of the Oriente boundary line.

Daybreak found us in Ciego de Avila, in western Camaguey province, pretty much on schedule. Ten minutes there for breakfast—more cafe con leche and cakes—then on to Camaguey City, and ever closer to Oriente.

There were no signs to tell us that we had entered Oriente. Nobody on the bus informed me. But I could tell almost as surely as if there had been a high wall and a moat a mile or so east of Guamaro and we had crossed over a drawbridge.

Zone of Hostilities

Oriente province is, by official proclamation, a "Zone of Hostilities." Here again is one of those official acts which belie the government claims that there is no substance to the 26th of July Movement.

The Fidelistas pose no threat, the government says, yet one-fourth of the nation is a Zone of Hostilities. Batista has committed at least one-third of his army to Oriente. The whole country is under what is known as the "Emergency Law."

It was eight o'clock in the morning when we crossed into Oriente. The countryside was flat and green. More palm trees, more banana trees... corn fields now... a few cows here and there... small thatched huts. Few civilians in sight, but squads and platoons of Batista soldiers every mile or so.

Frisks Passengers

The town of Victoria de las Tunas (Victory of the Prickly Pears) lay ahead, and there we stopped. A young soldier, his United States-supplied helmet at least one size too large and wobbling on his head, boarded the bus and ordered everybody up.

He quickly frisked the passengers in front of me, glanced at the luggage on the racks. When he approached me, I pretended not to have the slightest idea of what was going on.

Marti died at the age of 42; he was ten years older than Fidel Castro is at the moment.

Stopped Once Again

At Palma Soriano, about 30 miles west of Santiago, we were halted again, and everybody was ordered out of the bus. The other passengers took their luggage, but I walked out unencumbered. The driver pointed to another man's attache case, pointed to me and pointed to the inside of the bus. I went and got my case.

This time I had to open my case; but the soldier only glanced at the contents. While others emptied their wallets, he waved me aside. Soon we were on our way again, with two soldiers riding with us through the town.

We were on the last leg of our journey, and only about an hour behind schedule, despite all the stops. At about 11.45, we reached the outskirts of Santiago, where we were stopped for another search. This was the last time; and, once again, I was the only passenger who didn't get a thorough going over.

And I dare say that I was the only person on that bus who was carrying something incriminating. But I was a *turista Americano*, and the Batista policy is to be nice to Americans.

Cake in the Terminal

At the bus terminal in Santiago I tried to act as if I wasn't quite sure what I wanted to do; and in the meantime, I ordered some coffee and cake. I felt it would be best to wait until the terminal contained fewer people before I asked to be taken to the address of my next contact.

As I chewed on my cake and sipped my cafe con leche an English-speaking cab driver approached to offer his services. I inquired about hotels; and when he suggested the Casa Grande, I asked him to take me there.

Once under way, I tapped him on the shoulder and said, "I've got a better idea. A friend of mine at the United States Embassy gave me an address, and I think I would like to go there first." I repeated the address which I had memorized in Havana, and he understood.

The house was that of a middle economic class family, similar to hundreds of houses in provincial Cuba. My knock was answered by a young woman, no older than 21, and I pronounced the name of the person I was supposed to see. I shall call her Yolanda.

Calls Yolanda

The young woman who greeted me obviously was not Yolanda. She took my case and camera, bade me sit in a rocking chair and began to telephone. After about four calls, she said to me, "Yolanda come . . . pronto."

She sat across from me, after from its hiding place, and handed it to her. She read it quickly, then went to the phone. I could tell that she was summoning a *companero*.

The call completed, Yolanda disappeared, to return in about five minutes with a bag of food. Two small fried chickens, still hot; potato chips, pickles, beer and orange soda. When I declined the beer, it remained untouched.

Most of the 26th of July people, I learned later, are abstainers; and the abstinence rule is rather strictly enforced in the mountains. It's a matter of common sense: Those people play for keeps, and they have to have their wits about them at all times.

Taken to Another House

When lunch was finished, I was taken around the corner to another house, motioned to a chair and left alone. A middle-aged woman — she turned out to be Yolanda's mother — appeared with a huge glass of fruit juice; then she disappeared.

I dozed off in my comfortable chair and was awakened by a gentle tug at my sleeve. I awoke to see Yolanda and a young man, who had come to give me final instructions.

"You want to see Fidel?" he asked.

"That's why I came," I replied.

"And he is anxious to see you," the young man said. "But there is the question of time. How much time do you have?"

Patrols on Every Road

The young man explained the problem. The government had patrols on every passable road leading into the Sierra Maestra. Rebels were going in and out, but by circuitous routes, which took at least four days to chart.

Before they would let me go in, they would have to send a man ahead to plot a safe course, have him return and have him lead me to Castro's headquarters. It would take eight days, four in and four out, for the explorer to plot the course and four more days before I could reach Fidel's headquarters.

And all that depending on the explorer's survival.

"But," said the young man, "I can take you to Raul's headquarters in the Sierra del Cristal tomorrow morning. We already have mapped a course for that trip."

We agreed quickly that I would go to the Cristal in the morning.

Receives Instructions

Then the young man gave me instructions:

"I suggest that you take a room at the Casa Grande Hotel. Tomorrow morning a young woman will call for you, and you might explain to the hotel people that you are expecting a caller to take you sight-seeing.

"If you happen to be talking with anybody else at the hotel, ducing me to any Americans, but he introduced me to plenty of Cubans, with whom I talked in walks around the city and on the porch of the Casa Grande.

They talked about "the trouble," which I affected not to understand, and they explained that they meant the revolution. I told them we knew very little about that in the States and that I had wondered about all the searching during my bus trip.

Tell of Censorship

We in the States had heard nothing, they said, because of the censorship; the only news even in Santiago is transmitted by word of mouth.

My fellow conversationalists would disavow sympathy with the 26th of July Movement; then they would tell one tale of horror after another.

"You see that bank across the square?" one Cuban said to me, "that new building over there. Just last Saturday, at 6.30 in the evening . . . the square was filled . . . two boys threw a grenade into a Shore Patrol car.

"The grenade failed to explode. The soldiers jumped out of the car and killed the boys right there. They were only 14 or 15 years old. An American businessman ran over there, and he cursed those soldiers as murderers and butchers. It's a good thing those soldiers didn't understand English."

No Young Men Around

"Almost every day, something like that," another man said. "Look around . . . do you see any young men? No . . . they're all in the hills, or their parents keep them inside their houses. Just to be young in this province is to be suspect."

"Silly dam' kids," Herbert remarked. "They say they fighting for cause. Huh . . . you and I, we know better . . . but what do they know? They fight for cause, and they die. Sometimes I think they die happy. Silly dam' kids."

Twilight had come as we sat on the verandah of the Casa Grande Hotel, which extended along one side of the City Square. Over to our left was the Cathedral of Santiago (St. James); to our right was the City Hall and across the square was a row of business buildings, including the bank.

Square Is Empty

"Observe the square," one of the men said; "it is almost empty. Before the trouble, it would be filled at this time of night. This is July, the month of the Carnival, the greatest carnival in all the world. This is the month of San Tiago. But there is no carnival these days. Almost every family is in mourning. Maybe six thousand young men have been murdered . . . murdered, not just killed in battle."

"I don't suppose the people are too happy about Castro then, are they?" I asked.

"The more Batista kills, the time."

"Another priest go up in the hills two days ago," another member of the group said. "He go up to Raul . . . to hear confessions of the men. But he came back, I think."

"What about the Castros?" I asked. "What kind of men are they?"

"Crazy dam' fools. Their father die, leave them $14 million . . ."

Another man interrupted: "No, no, not $14 million . . . maybe not even a million."

Live In Mountains

"He leave them lots of money, anyway," and all the others nodded in assent. "And what they do? They could have everything they want, and they live up in the mountains like poor men. Crazy dam' fools. But they have lots of friends."

Two 1957 Oldsmobiles went by, in tandem. "Shore patrol," I was told, "always two together."

Two women walked by, and the men lowered their voices.

The man next to me whispered: "That one woman, the good looking one . . . her husband is chief of the Secret Military Intelligence here in Santiago. She's *chivato* for him. She says she no understand English, but she understand English as good as you do. She listen all the time and tell husband. Some Cubans talk English to be safe, but they no safe from her."

Two more Oldsmobiles sped by, then two more. They screeched around the corner and streaked toward the airport. "More boys will die tonight," the man next to me whispered, and Herbert remarked, "Silly dam' kids."

Back in the Hotel

We talked about nonentities for a few minutes, strictly for the benefit of the SMI chief's wife. Then we broke up . . . Herbert headed for his home, the rest of us for the hotel elevator. I fell into bed for the first time in almost 40 hours.

The phone rang at 8 o'clock the next morning, and I heard a woman's voice, speaking Spanish. I replied in English, but she came back in Spanish. So I said, "I come down. Uno minuto."

Already dressed and waiting, I walked down the one flight of stairs from my floor to the lobby and found two women, one looking very much like Yolanda and the other a buxom 35 or 40.

It was obvious that neither knew one word of English, but I had to assume that they were to be my escorts to the Sierra de Cristal. I gestured to indicate that I would return to my room to put on a tie and get my case, and they nodded.

Leaves With Women

Five minutes later, I was walking out of the hotel with them; and I looked out to the porch to see a very puzzled Herbert. His expression indicated I pointed to myself to indicate possession, pointed to Dolores and asked, "My wife?" Then I opened my Spanish-English dictionary to the word "wife," and asked. "Mi esposa?"

"Si, si," they all replied, grinning. I not only grinned, I laughed at the absurdity of the situation. Here I was with a girl young enough to be my daughter, a girl who spoke no English while I spoke very little Spanish who, in case we were stopped by Batista soldiers, was supposed to be my wife.

At any rate, I no longer called my companion by her right name . . . from then on she was "Esposa," and I to her was "Esposo." To Juan and Luisa, who actually were man and wife, I was "Mister Charlie," and then merely "Charlie."

A Car Ahead

Up the road a car was stopped. "Esposa" took my left hand and signified that I should put my arm around her.

As soon as we had turned a curb and left the car behind, she returned my arm, and I remarked, "That sure was a short marriage." None of the others understood.

The route Juan took showed that he had well cased the roads leading to the Cristal. He would follow the highway for a while, then take a dirt road or cut through a sugar plantation, return to the highway and detour again.

In mixed Spanish and English, he explained: "This road is bad but no soldiers. That road over there is good but there are soldiers." Thus we wandered about the countryside for more than two hours.

Nearing Rebel Area

By then it was obvious that we were in or nearing rebel-controlled territory, because we were moving straight ahead and turning only at intersections. Esposa took over as navigator, and Juan obeyed her polite commands. Esposa was clearly the boss.

We had long since run out of cement roads, but the dirt road we were traveling was fairly smooth. They worsened gradually so that you got used to the increasing discomfort.

Two and a half hours after take-off, we were riding along little more than a lane through jungle-like growth when we saw the branches of a bush ahead quiver and a uniformed young man step into the middle of the road. He was the first rebel soldier I saw and Hollywood could not have done a better job of casting.

A field cap sat jauntily on long, wavy coal-black hair, which lapped over the collar of his blue-green uniform. His bronzed face seemed to be sculptured . . . a good sized straight nose, a strong jutting chin and large black eyes. He carried a Winchester rifle.

Two hand grenades hung from couldn't have been more than 14—who carried a pistol and tried to swagger without too much success. His face was beardless; his hair was short, both indications that he was just a novice.

The rebels let their hair and beards grow as a sort of an act of faith and as a measure of their length of service. The second worst punishment that can be inflicted on a 26th of July soldier, I was told, is to cut his hair and beard, beacuse that strips him of his marks of seniority. The very worst punishment is not to let him fight . . . to assign him to desk duty.

I was turned over to a civilian with the cover name of Hector. His was a job like that of Captain Bradley . . . he traveled in and out of the mountains; and he gave me the impression that he might be on the ragged edge emotionally. He was hoping that Raul would let him remain in the mountains and fight.

"Where Do They Stay?"

I asked about all the girls at the command post. "Where do they stay over night?"

"They don't. They return to Santiago or Guantanamo or their villages at nightfall. They're here to help and not to cause any mischief."

There was only one exception to the no-women rule at Company A command post—the captain's wife, chubby, gray-haired and about 50, who was in fact if not in title, the chief cook and bottle washer.

But one of the rebel soldiers wore an apron on which had been stitched the letters "26 de Julio—Jefe Cocinero," the last two words meaning "Chief Cook."

I asked Hector about the distance to Raul's headquarters, and he reported that Raul was coming here to meet me.

"Does he speak English?"

"Not very well, but he's bringing with him a woman who speaks perfect English. She will be his interpreter."

Wander About Post

Hector and I wandered about the post. In the captain's office, the company commander showed us a map of the area he commanded and proudly displayed his small library, a mixture of books on military science and the writings of the poet-philosopher Marti.

In one corner was a bust of Marti; in the opposite corner, a shrine to Nuestra Senora de la Caridad del Cobre—the Virgin as, all Cuban Catholics believe, she appeared to save two children who were lost and facing death near the town of El Cobre in the Sierra Maestra many years ago.

Almost all the rebel soldiers wore necklace medals of Nuestra Senora de la Caridad del Cobre, who has become Cuba's patron.

We walked into the jungle- I feel that you often can judge a man better by how others react to him than by what he says and does himself.

Kidnaper of Americans

Had I met Raul alone, my snap judgment might well have been most unfavorable. Even after my brief association with him, I could not think of him as one whom I would like to have as a close friend. He was brash and cocky; but he is only 27 and how brash and cocky was I at the age of 27?

This 27-year-old, after having lived in the shadow of his revered brother, Fidel, had just been the object of world attention because of the kidnapings of 47 Americans and two Canadians he had engineered, and it was pretty heady wine he was drinking.

Raul, Deborah and a few others moved away from their admirers and into the captain's office. Hector presented me to them.

I asked questions as they came to mind, not necessarily in the order of their news value but mainly because that's the way the conversation ran.

"Why a revolution? Elections are scheduled for November 3. Why not settle this with ballots rather than bullets?"

Denounces Elections

Raul smiled, replied in English, "The elections are a fake," then went on in Spanish, which Deborah translated:

"Batista doesn't dare hold honest elections. If he did and the people's choices would be elected, the crimes of his administration would be exposed and just about everybody in the government would be put on trial. All the government officials are in this together, and they have to stay together for mere self-preservation. If the elections are held, they will be rigged. But they'll probably be postponed under the Emergency Law."

"How are you doing up here? Are you gaining or losing, or standing still?"

"We are gaining day by day, and if you want proof, consider this: Fidel went into the Sierra Maestra in December 1956, just 19 months ago, with 12 men. Today, he has thousands. Don't take my word for it. You saw for yourself some of the army activity in Oriente province along the road to Santiago. Batista has committed one third of his army to fighting Fidel. Fidel must have made a lot of gains.

Lists the Fronts

"Fidel commands the First Front, all of the Maestra.

"On March 10, 1958—last March—he sent me here to the Sierra Cristal with 150 men to establish the Second Front. Today, we have between five and six thousand men. It is a big front, extending from Sierra de

Continued on Page 3, Col. 1

Revolt Leaders Defend Kidnapings

Charge U. S. Bombs Fell On Civilians

Continued From Page 2

Nipe on the west, through the Sierra del Cristal and all the way north and east of Guantanamo.

"Then there is a Third Front, in Las Villas province, south of Santa Clara. It covers a large area.

"Finally, there is a guerilla front, which, of course, is very fluid, around Holguin."

Rebels' Organization

"How are you organized?" was my next question.

Raul proceeded to draw a diagram of the organization of his own command, at the top of which, however, was his brother's command. I explained that I was more interested in the organization of the entire 26th of July Movement. This is how he explained that:

The leadership is vested in a so-called National Council of Twelve, of which Fidel is chairman. Militarily, the movement is divided into an army, which fights from the mountains and conducts guerilla warfare, and a militia, which operates in the cities.

There are divisions for propaganda, education, administration, supplies, plans, finance and all the other needs of a military and political movement.

Why the Kidnapings?

Then I asked a question which had been asked of Raul many times in the two or three weeks before my arrival: "Why the kidnapings of Americans and Canadians?"

Raul replied in volleys, and Deborah waited until he had finished. She took a deep breath, adjusted the collar of her shirt and began:

"Well, the Batista army had been attacking us here, as well as Fidel's forces in the Maestra, since April. Their bombers came over twice every day.

"They killed very few of our soldiers but lots of civilians. The people were nearly crazy . . . they were living in caves . . . they were going hungry. And when some of them did get out and picked up bomb fragments, they would see United States markings on them.

"We staged the kidnapings first of all to try to stop the bombings. We figured Batista would not bomb if he knew our country people had thought they were being bombed by Americans. They had come to believe that Americans were beasts. They had never seen any Americans; so we took our guests around to see the people and let the people see them.

"I must say that the Americans we had up here were wonderful representatives of your country. The people liked them immediately, and they at least understand now that the American people are their friends, if not the United States government. We hope that they can come to believe that your government as well is their friend.

"One other thing: we got through the censorship and proved that we're in business."

Lunch Is Ready

The *jefe cocinero* peeked into the office to announce that lunch was served. Raul and Deborah suggested we continue our conversation at the table, and I welcomed the invitation after having barely staved off starvation by emptying a bowl of bananas and mangoes.

One of Raul's chief lieutenants engaged him in conversation at the table; and, after I had piled my plate with rice, thick red bean soup, a meat dish faintly mindful of chili con carne, a banana shaped corn meal preparation which tasted like a meatless tamale, and cold string beans, I turned to Deborah and asked:

"What about you? May I write anything about you? Frankly, I had never heard about you until today. . . and I find you're quite a woman. . . educated in the United States . . . high up in the movement. I would like to write about you. What may I say?"

"Well," she replied, "I believe it is now known that I am here and that I am called Deborah. That is not my right name. I shall tell you my right name, but I ask you not to use it for a while."

Attended MIT

To other questions, she said this:

"I am a member of the Council of Twelve. I am 28 years old. I studied chemical engineering at the University of Havana and at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. . . for one year.

"I wanted to be a chemical engineer, but I knew that one could do nothing worthwhile until Cuba is freed. So I joined the 26th of July Movement to do organization work. I worked in the cities until a few months ago, and then I came up to the mountains. I shall remain here until we have it was time for the girls to start back to their homes.

"Mi esposa" reappeared to say good-by. I took her hand and kissed it, saying, "It's been a lovely marriage," and when the remark was both translated and explained, the bearded rebels, the women, Raul, Deborah, even the pistol-packing kid joined in laughter.

I talked a while longer with Raul, Deborah and some of the others. . . then they took off, Deborah to her thatched hut which, I was told, was guarded constantly by four of the toughest rebels who were responsible only to Deborah, not even to Raul.

I was ready to go home now, but I had committed myself to spend at least another day and night in the mountains. It was little enough to do in exchange for all that had been done for me.

Rides on the Front

I slept that night in a hammock under the porch of the command post as the bearded teenagers and others just a little older went out on patrol and returned.

The next day, I rode around with them over much of the Second Front; I talked as best I could with them about their hopes and dreams.

I recalled a remark that Raul had made when I asked him what kind of weapons he had:

"We have rifles and pistols and home-made grenades, bazooka shells and mortars. Nothing heavier than mortars. But our best weapon is the morale of our men."

The men with whom I toured the Second Front represented a mighty arsenal.

Returning Home

Late the following morning, Juan and Luisa reappeared with their jeep to fetch me home.

We retraced our course and they took me to their home to spend the night. We decided that I should fly back to Havana rather than run the gauntlet of searchers on the highways; so Juan drove me to the airport, dropping me off briefly at the hotel so that I could check out and pay my bill.

Herbert was there, bursting with curiosity.

"You have a good time, my friend?" he asked.

"I had a wonderful time," I replied.

At the airport, a Cuban soldier wearing a Spanish-American War-type hat and leather puttees made me open my luggage; but he found nothing amiss. I booked a seat on a plane that was to leave in about four hours, and I insisted that Juan return home, and he said good-by.

Back in Havana

At midnight, I was back in Havana; at 5.15 the next day, after brief reports to my Havana friends and conversations with new friends, I was on a plane headed for Miami. My sojourn with the rebels was ended.

Looking down at the receding coastline of Cuba, I asked myself: "What do I think now?"

I silently replied to my own question like this:

"I hope that Fidel Castro and his brother are everything their followers think they are; although it would be impossible for any man to be the kind of man Fidel's followers think he is.

"But Fidel Castro is not nearly so important as the people who follow him—the Senora Gomezes, the Joses, the Padres Gonzaleses, the other priests, the ministers, Yolanda and Juan and Luisa and Mi Esposa. They, to me, are Cuba as I would like to think of Cuba . . .

Nameless Heroes

"I don't suppose I shall ever see them again. If their Movement succeeds, and I should cover the inauguration of their President, I'm sure that none of them will be in the Presidential Palace. None of them expects to be. They are the nameless heroes and heroines without whom no fight for freedom can be won.

"Those who have survived will listen to the ceremonies by radio, and perhaps they will remember me for only one thing . . . for passing on to them what Deborah said to me that afternoon in the Sierra del Cristal: " 'Freedom! It's a big word.' "

Optometrists Elect

Dr. Harry Kaplan was reelected president and Dr. Eli Pronchick was named president-elect at the annual meeting of the Philadelphia County Optometric Society, it was announced yesterday. Other officers are Dr. Jerome L. Goodman, vice president; Dr. Robert Berman, secretary; Dr. Charles Bertotto, financial secretary, and Dr. Sarah Tice, treasurer.

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

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Americans might get killed, because he needs American help.

"And we wanted to bring some Americans up here to show them proof that United States arms were being used to kill Cuban people in hopes that they might make your government stop sending arms to Batista."

Argues With Him

"Now, wait a minute," I interrupted. "I am not unfriendly to you, but I want to show you where you're very wrong. We have not shipped any arms to the Cuban government since March 7, except for the replacement of some defective rockets we had sent earlier. You must believe that that is true."

"If you say so, we shall believe you," Deborah replied after she had translated my remarks to Raul and had heard his reply, "because Dr. Llerena has sent word that you are a truthful man."

I noticed that Raul was glancing at a paper on which my name appeared. . .apparently it was a letter from the outside.

"But," Deborah went on, "there is a point you all seem to miss. Batista is killing Cubans with United States arms. You say he has received none since March 7. But under terms of the Mutual Security Agreement he was to use those arms you gave him only to repel outside aggression.

An Internal Affair

"Your government has never charged that we are supported by any other country, as you have charged in the case of the rebellion in Lebanon. The mere fact that you suspended arms shipments would indicate your government's belief that this is purely an internal Cuban affair.

"Therefore, we are not asking that you stop sending arms to Batista, if you already have stopped. What we are asking is that you compel Batista to live up to the terms of the Mutual Security Agreement and not let him use United States arms against Cuban people.

"Or else let us buy arms from the United States. We have the money to buy them, and we can get more money."

Getting back to the kidnapings, I said, "There have been stories that Fidel was angry with Raul, and some people have said that Raul might try to take over the Movement."

Fidel Is Boss

Raul seemed to be amused, and his reply was this:

"Fidel is the chief. He is the great disciple of Marti. He is the man around whom we rally . . .here in the mountains, in the cities, and in exile. He did not approve of the kidnapings; but I am convinced that I did the right thing in the circumstances.

"And there was an unexpected benefit from the kidnapings . . .to your country. Many of won."

What about the philosophy of the revolution?

"It is simply the philosophy of Marti, who led the last real revolution that Cuba has had. There have been changes in government since then, but changes only in personnel. We fight for human freedom and decency.

Fidel's Pledge

"Let me tell you what Fidel has pledged:

"Immediate freedom of political prisoners, both civilian and military; re-establishment of individual and political rights of all citizens; unlimited freedom of information and opinion; extermination of illiteracy; land reform, with compensation for any land expropriated; and elimination of corruption in public life, particularly among the rapacious chiefs of the Army."

"Maybe you can make Havana a more attractive place for decent visitors," I observed.

"That," she replied, "is a sympton of what we fight against. When we win, you will see a different Havana, a different Cuba."

Interested in Freedom

I looked at Deborah and said, "I am not particularly interested in Cuba, but I am interested in freedom. . . for a very selfish reason. Today, I am free. But I shall have a greater assurance of retaining my freedom, and of my son's living the life of a free man, as freedom is extended.

"Just as John Donne said that 'any man's death diminishes me,' so do I feel that any man's loss of freedom diminishes my freedom.

"If you are telling me the truth, and only time will determine that because I don't know any of you well enough to judge for myself, you are doing a great thing. As far as I am concerned, you are not fighting for Cuban freedom. . . you are fighting for freedom."

Deborah looked at me with her big black eyes, then glanced toward the ceiling of that ramshackled old barn and said:

"Freedom! That's a big word."

'A Lovely Marriage'

The day was wearing on, and

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★VINELAND, N. J. 84 W. Landis Ave.
★WILMINGTON, DEL. 1334 W. 4th St.

Shaw, Charles

June 19, 1958

Dear Charlie:

So far as I know in this uncertain world, we shall be at the farm on August 28th and will be delighted to have you stay overnight. The telephone number is Ulysses 5-6202.

Why don't you give me a ring a day or two before?

As ever yours,

Mr. Charles Shaw
WCAU
City and Monument Avenues
Philadelphia 31, Pennsylvania

mcc

cc: Mrs. Murrow

W
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A
U

Philadelphia 31, Pa. / city and monument avenues · greenwood 7-8300

June 16, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Ed:

We're going to pick up Kip at his New Hampshire camp August 24, spend the next day with some friends at Squalm Lake, drive around Maine for a few days and then head for home. We hope to be in the vicinity of Pawling Thursday, August 28, and would like to accept your invitation to call on you. Shall you all be home then?

I now have written 165 pages of my opus and, right now, I am reliving my first months in London. There never will be a writer with sufficient talent to tell the story of CBS London properly.

Nancy asked me to tell you she's looking forward to seeing all of you, especially that once tiny fellow she once wheeled to Regent's Park.

Sincerely,

Charlie

Charles Shaw

CS:mr

Shaw, Charles

April 10, 1958

Dear Charlie:

Thanks for sharing the letter, and don't forget to stop by with your family on the way to camp or on the way back, or preferably both.

As ever yours,

Mr. Charles Shaw
WCAU
Philadelphia 31, Pennsylvania

fc

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Philadelphia 31, Pa. / city and monument avenues • greenwood 7-8300

March 17, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N.Y.

Dear Ed:

Our brief encounter last Thursday was the most pleasant experience I have had in a long time. I spent the weekend going over a lot of old scripts and they provided me with additional reminders of how much I owe to you for personal as well as professional reasons.

In line with our political discussion, I thought you might like to see a letter I have just received from Dick Dilworth. It is rather poignant testimony to the fate that befalls a man who tries to be sincere.

Nancy and Kip are overjoyed by the thought that we might see you and Janet and Casey at your farm on our return from New Hampshire next August.

Sincerely,

Charles

Charles Shaw

CS:se

Enclosure

Richardson Dilworth
City Hall
Philadelphia 2 Pa

March 13, 1956.

Mr. Charles Shaw,
News Director,
WCAU Radio-WCAU Television,
City and Monument Avenues,
Philadelphia 31, Penna.

Dear Charlie:

I want to tell you how deeply moved I was by your letter and the copy of your broadcast which you enclosed.

I was, in one sense, relieved when everything was over, as my two years here as Mayor have been the happiest and most productive years I have ever had, whereas the one four-year term in Harrisburg has certainly ground up every Governor in this century, except Gifford Pinchot in his first term. What's more, it is wonderful to be able to head up as fine a City Government as I inherited, and also to be able to work in a community where the citizens, civic organizations, business organizations, newspapers, radio and television stations are all dedicated to active cooperation and participation in our programs.

However, there is, of course, the disappointment of the loss of opportunity to take a crack at such a challenging job.

I think there is no doubt that the two most powerful bosses in the State at the present time are Dave Lawrence in the West and the Green-Jim Clark combination in the East. They pretty well decided - in the past month - that things

Richardson Dilworth
202 City Hall
Philadelphia 2, Pa.

looked so good for the Democrats, they can win with any respectable candidate and, therefore, had no desire to take on someone who would be independent of their control.

Lawrence did try very hard to push across Knox, but when Leader flatly turned thumbs down on Knox, he made his deal with Green and Jim Clark and stepped into the picture himself. I think this was probably the worst deal Green and Clark ever made as Dave will keep them in short pants, and their only hope in the situation is that Dave may not survive his four year term. However, I think that is a very faint hope.

I like Dave Lawrence and think he is - far and away - the ablest politician in our State, and I also believe he will make a good Governor.

Again, many thanks for your kind comments.

Sincerely,

RD:MD

Shaw, Charles

WCAU

Philadelphia 31, Pa. / city and monument avenues • greenwood 7-8300

Can't Thursday
will see at
3:30

March 4, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N.Y.

Dear Ed:

I am going up to New York Thursday, March 13. I hesitate to tell you this, but a literary agent--Marie Rodell--wants to talk with me about writing a book on my experiences. I should be thinking of such a book when you, with so much more to say, record nothing. Just one more bit of proof that you're so much smarter than the rest of us, that your ego has no hunger like ours.

Anyway, could we by any chance have that lunch on March 13? My appointment is for 11 A.M., and I certainly should be free by 12:30 or 1 o'clock. If lunch is no good, could I park on your office couch for a brief period?

Sincerely,

Charlie

Charles Shaw

CS:se

Shaw, Charlie

February 3, 1958

Dear Charlie:

I hope you can manage to break away before long.
I will wait to hear from you.

I like the outline of the religious program.
I hope you get it on the air.

As ever yours,

Mr. Charles Shaw
WCAU
Philadelphia 31, Pennsylvania

fc

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Philadelphia 31, Pa. / city and monument avenues • greenwood 7-8300

January 27, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

I've been trying to arrange things to avail myself of your invitation to lunch, but I keep getting in a bind. I've been doing a lot of speech-making for the upcoming Cancer Crusade, I've had a few money-making speeches besides, and the Governor has named me to his committee which meets tomorrow and Wednesday to discuss ways of improving Pennsylvania's public education to meet current problems of various kinds. It should be an interesting meeting. I keep busy with daily radio and television shows as well as trying to run the store; so I find it hard to do some of the things I really want to do.

I hope I can be shouting to you sometime next month, because there are a few things about which I would like to talk with you; and, of course, it's always most stimulating just to exchange a few words with you about anything.

I can't shake this idea of a show on the world's religious faiths; so I've worked up a proposal for local presentation. I'm sending along a dopy of the proposal, and if you see anything too bad about it, I'd appreciate your telling me. I can't be entirely confident that Vanda will buy it; but I feel it would be good program material, it would weem to be of public service, and it shouldn't cost much. I'm hoping that if he does go for it, he'll agree to do the suggested show on Atheism, because I believe there's just as much public interest in the atheists' ideas as there would be in some of the other beliefs and this would be a good way of presenting a very provocative subject without giving undue offense to those at the other extreme.

I am looking forward to watching your conversation with Harry Truman with perhaps even more pleasure, if possible, than that afforded by your Marian Anderson show. Nancy asks me to give her best to you and Janet and Casey.

Sincerely,

Charlie

Charles Shaw

CS/hb
Enclosure

Proposing.....

A New Television Series

THE SEARCHING MIND OF MAN

A examination of the religious faiths
and philosophies by which mankind lives.

Told in conversations between Charles Shaw and representatives of these religions and religio - philosophies and with film and exhibits illustrating and explaining the beliefs.

THE SEARCHING MIND OF MAN

From the beginning of human existence, man has sought an explanation of life and the universe, the reason for his existence and an understanding of his destiny.

That seeking continues today...it has been intensified as man probes the heavens with missiles and satellites.

The search is responsible for best-selling books, both fiction and non-fiction. Major magazines, like LIFE and LOOK, have increased circulation by running comprehensive series explaining major religions or major denominations of a few major religions.

Mankind is divided into three groups: those who believe in a divine ruler of the universe, those who deny the existence of such a divine sovereign, and those who say they do not know whether there is or is not a supreme being. But all men, with insignificantly few exceptions, remain fascinated by thoughts of where they came from, where they are and where they are going.

The different opinions, or bodies of opinion, which men hold about their spiritual state are the world's religions and philosophies. But what do we really know about these faiths by which men live?

Most of us think we understand Christianity, a lot of us think we understand Judaism; but do we really understand even the religions to which we adhere? And how much do we know about the other faiths that provide a way of life, as well as a hope or idea for that which follows life, for millions of others?

To provide that explanation----------

Would be truly a searching examination.

Guests would be subjected to blunt questions...the questions would be blunt, but they would be asked respectfully and with the sole purpose of eliciting information, the kind of information viewers would seek.

The questions would be based, in part, on the information gathered by Charles Shaw during a long period of investigating the world's religions, investigation consisting of intensive reading, questioning of theologians and historians visits to many religious centers, and conversations about religion with many laymen from all walks of life and of many nationalities and religious persuasions.

But additional, and highly important, assistance would be sought from scholars and theologians, local museums such as that of the University of Pennsylvania, organizations like International House and other sources.

The number of programs could be almost limitless, if the series concerned itself with the numerous denomations and sects of the Protestant branch of Christianity. But these could be the main programs:

THE SEARCHING MIND OF MAN

1. IN THE BEGINNING...a program featuring an historian with museum relics on the primitive religions, the program perhaps originating in a room of the museum. First belief in good, evil and neutral spirits. First rligion was in hiding from evil spirits...mourning clothes originated as disguise to hide from spirits of dead, which were considered evil. Rituals to win friendship of spirits - fetishes and medicine men. Fetishes became idols or totems...houses for idols became temples or churches and medicine men became priests. Worship of natural objects and forces...origin of sacrifices...taboos, festivals.
   Druids of Celts...Egyptian Gods (Book of the Dead), Babylonians, Sumerians. Greek, Roman and Norse mythology...
   Aztecx and Incas (Similarity with Judaism and Christianity.)
2. JUDAISM...an explanation by Orthodox, Reformed and Conservative rabbis. Origin of Yahveh or Jehovah. The basic beliefs: importance of right conduct over right belief...obligations...life after death...resurrection... heaven and hell...Messiah concept...Position of Jesus of Nazareth... position of Prophets...dietary laws...Torah and Talmud vis-a-vis Christianity's Old Testament.
3. CHRISTIANITY - ROMAN CATHOLIC...with spokesman for Philadelphia Archdiocese. Origin of Christanity...Virgin Birth of Jesus and life-long virginity of Mary, Immaculate Conception - why? ...Crucifixion and Resurrection - physical or spiritual?...Trinity...Original Sin... Roman Catholicism only true faith - can non-Catholic enter Heaven? Purgatory...Hell...Papal Infallibility...Bodily Assumption of Mary... Transubstantation of Communion Bread.

THE SEARCHING MIND OF MAN

4. CHRISTIANITY - PROTESTANT...with representative of Philadlphia Council of Churches. What is basis of Protestantism? Differing creeds... do all believe in Virgin Birth, physical resurrection?...Varying beliefs about Heaven, Hell and equivalent of Purgatory...Faith versus works...Bible only authority?...Fundamentalists versus Liberals.

5. ISLAM...with guest from new Moslem Mosque in Washington or Moslem scholar from Philadelphia university. Position of Mohammed, the last of the prophets, the "real" prophet...Respect for Adam, Noah, Abraham, Moses and Jesus...Quarel with Christianity in worshipping a Son as well as a Father-God...Koran...Angels...Five Pillars of Islam: Belief, Prayer, Fasting, Almsgiving and Pilgrimage...Polygamy...Heaven and Hell...Jehads (Holy Wars).

6. HINDUISM...with guest detailed by Indian Embassy. Origins: Brahmanas, Upanishads and Great Epics ...God is reality, the true nature of the universe, beyond human representation. Brahma, Vishna and Shiva: Hindu trinity...Creation a continuing thing...Reincarnation: man leads many lives until he discovers who he really is, then leaves life...Caste system...Way to worship.

7. BUDDHISM...with perhaps priest of local Buddhist temple or representative of Buddhist Churches of America, headquartered at 1881 Pine Street, San Francisco. Prince Gautama who became Budda...Four Noble Truths.. Holy Eight-Fold Way...Yoga...Nirvana and Parinirvana...Various sects of Buddhism.

8. TAOISM...with spokesman for 15 thousand Taoists in North America. Originated by Lao-tse. Tao is "the way" - not God but reality, the law of nature. Must live in harmony with Tao or suffer consequences.

THE SEARCHING MIND OF MAN

9. CONFUCIANISM...with spokesman for 86 thousand Confucianists in North America, probably obtained through Chinese Embassy. Relation of Confucius with Lao-tse...Five Constant Virtues...Right Relationship.. Family Love and Devotion...Ancestor Reverence...Ways of Worship... Confucianism a religion?

10. SHINTO...with spokesman detailed by Japanese Embassy. National religion of Japan, mixed with Buddhism...Divine descent of Japanese.. Kinship with nature...Importance of purity...Willingness to learn... Goodness of man...3,000 gods...No teaching about life after death: that supplied by Buddhism.

11. ZOROASTRIANISM...with spokesman perhaps suggested by Iranian or Indian Embassy. 140,000 members in Asia: Parsees of India most numerous. Founded by Zarathustra or Zoroaster, born 660 B. C. in Persia... Teaches monotheism, love of God, truth and charity...believes in angels, immortality, after-life of rewards and punishment...Three Wise Men were priests of Zoroaster.

12. SWEDENBORGIANS (CHURCH OF NEW JERUSALEM)...with bishop from magnificent cathedral at Bryn Athyn (Raymond Pitcairn richest member). Story of Swedenborg and his clairvoyance...his trip into Spirit World...Heaven and Hell.

13. BAHA'I...with spokesman suggested by Bill Hart. Baha'ullah (1817-92) the newest prophet...Belief in Judaism, Christianity and Islam... Command for present is unification of mankind under one faith... Importance of love.

14. SPIRITUALISM...with spokesman of recognized society on psychical research. Spirit lives after death and can affect terestrial affairs... Sir Oliver Lodge et al...Seances...other experiences.

THE SEARCHING MIND OF MAN

15. ATHEISM...with spokesman for group carrying on Ingersoll's work. How do they account of creation and maintenance of universe...why insist on no Supreme Being...sincere effort to find out their motives and impulses.

Possible subsequent programs on:

UNITARIANS

UNIVERSALISTS

CHRISTIAN SCIENTISTS

QUAKERS

MORMONS

MENNONITES AND AMISH

SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS

DEISTS

ETHICAL SOCIETY

and

CONVENTIONAL PROTESTANT DENOMINATIONS:

EPISCOPALIAMS

PRESPYTERIANS

METHODISTS

EASTERN ORTHODOX

BAPTISTS

LUTHERANS

CONGREGATIONALISTS

ETC.

and

FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS:

Represented by American Council of Churches and other groups.

Shaw, Charles.

December 6, 1957

Dear Charlie:

Leave me know when you can come up for lunch.

Your references to me were not inadequate. They were superlative and warmed my heart. In that particular passage, you were guilty of over-writing, which is something I warned you about repeatedly. Don't do it again.

As ever yours,

Mr. Charles Shaw
WCAU
City & Monument Avenues
Philadelphia 31, Pennsylvania

mcc

WCAU

Philadelphia 31, Pa. / city and monument avenues • greenwood 7-8300

December 4, 1957

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Ed:

Naturally, I was a little disappointed in not having you advise me to get masses of visas. But I would like very much to call on you soon after the new year begins.

I'm sending you scripts of three recent broadcasts, one of which contains some inadequate references to you. My sponsor, learning that I had wound up 25 years in news, suggested this series. I was pleased to accept the suggestion.

Sincerely,

Charlie

Good Evening:

Twenty-five years ago last summer, I walked into a newspaper office in McKeesport, Pennsylvania, talked for a little while with the City Editor, sat down at a typewriter and began pecking out a story of a unique new enterprise in McKeesport called the Barter Mart.

As I took my seat in front of that typewriter in the City Room of The Daily News, I actually was taking a seat in the grandstand to watch and report the game of life, to be what William Hazlitt called "a spectator of the mighty scene of things." Most of the time, I tried to do what Hazlitt tried to do: "to take a thoughtful, anxious interest or curiosity in what was passing in the world, but not to feel the slightest inclination to make or meddle with it." Had I been able to do that, I suppose I would have been the ideal reporter; I had been told that a reporter should have no emotions lest he lose his objectivity. Later I was told that it's all right for a reporter to have emotions so long as he doesn't let them show.

But reporting has undergone a great change in the last quarter of a century, and I think the change began about the time I entered the business. We all tried to stay in the grandstand, or at least in the press box, and look objectively at this mighty scene of things; but, without being able to do anything about it, we found ourselves out on the field, part of the mighty scene we were, at the same time, trying to report. At times, it was like those dreams all of us have - dreams in which you are standing apart from a spectacle and yet seeing yourself as a part of that scene; or like showing home movies to company - narrating events in which you are plainly taking part.

For a quarter of a century now, I have been a spectator at the game of life and at the same time a participant - at once a grim and exciting game, a game that has been played for keeps every year, every day, every hour, every minute. There are those who will tell you that this has been perhaps the most eventful quarter of a century in the history of mankind, and it would be hard to think off-hand of any period that has been more eventful. There are those who say that these have been dark days - days of depression, war and fear, climaxed by spectacular scientific discoveries which mankind is using to fashion weapons that could be the means of its total destruction. But if I viewed my twenty-five years as a reporter and editor in that light, I should not be here to talk about them tonight...I would be secluded in shame.

Rather I feel as Winston Churchill did when he addressed the Boys of Harrow in perhaps the most critical stage of World War Two - back in October, 1941. "Do not let us speak of darker days," Mr. Churchill said. "Let us speak rather of sterner days. These are not dark days; these are great days - the greatest days our country has ever lived; and we must all thank God that we have been allowed, each of us according to our stations, to play a part in making these days memorable in the history of our race."

This then will be AS I HAVE SEEN IT, as I have seen a great quarter of a century - almost ten thousand days that have been stern days but great days...which will turn out to be dark days only if we are faithless to those with whom we have shared those days and negligent of the gifts which God has given us, ungrateful to God that we have been allowed, each of us according to our stations, to play a part in making these days memorable in the history of our race.

I began my quarter of a century by writing two paragraphs about the Barter Mart, a place where you could buy and sell without using money. Money was a very scarce commodity, because the year was 1932, and 1932 was the worst year of the Great Depression. At the Barter Mart, you tried to trade possessions you could do without for items you needed, and a public spirited citizen supervised the exchanges, which also gave the people something to do to relieve their idleness.

My first newspaper beat also included the Helping Hand, a private charitable organization, and it was enlarged to include the city's four leading undertakers, from whom I gathered obituaries. I asked one of the undertakers why the cause of death wasn't included on one obituary form, and he said, "You wouldn't print it if it were on there. It was starvation."

Yes, some people starved; multitudes were hungry; Ph. D.'s were grateful for jobs sweeping-up in silent, desolate steel mills. Fresh out of Allegheny College, soon associated with Socialists, worshipful of Norman Thomas as he campaigned for the Presidency that fateful election year, almost respectful of Communism but not, however, of the individual McKeesport Communists whom I had known since childhood as ne'er-do-wells and malcontents, I was convinced in my callowness that capitalism was doomed, that the next major sound would not be that of reviving steel mills but the death rattle of the American free enterprise system.

Each Saturday, after having spent a week looking into the haunted faces at the Helping Hand and the Barter Mart and the various breadlines and the long lines of applicants for a half dozen jobs now and then, I felt guilty as I accepted my 20-dollar pay, setting aside a dollar-14 for six 19-cent lunches, a dollar for a weekly street car pass, seventy cents for seven packs of cigarets, five dollars for room and board at home, three dollars for movies and other recreation and the rest, almost ten dollars, for the bank. I wanted three hundred dollars for a certain type of second hand car. I was close to that three hundred dollars, when my bank, like many others, had to close.

It seemed there for a while that even the sun didn't shine; and the jokes we made were tired ones. Around Pittsburgh, they speak of the mills running - running, not operating - so many days a week, and one wit said, "Things are so bad that the river's running only three days a week." They sang, "Hallelujah, I'm a bum," and "Brother, Can You Spare a Dime?" And, all the time, as I looked at food displays in store windows and on the sidewalks outside produce markets, I asked myself, "When will the people just decide to take what they can't buy? How long can they be so tantalized?"

That was the beginning - call it a dark beginning, or call it a stern beginning. My path led me next to Pittsburgh, back to McKeesport, throughout the United States, Canada and Mexico with a trailer, to Europe, the Middle East, the Far East; finally - and I would like to think of it as finally - to Philadelphia. I have seen tragedy, and I have known tragedy; I've also had an awful lot of fun.

Maybe it's because beginnings are most impressive, but I feel that I learned more from my first few years than I have learned in all the rest...certainly it was invaluable preparation and background for a career and private life that at all times have been intensely human.

It was then, almost at the very beginning, that I formulated my creed, composed my testament. Because we did hear the roar of the steel mills again and not the

death rattle of American enterprise; the people were patient until it became sinful not to become impatient and they saved themselves with the help of Him who had so richly endowed them; they did not despair for long...they quit singing "Hallelujah, I'm a bum" and "Brother, can you spare a dime?"

They were bled, the American people were; bled therapeutically, so to speak, and they rebounded with a vigor that was as truly characteristic as their temporary despair and bewilderment were uncharacteristic.

My bank, like the majority of the closed banks, reopened, and I got my 300-dollar car; with a salary increased to the staggering figure of 40 dollars a week by 1935, I did the one unquestionably smart thing of all my life in marrying the girl who now has shared all but three years of this quarter of a century. By that time, I had developed an abiding faith in humanity, especially in the American branch of humanity, and I have never been surprised by our most spectacular achievements; I have been surprised only by our foolish, needless failures.

I have seen every part of this country of ours, which Thomas Wolfe called "a fabulous country, the only fabulous country." I have heard America singing...and I have heard America crying, her tears mingled with the tears of mothers, fathers, wives and sweethearts all over the world when we had to prove our devotion to our principles in the arena of war; when some of us, without understanding why, suffered losses far removed from that arena. But failure to understand the reason does not mean there is no reason; you can always find someone who has suffered greater loss; and, while you would prefer that tragedy pass you by, you might accept it - as accept it you must - as a bond with all who suffer or have suffered and use it, rather than charge injustice, as a tool for understanding others. Without understanding, one has eyes that see not, ears that hear not.

This has been the beginning; philosophically, it could, perhaps, be the end. But there have been some experiences to document my beliefs, which I shall report Monday and Tuesday. And I might say, however, briefly, that among the most valuable, the most enjoyable experiences has been my privileged association with the farmers and families of the Interstate Milk Producers Co-operative, for whom I do these nightly broadcasts, and who have surrendered the time they pay for to tell their story commercially so that I could use all available time tonight.

For the moment, that's AS I SEE IT, recorded Monday through Friday for the Interstate Milk Producers Co-operative. This is Charles Shaw, wishing you Good Night.

AS I SEE IT! This is Charles Shaw, speaking for the Interstate Milk Producers Co-operative, tonight recording the most memorable experiences of a quarter of a century in news.

The memory of 25 years is a montage...one picture cut into another; a picture superimposed on another; pictures changing form like the bits of colored glass in a kaleidoscope. They could be put in order, into sequence by proper organization; but one can evaluate his experiences properly only if he lets memory operate spontaneously, without notes - and I don't have any scrapbooks or diaries, anyway - if he lets his experiences crowd each other for recognition. Those which crowd their way to the front are the most important, if not the most dramatic.

I recall my service as a correspondent in World War Two. I am at the front... the MP's have told me and a companion that we should go back...it had been pretty hot up there and would be again. It did get pretty hot again; and, as I started back, I remembered seeing a young American soldier lying peacefully in the lacey shade of a shattered building, and I thought I should wake him to warn him of renewed danger. If I shouted at him or shook him, I thought, I might startle him and he might instinctively jump me; so I leaned over to call him softly, as I sometimes had called my son when he was in a deep sleep. I leaned down over him...I was about to call when I saw, between the back of his head and the ground, a thin strip of light - maybe a sixteenth of an inch. His head was not touching the ground; unmarked so far as I could see, this young soldier - his eyes closed, his face composed - was sleeping the final sleep.

How many millions died in World War Two? How often did I see the bodies piled high...often on trucks, piled like cordwood? But I remember one body; and, for the life of me, I couldn't tell you where it was. I remember another young American who had given his life: His face registered surprise...he had been hit as he was climbing over a little hillock. And why shouldn't he have been surprised... don't we all believe that death marks only other people?

That was my war...not the tidal sweep of great forces, not the grand strategies, however impressive they were...but a single soldier here, a single civilian there, masses of people broken up into individuals. War is an intensely personal thing... if we think of it in any other way, we shall continue to have wars.

I didn't like to look upon the faces of the dead; but I remembered the words of a friend: "If men will not look upon the faces of those who died for them in battle, then surely those who died have died in vain." And I didn't like to look upon the faces of some of the living...like the wretched refuse of the concentration camps. I am sure that one reason was that I felt a share of guilt for their wretched state...they were victims of inhumane humanity.

I asked one girl, a teen-ager who had been subjected to nightly indignities by her lecherous Nazi guards, if she would like to go to America, and she said, "No." I want to go to Germany...and kill, kill, kill Germans. She would have been able to give the world - all of us - much. I shook hands with her in parting, and another correspondent told me I should not have done that; I might contract disease; I should wash my hands. I did, and I thought of the words, "Pilate took water and washed his hands before the multitude, saying, I am innocent of the blood of this just person."

No, the living weren't always pleasant to look at either. A few months after the war, I broadcast an interview with three children who had spent more than half their lives in concentration camps...they had watched their parents being led off to the gas chambers. Their bodies and souls also had been violated. As we rehearsed the script, they giggled at the starkest parts. I said, "When we get on the air, please don't giggle, please control yourselves. I understand why you do, that you either giggle or scream out in agony; but those who hear your stories will not understand because they can't."

Was it all bad, this war? Yes, it was all bad; but I would lie if I denied that I had been thrilled at times. One should be ashamed to be thrilled; but that's the part of us that remains uncivilized, the part we have to work on.

I was thrilled by the sidelights of war - the many acts of unselfish devotion, the many deeds of heroism; but I grieved that there had to be a war to provide the opportunity for such noble conduct.

I was thrilled by the sights of freedom's restoration...in the cities and villages of France but, more impressively, in Denmark and Norway, where I arrived before the Germans had surrendered and, in Copenhagen, broadcast to America while the Germans still controlled the country. I was thrilled to see people awakening, like Sleeping Beauty, from the sleep of subjugation; but I grieved again that any people had taken freedom so lightly that it could be so easily lost...as well it could be lost anywhere, even here.

But there were unadulterated thrills, the greatest of all perhaps which came to me in London's Central Hall on January 10, 1946, when, after I had set the scene in a special broadcast, I said, "The next voice you hear will be that of Doctor Edouardo Zuleta Angel, president of the United Nations Preparatory Commission," and then listened to Dr. Zuleta declare, "La seance eh t'ouvert," "The meeting is opened," the meeting being that of the First Assembly of the United Nations, which I had called "the last, best hope on earth." I was thrilled at other meetings of the UN... also disappointed, but never disappointed in the UN - only in the people who controlled it.

There was an August day in 1944: Tom Treanor of NBC, Sonnee Gottlieb of International News Pictures and I, with Private Floyd Williams at the wheel of our jeep, were on our way to Paris...we had plans for getting there ahead of our troops and broadcasting and photographing their arrival. We had told General Patton of our connections with the French underground, asked him what he would do if we broadcast without censorship, and he replied, in his high-pitched voice, "If anybody complained, I'd have to suspend you...But don't you think it would be worth it?" We intended to travel with our troops until we outdistanced them and then strike out on our own. We arrived at a cross roads at exactly the instant a Sherman tank made a sharp left turn and climbed over our jeep. The right tread of that Sherman ground right over Treanor; the only wonder was that he lived the few hours he did after the crash. I suffered a simple fracture of the fibula.

Five minutes before that accident, I had been riding in the front seat...we had stopped to stretch and, trying to be a good fellow, I insisted that the long-legged Treanor take the front seat, where he would be more comfortable. Gottlieb was already in the back, and I jumped in beside him, leaving only the front seat vacant for Tom. I did him a favor: he died, I lived.

But there has been more to this past quarter of a century than a war, although it seems that everything in 1932 was leading up to World War Two and everything since 1945 has been an aftermath. Perhaps the truth is that the first World War has never ended - the period from 1918 to 1939 was an armistice because nothing was resolved by Versailles and the other peace treaties and there still has been no resolution of the basic problems remaining from World War Two.

My baptism as a reporter was one of fire because, as I reported Friday night, it began at the very depth of the Great Depression. It was also the Prohibition Era and the Day of the Gangster. The first real celebrity with whom I worked was a reporter who had interviewed both the Prince of Wales and Al Capone, and those who heard that would say, "You mean you really talked with Al Capone?"

Our leading gangsters in Pittsburgh were the Volpe brothers, who said they came of princely Italian stock; and one day, all three of them were machine-gunned to death as they walked together along a Pittsburgh street. The lead on The Pittsburgh Sun-Telegraph story was: "They shot down the Volpe brothers today and left them lying in their own blood," while The Press lead read, "The princely blood of the Volpe brothers was spilled in a Pittsburgh gutter today." I envied those two rewrite men for the magic of their words; but, after all, they had something to write about.

Yes, it's all a montage...a year of free-lancing on a trailer tour of Canada, the United States and Mexico. The great Pittsburgh flood of 1936, when I was to learn for the first time that people are kinder to each other when they're in trouble than when they're not. Small-town council meetings and national political conventions, where the difference in behavior is only one of degree.

As a reporter, you see both the good and the bad, but you write most about the bad. And why is that? Because news is mostly information about the unusual - the man biting the dog rather than the dog biting the man - and when you realize that, you can come to only one conclusion: Evil is more unusual than virtue. And that makes you glad to have been, and to be, a reporter.

And that's AS I SEE IT, recorded Monday through Friday for the Interstate Milk Producers Co-operative, to whose members I express my thanks for foregoing the time usually devoted to their commercials so that I might use all the time available for these broadcasts commemorating my quarter of a century in news. The final one tomorrow night on the most unforgettable people I have met.

This is Charles Shaw, wishing you Good Night...

AS I SEE IT! This is Charles Shaw, speaking for the Interstate Milk Producers Co-operative, tonight recording the last of 3 broadcasts about my quarter of a century in news.

After 25 years in the news business, of mingling with the great and the near great, but more often with the little people, I often am asked, "Who is the greatest person you ever met?"

And I answer unhesitatingly, "My son, Bryan, who died almost seven years ago. In less than 11 years, he taught me much about how to live and everything about how to die. In his fatal illness, his concern was for us, his parents, not himself. I often think he believed he was shielding us from the knowledge from which we believed we were shielding him - the knowledge that he was going to leave us; and when he left, he left as Percival, following the gleam.

Also his mother, my wife, who bore her first-born's fate in what someone truly called a living sermon for all those bereaved and to be bereaved. And my second son, so very much like his brother, who also teaches me how to live but who, we pray, will never have to add to my instruction in how to depart this life.

My mother and father, of course unappreciated while they lived, but whose training, often hard to understand at the time, was the only kind of training for the life I chose to lead.

But then I'm asked, "Who among the famous was the greatest?" and again I reply unhesitatingly, "A boss who let me call him friend - Edward R. Murrow. His was the greatest mind I have ever known; his was the greatest compassion. To eulogize him properly would be to embarrass him; to eulogize him properly would require a greater gift of expression than mine. Edward R. Murrow taught me more about integrity in the three years in which I was privileged to work with him than all my other acquaintances combined - and for the simple reason that, as a reporter, he never preached integrity...he lived it.

Murrow never talked about his compassion. He lived that, too - he was living it when you saw him leaving his flat in London's first light to head for a bomber base and fly again with the B17's and the B24's on another bombing mission to Germany. How can you talk about these fellows, he was saying by his action, without sharing their experiences? Living his compassion, too, when he refused to let you take a single needless risk - forcing you sometimes to defy him secretly - with the almost gruff comment, "I don't want to make any widows or orphans." Short periods of deep depression, irritability - not temperament, as some have called it...he was - as he remains - involved in mankind.

The greatest, the most unforgettable - Ed Murrow - among many to whom I owe thanks for help and inspiration and friendship.

Larry Fagan, city editor of The Pittsburgh Press, who told me, and proved to me, that you have to have guts - and there's no other word for the sort of thing that Irishman named Fagan meant - if you would deserve that honored title of Reporter.

Younger men, whom I thought I was helping but who, in their enthusiasm and ability and sincerity, helped me more - Richard Amper, now of The New York Times; Dave Teitlebaum, of NBC's "Today"; Ralph Paskman, foreign editor of CBS Newsfilm; the men of my staff here at WCAU, those who have gone to other jobs as well as those who remain. You never really help anybody without helping yourself; and, sooner or later, you probably do it selfishly, having learned the truth about casting your bread upon the waters.

The memory of 25 years is a montage - faces, some distinct, some blurred, of the millions you have seen and the thousands you have met. Those whom you met, spent some time with and would like to have known much better.

I remember a lunch at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and a balding young colonel engaged in earnest conversation by brigadier and major generals. I asked an officer beside me, "Who is that young colonel over there - the one with all those generals?" And he replied, "His name's Eisenhower. You're going to hear a lot about him." I was to see and hear about this brilliant officer in years to come, but what I remember most, I believe, was watching him receive the Freedom of the City of London and getting goose-pimples when I read The London Evening Standard's headline that night, THE MAN FROM TEXAS IS A LONDONER NOW. Somehow, that ceremony seemed to link our countries more than anything else.

This has been a quarter of a century of great personalities: Franklin D. Roosevelt, singing out a creed for the stern days of 1933 that also is a creed for today. "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself," telling us in 1936 that "This generation of Americans has a rendezvous with destiny." The night of April 12, 1945, as I sat in the dining room of Stockholm's Grand Hotel, telling my companions that my son, Bryan, was five years old that day, then being called to the phone to be told that President Roosevelt was dead. I returned to the table to tell my friends, and the news spread over that immense dining room like a wave which stunned and silenced.

Another giant of the generation - Winston Churchill, who galvanized a people by promising them only agony. Churchill in Commons, Churchill in the bomb ruins, Churchill at railroad stations, coming from or going to meetings across the Atlantic or across Europe, behaving always as the incarnation of courage and dedication.

King George the Sixth, inspirational in his gentleness and domesticity - a perfect complement to the rugged, dogged Churchill.

A memorable audience with Pope Pius the Twelfth, the only man I ever met who seemed both ascetic and dynamic...another giant in a generation of giants.

These and other famous men...all of them inspiring. But who is to say whence one draws his greatest inspiration? And is it not true that fame does not always accompany greatness...that, truly, one may draw inspiration only from the great but that one may find the great in many places?

I have seen people by the millions and have met them by the thousands, and each one has made his or her impress. Brief encounters, sometimes more impressive than long acquaintances - "Ships that pass in the night, and speak each other in passing,/ Only a signal shown and a distant voice in the darkness;/

So on the ocean of life we pass and speak one another,/ Only a look and a voice; then darkness again and a silence."

And what have I learned from all these people - the great and the near great, the famous and the infamous, the little people who included some of the greatest? While carrying on a real love affair with America, I also learned the truth of what William Lloyd Garrison once said, "My country is the world; my countrymen are mankind." As a child in a region that had been invaded in force by immigrants, a region in which I also began my professional life, I was subjected to many prejudices. I rejected those prejudices instinctively; but it was my work, which took me to the lands from which my fellow townsmen came, which utterly destroyed them.

I learned that you can love America all the more for loving, or at least respecting, other lands as well, because America has drawn her strength from all the world.

I learned to love liberty by seeing liberty destroyed, or viewing the fruits of its destruction, and by being forced to plumb my mind for convincing arguments for democracy - as when a Greek Communist scoffed at my assertion that democracy was preferable to Communism by asking, "Democracy? Can you eat it, can you wear it, will it give you shelter?" My replies, while they may not have converted the Communist, silenced him momentarily, and they at least strengthened my faith. And so, another debt I owe - to one whose masters seek our destruction.

These past twenty-five years have been crowded years, but - and the best way I know of summing up is to repeat these words of Edward R. Murrow with which he concluded his first "I Can Hear It Now" record:

"If the universe is as many million years old as we think it is, our crowded little era is but an instant of yesterday when it is past. 1933's unemployment, September at Munich, that June 10th at Lidice, December 7th at Pearl Harbor, 9:15 over Hiroshima were all part of the identical moment. The one question remaining then: was it 23-59 o'clock or zero-zero-zero-one... was there to be still another cycle of affliction, appeasement and annihilation or had we walked through midnight toward the dawn without knowing it?"

And that's AS I SEE IT, recorded Monday through Friday for the Interstate Milk Producers Co-operative, who have relinquished their commercial time these past three nights so that I could tell my story of my quarter of a century. This is Charles Shaw, wishing you Good Night.

Shaw, Charles

November 1, 1957

Dear Charlie:

I have your letter of October 23 and am extremely sympathetic to your problem. Unfortunately, I see absolutely no chance of expanding the SEE IT NOW operation at this point. As a matter of fact, I am having trouble keeping it at its present level.

However, I shall be delighted to sit down and discuss the possibilities with you. Give me a ring and let me know when you would like to come up.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Charles Shaw
WCAU
City & Monument Avenues
Philadelphia 31, Pennsylvania

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October 23, 1957

Dear Ed:

I'm going to ask you for a great favor - there's no point in my trying to make this letter appear to be anything else than that. But I would like to think that this favor to me, if you could grant it, might be of some benefit to you also.

I am terribly restless, Ed. Natural for one in his middle forties? Perhaps that's the most of it, but it's not all by a long shot. As you may know, I went to Japan last summer...it was my first trip abroad since 1946... and I haven't been the same since. Despite the fact that I am more successful in my WCAU job than I ever dreamed I would be, despite the fact that I am making more money, as a combination administrator and radio-television airman, than I ever dreamed I would make, despite a certain "belonging" in a city where much time must elapse beforeyou can "belong," I realize more than ever that I am basically a reporter, not an administrator or a showman. I want to become a reporter again.

It wasn't long after I returned from Europe that I determined to make this Philadelphia stint a temporary affair. But I realized that I had some personal problems to solve before I could conscientiously seek a change. I set about solving those problems and met with great success and, in the summer of 1949, I was picked to handle Bill Henry's show during his vacation. The time had come for me to try to do what I really wanted to do; but, then, Bryan got sick, and he died in January 1951. That took a bit of getting over, but I think we did pretty well. I didn't think, however, that I should seek a job that would entail considerable separation from Nancy and Kip - for my own sake as well as theirs - until the wound was as nearly healed as we ever can expect it to be.

A little more than a year ago, Nancy went to work as an interior decorator with a real nice Ardmore concern, and she's been very successful and very happy. Kip is in fifth grade at Episcopal Academy and about as healthy, well-balanced, good-looking and capable a child as you can find. I have reason to believe that I have been doing very well - I feel certain that Don Thornburgh and Charlie Vanda would speak rather well of me.

The invitation to visit to Japan seemed to be heaven-sent, if only because it represented a chance to go abroad again. But it turned out to be something much more than that. It was as water to a thirsting man who hadn't realized the extent of his thirst. I found that my curiosity was infinitely greater than it had ever been before and, at the same time, I experienced a tremendous happiness - happiness, not just pleasure - in satisfying that curiosity. I worked harder on that trip than I ever had worked before, and I did so with a light heart...I was doing what I wanted to do more than anything else in the world. The radio and television shows I turned out were the best I have ever done. Perhaps one reason was that I was in full control of myself at all times, and my great thrill right now is the realization that the temptation such a trip offers to relax one's controls was no temptation at all. I wouldn't exchange that satisfaction for anything in the world.

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So what I would ask you is this: Could you make use of me as a member of your SEE IT NOW staff? I would knock myself out for you - and I guess I wouldn't be doing it for you, but for myself, because I have a terrible longing to knock myself out in helping you do the sort of thing that only you are doing on television. There are so many things I want to learn, and, while I would be working for you as a reporter to inform your audience, I would have the selfish motive of informing myself. I had thought of writing that "I would never let you down"; but somehow that seems vulgar. I would ask to become a member of your staff only for what I could do, not for what I would not do.

The greatest interest I have now is in mankind's ethics, philosophies and religions. I found something in Japan which can be explained only by a philosophy, a code of ethics, a religion or combination of religions that I have been trying to examine since my return. The opportunities for such examination are limited here.

There is one great project of which I would like to be a part - a television report on "The Searching Mind of Man," a report in depth on the faiths by which men live around the world - an examination of Buddhism in its various forms, Taoism, Confucianism, Hinduism and Shinto, as well as Judaism, Christianity and Islam. I should not presume to suggest this as a SEE IT NOW project, but I shall. If I could be part of only that one show, or series of shows, I would feel that I had done something worthwhile, that I would have made up in part for some of my derelictions, recaptured some of my lost opportunities.

But I feel I could do more. I remember the title of the exchange show we did with BBC during the war: TRANSATLANTIC CALL: PEOPLE TO PEOPLE. I assume that that suggested your PERSON TO PERSON title; but isn't there much to be done along the line of PEOPLE TO PEOPLE also...how people elsewhere work, how they play, how they study, etc.?

I know, Ed, that I am a good reporter. I feel that I am a pretty fair writer. I have been pretty successful as a broadcaster on both radio and television. My experience as a newspaper editor and now as a radio-television news director has acquainted me with the problems of production, which I always would bear in mind in the field. I get along well with people...I seem to do all right in interviews. Personally, my health, both physical and emotional, is excellent.

Would it be possible for us at least to have brief conversation about this? I could arrange to run up to New York almost any day by recording my radio show in advance and arranging for a suitable television substitute. Or perhaps you could see me some evening after your radio show.

Thanks for reading this. And all the best to Janet and Casey.

As ever,

Charlie Shaw

Shaw, Charles

SPEAKING FOR FREEDOM

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September 22, 1955

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Ed:

As always, it was real good to see you; the only trouble was that your visit had to be so short. Nancy and I are looking forward to accepting your invitation to spend some time in New York with you, and as soon as her ankle heals, we will be in a position to make some plans.

I want to thank you especially for your kindness to Jim Eadline. Your conversation with him was a better morale-builder than a $10 raise, and as long as Eadline's here, what helps Eadline helps me. I imagine he will be calling you real soon, and while I realize that you don't have anything in view, you might be in a position to turn him over to somebody who would need a good man. As I said to you down here, recommending Eadline is a favor to the person to whom the recommendation is made as well as to Eadline himself.

Good hay-baling, or whatever you farmers do at this time of the year.

Regards,

Charlie

CS:b



Shaw, Charles

September 9, 1955

Dear Charlie:

Many thanks for letting me see your piece on the French students of baseball. It was not only diverting but, as usual, you have succeeded in saying something well worth saying.

I will be working from your cordial Studio on Thursday night of next week if all goes well.

As ever yours,

Mr. Charles Shaw
Station WCAU
City and Monument Avenues
Philadelphia 31, Pennsylvania

rh

SPEAKING FOR FREEDOM

WCAU

city and monument avenues . philadelphia 31, pa. . greenwood 7-8300

September 7, 1955

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Ed:

Listening to your baseball piece last night, I thought you might like to see a piece I did last week. It seems to have amused and otherwise pleased a few people.

It's sure good to hear and see you again. Hope the family's all well. A bit of incidental intelligence: Nancy's having her first art exhibit beginning this Friday night. She's come along very well.

All the best,

Charlie

CS:b

enc.

RADIO BROADCAST

By Charles Shaw
News Editor
WCAU/ WCAU- TV
presented over WCAU Radio
7:30 PM, Monday, August 29,1955

Good Evening:

The tremendous battle that is being waged for the American League baseball pennant and the recent renaissance of the Philadelphia Phillies have set me to thinking more than usual about this so-called national pastime of ours. Some people, who don't particularly like baseball, call it our national madness. But there are others who would have you haled before a Congressional Committee as a suspected subversive if you said anything uncomplimentary about baseball. If baseball can be criticized with impunity, is nothing sacred?

I've often wondered what a person who knew absolutely nothing about baseball, who had never had any experience with baseball in any shape or form would do and say if he went to a game. We all know of women who say they know nothing about baseball, but they aren't telling the whole truth. They've watched their brothers or their sons playing at some kind of baseball; they couldn't have managed to avoid seeing at least a fleeting glimpse of a baseball game on a television screen or a movie newsreel; they must have heard a few snatches of a play-by-play broadcast. Every American woman knows something about baseball; otherwise, how could those who say they know nothing about baseball say they hate it so much?

But I finally found somebody who actually did not know a thing about baseball - ten such persons, in fact. They were ten young Frenchmen -- seven young men and three young women to be precise.- who are spending a month in the Philadelphia area as part of a project called "Experiment in International Living." The French visitors are living in ten different homes, each living the kind of family life his host and hostess and their children live. On a very few occasions, the ten visitors and their hosts and hostesses have got together for a special event.

They got together for such an event last Friday night, and the event was the baseball game at Connie Mack Stadium between the Philadelphia Phillies and the St. Louis Cardinals. One of my colleagues is host to one of the Frenchmen; and, since he is a darned good reporter and a keen student of human nature, I asked him if he would report to me on what these Frenchmen, who literally knew nothing about baseball, did and said at the game.

Now, it's one of my rules never to preconceive a story - that is, never to decide in advance how a story is going to work out, but I couldn't help but expect my colleague to come back with titillating stories similar to those told about Dumb Dora and her first baseball game.

He had some funny stories to tell, no doubt about that. But his report was quite different from what I had expected, and, I'm sure, from anything you would expect.

The first thing you must understand, he said, is that the Frenchman has no frame of reference for judging baseball. There is nothing remotely resembling baseball in France, nothing resembling it as closely, for example, as Great Britain's cricket. Their sense of games just doesn't include anything like baseball. Perhaps if we went to Mars and found the Martians engaged in a sport in which a pellet about the size of a pea was used and the idea was for a member of one team to blow that pea through the air as far as he could and for members of the other team to catch that pea behind the right ear and then do a lot of other strange tricks, we would be no more puzzled than a Frenchman seeing his first baseball game.

All the Frenchmen rather quickly decided that baseball was a very violent game, and that, of course, is a most surprising reaction to the average American who doesn't think of baseball and violence at the same time. But there were three things in this one game that convinced the Frenchmen that baseball is terribly violent and dangerous - a body-block charge by a baserunner into second base in an effort to upset the second baseman and prevent a double play; a hot grounder that almost tore the glove off the shortstop, prompting a French girl to ask, "Why didn't he get out of the way?" and, most convincing

of all, the rundown of a baserunner between third base and home. And the way my friend translated the thoughts and emotions of the visiting Frenchmen during that rundown, I can fully appreciate what a startling experience it must have been. This was the situation:

The Cardinals had runners on first and second when the batter knocked out a double. The runner scored from second, and the man who had been on first headed for third. A Philadelphia outfielder toyed with the ball as if he didn't know where he should throw it; so the runner decided to round third and try for home. With that, the outfielder rifled the ball to the catcher well in front of the runner. The runner turned back toward third, which was well covered by a Phillies player.

The runner was trapped and the crowd rose to its feet, yelling at the top of their voices. The Frenchmen rose automatically but only one of them was tall enough to see what was going on. The other nine kept tugging at his coat and calling, "Comment, Comment? What's going on?" but the Tall One could not answer. He was seeing something that was enough to give you cold chills.

He saw what looked for all the world like a terribly frightened man in the uniform of a St. Louis Cardinal running first in one direction and then in another like a trapped fawn as seven or eight men in the uniforms of the Phillies converged on him. The hulking catcher, with bulging chest protector and leg pads, held the ball in his ham-like right hand, ready, so it seemed, to clobber the lone Cardinal, then he would throw it to a brother assassin who would gesture menacingly with the ball. Finally, there was no more room for the Cardinal to run, the Phillies swarmed around him, the big right hand bearing the hard ball came down on his body. Amazingly, though, he got up and walked away, apparently unhurt.

The roaring crowd was seated, and so were the Frenchmen. The nine who didn't see the play kept quizzing the Tall One who did. They didn't ask the Americans to explain the rundown, probably because they weren't sure they'd get a completely honest answer.

And, as a matter of fact, they had some reasons to question the Americans' reliability. Before the game, each host told his guest how important it was to know everything you could know about each player...the more you knew, the more you could enjoy the game. And, of course, it's absolutely vital that you know everything about the pitcher: he's the key man, the most important player by far and so on and so on. At that point, the P.A. announcer began reeling off the lineups and the Americans comment to their French guests on each player: Ashburn - leads the league in batting; Morgan, red hot shortstop and so on down the line to Simmons, the pitcher, hurt his feet on a power lawnmover, has had a bad arm this year, but still has lots of promise. The St. Louis lineup: Comments on each player until the announcer reaches the pitcher: "No. 4, hrumphh." The name is indistinguishable, but that's all right. Look up No. 4 on the scorecard. There is no such number. So you ask some other fans, "Who's that pitching for St. Louis?" "Never heard of him." "But, you've just told the Frenchmen that you've got to have heard about the pitcher and a lot more than just heard of him. As my friend expressed it, "We lost 50 points right there."

But there was still another crisis of confidence - maybe even a worse one. In the eighth inning with the Phillies trailing, the pitcher, Mrozinski, was due to bat, but my friend explained to the Frenchmen that pitchers can't hit; so Manager Mayo Smith certainly would have somebody else bat for Mrozinski, somebody who could hit: Sure enough, Mrozinski was lifted; but who batted in his place? A pitcher, Robin Roberts.

Before the game, every host had told his French guest about the great Robin Roberts, the best pitcher in baseball today, truly a sensation. So, when Roberts was inserted into the lineup, most of the Frenchmen, who were still able to think anything about the game, concluded that although he couldn't hit, being a pitcher, he was going to pitch.

Roberts got a walk, a base on balls, and then he moved to second. Whereupon, a player named Lowery went out on the field, stepped on second base and Roberts stepped off and went to the club house. He was through for the evening. Being a pitcher, he had done what he was not supposed to be able to do, which was bat; but he did not do what he was most able to do, which was pitch.

At that point, the Frenchmen seemed convinced that this was a horribly disorganized, senseless game, which, by some accident, had come to be known as our national pastime and which we Americans, therefore, had to protect and explain. The Frenchmen seemed downright embarrassed for us.

One of the visitors did say that he thought the crowd was to chauviniste - too partisan - and to illustrate his contention he cited the booing which followed a third-called strike on a Phillies player. The Frenchman said, quite logically, "The umpire can see it much better than you or I. How can we possibly know?"

One fan, quite gay and noisy, rolled his scorecard into an improvised megaphone and shouted some untranslatable epithet to the umpire. One of the French girls thought he was shouting instructions and asked innocently, "Can the umpire understand him?"

The visitors, even though they regarded the game as a melange of violence, confusion and fear, enjoyed the game as a good crowd experience and something that made them feel very American. Anxious to get into the spirit of the game, one of them asked my friend if he could suggest an appropriate cheer which they could chant as the occasion permitted or demanded. My friend suggested the French words for "Down with the Umpire", and the suggestion met with a ready reception. And so, if a fielder muffed a ball, a batter struck out swinging, the Cardinals scored a run or anything happened to produce groans in the crowd, the French would chorus out, in their own language, "Down with the umpire", while cigar-smoking, shirt-sleeved fans on all sides would switch their attention from the playing field to that section of Connie Mack Stadium which had become a little part of Paris for a couple of hours. None of the umpires understood French or understood it well enough to know that he was being blamed for everything that went wrong with the Phillies and was being consigned to a tumbril for a ride to La Guillotine.

But if the visiting Frenchmen think we have adopted a pretty silly game for our national pastime, they think we're pretty good and capable and smart people in other respects. I've met a few of these visitors and I've talked with their hosts and hostesses, and I think they're going to tell a pretty good story about the United States when they go home. I hope they like us, because the ten young men and women who are staying in this area, now aged 18 to 26, are potentially influential, powerful politicians, journalists, businessmen and members of other professions. One of them may well become Prime Minister.

They are favorably impressed by American methods, and they think that many of our methods may be adopted with profit in France. They are anxious to get to work and help solve France's problems with modern, direct methods. They seem fed up with tradition where tradition stultifies; yet tradition is such a part of them that they can't help but respect it. One of the young men was asked if all his ancestors were French. "No", he said, "Only since the 11th Century. The DuPont Corporation, which we consider about as American as ham and eggs, is to the Frenchmen "DuPont de Nemours" founded by a French boy who made good just a couple of hundred years ago.

They don't like to see women drinking for pleasure - it's all right the way they do it in France, where the right women sip a little wine just to be sociable, but not to have any fun. For a woman to be intoxicated is unthinkable. But all the Experiment visitors in this area approve of the independence of American women, and they like the way we raise our children, making them part of the family and dispensing with formality.

All of the Frenchmen I've talked with here like our casual dress; they love our cooking. The one I've come to know best loathes onion soup and cheese, which every good Frenchman is supposed to love, and he drinks much more milk than wine - a lot of milk, very little wine.

All of these visitors are very much like us - yet very different from us. The distinction results from their experiences in war. All of them have been touched by war in a manner which none of us Americans have known. One of them, for example, had a five-year old brother who died just for lack of medical attention. They could easily have paid the fee charged by the most expensive doctor in France; they could have paid for the most expensive medicine in the world, but there was no doctor to examine the child; there was no medicine.

Hearing this story, I remembered the story told me by an Austrian noblewoman who fled Austria with her two children and headed for Italy. Just before arriving in Italy, one of her children died ... of starvation. The other was near death. The mother said to me, "If I had had just one can of dried milk, my child would have lived." At one time, she could have bought a whole dried milk factory.

And so, these young visitors are young people who have lived a lot, and they don't like some of the things they've been through. They don't want to go through them again, and they don't want their children to go through them.

If these youngsters are typical of their class and if they keep the resolutions they've made over here, this younger generation may well restore France to her past glory. And I think they'll keep on liking us, thanks to the Philadelphia men and women who have entertained them, keep on liking us even though they'll never understand what we can see in baseball.

And those are some of tonight's stories from The World Around Us....Good Night.....

Shaw, Chas

WCAU

city and monument avenues • philadelphia 31, pa. • greenwood 7-8300

May 12, 1955

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

Maybe I went overboard on this, but I think these fellows have a great idea, and they're turning out great copy. The quotes in the enclosed script are only a poor sample of the interviews. Thompson and Nemcoff would turn handsprings to provide you with any information you may want.

All the best,

Charlie

Charles Shaw

CS/gs

enc.

"AS I SEE IT" with Charles Shaw Tuesday May, 10, 1955

INTERSTATE MILK PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE 7:30 - 7:45 P.M.

SHAW: This is the story of two small-town newspapermen and their great idea for helping advance the cause of peace and freedom. It is story also of other men and women with great souls and spirits and minds which they have dedicated to the brotherhood of man in a peaceful world.

These people literally are our neighbors; for they all live in Pennsylvania's Bucks County. The two newspapermen are George R. Thompson, editor of The Doylestown Daily Intelligencer, and Barry R. Nemcoff, managing editor. The others are many of the artists, writers, sculptors and scientists who live in Bucks County.

Spread across the top of Page One of The Intelligencer yesterday was an editorial headed: "'Voices for Peace:' About Arms and Armament, Men and Morals, and Peace and War." Signed by Thompson and Nemcoff, the editorial began: "We have become increasingly concerned with the dawning of each day's news at the possibility of another war in which millions may become victims of nuclear bombs. As newspapermen we can offer good excuse for our attitude since in the course of our working day we are constantly reminded of the ominous state of world affairs by the teletype machine which monotonously and persistently clacks off words like these: U. S. DEVELOPS MOST POWERFUL H-BOMB...RUSSIA CLAIMS SUPERIORITY IN ARMS RACE....U.S.SENATOR CALLS RUSSIAN PEACE BID PROPAGANDA...RED CHINA REFUSES TO RELEASE AMERICAN FLYERS...MILITARY OFFICIALS CALL FOR ATOMIC BOMBING OF CHINA MAINLAND."

And so, Thompson and Nemcoff wrote, they wondered what they could do to change thoughts of war to thoughts of peace. They recalled General Douglas MacArthur's January speech in which he said: "The build-

up of nuclear weapons on both sides can lead only to another world war, a war which would be so disastrous as to leave neither side the victor." They recalled Harold Stassen's appointment to a government post amounting to that of Secretary of Peace and Stassen's request for ideas. Solutions to the world's problems, they realized, had been sought and sought earnestly by the world's statesmen, politicians, those with axes to grind; but no great hearing had been given to the artists - those who are most concerned with the "little man" since they contribute the most lasting and most intimate element of his civilization: his culture, which is the only tale of our times which will be left if the bomb falls.

So Editor Thompson and Managing Editor Nemcoff of The Doylestown Daily Intelligencer sought out the views of the many artists who live in Bucks County. They wrote to 35 of them - to people like Oscar Hammerstein the Second, Pearl Buck, James A. Michener, Budd Schulberg, George Nakashima, asking for the opportunity to interview them. The response was tremendous, and those who agreed recommended others who were willing to help.

Thompson and Nemcoff went into each of the artists' homes with tape recorder and wrote their stories from the tapes, so there would not be even a remote chance of misquoting. The stories are copyrighted by The Intelligencer, but any newspaper that will run them in their entirety may have them free of charge.

Thompson and Nemcoff have furnished me with proofs of all the stories written so far and have granted me permission to use excerpts because of the limitations of a broadcast. It is a privilege to read the stories and a greater privilege to be able to quote from them.

The interviews have at least one common denominator. None of the artists likes war. Many of them are staunch advocates of the United Nations, which they believe should be strengthened. All of them believe that individual man, wherever he may be, is the most important thing in the world; and if we forget that, we're in trouble.

The first interview, published today, is with Oscar Hammerstein, the man who wrote the lyrics for some of the biggest shows that ever hit Broadway. Hammerstein's statements on the condition of the world are as arresting as his songs. "Anarchy is a nasty word, "he says, "Nobody likes it, but that's what we've got. You've got to convince the little man that he is living in a world of anarchy."

Hammerstein complains that we attempt to govern the world with no government at all. Even the tiniest hamlet has the basic prerequisites to a social order - education, religion and law. Yet, on a world-wide scale, we have only little education - and this thanks to the United Nations - no international concept of religion and no international law. This is anarchy. We can enjoy the luxury of anarchy when we have reached the perfect spiritual life; but if we want to save the world from destruction now, we need laws."

Hammerstein pleads for an international police force and world law to prevent war, declaring that "the diplomacy of Metternich and Disraeli is obsolete...about as obsolete as a cavalry charge in modern warfare."

"We have to do something bold and original," Hammerstein continued, "and the United States must lead the way. We must admit that we need international laws, and that the Russians must obey them and we must obey them ourselves." We can't allow the establishment of world law to be impossible because we would then "face

mutual world-wide destruction."

To those who contend that the United Nations should be scrapped because it is weak, Hammerstein says we should strengthen it because it is weak.

"We must accomplish the impossible feat of establishing world law enforceable by a world police force. The alternative to this task is marching straight into wholesale destruction of the modern world. We must prevent this by doing the impossible. And we can do it if we try - if we all try."

Soon to be published in TheDoylestown Intelligencer is the Interview with Pearl Buck who, by virtue of her 40 years in China and the intense study which produced her great books on China,knows as much about Asia as any American. It would not be right for me to report too much of the Pearl Buck story in advance of publication, but a few excerpts are in order.

Miss Buck believes the road to peace lies through Asia. "The Asians," she says,"are seeking a political structure, and it is a temptation for them to fall into the simple path of communism rather than try - to them - complex and incomprehensible ways of our form of democracy. We are a relatively new nation which has been pushed into a position of leadership about 500 years too soon. We are confronted with the problem of a new nationa leading many old nations. We have been called to opportunity, duty, responsibility - or whatever you want to call it - much too soon, and we need the perspective of history. All of this is a curious and dangerous concatenation of human events which, without the hydrogen bomb, would have been bad enough; but on top of that our industrious scientists have given us the bomb. Now the real danger lies in that some foolhardy, ignorant,

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pig-headed man will drop the bomb; and in our country every possible control through government must be put on these men. They must not be allowed to have their way.

"If you ask for a solution," Miss Buck says, "the only solution I know is time. Because we have so many nations living in so many eras, once they start fighting, there will be no end. Time, delay - this is not appeasement. Let us avoid announcements we cannot fulfill.... let us keep calm...these are the only immediate actions we can take."

Miss Buck also advocates strengthening the UN, as does Artist Walter Emerson Baum, who says: "Like the 48 states in the nation which learned to live together peacefully and, at the same time, maintain a degree of independence from each other, so must the nations of the world find harmony through the United Nations." Artist John Folinsbee calls for a strong United Nations comparable to a united world federation.

Author-Historian David Taylor says: "The Eastern world has the long-range view and is ready to wait a long time to get its way. We are like children and must have everything immediately. We have to convince the East that we are impatient for peace and not for war, that we are impatient to get the menace of war out of the way."

Throughout all the interviews runs the stream of spirituality, expectable from people who have to be sensitive to follow their trades, who have to know people and appreciate their value, who recognize the sin of using rather than serving people.

N. J. Toomer, writer, scholer and student of India, says: "Life was not put here accidentally; it was put here for a purpose. Man must therefore meet the crisis with reason and human values; he must realize we must grow up inwardly in spirit, conscience and ability to bring human values into action in daily life."

George Nakashima, called the world's foremost designer of furniture, spentWorld War Two in an American relocation camp. He also spent a contemplative two years in a Hindu assram, or monastery. The essence of his belief is contained in these words:

"We have to arrive beyond intellect to solve anything. We can't save ourselves by being smart. We have to have an aspiration of inspiration, which must come from a completely different source. The answer to this riddle does not lie in the mind of man...it lies in his soul."

Good Night.

March 16th, 1951

7

Dear Ed:

Dr. Reimann has just sent me the names of the CBS people who sent checks to the Cancer Institute in Bryan's name.

Thanks very much for your contribution and for your suggesting to the others such a thoughtful and practical memorial.

We appreciated Janet's letter to Nancy, and Nancy will be telling her so in a note one of these days.

We're off to Texas on April 7th to investigate the possibility of taking up the new work I was telling you about. A clergyman friend of ours in Texarkana wants me to study privately under him and work for the Church down there. Nancy and I are most enthusiastic.

Sincerely yours,

Charlie Shaw

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Shaw, Charlie

December 10, 1948

Dear Charlie:

I am afraid that Brother Scott's recent action doesn't come as much of a surprise to either one of us. The source of power, and therefore decision, is so seldom in the hands of the politician.

Maybe we can take comfort in the fact that eventually he may be horsed on his own timidity.

Like always,

Mr. Charles Shaw
Radio Station WCAU
1622 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia 3, Pennsylvania

YCAU of The Philadelphia Bulletin
1622 CHESTNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA 3, PA.

December 1

Dear Ed:

The enclosed, which you probably have seen, represents to me a stark, but probably expectable, turnabout by Brother Scott. It should be proof positive that he is dancing and will continue to dance to the Grundy tune.

During my conversation with him two days after the election, part of which you overheard, Scott told me that the Republican party had a lot to learn from the elections, and one of the first things it should learn was that its program did not appeal to the people. Bitterly criticizing Joe Martin, he said: "Joe Martin has always been wrong in everything he's advised us to do. His has been a policy of obstruction - opposing the administration on everything, no matter what. I always knew he was wrong (said Scott without even putting his tongue in cheek) and now we have proof that he's wrong."

Then he repeated the rather revolutionary and impractical proposal that there be a bi-partisan policy on social gains and he said to me: "I thought that up on the spur of the moment. I think that was pretty good, wasn't it? I think I'll talk some more about that."

When I reminded him that our social gains were the heart of the New Deal and the Republicans are supposed to oppose the New Deal, he reminded me again of Joe Martin. Enlightened Republicans, he said, aren't going for that stuff anymore.

That's how he talked in his home after he had led his party to defeat. Of course, Scott, who never expected to be chairman, had dreamed of being the first Republican chairman to lead his party to victory in 20 years, and his dream was shattered. He seemed to be taking honest inventory of himself and his party.

Since then, he obviously has been talking with his mentors, and how different he sounds. I think it's safe to assume that he will not, as he told me he would, lead a fight to deprive Joe Martin of his party leadership in the House. Hugh Scott has reassumed his role of errand boy.

As ever,

Charlie Shaw

POLITICS

WASHINGTON, DEC 1-(AP)-THE DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CHAIRMEN SWUNG A COUPLE OF ROUNDHOUSE POST-ELECTION BLOWS AT EACH OTHER TODAY.

GOP CHAIRMAN HUGH SCOTT, JR., IN A BRISTLING LETTER TO PARTY WORKERS YESTERDAY, URGED THEM TO "SLUG TOE-TO-TOE, DAY IN AND DAY OUT, WITH THE DEMAGOGUES.

"WE HAVE LOST A BATTLE WITH THE RADICAL SPENDTHRIFTS AND THEIR ALIEN PHILOSOPHY OF GOVERNMENT," HE DECLARED, "BUT WE HAVE NOT LOST THE WAR."

THAT BROUGHT THIS RETORT FROM HIS DEMOCRATIC COUNTERPART, SENATOR J.HOWARD MCGRATH OF RHODE ISLAND:

"APPARENTLY THE REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP AS IT IS NOW CONSTITUTED HAS LEARNED NO LESSON FROM THE NOVEMBER 2ND ELECTION."

DECLARING THAT SCOTT'S LETTER "SPELLS OUT STAND PAT REPUBLICANISM," MCGRATH SAID:

"HE STILL DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE. HE STILL EXPRESSES OPPOSITION TO ALL THE THINGS THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES HAVE GIVEN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY A MANDATE TO CARRY OUT."

SCOTT, SPLITTING SHARPLY WITH SOME OF HIS OWN PARTY MEMBERS, INSISTED THAT THE REPUBLICANS "HAD A GOOD PROGRAM AND AN HONEST PROGRAM" DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, BUT FAILED TO SELL IT "ADEQUATELY AND AGGRESSIVELY."

A NUMBER OF GOP LAWMAKERS IN BOTH THE HOUSE AND THE SENATE HAVE CRITICIZED THE REPUBLICAN PROGRAM AND LEADERSHIP SINCE THE ELECTION. SOME OF THEM, SAYING REPUBLICAN AIMS HAD NO POPULAR APPEAL, URGED THE OUSTING OF WHAT THEY CALLED THE "OLD GUARD."

BUT SCOTT, HIMSELF A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE FROM PENNSYLVANIA, INDICATED THAT HE, FOR ONE, INTENDS TO STAND FAST.

"WE HAVE DECLARED OUR CONVICTIONS THAT CERTAIN THINGS ARE WRONG AND THEY ARE JUST AS WRONG AFTER THE ELECTION AS BEFORE," HE SAID. "WE SHALL AUDIT AND POLICE THE TRUMAN NEW DEAL. WE WILL START RIGHT NOW."

HE SAID THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IS BEING "CHALLENGED TO PROVE THAT OUR WAY IS THE BEST WAY FOR THE AVERAGE AMERICAN," AND DECLARED THAT THE GOP WILL MEET THE CHALLENGE AND "GO FORWARD TO VICTORY IN 1950 AND 1952."

SU758AES

0 WATTS • CBS AFFILIATE
WCAU
NCORPORATED
of The Philadelphia Bulletin
1622 CHESTNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA 3, PA.

April 21, 1950

Dear Ed:

It was good talking with you the other night. Your re-expression of friendship raised my spirits considerably, and having you in my corner - which certainly is crowded now with wonderful people - helps a lot.

Dr. Stanley Reimann is working hard on Bryan's case. He offers us no hope, except that which comes from life itself, but he keeps reminding us that we may be on the eve of great discovery. His efforts now are devoted to keeping Bryan alive as long as possible.

Personally, I feel that Bryan is going to live. I believe that God is going to save him, because I think Bryan was born and endowed with a great mind and spirit for a purpose. So far as I am concerned, only a miracle of God will save Bryan, but I feel that God will work that miracle through the doctors who are treating him. Nancy and I pray for that, and hundreds - perhaps thousands - of others are praying for us. Catholics, Protestants and Jews are praying for us to provide the most beautiful spiritual experience of my life. One of our women broadcasters told me the other day that if Bryan should go, he would have accomplished much in his short life, because the news of his illness seemed to set off a spiritual wave that has engulfed WCAU. Several hard-bitten men flabbergasted her by talking of prayer for Bryan. And this certainly has changed my thinking - for the better.

Incidentally, I cut a four-minute tape with Dr. Reimann for your cancer show of April 30. I told Tony Kraber that I must be considered as nothing more than a reporter - that no reference be made to my personal interest in this illness - because Bryan, who doesn't know what's wrong with him but who does know how deadly cancer is, might hear the show and suffer a terrible psychic shock. So, would you watch the copy pretty carefully, Ed? And then some day, we can put on a show called "The Working of a Miracle" - the story of how prayer and faith in God saved a life in 1950.

Nancy joins me in wishing all the best to you and Janet and Casey. I hope to see you soon.

As ever,

Charles Shaw

Kraber has been informed

Shaw, Charles

October 19, 1948

Mr. Charles Shaw
WCAU
1622 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia 3, Pa.

Dear Charlie:

Many thanks for yours of the 28th. I'm glad to know things are going well with you at WCAU.

I think CBS has found a replacement for George Folk. However, I will inquire about it, and let you know if anything turns up.

As ever yours,

WCAU of The Philadelphia Bulletin
1622 CHESTNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA 3, PA.

SEPTEMBER 28, 1948

DEAR ED:

BILL STEPHENS' WIFE TELLS ME HER HUSBAND FLEW BACK FROM EUROPE WITH YOU LAST WEEK. I HAVEN'T SEEN BILL SINCE HIS RETURN; BUT I'M CERTAINLY ANXIOUS TO GET HIS REPORT. UNFORTUNATELY, I'VE HAD TO BE AWAY FROM THE RADIO AT 7:45 MOST RECENT EVENINGS; SO I HAVEN'T HEARD YOU AS REGULARLY AS I WOULD HAVE LIKED. I SHALL NOW BECOME A STEADY LISTENER AGAIN.

I HAVE BECOME RE-ESTABLISHED HERE AT WCAU - THE HOURS ARE GOOD AND SO IS THE MONEY. I AM NOW ABOUT TO DO SOME WRITING - I SHALL TRY A BOOK WHICH HAS ONLY A FAINT PATTERN AT THE MOMENT.

SOMEBODY SHOWED ME A CLIPPING FROM "VARIETY" WHICH SAID CBS IS "MULLING A SUCCESSOR TO GEORGE POLK." WONDER IF THEY WOULD MULL CHARLES SHAW. I'VE AT LEAST VISITED THAT PART OF THE WORLD, AND I LEARNED AT LOT ABOUT BEING ALONE IN STOCKHOLM. YOU SEE, ALTHOUGH I'M COMFORTABLE HERE, I'M STILL NOT CONTENTED. FORTUNATELY, THOUGH, THERE'S NO URGENCY ABOUT MY MOVING, AND I SHALL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ALL THE OPPORTUNITIES THIS SPOT AFFORDS.

WISH YOU'D BE COMING DOWN TO PHILADELPHIA AGAIN. I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU A LOT OF QUESTIONS AND JUST PLAIN SEE YOU.

AS EVER,

Charlie Shaw

August 16, 1948

Mr. Charles Shaw
106 Rolling Road
Carroll Park
Philadelphia 31, Pa.

Dear Charlie:

Many thanks for your letter of August 11th.

It's good to hear of your new job with WCAU, and I wish you luck on it. If I should hear of anything else here, I'll be glad to put in a good word for you. Meantime, I hope your new spots will work out satisfactorily for you.

As ever yours,

WCAU of The Philadelphia Bulletin
1622 CHESTNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA 3, PA.

August 11, 1948

Dear Ed:

Here's a report on what's been happening to me since I last wrote you:

I sang my WCAU swan song July 17 and went home, wondering where my next job was coming from. I was idle one day when WCAU asked me if I would do John Raleigh's morning news shots while he vacationed for three weeks. I did. Then the sales manager informed me that he had sold me on two afternoon spots, each paying $90 a week, beginning September 6.

Meanwhile, I went to New York to talk with Ed Beattie, and he told me there was nothing imminent with the State Department and probably wouldn't be for some months. He said he would like to hire me, if for no other reason than that you asked him to. So, I asked him to keep my application active, and I accepted the two WCAU shows. Now, I am beginning a four-week "hiatus."

One of my shows will be a so-called "commentary," and I agreed ~~that~~ it would be light enough to satisfy the kind of audience Dr. Levy thinks WCAU has. I couldn't do anything else but agree.

I am deeply grateful to you, Ed, for all that you have done for me with the State Department. And I don't suppose anything more can be done at the moment. I would ask you if you would do just one more thing for me: if you hear of any opening with CBS in Washington or overseas and you think I could do the job, would you suggest me to Ted Church? I'm fixed at WCAU for at least 26 weeks; but I have told them that I might give them notice during that period, and they understand my attitude. I must say that my relations with WCAU have improved vastly since my short-lived departure.

Thanks again for all you've done, Ed; and it's good hearing you back on the air.

As ever,

Charlie Shaw

P.S. I'm going away for about ten days, beginning Friday; and, in event of a miracle, I'll be reachable at the home of J.E. Jones, 1608 Lee Avenue, McKeesport, Pa. (McKeesport 22265) and thereafter at my home, 106 Rolling Road, Carroll Park, Philadelphia, 31, Pa. (Ardmore 4635-R)

Shaw, Charles

August 4, 1948

Dear Charlie:

I'm just back from holiday and take this first opportunity to answer your letters. I'm glad to hear that things are working out well. Give me a shout when you get to town and we'll arrange that lunch.

As ever,

Mr. Charles Shaw
Radio Station WCAU
1622 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia 3, Pennsylvania

WATTS • CBS AFFILIATE
WCAU
CORPORATED
of The Philadelphia Bulletin
1622 CHESTNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA 3, PA.

mar
yes

July 20, 1948

Dear Ed:

I've been granted an eleventh-hour reprieve. John Raleigh decided all of a sudden that he needed a three-week vacation; so WCAU asked me if I would fill [redacted] in for him. So, after one day of idleness, I'm now back on the air.

This is just what the doctor ordered. It gives me time and money with which to wait [redacted] the State Department job. And if the job, eventually certain, is still a little slow in coming, I have an idea for filling the extra time.

I'd like to tell you about that over a lunch that I would buy you in New York about three weeks hence.

Innidentally, you were sure swell to me last Thursday, considering the fact that you had gone sleepless and were being additionally harassed by the ailing CBS girl. I'm afraid that I wouldn't have been nearly so gracious.

You might like to know that, when I thought I was leaving WCAU forever, Dr. Levy and I parted the very best of friends, with a certain understanding of each other, and he made quite a handsome settlement on me. That, together with a little saved and the money I'll get for being Raleigh, will enable me to sweat out the State Department job longer than I thought I could.

I do hope you'll have lunch with me when I finally wind up here.

As ever,

Charles Shaw

July 8, 1948

Mr. Charles Shaw
WCAU
1622 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia 3, Pa.

Dear Mr. Shaw:

Your letter of the 1st has been received here during Mr. Murrow's absence from the city. It will be brought to his attention promptly on his return to the office.

Sincerely yours,

WCAU 1622 CHESTNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA 3, PA.
FREQUENCY MODULATION WCAU — FM

50,000 WATTS

July 1, 1948

Dear Ed:

Here's what's been happening to me:

I received a letter from Parker May, acting executive officer of the Office of International Information, who told me that Charles Thayer "has been informed of your interest in becoming associated with the Department's international information program" and suggested that I contact Thayer to "ascertain the present status of your application." I wrote Thayer briefly, informing him of May's suggestion and saying, "I am writing merely to express my hope that you will see fit to act favorably on my application."

Then, I received a letter from the Civil Service Commission, which said, in part: "A preliminary review of your training and experience indicates that your application is acceptable...as vacancies occur, your application will be given final evaluation in relation to the specific positions to be filled...it is impossible to predict when vacancies may occur in these high level positions."

That's the way it looks from here. Thanks to your good offices, it looks as if I might soon be getting out of your hair.

As ever,

Charlie Shaw

WCAU 1622 CHESTNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA 3, PA.
FREQUENCY MODULATION WCAU — FM

50,000 WATTS

June 7, 1948

Dear Ed:

I thought you'd like to have some background on Philadelphia itself; so I'm sending along some clips from the magazine "Philadelphia," which is published in co-operation with the Chamber of Commerce. The facts about Philadelphia industry, entertainment and the like are O.K.; the stuff about Philadelphia friendliness, hospitality and so on are so much tripe, as see enclosed editorial from The Bulletin.

Philadelphia, as you've probably heard many times, is called "corrupt and contented." Philadelphia's had Republican administrations for almost 70 years; and that tenure has brought everything you'd suspect.

Right now, we have a first-class scandal, which prompted me to report on "News of America" this morning that "Philadelphia is sort of like a family which planned a big party and then went on a binge just as the guests were due to arrive." Perhaps as much as two million dollars has been stolen from city amusement tax funds during the last eight years. One suspect, a city employe, has killed himself and has involved a half dozen others in his suicide note. One of those named died of heart failure soon after the other's suicide. Several city employes are under arrest, others have been suspended, a former state legislator is being sought on an embezzlement charge. Mayor Bernard Samuel, prodded by the new Republican city chairman, is demanding the city purchasing [redacted] director's resignation; but the purchasing chief says he won't quit. The Republican chairman also demands the city tax receiver's resignation; but the tax receiver won't quit either. There have been suggestion that a committee of Councilmen and private citizens (the Committee of 15 you've seen mentioned in other clippings) postpone its inquiry until after the Republican convention. But that suggestion has been rejected. There's talk of a Grand Jury investigation.

As for convention news itself, I've been talking with as many people as I can about how the Pennsylvania delegation will act; and what I have found coincides with that reported by Ray Brecht in the enclosed clipping. This Grundy boy is really powerful; and if I had to bet on him or Duff, I'd lay my wager on Grundy. But Vandenberg's action in fighting for full ERP funds has certainly helped Duff, and it may influence Grundy, who likes to have a winner as well as the next politician.

I'm sending along another feature clipping - on telephones.

Hope you won't be off the air too much this summer.

As ever,

Charlie Shaw

Shaw, Charles.

May 24, 1948

Dear Charlie:

The attached is self-explanatory.

I'll give you a shout as soon as

I hear anything.

As ever yours,

Mr. Charles Shaw
Radio Station WCAU
1622 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia 3, Pennsylvania

May 21, 1948

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I don't know where to send this so I am sending it to you. It has to do with a young man who has applied for a job with the Department as Public Information Specialist. His name is Charles Shaw. Perhaps you would route the following comment to the proper quarters.

I have known Shaw since 1942. I found him broadcasting news on KTSA, San Antonio, Texas, hired him, and took him to Europe as a member of a small, but I think, pretty competent staff. Shaw's application, I assume, will reveal the pertinent details of his career. He has very considerable experience in both print and radio. While he worked with me in London he was industrious, got on well with his colleagues and British officials, and was a first-rate broadcaster. He went from London to Stockholm where he ran the OWI bureau single-handed for a period of seven months. He covered a considerable part of the Normandy campaign. He is now employed by WCAU in Philadelphia as a newscaster where he has done an outstanding job.

I am acquainted with the USIS and can, I think, claim with modesty to be familiar with some of the tasks confronting it. I am persuaded that Charles Shaw merits the careful consideration of the Department, and I shall be pleased to furnish any additional data.

Respectfully yours,

Edward R. Murrow

The Honorable George V. Allen
Assistant Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

cc: Mr. Charles Shaw

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WCAU
INCORPORATED
of The Philadelphia Bulletin
1622 CHESTNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA 3, PA.

May 12, 1948

Dear Ed:

It was good seeing you again yesterday; and, like you, I was only too sorry that we didn't have more time for a chat. I'm banking on a rendezvous come Convention time - at our little house in the suburbs.

This is a reminder that I'm very much interested in that State Department job, and I would deeply appreciate anything you could do in my behalf. I'd prefer going back overseas for CBS; but Ted told me recently that there's nothing on the horizon. I can understand the situation.

However, the State Department job also appeals to me. I think it could be a real opportunity for service, and I'm beginning to feel that service is eminently satisfactory. I don't think that I told you that I've been talking recently with the American Friends Service Committee about doing work for the Quakers. Nothing has come of that because, as you know, the Service Committee's budget is based mainly on work by volunteers or those people, particularly single men and women, who don't need a very large income.

Of course, I'm not so naive as to think that everybody who works for the State Department has stars in his eyes, and I wouldn't expect the job of Information Specialist to be the perfect job. But I know that I would enjoy it as much as I enjoy this job. If nothing else, it would provide me with a more intimate knowledge of government affairs and, I hope, it would let me do the traveling I want to do.

The application for the $9975 job demands certain information which you might like to have in stating my case. As for administrative experience, I was managing editor of The McKeesport (Pa.) Daily News (circulation 25,000) from Jan. 1, 1937 to June 1938 and I was in charge of about 25 employes. I was News Editor of KTSA, San Antonio, Texas, from 1939 to 1943 and had a small staff. You left me alone in London quite a bit and, of course, I had the Stockholm bureau (myself and a secretary) for seven and a half months. As for other experience, I was a reporter on The McKeesport Daily News from 1932 to 1936 and a general assignment and rewrite man on The Pittsburgh Press from 1936 to 1937. I've been here from October 1946 as a news broadcaster and commentator and have been broadcasting news and news features for CBS on assignment.

They might like to know also about my familiarity with this country and others. I've been in every state of this country and large parts of Canada and Mexico. Nancy and I spent a year in trailer-touring the country, during which I performed odd jobs and gathered material for magazine and newspaper articles. Then, I spent three years in Europe: Britain, France, Sweden, Denmark, Norway,

WCAU of The Philadelphia Bulletin
1622 CHESTNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA 3, PA.

Italy, Greece, Switzerland and Trieste. You're the best judge I know of how well informed I am about foreign affairs. As for languages, I have a fair speaking and understanding knowledge of French, and I read it well. I can also read Swedish and Spanish to a fair extent.

I am a graduate of Allegheny College, Meadville, Pa., having received an A.B. there in 1932. My health is good, my vices have been considerably reduced. I'm an Episcopalian and a political independent. Married, with two sons.

That's my story, and I hope it's sufficiently attractive to get me the job. Thanks for whatever you can do. It seems that you are destined to keep altering the course of my life; and I am grateful that you are around to do it.

As ever,

Charlie Shaw

50,000 WATTS 24 HRS AFFILIATE
WCAU
INCORPORATED
of The Philadelphia Bulletin
1622 CHESTNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA 3, PA.

Ed:

In case you might want to send my letter to the State Department, I thought I would tell you on a separate page that I am desperately hoping to get that job or some other work that would let me do more than I am doing or can do here. I repeat that I have nothing but the highest regard for Doc and I.D. Levy - they've treated me swell - but I find myself facing a very high stone wall here.

I don't regret coming here. It was ideally suited to the situation Nancy and I were in back in 1946. But now I need more scope - I feel that I am in a state of semi-retirement, and I don't want to retire at the age of 36. I feel that I'm capable of doing a lot more than I am doing - for myself as well as others.

There's no reason that you should worry about me; but it's great to think that you will help. Maybe some day I can do something for you.

Charlie

WCAU
INCORPORATED
of The Philadelphia Bulletin
1622 CHESTNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA 3, PA.

Mr. Chuck
FYI
Thanks
Ed

March 30, 1948

Dear Ed:

Thanks a lot for your letter telling me that "something will be done soon." I'm ready to move into the staging area.

This next may sound for all the world like pressure, and I hesitate to write it; but I do have a real fear that our sales department may be on the verge of selling my 6:10 commentary at long last. Our sales manager told me last week that he was going to make a real effort to sell the thing; and, with interest in foreign news increasing, the job may not be too difficult.

If that should happen before anything developed CBS-wise, the job would be to convince Dr. Levy to convince the sponsor that John Raleigh could do the job after I left. John hasn't become a very big part of the WCAU organization, and it might be a job to sell him to Dr. Levy as a commentator. I do think, however, that a sponsor would find him very amenable.

I'm enclosing a couple of clippings from The Collingswood, N.J., Weekly Retrospect, out of which you might glean a paragraph. I promised Raymond Bancroft, the editor, I would send them to you.

As ever,

Charlie Shaw

THE WEEKLY RE

and Collingswood American

Vol. 48, No. 25 Collingswood (Camden P. O.), New Jersey, Thursday, M

Many Stores To Close Three Hours Good Friday

Members of the Collingswood Business Association announce that their stores will be closed on Good Friday, from noon to 3 p. m.

These stores request that shoppers arrange their buying time on Haddon avenue to cooperate with the project. They trust that no inconvenience results.

Wide Acclaim For 'John,' Ambassador Without Portfolio

Charles Shaw, WCAU's ace news commentator has joined us in saying "hurrah" for the worth of John Giuliano as an American ambassador without striped pants.

In last Thursday's issue, we commented upon the Haddon avenue shoemaker's visit in Sicily, and said that as an exponent of true democracy, he was more convincing than many sessions of the U. N. and the visiting committees who are constantly trying to sell our way of life to impoverished, confused peoples of Europe.

John, who works for a living, prays at nights, walks straight and looks his fellowman in the eye, is a plain ordinary guy, who has read more about the American Revolution than he has the Russian one. He is sold on democracy because he is a product of it. He doesn't have to talk it—because he is it!

On Monday Shaw took up our evaluation of John's worth "over there" and voiced it over the air waves at 6.10. Thanks, Mr. Shaw.

Last week we suggested that the Government or some agency sponsor trips to the old countries for the Johns, the Jabobs, the Toms, Dicks and Harrys. We are still for it.

John [illegible] walking with the common men over there, because he is a common man. But he is an American man, and that must be strange to them at first.

John isn't a pauper. He isn't rich, either, and he has earned his modest wage honestly. He is an individual, not a robot. He is not envious of those who possess more of worldly goods. He is good.

Because of all these things, they will like and trust him. They will find in him all that they want to be—all the things they have a right to be. Certainly they must wonder, and feel some respect and even new faith, for a country which breeds men like John—and a government which encouraged him to grow as John has grown.

We [illegible] Europe our politicians [illegible] and they are [illegible] have sent them our [illegible] and they have been [illegible] as our ambassa- [illegible] men like John!

ETROSPECT
n
, March 25, 1948 5¢ Per Copy

RESIDENTS URGED TO GIVE GENEROUSLY TO

THE WEEKLY REC

and Collingswood American

Vol. 48, No. 24 Collingswood (Camden P. O.), New Jersey, Thursday, M

LOCAL SHOEMAKER, NOW IN ITALY, EXPONENT OF TRUE AMERICANISM

John Giuliano is a friend of ours. We met him first in pre-war days, and came to know him better when his "boss" was called into the armed forces to fight in War II, and John was entrusted with the shop's management.

Despite daily association with John over a period of years, we do not know his religion nor his political opinions. We do know, however, that he is a religious man, interested in the policies of his country and community. We know, too, that he is a conscientious fellow, who learned a trade and who has been given an opportunity to work at it, for a wage which has made possible the modest and comfortable care of a wife and three children.

He pays his bills and expects to be paid that which is owed to him. He takes pride in his work at the Lincoln Shoe Repair shop on Haddon avenue, and his own industry and application, as well as his honesty, has won him a partnership in the small but growing business.

Although born here, John was taken back to Italy when he was two, and did not return until he was 18. He attended night school and there learned not only the English language, but the views and ideas of other young Americans who were going to night school. In short, John's modest success, health, and outlook, is typically a product of America.

On election days, John goes out and votes for the candidate of his choice. Oftimes there are so many that the issues tend to become confusing, but he has listened to radios, read newspapers, and talked freely with his friends and neighbors and heard both sides, and so casts his ballot for the candidates he believes best. No one tells him how to vote. No one has told him that he must vote. No one has ever arrested him on a trumped-up charge, no one has ever spied on him, nor thrown him in jail because he has expressed an opinion, when he feels that some politician has been wrong or that his government is wrong. His government gives John all those privileges. There is some violence and prejudice, and these worry John, but there is not enough of them to cause great concern. They, too, will be righted, John feels.

Should someone violate John's rights, cheat on a job him, or do him bodily injury, he goes to the police and they will arrest him. If the case goes to the courts, John can get a lawyer to assist him, or defend his rights, confident that the courts of his country are just. John knows all this. After John's wage had been t[illegible]

After John's wage had been used for adequate food, clothing, fuel and a home, there was still enough left for the movies, for church donations, the various charities and civic projects. There was enough left, too, for John to [illegible] for week, for enough money [illegible] a vacation to Sicily, to visit his aged father. He is [illegible]

This [illegible] and happiness [illegible] In

TO RED CROSS FUND DRIVE

ETROSPECT

an

, March 18, 1948 5¢ Per Copy

CHURCH GROUP NOTES

St. Cecelia's Guild of Christ P. E. Church, West Collingswood, are spo soring a cake sale this Saturday, in the church basement, beginning at 11 o'clock. Mrs. Amy Smith is president of the organization, and Mrs. Charlotte Havens is chairman of the soliciting committee.

The Girls Friendly Group of Holy Trinity Church met on Tuesday evening at the home of their advisor, Mrs. Clarence Layer, on Oriental avenue. The girls completed five dresses and five pajamas, and packed them ready to be sent to the missionary field of the Mississippi.

The girls are selling tea, the proceeds to be applied toward the Presiding Bishop's Fund during Lent and after Lent, the proceeds will go toward the Building Fund.

The Women's Missionary Society of St. Paul's Lutheran Church held their luncheon on Thursday in the lower church. Mrs. Helen Albright, president, presided. Rev. Gries, assistant pastor, spoke on "India." Following the luncheon, members worked on cancer pads.

Mrs. Dorothy Noll's Sunday School Class of the First Baptist Church met last evening at the home of Miss Jean Barth of Lincoln avenue.

The Nu Nu Sigma Class of St. Paul's Lutheran Church are making a trip to Campbell's, at 1 p. m. Tuesday, and on their return will meet in the lower church, where they will pack four layettes and twelve "kitty-paks" to be

St. Cecelia's Guild of Christ P. E. Church met Tuesday for their weekly Lenten luncheon, as guests of Mrs. M. Ward, at her home, 804 Grant avenue. Plans were completed for their food sale, to be held Saturday, March 20, in the parish house. Mrs. George Smith presided.

ENGAGED

Mr. and Mrs. Hugh M. O'Donnell of 530 Narberth avenue, Haddonfield, formerly of Collingswood, announce the engagement of their daughter, Miss Rita Marie O'Donnell, to Robert A. Maguire, son of Mr. and Mrs. A. A. Maguire, of 9 W. Narberth terrace, Collingswood. They will be married June 19.

Miss O'Donnell and Mr. Maguire are both graduates of Collingswood High School. Miss O'Donnel is a member of Eta Sigma Theta sorority, and Mr. Maguire a member of Alpha Gamma Sigma fraternity. He was with the Signal Corps of the U. S. Army in the European theater for months.

SUPPORT THE 1948 RED CROSS DRIVE NOW IN PROGRESS

POPULAR BRANDS carto

Cigarettes $1.3

Shaw, Charlie

March 23, 1948

Dear Charlie:

I had a talk with Ted Church since coming back, and the business of a new assignment for Charlie Shaw is as much on his mind and conscience as it is on mine. Something will be done about it soon, and I don't anticipate much difficulty from the Levy brothers. Let's keep in touch.

As ever yours,

Mr. Charlie Shaw
Radio Station WCAU
1622 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia 3, Pennsylvania

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MARCH 17, 1948

Dear Ed:

If I seem impatient, perhaps it's because I am. Since you were here, I've been able to think of little else than my returning to Europe for CBS. In view of the President's speech today, I am all the more anxious.

What do you think? Does protocol demand that I do any additional letter-writing or should I wait until I hear from you? Also, should there be a place for me with CBS, what about Doc Levy? Bill Campbell, our sports editor, told me he was offered a job by Red Barber but Doc Levy killed the offer. I have no proof of that; and I really don't think the Doctor would interfere with my change of job, provided it was not presented to him as a fait accompli.

I think you understand, Ed, why I want to return and why I think I could do the job. I can promise you that I'll do a better job than I ever did before.

If I should tell you how much I enjoyed your visit here, I might be accused of being too sentimental. It was wonderful seeing you and talking wi you; it gave me a much-needed lift. I hope it won't be too long until I can once again consider myself your junior colleague.

Sincerely,

Charlie Shaw

Siepman, C.

September 30, 1964

Dear Charles,

I will send along a modest contribution for the A.C.L.U.

It was great to see you and Janie, even so briefly.

The disposition of our mutual financial problem will require a prolonged and liquid lunch at the Century Club and I will propose a date when next I come to New York.

As ever,

Yours,

Edward R. Murrow

Mr. Charles Siepmann
New York University
Communication Arts Group
Washington Square
New York, New York 10003

ERM/mph

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
COMMUNICATION ARTS GROUP
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
IN EDUCATION

51 WEST FOURTH STREET
AREA CODE 212 SP 7-2000, EXT. 640

Dear Ed,

I know you won't want to come, though it's a good play and a fine cast, but can I prevail on you to contribute? You know that this is what I give all my spare energy to and we're in extra trouble this year. We're opening an office in the South and every affiliate is contributing 10% of its income to get it going.

By good luck I can write to you not only as a beggar but as a debtor who is coming clean. Years back you lent me, bless you, $50 when I was in dire need. All these years I haven't been able to save it, but I've just been paid (correction, am about to be paid) the precise sum for a "position paper" I was asked to write. So at long last I can repay you – in cash, though never in terms of gratitude. Please, please, let us make sure of being together soon. Yours ever Charles

Siepmann, C.

9503 La Jolla Farms Road
La Jolla, California
April 8, 1964

Mr. Charles Seipmann
Department of Communications
51 West 4th Street
New York 3, New York

Dear Charles,

Your letter to Ed arrived on Friday last, and I regret to report to you that when I read it to him he said the answer is no.

Ed's convalescence has not been going on as well or as speedily as we had hoped, and at the moment he feels he is in no position to make any plans at all; in fact our only plan is to get back to Washington about the first of May and to establish ourselves in Pawling by the first of June. We will hope to be seeing you and Janey there before long.

Sincerely yours,

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
COMMUNICATION ARTS GROUP
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
IN EDUCATION

51 WEST FOURTH STREET
SPRING 7-2000, EXT. 640

Replied to:
8. April

3. 9. 64

My dear Ed,

Dick Heffner had lunch with me yesterday and made me green with envy. He reported having seen and talked with you. But at least I'm glad to have recent news. I'm afraid (I realise) you've been through hell and that convalescence after such an ordeal is a hell in its own right, and my distress and affection for you can't help one whit. It makes me sad that our mar thirty years of friendship is in ~~a~~ kind of permanent moth ball.

God knows if you can bring yourself to think of future plans and I write at a venture. I'm on a committee at the University of Pennsylvania (I'm again visiting professor there) to select the man to give the inaugural address in a new series of annual lectures (for which endowment has been found) on communications. They're looking for someone who can speak as a statesman, not as an operator, and for me there's only one man who can give to the inaugural lecture the perspective and the vision that would set the tone and standard for the series. It's of course you. Is there even a remote possibility that you might see in this an opportunity to give expression to a lifetime's work and say what, as you see it is "the conclusion of the whole matter". I know you have stomach for correspondence, but would you scribble 'yes', 'no', or 'perhaps' on a postcard? My love to you both

Charles

Siepmann, Charles
240 South Main St
New Canaan
Conn

Janet Dear,

I'm longing to see Ed again, as you can well imagine. Could he tolerate seeing me? Summer school starts on Monday. We'll be weekending here, alternating with weekends in Vermont. But, given notice, I could cut out from summer school around noon and drive up (any weekday barring Thursday) to see you in Bowling and so home to New Canaan. Is there prospect of my doing this at your convenience? Be candid about it.

My very best to you both.

Charles (Siepmann)

Chas. Siepmann

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
COMMUNICATION ARTS GROUP
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
IN EDUCATION

51 WEST FOURTH STREET
SPRING 7-2000, EXT. 640

July 8, 1960

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
580 Park Avenue
N.Y., N.Y.

Dear Ed:

I hear from others that you have been back some time. I am teaching summer school and if you are around, I'd like to see and consult you about something. If you have a free lunch date, Monday through Thursday, could you offer me one?

Cordially, yours ever,

Charles/ne

Charles A. Siepmann
Chairman
Communications in Education

Siepmann

BROADCASTING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST

Facts and figures on broadcasting

There are, today, some 3800 radio and 530 television stations on the air, transmitting programs throughout and far beyond a normal person's waking hours. More than 94% of American homes have radio receivers and there are 43 million television homes. (This figure exceeds that for homes with bath tubs).

Radio's metamorphosis

Radio has survived the assault of television, but at a price. The plastic surgery to which it has been subjected has changed but not improved its appearance. Radio networks are in the red. Most local stations do good business, but only by drastic reduction of the services they offer. An engineer, an announcer and a disk jockey suffice nowadays as the skeleton staff for the standard fare of news, mood music and hillbillies that most stations purvey.

Broadcasting as business

Despite which (or, if you like, because of it) broadcasting as a whole is a growing and, by and large, a highly profitable business. Only thirty years ago radio time sales amounted to a mere 45 million. By 1944 the industry's net income had jumped to $90 million, and annual profits to 108% of the original cost of tangible property or, if you take account of depreciated values, to 223%. In 1956 the Columbia Broadcasting system earned $16,283,462, the highest profit

figure of its then 28 year existence - and in 1957 topped this by another $6 million (actually $5,909,915) I don't have to tell you that broadcasters do the bulk of their business with advertisers who buy time to channel the public's needs and preferences toward particular brands and commodities. Through radio and television the salesman has added a cubit to his stature. "Facts", Ronald Knox once said, "are the steam that obscures the mirror of truth". But for what they are worth, these are the crude facts and figures of a hurricane that swept in on us thirty-five years ago and whose force is not yet spent. What has it done to our cultural landscape?

Influence & effects

There is surprisingly little that can be said with certainty in answer to this question- mainly because we have no means as yet of separating broadcasting out from other, concomitant influences on our culture. Most of what is important (as it relates to character, to conduct and to values) thus remains matter for surmise.

Those who had high hopes of broadcasting as a revolutionary force, conceiving of communication's golden age as precursor of a golden age of culture, have had to pocket them. And, as the Book of Proverbs tells us, "hope deferred maketh the heart sick." There are, in this sense, quite a lot of sick people around. The prophets of doom have likewise been confounded. Radio,

for instance, was not the ruin of the press, as television has not ruined radio- at any rate financially. Some of us may have fears and indignations (fear, for example, of the effects, particularly on the young, of the amount of murder and mayhem on the air; indignation at the intrusions on privacy and the high status accorded to vulgarity). But we cannot "prove" that they have substance, other than for ourselves. Though, one might ask, what good men ever waited upon proof when they smelt danger in the air. I confine myself, therefore, to a few pretty well substantiated facts about effects.

1. Leisure

1. Broadcasting has come virtually to monopolise our leisure life. Discount the despised "egghead", and you will find that it is only to work and sleep that we surrender more of our time. This is true of the mature (in years, at least) and even more true of the young. I use the word "surrender" advisedly, for, as we attend to broadcasting, activity of thought, high sensibility or nice critical discrimination, being rarely invoked, are rarely engaged. By and large, broadcasting offers us "inert ideas". Passive and supine, we lend ourselves to its "lulling charities" as to a tranquilizer. It is thus we use (or, as some claim, abuse and dissipate) our leisure.

2. Cultural Communism

2. Broadcasting has brought to millions upon millions a variety of experiences hitherto available only to

the privileged few. Predominant is entertainment. Broadcasting is the poor man's theatre, his music hall, his circus, his Sportspalast. It did not create , but it has catered, and amply, to this insatiable appetite. It is to forces, social and psychological, outside broadcasting that we must look for its occasion.

Within the broad confines of entertainment broadcasting can stake out one substantial claim for the achievement of a revolutionary change.

3. Music Education

It has helped convert us into a nation of music lovers. More than one third of music records sold today are "classical". Ironically enough, having helped create this audience, broadcasters have deserted it. There is, proportionately, less good music on the air today than there was ten years, and less still than twenty years ago. Barring some thirty local stations, the musically hungry sheep (outside New York City) look up and are not fed.

4. News consciousness

Broadcasting has made us newsconscious, by swift and accurate reporting of events the world over. Listeners cite news as the service they would chiefly miss were they deprived of it. Broadcasting cannot be blamed for the fact that despite this,

some 23% of us remain largely ignorant of personalities and issues in the realm of public affairs. Balanced interpretation of the news is something else again. Such service is scanty, some of it unprofessional and largely exclusive of liberal, to say nothing of "leftist" opinion.

5. Consolidation of existing mores and opinion

Broadcasting has done little to change opinion. This is in part due to the fact that the public is ill served with programs discussing vital questions from many points of view. In politics, despite changes in style induced by broadcasting (e.g. the cult of personality, political slogan/spot announcements modelled on the singing commercial, and the dramatization of political conventions), there is no evidence that people in large numbers are swayed by the barrage of broadcast propaganda to which they are subjected at election time. Generally speaking, broadcasting tends to consolidate existing mores, to confer status on radio-TV personalities, to indulge rather than to educate us and hence to keep us where we are rather than help us discover that which we have it in us to become.

Variant exposure as the condition of cultural growth

The public interest requires that broadcasting, if it is not to function as a break on our cultural development, shall offer us variant exposure to the widest conceivable range of intellectual and emotional experience. It can and should put

at our disposal the funded knowledge of mankind. By, supposedly, "giving the public what it wants" it has defaulted on this responsibility and, in the main, foregone this opportunity to help us win the desperate race against time that all of us are running. Over a hundred years ago, J.S. Mill foresaw the consequence of such restricted cultural dieting. "Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of nutrtenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favorable to keeping the higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying." These seem to me pregnant and prophetic words.

Changed attitudes & practices in broadcasting

Retrospect gives us perspective on ourselves and underscores the truth of Bernard Shaw's warning that you had better " get what you want, or you will be forced to like what you get." I doubt if

many of you realize how much, in broadcasting, we have got used to. Let me give you some examples.

In 1929, the Chairman of the Board of N.B.C. stated publicly that "its aim has never been to make money, but rather to offer programs of such varied interest that our people could not afford to miss them."

In 1922, the then Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, held that "it is inconceivable that we should allow so great a possibility (as broadcasting)...to be drowned in advertising matter." As late as 1929 the Broadcasters' own "Standards of Commercial Practice" barred commercials between 7 and 11 P.M.

In 1942, the Readers' Digest received 80,000 letters of support for an article protesting radio's commercial "plug uglies". But by 1948, 32% of the public were "in favor" of advertising, while another 35% didn't "particularly mind" it.

In 1934, the Broadcasters Association asserted that "it is the manifest duty of the licensing authority (i.e., the F.C.C.)...to determine whether or not the applicant is rendering or can render an adequate public service. Such service necessarily includes broadcasting a considerable proportion of programs devoted to education, religion, labor, agricultural and similar activities concerned with human betterment.

In 1934, the F.C.C. studied a proposal by the U.S. Congress that a fixed percentage of radio facilities be reserved for use by nonprofit stations. The F.C.C. decided not. "Commercial stations", it reported, "are now responsible under the law to render a public service, and the tendency of the proposal would be to lessen this responsibility. In order for the nonprofit organization to obtain the maximum service possible, cooperation in good faith by the broadcaster is required. Such cooperation should, therefore, be under the direction of the commission."

Such "cooperation in good faith" has since been wanting. Conceivable awareness of this fact may have influenced the F.C.C. to eat its own words to the Congress in 1934 and to set aside, in 1951, 258 television frequencies for use exclusively by nonprofit organizations. We shall soon have 40 of these stations on the air. The prospect of their expansion makes for a glimmer of hope on an otherwise dark horizon.

In 1946, in a document entitled "Public Service Responsibilities of Broadcast Licenses", the F.C.C. spelt out in part what public service meant and said that these criteria, among others, would be used in considering the fitness of a station for renewal of its license.

These concepts and principles are part of the history of broadcasting. But they are dead, even if recent, history. With rare exceptions the policy and practice of networks

and local stations alike are today geared to profit making- and to profit without end. Advertisers, not station licensees determine the main flow of broadcast communication. Audiences are "rated" by their size, and in the frenzied competition for mass markets, major minorities and minor majorities, though they may muster millions, are scouted. Scan your television program schedules and judge for yourself, (outside what Edward R. Murrow wryly terms the "intellectual ghetto" of a Sunday), the kind of public service you are getting. Count (you can do it on two hands) the number of programs on television in which controversial subjects are discussed by two or more men of contrary opinion. Don't waste your time investigating the number of stations whose license has been suspended by the FCC for breach of promise. You will not find any. Yet, to quote Mr. Murrow again,"every licensee (applying to the F.C.C.)...makes certain promises as to what he will do in terms of program content. Many recipients of licenses have, in blunt language, voided on these promises."

Broadcasting, as we have it, is clearly not the kind of broadcasting conceived by those who wrote our system into law or by its early practicioners. How do we appraise it in relation to the common good?

[illegible] of its improvement?)

What are the causes of its default? What are the conditions of its improvement? If we are to avoid totally subjective answers, we must define criteria by which to make our judgment.

If we conceive of broadcasting as just another business, there is nothing much to say. It's sitting pretty. Its profits are enviable. If we ask if the public is satisfied the weight of the evidence forces an affirmative answer - at least if we count heads and attach any significance to so broad a question. But I suggest that neither question is pertinent to the public welfare, properly conceived. Like it or not, the circumstances of our time put a high premium on intelligence. They put a like premium on courage and moral integrity. To be civilized, moreover, is no longer a luxury but a competitive political necessity in a world shaken by rival ideologies. I believe these to be inexorable laws for modern man's observance. Flount them, and we perish.

Judged by these criteria, I think we are driven to conclude that, while there is nothing particularly "wrong" about broadcasting, there are certain positive requirements of it which are not being met and which are crucial to our future welfare. Broadcasting is not destroying either our intelligence, our courage or our integrity. It may be stunting them. And it is certainly not lending them the support it might. I have already suggested the principle which, if honored,

would enable it to do so-the provision forall of variant exposure to all that mankind, through the long ordeal of suffering and aspiration which is history, has learnt gives solace and inspiration and significance to life. Even in broadcasting we are members one of another. As we starve or stunt one, we starve or stunt all.

Broadcasting, for reasons of its own, has tragically underestimated what, given time and a opportunity, quite ordinary people are capable of rising and responding to. In this day and age it is perilous to take us for what we are and thereby keep us where we are. The race today goes to the swift. Public interest requires that broadcasting help us run. Fat, complacent and unaware, we dawdle only to our doom.

Why has broadcasting defaulted so much on society's positive requirements of it? The reasons are complex and I can suggest only a few.

1. Like Midas of old, it seeks to turn everything it touches into gold. And when the gold was counted what was left to Midas? What is left to us?

2. It has long suffered from a failure of nerve. Hag ridden with anxiety lest it give offense, it skirts issues which, precisely because they are controversial, are live and vital issues, touching us

at the quick of what should be of deepest concern to us.

3. Broadcasters boast of the virtues of private enterprise. Private they are - though not under the law, but they are not enterprising. One man's invention is aped slavishly by the rest. Quiz programs spawn more quiz programs. Westerns proliferate in geometrical progression. And so it goes. From competitive enterprise those who designed our system looked for diversity of service born of initiative. Broadcasting has many virtues, but diversity is not now one of them.

4. But what should be its greatest pride is, as I would judge its greatest shame. Despite a spate of verbiage put out by its public relations offices and some of its highest executives, it has failed signally to recognise that power without a high sense of responsibility smells of corruption and that the price of power is exercise of a courageous leadership. Great statesmen have never fawned and pandered to the public. They have led and inspired it, and earned respect and gratitude. Broadcasters are (or should be) statesmen in a realm more crucial even than that of politics- the realm of our enlightenment.

But the defects of broadcasting cannot all be laid at the broadcaster's door. Would that they might be. The malaise from which we suffer is endemic, a universal failure of nerve, of moral integrity, true feeling and clear eyed perception of the abyss at whose very brink we stand. All of us, in our degree, are accessories before the fact.

5. The F.C.C. stands guilty, as guardian of the public interest, of a quarter century of flagrant default.

6. There are not a dozen broadcast critics who speak out loud and bold. In most newspapers the socalled critic is a publicist disgorging network handouts and gossip from talent agencies.

7. Sponsors, obsessed with quick returns on their investment are for the most part too myopic to recognise their own crucial stake in the only investment worth anything to anyone - the spiritual and intellectual welfare of our people.

8. We teachers are guilty. Our collective silence where protest was in order, echoes down the years to shame us. We have done little to guide or influence the listening and viewing of children. We might have done much.

This, you will say, is a long, grave, indictment.

It is indeed. I take no pleasure in its composition. But these are not times for honeyed words and mutual self congratulation. The time is short and, despite all the efforts of our forefathers, the three great enemies of a democracy - ignorance, indifference and inertia - still stare us in the eye. Pray God they won't stare us down. But they will do so yet, other than as we heed a wise man's warning. "In the conditions of modern life the rule is absolute. The race that does not value trained intelligence is doomed." From that challenge neither you nor I nor broadcasting can claim an alibi. This is the first, last measure of its relevance to the public interest. Service to this end is its transcendent opportunity and duty.

May 1960
Siepman, Charles

James Weber
President & Managing Director

SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO — Cable Address: "CONDADO"

Frederick E. Dieterle
Manager

Dear Ed,

You'll think I failed you, as essentially I did, but not for want of trying or forgetfulness. I worked two mornings on the speech in Norway but found I just didn't have enough to go on – the specific task set you, your mind on it and the scope of what needed to be said. I could only write out of myself. I should have probed your mind more fully and shared my own thoughts with you. It's an opportunity for partnership missed and I regret it. Send me a copy of what you wrote.

We had restful, remote days in Norway and a final 8 days in England, three on a job for the Fund in London, then three honeymooning alone, driving the little Volkswagen we'd bought from Oxfordshire, down through Berkshire + Wiltshire to Dorset. We ate a picnic lunch on the

James Weber
President & Managing Director

SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO — Cable Address: "CONDADO"

Frederick E. Dieterle
Manager

battlements of Corfe Castle and the remnants
of supper at dusk at Stonehenge which
we had virtually to ourselves. We stayed the
night in Salisbury, went to an organ recital
in the Cathedral, stood outside a 15th century
church and watched them ring the changes
in the bell tower. We sat through
matins in Winchester Cathedral next morning
and visited Jane, the Cheyne Court where
I'd stayed and, at nineteen, fell in love with
Gwendolen. My roots went down again
in England and parting was worse than
just sweet sorrow.

I'm here for a week advising on educa-
tional TV. The Lord provided again just
as I faced financial desperation. I can
now see my way ahead those months and
we may conceivably get new covers on
the sofa + armchair in the living room.
Lucre is properly called filthy. The family
are well and spoilt like their fellow
American children. It warmed my heart

to see Janey relax abroad + turn pretty as ever she was, with never a meal to cook nor a child to worry over, as is the wont of women, for 6 long, lovely weeks.

Jeremy starts at the Manners College of Music in a fortnight. He took lessons and practiced hours a day throughout July, living in Alistair's apartment alone.

I reckon you know that Orwell is off, but may not know that John Hanson-Dyer has resigned from the Stratford Theatre.

I suspect that swine Black of the International Monetary Fund, has passed his "red" baiting to final triumph. Evil and Stupidity grow and throttle life like ivy.

I am very low on my nerves and have missed you badly! But neither of these things is new and neither, I reckon, will be repaired for many a day.

I know you can't bring yourself to write. But do send me word so that I can think of you not in limbo but attached, however passively, to some spot on earth. Bless you Charles

Siepmann, Chas

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
COMMUNICATION ARTS GROUP
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
IN EDUCATION

51 WEST FOURTH STREET
SPRING 7-2000, EXT. 640

F

Dear Ed,

Thursday is obviously a bum day. How about we change it? Any other day (but Friday) is good for me. You name it. I'll make it.

That was a splendid speech. I love to imagine the turning of the worms. I'm having all my students read and write about it. I quoted you, with huge effect, at Dartmouth in the Great Issues series last Monday. Well done, and bless you.

Charles

Siepmann, Chas.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
COMMUNICATION ARTS GROUP
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
IN EDUCATION

51 WEST FOURTH STREET
SPRING 7-2000, EXT. 640

October 2, 1958

Palmer Williams
Will you handle please.
E.R.M.

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
CBS
485 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Ed,

Bless you for agreeing to lend us your kinescope of your See It Now Program on Germany. My colleague would like to show it to students in his class on November 5th. Would it be convenient if we had someone pick it up the previous day?

Yours ever,

Charles

Professor Charles A. Siepmann
Communications in Education

mdc

Siepmann,

August 20, 1958

Dear Charles:

Alas, there is no possibility of our coming up to see you. The reasons are complicated and I will explain them when we meet. All three of us are desperately disappointed. When do you return to town?

As ever yours,

EHM:skh

Mr. Charles Siepmann
Route 1
Newfane
Vermont

Dear Ed,

This, in a lovely small town newspaper (The Brattleboro Reformer), seemed heartening to me, though I fear it'll be cold comfort to you. But I thought you might like to see it.

We await you here, with joy at the very thought and with tempered hope of the event.

Bless you

Charles

THE END OF "SEE IT NOW"

If you have a good television memory, you probably recall with millions of other Americans the tense and telling insights we have experienced since Edward R. Murrow and Fred W. Friendly took to television with their CBS documentary series "See It Now."

The lives of many of us have been enriched by the humanity and intelligence of the Murrow-Friendly programs, such as those on Nuclear Power, England after Suez, Gumulka's Poland, and Nasser and the Suez Canal. We saw Danny Kaye bringing joy to the blind, benighted poor of Tunisia and dancing with the lepers in French Equatorial Africa. And the now-famous "See It Now" depiction of Senator McCarthy and his methods is one of the monuments of American journalism.

On Monday night the Murrow-Friendly team presented "Watch on the Ruhr," a film study of the devastation and rebirth of Germany and its people after World War II. The critic of the New York Times called it "visual reporting of crispness and discernment." But, according to an announcement by the Columbia Broadcasting System, it will be the last "See It Now" to be seen.

The vanishing of "See It Now" raises certain questions about the obligations of the television industry to its audience. CBS officials have stated that the "See It Now" series was graphic and eloquent, but very expensive. We wonder how expensive it must have been for the cost of the Murrow-Friendly series to outweigh its immense educational value to the millions who watched it. After the cries of insufficiency which followed the Sputnik launchings, nothing much has been done for our defective defense and education programs. At this time Americans need, if anything, more information programs like "See It Now." We can only weigh the portent of its passing.

The American people have underwritten many times over the expenses of "See It Now" by their purchases from the advertisers who have made the Columbia Broadcasting System such a profitable enterprise. A responsible communications industry must reciprocate with the proper information of its public prescribed by law and the terms of the FCC license. Without such civic participation, free enterprise becomes a polite word for economic chaos, and democracy a euphemism fo[illegible] rule of the ruled.

[illegible]

Newfane
Vt.

6. 16. 58

See you
Chas.

My dear Ed.

It was so good to see you. I miss you steadily. I could wish things stood better for you, but it is an ugly world we live in, and yours is a dirty corner of it. We're overdue for a long talk. Try hard to make it to Vermont this summer. You little know the deep affection that awaits you.

It was good of you to sign up Jeremy for a lunch. Give him courage and watch him work. I'd value your appraisal.

You've probably seen the enclosed, but I thought I'd send it on the chance you'd missed it. Bless you a thousand times. Charles

London Times

BACKGROUND TO THE ALGIERS INSURRECTIONARY MOVEMENT

ARMY OFFICERS' OATH AT TIME OF DIEN BIEN PHU DEBACLE

From Our Special Correspondent

ALGIERS, JUNE 1

The organizers of the Algiers insurrection of May 13 have now been encouraged by their apparent victory to talk openly about how their plans were laid. It is an astonishing story. The following version was told to your Correspondent by someone who has collaborated closely during the past five years with M. Delbecque, the principal supporter; it has been verified by opinions from other reliable sources.

It suggests that the supporters sounded the views of General de Gaulle before carrying out their plot, and that M. Lacoste and M. Chaban-Delmas were both to some extent privy to it. Several Army officers between the ranks of captain and colonel were directly involved, but this does not appear to have been true of General Salan or General Massu. M. Delbecque emerges as the key figure in the drama, with M. Soustelle promising him political support.

TO END HUMILIATION

It all began about four years ago, at the time of Dien Bien Phu, when several young officers in Indo-China swore a solemn oath to devote themselves to restoring the grandeur of France and putting an end to the humiliation caused by weak governments. This sowed the seed of insurrection in the Army. For a year or two nothing was done. Then M. Delbecque, a young textile magnate from Tourcoing, with a strong Gaullist background, began to develop the same ideas.

Last year he made contacts with certain politicians in Paris and civil personalities in Algiers, and also with a major at the War Ministry in Paris who promised him the support of certain sections of the Army. In political circles M. Delbecque made no secret of his plans. He explained that his plot was aimed not at any particular person, but at the "système" as a whole. He wanted to secure the return of General de Gaulle.

At about this time last year two things were happening in Algiers. First, some extremist civilians—"ultras," as the French call them—were organizing their own *coup d'État*, with the aid of a few Army officers. This *coup* failed: General Faure, one of its ringleaders, was arrested before he could take action, and the bazooka attack on January 16 on General Salan, who was considered too "soft" with the rebellion and with Paris, succeeded only in killing his principal adjutant. There is no evidence that M. Delbecque himself was involved in these incidents, which his collaborators now denounce as the work of a "band of fanatics." But several of those who were involved are now sitting happily on the various public safety committees.

THIRD DEGREE

The second main event in Algiers last year was the handing over of police powers to the parachute troops, with the purpose of cleaning up terrorist cells. General Massu, a practising Roman Catholic, is known to have been profoundly disturbed at heart by the third degree methods which sheer necessity obliged him to use in order to wipe out the cells and so save hundreds of other innocent lives from terrorism and restore the city to calm. On several occasions he consulted the Church authorities here in an agony of spirit, but finally decided that it was his duty as a Christian and a soldier to go on with the work.

This must be said to put into perspective the various wild stories about tortures which circulate in liberal circles in Paris and London. But several of General Massu's subordinate officers were less scrupulous than he.

When the parachute troops had finished their work, security duties in the city were handed back not only to the police but to specially organized groups of civilian auxiliaries, both European and Muslim, totalling several thousands. It is suggested that the *coup* of May 13 could not have been carried out without the disciplined aid of these men who, operating in plain clothes among the crowd, gave force and direction to what would otherwise have been a rabble.

When M. Gaillard came to power last November M. Delbecque managed to get himself appointed *chef de cabinet* to M. Chaban-Delmas, the Gaullist Defence Minister. In this guise M. Delbecque arrived in Algiers in January and set up his headquarters in a delightful white villa on a height overlooking the city and the Bay of Algiers. Rarely since the days of Alcibiades can revolution have been plotted from so romantic a site. The villa, cool and luxurious, belongs to M. Nouvion a rich agricultural engineer. Mme. Nouvion, a pre-war member of Laroc's pro-Fascist Croix de Feu—the French Mosleyites—gave M. Delbecque all the help he needed.

FORCES JOINED

Here during January and February M. Delbecque joined forces with some Army officers and with 16 leading Algiers citizens who were also in favour of preventing the Paris Government at all cost from negotiating with the F.L.N. or relaxing France's hold over Algeria. The original public

As most of the civilians in this group were anti-Gaullist and former Pétainists, M. Delbecque had some difficulty in convincing them that the best course was to secure the return of General de Gaulle.

He also emphasized the need for fraternity with the Muslims, and for the absence of all racialism. M. de Sérigny, owner of the *Echo d'Alger*, was brought into the movement because it was thought that his wide influence might be useful, but he was never very popular with it. M. Delbecque and his friends are believed to have feared that M. de Sérigny was really more interested in preserving settler interests in Algeria than in bringing about a wonderful French national resurrection.

Various Gaullist officers were allowed to infiltrate into Algiers from other parts of the country and from France. M. Chaban-Delmas, it is said, knew something of what was going on and is believed to have been secretly sympathetic. The same is said to be true of M. Lacoste, who would anyway have found it hard to take action against the movement by this stage because of the strength of feelings among the settlers and part of the Army.

M. Soustelle pledged M. Delbecque his support, but did little active work. Finally, when the Gaillard Government fell and it appeared that M. Lacoste would be replaced in Algiers, M. Delbecque decided that the time had come for action. The peaceful demonstration in Algiers on April 26 was a dress rehearsal for the actual *coup*. By this time the leaders of the crowd, especially the police auxiliaries, and the students, had been carefully briefed. At about the same time M. Delbecque met General de Gaulle in France and secured a promise that the General was prepared to return to power "if the people wanted it." Then M. Pflimlin was asked to form a Government—the man who M. Delbecque knew for certain was intent on abandoning Algeria. All was laid ready here for the night of his investiture.

GEN. DE GAULLE SEEN

On May 9, according to one version, M. Delbecque asked M. Lacoste to remain in Algiers and lead the *coup*, but the last-named refused, saying that he could not bring himself to make a complete break with the Socialist Party. According to another version, M. Lacoste agreed the same day that demonstrations should be organized in Algiers in his absence, so as to prevent M. Pflimlin from sending a new Minister Resident to Algeria.

But this time M. Pflimlin had decided to appoint M. Mutter, the Independent, whom people here suppose would carry out the Pflimlin policy. There is some evidence that at this stage M. Delbecque and his friends put their trust in M. Lacoste and would in some way have preferred him to M. Soustelle. They hoped he would be able to prevent the policy and Army from intervening against them.

On May 9 M. Neuwirth, a close colleague of M. Delbecque and now chief press officer of the public safety committee, saw General de Gaulle in France and secured a further promise of possible support. It is not clear, however, how much the General was told of what was really being prepared. It would be wrong to suppose that he was necessarily privy to the plot: more probably M. Delbecque and M. Neuwirth merely sounded his views on a possible return to power.

By May 11 M. Pflimlin began to fear trouble and is reported to have secured from General Salan and General Massu a promise of their loyalty. On the same day M. de Sérigny launched an appeal to General de Gaulle in the *Echo d'Alger*.

On the afternoon of May 13 the crowds began massing according to plan. M. Delbecque's aim was to shock Parliament into rejecting M. Pflimlin and calling on General de Gaulle. He was taking a great risk, but he had received some assurances from M. Lacoste and from parachute officers up to the rank of colonel. But the storming of the Government building was not part of the original programme.

TEAR GAS USED

M. Lacoste was now back in Paris, and M. Delbecque had arranged with M. Maisonneuve, M. Lacoste's political director, that the Government building would yield peacefully, and that he, M. Maisonneuve, would receive a delegation from the crowd and allow a public safety committee to be installed officially. But when the security police started using tear-gas bombs the crowd went wild and stormed the building. The police were too weak to stop them and many were probably sympathetic. For a while it looked as if things were getting out of hand.

Then General Massu arrived. According to reports neither officially confirmed nor denied, General Salan ordered him to telephone to Paris for instructions as to whether or not to open fire on the crowd. M. Gaillard replied that he had resigned and so could not answer; M. Pflimlin replied that he had not yet been elected, and so could not answer either. This reported incident is being widely quoted as the supreme condemnation of the Fourth Republic.

So General Massu made his famous snap decision—to join and control the movement rather than suppress it. As he told your Correspondent afterwards, "I jumped on a moving train and now there is no going back." All observers agree that he, General Salan, and the other leading officers had no direct part in the plot before it took place, even though they must have sensed that something was being prepared.

HISTORIC NIGHT

Later that historic night other things began to go wrong with the plot. First General Massu, to appease the crowd, announced that M. Soustelle was on his way. This had in fact been prepared, but the Paris police were alerted by the announcement and arrested M. Soustelle as he was about to board an aircraft that was waiting for him at Villacoublay, near Paris. This set M. Soustelle back by three and a half days.

Secondly, the National Assembly, far from collapsing like a pack of cards, elected M. Pflimlin by a large majority, and so set in motion the 19-day crisis. Code messages have been passing by radio between the movement here and its secret contacts in France. M. Soustelle's code message was "*La bouteille de Muscadet est arrivée.*" M. Delbecque claims that the movement has organized 120 cells in France. But after the National Assembly's failure to collapse on the night of May 13-14, they were unable to rise up openly in favour of General de Gaulle.

General Salan's role has now become clearer. On May 14 he wanted to canalize and subdue the movement and remain *dans la légalité*, under the orders of Paris. But when he saw the extent of support for the insurrection, among the civilians, and more especially within the ranks of his own officers, he gradually realized that this was impossible. He hated to turn against the Republic, and was therefore profoundly relieved when General de Gaulle's two statements seemed to offer moral support for his disobedience. He was suspicious of M. Soustelle on the latter's arrival, but soon the two men began to cooperate easily. By May 20 General Salan had decided to break with Paris and throw in his weight wholeheartedly with the insurrection. As he had always shared his junior officers' contempt for the politicians and for the Fourth Republic, this was not really so difficult for him. General Massu, a stronger man than General Salan and a keener Gaullist, reached the same decision several days sooner.

As for M. Delbecque, he has won on the short term, in spite of the delays, but whether General de Gaulle will now give him what he wants is another matter. Even if he fails in the long term he will still be able to teach Cataline and Alcibiades quite a lot about how to make your conspiracy successful. He is an odd mixture of ruthlessness and idealism. He and his friends have a profound sense of vocation

Siegmann Chas.

240 SOUTH MAIN STREET
NEW CANAAN, CONNECTICUT

upcoming

yes I hear called 1 Century

My very dear Ed.

Are you free for lunch next Thursday? Or any other day next week? I'm likely to be in town each day and, being a traditionalist, I want to keep our club alive and active. I'm spoiling to see you and propose to dump the manuscript of this damned book in your lap. That prostituted character, Kip Fadiman, has volunteered to say nice things about it! How are you? I've got a new TV set, so make me know when your next show is on. My publisher had the insolence to suggest you put me on Person to Person !!! This world is full of insolence. Bless you + love

to Janet. Call me. Charles

Siepman C

October 31, 1957

Dear Charles:

I feel that it will not be possible for me to go to the Civil Liberties Educational Foundation Benefit on December 11th, but I would like to take a couple of tickets anyway, so here is my check for that purpose.

As ever yours,

Mr. Charles Siepmann
240 South Main Street
New Canaan, Connecticut

mcc
Enc.

240 SOUTH MAIN STREET
NEW CANAAN, CONNECTICUT

Dear Ed.

That was good. I'll call you when there's prospect of my being in town again. And do you call me, whenever the inclination for lunch is on you.

The Civil Liberties Education & Research Foundation benefit is on December 11. Maybe we could all four go together? Anything you can do to help will be entered in your credit account in heaven.

Bless you, dear Ed.

Charles

CLEF THEATRE PARTY

Thomas Wolfe's

LOOK HOMEWARD, ANGEL

Dramatization by Ketti Frings
Produced by Kermit Bloomgarden
Sets by Joe Mielziner

Starring

ANTHONY PERKINS
JO VAN FLEET

WEDNESDAY EVENING
DECEMBER 11th, 1957
ETHEL BARRYMORE THEATRE

CIVIL LIBERTIES EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION

Statement of Purpose

THERE ARE many fighting agencies devoted to the cause of civil liberty. There is perhaps need for more. But such is not the purpose of CLEF. Its proposed functions are complementary.

The goals of CLEF are threefold, each of them designed to meet long-felt needs which, until met, retard the work and limit the success of militant organizations. It aims: 1) to pursue careful, objective research into the facts, 2) to further public education on the vital significance and present state of civil liberties and, 3) to provide defense funds, not obtainable elsewhere, for those unable to defend themselves in cases involving civil rights. More knowledge about civil liberty, and its wider dissemination in terms that ordinary people can appreciate — these are the twin, major objectives. "Democracy", as Jefferson put it "cannot long survive without frequent return to fundamentals".

CLEF will circulate its researc
at large, to educational institu
tions active in the field of civi
ings will also be part of the ra
designed to carry constructiv
whose present ignorance and
threat to the survival of civil li

The Directors of CLEF are m
for their long-term interest i
protection of civil liberties
their combined background of
unique association in CLEF, th
those sensitive and essential a
tion in the continuous effort to
for all in America.

Two research projects have alr
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into comment and discussion
the air, to determine how far t
day are being fully, fairly and
second project is concerned
citizens in our lower courts. O
study protection of civil lib
criminal courts. These constitu
of extensive studies to be pu
funds have been secured.

CLEF invites further sugges
investigate.

search findings to the public
institutions and to organiza-
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uggestions on matters to

Civil Liberties Educational Foundation, Inc.

CO-CHAIRMEN THEATRE BENEFIT

Mr. Charles Ballon Mrs. Jo Ann List-Israel

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Siepmann Ch

May 2, 1957

Dear Charles:

This is merely a note to tell you that while I have not as yet seen your nephew, Bayard Stockton, I shall do so when he returns from Washington.

A tentative appointment has already been set.

As ever yours,

Mr. Charles Siepmann
New York University
Washington Square, New York 3, New York

fc

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
COMMUNICATION ARTS GROUP
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
IN EDUCATION

30 WASHINGTON PLACE
SPRING 7-2000, EXT. 438

Dear Ed.

Bayard Stockton is my American nephew (in law) whose letter I sent you last summer + of whom I've talked to you. He's back from Munich where he's on some hush hush work for, I'd gather, the CIA. His mother is to have a critical operation in about 10 days.

He's fed up with government and wants to get into public service work in TV or radio. I don't often plague you this way, but if you could see him, size him up + give him some steers on possible employment, I'd be immeasurably grateful. He's a very decent guy, able + with a public service bug that won't let him alone.

If you could see him (any time) this week, would you call him at EN 9-8094. ~~Address~~ Address 1105 Park Avenue. He has to be in Washington all next week but would be free the week after (subject to his mother's condition).

Do we meet Thursday? I'm sending you some first thoughts on humanicism + would love to talk further. There's nothing I care more about.

Yours Charles

P.S. Raymond called up after our lunch and confirmed his warmth, Saturday.

Siepman, Chas.

April 3, 1957

Dear Ed,

When you accept that award you will be speaking out of yourself, expressing your own thoughts. I am not impertinent enough to suggest to you, as you are not vulgar enough to ask me, what those thoughts should be. But the theme is tremendous, as is the opportunity to get something said that will give heart to others and to throw light on this dark world we live in. I offer you, therefore, "themes for your consideration."

The humanist is he who cares, and is preoccupied with what is worth caring about. T. S. Eliot put it beautifully. "Teach us to care, and not to care. Teach us to sit still."

Anyone who cares, comes ultimately to believe in what he cares for. Thus the humanist is always a believer.

All true belief, however, is rooted in doubt. This is because we are finite, and cannot know. And yet, to live an ordered life, we must believe. This recognition of doubt (of "that reserve of truth beyond what the mind reaches, and still knows to be behind") characterizes the beliefs of the humanist. From which it follows that he is never a dogmatist.

Another characteristic of the humanist is that he is preoccupied with the mystery of personality. People, for him, are always persons. This is what, these days, makes him lonely. For, in this age of science, persons are people, statistics on a chart, and tendencies and "charactertistics" symbolized by curves on graphs.

The humanist is distinguished from the scientist not only in this respect, but in two others. His preoccupations are subjective, not objective. His concern is not with manipulation, but with understanding. Hence, it is character, and not events, that centrally preoccupy him.

Distinctive of the humanist is his sense of himself -- as, with his fellow man, a caesura between the past and the future. He has, in wholly unacademic terms, a sense of history, and consequently an awareness of necessity, of laws of life which we can either learn or have drilled into us by suffering as, in our perversity, we depart from them. In wholly secular terms he recognizes with Shakespeare that "There is a divinity that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will." And from necessity derive two humanist concepts - that of duty + of reverence

One has only to list these aspects of humanism to see how television flouts them. Thus:

1) Audiences are conceived and treated as people, not as persons.

2) Quantitative response is consequently made the measure of quality.

3) People are seen as means to the end of profitable marketing, not as ends in themselves. Thus exploitation is substituted for honest service.

4) Events, not character, constitute the raw material of program. "What" and "how" not "why," is what television asks and answers.

5) Not being humanist, television has never taught itself "to care and not to care." It is not itself in search of anything. Hence it has no dynamic, no inspiration, no leadership. It functions like a prostitute, making itself available (at a price) for other people's pleasures. Taking us for what we are, it keeps us where we are. It lacks utterly the life giving contagion of personality. It is in fact afraid to be itself, whereas the essence of humanism is the urge to self-discovery. Television is faceless.

The Bishop of Beauvais in Bernard Shaw's St. Joan thus answers the truculent little English priest who asks him "What is a miracle?" "A miracle," says the Bishop, "is any event that creates faith." In this sense television, to put it mildly, is not miraculous.

I could go on!

Charles.

Charles A. Siepmann

FCAS:gwa

Sleepwalk

CAROLINA INN — CHAPEL HILL
OWNED AND OPERATED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA

as from
240 South Main St
New Canaan
Conn.

Monday

Thursday

3. 19. 57.

Dear Ed,

Twenty years ago you told me to visit Chapel Hill. I started out from Cambridge, Mass, but the hurricane of 1938 turned me back after 40 miles - railroad bridge washed out. Now, at long last, I'm here, and off again, home, tomorrow. Next week to Philadelphia, and then I'll have completed this 3 months odyssey for the Fund. For two weeks I'll be home (then to Oregon to make a speech + visit old friends in San Francisco) and I'm hungering for prospect of sight of you again. If you have inclination, name a lunch date between April 1 (3rd to 5th excepted) and April 14, and I'll be in.

Your silence on the book (out last Monday) suggests to you didn't like it. I don't blame you. Person to Person is cooking up. I liked your talk with Williams and with that photographer.

My love to Janet, and bless you.

Charles

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
COMMUNICATION ARTS GROUP
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
IN EDUCATION

30 WASHINGTON PLACE
SPRING 7-2000, EXT. 438

Seymour, Chas

Howe Library
Hanover
N.H.

8·14·56

Dear Sid.

The enclosed is from a nephew in law (if there is such a thing!) now working on secret intelligence in Germany. As you see, he's fed up. He's bright and has character. As raw material he'd be an asset. But experience? Has he any chance of breaking into TV anywhere on the public affairs or public service front? And if so, how? Will you give it a thought and talk to me about him when, as I fervently hope, we meet again in early September?

Teaching 44 AT+T executives has held me here at Dartmouth these last 6 weeks. We finish 12 days from now. It has proved as near an ideal life as a man can ask for. Four days of bachelor life, free from familial strains + responsibilities, with time to read and think; and 3 days on the farm with the family – and they only 65 miles off.. I'm momentarily in luck. There's prospect of repeating the experiment next year.

How's you? I miss you. Keep an early lunch free for me in September. Our love to you all. Charles

Wednesday, July 25th

Dear Mr. Siepmann,

My mother mentioned in a recent letter that she had talked to you about my aspirations after leaving my current job at Alexandria. You will probably also remember that I discussed the same general subject with you last March before we returned to Europe. This letter may be somewhat premature, but I feel that I must start thinking about the future now, despite the time and distance interval, so that I will have some idea of what my prospects are when we return to the States next Spring. I hope that it won't disturb your summer leisure too much by bringing up unpleasantly humid and warm thoughts of sweltering New York to conflict with the cool of Vermont and Hannover.

First, I should probably explain as freely as I am able to, why I intend to leave the government. The reasons are various and many - some of them undoubtedly petty. But they boil down basically to two: I see little future and less satisfaction in staying in an organization which is top-heavy and which offers only slow promotion based generally on tenure rather than merit. Secondly, I have come to experience daily almost complete frustration in my job, brought about by a towering bureaucracy which concerns itself more with internal power struggles than with the vital job at hand. There have been a number of blows to the ideology that initially led me into this employment. These have been cumulative in effect, to the point where I feel that there is more to be done for the "public good" elsewhere than in government. By this I mean that I have always felt that Americans should be aware of what goes on outside their own watery borders. This job, ideally, should contribute to that awareness, even if only to the knowledge of a restricted number of people. In the broader field in which my interest now lies, I feel that this awareness can be brought about best not by relatively dry newspaper accounts which all too frequently are lightly passed over, but rather in a manner which can be comprehended vividly. Television, and, to a lesser extent, radio are the media which are capable of bringing such knowledge and, perhaps, understanding; lamentably, this is probably because they present news and features in a more palatable and less strenuous form.

This belief, coupled with my complete disillusionment with government as a career make me feel that at the very least, I should like to investigate the possibilities offered by television and radio - specifically in the connected fields of news and special or public events.

Although I have rarely had the privilege of seeing Mr. Murrow's programs, I remember you mentioning that he does a magnificent job of presenting and documenting problems and issues on television. There are undoubtedly others who strive to achieve similar enlightening goals. This is the kind of thing in which I would be extremely interested.

Bad to say, I realize that there is precious little that I can offer in this highle specialized and competitive field. My knowledge of radio is almost rudimentary - production manager of the college radio station, some part-time work for local independents near Williams, and an intense interest in the entire problem of presenting news in an appealing,

but accurate, manner.

On the other hand, I believe that the past five-plus years have not been completely wasted. I have picked up a near-fluent knowledge of one language, and am acquainted with another. For more than four years, my work has brought me into close association with a variety of foreign people whose confidence I have had to win in order to fulfill my assignments. Naturally, the work has also involved considerable report-writing. (Albeit in that tortuous variety of the language admirably termed gobblydegook). The experience as a whole has been a rich one which cannot weigh against me if I am considered for a job in the news field. Perhaps the greatest single advantage I have derived from this time is a realization of some of the problems that face nations other than our own and of those pressures which make true mutual understanding such a difficult proposition.

I believe that I mentioned much of this to you when we last met. My resolve to leave the government has become even more strong on the intervening period. In the Spring of 1955, you suggested that I write you about a year before I returned. For a while, I thought I might have to come to the States this fall on business, so I delayed. Now, however, that that possibility has fallen through, I am at a loss on how I should proceed. Judging by the reception I have previously received when applying for a job cold, I don't imagine it would do much good to write a formal letter to the various networks now (or even when I returned). Another awkward consideration is that I shall not be able to discuss my present occupation with anyone in more detailed terms than the above. This, of course, is guaranteed to evoke fishy stares and chilly responses. To complicate matters further, I shall probably not be able to present a reference, specify the peculiar skills that I may have, nor dwell on the nature of my assignments.

The problem of finding a job will be rather pressing upon our return. I want to leave this organization with all possible speed; on the other hand, I don't want to throw up my present job (which I can hang onto indefinitely), until I am assured of another. I would like, if at all possible to lay the groundwork now. If there's anything that you think I can accomplish from here, I would be only too pleased to do so - whether it be submitting personal histories to prospective employers, going to Bonn, Paris or London to meet someone, or the like.

Thus I would be very grateful for any advice that you might be able to give me on how to proceed. I realize only too well that there's little I shall be able to accomplish from here, but if you have any ideas, I'll be delighted to act upon them.

Many thanks for toiling through this epic of breast-beating. I hope that the summer is a pleasant one - at least not as varied as ours where one day promises the quick advent of fall, the next makes one think about unpacking summer clothes finally.

Best to you and your family

Bayard Walker

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
COMMUNICATION ARTS GROUP
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
IN EDUCATION

30 WASHINGTON PLACE
SPRING 7-2000, EXT. 438

Siepman, C. A.

January 10, 1956

Miss Rebecca Holder
Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Miss Holder:

Thank you for your note of January 6th. I have sent a check to the CBS Accounting Department.

Thanks for all your friendly help and best wishes to you for the New Year.

Sincerely yours,

Charles A. Siepmann
gwa

Charles A. Siepmann
Chairman, Dept. of Communications

CAS:gwa

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SPRING 7-2000, EXT. 438

Segmann, Charles

Dear Ed.

Things look bad - this time from my side - for our luncheon meetings. I have to chair a final doctoral oral on Thursday, January 17, and I have to go to Pittsburgh on January 24. Damn! I hope to God you'll be free next Thursday (the 10th), or else we'll not meet till February. I'm eager to talk on a million matters. Hold the 10th if you can.

Yours
Charles

Siepmann, Charles

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IN EDUCATION

30 WASHINGTON PLACE
SPRING 7-2000, EXT. 438

March 10, 1955

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Ed:

I had hoped against hope that we'd be lunching today. As we're not, I must write to you about something that can't wait long for an answer.

A group of us approached Vice Chancellor Henry earlier this week about a project in which he showed keen interest. In brief the idea is this. We are concerned to feel out the possibility of securing the cooperation of networks (and maybe of the NARTB) in the formation of a non-profit institution for the selection of outstanding radio and TV programs for distribution to schools and colleges in much the same way as Teaching Films Custodians have made available selected films for educational use.

The idea would be to set up such an institution under the supervision of a distinguished group of educators. The financing of this operation, however, would be underwritten by the networks as a contribution to their public service responsibility. It occurs to me that, costly as this might prove to be, it might be seen as good public relations and is a form of insurance against those who complain of broadcasters as ~~being~~ paying mere lip-service to the public interest and as pursuing profit as the sole objective.

Vice Chancellor Henry suggests that the best way to go about the further exploration of this idea would be sound out the top-flight people on an informal basis before going further. He offered the hospitality of the university and himself as host for a luncheon or dinner meeting with a few such representatives of the industry. It was suggested that I discover through you whether the approach is warranted at all, and if so, who might be invited. As regards CBS, would it be Paley and/or Stanton and yourself? As regards other networks, would it be similarly the chairman and/or the president?

I'd like to move on this as soon as possible but there is no point in wasting time, If, in your judgement, we stand ~~any~~ no chance at all of sympathetic exploration of the possibilities of such a project, Could you give this a moment's thought and call me up some time about it.

Edward R. Murrow March 10, 1955

I'm going to Chicago for the week-end but will be back in the office on Tuesday. It would be a big help if you could maybe call me sometime that day.

Cordially yours,

Charles

Charles A. Siepmann

CAS:gs

Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. Siepman, Chu

F 502

OFFICE COMMUNICATION

To Mr. Seward

From Kay Campbell

Station

March 9, 1955

In reply to the memo from you to Mr. Murrow dated February 3, the check for $50.00 which was issued to Charles Siepmann on January 9, 1952 has never been presented to the bank because Mr. Siepman tore it up. He apparently had his own good reason for doing this and is never going to ask for another check. Incidentally, Mr. Siepmann apologizes for making a hash of our accounts.

Chas. keeping mail?

CBS RADIO

Office Communication

to: Mr. Murrow

from: Mr. Seward

February 3, 1955

On January 9, 1952 you issued check number 1223 to Charles Siepmann in the amount of $50.00 for "consultative service -- 7:45 show". This check has never been presented to the bank. I thought you should know.

J.M.S.

Charles - How come?

Ed

I tore it up. The thought that prompted the writing of that check was enough to move me more than I like admitting. I decided I could savor the thought longer and with more relish if I didn't "convert" it into a crider currency. But I'm sorry if I've balled up your accounts. Charles

693

Sessions, Chas.
January 5, 1955

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
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WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
IN EDUCATION

30 WASHINGTON PLACE
SPRING 7-2000, EXT. 438

No Ans.

1. 5. 55

Dear Ed.

For two days now I've had you in my head, as I always have you in my heart. I've hoped (a little wanly, I confess) that words would come to me to match my feelings, but they don't. And I know now that they won't. What you've done stirred such a turmoil of emotion in me that, beyond words, I've not yet found my own self again. 'Thank you' is a big word, but it isn't big enough for what I need so much to say to you. Neither big nor broad enough, for I want to say more. No, not say; convey. If I could write music, maybe I could get to you, and out of myself, what won't go into words. But I can't, and remain locked up inside myself, while this hurricane of feelings roars through me. I guess all I can do is bless you and thank God for you and for our friendship which, I envy apart, means more to me than any living relationship. Let's "Keep Loyalties young", Ed, and not let the world intervene. Hold Thursday if you can. It's too long since we talked and probed things to other.

Bless you again. Charlie

Dramatic Arts • Journalism • Motion Pictures • Radio • Television • Communications in Education

P.S. I wish I could have been with you for the full 2½ hours with Oppenheimer. I saw your cutting problem. But it was enormously impressive. It shone, like a good deed in a naughty world. Greatness is very moving, and it changes one.

Siegman, Charles

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
IN EDUCATION

30 WASHINGTON PLACE
SPRING 7-2000, EXT. 438

Dear Ed.

I hope to heaven you've kept Thursday clear. Otherwise we'll not have met for 7 weeks. Are you familiar with "The Investigators"? If not, reserve a studio and let us hurry back after lunch and hear a tape recording of it in my possession. I want to talk to you about it anyhow. I have plans in which I hope I can interest you.

Yours
Charles
(Siegmann)

Siegmann, Charles

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
IN EDUCATION

30 WASHINGTON PLACE
SPRING 7-2000, EXT. 438

Dear Ed,

In case (as I suspect is likely) you don't return my call this afternoon, this is to send you renewed blessings and an even greater load of affection, hopes that you had some peace + quiet in the summer and – highest hope of all – that you will lunch with me on Thursday. We have much to pick up on, and I have a favor to ask of you that you'll be reluctant to grant. So I promise not to ask it until after the second whiskey sour!

Bless you again.

Charles

Siepmann, Jane

240 South Main Street
New Canaan, Connecticut

Wednesday

Dear Ed,

I've often been moved to write Murrow and Friendly fan letters,but this time I'm moved to the point of being unable to resist the impulse. That Oppenheimer show last night was beyond price. Most of us never meet in person the quality that makes that human being... and if there is so much as one such human being,the rest of us needn't feel we belong to a race of beasts. To have that transcendent mind and spirit in the living-room,with the camera steadily playing on that wonderful mobile face,was the rarest experience. And your own infinite skill in interviewing,plus some magnificent editing,of course made it the lovely full rounded thing it was. It was overwhelmingly moving, and life looks better this morning because of it.

As to your letter to Charles,my dear Ed,what another reflection of the quality that is you. We border here on the things one can't say,but only understand to be felt. You know I think what you,personally,with or without success,reputation, and fixings,mean to Charles. Take " affection" in the Oppenheimer rather than the market-place sense,and you have some of it. All I can say,bless you,in your private and your public characters both, - the so wonderfully fruitful for the rest of us public character being possible only because of the quality that Charles loves in the private one.

Love to Janet and let's see you some time,

Jane (Siepmann)

Siegmann, Chas
Prepared for Murrow
Ford Foundation
work.

First, then, the Proposition. This, as they say, is fundamental. It's obvious and inscrutable. The essential thing to probe is what people love. Hate is easy. It's the obvious manifestation of what you can observe in people. It requires no interpretation. It is manifest.

What people love--and why--that's what they don't understand themselves and what the rest of us find such difficulty in understanding -- because our self-esteem gets in the way. Love, at its best and worst, is the unconscious revelation of our insecurities. It ranges from true self-surrender to pure self-deception. It is the point for observation -- the clue. It's the clue to persons and to societies. What's wrong with us -- and with the communists -- is what we love. The business of anyone concerned with understanding is -- Love.

Now, and next, Procedure. This is simple. You reverse the procedures of the academicians -- the long-winded elaboration of the irrelevant. You state simple problems in simple terms - recognizing that the simplicity of the statement of the problem is in inverse proportion to the simplicity of the solution. You will go furthest in 'solutions' if you're dedicated to the proposition that most things are insoluble. Academicians chase non-existent foxes on illusory horses. Honest men pursue insoluble problems on verifiable premises.

I have two 'projects' for you that stem from my proposition. There are only two things to do today - to begin the process by which we may (it's doubtful) 1) come to understand ourselves; 2) come to understand others. This is at least intelligent and is the reverse of the process, born of the Puritain conscience of digging up the dirt about others. Muck raking is a peculiarly American and peculiarly unprofitable pastime. It looks good. In fact it feeds hate and the urge in everyone to find an alibi for themselves. We're all dodging ourselves and until we understand this will go on with this lunatic, unconscious game of hide and seek.

Understanding ourselves: This has two great merits of 1) being impossible; 2) corresponding to the only thing possible to finite man - which is an approximation to the truth. There is one grand little book in the whole dreary, methodical, and barren literature of communications research - "Mass Persuasion" - which analyzes why millions in the war loved Kate Smith. Note - they loved her, meaning they hated themselves. The sample was inadequate. The job needs doing on a larger scale. Take the 3 or 4 top ratings - Hooper, Nielson or what have you, in either TV or radio and probe people, on a broader sample basis than Merton could in "Mass Persuasion" - and discover what people love - and why. The why is all. Provide this clue and we'll begin to understand ourselves. It'll provide the spots by which the doctor can diagnose the measles. We haven't yet even got onto the spots of our social measles. We think, indeed, they're beauty spots!

Understanding others: Take the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. Ask some simple questions. What are they out to do? How are they doing it? What happens? We don't have an answer to any one of these questions. Yet we poor, bloody taxpayers foot the bill for all this nonsense.

Charles Siepmann
May 15, 1952





Annual Report

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND

1952

This copy of the 1952 Annual Report of the Twentieth Century Fund is sent to you with the compliments of Evans Clark, Executive Director of the Fund. On August 9, 1953 Mr. Clark will retire as Director and will become a trustee of the Fund.

J. Frederic Dewhurst, Economist of the Fund since 1933, will succeed Mr. Clark as Executive Director.

ANNUAL REPORT · 1952

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND

ANNUAL REPORT

1952

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND

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THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND

FOUNDED IN 1919 BY EDWARD A. FILENE

THE CHARTER of the Twentieth Century Fund, empowering it to seek "the improvement of economic, industrial, civic, and educational conditions," expresses the generosity and faith of the late Edward A. Filene of Boston, who founded the Fund in 1919 and endowed it with a series of gifts. Mr. Filene had an overriding concern for a wider public understanding of basic economic issues as an essential to the formation of sound public policies in a democracy. The trustees of the Fund have, until recently, concentrated its activities largely in attempting to meet this urgent community need.

In 1951, however, the trustees decided to enlarge the Fund's field of activity to include studies of the political and social forces that affect our economic life. The Fund will enter this new area gradually, as fruitful and feasible areas for research are developed, meanwhile carrying forward its studies of economic problems.

The Fund seeks to enlighten the public through research projects that usually involve five steps:

1 The trustees choose a problem of pressing public importance, seeking controversial subjects with respect to which the Fund's impartial, professional approach can be of high value to the public.

2 A competent research staff is engaged to assemble and analyze the facts relating to the problem.

3 A committee of representative people, of varying backgrounds and with special knowledge of the problem, is appointed to review the research findings and make recommendations for action in the public interest.

4 The Fund publishes the results of the study in book form, and seeks the widest possible distribution through its own sales efforts and through regular trade channels. The recommendations of the special committee are included as a final chapter.

5 The Fund undertakes the dissemination of the research findings and committee recommendations in popular media, including newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, radio and television programs, motion pictures, filmstrips, etc.

The work of the Fund consists solely of research and nonpartisan, nonprofit educational activities in the public interest.

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BRITISH PLANNING AND NATIONALIZATION

by Ben W. Lewis

COSTA RICA: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

by Stacy May, Just Faaland, Albert R. Koch, Howard L. Parsons and Clarence Senior

BRITISH PLANNING AND NATIONALIZATION

BY BEN W. LEWIS

Professor of Economics, Oberlin College

When the British chose a course of nationalizing major industries and wide-scale economic planning after the war, they created new problems of understanding at this western end of the English-speaking entente. To help Americans evaluate this new turn in Britain, much of it seemingly so foreign to our political temper, the Fund sent Dr. Lewis, long a student of British affairs, to view the scene at first hand and prepare a brief factual summary of postwar British economics.

Dr. Lewis spent six weeks in Britain, and studied published material there and in this country. His report, titled *British Planning and Nationalization,* was published by the Fund in May.

Summarizing the financial returns, production, labor policies, and other results in each of the major nationalized industries to date, Dr. Lewis makes it clear that nationalization has not wrought a miracle for Britain. Some of the nationalized industries have done reasonably well, others poorly. Dr. Lewis also describes what the British have accomplished with their town and country planning, their housing programs, and their national health service. He gives much background material that is indispensable for understanding the condition of the British, sketching their shattered economic state at the end of the war, which made a high degree of economic planning seem to them necessary to survival. He shows that nationalization fits in with the long-term trend toward cartelization in British industry. The pragmatic character of British planning impressed

Dr. Lewis; he says that no doctrinaire blueprint guides the British, but rather an attempt to meet immediate pressures. "From an economic point of view," he concludes, "what Britain really needs is an industrial and commercial rebirth — inventiveness, mechanization, daring and drive."

Reviews and editorial comments on the study, in newspapers and other periodicals, characterized it as giving Americans a factual account of a subject too often obscured by the fogs of partisanship.



COSTA RICA: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

BY STACY MAY, JUST FAALAND, ALBERT R. KOCH, HOWARD L. PARSONS AND CLARENCE SENIOR

In September the Fund published *Costa Rica: A Study in Economic Development*, the report of a team of economists who went to Costa Rica for the Fund to study the economy and suggest the leverage points at which the Costa Ricans might lift the levels of production, consumption, capital formation, etc.

The team making the survey was headed by Stacy May, Economic Advisor to the International Basic Economy Corporation; and included in addition Just Faaland, on leave as economist with the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation; Albert R. Koch, on leave from the Federal Reserve Board; Howard L. Parsons, agricultural economist; and Clarence Senior, Latin American specialist.

Economic expansion in underdeveloped areas is, of course, one of the basic problems on which the long-range political stability of the world now depends. The study of Costa Rica was conceived by the Fund as a case history of the problems of industrialization in one nation, which might aid not only that nation but others — particularly in Latin America — with similar problems. A further objective was to show how both private and public aid under the U. S. "Point Four" and other international programs might be applied most usefully.

The survey team found that Costa Rica, dependent mainly on agriculture both for the major part of its food and for vital exports, can make its greatest immediate gains in national income by increasing farm productivity, thus lowering the cost of food, releasing workers for industry, and raising the quantities of the export crops. Although

lack of mineral resources, and the smallness of the market, preclude a profitable heavy industry, the nation can with great profit expand its light manufacturing and assembly activities. Many specific suggestions for improving farm productivity and for expanding light manufacturing are included in the report.

The report has been widely reviewed and favorably commented on in this country and in Costa Rica. The Fund prepared a series of extended news releases, with accompanying supplements of excerpts from the study, all in Spanish, which were serialized in whole or in part by leading Costa Rican newspapers, making the main findings of the study widely available in Costa Rica.



Del Estudio del Twentieth Century Fund

ESTADO DE LA SALUBRIDAD Y DE LA VIVIENDA EN COSTA RICA

ANALIZA EL PROBLEMA DEL CAFE DE COSTA RICA Y SUS POSIBILIDADES FUTURAS EL 20 Th. CENTURY FUND

LAS IMPLICACIONES DEL ESTUDIO SOBRE EL DESARROLLO ECONOMICO DE NUESTRO PAIS SON DE INTERES PARA UN AREA MUCHO MAS AMPLIA

LA "TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND" SEÑALA LAS VENTAJAS DEL BIENESTAR ECONOMICO DE COSTA RICA

"THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND" Y COSTA RICA

RESEARCH COMPLETED IN 1952
REPORT IN PREPARATION

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION SERIES

Third Report: DEFENSE AND THE DOLLAR

Fourth Report: ECONOMIC CONTROLS AND DEFENSE

EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES

FARM POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1950

THE FEDERAL DEBT

URBAN REDEVELOPMENT

WORLD POPULATION AND PRODUCTION

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION SERIES

Third Report: DEFENSE AND THE DOLLAR

Fourth Report: ECONOMIC CONTROLS AND DEFENSE

RESEARCH DIRECTOR: ALBERT G. HART

Professor of Economics, Columbia University

In a series of economic stabilization studies the Fund has sought to find how we can keep our economic system healthy while carrying the weight of our huge military and defense expenditures. The first two reports in the series were published in 1951. The final two were in preparation in 1952, for publication in 1953.

The Fund began the project in 1949 as a study of long-range stabilizing measures for reducing the swings of the business cycle, in the kind of full-employment peacetime economy that the whole country desires. The Korean War forced a sharp change of direction in the study, as inflation became an immediate and highly dangerous national problem. Four distinguished economists were asked by the Fund to participate, as a working committee, in the preparation of a series of reports which would cover the whole range of measures needed to keep inflation pressures from seriously damaging our economy. Albert G. Hart had primary responsibility for writing the reports. The Committee, or one of its members, also has prepared a special chapter of policy recommendations for each report, according to the Fund's usual practice.

Published in 1951 were *Defense without Inflation,* written by Dr. Hart, a general survey of the impact of the defense effort on the economy; and *Financing Defense,* by Dr. Hart and E. Cary Brown, in

which the authors considered in detail the effects of various federal tax and expenditure policies on inflation potentials.

In 1952 Dr. Hart completed his manuscript of the third report, which covers the use of monetary and credit policies to reduce inflationary pressure. The report will be published in 1953 with the title *Defense and the Dollar: Federal Credit and Monetary Policies.*

Donald H. Wallace, Professor of Economics and Director of Graduate Program, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, completed the manuscript of the fourth report in 1952: a study of the use and effectiveness of direct controls as anti-inflation measures. The report will be published in 1953 with the title *Economic Controls and Defense.*

COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC STABILIZATION

John Maurice Clark, *Chairman*
John Bates Clark Professor Emeritus of Political Economy, Columbia University

Theodore W. Schultz
Professor of Economics and Chairman, Department of Economics, University of Chicago

Arthur Smithies
Chairman, Department of Economics, Harvard University

Donald H. Wallace
Professor of Economics and Director of Graduate Program, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES

RESEARCH DIRECTOR: W. S. WOYTINSKY

For two decades we have watched wage negotiations in this country become more and more problems of public policy. Today it is clear to everyone that, in our complex economy, the public interest is heavily involved in the vital process of wage determination. The sharpening need for a firm background of fact and theory, against which wage policies could be measured wisely, led the Fund in 1948 to begin a comprehensive survey of wages and employment in the United States under the direction of W. S. Woytinsky.

The report, prepared by Mr. Woytinsky and a group of associates, was in type at the end of 1952. Publication was scheduled for mid-year 1953, with the title *Employment and Wages in the United States.*

The report includes an extensive survey of the make-up of the labor force and of wages and employment as they have developed in the United States up to the present. It also covers general theories of wage determination and employment demand; relation of wages to national income, to productivity, to the business cycle and to other economic factors; the social and political institutions that affect wages and employment; factors in wage differentials; and the actual patterns of employment and unemployment.

Mr. Woytinsky describes past experience, analyzes the probable future effects of various wage and employment policies, and makes projections of future trends in the wage and employment structure.

A Committee on Employment and Wages, appointed by the Fund, has prepared a set of policy recommendations which will be published as the final chapter of the report.

COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES*

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Lawyer, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison; formerly Chairman, National War Labor Board

Solomon Barkin
Director of Research, Textile Workers Union of America

Harry A. Bullis
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Waldo E. Fisher
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Labor Bureau of the Middle West

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Louis Stark
Editorial Writer, *New York Times*

Lazare Teper
Director, Research Department, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union

Harold L. Zellerbach
President, Zellerbach Paper Company

*William A. Hughes, President, New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, and Anna M. Rosenberg, formerly Assistant Secretary of Defense, were originally members of the Committee, but resigned before participating in either the deliberations or the conclusions of the Committee.



Workers Involved in Work Stoppages and Union Membership, 1897-1947

FARM POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1950

RESEARCH DIRECTOR: MURRAY R. BENEDICT

Professor of Agricultural Economics, Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics, University of California

As a complement to a Fund study of government farm aid programs of the last two decades (see page 29), the Fund is publishing a history of United States farm policies from colonial times, on which Murray R. Benedict was working when he began the Fund project. Dr. Benedict completed the manuscript of his history in 1952. Publication was scheduled for midyear 1953, under the title *Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950: A Study of Their Origins and Development.*

This survey of a hundred and sixty years of public policies and government actions concerned with farming begins with the formation of the American land system in the eighteenth century. It describes the changing economic, political, and technological forces affecting agriculture and their results in policy through the whole history of the Republic.



THE FEDERAL DEBT: STRUCTURE AND IMPACT

RESEARCH DIRECTOR: CHARLES C. ABBOTT

Converse Professor of Banking and Finance, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration

The growing intensity of controversies over federal debt management is evidence that Americans realize more and more clearly that the 260-billion-dollar postwar national debt is not just an incomprehensible mountain-pile of figures, but a great, new, and potent economic force, with a powerful influence over our economic future.

This force is analyzed thoroughly by Charles C. Abbott in a Fund study that was completed in 1952. Dr. Abbott's report was ready at the end of the year, and was scheduled for publication early in January 1953, under the title *The Federal Debt: Structure and Impact.*

Dr. Abbott abundantly documents his conviction that the federal debt, in rising to its present massiveness, has gained an influence in our economy unparalleled in our history. He shows how the debt can affect profoundly the economic interest of every citizen, through its effect on the value of money, the level of interest, the volume of credit, and general economic stability.

The report analyzes in detail the patterns of federal debt ownership, the interest rate structure, the maturity pattern. Dr. Abbott shows in particular that instability in the pattern of ownership of federal securities has become a real economic danger, with a debt that can expand and contract our supply of money and credit on a large scale, simply by shifts in ownership.

The Fund appointed a Committee on the Federal Debt to review Dr. Abbott's findings and make policy recommendations. The Com-

mittee's report, forming the final chapter of the published study, was also issued separately in pamphlet form. The Committee saw the huge debt as having a dual potential: as a great danger, if improperly handled; as a resource of great power for stabilizing the economy, if handled with intelligence and courage. It counseled whittling down the debt when employment is full and prices stable, but warned against "heroic" debt reduction that might heavily depress the price level. The Committee's recommendations were widely, and on the whole favorably, commented on in the daily press and other periodicals across the country.

COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL DEBT*

Arthur R. Upgren, *Chairman*
Dean and Director of Research, Amos Tuck School of Business Administration, Dartmouth College

Henry H. Heimann
Executive Manager, National Association of Credit Men

Neil H. Jacoby
Dean, School of Business Administration, University of California at Los Angeles

E. B. MacNaughton
Chairman of the Board, First National Bank of Portland, Oregon

Earl B. Schwulst
President and Chairman of the Board, Bowery Savings Bank

Louis Stulberg
Vice President, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union

Donald B. Woodward
Vice President for Research, Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York

* Daniel W. Bell, President, American Security and Trust Company, was prevented by other commitments from attending meetings of the Committee and participating in its conclusions. His views as expressed in correspondence were considered, however, in drafting the report. Beardsley Ruml, formerly Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was a member of the Committee until July 15, 1952 but was unable to take part in any of its decisions.

URBAN REDEVELOPMENT

RESEARCH DIRECTOR: MILES L. COLEAN

Consulting Architect

Few American cities ever have had a planned and orderly development. Usually it is a more haphazard process, in which forces of vitality and growth struggle with forces of decay and self-destruction. The manifold problems of cities appear more and more clearly as parts of this larger problem: how can the city's inherent strength to grow and renew itself be given full room for action, free from crippling attacks of blight, self-blockage, and premature old age?

In 1950 Miles L. Colean began a brief analysis for the Fund of the roadblocks to urban renewal, and a survey of our resources for overcoming them. Mr. Colean finished his manuscript in 1952, and the Fund will publish the report during 1953, with the title *Renewing Our Cities.*

The study reviews the status of the many current schemes of slum clearance and area redevelopment in American cities. Mr. Colean, however, is interested in the slum primarily as a symptom of the general urban problem of blocked renewal. He is seeking to find how we can best marshal our economic, political and technological forces to clear the road for the growth of vigorous, useful and beautiful cities.

Mr. Colean's findings are also being used as subject matter for a motion picture, which the Fund and Encyclopaedia Britannica Films are jointly producing.

WORLD POPULATION AND PRODUCTION

RESEARCH DIRECTORS: W. S. AND E. S. WOYTINSKY

What is the economic shape of the world? An answer to this sweeping question is the goal of a large-scale survey begun five years ago by W. S. Woytinsky and his wife, E. S. Woytinsky. They bring together facts on how many people there are on the globe, where they are located and how they live; the natural and industrial resources of the countries and regions of the globe; world patterns in business, trade and commerce; world trends and outlook.

This survey has been financed by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Twentieth Century Fund and is jointly administered by the Fund and the Johns Hopkins University. The Twentieth Century Fund will publish the two volumes embodying the findings of the survey. The first volume was all in type at the end of 1952, and the Fund will

publish it in 1953 with the title *World Population and Production: Trends and Outlook.*

Mr. and Mrs. Woytinsky have covered in this first volume the populations of the world and their geographic settings; consumption needs and patterns in all the major world areas; the world's human and natural resources; and the size, distribution, organization, output, etc., of the world's farming, energy production, mining, and manufacturing. The trends of all the major economic factors are also projected into the future. The volume will total about 1,300 pages, and includes nearly 340 charts, graphs and maps especially prepared for the study. The nearly 500 tables in the volume give the statistical basis for an understanding of world economic achievements, relationships, and possibilities.

The status of the second volume of the study, *World Trade and Organization*, is described on page 41.



Continents and Regions of the World

RESEARCH CONTINUED THROUGH 1952

ACHIEVING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

AGRICULTURAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES

AMERICAN IMPORTS

AMERICA'S NEEDS AND RESOURCES REVISION

ANTITRUST POLICIES AND ENFORCEMENT

ECONOMIC NEEDS OF OLDER PEOPLE

EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES

EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES—POPULAR VOLUME

FOREIGN EXCHANGE PRACTICES AND POLICIES

WORLD TRADE AND ORGANIZATION

ACHIEVING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

RESEARCH DIRECTORS:

NORMAN S. BUCHANAN
Professor of Economics, University of California

HOWARD S. ELLIS
Professor of Economics, University of California

The crucial world problem of industrialization in underdeveloped areas, approached through a single-country "case study" in the Fund's *Costa Rica: A Study in Economic Development* (see page 12), is the subject of a more general Fund study begun in 1951 under the direction of Norman S. Buchanan and Howard S. Ellis.

Drs. Buchanan and Ellis are reviewing the economic, political and social factors which promote industrialization under a wide variety of conditions, so that their study will be relevant to the problems of underdeveloped areas in all parts of the world. The first part of the study will be a description of how industrialization has actually taken place in the already developed countries, with emphasis on the common factors in economic growth. These basic requirements for economic expansion will then be measured against the particular strengths and weaknesses of each of today's major underdeveloped areas, to show in each case the points at which the attack must be pushed.

The research directors hope to complete a manuscript of their report in late spring 1953.

AGRICULTURAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES

RESEARCH DIRECTOR: MURRAY R. BENEDICT

Professor of Agricultural Economics, Giannini Foundation of Agricultural Economics, University of California

ASSOCIATE RESEARCH DIRECTOR: OSCAR C. STINE

Formerly Assistant Chief, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture

The American farmer has, from the beginning, engaged in a give-and-take with the rest of the community to maintain his own welfare. Increasingly, in recent decades, he has turned to the federal government for help. The vast government farm aid programs rolled up in the thirties to meet depression emergencies so strengthened this trend that today the relationship of farmer and government is one of the most important and controversial issues in American politics.

In the fall of 1951, Drs. Benedict and Stine started a study for the Fund of the whole array of government farm programs of the preceding two decades, to give Americans a thoroughgoing analysis of their actual gains and losses from the many varieties of government aid they have given to the American farmer during this period. With the perspective of twenty years which included the depression, the war, and the postwar expansion, the time seems ripe for totting up our experience with government farm programs, as a guide to intelligent action in the future.

At the end of 1952, the directors were drafting their report, with the hope of completing it in the fall of 1953.

The Fund has also appointed a Committee on Agricultural Policy, which will review the research findings and make recommendations for action in the public interest.

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURAL POLICY

Jesse W. Tapp, *Chairman*
Executive Vice President, Bank of America, National Trust and Savings Association

John D. Black
Professor of Economics, Harvard University

Harry B. Caldwell
Master of the North Carolina State Grange

Leon Henderson
Chief Economist, Research Institute of America

Calvin B. Hoover
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Past Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers

Margaret G. Reid
Consumption and Family Economist, University of Chicago

Quentin Reynolds
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Theodore W. Schultz
Professor of Economics and Chairman, Department of Economics, University of Chicago

Andrew Stewart
President, University of Alberta

Louise L. Wright
Director, Midwest Office, Institute of International Education

Obed A. Wyum
Chairman, Policy and Program Committee, North Dakota Farmers Union

AMERICAN IMPORTS

RESEARCH DIRECTOR: DON D. HUMPHREY

Professor of Economics, Duke University

That tidy phrase, "the dollar gap," expresses a very untidy reality: the enormous dislocation of world trade left behind by the war, and in particular the failure of the United States to buy enough in other countries to balance what those countries, often desperately, need to buy from us. For many foreign countries, America's failure to import has caused economic hardship. For us, the imports question has traditionally been more closely related to the status of specific domestic industries as against foreign competition.

The crucial importance of American imports to the whole postwar world led the Fund and the National Planning Association to start in 1950 a joint analysis of the capacity of the United States to absorb more goods and services from abroad, including the effects of such imports on specific American industries, and on the American economy as a whole.

Directors chosen for the study were Calvin B. Hoover, Chairman of the Department of Economics, Duke University, and Dr. Humphrey. Dr. Hoover was forced to withdraw from the project at the end of 1950 because of other commitments.

Dr. Humphrey completed a first draft of the major part of his report in 1952. This was being reviewed by specialists at the end of the year, and a final revised manuscript was scheduled for completion in 1953.

The Committee for this project is the International Committee of the National Planning Association, which is co-sponsoring this study

with the Fund. The following comprise a subcommittee of this larger committee to advise on the project and draft a report.

Isador Lubin, *Chairman*
Formerly United States Representative, Economic and Employment Commission, Economic and Social Council of the United Nations; Confidential Reports, Inc.

Frank Altschul
Chairman of the Board, General American Investors Company

Solomon Barkin
Director of Research, Textile Workers Union of America

John F.Chapman
Associate Editor, *Harvard Business Review*

* Resigned April 28, 1952.

*J. B. Condliffe
Professor of Economics, University of California

Allan B. Kline
President, American Farm Bureau Federation

Morris S. Rosenthal
President, Stein, Hall & Company, Inc.

James H. Stebbins
Vice President, W. R. Grace & Company

Wayne Chatfield Taylor
Consultant, Mutual Security Agency

AMERICA'S NEEDS AND RESOURCES REVISION

RESEARCH DIRECTOR: J. FREDERIC DEWHURST

Economist of the Twentieth Century Fund

The publication, in 1947, of *America's Needs and Resources*, in which Dr. Dewhurst and a team of associates showed Americans the true scope of their economy by carefully measuring past and present trends of each of its major elements and projecting them into the future, has attracted more public attention than any other Fund study. The study's estimates of the future movement of production, consumption, productivity, population, capital formation, and other basic factors gave unmistakable evidence of the enormous potential for future growth in our unique high-productivity economy. In the year of publication *America's Needs and Resources* sold 15,000 copies, and at the end of 1952 almost 22,000 copies had been sold.

The volume of comment and the growing number of requests for information based on later figures than those available when the study was made showed the need for a revision which would take account of the postwar economic expansion and defense mobilization.

Late in 1949 Dr. Dewhurst and a research staff began work on a completely new volume to meet this need. The staff has provided a detailed statistical framework, showing past and future trends to 1960 of the basic factors: population growth, capital investment, national income, etc. On this framework, each of the major areas of the economy is measured and described. Of the twenty-eight chapters into which the new study is divided, fifteen were assigned to outside contributors, each of whom is a specialist in the subject of his

chapter. The thirteen other chapters are being written by members of the staff.

At the end of 1952 sixteen chapters were in draft form, four of them virtually ready for the printer. Dr. Dewhurst plans to send the chapters to the printer beginning early in 1953, with the whole manuscript to be in type by the end of the year.



ANTITRUST POLICIES AND ENFORCEMENT

RESEARCH DIRECTOR: SIMON N. WHITNEY

Associate Economist, The Twentieth Century Fund, and Professor of Economics, University College of Arts and Science, New York University

The American antitrust laws express one of the deepest currents of our economic faith, the belief in competition as the prime source of efficiency and fair prices in our economic life. But we know very little about how the enforcement of the antitrust laws in specific cases has actually affected the operation of our business and economic system.

In 1950, Dr. Whitney started a study for the Fund to find what the results of enforcement have been in a number of industries subjected to antitrust action. At the end of 1952, Dr. Whitney had drafted sections of the report dealing with the antitrust history of a number of industries.

During the year the Fund appointed a Committee on Antitrust Policy to review Dr. Whitney's findings and prepare a policy program based on them.

COMMITTEE ON ANTITRUST POLICY

Paul M. O'Leary, *Chairman*
Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, Cornell University

Hugh B. Cox
Lawyer, Covington and Burling

Goldthwaite H. Dorr
Lawyer, Dorr, Hand and Dawson

Edwin B. George
Director, Department of Economics, Dun and Bradstreet, Inc.

Walton H. Hamilton
Lawyer, Arnold, Fortas and Porter; Southmayd Professor Emeritus, School of Law, Yale University

Edward H. Levi
Dean, University of Chicago Law School

Edward S. Mason
Dean, Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University

ECONOMIC NEEDS OF OLDER PEOPLE

RESEARCH DIRECTORS:

JOHN J. CORSON
Staff Member, McKinsey & Company

JOHN W. MC CONNELL
New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University

One striking development in mid-century America is that our average life expectancy is steadily increasing and the proportion of older persons in our population is steadily growing. How can these older persons obtain support and solve their health, recreational, housing and other problems? These are matters of central importance today. As a step toward solution, the Fund launched in 1950 an analysis, under the direction of John J. Corson and John W. McConnell, of the present and future economic needs of older persons in the United States, and of measures already taken to meet these needs.

The first part of the study will answer basic questions: who are the aged? how many can work? how is their health? what income do they have? The study will also describe the factors now determining the employment, or conversely, the retirement, of older people, and the patterns of saving by individuals in this country, to show how adequate such saving is now, or is likely to be, for their support in later life.

The directors will describe and analyze the development of pension plans, both private and public, with special reference to the postwar "new pension era," in which the bargaining demands of the large unions have made private industrial pension plans a national

issue. The present role and probable development of government pension plans will be thoroughly examined, with particular attention to federal old-age and survivors insurance and old-age assistance. Finally the study will weigh the present and future capacity of our economy to provide an increasing standard of living for our older people.

During the year the directors completed the first draft of their report, which was reviewed by specialists and by the Fund's Committee on the Economic Needs of Older People. At the end of the year the report was in process of final revision, with publication scheduled for late 1953. Also published with the research report will be the recommendations of the Committee for action in the public interest based on the findings of the study.

COMMITTEE ON THE ECONOMIC NEEDS OF OLDER PEOPLE

Arthur H. Dean, *Chairman*
Lawyer, Sullivan and Cromwell

Harry J. Becker
Associate Director, Commission on Financing of Hospital Care; on leave as Director, Social Security Department, International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft, Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW-CIO)

James A. Brownlow
President, Metal Trades Department, American Federation of Labor

Eveline M. Burns
Professor of Social Work, New York School of Social Work, Columbia University

Joseph S. Davis
Director Emeritus, Food Research Institute, Stanford University

*Marion B. Folsom
Treasurer and Director, Eastman Kodak Company

†Reinhard A. Hohaus
Vice President and Chief Actuary, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

M. Albert Linton
Chairman of the Board, Provident Mutual Life Insurance Company of Philadelphia

‡J. Waldo Myers
Manager, Insurance and Social Security Department, Standard Oil Company (N. J.)

* Mr. Folsom resigned from the Committee December 24, 1952, following his appointment as Under Secretary of the U. S. Treasury.

† Mr. Hohaus resigned from the Committee April 7, 1953, following his appointment as chairman of a committee of special consultants to Oveta Culp Hobby, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

‡ Mr. Myers resigned from the Committee on August 18, 1952.

EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES

RESEARCH DIRECTORS:

W. DUANE EVANS
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U. S. Department of Labor

IRVING H. SIEGEL
Formerly of the Department of Political Economy, Johns Hopkins University

Science may or may not get us to the moon in this generation, but it *will* inevitably make changes in our economic and social patterns that will have vastly more effect on the life of the average human being than will the first daredevil trips into space.

The Fund started full-scale work in July 1951 on a major study to forecast these economic and social results, over the next decade, of today's sensationally rapid advances in science and technology.

Drs. Evans and Siegel have been concerned first with identifying those technological advances that promise to reach large-scale use in the near future. They have divided the inquiry into a manageable number of specific fields, each to be examined by a specialist who will contribute a paper for use in preparing the report. With the direction of development in each field of technology identified, the directors will move on to forecast the probable effects, over the near future, on basic economic and social patterns.

The report is planned to appear in two volumes: (1) a general summary of the problem and findings, including some of the broader implications that may not emerge in the "sector" studies; (2) a more technical "symposium" of the most important of the sector papers.

The directors plan to have complete manuscripts of both volumes by the end of 1953.

EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES—POPULAR VOLUME

The main findings of the Fund study *Employment and Wages in the United States*, by W. S. Woytinsky and Associates (see page 18), will appear in a pocket-size, popular volume, the text for which is being written by George Soule, manuscript editor for the Fund.

The New American Library will publish this popularization in its "Mentor" paper-back series, through which it has been markedly successful in the mass distribution of material of serious cultural interest.

Mr. Soule was well along on his 65,000-word draft of the popularization at the end of the year.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE PRACTICES AND POLICIES

RESEARCH DIRECTOR: RAYMOND F. MIKESELL

Professor of Economics, James Wilson School of Economics, University of Virginia

One of the most marked politico-economic developments of the post-war world is the restriction by national governments of the exchange of currency across international frontiers. Governmental control of international exchange is far removed from the average citizen's experience, but the powerful effects of such restrictions on foreign trade make them basically important to the world economy. Raymond F. Mikesell began, in 1951, to compile for the Fund a summary of all the major control systems now in use, and their effects on the vital flow of international payments. An appendix to the report will be a tabulation of the principal trade and exchange control systems in effect in all parts of the world.

Professor Mikesell has planned to complete a draft of his report in mid-1953.

WORLD TRADE AND ORGANIZATION

RESEARCH DIRECTORS: W. S. AND E. S. WOYTINSKY

Mr. and Mrs. Woytinsky were drafting, at the end of 1952, the second volume of their survey of the world economy. (See page 24 for description of the project as a whole and of the first volume, *World Population and Production.*) They planned to complete a first draft of the report by June 1953.

This second volume, tentatively titled *World Trade and Organization*, will be divided into seventeen chapters, covering the world's trade, transportation, and government. Among specific chapter headings are: the functions of trade in the world economy; the value, volume, direction and composition of foreign trade; the role of the different forms of transportation in the world economy; public finance; national debts; colonial empires; international cooperation as an economic force.

RESEARCH IN PLANNING STAGE IN 1952

STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN NATIONAL POLICIES

STUDY OF THE RELATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POWER IN A MODERN DEMOCRACY

STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN NATIONAL POLICIES

During the year the Fund sought ways to apply its investigation and dissemination resources to a new and broader area of American life: the political and social forces that interact with those of our economy. The trustees of the Fund in 1951 reached a basic decision to enlarge the Fund's sphere of activity gradually in this new direction as practical and useful areas of research can be mapped out. Meanwhile the Fund will carry on central economic studies.

A committee of the Board of Trustees, and the Fund staff, held consultations with a number of eminent scientists and historians. These meetings brought out several challenging proposals for research in the new direction. Among these was a proposal by Gordon A. Craig, Professor of History, and Harold Sprout, Professor of Geography and International Relations, both of Princeton University, that the Fund study the influence of the military on United States national policies. The Fund appointed a special committee to prepare a detailed prospectus for a study along the lines of this proposal, for consideration by the Board of Trustees. The members of this committee are:

Gordon A. Craig
Professor of History, Princeton University

Edward Mead Earle
Professor, School of Historical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study

William T. R. Fox
Professor of International Relations, Columbia University

George A. Graham
Professor of Politics, Princeton University

Edward S. Greenbaum
Lawyer, Greenbaum, Wolff and Ernst

Herbert S. Marks
Lawyer, Washington, D. C.

Edward S. Mason
Dean, Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University

Max F. Millikan
Professor of Economics and Director, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Walter Millis
Military Commentator, *New York Herald Tribune*

J. Robert Oppenheimer
Director, Institute for Advanced Study

Elwood R. Quesada
Vice President, Olin Industries, Inc.

James H. Rowe, Jr.
Lawyer, Corcoran, Youngman and Rowe

Harold Sprout
Henry Grier Bryant Professor of Geography and International Relations, Department of Politics, Princeton University

The committee met in December and at the end of the year was working on a preliminary outline of the proposed study.

STUDY OF THE RELATION OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POWER IN A MODERN DEMOCRACY

A second proposal for studies in the new area of political and social forces was submitted by Franz L. Neumann, Professor, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia University. It consisted of a series of projects under the general heading, "The Relation of Economic, Social and Political Power in a Modern Democracy." A first project in this area is being carried to the stage of a detailed prospectus by Professor Neumann and a special committee appointed by the Fund. The members of the committee are:

Emile Despres
Professor, Department of Economics, Williams College

John Kenneth Galbraith
Professor, Department of Economics, Harvard University

Richard Hofstadter
Professor, Department of History, Columbia University

David B. Truman
Professor, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia University

H. H. Wilson
Associate Professor, Department of Politics, Princeton University

This committee was scheduled to begin active consultation with Professor Neumann early in 1953, with the objective of completing the prospectus for submission to a fall, 1953, meeting of the Fund's trustees.

SALES OF FUND PUBLICATIONS

1930-1952

The Fund seeks to assemble facts that specialists and the general public may need for a more intelligent and democratic approach to current economic questions. The facts must be delivered before they can be put to work. The Fund makes its basic delivery of the facts by publishing, in book form, the report of each research project. The table following, showing sales of more than 448,000 copies of Fund reports over a twenty-three-year period, is a measure of the sweep of this operation.


THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
How can we pay the costs of national security?
FINANCING DEFENSE
FEDERAL TAX AND EXPENDITURE POLICIES
THE FEDERAL DEBT
STRUCTURE AND IMPACT
FARM POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES 1790-1950
Costa Rica
A STUDY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
BY STACY MAY · JUST FAALAND · ALBERT R. KOCH · HOWARD L. PARSONS · CLARENCE SENIOR
NEXT STEPS FORWARD
British Planning & Nationalization
BY BEN W. LEWIS
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
The shape of things to come
DEFENSE WITHOUT INFLATION
BY ALBERT G. HART
JOHN MAURICE CLARK
THEODORE W. SCHULTZ
ARTHUR SMITHIES
DONALD M. WALLACE
A STUDY FOR THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
THE Twentieth Century Fund

SALES OF FUND PUBLICATIONS, 1930-1952

TITLE	DATE PUBLISHED	1952 SALES	TOTAL SALES TO END OF 1952
Financing the Consumer	Nov. 1930	*	3,068
Boycotts and Peace	July 1932	0	674
How to Budget Health	Jan. 1933	0	828
The Internal Debts of the United States	May 1933	*	1,879
Stock Market Control	Feb. 1934	1	1,262
Labor and the Government	May 1935	*	1,369
The Security Markets	July 1935	*	1,812
The Townsend Crusade	July 1936	1	1,073
Big Business: Its Growth and Its Place	Feb. 1937	15	2,542
Facing the Tax Problem	Apr. 1937	19	4,534
How Profitable Is Big Business?	June 1937	12	1,612
The National Debt and Government Credit	July 1937	3	1,674
More Security for Old Age	July 1937	*	1,136
Studies in Current Tax Problems	Nov. 1937	*	1,242
Debts and Recovery	Nov. 1938	3	1,556
A Memorandum on the Problem of Big Business	Feb. 1939	1	2,008
Does Distribution Cost Too Much?	Aug. 1939	1	8,591
Housing for Defense	Nov. 1940	0	2,411
Labor and National Defense	Mar. 1941	*	3,071
Postwar Planning in the United States, 1	Apr. 1942	*	7,091
The Road We Are Traveling[a]	Apr. 1942	19	38,901
How Collective Bargaining Works	Aug. 1942	*	4,632
Goals for America[a]	Nov. 1942	6	33,762
Wartime Facts and Postwar Problems	May 1943	0	16,047
Postwar Planning in the United States, 2	May 1943	*	5,992
Postwar Plans of the United Nations	Nov. 1943	*	6,163
Where's the Money Coming From?[a]	Nov. 1943	13	38,104
The Power Industry and the Public Interest	Feb. 1944	27	2,546
American Housing	Apr. 1944	213	10,250
Postwar Planning in the United States, 3	Apr. 1944	4	4,390
Democracy Under Pressure[a]	Jan. 1945	196	42,062
Financing American Prosperity	Oct. 1945	49	6,828
Tomorrow's Trade[a]	Nov. 1945	126	20,855
Trends in Collective Bargaining	Nov. 1945	58	14,224

*Out of print

a. Titles of the six reports in the Stuart Chase series on "When the War Ends."

Note: The first seven titles listed were issued originally by other publishers, although the Fund later took over distribution of them.

SALES OF FUND PUBLICATIONS, 1930-1952

(continued)

TITLE	DATE PUBLISHED	1952 SALES	TOTAL SALES TO END OF 1952
For This We Fought[a]	Oct. 1946	24	19,510
Cartels in Action	Dec. 1946	137	5,733
America's Needs and Resources	May 1947	426	21,873
Rebuilding the World Economy	Oct. 1947	77	8,549
Electric Power and Government Policy	Feb. 1948	50	1,540
Cartels or Competition?	May 1948	141	3,893
Report on the Greeks	Sept. 1948	100	4,691
Partners in Production	Jan. 1949	139	8,440
Turkey: An Economic Appraisal	June 1949	268	2,635
U.S.A.: Measure of a Nation	July 1949	3,973[b]	50,099
Brazil: An Expanding Economy	Oct. 1949	356	2,809
America's Capital Requirements	Sept. 1950	*	1,277
Monopoly and Free Enterprise	Jan. 1951	886	6,482
Defense without Inflation	Apr. 1951	609	6,918
Financing Defense	Aug. 1951	463	4,088
British Planning and Nationalization	May 1952	3,986	3,986
Costa Rica: A Study in Economic Development	Sept. 1952	1,476	1,476
Total		13,878	448,188
The Information Film (published by Columbia University Press)	Sept. 1949	92	2,002

*Out of print

a. Titles of the six reports in the Stuart Chase series on "When the War Ends."

b. Published for the Fund by the Macmillan Company.

EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES

The questions investigated by the Fund usually are so broadly concerned with the public welfare that the findings are inherently valuable to a much larger public than can be reached by the basic reports themselves. Therefore the Fund believes its responsibility for "delivery" of the findings goes far beyond their publication in book form. The Fund adapts them to popular media, including newspapers, magazines, motion pictures, radio and television programs, pamphlets, etc.

Fund activities in 1952 in the use of popular media to reach a wide public with the Fund's findings are shown in the following order:

MOTION PICTURES

TELEVISION

RADIO

NEWSLETTER AND CLIPSHEET

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND

PRESENTS: a spirited and authentic motion picture commentary on a crucial issue of our times

INFLATION

a 16mm. two-reel sound film in full color produced by The Fund and ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA FILMS

Should inflation flare up, where are you? Caught in the whirlwind of rocketing prices and plunging dollar values, inferior qualities.

the defense program, place everyone in jeopardy. Understanding inflation, and knowing how to deal with the threat when it arises, is everybody's business.

INFLATION is based on research of The Twentieth Century Fund

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND

presents

WORKING TOGETHER:

A Case History of Labor-Management Cooperation

A Motion Picture Exploration of The Road to Labor-Management Understanding

Produced by Eddie Albert Productions

Distributed by Encyclopaedia Britannica Films, Inc.

...a union is born

...first uneasy conferences between union and management

...development of workable grievance machinery

...what happened when outside employees had pay for absences during a film

...a strike that was ended by an unusual agreement between union and management

...how union ideas on productivity benefited both the union and the employer

...and other events that lead to a relationship of understanding

the "give-and-take" between union and management

Together is real history. It tells the labor relations story of the American Pencil Company of Hoboken, New Jersey, and the union formed at the Company. The film was photographed at the scene of the events pictured—the Company's plant. With two exceptions, the major roles in the story are acted by the men who made the story in the first place, men and women from both union and management at the American Lead Pencil Company.

Together is a vivid, human demonstration of what really happens when labor and management come to grips with their common problems. The film gives the focus to major findings of the Twentieth Century Fund's pioneering report on problems of management and labor, published under the title "Unions in Production."

in the belief that it ... management cooperation.

...together.")

the

Twentieth

Century

Fund

presents

PRODUCING FOR DEFENSE

Produced for the Twentieth Century Fund. Distributed by Encyclopaedia Britannica Films. "Producing for Defense" is a 30-minute forum on 16mm. sound film, featuring—

Paul G. Hoffman, Director of the Ford Foundation, formerly head of ECA (Marshall Plan), formerly President of the Studebaker Corporation.

Clinton S. Golden, Labor relations authority, lecturer at Harvard, formerly labor advisor to ECA.

J. Frederic Dewhurst, Economist of the Twentieth Century Fund, director of the Fund's study *America's Needs and Resources*.

Ben Grauer, of radio and television, as moderator.

"Producing for Defense" brings ... informal give-...

Can America a...

Can America ...

Can America ...

What is the ...

What can the ...

And many other ...

The presentation ... film "Production ... Fund and Encyclopaedia ... released as a ... distinguished ... crucial problems ... the country. ... original film: ... Films, Inc. Use the ... Defense."

THE TW...

Engineer:
"We've got to see that everybody everywhere gets a fair chance to stay in business or keep a job. This foreign trade year—it's like a round trip—it works best when there's a full load coming and going. Doesn't that make sense?"

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND

presents

ROUND TRIP

the U.S.A. in World Trade

distributed by
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA FILMS INC.
See other side for offices of distribution

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND 500 WEST 43rd STREET, NEW YORK 36, NEW YORK

MOTION PICTURES

The Fund has sought increasingly since World War II to make use of the vividness and appeal of the motion picture to carry the results of Fund investigations to a large public. The factual, "documentary" film can now reach nearly 400,000 educational, religious, industrial, recreational, fraternal, and other groups, which have equipped themselves with 16mm. projectors, a majority of them since the war.

From 1946 through 1951, the Fund released four 16mm. films based on Fund findings:

"Distributing America's Goods," a one-reel sound film, based on the Fund study *Does Distribution Cost Too Much?*

"Building America's Houses," also a one-reel sound film, showing findings from the study *American Housing.*

"Round Trip: The U.S.A. in World Trade," a two-reel sound film, demonstrating the importance of two-way foreign trade, using material from the study *Rebuilding the World Economy.*

"Productivity: Key to Plenty," a two-reel sound film, making clear the relation of rising productivity to higher standards of living, one of the major findings of the 1947 study *America's Needs and Resources.*

All of the Fund's films are distributed, by sale and rental, through Encyclopaedia Britannica Films, Inc.

"Productivity: Key to Plenty" has been a top "best-seller" among documentary films, with outright sales of more than a thousand prints. All Fund films also have wide use on a rental basis.

MOTION PICTURE ACTIVITY IN 1952

"WORKING TOGETHER," RE-ENACTMENT OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT HISTORY

The Fund released in 1952, through Encyclopaedia Britannica Films, a new film titled "Working Together: A Case History of Labor-Management Cooperation." The true "case history" portrayed in the film is that of the American Lead Pencil Company of Hoboken, New Jersey. The story begins with the formation of the first union at the company's Hoboken plant in an atmosphere of labor-management conflict, and progresses through wage and grievance disputes, a strike, and a joint company-union productivity drive, to genuine cooperation between the union and the management. The film is given vividness and clarity by using real scenes in the company's plant, by using the actual participants (except for two roles) as actors, and by re-creating the story in a dramatic and authentic style. The film was made for the Fund by Eddie Albert Productions, with Victor Vikas directing.

The film was made to show in action, in real life, some of the principles of practical labor-management cooperation which were brought out in the Fund's report, *Partners in Production.*

"PRODUCING FOR DEFENSE," FORUM ON PRODUCTIVITY

During the year the Fund released through Encyclopaedia Britannica Films a new film, "Producing for Defense," which had been produced and distributed in 1951 as a television program-on-film. The television version was shown on more than sixty stations in all parts of the country. This popularity led the Fund and Encyclopaedia Britannica Films to prepare a version for regular nontheatrical screen use.

"Producing for Defense" is a half-hour forum and panel discussion, which brings out the essential role of increased productivity in

enabling the nation to carry its defense burden while maintaining its standard of living. Members of the panel are: Paul G. Hoffman, then Director of the Ford Foundation and former Administrator of ECA; Clinton S. Golden, labor authority and lecturer at Harvard; and J. Frederic Dewhurst, the Fund's Economist. Moderator for the discussion is Ben Grauer, radio and television announcer.

"ROUND TRIP," NEW VERSION

The Fund released during the year a new version of its film "Round Trip: The U.S.A. in World Trade," revised to ensure up-to-dateness. Encyclopaedia Britannica Films is its distributor.

The importance of two-way foreign trade is made dramatically clear in "Round Trip" by bringing together, through cinema technique, a number of producers and consumers in different countries for a free-for-all argument on the merits and demerits of buying and selling across national borders. An American businessman, a British machinist, a Mexican farmer, a French laborer, and others, each expresses with pungency what he feels to be the advantages or disadvantages of foreign trade to his own economic well-being.

The disputants are helped across tough points in the argument by two experts appearing in the film: Paul G. Hoffman, former Director of the Ford Foundation, who was then President of the Studebaker Corporation; and Winfield W. Riefler, now Assistant to the Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, then on the staff of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey. The argument leads finally to the agreement that everyone benefits from a full load, going and coming, in foreign trade.

FILM ON CAUSE AND CURE OF INFLATION

At the end of the year the Fund and Encyclopaedia Britannica Films were in the final stages of joint production of a new film, "Inflation," which was scheduled for release early in 1953.

"Inflation" is based on material from the Fund's Economic Stabili-

zation series and is intended to make clear the principal causes of inflation and how it may be checked. Consultants in making the film were J. Frederic Dewhurst, Economist, and Simon N. Whitney, Associate Economist, of the Fund. The film shows inflation as a personal experience for several citizens of a typical American town, including a businessman, a white-collar worker, a housewife, a schoolteacher, and the harassed and mettlesome mayor. The mayor organizes a meeting at which the citizens can express their questions about inflation, and get answers from an economist who teaches at the local university. Animation sequences help to make clear how cause and cure operate.

FILM ON NEEDS OF OLDER PEOPLE

During the year the Fund entered into an agreement with Herbert Morgan, producer of documentary films for theatrical distribution, for the production of a film using material from the current study, "Economic Needs of Older People."

The film will be part of a series produced by Mr. Morgan under the general title "The Theatre of Life," in collaboration with the Associated Press and distributed to motion picture theatres across the country. A shooting script was in preparation at the end of the year.

FILMS ON URBAN REDEVELOPMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

The Fund and Encyclopaedia Britannica Films worked during the year on joint production of two films: one on the problems of urban redevelopment, including the causes of urban decay and the barriers to the renewal of cities, with particular emphasis on the long-range policies for overcoming these barriers; and the other on the methods for, and the importance of, the development of our rural and regional natural resources.

The film on renewal of cities draws material from the study by Miles Colean on this subject (see page 23). The film on rural and regional development is based on sections of the Fund study *America's Needs and Resources.*

The script for the urban film was substantially in final form at the end of the year, and about two thirds of the footage had been shot. Completion of the film is scheduled for the autumn of 1953. A final script for the rural film was planned for early 1953, with the film itself to be completed before the end of the year.

Illustrations on this and facing page are from the Fund film, "Inflation."

TELEVISION

EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMS AT SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY

The Fund is keeping close contact with the rapid growth of television, with its great potentials for carrying ideas to millions of people. At this preliminary, rapidly shifting stage of television development, the Fund is looking for patterns of form, of production, of distribution, that will make the dissemination of Fund findings on television practicable and effective.

During the year the Fund underwrote, jointly with Syracuse University, a series of three experimental television programs based on Fund material, which were produced by the Syracuse University Radio-Television Center on Syracuse station WSYR-TV. Each program used a different production technique: the first, based on the Fund study *Defense without Inflation*, was a rehearsed "forum" discussion; the second, using material from the Fund's *Partners in Production*, was cast as a stylized "courtroom" with "witnesses" and "cross-examining attorneys" to bring out the points in the material; the third program, using data from *America's Needs and Resources*, had the form of a current events program, with the time of the "events" established as in the 1960s, to bring to life some of the projections of the Fund study as to future trends of production, consumption, capital investment, etc.

The programs attracted an audience in the Syracuse area, as estimated by telephone surveys, of 15,000 to 18,000 people, and the numbers increased over the series, even in competition with a nationally popular entertainment program available at the same time.

At the end of the year, the Fund and the Syracuse Radio-Television Center were discussing possible further experimental programs, for 1953 production.

EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMS AT IOWA STATE COLLEGE

Iowa State College, at Ames, Iowa, also produced a series of television programs on Fund material, on the college-owned station WOI-TV. The three half-hour programs were all devoted to material from the Fund's labor-management studies, principally *Partners in Production*. Technique of the programs was in general the re-enactment of actual labor-management "situations," including contract bargaining, grievance handling, etc. Persons who took the various roles in the re-enacted scenes were officials of labor and management from the area around Ames. Surveys were not made to indicate the size of the audiences for the programs, but unsolicited mail from viewers was strongly favorable.

Kinescope recordings of the three programs were made at WOI-TV, and Iowa State College is planning to offer to lend the kinescopes to documentary film users. Additional programs on Fund material for 1953 were under discussion between the Fund and Iowa State College at the end of the year.



Scene from experimental television program produced by the Syracuse University Radio-Television Center, using material from Fund labor-management surveys.

RADIO

The Fund and the National Broadcasting Company, in 1950 and 1951, jointly produced a series of thirteen half-hour radio programs under the series title "The People Act." The programs used tape recordings to tell, mainly through the voices of actual participants, true-life stories of American communities, each of which had attacked some local economic or social problem by voluntary group action of its own citizens.

During 1952 the series continued to reach a large audience through disc recordings, which were distributed by the U. S. Office of Education on a free loan basis to educational institutions, study groups, radio stations, and others. More than 190 agencies used the discs in 1951 and 1952, including about 115 radio stations and 40 colleges and universities.

The National Association of Educational Broadcasters, which includes about 75 radio stations in all parts of the country, sent magnetic tape recordings of the series around its "Tape Network," for scores of further radio airings.

NEWSLETTER AND CLIPSHEET

Ordinarily two or three times a year, the Fund issues a Newsletter summarizing its current activities in research, reports published, dissemination work, etc. Through the Newsletter the Fund seeks to inform leaders in industry, education, government, welfare, the press, as well as interested individuals, of its plans and progress. The Newsletter is distributed free to about 18,000 individuals and institutions.

With each Newsletter the Fund issues a Clipsheet, made up of short items of information from Fund studies, designed for "filler" use by a wide variety of publications. Usually several thousand are published each year.

In 1952 one Newsletter and one Clipsheet were issued. An issue of the Newsletter, experimentally increased in size from four pages to eight, was on press at the end of the year, for January 1953 distribution.

NEWSLETTER

Issued occasionally by THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND

VOLUME 7 WINTER 1951-2 NUMBER 1

NEWSBRIEFS—A CLIPSHEET

from the TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND *330 West 42 Street, New York 36, N. Y.*

NUMBER 15

APPENDIX

TRUSTEES

STAFF

FUND FINANCES

FUND PUBLICATIONS

MOTION PICTURES

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

TRUSTEES DURING 1952

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.	Professor of Law, Columbia University; formerly Assistant Secretary of State
FRANCIS BIDDLE	Formerly Attorney General of the United States
BRUCE BLIVEN	Chairman, Editorial Board, *The New Republic*
ERWIN D. CANHAM	Editor, *The Christian Science Monitor*
BENJAMIN V. COHEN	Lawyer; formerly Alternate Representative, United States Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations
***HENRY S. DENNISON**	Formerly President, Dennison Manufacturing Company
PAUL H. DOUGLAS	United States Senator from Illinois; formerly Professor of Industrial Relations, University of Chicago
WALLACE K. HARRISON	Director of Planning, United Nations
AUGUST HECKSCHER	Chief Editorial Writer, *New York Herald Tribune*
OSWALD W. KNAUTH	Economist; formerly President, Associated Dry Goods Corporation
DAVID E. LILIENTHAL	Business Consultant; formerly Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
ROBERT S. LYND	Professor of Sociology, Columbia University; author of *Middletown*
JAMES G. MCDONALD	Consultant, European and Middle Eastern Affairs; First United States Ambassador to Israel
J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER	Director, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey; Chairman, General Advisory Committee, Atomic Energy Commission
EDMUND ORGILL	President, Orgill Bros. & Co.
JAMES H. ROWE, JR.	Lawyer, Corcoran, Youngman & Rowe
H. CHR. SONNE	Chairman of the Board, Amsinck, Sonne & Company; Chairman, National Planning Association
HERMAN W. STEINKRAUS	President, Bridgeport Brass Company; formerly President, Chamber of Commerce of the United States

*Died February 29, 1952

TRUSTEES DURING 1952 (continued)

CHARLES P. TAFT	Lawyer, Headley, Taft and Headley; formerly President, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America
W. W. WAYMACK	Formerly Editor, *The Des Moines Register and Tribune*

HONORARY TRUSTEE FOR LIFE

***MORRIS E. LEEDS**	Formerly Chairman of the Board, Leeds and Northrup Company

OFFICERS FOR 1952

ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.	Chairman of the Board
FRANCIS BIDDLE	Vice Chairman of the Board and Chairman, Executive Committee
H. CHR. SONNE	Treasurer
EVANS CLARK	Executive Director
J. FREDERIC DEWHURST	Economist

FORMER TRUSTEES

EDWARD A. FILENE	Founder and President (died September 26, 1937)
NEWTON D. BAKER 1919–1936	Lawyer; formerly Secretary of War (died December 26, 1937)
CHESTER BOWLES 1947–1950	Formerly United States Ambassador to India and Governor of Connecticut
PERCY S. BROWN 1938–1947	Formerly Executive Director, Edward A. Filene Good Will Fund, Inc.
HENRY BRUÈRE 1932–1934	Honorary Chairman of the Board, The Bowery Savings Bank

*Died February 8, 1952

FORMER TRUSTEES (continued)

JOHN H. FAHEY 1919–1950	Formerly Commissioner, Federal Home Loan Bank Administration (died November 19, 1950)
PAUL G. HOFFMAN 1947–1950	Chairman of the Board, Studebaker Corporation; formerly President, The Ford Foundation and Administrator, Economic Cooperation Administration
ROBERT H. JACKSON 1937–1941	Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States
ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, JR. 1947–1950	Formerly United States Senator from Wisconsin (died February 24, 1953)
MAX LOWENTHAL 1924–1933	Lawyer
WILLIAM I. MYERS 1941–1947	Dean, New York State College of Agriculture, Cornell University
ROSCOE POUND 1924–1938	Formerly Dean, Harvard Law School
HARRISON TWEED 1937–1946	Lawyer, Milbank, Tweed, Hope & Hadley
WILLIAM A. WHITE 1938–1941	Formerly Editor, *The Emporia Gazette* (died January 29, 1944)
OWEN D. YOUNG 1929–1934	Honorary Chairman, General Electric Company

HEADQUARTERS STAFF

EVANS CLARK, Executive Director

J. FREDERIC DEWHURST, Economist

THOMAS R. CARSKADON, Chief, Education Department

ELIZABETH MANN, Chief, Publishing Department and Assistant to the Director

SIMON N. WHITNEY, Associate Economist

ELIZABETH BLACKERT, Research Associate

THOMAS C. FICHANDLER, Research Associate

LOUISE FIELD, Research Associate

R. S. LANIER, Associate, Education Department

CHARLES P. ROCKWOOD, Staff Associate

F. EMERSON ANDREWS, Consultant on Publications

BETTY R. HIRSCH, Bursar

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RUTH ROCKER, Copy Editor

ESTHER I. PERSSON, Copy Editor

***LILLIAN D. SMITH**, Proofreader

BERNADETTE E. HIGGINS, Proofreader

***MARY SHAFFNER**, Secretary to the Director

CAROLYN FRAINT, Secretary to the Director

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*Resigned during year

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Mary R. Gannett, *Editor*
Margaret Hitchcock, *Editor*
Joseph A. S. Kenas, *Consultant on Films*
George Soule, *Editor*

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ACHIEVING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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Erskine McKinley, Frances J. Toler

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Oscar C. Stine, *Associate Research Director*
Elizabeth K. Bauer, Robert J. Coffman, Patricia C. Gustafson, Patricia M. Kelley, David MacFarlane, Orville F. Poland, Florence L. Schifter

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Calvin B. Hoover, *Consultant*
Robert S. Smith

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Thomas C. Fichandler, *Assistant Research Director*
Leah L. Feingold, Frances Klafter, J. Dart Morgan

CONTRIBUTORS

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Jerome Strong

BRITISH ECONOMIC PLANNING AND NATIONALIZATION

Ben W. Lewis, *Research Director*

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS OF COSTA RICA

Stacy May, *Research Director*

COLLABORATORS

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ECONOMIC NEEDS OF OLDER PEOPLE

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Wilbur Cohen

ECONOMIC STABILIZATION SERIES

Albert G. Hart, *Research Director*
Donald H. Wallace, *Collaborator*
Donald Barr, Mary Barr

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W. Duane Evans and Irving H. Siegel, *Research Directors*
Miriam K. Carliner, Betty Jane Esau, Alexander Gourvitch, Inge Kaiser, Jack U. Mowll, John DeWitt Norton, Astor E. Simon

CONTRIBUTORS

Glen T. Barton, Nathan Belfer, Spurgeon Bell, Miles L. Colean, Martin R. Cooper, Cornelius M. Cosman, John H. Frederick, William G. Friedrich, Wilbert G. Fritz, Buell G. Gallagher, H. H. Goldin, Harold L. Hirsh, George E. Lent, George Perazich, Sam H. Schurr, Charles Stewart, Vivian E. Spencer

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Lloyd G. Reynolds, *Staff Associate*

FEDERAL DEBT

Charles C. Abbott, *Research Director*

FOREIGN EXCHANGE PRACTICES AND POLICIES

Raymond F. Mikesell, *Research Director*

URBAN REDEVELOPMENT

Miles L. Colean, *Research Director*

WORLD RESOURCES, PRODUCTION AND TRADE

W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky, *Research Directors*

FUND FINANCES

CONDENSED AUDITOR'S STATEMENT

FINANCIAL STATEMENTS: DECEMBER 31, 1952

WITH COMPARABLE AMOUNTS AT DECEMBER 31, 1951

STATEMENT OF ASSETS AND PRINCIPAL

	AS OF DECEMBER 31	
	1952	1951
CASH	$ 287,856.60	$ 656,581.10
INVESTMENTS, AT INDICATED MARKET VALUE:		
United States Government bonds	$ 391,466.00	$ 272,155.00
Corporate bonds	11,000.00	22,275.00
Preferred stocks	1,363,410.00	10,412.50
Common stocks	8,822,025.00	8,918,074.37
Total Investments	$10,587,901.00	$9,222,916.87
PRINCIPAL OF FUND	$10,875,757.60	$9,879,497.97

STATEMENT OF CHANGES IN PRINCIPAL

	YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31	
	1952	1951
OPERATING RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS:		
Operating receipts:		
Interest and dividends on investments	$ 530,446.89	$ 553,894.89
Sales of publications	22,553.14	40,211.25
Sales and rentals of films	1,848.80	4,506.78
Total Operating Receipts	$ 554,848.83	$ 598,612.92
Operating disbursements:	624,173.83	691,305.34
Excess of Operating Disbursements over Receipts	$ 69,325.00	$ 92,692.42
CHANGES IN INVESTMENT HOLDINGS:		
Increase in indicated market value of investments held throughout the year	$ 1,012,023.00	$ 111,004.95
Increase (decrease) in indicated market value over purchase cost of investments purchased during the year	37,832.84	(4,097.58)
Gain on sales of investments based on indicated market value at beginning of year or purchase price during year	15,728.79	21,576.62
Increase in Principal Resulting from Changes in Investment Holdings	$ 1,065,584.63	$ 128,483.99
Net Increase in Principal	$ 996,259.63	$ 35,791.57
BALANCE OF PRINCIPAL AT BEGINNING OF YEAR	9,879,497.97	9,843,706.40
BALANCE OF PRINCIPAL AT END OF YEAR	$10,875,757.60	$9,879,497.97

NOTE: While the books of the Fund are maintained on a cash basis, the indicated market values of the investments owned by the Fund are given effect to in the statements shown above.

REPORT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

The Board of Trustees, Twentieth Century Fund, Inc.:

We have examined the financial statements of Twentieth Century Fund, Inc. as of December 31, 1952. Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. We had previously made a similar examination for the preceding year.

In our opinion, the accompanying financial statements present fairly the financial position of Twentieth Century Fund, Inc. at December 31, 1952 and the changes in its principal for the year then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a basis consistent with that of the preceding year.

PEAT, MARWICK, MITCHELL & CO.

New York, N. Y., January 21, 1953.

CASH TRANSACTIONS, 1952

(WITH 1951 COMPARISONS)

SUMMARY

	1952	1951
Cash Balance January 1	$ 656,581.10	$ 264,573.94
Total Receipts	4,713,237.43	2,206,942.86
Total Receipts and Cash Balance	$5,369,818.53	$2,471,516.80
Total Disbursements	5,081,961.93	1,814,935.70
Cash Balance December 31	$ 287,856.60	$ 656,581.10

RECEIPTS

Income from Investments	$ 530,446.89	$ 553,894.89
Income from Sale of Publications	22,553.14	40,211.25
Income from Film Sales and Royalties	1,848.80	4,506.78
Total Operating Receipts	$ 554,848.83	$ 598,612.92
Proceeds from Sale of Investments	4,158,388.60	1,608,329.94
Total Receipts	$4,713,237.43	$2,206,942.86

DISBURSEMENTS

		1952	1951
OFFICE OPERATIONS		$ 348,885.31	$ 311,532.11
RESEARCH PROJECTS			
America's Needs and Resources — revision	$16,489.79		
Economic Stabilization Series	10,518.55		
Employment and Wages in the United States	555.92		
Federal Debt	3,382.93		
World Resources, Production and Trade	14,704.29		
Antitrust Policies and Enforcement	2,164.83		
Effects of Technological Changes	47,608.31		
British Planning and Nationalization	146.09		
Economic Needs of Older People	7,555.91		
American Imports	2,436.84		
Costa Rica Economy	936.57		
Urban Redevelopment	5,085.06		
Agricultural Policies	31,523.04		
U. S. Farm Policies, 1790–1950	1,267.30		
Foreign Exchange Practices and Policies	5,005.29		
Research Personnel — Grants-in-Aid	50,000.00		
Achieving Economic Development	15,947.63		
POLITICAL STUDIES			
a. Neumann Grant	3,750.00		
b. Neumann Proposals — Prospectus	2.50		
c. Civil-Military Relations Prospectus	681.56	219,762.41	279,835.93
MOTION PICTURES		15,788.48	20,303.93
RADIO AND TELEVISION		4,998.92	26,284.29
SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL PROJECTS		39.76	5,542.91
PUBLISHING SURVEY REPORTS		34,698.95	47,806.17
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES		$ 624,173.83	$ 691,305.34
PURCHASE OF INVESTMENTS		4,457,788.10	1,123,630.36
TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS		$5,081,961.93	$1,814,935.70



TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES FOR THE YEAR 1952: $624,174 Although no detailed cost accounting records are kept, it is estimated that the total expenditures for the year were distributed as follows:

PRODUCTION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

61% — $378,710 Production of research findings: research, writing, revision and editing of studies and reports; publication in book and pamphlet form.

DISSEMINATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS TO THE PUBLIC

25% — $154,754 Dissemination of research findings to the public through: distribution and promotion of publications; releases and articles for newspapers and magazines; radio and television programs; educational films and filmstrips; the Newsletter and Clipsheet; personal contact with key organizations and individuals.

ADMINISTRATION

14% — $90,710 General administration.

DETAILED STATEMENT OF ASSETS

DECEMBER 31, 1952 AND DECEMBER 31, 1951

	AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1952		AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1951	
	par value	*market value*	*par value*	*market value*
BONDS				
Corporate Bonds:				
Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company 4½% A, January 1, 1990			$ 20,000.00	$ 11,450.00
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, 5s A February 1, 1965	$ 10,000.00	$ 11,000.00	10,000.00	10,825.00
United States Government Bonds:				
Savings Defense Bonds:				
Series G, 2½% October 1, 1953	25,000.00	24,650.00	25,000.00	24,475.00
Series G, 2½% July 1, 1960	20,000.00	18,940.00	20,000.00	19,020.00
Series G, 2½% November 1, 1960	80,000.00	75,760.00	80,000.00	76,080.00
Series G, 2½% May 1, 1961	55,000.00	52,140.00	55,000.00	52,580.00
Treasury, 2¾% April 1, 1980–75	100,000.00	100,000.00	100,000.00	100,000.00
Treasury Certificates of Indebtedness 2% 8/15/53	120,000.00	119,976.00		
Total Bonds	3.8%	$ 402,466.00	3.3%	$ 294,430.00

PREFERRED STOCKS	*shares*		*shares*	
Air Reduction Company 4½% Convertible	500	57,250.00		
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company 5% Non-cumulative	1,000	56,000.00		
Brooklyn Union Gas Company (N. Y.) 5% Convertible	400	20,600.00		
Capital Administration Company, Ltd. $3 Cumulative Convertible Series "A"	1,000	55,000.00		
Celanese Corporation of America 4½% Convertible	500	48,375.00		
Central Maine Power Company 3½% Cumulative	870	68,077.50		
General Cigar Company 7% Cumulative	500	61,500.00		
Gillette Company $5 Convertible	500	49,250.00		
Gulf States Utilities Company $4.44 Cumulative	500	52,500.00		
Helme, (George W.) Company 7% Non-cumulative	1,000	38,000.00		

DETAILED STATEMENT OF ASSETS – Continued

PREFERRED STOCK — Continued	AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1952 shares	market value	AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1951 shares	market value
Interchemical Corporation 4½% Cumulative	500	$ 45,500.00		
Jersey Central Power & Light Company 4% Cumulative	500	43,250.00		
Mathieson Chemical Corporation 7%			100	$ 10,412.50
Monongahela Power Company 4.40% Cumulative	475	44,650.00		
Monongahela Power Company 4.50% Cumulative	25	2,400.00		
Pacific Gas & Electric Company 5% Cumulative 1st	1,100	30,662.50		
Radio Corporation of America $3.50 Cumulative 1st	500	39,500.00		
Rayonier, Inc. $2 Cumulative	1,500	51,000.00		
Royal Typewriter Company 4½% Cumulative "A"	500	46,000.00		
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company 5% Cumulative	700	35,962.50		
Sutherland Paper Company 4.40% Convertible	200	21,600.00		
Sylvania Electric Products $4.40 Convertible	500	54,875.00		
Toledo Edison Company $4.25 Cumulative	500	48,000.00		
Tri-Continental Corporation $6 Cumulative	500	55,625.00		
United States & Foreign Securities Corporation $4.50 Cumulative 1st	960	95,520.00		
United States Steel Corporation 7% Cumulative	1,000	142,000.00		
United States Tobacco Company 7% Non-cumulative	1,500	56,625.00		
Virginian Railway Company 6% Cumulative	1,500	43,687.50		
Total Preferred Stocks	12.9%	$1,363,410.00	0.1%	$ 10,412.50

DETAILED STATEMENT OF ASSETS – Continued

COMMON STOCKS	AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1952		AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1951	
	shares	*market value*	*shares*	*market value*
Alpha Portland Cement Company	500	$ 24,375.00	500	$ 19,937.50
American Gas & Electric Company	1,000	67,875.00		
American Natural Gas Company	1,000	35,125.00		
American Telephone & Telegraph Company	1,200	191,250.00		
American Tobacco Company			500	31,125.00
Anaconda Copper Mining Company	1,000	42,500.00	1,000	50,500.00
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company	500	50,750.00		
Bank of New York & Fifth Avenue Bank	150	56,850.00		
Beneficial Loan Corporation			500	16,340.62
Borg-Warner Corporation	500	39,875.00	500	32,000.00
Canadian Pacific Railway Company	1,000	33,125.00		
Central Illinois Light Company	1,000	38,750.00	750	27,562.50
Chrysler Corporation	500	48,000.00	500	35,000.00
Columbian Carbon Company			600	25,950.00
Consolidated Natural Gas Company	500	29,000.00		
Consumers Power Company	2,000	76,000.00	1,100	37,950.00
Dayton Power & Light Company	2,000	70,500.00	500	17,000.00
Du Pont (E. I.) de Nemours & Company	1,000	96,625.00	1,000	92,000.00
Eaton Manufacturing Company	600	27,525.00	600	23,100.00
Federated Department Stores, Inc.	130,000	6,110,000.00	180,000	7,245,000.00
First National Bank of Boston	1,000	50,125.00		
First National Bank of New York	100	39,400.00		
General Electric Company	1,000	72,750.00	1,000	59,500.00
General Foods Corporation			500	22,437.50
General Motors Corporation	1,000	68,875.00	1,000	52,000.00
Guaranty Trust Company of New York	150	54,150.00		
Hazel-Atlas Glass Company			500	10,812.50
Hershey Chocolate Corporation			510	19,762.50
International Nickel Company (Canada)	1,000	46,375.00		
Johns-Manville Corporation	1,000	74,000.00	1,000	68,000.00
Kansas City Power & Light Company	2,000	59,000.00		
Kennecott Copper Corporation	1,000	78,500.00	500	42,875.00
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company	600	25,500.00	600	20,775.00
Life Savers Corporation			500	18,625.00
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company			500	33,500.00

DETAILED STATEMENT OF ASSETS — Continued

COMMON STOCKS — Continued	AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1952 shares	market value	AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1951 shares	market value
McGraw-Hill Publishing Company	500	$ 26,625.00	500	$ 19,750.00
Mississippi River Fuel Corporation	1,000	37,375.00		
National Biscuit Company	1,000	35,500.00	1,000	30,250.00
National Dairy Products Corporation	500	29,500.00	500	24,625.00
Niagara Mohawk Power Company	2,000	55,500.00		
Ohio Edison Company	2,000	77,250.00	1,210	40,383.75
Otis Elevator Company	500	19,750.00	500	19,000.00
Pacific Gas & Electric Company	1,500	58,687.50		
Pacific Lighting Corporation	1,100	63,387.50	600	30,825.00
Parke, Davis & Company			500	28,562.50
Phelps Dodge Corporation	1,500	60,187.50	500	38,875.00
Philip Morris & Company, Ltd.			525	24,806.25
Phillips Petroleum Company	1,000	63,250.00	1,000	51,000.00
St. Joseph Lead Company	1,000	41,375.00	625	30,781.25
Socony-Vacuum Oil Company	1,000	37,625.00		
Southern Pacific Company	1,000	46,000.00		
Standard Oil Company of California	1,000	59,250.00	1,000	50,875.00
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey	1,500	116,625.00	1,000	75,750.00
Standard Oil Company of Ohio	500	19,062.50	500	20,937.50
Sterling Drug, Inc.	1,000	34,625.00	1,000	39,625.00
Sunshine Biscuits, Inc.			150	9,525.00
Swift and Company			1,000	32,750.00
Texas Company	1,500	86,625.00	1,000	56,125.00
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company	500	55,125.00	500	50,062.50
Union Oil Company of California			500	19,125.00
Union Pacific Railroad Company	500	57,625.00	400	40,000.00
United Fruit Company			600	38,175.00
United States Gypsum Company	500	58,625.00	500	54,250.00
United States Steel Corporation			500	19,937.50
Westinghouse Electric Corporation	1,000	47,750.00	1,000	39,875.00
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company	600	27,900.00	600	30,450.00
Total Common Stock	83.3%	$ 8,822,025.00	96.6%	$8,918,074.37
TOTAL, ALL INVESTMENTS	100 %	10,587,901.00	100 %	9,222,916.87
CASH		287,856.60		656,581.10
GRAND TOTAL, FUND ASSETS		$10,875,757.60		$9,879,497.97

FUND PUBLICATIONS

MOTION PICTURES

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS

A list of Fund publications—including books, pamphlets, bulletins and charts published from 1929 through 1952—follows in chronological order. Motion pictures and filmstrips are listed separately. Additional lists are shown of the Public Affairs Pamphlets and the series of Personal Growth Leaflets based on Fund reports. The Fund has also published annual reports of its operations every year beginning with the report covering the year 1930. The reports for the years 1939 and 1940, however, were combined in a single booklet which also reviewed Fund activities for the twelve-year period 1929–1940. The annual reports (except those which are out of print) may be obtained from the Fund free of charge. All publications still in print may be obtained from Fund headquarters at the prices noted.

BOOKS, PAMPHLETS, LEAFLETS

1929 **AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS AND THEIR FIELDS**
Edition of 1929. Single sheet chart. (Out of print)

1930 **FINANCING THE CONSUMER**
By Evans Clark. xii + 358 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

STOCK MARKET CYCLE RESEARCH
42 pages, paper. (Out of print)

WASTE IN DISTRIBUTION
8 pages, paper. (Out of print)

1931 **AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS AND THEIR FIELDS**
Edition of 1931. 32 pages, paper. (Out of print)

FOR EFFECTIVE PUBLIC GIVING
8 pages, paper. (Out of print)

MEETING A COMMON PROBLEM
8 pages, paper. (Out of print)

1932 **AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS AND THEIR FIELDS**
Edition of 1932. 69 pages, paper. (Out of print)

BOYCOTTS AND PEACE
Edited by Evans Clark, Secretary of the Committee on Economic Sanctions. xx + 381 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: TEXT OF THE FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
4 pages, paper. (Out of print)

THE PROPOSALS OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
8 pages, paper. (Out of print)

1933 **HOW TO BUDGET HEALTH**
By Evans Clark. xvi + 328 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

THE INTERNAL DEBTS OF THE UNITED STATES
Edited by Evans Clark. xx + 430 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

1934 **STOCK MARKET CONTROL**
Edited by Evans Clark, Alfred L. Bernheim, J. Frederic Dewhurst and Margaret Grant Schneider. xvi + 209 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

STATEMENT BY ALFRED L. BERNHEIM TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY IN REGARD TO THE NATIONAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
20 pages, paper. (Out of print)

STATEMENT BY EVANS CLARK TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
7 pages, paper. (Out of print)

1935 **FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT AND LABOR**
8 pages, paper. (Out of print)

STATEMENT BY WILLIAM H. DAVIS BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR IN RE THE WAGNER-CONNERY LABOR RELATIONS BILL
6 pages, paper. (Out of print)

LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT
Edited by Alfred L. Bernheim and Dorothy Van Doren. xii + 413 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

THE SECURITY MARKETS
Edited by Alfred L. Bernheim and Margaret Grant Schneider. xxi + 865 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

AMERICAN FOUNDATIONS AND THEIR FIELDS
Edition of 1934. 60 pages, paper. (Out of print)

1936 **THE TOWNSEND CRUSADE**
93 pages, paper and cloth. (Out of print)

WILL THE TOWNSEND PLAN WORK?
12 pages, paper. (Out of print)

1937 **BIG BUSINESS: ITS GROWTH AND ITS PLACE**

Edited by Alfred L. Bernheim and M. J. Fields. xv + 102 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

FACING THE TAX PROBLEM

Edited by Carl Shoup with recommendations of the Committee on Taxation. xxiii + 606 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON TAXATION

67 pages, paper. (Out of print)

HOW PROFITABLE IS BIG BUSINESS?

Edited by Alfred L. Bernheim and Estelle Shrifte. xviii + 201 pages, cloth, $2.00.

MORE SECURITY FOR OLD AGE

By Margaret Grant Schneider, with recommendations of the Committee on Old-Age Security. xiii + 191 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

MORE SECURITY FOR OLD AGE: A PROGRAM FOR ACTION

By the Committee on Old-Age Security. 70 pages, paper. (Out of print)

THE NATIONAL DEBT AND GOVERNMENT CREDIT

By Paul W. Stewart and Rufus S. Tucker, assisted by Carolyn Stetson, with recommendations of the Committee on Government Credit. xvii + 171 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT CREDIT

8 pages, paper. (Out of print)

STUDIES IN CURRENT TAX PROBLEMS

Edited by Carl Shoup. xxiii + 303 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

THE CHAIN STORE TAX

Public Policy Bulletin No. 1. 6 pages, paper. (Out of print)

SALES TAXES

Public Policy Bulletin No. 2. 6 pages, paper. (Out of print)

OLD-AGE SECURITY

Public Policy Bulletin No. 3. 6 pages, paper. (Out of print)

HIDDEN VERSUS INCOME TAXES

Public Policy Bulletin No. 4. 6 pages, paper. (Out of print)

DOUBLE TAXATION

Public Policy Bulletin No. 5. 6 pages, paper. (Out of print)

THE EXCESS PROFITS TAX

Public Policy Bulletin No. M1. 2 pages, mimeographed. (Out of print)

UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX

Public Policy Bulletin No. M2. 4 pages, mimeographed. (Out of print)

DEATH AND GIFT TAXES

Public Policy Bulletin No. M3. 2 pages, mimeographed. (Out of print)

TAXES ON CAPITAL GAINS

Public Policy Bulletin No. M4. 3 pages, mimeographed. (Out of print)

CREDIT AND THE NATIONAL DEBT

6 pages, paper. (Out of print)

BIG BUSINESS
6 pages, paper. (Out of print)

SECURITY FOR OLD AGE
6 pages, paper. (Out of print)

THE NEXT STEP FORWARD IN MEETING PROBLEMS OF TODAY
(Including *Who's Who of the Twentieth Century Fund.)* 20 pages, paper. (Out of print)

1938 **DEBTS AND RECOVERY, 1929–1937**
By Albert G. Hart, with recommendations of the Committee on Debt Adjustment. xxvi + 366 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEBT ADJUSTMENT
28 pages, paper. (Out of print)

SAFEGUARDING FARM AND HOME MORTGAGES
Public Policy Bulletin No. 6. 8 pages, paper. (Out of print)

DIRECT OWNERSHIP VERSUS DEBT FINANCING
Public Policy Bulletin No. 7. 8 pages, paper. (Out of print)

GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARD DEBT
Public Policy Bulletin No. 8. 8 pages, paper. (Out of print)

NEXT STEPS FORWARD: TAXATION, BIG BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT DEBT, OLD-AGE SECURITY
ix + 219 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

YOUR TAXES
48 pages, paper. (Out of print)

1939 **A MEMORANDUM ON THE PROBLEM OF BIG BUSINESS**
Edited by Evans Clark and J. Frederic Dewhurst. 35 pages, paper. (Out of print)

DOES DISTRIBUTION COST TOO MUCH?
By Paul W. Stewart and J. Frederic Dewhurst, assisted by Louise Field, with recommendations of the Distribution Committee. xvii + 403 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE
53 pages, paper, 25 cents.

1940 **HOUSING FOR DEFENSE**
By Miles L. Colean, with recommendations of the Housing Committee. xx + 198 pages, paper boards. (Out of print)

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HOUSING COMMITTEE
22 pages, paper. (Out of print)

ANSWERS FOR AMERICA
48 pages, paper. (Out of print)

HOW CONSUMERS ADD TO DISTRIBUTION COSTS
Public Policy Bulletin No. 9. 12 pages, paper, 2 cents.

HAZARDS OF RETAILING
Public Policy Bulletin No. 10. 12 pages, paper, 2 cents.

WALLS BETWEEN THE STATES
Public Policy Bulletin No. 11. 12 pages, paper. (Out of print)

PRODUCER TO CONSUMER
Public Policy Bulletin No. 12. 12 pages, paper. (Out of print)

DEFENSE HOUSING IN OUR TOWN
Public Policy Bulletin No. 13. 16 pages, paper. (Out of print)

1941 **WHO'S WHO OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND**
30 pages, paper. (Out of print)

THE FLOW OF GOODS THROUGH DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS
Colored 9 x 11 Chart. (Out of print)

LABOR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
By Lloyd G. Reynolds, with recommendations of the Labor Committee. xii + 130 pages, paper boards. (Out of print)

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LABOR COMMITTEE
18 pages, paper. (Out of print)

FACTS ABOUT LABOR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
Public Policy Bulletin No. 14. 16 pages, paper. (Out of print)

1942 **POSTWAR PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES**
Compiled by George B. Galloway. xi + 158 pages, paper. (Out of print)

THE ROAD WE ARE TRAVELING: 1914–1942
By Stuart Chase. (Number 1 in the series, *When the War Ends.*) vi + 106 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

HOW COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKS
By the research staff under the direction of Harry A. Millis. xxviii + 986 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

GOALS FOR AMERICA: A BUDGET OF OUR NEEDS AND RESOURCES
By Stuart Chase. (Number 2 in the series, *When the War Ends.*) ix + 134 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

1943 **POSTWAR PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ORGANIZATION DIRECTORY, 2**
xvi + 101 pages, paper. (Out of print)

WARTIME FACTS AND POSTWAR PROBLEMS: A STUDY AND DISCUSSION MANUAL
Edited by Evans Clark. viii + 136 pages, paper. (Out of print)

POSTWAR PLANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS
By Lewis L. Lorwin. xii + 307 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

WHERE'S THE MONEY COMING FROM?: PROBLEMS OF POSTWAR FINANCE
By Stuart Chase. (Number 3 in the series, *When the War Ends.*) xi + 179 pages, cloth. (Out of print)

WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS: THE ABC'S OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Public Policy Bulletin No. 15. 16 pages, paper. (Out of print)

FOR THIS WE FIGHT

Thirty 15-page pamphlet reports based on the NBC radio series produced in cooperation with the Fund and the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace. (Out of print)

1944 **THE POWER INDUSTRY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST**

By Edward Eyre Hunt, Editor, with recommendations of the Power Committee. xiv + 261 pages, cloth. $2.00.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE POWER COMMITTEE

58 pages, paper. (Out of print)

AMERICAN HOUSING: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

By Miles L. Colean, with recommendations of the Housing Committee xxii + 466 pages, cloth, $3.00.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HOUSING COMMITTEE

56 pages, paper, 25 cents.

POSTWAR PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ORGANIZATION DIRECTORY, 3

xvii + 134 pages, paper, $1.00.

1945 **DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE: SPECIAL INTERESTS VS THE PUBLIC WELFARE**

By Stuart Chase. (Number 4 in the series, *When the War Ends.*) xi + 142 pages, cloth, $1.00.

BUILDING AMERICA'S HOUSES

12 pages, illustrated, paper. (Out of print)

FINANCING AMERICAN PROSPERITY: A SYMPOSIUM OF ECONOMISTS

Edited by Paul T. Homan and Fritz Machlup. xii + 508 pages, cloth, $3.00.

TOWARD AMERICAN PROSPERITY: VIEWS OF SIX LEADING ECONOMISTS

20 pages, paper. (Out of print)

TOMORROW'S TRADE: PROBLEMS OF OUR FOREIGN COMMERCE

By Stuart Chase. (Number 5 in the series, *When the War Ends.*) xii + 156 pages, cloth, $1.00.

TRENDS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A SUMMARY OF RECENT EXPERIENCE

By S. T. Williamson and Herbert Harris, with recommendations of the Labor Committee. x + 254 pages, cloth, $2.00.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LABOR COMMITTEE

43 pages, paper, 25 cents.

1946 **FOR THIS WE FOUGHT**

By Stuart Chase. (Number 6 in the series, *When the War Ends.*) xii + 123 pages, cloth, $1.00.

CARTELS IN ACTION: CASE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DIPLOMACY

By George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins. xii + 533 pages, cloth, $4.00.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
32 pages, paper. (Out of print)

1947 **STRIKES AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT: A REPORT BY THE LABOR COMMITTEE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND**
31 pages, paper, 25 cents.

FACTS AND ISSUES IN THE TELEPHONE DISPUTE
A statement by the Fund Staff. 6 pages, mimeographed, free.

AMERICA'S NEEDS AND RESOURCES: A TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND SURVEY WHICH INCLUDES ESTIMATES FOR 1950 AND 1960
By J. Frederic Dewhurst and Associates. xxviii + 812 pages, cloth, $5.00.

REBUILDING THE WORLD ECONOMY: AMERICA'S ROLE IN FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
By Norman S. Buchanan and Friedrich A. Lutz, with recommendations of the Committee on Foreign Economic Relations. xiii + 434 pages, cloth, $3.50.

1948 **ELECTRIC POWER AND GOVERNMENT POLICY: A SURVEY OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY**
By Arthur R. Burns and Walter E. Caine, with recommendations of the Power Committee. xx + 860 pages, cloth, $5.00.

CARTELS OR COMPETITION?: THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS BY BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT
By George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins, with recommendations of the Committee on Cartels and Monopoly. xiv + 516 pages, cloth, $4.00.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CARTELS AND MONOPOLY
64 pages, paper, 25 cents.

REPORT ON THE GREEKS
By Frank Smothers, William Hardy McNeill and Elizabeth Darbishire McNeill. xvi + 226 pages, illustrated, cloth, $2.50.

1949 **PARTNERS IN PRODUCTION: A BASIS FOR LABOR-MANAGEMENT UNDERSTANDING**
By the Labor Committee of the Twentieth Century Fund, assisted by Osgood Nichols. xx + 149 pages, cloth, $1.50.

LABOR AND MANAGEMENT LOOK AT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
By W. S. Woytinsky and Associates. xxxv + 285 pages, mimeographed. (Out of print)

TURKEY: AN ECONOMIC APPRAISAL
By Max Weston Thornburg, Graham Spry and George Soule. xvi + 324 pages, illustrated, map, cloth, $3.50.

U.S.A.: MEASURE OF A NATION
By Thomas R. Carskadon and Rudolf Modley. 101 pages, illustrated, paper, $1.00. (Published by The Macmillan Company)

THE INFORMATION FILM
By Gloria Waldron Grover. 281 pages, illustrated, cloth, $3.75. (Published by Columbia University Press)

BRAZIL: AN EXPANDING ECONOMY

By George Wythe, Royce A. Wight and Harold M. Midkiff. xx + 412 pages, illustrated, cloth, $3.50.

1950 **AMERICA'S CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS: ESTIMATES FOR 1946–1960**

By Robert W. Hartley in collaboration with Eleanor Wolkind and assisted by Maynard Hufschmidt and Sidney Jaffe. xvii + 244 pages, paper. (Out of print)

1951 **MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE**

By George W. Stocking and Myron W. Watkins, with recommendations of the Committee on Cartels and Monopoly. xvi + 596 pages, cloth, $4.00.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CARTELS AND MONOPOLY

55 pages, paper, 25 cents.

DEFENSE WITHOUT INFLATION

By Albert G. Hart, with recommendations of the Committee on Economic Stabilization. xiv + 186 pages, cloth, $2.00.

FINANCING DEFENSE: FEDERAL TAX AND EXPENDITURE POLICIES

By Albert G. Hart and E. Cary Brown, assisted by H. F. Rasmussen, with recommendations of the Committee on Economic Stabilization. xiv + 161 pages, cloth, $2.00.

MACHINE POWER MEANS PLENTY

48 pages, paper. (Out of print)

SHORT SELLING ON THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE

By Fred R. Macaulay in collaboration with David Durand. xviii + 70 pages, mimeographed, free.

1952 **BRITISH PLANNING AND NATIONALIZATION**

By Ben W. Lewis. xi + 313 pages, cloth, $3.00.

COSTA RICA: A STUDY IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By Stacy May, Just Faaland, Albert R. Koch, Howard L. Parsons, and Clarence Senior. xiv + 374 pages, cloth, $3.00.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL DEBT

xvii + 26 pages, paper, 50 cents.

NEWSLETTER AND CLIPSHEET

Since the fall of 1945 the Fund has published, several times a year, a periodical popular review and summary of its current activities entitled Newsletter and also a Clipsheet which contains brief excerpts of general interest culled from Fund publications. The Newsletter and Clipsheet are sent free of charge to all those who wish to subscribe.

MOTION PICTURES

DISTRIBUTING AMERICA'S GOODS

10 minutes, 16mm., sound film. 1946. For sale at $50.00, rental $2.50.

BUILDING AMERICA'S HOUSES

10 minutes, 16mm., sound film. 1947. For sale at $50.00, rental $2.50.

ROUND TRIP: THE U.S.A. IN WORLD TRADE

20 minutes, 16mm., sound film. 1947. Revised 1952. For sale at $70.00, rental $3.50.

PRODUCTIVITY: KEY TO PLENTY

20 minutes, 16mm., sound film. 1949. For sale at $85.00, rental $5.00.

WORKING TOGETHER: A CASE HISTORY OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION

22 minutes, 16mm., sound film. 1951. For sale at $100.00, rental $5.00.

PRODUCING FOR DEFENSE

28 minutes, 16mm., sound film. 1951. For sale at $100.00, rental $4.50.

All the above films are distributed for nontheatrical use by Encyclopaedia Britannica Films, Incorporated, Wilmette, Illinois. Prints are also available through Encyclopaedia Britannica Films' regional offices in Atlanta, Georgia; Birmingham, Michigan; Boston, Massachusetts; Dallas, Texas; Los Angeles, California; New York, New York; Portland, Oregon; Willoughby, Ohio; and Wilmette, Illinois.

FILMSTRIPS

YOUR STAKE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

A Public Affairs Picture Story Filmstrip, 35mm., 51 frames, produced in cooperation with the Public Affairs Committee. 1947. Complete Public Affairs Packet No. 3 contains: (1) Picture Story Filmstrip, (2) Script, (3) Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 117, *Your Stake in Collective Bargaining.* Available from the Public Affairs Committee, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, New York, at $3.50 including postage.

MACHINE-POWER MEANS PLENTY

35mm. filmstrip, color, 60 frames. For sale at $6.00 per print from Text-Film Department, McGraw-Hill Book Company, 330 West 42d Street, New York 36, New York.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS PAMPHLETS

(Available at twenty-five cents each from the Fund or the Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, New York.)
The following 32-page pamphlets published by the Public Affairs Committee are based wholly, or in part, upon surveys of the Twentieth Century Fund.

NO. 28. OUR TAXES — AND WHAT THEY BUY
By Maxwell S. Stewart. 1939. (Out of print)

NO. 36. DEBTS — GOOD OR BAD?
By Maxwell S. Stewart. 1939.

NO. 44. 59c OF YOUR $1 — THE COST OF DISTRIBUTION
By Thomas R. Carskadon. 1940.

NO. 58. LABOR IN THE DEFENSE CRISIS
By Thomas R. Carskadon. 1941. (Out of print)

NO. 76. WORKERS AND BOSSES ARE HUMAN
By Thomas R. Carskadon. 1943. (Out of print)

NO. 96. HOUSES FOR TOMORROW
By Thomas R. Carskadon. 1944. (Out of print)

NO. 117. YOUR STAKE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
By Thomas R. Carskadon and S. T. Williamson. 1946.

NO. 130. AMERICA'S STAKE IN WORLD TRADE
By Gloria Waldron and Norman S. Buchanan. 1947. (Out of print)

NO. 142. POWER, MACHINES, AND PLENTY
By Gloria Waldron and J. Frederic Dewhurst. 1948.

NO. 151. CAN LABOR AND MANAGEMENT WORK TOGETHER?
By Osgood Nichols and Thomas R. Carskadon. 1949.

PERSONAL GROWTH LEAFLETS

The following 16-page leaflets, written by Stuart Chase on the basis of his series of six reports to the Fund, were published by the National Education Association, and all are now out of print.

NO. 152. PATHS TO TOMORROW
1942. Based on *The Road We Are Traveling: 1914–1942.*

NO. 153. AN AMERICAN PROGRAM OF PLENTY
1942. Based on *Goals for America.*

NO. 154. FINANCING POSTWAR PROSPERITY
1943. Based on *Where's the Money Coming From?*

NO. 157. PRESSURE GROUPS IN OUR DEMOCRACY
1945. Based on *Democracy Under Pressure.*

NO. 158. FOREIGN TRADE MEANS YOU
1946. Based on *Tomorrow's Trade.*

NO. 159. THE WORLD WE FOUGHT FOR
1947. Based on *For This We Fought.*

Monday. Dupneau New Fane Vt.

Dear Ed,

You let yourself in for this - though I suspect with malice aforethought, trusting me to be as taciturn and sensitive to your privacy as to defeat their ends. But Time's publicity hounds have followed my scent and caught up with me here in Vermont. A guy (and I admit a nice one) turned up today with a telegram he'd had from Time headquarters, hoping to discover from me what they couldn't find out from you - whether you talk about women, how you broke your nose and similar nonsense.

I gave him as little as I could, and in terms that, if he himself understood them, should certainly be unintelligible to Time's editors, let alone Time's readers. But my fear is of the license and distortion they

may indulge in. It all, I know, belongs to a side of your life to which you attach only secondary importance. And, seeing that I spoke out of a great affection and a discriminating respect I suspect and hope that it will be regarded as unnewsworthy. But I shan't know, until the damned piece appears, whether our next club luncheon can take up where the last left off without a score having to be paid ~~for~~ off by you.

Where are you? When do you cease to go on the air? I shall be back in New York on September 15. Is there prospect of a club luncheon (and let's hold at least the first à deux) soon thereafter? Our love to you all.

Charles Siepmann

Siepmann, Chas.

NO

Dear Ed,

A German broadcaster from Baden Baden is very anxious to see you and may call you up.

I saw him yesterday and undertook to soften you up for an interview!

His name is

WOLFGANG BROBEIL

and his interest is in TV special events, documentaries and news coverage. He has intelligence.

Jim Lavenstein

Yours

Charles Siepmann

12. 3. 56

Ept 7186

TR 4-8508.

Thurs-Fri-Sat.

Thoughts on Fatheris Day.

C. Siepmann

SP.

exploitation

Fatheris Day is a commercial racket, inviting reflection on the high "tolerance level", in our generation, for vulgar exploitation. Was man ever so vulgar or so effectively exploited – or have we stormed the heights? ~~Particular~~

privacy

Particular reflection is invited on the relation of exploitation to privacy. As exploitation ~~is on the way~~ moves in, the sense of privacy – and all that goes with it – ~~is on the way~~ moves out. There are those today for whom the very notion of privacy is meaningless and denoted of value. How 'public' can you get – + still be you?

vulgarity.

Perhaps we have a clue here to the meaning of vulgarity – another 'faded' word. You are vulgar as you tolerate (or practice) invasion (exploitation) of privacy. Fatherhood, properly considered, is a very private thing.

the embarrassment of a) fatheris day

Father's Day, as exploited, results (among fathers of any remnant sensibility) in a state of ill concealed embarrassment. Its immediate occasion ~~(the embarrassment)~~ is a variety of awful incidents, such as receipt of neckties of excruciating design, or (worse still) that of the adoring bride who washed out her husband's rack of smelly pipes in soap + water – and came near, thereby, to washing out her marriage too.

b) fatherhood

The true occasion is men's embarrassment over paternity itself. For the fact is that fathers are a scared and awkward ~~bit~~ lot. Perhaps at the end of an awful day we might profitably spend 5 minutes asking 'why'.

The incompetence of fathers

Fatherhood constitutes the largest (male) profession in the world. It is also the profession to which men bring

the ~~lowest level of~~ smallest elementary competence. (For confirmation refer to any child.) We offer a few clues to this incompetence.

"The child is father of the man."

1. Men graduate to being fathers by being sons first. This, while being (at our present stage of scientific knowledge) inescapable, is also fatal. For a son's attitude to his father (however sentimentalized or modified in later life) is either that of veiled dislike (the veil, however, is optional + not always worn), of passionate attachment, or of tolerant indifference. None of these attitudes is appropriate to the reverse role – i.e that of the father-son relationship.

Not doing what our fathers did

2. The ~~best~~ most that we can learn from being sons is not to inflict on our own children the errors that our own fathers inflicted upon us. But this gets us nowhere. For the dictionary of paternal ~~[illegible]~~ do's + don'ts is so fat that not even our own fathers mastered its vocabulary much beyond the letter D – standing for 'Don't'. And of course the most important letter of them all is the last of all – Z, standing for zero, the neutral numeral. ~~First, [illegible]~~ ~~Affectionate [illegible]~~ Affectionate neutrality – that's what a child most needs – + never gets. Which brings us to the fallacy of fond fantasy.

Paternal predestination

3. All fathers in some degree are guilty of the worst form of 'unprofessional conduct'. They wish things on their children. To have expectations of our children – to map (even in our minds) the course and character we hope for them – this spells disaster. This all but guarantees revolt – or, worse still, anxiety. It is the projection of the worst in us (vanity) instead of the best in us (true humility).

4. And finally there is to say. Fatherhood forces us to live out and learn, on the small stage of family relations, the lessons writ large (but never wholly learnt) in life itself. Of these we choose two for comment.

Experience cannot be communicated

a) Nature has so provided that (at the highest + deepest levels of significance) we learn only by our own experience. Part of man's tragedy is that he cannot, at these levels, communicate what he has learnt. There is, in this sense, no progress.

Fatherhood daily reminds us of this fact. For the one thing our own fathers might be said to know about is - fatherhood. Yet this is the one thing, also, they could not teach us or that we would not learn. No, not the one thing. It is in fact the least thing. For the poignancy of fatherhood lies in the fact that what we most would wish we might communicate - what life has taught us about living - the child will neither understand nor learn. But nature may here be wise, for who knows that we have learnt our lesson well? Properly seen, perhaps, the child's deaf ear to the "wisdom" of its parents is its own gift of freedom - to learn + suffer by itself. Man's generations are not cars on a transmission belt of knowledge.

We don't even apply what we know

b) In fatherhood we see, too, how little we apply even what we know (if we don't always practice) on the small stage of family relations. We have learnt the futility of slapping children. But on the larger stage of national + international relations slapping continues much in vogue. We have learnt likewise that by threatening a child we may get our immediate way - but at the price

of strained relations + warped attitudes: yet powerful nations, our own included, continue to use threats -- with like short + long term consequences.

Thus the most sobering fact about Fathers Day is, perhaps, its reminder that each of us, as fathers, is ~~concerned~~ faced with the same problem as that faced by statesmen + nations — how to behave and get along with others — and that neither of us as yet handles it very well.

Dear Ed,

Herewith ~~some~~ trundling thoughts on Father's Day - to swell the contents of your waste basket.

February 5, 1953

Dear Charles:

This is a loan, without interest, repayable at your convenience, and will, I hope, have last priority in connection with any commitments you may have outstanding.

As ever yours,

Mr. Charles Siepmann
240 South Main Street
New Canaan, Connecticut

called him.
Miss W. now has a job so we need not bother.
K.C.

Siepmann

Siepman, C.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

TELEPHONE: SPRING 7-2000

Ext. 438

Dear Ed.

This is the reminder you asked for.

My niece, Jill Waterfield, arrives in New York from England next Monday. She is 25 years old, attractive, intelligent. She took a Second class in "Modern Greats" at Oxford, then worked in the Treasury, preparing material for the Chancellor of the Exchequer + other ministers for speeches in the House and elsewhere, etc etc.

For the last 6 months she has trained herself as a stenotypist (on my advice) as probably the realistic way of securing employment over here. She wants to go right to work, lest she lose speed + skill by a summer's lapse with us in Vermont. I'm concerned to get her secretarial employment with a human being, not a wolf or a thing. She'd be ready to go to it as of June 1, or any time thereafter. She would like to work in New York and, if possible, to avoid Washington. If you know or hear of anyone who'd be willing to take her on at standard wages, I wish you'd let me know.

Yours Charlotte

P.S. I wish we'd had our last lunch alone. But it was my fault. Do what you can to have us meet in July. Bless you.

Siepmann, Charles

...e account of CBS NEWS $

SERVICE DESIRED			
TELEGRAM		CABLE	
		ORDINARY	
DAY LETTER		URGENT RATE	
SERIAL		DEFERRED	
NIGHT LETTER		NIGHT LETTER	

Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise the message will be transmitted as a telegram or ordinary cablegram.

WESTERN UNION

1206

JOSEPH L. EGAN
PRESIDENT

CHECK
ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
TIME FILED

Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

APRIL 18, 1950

CHARLES SIEPMANN
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON SQUARE
NEW YORK, N.Y.

ALL IS CONFUSION HAVE ASKED NEW YORK SEND ME THE BOOK WILL

PRODUCE BLURB SOONEST LOVE

ED MURROW

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

TELEPHONE: SPRING 7-2000

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
April 17, 1950

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
News Department
Columbia Broadcasting System
Station WTOP
Warner Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ed:

The Oxford Press people have just called me up in some distress and told me a story that makes me think the wires have somehow got crossed.

You will remember way back my asking you if you would be prepared to say a good word for the book when it came out which might be printed on the dust jacket and help sales on their way. In your usual generous way you said you would be delighted. Special proof copies were rushed through to be sent to you, to Raymond, Walter Lippmann and a couple of others and one of these went to CBS. I gather your secretary told the Oxford Press people that you were too damn busy to look at the thing. I suspect that maybe she did not make you realize what it was all about. The publishers are so eager to have some word from you that they are prepared to hold up the printing of the dust jacket for a couple of weeks if that would help and if such delay would make it possible for you to skim through the book and say such good words about it as you feel you can, I, for one, would be eager to have them make this delay. To simplify your task I can tell you that you would not have to worry about the first four chapters which are more or less straight history. Then, of course, you have read the BBC chapter. That leaves you with only Propaganda, Free Speech, Education, International Affairs and Television chapters.

I can imagine what life in Washington is like and I am loath to press you but if you could conceivably do this it would be of enormous importance and help to me.

When are you coming back? I have called several times but you seem to be in almost permanent exile. Do let us get together on your return. We, ourselves, are in process of moving out of New York, having bought a house in New Canaan. All further news when we meet.

Bless you,

Charles

C. A. Siepmann

cas/bf

the account of CBS NEWS $

SERVICE DESIRED			
		* CABLE *	
GRAM		ORDINARY	
DAY LETTER		URGENT RATE	
SERIAL		DEFERRED	
NIGHT LETTER		NIGHT LETTER	

Patrons should check class of service desired; otherwise the message will be transmitted as a telegram or ordinary cablegram.

WESTERN UNION

1206

JOSEPH L. EGAN
PRESIDENT

CHECK
ACCOUNTING INFORMATION
TIME FILED

Send the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to

APRIL 19, 1950

MISS CATHERINE SCOTT
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
114 FIFTH AVE.
NEW YORK,

FOLLOWING IS MY COMMENT REGARDING CHARLES SIEPMANN'S BOOK: "THIS IS THE MOST COMPLETE AND PROVOCATIVE TREATMENT OF THIS SUBJECT I HAVE EVER READ STOP THIS BOOK SHOULD BE READ BY EVERYONE WHO HAS ANY INTEREST IN, OR IS INFLUENCED BY, MASS COMMUNICATIONS AND THAT MEANS ALL OF US."

EDWARD R. MURROW

April 14, 1950

Dear Miss Scott:

Mr. Murrow is at present in Washington, and will not be returning to the office until some time in May. I have told him about your letter over the phone, and he has asked me to write and tell you that it's impossible for him to prepare a quotation for the jacket of Mr. Siepmann's book. He is currently so rushed with work that he has time for no extra-curricular reading or writing; he sincerely regrets that he cannot meet your request.

Sincerely yours,

Joan Flatoff
Secretary

Miss Catherine S. Scott
Publicity Manager
Oxford University Press
114 Fifth Avenue
New York 11, N. Y.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, INC.
114 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 11, N. Y.

TELEPHONE: WATKINS 4-1200

April 6, 1950

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting Co.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Murrow:

We are sending you advance galleys of one of the very important books on our fall list. This is RADIO, TELEVISION AND SOCIETY by Charles Siepmann. It is possible that you are already aware of the book.

We feel that Mr. Siepmann's book is extremely timely and should create a great deal of interest among the general public as well as the specialists. Certainly it will develop discussion on this vital subject.

Your comments on the book would be extremely helpful, and if it is at all possible we would like to be able to quote you on the jacket. This will be going into production by the end of April. Any suggestions that you may have will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Catherine S. Scott

Catherine S. Scott
Publicity Manager

CSS:ecs

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

TELEPHONE: SPRING 7-2000

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
April 19, 1950

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
News Department
Columbia Broadcasting System
Station WTOP
Warner Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Ed:

Bless you for that wire. I hope I have not imposed on you. Do let us get together when you are back for there is much to say.

Yours ever,

Charles

C. A. Siepmann

cas/bf

Siepmann, Chas.

November 1, 1949

Mr. C. A. Siepmann
Chairman
Department of Communications
New York University
School of Education
Washington Square
New York 3, N. Y.

Dear Charles:

About the chapter on the BBC: I'll sure do it. Let me have a couple of page proofs or galleys and I'll bang them right off.

I hope to see you soon.

As ever yours,

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

TELEPHONE: SPRING 7-2000

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
October 27, 1949

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Ed:

Let's lunch soon. I miss you, and refuse to allow your hectic life to squeeze friendship out entirely. Meantime, may I take you up on one of your kind offers?

Would you write to Violet Bonham Carter and whoever else it was you mentioned with a view to getting my BBC chapter before the Beveridge Committee? I suggested to the Oxford Press that they might get Cumberlidge to do this but I have just heard from them that he thinks it would be better if I wrote to Beveridge myself. I rather hesitate to do this. On the other hand I am rather interested at least to have the chapter read by them if not written into the record. I gather their minds are made up anyhow and that no change is in prospect. But for some reason I still want to press for consideration at least of dissenting opinion. Would you be prepared to anything about it?

More when we meet.

Cordially yours,

Charles

C. A. Siepmann
Chairman

cas/bf

Siepmann, Chas

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

TELEPHONE: SPRING 7-2000

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
May 4, 1949

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Ed:

That was a wonderful lunch hour, the glow of which is still on me, which only proves that I could do with far more frequent sight of you. I hope Vermont is a cinch but I shall believe it when I see you drive in off the road.

I am sending back, under separate cover the Hoover Commission Report on the FCC (quite disappointing because very superficial) and your piece on television news, which I liked very well. Your emphasis as usual is on the right note. I am also sending you six chapters of the book to pass on to friendly critics in CBS. Also the chapter on free speech which is for you and not for them. If you can bring yourself to read it, I'd immensely value your reaction. Temper judgment with mercy in recognition ~~of the fact~~ of the formidable job of compression that was involved.

Chapts 2-7 sent to Manship 6/14/49 DM

Cordially yours,

Charles

C. A. Siepmann
Chairman

cas/bf

Siepmann, Chas.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

TELEPHONE: SPRING 7-2000

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
March 30, 1949

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Ed:

I don't want you to blame yourself or to have any pangs of conscience about this damned manuscript of mine. You should never have undertaken to review it and remember that I neither asked nor expected it of you. So that there is nothing undone. You shall have it back in good time if the inclination is still with you, but would you do me the kindness of sending it on to one or two respohsible people in CBS who could give me an unprejudiced jdgment on it and perhaps check facts for me?

I am enclosing the first draft of a new chapter which is by way of prelude to a practical discussion of some current controversial issues in radio relating to free speech. I am not happy about it as it is a hopeless job of condensation, nor I suspect, will you agree with it. But I would like your judgment on this, above all other chapters. I think the theory of the unalienable area within which the right to free speech may be claimed is at least original even if, in your judgment, it is not valid.

If you could read it perhaps we might make this the occasion for a lunch some day again for I do sorely miss you.

Cordially yours,

Charles

C. A. Siepmann
Chairman

cas/bf
enc.

Call
Lunch on
Friday
Century

Siepmann, Charles A

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

TELEPHONE: SPRING 7-2000

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
February 2, 1949

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Ed:

The Oxford Press are querying me about industry reactions to my book. The man who deals with me, a Mr. William Oman, seems to know Ackerman and would appreciate his comments. I have told him that I have sent you a copy of the draft and that as a friend I look to you for more exacting and more pitiless criticism than I could get from any stranger. I have said I'd pass your comments on to him and also mentioned that you had said that you thought you could get more competent reaction within CBS than that of Ackerman's. What all this amounts to is that I'd be very grateful if you could let a few responsible people look at the early chapters with a view to eliciting their comment on the fairness and accuracy of what I have said. I suggest that only the chapters up to and through that on the listening public need be passed on. The BBC chapter and that on propaganda lie, I think, beyond the competence of CBS to judge.

How are you and where are you? I have missed you lately on the air and last time I heard you you were in Washington. Let's lunch together soon if you are inclined.

Cordially yours,

Charles

C. A. Siepmann
Chairman

cas/bf

Siepmann, C. A.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

TELEPHONE: SPRING 7-2000

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
September 22, 1948

Miss Joan Platoff
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Miss Platoff:

In the rush of getting back from the country, I am afraid I was discourteous enough not to send you a note of very warm thanks for your own letter of September 15 and the enclosures you kindly forwarded. I am most grateful to you for being so considerate.

You will by now, I expect, have received the manuscript of the book but I realise that Ed is still abroad and do not expect any early reaction to it. But do get him to call me up when he gets back just to say hello and to arrange a get together.

Sincerely yours,

C. A. Siepmann

C. A. Siepmann
Chairman

cas/bf

Siepman, Chas.

September 15, 1948

Mr. Charles Siepmann
Newfane, Vermont

Dear Mr. Siepmann:

The research material on soap opera has come through in Mr. Murrow's absence. I am sending it on to you in the belief that you would want it as soon as possible. I am sorry that the available information is fairly meager.

Mr. Murrow had held your letter pending the arrival of the enclosed information, and now that he has left for a week in Germany, it will be brought to his attention once more upon his return to the office.

Sincerely yours,

Newfane
Vt.

9. 4. 48

Dear Ed.

I was delighted and encouraged by your wire – except the last sentence in which my fond hope of seeing you + Janet foundered. I'm nearing the half-way point in the book. I'll not get much more done up here as I must prepare lectures (I have to take 5 two hour courses weekly this fall). Fair copies are being typed up and within the next 2 weeks, I guess, I'll fire the stuff at you. I'm really overjoyed that you're prepared to take a hand yourself in keeping me on the tracks. I've enjoyed writing much of the stuff and am intensely interested in what you think

open study which CBS commissioned the Chicago Public Opinion Research Center to do. Is it available?

We have no set up here that works, so I've missed you since July. Have you had no vacation.

It will be good to see you. My nerves are under control. God knows what New York will do to them.

Our love to you both

Charles

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feeling that it was o
on your time and

Anyhow you're
and provided one re
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however of the prospe
to New York. Bless

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Opera. Radio Research
to be the qualified by no
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2.) where I can get the e
promised a copy (earli

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becoming an imposition
nd a bore to you.)
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less you.
nwhile do me ~~want to~~ one favor?
research findings on soap
arch 1942 probably has
y now. I'd like to know
it's out of date
e latest data. I was
earlier this year) of a soap

Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

F 549

OFFICE COMMUNICATION

..ss Platoff

From Mr. Reeve

Station Research

copy of info here sent to Supreme

September 16, 1948

The Reference Department passed Mr. Murrows requests concerning serial drama data on to me. Here is the best information I have from Research Department sources:

1. Research in the area of daytime serials has not been extensive since the large studies of 1942-43 by CBS and others. I am sending you a copy of "Radio's Daytime Serial", which digests in popular form the major results of the CBS studies.

2. Radio Research 1942-43 contains some findings which I think will still stand up.

3. A copy of the study commissioned by CBS: The Radio Daytime Serial: A Symbolic Analysis, is enclosed.

4. Some more recent articles and data are as follows:

   A. "The People Look At Radio", by Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Harry Field, Univ. of No. Carolina Press, 1946 pp 49 - 53.

   B. Fortune Magazine, March 1946: Soap Operas

   C. "Soapland", by James Thurber published in the New Yorker magazine:

   May 15, 1948 p.34
   May 29, 1948 p.30
   June 12, 1948 p.48
   July 3, 1948 p.40
   July 24, 1948 p.63

   These articles, while semi-serious in tone, contain the results of a lot of obviously intensive digging.

5. Essentially, research into the daytime serial has revealed no real psychological differences between listeners and non-listeners. Serial drama listeners seem to be normal, everyday people with a certain predelection for radio listening per se -- they listen to everything on the radio more than do non-serial drama listeners. There seems to be no evidence of any harmful or anti-social effects produced by serial drama listening.

   The problem of what makes one person listen to serials and another avoid them is not solved, but neither has it been solved in exhibited preferences for other types of radio, written or visual material where personal tastes are involved.

SR

Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

OFFICE COMMUNICATION

To ~~Miss Abrams - 13~~

From ~~E. R. Murrow - 17~~

Station

September 7, 1948

What are the latest research findings on Soap Opera?

In what respects is Radio Research 1942 out of date?

Where is the latest data available? (Names of organizations or individuals to contact, with names of articles, etc.)

May I have a copy of the soap opera study which CBS commissioned the Chicago Public Opinion Research Center to do?

And anything else you consider pertinent to the latest theories on the subject -- would like literature where available, or at least exact titles and information as to where the stuff can be obtained.

Many, many thanks - hope you're not too confused.

Sincerely yours,

Joan Platoff - Murrow Office

P. S. He'd like it at once, if not sooner - well, at least by next week!

Seifmann, Chas.

AUGUST 24, 1948

CHARLES SEIFMANN
MENPAIR
VERMONT

WOULD BE DELIGHTED AND HONORED TO READ MANUSCRIPTS AND WILL GET LYMAN AND OTHERS TO DO LIKEWISE STOP AFRAID NO CHANCE OF GETTING TO VERMONT THIS SUMMER REGARDS AND LOVE

ED MURROW

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

TELEPHONE: SPRING 7-2000

Newfane
Vt.

Dear Ed,

Janet, I remember, once consoled me over our rare get-together by saying that there would be a chance for friendship when you came to see us here in Vermont during the summer. Is it an illusory hope, or can we conceivably count on having you for a night or two? We have ample room and oh! such a longing for reunion. Come if you can. I miss you.

I've been up here since July writing another book, as a way of earning the much needed $1000 I forfeited by not teaching summer school. It's a text book for college radio courses - on radio's social implications - but planned for a much wider reading public. It's a dreary job but the quickest book I can write to earn the money I need. Being a text-book it's not provocative as was Radio's Second Chance. At least not quite so! I want to be both fair + accurate. Which makes me eager to discover someone in radio who would help by reading + commenting on chapters in a friendly and constructive way, as also by

giving me facts I need. You're obviously far too busy, though God knows there's no one I'd so much welcome at my elbow. A Lyman occurred to me, but I don't know. Have you any suggestions? I'd be grateful if you'd give it a thought.

Writing is hard up here. I so much prefer digging and terrace walling! Also writing it all in long hand takes hours.

Here's the mail man. I must rush. Our love to you all. I do very really miss you and old days. How are you? What's cooking? I'm gloriously out of touch!

Bless you
Charles

Siepmann, Chas

April 19, 1948

Dear Mr. Siepmann:

In Mr. Murrow's absence I am acknowledging your letter of April 9th, and am enclosing the script of his April 8th broadcast which you requested.

Sincerely yours,

Dorothy McDonough
Secretary

Mr. Charles Siepmann
New York University
School of Education
Washington Square
New York 3, New York

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

TELEPHONE: SPRING 7-2000

DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATIONS
April 9, 1948

Mr. Edward Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Ed:

I'd be most grateful if you'd slip me a copy of your talk last night, Thursday, April 8. I thought you handled this passport problem with your usual intelligence.

Sincerely yours,

Charlie

C. A. Siepmann
Chairman

cas/bf

Siepmann, Charles

7

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26 WASHINGTON PLACE
NEW YORK 3, N.Y.

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Professor of Motion Pictures
Bernard E. Hughes
Instructor in Education
Edgar S. Tilton
Secretary, College of Medicine

3. 31. 48

Dear Ed.

I was too lazy to rush to the telephone last night. So you must have a letter to add to your fan mail. You did nobly. You pulled no punches and the effect was electrifying. It ~~was~~ made me realize how rare it is now to hear someone "speak out loud and bold", how much it does to restore one's sense of purpose + of belonging. I happen to agree with you but I should have been grateful even if I had disagreed. It was a superb broadcast and I was proud of you. But Lord! how you must have suffered at your sponsor. To have to end + to hear that unlovely voice drool on – of all things – about Franco – American macaroni!! The bathos of the juxtaposition of those words with what you'd said about Franco + the U.S.! We didn't know whether to laugh or cry. Janey laughed, but the tears were in her eyes. When did you get the slides?

When can you come to dinner? Have you a Sunday free before you go? Sophie Marshall is simply anxious to meet you again & we want to fix an evening.

from June 14, 1947

CBS EXECUTIVE OFFICES

to: Mr. Murrow

Siepmann's proposal -- which I read with considerable interest and am returning herewith -- seems to me to be ideally suited for Foundation support in one of the university FM stations. Aside from the cost of such an undertaking, we face one very difficult problem and that involves CBS Station Relations and to a lesser extent, Sales.

No affiliate I know of would welcome Columbia in any such experiment because to the extent that we were successful we would be competing with our own network output and taking circulation away from a CBS affiliate. Similar conditions would motivate our network advertisers to complain.

There are ways to circumvent these two road blocks. The obvious approach is to seek a non-CBS market. If that were possible, I would want to hear how Siepmann plans to handle the following:

1. Programs - who provides them and how much they cost.

2. Program Promotion - what or how is this to be done and at what cost.

3. Audience Research - without some reliable gauge, how will we know the outcome of 1 and 2.

If Siepmann has definite plans we might discuss them further with him. However, I am convinced we should not be identified directly with this idea because it will cost much more if we are connected with it officially.

Frank Stanton

cs

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY FILM LIBRARY

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Professor of Motion Pictures
Bernard E. Hughes
Instructor in Education
Edgar S. Tilton
Secretary, College of Medicine

SPRING 7-2000; EXT.
SPRING 7-6724

June 3, 1947.

Mr. Edward Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Ed,

I have a project to suggest to you. It occurs to me that it might be of special interest to CBS for two reasons. You have always shown special interest in research and you have pioneered, as has no other network, in the field of public service. As far as I know, no concerted effort has yet been made to see how audiences for public service programs can be increased to a point at which they might prove tempting to a sponsor. With FM coming along and with it the prospects of increased competition, there is surely a need to foster and develop sizeable audiences in a wider range of differential fields of interest. The project I have in mind has reference to this problem.

Is it conceivable that we might consider a five year experiment in the deliberate promotion of interest in and attention to a selected range of programs in the educational and public service fields through the joint action of a network and a selected control community? Take Schenectady for instance. Here is a city of a manageable size, with a homogeneous community and active citizens' groups. My thought is that we should move into such a community, and enlist the cooperation primarily of the schools but also of civic groups (Chamber of Commerce, Labor Unions, etc.) and see if we could organize regular listening to a select list of programs which could be integrated with the activities and interests of the community both in and out of school. The organization need not, I think, be elaborate or the expense anything but modest. One organizer with a secretary and a modest budget for promotional activities might indeed prove sufficient.

The whole purpose would be to get the community acting on its own steam. Over five years it might be possible to prove something interesting as to the speed at which and the extent to which interest could be shifted permanently to new fields of interest. You will ~~note~~ know from our many discussions that what I am after is the beginning of collaborative effort between radio and groups in the community concerned with a more rapid advance toward civics and educational mat~~erial~~ unity.* I remain convinced that much more could be done than is at present realized in this ~~eating~~ speeding up process, given a sincere desire for cooperative effort on the part of the radio industry and of responsible social groups. A five year test should at least give us some valuable evidence. At best it might set a precedent of exceptional importance not only to educators but, who knows, to the future revenue of the radio industry itself. I don't think I am crazy in anticipating that unless we develop a wider range of differential interests among listeners, the increased competition which FM is likely to bring about may well result in reduced earnings for any given station.

This is, of course, the barest outline of the project. If you think your people would find it of any interest, I should be delighted if we could discuss it further.

Cordially yours,

Charles

C. A. Siepmann
Director

CAS/rcd

* Combined with this would be an effort to induce non listeners who "despise" radio to discover in it matter of genuine interest to them.

Siepmann, Charles

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
485 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

May 26, 1947

Dear Charles:

Here are a few random suggestions on the matter we discussed on the telephone the other day.

As ever yours,

COPY

Mr. Charles Siepmann
The New York University Film Library
Press Annex Building
26 Washington Place
New York, New York

dm

C B S

THE EAGLE'S BROOD 3/5/47

OPEN LETTER 7/24/43

A LONG LIFE AND A MERRY ONE 4/4/47

ASSIGNMENT HOME (especially "The Biggest Crime" 5/26/46)

OPERATION CROSSROADS 5/5/46

REPORT ON HUNGER 4/18/46

YOU AND ALCOHOL (11/12/46 - 2/11/47)

BEFORE THEIR TIME (Highway Safety) 1/7/47 and 4/15/47

THE CASE AGAINST CANCER (produced by CBC) 4/26/47

A B C

WE THE GUILTY (6 weeks June & July 1946) Juvenile delinquency

THE SHAME OF THE PEOPLE (U.S. election apathy) November, 1946.

SCHOOL TEACHER 1947, February (3 broadcasts)

UNHAPPY BIRTHDAY (Hiroshima anniversary) August, 1946

SLUMS 5/20/47

C. Siepmann

Dear Ed. Siepmann, Chas.

Tell me if this at all serviceable. If not, let him.

Call me, if you can. It has to be in by Friday. I'll call you

Charles

THE PASSING OF A VOICE

If a million listeners - two, three, four million - protested, would radio respond? When do we constitute that mythical "public" which radio claims gets what it wants? The question has relevance for those millions who, though they don't know it yet, are to hear Raymond Swing, as regular news commentator, for the last time on January 25. Heard for months past on "sustaining time", his contract has not been renewed. ABC has failed to find him a sponsor. Thus ends a broadcasting career so distinguished as to invite grateful analysis.

Raymond Swing was first heard in this country in 1935. He has been on the air ever since. His audience has ranged from 3 to 8 millions according to the convenience of the time of his broadcast and the frequency of his presence at the microphone. He came to radio a seasoned journalist. "I have held," he says, "every job there is on a newspaper outside the business office". He knew Europe intimately. What is more, he understood it. But he knew and understood more than a mere segment of the globe. With the capacity of a trained observer he combined that faculty "to see life steadily and see it whole" which is wisdom.

Beyond this he met the peculiar and exacting demands of radio. Though his voice was not ideal, he conveyed a burning sincerity which produced in the listener the illusion, appropriate if not essential to broadcasting, that he or she was being spoken to personally and in private. He disdained to curry favor. He never heistated to speak out. His appeal was always to our conscience and, though we might wince, we could not protest, for we knew that he spoke from his own troubled concern about the world. It was this, perhaps above all else that made for that intimacy which he achieved with listeners and which was reflected in the hundreds of letters he received.

But a man's performance is to be measured not only by his qualifications and skills but by his conception of his task. Raymond Swing conceived of broadcasting as a Herculean labor. He was tormented, almost, by the sense of his responsibility. "When broadcasting first began", he says, "it seemed to offer a promise of democratic enlightenment

such as surpassed the dreams of a Jefferson. But what has been accomplished, good as it is, is almost miserably inadequate to the need and falls miserably short of the opportunity. The world is plunging forward to unprecedented dangers, and it is only understanding and citizen control that can save it. We have all the paraphernalia of adult education and use only a fraction of it. It seems to me the task of broadcasting to make news analysis listenable, to devote all its skill and imagination to it. With the best, and with the public listening, the world may still be lost. But without it it is almost sure to be". Radio, as he saw it, was "born great". He set himself to serve it greatly.

Intimate and personal as was his manner, he yet conveyed, like a great actor, the tragic implication of the drama unfolding before us on the stage of the contemporary world. None surpassed and very few even approximated his capacity to "think like a wise man but communicate in the language of the people". His loss to broadcasting is irreparable and will be felt by many listeners, who never saw him, as personal.

The circumstances of Raymond Swing's departure prompt anxious reflection on the state of news analysis in radio at the present time. His own estimate of what radio can do to save us from disaster may be too high. But no-one who surveys the list of regular news analysts on the four networks today can question that the radio industry's conception of its duty is low to the point of irresponsibility. What regular interpretation of the news are we now getting? Here are the facts. On NBC the only commentator heard more than once a week between the hour of 6:00 P.M. and 11:15 P.M. is Mr. Kaltenborn; on ABC Elmer Davis and Earl Godwin; on Mutual, Fulton Lewis, Henry J. Taylor and Gabriel Heatter. CBS has a policy which, theoretically at least, precludes personal comment by its news staff, though Edward Murrow, for one, devotes a portion of his broadcast to interpretation.

Are these men adequate in numbers to ensure "understanding and citizen control"? Do they represent a fair balance of political outlook? How many of them are qualified by experience and ability to weigh the implications of world events? The conclusion of one who has listened to them all is that they are inadequate in number, lacking, as a group, in

experience and ability, and wholly unrepresentative as a cross section of responsible opinion. To say this is not to attack the men themselves but the policy which determines their presence on the air.

People are hungry for news over the radio. They rate it higher, even, than entertainment as a service. But news and news analysis alike have come increasingly to be regarded by the industry as a commodity, dependent for its place in broadcast schedules on the whim of the sponsors. Only a sponsored news analyst has assurance of the prime prerequisite of service to the listener - a regular time at a reasonable hour. No network has had the public spirit to keep a news analyst on the air at a decent hour for a sufficient time to build an audience. Raymond Swing's own experience is worth citing. "I would build up a good listening public and the business office would sell it to somebody for an entertainment program. In 1938 I was allowed to broadcast twice a week (Munich) and in 1939 three times. But the hours were changed at shortest notice, as I was only sustaining". As soon as he had a sponsor he wasn't moved and 10 o'clock became so much "his" period that two detective novels used someone listening to his program as alibis! "Unless a program can be sold", Swing says, "it is an orphan in the network family. Nobody pays much attention to it, no conscience is shown as to whether it is being carried throughout the country, its broadcast time is changed, and it is not promoted as a public service".

News analysis, in other words, like radio writing in general is, as Norman Rosten has said, "simply an adjunct of advertising. The word is fitted to the product. The product is God. The word is the interval between the announcements of God". That such considerations should determine the policies of a medium which transcends all others in its range and, who knows, its influence on intelligent opinion, is deplorable. The times are perilous. The need for news analysis is greater, not less, than it was. To say that listeners are not receptive to such programs is to say what is not proven or even tested. "Before I shall agree", says Mr. Swing, "that the public will not listen to a wise discussion of world affairs, I should like to have it offered a year's constant access to it. If

the public were to be offered first class news analysis, in the peak listening period, I remain to be convinced that it would turn it off".

Those who are concerned over this state of affairs should be warned against looking elsewhere for action. It is probably beyond the present powers of the FCC to step in. It may even be undesirable that it should. This is a matter between radio and its listeners, that vast, unorganised public which - until it organises - is likely to continue to receive short measure. Raymond Swing is lost to us. Who will be the next? Here is something for men of liberal persuasion (Raymond Swing's listeners among them) to think and do something about.

-C. A. Siepmann-

Sloane, Al

12/1/52

Mr. M,

Allan Sloane called to add that he had learned Nick's Serial Number...RA12337666.

Also, he talked with Henry Wefing who said "can do" on Herman.

dm

Alla

December 1

DEAR ED:

RE the reprise on "Between the Dark and the Daylight" I'm working on for UN Radio: I've tracked down all the kids I had on the show and setting up interviews all over the US. However, one of them is beyond my reach: he's NICK, the GI Mascot. As you may have guessed, he's in Korea, a corporal with the 40th Infantry— further facts unknown. I've contacted Mr. Weffing in an effort to have Geo. Herman unreel some tape on him. You remember the approach we took to the NICK section of the show. . .he was the kid who said "If it wasn't for the GI's I wouldn't of had nuttin, no home, no food, no clothes, no nuttin'." And he had a thing or two to say about war, too. It "bombed my home, killed my mudder, my fadder. . ." Also he defined happiness as "You're happy, you got your home, you got what you need, you happy," and defined "Tomorrow" as "the next day what's gonna come." A sassy little kid in a cut-down GI uniform, picked up by the GI's when they liberated the camps, left behind when they moved out ------ now a soldier of the United Nations . Quite a story, and I hope to use it in a quiet way as the hard core, perhaps even the climax, of the show. Would you, if your schedule permits the squeeze-in, and the Herman idea comes through, chat about the spot a little with George? My phone extension at PL-4-1234 (UN) is 2873, if you need further.

Meantime — best of everything. Everything.

Allan

Allan Sloane

PS: Alternative: how can I get to Korea?

Sloane, Allan

January 30, 1951

Dear Allan:

Thanks for yours of the 1st; I hope you will forgive me for the delay in replying. I have been somewhat beaten down with a cold and bad throat and am taking a week off. Maybe we can talk about possibilites when I get back.

As ever yours,

Mr. Allan Sloane
17 East 97th Street
New York, New York

(Signed in Mr. Murrow's absence)

17 E. 97th Street
N.Y. 29

January 1, 1950

Mr. Ed Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue

Dear Ed:

I was serious, the other day, when I said I wanted to ask you for a job on the big show. It's a little difficult to do this, though, since if I were applying to anybody else I'd put your name down as a reference.

But this tells the story:

News: 1935-39, New York Post, Boston Transcript, Providence Journal. Street, desk, city desk.

1939-43 Army. Infantry, then Public Relations.

Radio: 1943--- Everything. Especially: 43-45, Transatlantic Call, bridging understanding between U.S. & Britain. Report to the Nation, which for 3 months I produced and wrote for Paul White, later writing spots. Have done, as you know, my own reporting-writing-directing-producing-engineering tape jobs, here and overseas.

General: Have been in every state of U.S., Canada, Mexico, Alaska, England, France, Holland, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Greece. Know my way around Washington, Lake Success, Police HQ, etc.

Specific: Know a story, know radio, know how to ask questions and put the answers together to make radio. Have done many shows like this one, and honestly think I would be a value.

I would really appreciate a talk, Ed, either with you or with your blessing vis-a-vis Fred, whom I do not know. I'd like to work out, rather than a staff job, a kind of outside free-lance arrangement, whereby I'd be the extra all-round workhorse. Finally, what you don't know about me and what I can't say for myself, anybody else will, from Ed Scott thru Lee Otis and Johnny Aarons all the way down to the boys in the tape-room.

In all sincerity,

Allan Sloane

P.S. It has just occurred to me that the one way in which I might well serve is also indicated in my experience and work. And that is, as a person who can talk to G.I.'s. I used to do Man Behind the Gun, originated Sound Off, proudly wear the title Private, 47th Infantry, 9th Divisio and get along swell with soldiers. I think more and more that kind of material will be used in radio from here on o and I'd be proud to help be the G.I.'s spokesman or speak-through-er.

AES

Sloane Allan

June 8, 1948

Dear Allan:

Thanks for the note. I will make an opportunity to have a word with Taylor. 'Twas a pleasure to work with you.

As ever yours,

Mr. Allan Sloane
250 West 85th Street
New York, New York.

Sloane, Allan

June 4, 1948

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York City, 22, N.Y.

Dear Ed:

In all the spate of letters and phone calls and congratulations of one kind and another that have come in since the program, I remember best and cherish most two words, which you said. Coming from you they are an accolade, because you are a newspaperman and I like to call myself one. You called the show "good copy." That means most to me.

And so, Ed, this is my formal thanks for a job most excellently done. I was jealous of my own words, and anxious over what my kids would sound like with another grownup talking to and with them, another than I. I think now, having heard the thing once again, that you were the one person who could have brought even more to the words than I had put in them. And you did.

You are very busy and tapering toward your well-earned "hiatus." I've hesitated to bother you. . .and after all, I had only vague ideas of possible subjects for exploration. I have sort of decided, though, that I would like to get in on what they are calling, on 18, "new thinking" on the documentary unit. I think I'd do well for CBS there. And if you see fit, would you talk to Dave Taylor about it?

Again, Ed -- that very meagre word --

Thanks.

Allan

Allan

CBS NEWS
485 Madison Avenue
New York City 22
New York
PLaza 1-2345

SMALL WORLD

Guests: Edward Crankshaw, from Sandhurst, England
Barbara Ward Jackson, from Honolulu, Hawaii
Adlai Stevenson, from San Francisco, California

Producers: Edward R. Murrow
Fred W. Friendly

as broadcast over the
CBS TELEVISON NETWORK

February 22, 1959 ---------- 6:00 to 6:30 pm EST.

2.

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UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

YUkon 6-2424

March 18, 1965

My dear Sir Edward!

Why is it I am always the last to hear the important news? At all events, I have finally caught up with your most recent recognition and send you this belated word of congratulation.

But I would rather hear that you were out of the hospital and ready for a long walk and a long talk with an old admirer.

Bless you, my dear and distinguished friend, and much love to Janet.

Yours,

Adlai

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
1 West 72nd Street
New York City

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

1960 NOV 14 PM 10 55

SF-1201

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LT = International Letter Telegram

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

KLA353 KL-NA629

PD VIA N KL NEW YORK NY 14 NFT MR AND MRS EDWARD R MURROW, COLUMBIAA BROADCASTING SYSTEM

485 MADISON AVE NYK

HOPE YOU CAN HAVE COCKTAILS WITH ME AT SAVOY HILTON SUITE 1734 WEDNESDAY FROM SIX TO EIGHT. RSVP MISS SCHORR, MURRAY HILL 8-5600

ADLAI E STEVENSON.

Adlai Stevenson

September 22, 1960

Dear Adlai:

Thanks for yours of December 19th. I am, of course, disappointed, but am nonetheless grateful to you for giving the project consideration.

Hope to see you when next you are in New York.

As ever yours,

Mr. Adlai E. Stevenson
135 South La Salle Street
Chicago, Illinois

ADLAI E. STEVENSON
135 So. LaSalle Street
Chicago

September 19, 1960

Dear Ed:

I have thought about your invitation for the night before the election and concluded that it would not be convenient for me. It seems very likely now that I shall have to finish the campaign at a meeting that night in California.

You were good to think of me and I am flattered and also disappointed that I cannot accept.

Cordially yours,

Adlai

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Adlai Stevenson

August 31, 1960

Dear Governor ~~Dewey~~ STEVENSON:

Pursuant to our brief conversation regarding an Election Eve television appearance by you and Governor Stevenson, I enclose a brief memorandum on the subject.

As you will note the suggested format is flexible. I am confident that if you and Governor Stevenson agree in principle to this meeting, we can work out details to everyone's satisfaction.

Having discussed this proposal with a few of my colleagues, I am more than ever convinced that such a confrontation will represent a real service to our country.

If you would send me your thoughts regarding the attached, I should be grateful.

Sincerely yours,

Governor Thomas E. Dewey
Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby,
Palmer & Wood
40 Wall Street
New York, New York

ERM:gw
encl

MEMORANDUM

August 31, 1960

To: Governor Adlai E. Stevenson and Governor Thomas E. Dewey
From: Edward R. Murrow

Subject: The Dewey-Stevenson Debate

Time: 8-9 P.M., E.S.T., November 7th, C.B.S. Television and Radio

Manner of Presentation: Live - Unrehearsed - No audience - A Chairman, could be Murrow, whose function would merely be brief introductions and time keeping.

Statement of the Issue: "Resolved that the election of a Democratic (Republican) Administration tomorrow will best serve the interests of the United States and the Free World."

Division of Time: I would suggest 15 minute opening statements by both participants to be followed by 10 minutes of rebuttal, this in turn to be followed by 5 minutes of rebuttal or alternatively 10 minutes of free-wheeling conversation.

Location: A library type studio set in New York, Chicago, or any other mutually acceptable place.

Sponsorship: Not yet determined, but if sponsorship is accepted, it will be of an unobtrusive, institutional nature subject to your approval.

Honorarium: $10,000 to each participant or to such charity or organization as he may designate.

Note: I know you both too well to believe that any turgid eloquence by me would influence your decision. However, I should like to say again that I can think of no more effective or fruitful use of an hour's television time on the eve of the election. We would purpose to provide maximum advance publicity for this program, which would have in my opinion, a larger audience, with possible exception of the first meeting of the two candidates, than any other program in the course of the campaign.

4-B-19

TELEVISION FEATURE

CBS Television Network
485 Madison Ave., New York 22, N.Y.

October 26, 1960

THIS IS THE ELEPHANT THAT STARTED THE TRUCK THAT PULLED THE VEHICLE THAT CARRIED THE BUS THAT GOT TO THE HOUSE WHERE ADLAI WAS

A massive key figure in putting the CBS News "Presidential Countdown" interview with Adlai E. Stevenson on the CBS Television Network Monday night (Oct. 24) was a seven-ton elephant. "A strictly non-political pachyderm," to quote producer Warren Bush.

The "Arabian Nights" tale began when a mobile video-tape unit -- a converted bus dispatched from Atlanta, Ga., to handle the Stevenson interview on the Southern Pines, N.C., farm of Mr. Stevenson's sister, Mrs. Ernest Ives -- broke down while still 375 miles away from its destination. Bush promptly hired a giant house-moving truck-trailer, loaded his bus aboard, and highballed north to Southern Pines. But the rudimentary sand road to the Ives farm proved too much for the big truck. Bush hired a tow truck to pull his trailer-truck, and the tow truck bogged down, too. Enter the elephant.

Providentially, a traveling circus pulled into the motor lodge where the "Countdown" crew was billeted. In a flash of inspiration, Bush hired the elephant to start the tow truck to pull the trailer-truck to carry the video-tape bus to the Ives farm.

The whole impossible house-that-Jack-built caravan was a worthy demonstration of a "Presidential Countdown" promise to "go where the people are, no matter where they are" to cover the election story.

* * *

4-R-26

April 19, 1960

Dear Mr. Garth:

Your letter of April 8th was received at this office in Mrs. Murrow's absence. I regret that since Mrs. Murrow is traveling abroad and will not be returning to the States for several months, she will not be able to reply to your letter.

Sincerely yours,

Gabrielle Wachsner
Secretary

Mr. David Garth, Chairman
Stevenson for President Committee
929 Madison Avenue
New York 21, New York

YU 8-3939

STEVENSON FOR PRESIDENT COMMITTEE
of New York

929 MADISON AVENUE • NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

April 8, 1960

Mrs. Edward R. Murrow
~~580 Park Avenue~~
New York, New York

Dear Mrs. Murrow,

Adlai E. Stevenson can be nominated and elected President of the United States this year. We are confident that a substantial, but as yet unorganized majority of Americans, acknowledge instinctively the urgent need for the quality of leadership which only he can provide in the critical 60's.

Governor Stevenson has made clear that he is not seeking the nomination; he has made equally clear, in response to newsmen's questions, that he will accept a draft. For this reason a fast growing nucleus of active pro-Stevenson New Yorkers is now in operation, and in the coming months it will put its case before the voters of this State. To assist in this difficult task an advisory panel of leading citizens, sympathetic to the candidacy of Adlai E. Stevenson, is in formation. Your association with us in this way will be most persuasive, and we cordially invite you to join it.

In the event that you have any questions regarding our membership, our present activities or our plans, we shall be happy to answer them. We look forward to your support.

Sincerely yours,
David Garth
Arthur I. Blaustein
David Garth, Chairman
Arthur I. Blaustein, Executive Director

DG/ms

Stevenson, Adlai

ADLAI E. STEVENSON
University of Louisville
Louisville, Kentucky
Wednesday, May 21, 1958

I thought at first, a little ambitiously, of talking about some of the great dynamics, the massive forces, of our times: the explosive growth of our population and its consequences a few years hence, America's enormous social capital needs for education, health, water supply, transportation, urban renewal, resource development, etc; I thought of talking about the nuclear arms race and man's ability to create but not to control the means of his self-extermination.

I think James Thurber summed it all up:

> "Man is flying too fast for a world that is round. Soon he will catch up with himself, in a great rear-end collision, and Man will never know that what hit Man from behind was Man."

But while pondering these subjects for tonight's lecture, I read about the rising anti-American incidents in Lebanon, Algeria, Haiti, and the violent demonstrations against Mr. Nixon which were the culmination of his ill-starred trip to South America. As usual, we blamed it on the Communists. But the comments in the South American press were different, and I was reminded again of the easy way we have of blaming all our misfortunes on Communist plots. Sometimes I think the subtlest and greatest damage the Communists do us is by affording us such a convenient excuse for everything that goes wrong.

Obviously the important thing for Americans to ponder these days, and Nixon's disastrous trip points it up, is that anti-American feeling is so great anywhere, let alone among our next door neighbors, that it could erupt with such bitterness and violence, with or without Communist help. And we won't cure such a situation by a good-will tour that invites demonstrations of ill-will, nor by brandishing our

military might. Didn't our government know the situation? And if not, why not? But if it did, why did Nixon go to South America and risk a fiasco which has cost us so dearly and given the Communists another gigantic propaganda victory.

Obviously these ugly outbursts are a warning and a symptom of troubles that we can ignore and gloss over no longer. We have lived long enough in the foolish and agreeable illusion that most of our problems and even peace and prosperity had been successfully mastered by the administration. Suddenly we have been rudely awakened by a series of unprecedented Soviet triumps -- the Sputniks and Soviet scientific achievements, their remarkable industrial growth; their foreign trade and aid challenge; their leadership toward nuclear weapons controls; and then our crisis over school integration and Little Rock; our sudden doubts about our vaunted educational system, the smoldering anti-American feeling that has been erupting lately, and finally, the severe economic recession here in the United States.

We are taking belated steps in science, defense, education to remedy some of these deficiencies, halting, uncertain steps, but steps all the same. But have we faced boldly, realistically, the grave economic crisis that confronts the Free World, especially our Atlantic world? I don't think so; and unless we do, and quickly, I think the survival of freedom is very precarious and the disorders of today only a preview of tomorrows discontent.

That's what I want to talk about -- an economic crisis that is much larger than the American recession.

Let me start ten years ago this summer when shipments were beginning to move to Europe under the most brilliantly successful program of post-war diplomacy -- the Marshall Plan, in which, by the way, your fellow townsman, Barry Bingham, played such a large and distinguished part.

A year of careful preparation by experts from all the Atlantic nations had preceded its launching. The scale of the emergency had been measured, its causes discerned, the most hopeful patterns for the future discussed and laid down. The crisis of 1947 which, left to itself, could have blasted European freedom, was arrested in time -- by vision, by forethought, and by a vast joint economic effort.

But today the Atlantic Powers have no great purposes in which we can all share. We are not engaged on any careful study of our situation. Our economies, far from working in high gear to achieve a joint strategy, are slack, confused and declining. This, under any circumstances, should be grave enough; but I fear this listlessness, this lassitude, these diplomatic platitudes covering a morass of Allied misunderstanding, are coinciding with a new economic crisis in our Atlantic world. It may not be so dramatic as that summer and fall of 1947, when, after a desperate winter, the gold and dollar reserves of Western Europe seemed to flow from an unquenchable wound. But I believe it may be more serious and more far reaching. I believe it spells more than the economic low point after a devastating war. Our new creeping crisis means the end of a whole economic order and opens the crucial question of what will take its place.

We are witnessing, I believe, the last stages of the old, world-wide, self-regulating, international trading and investment system which we in America have largely taken for granted. At the same time, as it recedes, we see, expanding, eager to take its place, the new Communist techniques of grants, gifts, loans, trade, aid, barter, technical assistance, raw materials at cost, or plain dumping, all bent to a single political purpose -- the reinforcement of Communist power.

And, to give this crisis its full dimensions, it is occurring just at a time when America's need for secure trade abroad and for steady access to foreign materials is growing in proportion to our soaring population and diminishing resources.

Moreover, the change comes at a time when the peoples of the world as a whole are demanding with more urgency and political pressure than ever before a larger share in the world's wealth. Back in 1953 I called this mood "the revolution of rising expectations." Today I would add an even more revolutionary crisis -- "the revolution of frustrated hope."

In short, we face forces of economic and political change each in itself able to shift radically the present pattern of international relations. Coming all at once, they threaten not a shift but a catastrophe.

Let us look at these forces a little more closely. We have inherited most of our ideas about the conduct of our foreign economic relations from the 19th Century -- the golden era of unfettered trade. And in spite of two world wars and the almost total disappearance of the old conditions, we still tend to react to problems raised by trade or foreign investment or balance of payment difficulties as though the old conditions still prevailed. We do this, I think, because we have only the faintest idea of what the conditions were. What we take for basic laws of economics were a happy conjuncture of particular economic and political conditions -- conditions which have now vanished.

Let me mention briefly one or two. When America started to trade with the world, most of what we now call "the uncommitted areas" were administered and policed by the Colonial powers. The New World enjoyed the protection of the Monroe Doctrine and the British Navy. China was in eclipse and Europe, including Russia, was immobilized for nearly a century by an effective balance of power. Our framework of world trade was thus one of unprecedented security and order provided in the main by others. So we assumed it was normal and would look after itself.

Let me digress to say that even today, after two wars, we still tendto hanker for a world system that will run itself and leave us to get on with our own business. Deep in our hearts I think we Americans have two profound wishes -- that the Communists will silently vanish away, and then that our allies will obligingly do the same. But no vital question can be decided rationally or effectively if we do not accept our involvement in the world as a basic fact. And this is the more compelling because one thing you don't find is a really isolationist Communist. For them the decision is made and the commitment total. Their field of operation is world wide.

Within this 19th Century framework of political stability -- within it the new economic forces of expanding industrialism were also, in large measure, self-stabilizing. The essence of any international trading system is, of course, that buyers can sell and sellers can buy and that their transactions will balance at a high and sustained level. I mention this truism simply because so many devotees of foreign trade in our great country only wish to sell and regard foreigners' efforts to do the same as an unwarranted intrusion on the rights of free Americans.

The old system worked well and easily because it tended naturally to produce a balance between sellers and buyers. The pioneer industrializers -- Britain, the Low Countries, and for a time, France -- did not fence off their markets with high tariffs. They looked overseas for growing purchases of food and raw materials. They were exporters of capital and these balancing factors meant that the biggest sellers of the day were also formidable buyers. In these circumstances, the ups and downs in foreign trade -- the debts which had to be settled in gold -- were neither large nor enduring. And we should, perhaps, notice that the automatic working of the gold standard put pressure on both debtors and creditors to bring them back into balance.

Now this is not irrelevant historical analysis. It is a shorthand attempt to explain the conditions under which unfettered, expanding, international trade occurred. Tariffs

were low or absent. Overseas investment was massive. For Britain the customary figure was 7 per cent of its national income -- the equivalent today for America of perhaps $28 billion a year in outside investment -- which is twice the Marshall Plan each year, incidentally.

Much of that capital found its way to North America and was one of the jet propulsions behind our take-off into rapid industrialization. By buying and lending freely, the European Powers thus kept trade moving and, as a result, kept to a minimum the use of gold for settling current deficits.

This congenial system -- congenial in its apparent ability to run without intervention or guidance -- was dealt a hammer blow by the first World War. The old creditors -- Britain, France, Germany -- had been ravaged. New producers had grown up while they were laying each other waste. Their margins for massive lending were cut. Their ability to sell was cut. Tariff walls were rising everywhere. And they had hardly recovered their breath when the great depression flattened them again.

By hindsight we can now see that the chief factor of the twenties was not so much this growing eclipse of Europe but the emergence of America as the world's industrial giant. Here was a new phenomenon -- a nation able to satisfy most of its internal market, yet able to sell competitively abroad both manufactures and primary products. Inexorably it had moved to a central creditor position, but it was not forced by a variety of natural compulsions either to buy or lend freely abroad. With this phenomenon we have been struggling ever since.

The second World War would have completed the ruin of Britain, the Commonwealth and Western Europe if it had not been for a series of strokes of good fortune, flashes of insight, occasional brilliant strategy and a host of successful ad hoc solutions. These have helped us to move on without disaster since 1945. But like a series of temporary cures, they have left the main malady untreated. We have not

been thinking seriously of the new system which must take the place of the old. And we Americans have been specially tempted by the policy of expedients for they postpone the day when we squarely face the fundamental fact of a future, free world economy.

That fact is that unless we Americans make such a system work, actively and consistently, nobody else can or will.

Now let us take a quick look at the expedients that have kept us going since 1945. First, in 1944 we have the general policy worked out at Bretton Woods. Some of the economic leaders of the free world recognized certain preconditions of successful international commerce and attempted to meet them. At Bretton Woods they proposed the systematic lowering of tariffs, first in an international trade organization, and then under GATT, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs. They proposed to supplement international lending by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. And they noted that the reserves available to meet fluctuations in trade -- the responsibility of the old gold standard -- had hardly been adequate before the second World War and would quite certainly be much more inadequate thereafter. Britain, for instance, had run an unfavorable trade balance consistently between the Wars and covered it only by interest on its overseas loans. But these loans had now been liquidated to pay for the War.

(In passing perhaps it is worth noting the strange reversal of fortune: In the War, German assets in America were frozen because Germany was an enemy. Britain's American assets were sold or pledged in 1939 and 1940 to buy arms and to tool up our arms industry. But now, it seems righteous to the Administration to return Germany's assets, while, in the main, our British allies must be content with the memory of how they helped us to win the war!)

To return to the matter of working reserves, the Allies set up the International

Monetary Fund at Bretton Woods to tide over embarrassments arising from temporary imbalances in trade. The sum made available to the Fund in gold and dollars -- the crucial components -- was on the order of $2 billions.

Thus, the three main elements of 19th Century stability -- low tariffs, international lending and adequate trading reserves -- were analyzed or recognized and in some measure acted upon as the War drew to a close.

But I think we can now say that this framework, however rightly conceived, would have proved totally inadequate if it had not been for other policies and expedients pursued by the free nations.

I would like to suggest three factors which have enabled the nations of the free world to avoid disaster in the last decade. The first is the degree to which the old colonial powers have revived their earlier lending. The case of Belgium with its $1 billion development program in the Congo should be noted, though a large part of the inventment is, in fact, derived from bounding revenue in the Congo itself. But France has invested, largely from Metropolitan sources, on the order of $150 millions in French West and Equatorial Africa in the last decade. If the North African figure is added, the total is nearer $300 millions.

The British effort has been even more widespread. Total post war investment in Africa alone, public and private, including funds from local sources, is past the $1.5 billion mark. At the same time, India's first Five Year Plan was massively underpinned by the releases of India's sterling balances in London in the shape of war debts. Over $3 billions have been transferred in this fashion -- either to India or to Pakistan.

Thus a very large measure of international lending -- more than we in America recognize -- has been carried on by some of our partners. These transfers are, however, intimately bound up with the other two factors I want to mention. In the first

place, they have helped to bring about an unprecedented strain upon French and British reserves. In the second place, they could not have occurred at all without American underpinning.

It is, of course, clear that there is some measure of direct conflict between the policy of widespread international lending and the policy of building up reserves to tide one's trade over the ups and downs. To lend abroad is to create further demands on the national product and, if the demands are too high, inflation sets in, the internal market sucks in producing power needed for exports, imports rise and foreign exchange drains away. This has been a feature of both the French and British economies in the last decade.

Their reserves have been, in fact, quite inadequate for the work they have been made to do. This can be seen most forcefully from the case of Britain. Today, about 40 per cent of total world trade is conducted in sterling and the wide availability of sterling is insured by Britain's massive buying and lending. The country, in short, is behaving -- as of old -- like a creditor. The trouble is that it is not. It is a debtor. At the core of the system lies a hard currency reserve of only $2 billions of convertible currencies. Thus, just below half of the trade of the free world is balanced on funds about equivalent to those of the Ford Foundation. This is a remarkable and an exceedingly useful achievement, but it is desperately precarious. With $6 billions of sterling balances on deposit in London and only $2 billions to meet them in the last resort, Britain is forever at the mercy of a run on the bank.

Moreover, this British effort would have been impossible had it not been for the post-war policies pursued by the United States. Since 1945, the full implications of American economic dominance have become apparent. The great question has been whether America's policies would permit the old system of general international trade to flourish or not. What answer can we give? Let us remind ourselves once again of

what the old conditions were: low tariffs, high lending and reserves flexibly based upon gold.

On tariffs, we have a little progress to show -- some modest concessions to the fact that we produce 40% of the world's industrial goods. But our tariffs are high relatively to our economic strength and they are still complicated by a thousand harrassments in the shape of customs specifications and the like.

On the matter of flexible reserves, certainly we have nothing faintly resembling the system prevailing in the great days of free trade. We have neither allowed the price of gold to move freely in concert with the threefold rise in other commodities. Nor have we used the vast influx of gold for massive purchasing abroad to meet the rising internal demand. We have $22 billions of the world's gold reserves of $38 billions -- but they are insulated from our economy. There are some sound reasons for this, both internal and external, but they are as contrary to the old workings of free trade as are, say, the remaining British checks on full convertibility of sterling.

(We are all, in fact, in the position of proclaiming those bits of the old system which suit our present purposes while soundly berating our partners for their own reservations.)

But if our performance on the issues of tariffs and reserves has differed very widely from the classical free trade tradition, it cannot be denied that we have made good some of the deficiencies and amply fulfilled our responsibilities in the third key area -- that of lending abroad. I do not refer now to private lending, though this has been substantial in some directions -- for oil and mineral development, for instance, or for investment in Canada.

But the great flow of American lending of all sorts has been governmental and, since 1945, it has been the basic element in the expansion and prosperity of the free world. The aid extended under UNRRA at the end of the war, the sums disbursed

under military government in Europe, especially in Germany, the creative expenditure of the Marshall Plan, the subsequent billions each year under mutual security programs, the assistance given on various occasions to the Indian subcontinent -- all these various efforts which, by 1957, had reached the sum of $64 billions, an annual average of over $5 billions -- have generously fulfilled the obligation and self-interest of a creditor country.

In spite, indeed, of our persistently favorable balance of trade -- last year it was in the neighborhood of $7 billions -- we have made it possible by aid and by loans for the free world to trade with us, and even to increase their dollar reserves by some $6 billions. It was this solid underpinning alone that has kept the sterling area in being and has enabled France and Britain to continue as international lenders.

And before we leave this question of America's performance as the post-war pivot of the free world economy, I must add one further vital element -- the high prosperity maintained at home since 1945. The Communists may have scanned the horizon for an American recession as eagerly as the prophet of old looked for the cloud no bigger than a man's hand. Through a whole decade they had to search in a virtually cloudless sky as the American economy improved on all past performance, raised its growth rate from 3 to 4 per cent, doubled the average income of its people and drew the rest of the free world upwards in its wake.

Then the tide turned, and this is now the crucial fact. The plain truth is that today, in 1958, the elements of a functioning system which I have described are beginning to disintegrate. Either their inadequacies are becoming apparent, or their strength is being dissipated, or they have come up against road blocks.

That is why I say that virtually unprepared we are heading for a new crisis -- one no less dire than the crisis of 1947 and no less certain to lead to catastrophe unless we act in time. And today there is no aftermath of war to blame, no antecedent

turmoil and destruction. The world is rebuilt -- Europe has been operating at better levels than for thirty years. Trade has expanded all round the world. If we falter now, we cannot blame war or bad winters or the failure of harvests. We have the system itself to blame and the changes we need are not temporary expedients but a fundamental reform.

And if the system fails, if Western industrial capitalist economies can't maintain an effective trading system and steady growth, the implications in the cold war are obvious. And in that contest we have already lost so much ground in the last few years that we can't stand to lose much more.

Consider for a moment the vulnerability of our present position. The starting point must be the repercussions of our dragging, deteriorating recession here in America. Last year, the world's primary producers felt the first cold breath of decline. Their income fell by $750 millions in one year -- almost the equivalent of the whole free world aid program to Asia. Now in 1958 the blight shows signs of spreading. Sterling area exports as a whole are falling and presure on the central reserves must increase if import programs are to continue.

The argument is now advanced in England that the days of sterling lending and maintenance of world trade must give way to a stern program of building up reserves and high investment in Britain's own resources. If this policy prevails it will be the end of one of the few flexible international systems of working capital for day to day trade transactions. It also ends a sustained source of capital for the developing economies. It would mean, in short, the disruption of two of the essential mechanisms that have helped to maintain world progress and prosperity in the last decade. And if the British decide that they can no longer underpin development, we must at least be prepared for the French at some point to make a similar policy reversal.

In these conditions, there are no automatic alternatives. The International

Monetary Fund will not suddenly be able to create a substitute for sterling long-term lending and short-term banking. On the contrary, $560 millions of its reserves are already on loan to Britain.

Nor are the funds at the disposal of the World Bank going to increase because of cuts in the British system. Nor will this possible retreat of the British from their exposed position automatically compel the world's solid creditors -- America and Germany -- to change their course. Germany has deliberately chosen to use its massive American aid and its great national effort to rebuild itself and its reserves. These reserves are now over twice as large as Britain's, but there is no obligation on Germany to pursue a more expansive trading or credit policy.

But the central element of uncertainty in the free world's economy today is, inevitably, centered in its most powerful member. American policies will become even more crucial if Britain has to abdicate its post-war role in international banking and investment. And what can be honestly said of our understanding of our own decisive role? Of our realization that, far from being stable, the system itself is tottering and needs only a few more chance knocks to founder completely? I suggest that the gravest element in our current crisis is the lack of realization of the scale of the crisis or of the response needed.

I believe that in general terms our present attitudes towards world economic policy disclose a frightening disregard of reality, a dangerous unawareness of the implication of what we do. Organized lobbies use every pressure to secure higher tariff protection. The voices warning us that our own vital foreign trade and the expansion of the entire non-Communist world are involved in this issue can barely make themselves heard above the righteous declamations about the virtues of free enterprise from gentlemen who, at the same time, demand tariff subsidies and checks on free competition.

In the related field of foreign lending, there is the same lack of clear perspective. At best, we shall carry on as we do today -- with a lot of foreign military support and a little foreign investment as our grudging contribution to containing the Communists, although it bears little relation to our position as the world's greatest creditor and as a nation massively engaged in international trade.

As a result, all these programs which insure the necessary outflow of dollars from our economy have a provisional, even chaotic, character -- a little here, a little there, a program started, a program reduced -- following the rhythm not of need but of Communist pressure and the Congressional fever chart.

And, equally, they bear the stamp of the ephemeral. They could be gone tomorrow, we argue, if only the Communists would pipe down. The fact is, on the contrary, with or without Communists, with or without Mr. Khrushchev, the free trading system which we desire to live by, which, for others, is a condition of survival, and which we honestly believe is the best hope for growth and prosperity cannot function unless, steadily and consistently, we take up the creditor role which our industrial predecessors in Europe are putting down.

This is not the time for hesitation. It is a time to face squarely our long-term responsibilities as creditiors and to put the whole business of capital for development, both public and private, upon a consistent basis, to accept its continuity, to coordinate and combine it with others, to link it to long-term programs of growth and to give it the trained personnel it requires for efficient, resourceful administration. If we were to act on the scale once achieved by Britain in her heyday, both our public and our private lending would need to be tripled. It is a sobering thought how far beyond our ambitions such a figure lies today.

But the notion of even doubling the present scale -- which would entail an outward flow of, say, some $15 billions a year — underlines another fundamental need -- the

need to swing our own economy back from its present stagnation to new and, I believe, higher rates of growth. So long as we grind along at levels of production ten to fifteen per cent lower than those of 1957, pressure for more protection will grow, the attacks on foreign investment will increase and, worst of all, we shall continue to export deflation and recession as a result of our own decline. Our imports this year have already fallen off by some 12 to 15 per cent. Europe fears a widening of the trade gap this fall. The old misery of the 1930s -- so gleefully portrayed by Communists -- that of nations in need, men out of work and resources wasting while the vaults bulge with gold, in being revived in Communist propaganda. And Russia is making its offers of trade and aid with deep commiseration to all the nations who have sought to depend upon the West's "failing capitalism" for their economic future.

Let us not, for Heaven's sake, forget this entirely new element. Just as the American effort has become overshadowed by recession and doubt, the Russians are advancing. They are offering Europe expanded trade on the basis of Russian raw materials. They tempt the fringe countries of Asia with long-term, low-interest loans which, in two and a half years, have nearly reached the $2 billion mark and outmatch American offers in the same area by nearly 100 per cent. Nor is this a passing phenomenon. Russian production is expanding. Each year there are more resources upon which to draw for foreign enticements, more capital to offer, more goods to exchange. Nor do rising consumer demands in Russia impede the leaders' foreign economic policy -- or at least, not yet.

This is the new and formidable factor we face. Not only is the old system tottering, but a new, brash, aggressive and powerful competitor is thrusting his way in to complete the overturn and to set up his own controlled, guided and totally political system in its place.

In this atmosphere of growing crisis, I suggest to you, with the utmost urgency,

that we cannot permit the present policy of drift and confusion to persist indefinitely. The free nations must be rallied to consider ways and means to a functioning, expanding, free world trading system, and each must accept full responsibility for the policies that are worked out.

I believe that America should now declare its readiness for such a stocktaking.

I believe we should propose a Committee of Experts comparable to the group which laid the groundwork for the Marshall Plan in 1947. It should be their responsibility to prepare an agenda for the regeneration of the free world economy upon which the nations can agree and act within a year.

The agenda springs naturally and inevitably from the needs and frailties which I have vaguely traced. You will not require from me that, at the end of an over-long lecture, I undertake the experts' work, but I might mention four or five points which seem to me supremely relevant.

First, the recovery of internal momentum. We must consider the implications of aiming at a sustained rate of growth of 5 per cent a year in place of our traditional 3 per cent. We shall certainly have to consider the urgent problem of inflation. We shall have to learn to act vigorously and boldly to check undue consumption and to keep rising living standards and demands in balance with rising capacity to produce. But I suggest that the last 18 months have proved once and for all that we cannot check inflation by halting production.

Secondly, in the field of tariffs, I would hope that our Commission of Experts would link the European experiment with a common market to the needs of a wider free trade area. There is danger that the Europeans may establish not freer conditions of trade but closer forms of protection for themselves. For this reason, I believe that not only the whole sterling area should be drawn into free trade relations with Europe's Common Market, but that a free-trade or low-tariff area

spanning the Atlantic would be an immense step toward a liberal, world-wide trading system.

Third, is economic aid to the undeveloped areas. We must rationalize and enlarge the many foreign investment programs of the industrialized nations. Six months ago I urged the administration to take the lead in the direction of consolidating and coordinating our financial and human resources for economic development in the "have-not" nations. For maximum effectiveness, such loans and aid should be stabilized and related to long-term policies of sustained growth in the backward countries. Underpinning India's economic transformation is an immediate imperative. Germany must be brought in on the contributors' side. And, surely, to give to contributors and receivers alike a steady picture of the amounts and skills needed and available is not beyond the genius of the free world.

Fourth, is reserves or working capital, and the convertibility of currencies into dollars. Our experts should advise on the best way to insure the safe, short-term financing of world commerce. My first impression is that with larger backing from the hard currency powers, the International Monetary Fund could become an effective instrument of full convertibility. Trebling the contribution of all members would be in keeping with the modern tendency to regard all currencies, hard and soft, as part of the "cushion" to world trade.

To sum up: joint measures to secure sustained growth, joint negotiations for a low tariff or free trade area, joint undertaking of a long-term aid and investment program, and joint agreement on adequate working capital for world trade and convertibility -- this agenda for the free world not only meets the main strains and crises of today, it would go far to revive the conditions under which the old, unfettered, expansive system of free international trade once worked.

We can do it. Our joint potentialities are enormous. But it won't be done unless

we, the United States, act. Today, make no mistake about it, the drift is all the other way -- towards declining production, higher trade barriers, commerce starved for working capital, falling investment, economic frustration and trouble in the under-developed areas.

As in 1947, the drift is to disaster and it is to our energy, intelligence and foresight that we must look if this drift is to be reversed.

I would appeal to our present Administration to heed these portents of disaster and not permit outworn dogmas or faulty economic shibboleths to paralyze their will and freeze their energy. In 1947, the challenge did not find us wanting. The foresight of General Marshall and Dean Acheson, the energy of President Truman, the patience of Senator Vandenberg, met the vision of men in Europe, such as Bevin and Monnet and sparked the greatest enterprise of constructive common economic effort the world has ever seen.

I know the achievement was bipartisan in the truest sense of that abused word, and I believe that any comparable effort today must be so again. I believe that my fellow Democrats will follow an Administration lead today as faithfully and eagerly as many Republicans followed the Democratic initiative ten years ago. But we connot give that lead. We are not at the levers of power.

I therefore repeat my plea to our Republican leaders. Do not let this crisis slip irretrievably by. Do not let sign after sign appear in the heavens and portent follow portent without a full, courageous and wholesale response. We have hung too long in slack waters, waiting and fearing.

And now a final word. I fear the rush of recent events -- the crisis in France, the war in Algeria, the rebellion in Lebanon, in Indonesia, the abuse, the ingratitude, the anti-American outbursts everywhere, have added dangerously to our feeling that the world is too evil and troublesome to be worth saving, even if we could.

This is, of course, precisely what the Communists want Americans to feel, for the only real obstacle, in the short run, to their plans is the consciousness all around the world that Americans are interested, aware, powerful, involved and committed.

Making a world that is reasonably decent to live in is quite as difficult as breaking open a virgin continent. The early pioneers, your ancestors and mine, thought the going would be tough, and they were quite right. It is still tough -- and it is still worthwhile, for we have to live in the world as well as the continent.

Stevenson, Adlai E.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON
135 So. LaSalle Street
Chicago

February 28, 1959

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Governor Stevenson was out of town last weekend, but on his return home he was gratified to find your wire, and also your note of the 24th enclosing the check for his SMALL WORLD appearance. He has had to leave on another trip almost immediately, but has asked me to tell you how grateful he is for all you did to make the broadcast a success. I think he was pleased with the way it turned out.

Sincerely yours,

Carol Evans

Miss Carol Evans
Personal Secretary

Stevenson, Adlai

February 24, 1959

Dear Adlai:

Herewith our huge check for your contribution to SMALL WORLD. I have seldom seen you look better or talk better. Thanks again.

As ever yours,

ERM:skh

(signed in Mr. Murrow's absence)

Governor Adlai E. Stevenson
135 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois

Stevenson, Adlai

DOMESTIC February 20, 1959

to:

ADLAI STEVENSON
135 SOUTH LASALLE STREET
CHICAGO
ILLINOIS

IF YOU WANT TO SEE AND HEAR SOME VINTAGE STEVENSON FILMED AS HE SHOULD OUGHT TO BE LOOK AT WBBM-TV THIS COMING SUNDAY AT FIVE PAYEM. REGARDS.

ED MURROW

514-70

Stevenson, Adlai

ADLAI E. STEVENSON
135 So. LaSalle Street
Chicago

February 12, 1959

Dear Ed:

I am distressed about March 1st to 4th, but I am afraid I cannot get to Naples at that time. Somehow we must contrive a leisurely visit somewhere.

Cordially yours,

Adlai

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Choose Adlai, Mr. K to Head 'Cabinet'

London, Jan. 7 (Reuters)—Nikita Khrushchev and Adai Stevenson today were chosen prime minister and foreign secretary of an "Emergency World Cabinet" by the readers of "Britain's leading right-wing newspaper.

Lord Beaverbrook's 4,250,000-circulation Daily Express published the results of a special poll. The cabinet was chosen to combat an emergency "threat from outer space."

Prime Minister MacMillan was named minister of agriculture.

Stevenson was the only American to make the list. But Canadian Prime Minister Diefenbaker was named minister of education. Others named included French Premier de Gaulle as Minister of Defense; Russian Deputy Premier Mikoyan as Minister of Trade, and West German Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard as Chan-

NEW YORK POST, WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 7, 1959

Stevenson

May 16, 1957

Notes re Mr. Stevenson's Itinierary

1. Mr. Stevenson and Mr. Blair will stay at Claridge's in London.

2. The itinerary shows Mr. Stevenson leaving from Stanleyville in the Congo for Leopoldville on June 20. If transportation can be arranged, Mr. Stevenson will probably leave on June 21 instead.

3. The itinerary shows Mr. Stevenson spending one day - June 28 - in Lagos, Nigeria. If arrangements can be made, he will stay a day or two longer, which in turn would cut down on the number of days the itinerary shows him spending in Liberia. There is also a possibility that Mr. Stevenson will spend a day in Accra en route in Liberia.

4. From July 9 to July 16, Mr. Stevenson will be staying with Mr. Francis T. P. Plimpton at

Villa Balbianello
Lenno
Lago di Como
Italy

ITINERARY OF GOVERNOR STEVENSON

LEAVE/ ARRIVE	DAY	DATE	TIME	FLIGHT	CITY AND AIRPORT
Lv	Thurs.	5/16	6:00 PM	PAA 114	Idlewild Airport
Ar	Fri.	5/17	11:50 AM		Paris
			HOTEL: VENDOME		
Lv	Mon.	5/20	8:00 AM	SNH 951	Paris
Ar			9:45 AM		Brussels
			HOTEL: PALACE		
Lv	Tues.	5/21	8:00 PM	SN 607	Brussels
Ar			9:25 PM		London
			WITH FRIENDS		
Lv	Sat.	6/1	4:35 PM	TP 573	London
Ar			9:50 PM		Lisbon
			HOTEL: AVIZ on request		
Lv	Sun.	6/2	12:00 PM	PA 152	Lisbon
Ar	Mon.	6/3	2:35 AM		Accra
			HOTEL: AMBASSADOR		
Lv	Wed.	6/5	3:30 AM	PA 150	Accra
Ar			6:40 PM		Johannesburg
			HOTEL: CARLTON		
Lv	Sat.	6/8	8:00 AM	SA 301	Johannesburg
Ar			12:00 noon		Capetown
			HOTEL: MOUNT NELSON		
Lv	Mon.	6/10	5:00 PM	SA 304	Capetown
Ar			9:15 PM		Johannesburg
			HOTEL: CARLTON		
Lv	Wed.	6/12	11:30 AM	SA 256	Johannesburg
Ar			2:05 PM		Salisbury

LEAVE/ ARRIVE	DAY	DATE	TIME	FLIGHT	CITY AND AIRPORT
MR. BLAIR					
Lv	Wed.	6/12	3:00 PM	CE 852	Salisbury
Ar			5:40 PM		Ndola
MR. STEVENSON	PRIVATE PLANE TO STANLEYVILLE				
Lv	Thurs.	6/20	6:30 AM	SN 403	Stanleyville
Ar			1:30 PM		Leopoldville
			HOTEL: RELAIS		
Lv	Sat.	6/22	7:10 AM	AF 5070	Brazzaville
Ar			12:15 PM		Lambarene
Lv	Mon.	6/24	10:05 AM	AF 5041	Lambarene
Ar			5:30 PM		Brazzaville
			HOTEL: RELAIS		
Lv	Wed.	6/26	1:15 PM	AF 394	Brazzaville
Ar			5:45 PM		Lagos
			HOTEL: MAINLAND		
Lv	Fri.	6/28	7:00 AM	WT 951	Lagos
Ar			7:35 AM		Accra
Lv	Fri.	6/28	8:05 AM	WT 931	Accra
Ar			12:55 PM		Robertsfield
			FIRESTONE PLANTATION		
Lv	Fri.	7/5	6:00 AM	PA 151	Robertsfield
Ar			5:40 PM		Lisbon
			HOTEL: AVIZ		
Lv	Sat.	7/6	7:15 AM	PA 154	Lisbon
Ar			12:55 PM		Rome
			HOTEL: HASSLER		
MR. BLAIR					
Lv			OPEN		Rome
Ar					Milan

LEAVE/ ARRIVE	DAY	DATE	TIME	FLIGHT	CITY AND AIRPORT
MR. STEVENSON					
Lv	Tues.	7/9	2:00 PM	LI 427	Rome
Ar			3:35 PM		Milan
			WITH FRIENDS (See NOTE 4)		
Lv			OPEN		Milan
Ar					Munich
Lv	Fri.	7/19	11:40 AM	SR 207	Munich
Ar			12:55 PM		Zurich
Lv	Fri.	7/19	3:55 PM	SR 208	Zurich
Ar			6:35 PM		Cologne

Mr. Blair will furnish additional information as soon as arrangements are made.

Stevenson
Adl

January 31, 1957

Dear Adlai:

Here is the text of Ford's speech.

Sincerely yours,

Governor Adlai Stevenson
231 South LaSalle Street
Chicago 4, Illinois

rh

1900 Que St. N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.
DUpont 7-0666
22 January 1957

Stevenson

Stevenson-Kefauver

CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE

JAMES A. FINNEGAN, *Chairman* • HYMAN B. RASKIN, *Treasurer*
1128 Sixteenth St., N.W., Washington 6, D.C. / Telephone: District 7-1717 — District 7-9550

F. JOSEPH DONOHUE
DIRECTOR
VICE PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITIES

Edward R. Murrow, Esq.
Columbia Broadcasting System
Radio City
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I am taking the liberty of sending you herewith some material on the KOED proposal for the Democratic Party for which I am trying to get support. I believe that if it is coupled with an effective program on political organization (which is being worked up by Neil Staebler and his group) it will go a long way to assuring that we will win the 1958 and 1960 elections. The two programs go together like gun and bullet; neither is complete without the other -- the program on political organization and the KOED program on political ammunition.

The KOED program will be submitted to the meeting of the Democratic National Committee in San Francisco on February 15th at which I expect to be present. Sometime around March 1st I will be back in New York and I would appreciate very much an opportunity to sit down and discuss with you this matter and get your ideas on it. I have had such discussions previously with Drew Pearson, Eric Severeid, Frank Edwards and other well-known journalists and commentators and I hope to talk to a lot more before I'm through.

I had the great pleasure of sitting at the same table with your wife at the dinner of January 18th for Senator Lehman.

From January 30th to February 15th I can be reached by mail at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel in Beverly Hills, California. After that I'll be in Washington and expect to come up to New York sometime in March.

Yes
Will see

Sincerely,

Stephen J. Spingarn

Stephen J. Spingarn

P.S. I was an Administrative Assistant to Mr. Truman when he was President and I happened to be present in his suite at the Mayflower recently while arrangements were being made for your week-long powwow with him in Florida. It ought to be an interesting week. S.J.S.

Encls: KOED, Offsets

VOTE DEMOCRATIC

MRS. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
211 EAST 62ND STREET
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

January 8, 1957

Dear Mr. Spingarn:

I think your idea as outlined in your letter of the 2nd is excellent and you can tell Mr. Butler that it seems to me KOED could be used in more ways even than you have mentioned.

* * * * * * * * * * *

With my good wishes,

Very sincerely yours,

Eleanor Roosevelt

Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Que Street, N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.
DUpont 7-0666

KOED SUMMARY

HOW THE KOED PLAN COULD HELP THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY TO WIN THE 1958 AND 1960 ELECTIONS BY "KNOCKING ON EVERY DOOR" IN THE NATION AND PRESENTING THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY'S CASE ON EVERY ISSUE WITH MAXIMUM EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT.

If the KOED plan were in effective operation, it could provide literally hundreds of draft speeches and fact sheets every year by highly competent, politically savvy, people writing about political issues which are their special interest and on which they keep themselves up to date as a matter of course, and prepared in simple, understandable, lucid terms. These draft speeches and fact sheets would cover every major issue and would be available to members of Congress who cared to use them, either as actual speeches to give on the floor of Congress, or in their home state, or as factual memoranda from which the Congressmen could prepare a speech in their own style and language. The average member of Congress would not need such a service in the subject areas in which he is particularly active, since there his familiarity with the subject means that he and his staff could prepare speeches and other public statements themselves without trouble or extensive research. However, no one can cover the whole waterfront of issues, and every member of Congress has to speak out frequently on issues with which he is only generally familiar and does not follow closely.

Here the KOED plan could be invaluable. Moreover, it would permit planning ahead so that a member of Congress who was coming up for election a year or two years hence could pick the issues with the greatest impact in his state and district and deliver a series of hard-hitting speeches on them in Congress and at home on every timely occasion. This would increase the Congressman's stature with his constituency and improve his chances of re-election.

Moreover, the KOED unit could do a lot of thinking ahead and start early to prepare draft speeches and fact sheets on issues which had not yet come to a head but which looked as if they might become important.

There is a very large pool of relatively untapped talent all round the country that would be glad to do volunteer work of this sort for our Party and its representatives in Congress, as well as for our candidates during the campaigns. These people will be found mostly among the younger men and women on university faculties around the country who are active the year round in their local Democratic organizations as city or county Democratic organization officials, county Democratic committeeman, or the like. In addition, there would be the ex-Democratic officials who are practicing law or who are in business around the country.

In the past the Democratic Party has probably placed too much reliance for this kind of work on the Northeastern seaboard people. They are talented and they are conveniently close, but they represent only a small part of the talent in our Party. Moreover, one of the best features of the Democratic Party is that it is a National Party and the fusion of ideas from people all over the country would be a very valuable element of the plan.

The KOED operation would not involve any formulation of policy, but would be strictly a service operation to strengthen our people in Congress by providing them, if they desired it, with a large flow of good draft speeches and fact sheets, all written within the four corners of the Democratic Platform.

In addition, these draft speeches and fact sheets could be sent out to the Democratic state, county, and city organizations in quantity and could be used on any occasions where a speech on any issue was to be made before a business, labor, farm, or civic organization. The availability of this service would probably have the healthy effect of precipitating the making of speeches on the Democratic side of the issues which would not otherwise be delivered.

The effective operation of the KOED plan in the Democratic National Committee would strengthen the bridge between the Committee and the Democratic members of Congress in a way which would be most valuable from the standpoint of both sides, from the standpoint of the Democratic Party, and, above all, from the standpoint of the Nation.

S.J.S.

KOED MEMO

Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Que St., N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.
DUpont 7-0666

November 1956
(After the election)

A PROPOSAL FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY (NOVEMBER 1956-NOVEMBER 1960)

Subject: A Proposal to Help the Democratic Party Present its Case to the People More Effectively -- and More Winningly -- through Democratic Members of Congress, at the grass root and pavement level, and in the 1958 and 1960 Campaigns.

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The attached memoranda set out this proposal and indicate how it could be carried out.

For purposes of convenience (and amusement), I call this proposal (at this stage) "Operation KOED" which means "Knock on Every Door" because that is what I have been doing since November 7th in an effort to enlist support for the proposal and get it rolling.*

In addition to the proposal described in the attached memoranda, and as a major part of "KOED", I propose an informal, advisory group of top-notch popular journalists and political commentators in the other media to advise us on the "Communication" problem -- how to reach the public mind most effectively and with greatest impact on political issues. This would include advice on what issues will have the greatest impact and how they can be most effectively presented.

I have already talked to several top-flight men in this category who have promised their help on an informal basis.

As another major benefit of "KOED", I note that it would provide a continuous flow of good, simple, understandable speeches on all the major issues to state, city, and county Democratic chairmen and their organizations. These speeches could be stock-piled locally and used either "as is" or with local variations for any occasion that called for a speech on a political issue, such as talks before Chambers of Commerce, Rotary Clubs, civic and religious groups, labor, farm, and small business organizations, etc. And in state, local, and national campaigns, too, of course.

I have indicated a minimum subsistence budget for salaries of $15,000. a year for "KOED". The operation could be mounted for this sum, but, if possible, it would be much better to have a $25,000. a year budget for salaries, since this would permit the employment of an alert, quick-footed researcher and an additional stenographer.

S. J. S.

*And the KOED plan is designed to "Knock on every door" in the nation and present the Democratic Party's case on every issue with maximum effectiveness and impact.

Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Que St., N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.
DUpont 7-0666

November 1956
(After the election)

MEMORANDUM ABOUT THE OPERATIONS OF "PROJECT X" IN THE 1956 POLITICAL CAMPAIGN (21 OCTOBER -- 6 NOVEMBER); AND A PROPOSAL FOR SETTING UP THIS KIND OF AN OPERATION, GREATLY IMPROVED AND EXTENDED, ON A PERMANENT BASIS IN ORDER THAT THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY MAY MORE EFFECTIVELY (AND MORE WINNINGLY) PRESENT ITS CASE TO THE PEOPLE THROUGH DEMOCRATIC MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND IN THE 1958 AND 1960 CAMPAIGNS.

On the afternoon of Wednesday, October 17, 1956, the Stevenson-Kefauver Campaign Headquarters asked me to set up a hurry-up operation to provide a quick flow of speech drafts for Senator Estes Kefauver to use in his vice presidential campaign. The very able group of associates travelling with Senator Kefauver had done heroic and extremely effective work in helping the Senator in the preparation of scores and scores of speeches, but many weeks of work on a seven-day a week, 16 or 18 hours a day basis, had imposed a heavy strain on this group and it was felt that it was time to warm up a second platoon on the bench to try to assist them.

I actually began operating on Sunday, October 21st, when I made a series of long-distance telephone calls to top-notch politically savvy Democratic "egg-heads" all over the country. I called seven or eight universities and talked to political scientists and economists whom I knew. I also called Democratic ex-government officials around the country, now practicing law or economics or in business. Because of the time element, and to keep down expenses, I naturally tended to favor people in or near Washington, but I also made contact with people in California, Arizona, Michigan, Illinois, Ohio and elsewhere, some 35 or 40 people in all, over a period of two or three days.

To each person I said approximately the same thing:

"We need, for use by Senator Kefauver, hard-hitting speech drafts of about 2,000 words. A copy of each such draft will also go to Governor Stevenson and President Truman. Your name will be on the draft as the author.

Do not bother with a beginning or an ending -- we add those. Simply start out 'I want to talk to you tonight about---' Your paragraphs and sentences should be short and your language should be basic English. Do not freight down the speech with too many ideas. We want an organ march, not a cacophony of sounds.

We are aiming these speeches at the average American, who has had approximately ten to eleven years of schooling. We do not talk down or patronize him, but we do talk in simple, lucid terms which he can understand -- a poster, not an engraving.

All the speeches are to come in under the same general theme tent, namely:

The Eisenhower Administration is totally dominated by giant businessmen, and their bankers and their lawyers. When the Eisenhower Administration sits down at its council tables, these men occupy all the chairs.

Now we Democrats don't dislike big businessmen. On the contrary, we like them very much when they are enlightened men with a social conscience. We point with pride to our own Averell Harriman and our own Herbert Lehman. We like Republican big businessmen of this type, too, such as Paul Hoffman and Robert Lovett; and as proof of that, we note that we used these men in Cabinet jobs during President Truman's administration, but they have not been so used by the Eisenhower Administration.

However, we do not want even these good men to occupy all the chairs at the council tables of government. We want the representatives of the working man, the white collar employee, the farmer, the small businessman, and the housewife to occupy a fair share of the chairs at government's tables.

We want the egg-heads, too, the scientists and thinkers from our universities all over the country because, unlike the Republicans, we admire and appreciate egg-heads and we know that almost all human progress through the centuries has come from the thoughts and ideas of egg-heads. We know that Socrates and Plato and Copernicus and Galileo and Voltaire and Newton and Pasteur and all the other great men of thought and vision were egg-heads.

And, if a Democratic administration and Congress are elected on November 6th, that is the kind of government you will have."

I asked each man, working under that general theme, to write a speech in the area in which he was most qualified and most interested, and to send it to me by air mail, special delivery.

For example, I asked two top tax experts, both former government officials now practicing law in the Midwest, to write separate speeches on Taxes. These speeches were to show what the tax policy of the Eisenhower Administration was, and how it favored big business and the well-to-do and unfairly dealt with all the rest of the nation. I asked each writer to explain how this affected you, Mr. Small Businessman, you, Mr. Worker, you, Mr. Farmer, and you, Mrs.Housewife.

I asked other experts to write on the "Tight Money" policy of General Eisenhower and that giant businessman, Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey; and how it meant scant credit and loans for small business, but did not inconvenience big business at all in getting credit and loans.

From others I got speeches on such subjects as High Prices; on the Small Business recession since 1952; on the one-sided General Prosperity of General Motors, General Electric, General Foods and General Eisenhower; on Attorney-General Brownell's emasculation of effective enforcement of the antitrust laws, which protect small and medium sized business against monopoly power; on the Rape of the Regulatory Agencies; on how Giant Business pays for Republican services rendered through its campaign contributions (according to the Gore Subcommittee report of November 2, 1956, the officers of the 100 corporations having the largest amount of defense contracts with the government in 1956 -- January 1 to October 21 -- gave $435,310 to the Republicans, $9,500 to the Democrats, and $4,000 fo For America).

I also asked for speeches specially geared to the interests of women.

After October 29th when the war broke out in the Middle East, we were, of course, grinding out speeches on the utter bankruptcy of the Eisenhower-Dulles policy in the Middle East.

Here we stressed the fact that on October 12th in a nation-wide television appearance, General Eisenhower had told the country that there was good news from Suez -- good news in the Middle East -- that the crisis was passed. Then came October 29th and the war, which proved that the crisis was ahead and the fantastic thing was that Eisenhower and Dulles had to read about it in the newspapers -- did not even know it was brewing.

We stressed in these speech drafts, moreover, that the great Western alliance, forged in 1940 by Roosevelt and Churchill, had collapsed, that our great allies, England and France didn't even trust Eisenhower and Dulles enough to confide in them what they were planning, because they had seen the Eisenhower-Dulles policy build up Nasser so big that he seized the Suez Canal, and the same policy, of course, also brought the Russians on the run into the Middle East with arms deals to offset our handouts to Nasser, with the result that the Russians had a strong beachhead in the Middle East for the first time in 300 years.

And then there was the fantastic situation of us being lined up in the United Nations with Russia against the English and French. The total situation being one from which only the Communists could gain.

With the concurrence of all concerned, I sent a copy of each speech, not only to Senator Kefauver, but also to Governor Stevenson and President Truman. This was on the theory that the three men were talking to different audiences with different press play, and that the men travelling with them would help them to revise anything that did reach them to meet fast-changing circumstances.

It seemed clear to me from the beginning that our operation (which we called "Project X" for our own amusement and because it gave some people a chuckle, baffled some, and irritated others) could not, except in rare cases, produce final drafts of speeches. No one sitting hundreds of miles away and not in continuous contact with the candidate can do that kind of a job in a political campaign, except, perhaps, in the case of a few set speeches such as a labor speech in Detroit. But there are not many of this type in a political campaign and each candidate must make five, ten, or fifteen speeches and talks of varying importance and size almost every day.

Project X, therefore, was designed to furnish the rough ore from which the candidates and their assistants could refine speech ideas and drafts.

It would take several researchers several weeks to figure out just how much of Project X material was used by each candidate, but there was a substantial use of this material.

For example, in a two-page memorandum of October 31, Project X sent out a speech outline entitled "One Glorious Week of Peace and Prosperity with Ike," and subtitled, "How many more Weeks of Peace and Prosperity ike this can you stand?"

The week in question began with October 25th when the Bureau of Labor Statistics announced that consumer prices had reached a new historic high and ended with October 30th when the Department of Agriculture announced that farm prices had dropped another 1% thus continuing the long slump from the 100% parity ratio of President Truman's last year in office to the present 82%. In between, of course, on October 29th, came the war in the Middle East.

In addition to sending this out in outline form by air mail, special delivery, on October 31st, the idea was telephoned to both Senator Kefauver's and Governor Stevenson's groups.

Governor Stevenson used this idea and even the exact words of the Project X outline in his nationally televised speech in Chicago on Saturday night, November 3rd.

I asked 35 or 40 people around the country to write speech drafts and 31 of them actually sent me drafts. In all, Project X produced 52 items, of which 35 were speech drafts, and the rest speech outlines and fact sheets of use in preparing speeches. I wrote about a dozen items, including five full-length speech drafts, and the rest came from the able men and women who volunteered to help Project X.

During the last few days of the campaign, time was so short I telegraphed and telephoned speech ideas and factual material to the Kefauver and Stevenson parties.

The November election obviously revealed that the Democratic Party had not presented its case with sufficient effectiveness to the American people. Although it is true that the country repudiated the Republican party and elected a Democratic Congress, General Eisenhower still won an overwhelming personal triumph.

Like any good Democrat, I strongly believe that the facts on the major issues which decide elections are-- on their merits -- overwhelmingly on the side of the Democratic Party. If this is true, it is clear that we Democratic politicians did not communicate our position to the American people with sufficient clarity and impact. The Republican politicians, with the able assistance of Madison Avenue and Robert Montgomery, did a better job than we did on the national level, although we licked them in many state and local contests.

This situation must be corrected if we are to win the elections of 1958 and 1960.

I start with the premise that the Democratic party has enormous talent all over the United States which it has never tapped on a national basis; that we have relied too heavily on the talent of the Northeastern seaboard (Washington, New York, Boston, etc.) which is perfectly understandable because it is close and convenient and there is, indeed, a wealth of talent in those cities.

However, the Democratic party is a truly national party and the fusion of ideas from all over the country is most important in such a party.

At the universities, among ex-government officials, and among Democratic business and professional men, we have an enormous reservoir of ability, much of which is aching to be used. The people in Arizona, Colorado, Minnesota, Oregon, Georgia, Alabama, Indiana, and Ohio, as well as all the other states, and the territories and possessions, too, include men and women who have brains, energy, and the ability to express themselves lucidly and effectively in writing, given a little help and guidance from politically savvy people in Washington.

If we can effectively mobilize and use this talent to better present our case in Congress through our Democratic Congressmen (always operating within the four corners of the Democratic platform and not seeking to make new policy), I am convinced that we will be able to win the 1958

Congressional election and the 1960 Presidential election. In addition, we will have a more effective Congress.

My proposal, therefore, is that a permanent and continuing Project X, vastly enlarged, be set up with a home base either at the Democratic National Committee, the new National Capitol Democratic Club, the Senate Democratic Campaign Committee, or the Senate Democratic Policy Committee. Such a base, as a minimum, would need only a full-time staff director at $8 - $10,000 a year and a secretary at $4 - $5,000-- a total of say $15,000 a year for salaries, with space and incidental expenses (telephone, paper, stamps, mimeographing, etc.) provided by the "home base" organization.

Under the general guidance of an advisory group of Congressional and political personalities, mostly in Washington, this operation could, I think, do an extremely useful and effective job. Naturally, with more money and a larger staff, an even better job could be done. But the operation should prove its value first.

In about 1948, the Republicans set up an operation somewhat like the one here outlined in their Senate Policy Committee. Being Republicans, they had plenty of money and so they hired 10 or 12 competent staff men to do the job, which was to furnish Republican Senators and candidates speech drafts and fact sheets with which to answer or attack Democrats in prompt, timely, and effective manner.

I understand that the Republican Senate Policy Committee and the Republican National Committee share the cost of the operation. Of course, the Republicans have lots of money so ~~xxxx~~ they can afford the $100,000 or so a year this costs. But they do not have the young, energetic, politically savvy egg-heads in quantity and quality, ready and eager to work for free, as we have them.

So we should be able to do the same job -- only better -- for a fraction of the Republican cost.

Incidentally, several persons, whose political judgement I have confidence in, have told me that the Republican Policy Committee staff operation played a major role in the Republican victories of 1952 and 1956.

Here are some further ideas and details on how my proposal might operate:

It is obvious that in the next election the Democratic Party will be judged largely by the impressions created and maintained by our members in Congress. The Democratic Congressmen could receive great aid from the proposed speech writing service, not only for speeches on the floor, but also for speeches and news releases for their home districts. By keeping all interested Democratic Congressmen supplied with speech drafts we could assist them now in making a more favorable impression for themselves and the party on the public. Further, we could thereby develop a large stable of writers who would acquire practical experience, guidance in their development and also screening for their individual talents. When the campaign gets warmer in the summer and fall of 1958, the Democratic Congressional candidates would have a good back-log of speeches and a large pool of experienced experts at their disposal.

The more speeches are made available, the more they will be used. Their use and a letter of praise and thanks would facilitate an even greater flow of even better speeches. There would be no shortage of campaign ammunition either in the build-up stage (from now on) or in the hottest days of Fall '58 or '60.

To carry out this service all that is needed is an advisory committee one good qualified man as a director, one good secretary, office space and equipment (including a mimeograph machine), proper party affiliation and a small sum of money.

The director should be full-time with full control over his own and his secretary's time.

The work of the service should be guided by a separate advisory committee, whose members should be experienced party leaders, Congressmen or their first assistants, former high administration officials, etc. This advisory committee would also assist the director in respect to contacts in Congress for speech outlets and across the country for speech sources.

This committee should be small so that it could meet frequently and informally.

The chairman of the party organization sponsoring this service could have the final word as to the selection of issues to be emphasized and he would, of course, be an ex officio member of the advisory committee, with the privilege but not the obligation to attend the meetings of the advisory committee.

The director should be chosen by the advisory committee. He should be appointed initially for 18 months, (i.e., early 1957 to September, 1958) with succeeding terms of one year. He could be selected from the ranks of young professional political scientists who have also been active in the regular party organization, preferably as more than merely presidential-year volunteers. His term should coincide with the school year, with a successor selected (where necessary) at least a semester prior to assuming active responsibility to insure an orderly transition.

The director and the speech writers must be conscious of a two-fold restriction: they must remain comparatively unknown to the public and their function is to be the instruments and not the makers of party policy.

While speech writers will have individual specialties, essentially the function of the service would be speech writing, with research being only incidental and secondary. The director's responsibilities would include compiling quotations, facts and figures from the established party research services, the Congressional Record, committee hearings and reports, and from such obvious sources as the New York Times, etc. This material would then be given to the writers as the main points of the speeches. Since policy would be made elsewhere, the speeches would echo and paraphrase the established party policies, always seeking a more widely-understandable presentation of these policies.

The director should be free to travel to national and regional conventions of political scientists, to university campuses, etc., to establish contacts with writers from every region in the country, with a minimum of modest entertainment. Once contacts are established they should be maintained by constant use of the mails and occasional phone calls.

Another function of the director would be to arrange contacts between members of Congress and tested writers in their own areas, both by subject and geography. This would enable Democratic Congressional candidates to have the maximum of personal and professional assistance in their campaigns. Such contacts should not be allowed to disrupt the overall general service by becoming too exclusive. A good speech should serve more than one candidate, unless it receives national coverage in the press.

This service should be made available in stages to members of both Houses and eventually to the entire Democratic Party. The one group should not be duplicated but rather expanded, to prevent wasted effort and competition for the services of writers. It is important to preserve this professional-type service on a professional level. Improvement and expansion of the original is preferably to multiple imitation.

The name of this service should not be too obvious. "Special Services" might do. Since its functions would be specialized and limited, and its budget therefore small, its funds should be originated, maintained and supervised separately, except for housekeeping expenses such as office space and equipment, postage, etc. Apart from housekeeping, $15,000. a year might be sufficient.

Stephen J. Spingarn

PROJECT X MEMOS

Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Que St., N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.
DUpont 7-0366
November 1956
(after the Election)

NOTE

Attached are a selection of Project X Cover Memoranda,* transmitting Speech Drafts, Outlines, and Fact Sheets, to Governor Stevenson, Senator Kefauver, and President Truman, through their senior campaign associates.

During the last few days of the Campaign (November 1-5), Speech Outlines and Fact Sheets were sent out by telegram or (orally) by telephone.

S.J.S.

* not included.

The attached memoranda relate to the Project X operation run for Senator Kefauver during the last two weeks or so of the campaign. This represents the seed -- a very small one -- of "Operation HUMP." S.J.S.

Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Que St., N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.
DUpont 7-0666

Wednesday 31 October 1956

SPEECH OUTLINE*

"ONE GLORIOUS WEEK OF PEACE AND PROSPERITY WITH IKE"

(Subtitle: "How Many More Weeks of Eisenhower Peace and Prosperity Like This Can You Stand?")

1. Consumers and Housewives.

A. In 1952, General Eisenhower said "my Mamie gets after me about the high cost of living. I say it's time for a change - to get back to an honest dollar."

B. October 25, 1956. General Eisenhower's Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today that the Consumer Price Index (which measures the cost of living) reached its highest level in history last month.

2. Farmers.

A. At Brookings, South Dakota on October 4, 1952, Eisenhower said:

> "The Republican party is pledged to the sustaining of a 90% parity price support and it is pledged even more than that to helping the farmer obtain his full parity, 100% parity, with a guarantee in the price supports of 90%."

---

* This speech outline was sent by me to Stevenson, Kefauver, and Truman on 31 October. On Saturday A.M., I phoned this idea to Clayton Fritchey and Arthur Schlesinger in Chicago, as well as to Dick Wallace (with Senator Kefauver) in - (I forget where). In his Saturday night (Nov. 3) televised speech, Governor Stevenson used this idea, including some of the exact words.
S.J.S.

B. October 30, 1956. General Eisenhower's Department of Agriculture announced today, farm prices had declined another 1% during the past month, marking a long continued decline in these prices. The parity ratio in 1952, the last Truman year, was 100%. It is now 82%.

3. Wives, Mothers, Fathers, Children, Young Men of Fighting Age - Everbody.

A. On October 12, 1956, in a nation-wide television appearance, General Eisenhower made what he called "the best announcement that I think I could possibly make to America tonight." He said, "The progress made in the settlement of the Suez dispute this afternoon at the United Nations is most gratifying." According to Time Magazine, he said that "it looks like a very great crisis is behind us." The major campaign theme of the Republicans has been that the Democratic party is the party of war and starts them and that the Republican party is the party of peace and ends them.

B. October 29, 1956 and since. The Israeli army marched into Egypt. Today (31 October 1956) the British and French are bombing Egypt. The great alliance of the Western World established by Roosevelt and Churchill in 1940 has collapsed. The Russians and the United States lined up in the United Nations yesterday against France and England.

Stephen J. Spingarn

COPY

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D.C. NOV. 2,1956

NDC PAID-CHARGE

Straight Message

THIS SAME WIRE SENT TO

Arthur Schlessinger, Jr. or
Clayton Fritchey
Governor Adlai Stevenson's Party
Sheraton-Cadillac Hotel
Detroit, Michigan

Richard J. Wallace
Senator Estes Kefauver's Party
Hotel Broadhead
Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania

Speech theme for Senator Estes Kefauver - copy to Governor Stevenson: "How General Eisenhower Picks his Chief Lieutenants for Public Office." Speech would go along these lines: General Eisenhower has established many precedents since he became President, but perhaps the most historical precedent which he has established is his unique way of selecting his Chief Lieutenants, the men whom he picks to run the major programs of his Administration and our Government. As nearly as I can figure it out from the record of his selections, this is how Eisenhower goes about it. First of all, of course, he has a program and he needs a man to run it. Then he gets suggestions from many sources as to who that many should be. Next he screens this group in a rough way and culls from it all the men who like the program which has to be administered. Their names are stricken from the list. He then proceeds to carefully scrutinize the remaining names. After intensive screening he determines the man that hates the program most and him, of course, he appoints to run it.

This is not idle speculation on my part. All you have to do is run down the roster of General Eisenhower's appointees. For example, General Eisenhower had a public housing program that needed to be run, so naturally he picks to run it Mr. Cole, who hates public housing. Similarly, he picks Mr. Andrews who hates taxes to run the tax bureau. He picks Mr. Hollister, who hates foreign aid, to administer foreign aid. He picks Mr. Howrey who hates the anti-trust laws to run his anti-trust program as Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission. So on and on - you can name your own men.

Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Que St., N.W., Wash., D.C.

From Steve Spingarn to Jiggs Donohue (via Bill Haddad) for Senator Kefauver.

A REPUBLICAN VICTORY WILL REVIVE McCARTHYISM

In a speech on October 25th at West Allis, Wisconsin, Senator Joseph McCarthy said: "Some of you may be surprised, but I also think it's important beyond words that we elect Alex Wiley to the Senate. If we control the Senate, I think you'll get some more McCarthyism because I'll be Chairman of a Senate Committee again."

- - - - - - MILAUKEE JOURNAL
October 26, 1956

NOTE: I wired this today to Mayor Wagner of New York with the suggestion that he ask Javits to comment on its.

Steve Spingarn

Thursday, November 1, 1956

353PM

FO OCT 23

CONFIRMATION OF WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM 35 NL PD

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER JR AND CLAYTON FRITCHEY
CARE GOVERNOR ADLAI STEVENSON
BILTMORE HOTEL NYK

SUGGEST STEVENSON USE FOLLOWING IN NEXT FOREIGN POLICY SPEECH:

POINT 1: WITHOUT TITO THERE COULD HAVE BEEN NO POLISH TITOISM.

POINT 2: ON JUNE 23, 1956 SENATE VOTED ON BRIDGES-MCCARTHY AMENDMENT TO CUT OFF ALL AID TO YUGOSLAVIA WITHIN 90 DAYS INSTEAD OF PERMITTING PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TO DECIDE IF CONTINUED AID IS IN INTEREST OF U S REPUBLICANS VOTED 23 to 21 FOR BRIDGES-MCCARTHY AMENDMENT. DEMOCRATS VOTED 29 to 15 AGAINST IT.

STEPHEN J SPINGARN 1900 QUE ST
NORTHWEST WASHINGTON DC DUPONT 70663

Draft of Night Letter sent Monday, October 22 to:

Arthur Schlesinger and Clayton Fritchey
c/o Gov. Adlai Stevenson
Biltmore Hotel
New York City

Tonight's paper carries lengthy story that Eisenhower today said his administration "has done more for small business than any prior administration". This statement plus many other absurd claims in President's letter to Fred Herman, Chairman of Rochester "Small Businessmen For Ike" Organization.

Urgent that Stevenson (who has so far said almost nothing useful on small business) pinpoint this malarkey with strong statement and, even better, speech of which Arthur has draft.

Any statement should stress this is one of those operation-was-success-but-patient-died stories. Small Business profits down 52 percent since 1952 while big business up 61 percent and General Motors up 113 percent. These are Republican figures, not ours. Small business failures at highest rate in many years. Mergers at highest rate since Hoover. Small business share of defense contracts steadily on down-grade since 1954. Tight money policy no hinderance to big firms financing but is preventing small ones getting loans to live much less grow. Small retail stores closing down all over country. This is general prosperity of General Eisenhower, General Motors (which had biggest profit in American history last year, almost 1.2 billions after taxes), General Electric (which just announced record 9 months of its history), etc. This nonsense should be hit hard.

Draft of Night Letter to Arthur Schlesinger and Clayton Fritchey, October 22 (Continued)

Governor might indicate it's too bad that General Eisenhower's 40 years in Army left him unequipped to study or even understand problems of small businessman. And so he accepts without question the wild distortions placed in his mouth by giant businessmen around him who ring him off from the world of reality.

Steve Spingarn

STEPHEN J. SPINGARN

(See also current volume of Who's Who in America)

Birth: Town of Bedford, New York, September 1, 1908, son of J. E. and Amy Spingarn of Troutbeck, Amenia, Dutchess County, New York. Ancestors have fought in every major American war beginning with the American Revolution. J. E. Spingarn (died 1939) was Professor of Comparative Literature at Columbia University; author of numerous scholarly books and articles; soldier (infantry battalion commander, World War 1); First Post Commander, American Legion Post, Amenia, N. Y.; farmer; small-town newspaper publisher; literary adviser and a founder and Vice President of the publishing firm of Harcourt, Brace and Company; candidate for Congress in 1908 with personal endorsement of President Theodore Roosevelt; President (1930-1939), National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP); and active in public and civic affairs. See any edition of the American or International Who's Who up to the date of his death. Spingarn High School in Washington, D. C., is named after him.

Education: Phillips Exeter Academy, Exeter, New Hampshire; Yale University; University of Grenoble, Grenoble, France; University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona. A.B., 1930 and LL.B., 1934, both from University of Arizona. Law school honors. Also attended Stanford University (California), and Rollins College (Florida).

Extra Curricular University Activities: Vice President, law school student body; managing editor, University Humor magazine; president of several campus organizations, including literary society; vice-justice of law fraternity (Phi Alpha Delta); played mediocre football, tennis, and golf in college.

For five summers (1926-1930) while in college worked as U. S. National Park Ranger at the Mesa Verde National Park, Colorado. For a brief period acted as Chief Ranger.

Work Record: (Note: Spingarn's main experience has been in 1) Legislative Drafting and Congressional Relations, 2) Small Business and Antimonopoly matters, 3) Counter Espionage and Internal Security, and 4) Politics at the National level.)

1934-1942: Attorney, U. S. Treasury Department, and Special Assistant to the Attorney General. This work involved primarily drafting bills and preparing supporting data, testifying before Congressional Committees, and consultation with and assistance to members of Congress at their request.

1942-1946: Army Captain, Major, and Lt. Col. Three years overseas. Participated in North African (Nov. 1942) and Italian (Sept. 1943) invasions. Served on Salerno and Anzio beachheads. Commanding officer, Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps, (CIC), July 1943-July 1945; and directed its operations in the capture of over 500 enemy espionage and sabotage agents and the arrest and internment of several thousand security threats. In his book, Calculated Risk, General Mark Clark (WWII Commander of Fifth Army) referred to Spingarn's "able direction" of Fifth Army CIC in the capture of many spies. General Alfred M. Gruenther (WWII Fifth Army Chief of Staff and until recently Supreme Allied Commander in Europe) wrote Spingarn on January 2, 1953:

> "I have always been most appreciative of the outstanding results obtained by you and the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps during the Italian Campaign, 1943-1945. Under your operational direction, the CIC defeated and practically destroyed the enemy espionage and sabotage organization in the Fifth Army Zone of Combat."

Spingarn was awarded Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal with Valor Emblem, Invasion Arrowhead, and 5 Battle Stars. Was recommended for Silver Star Medal and additional Legion of Merit. Fifth Army CIC was awarded a Unit Citation.

1946-1949: Legislative Counsel of U. S. Treasury Department with title of Assistant General Counsel. Also served as Deputy Director of Contract Settlement, and as Legal Counsel to U. S. Secret Service (and other coordinated Treasury Enforcement Agencies). Represented Treasury at International Conference in Lima, Peru, in 1947. Served on Working Committee of President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty (1946-7) which drafted Truman Loyalty Program. Legal Member of 3-man Treasury Loyalty Board.

1949-1950: Administrative Assistant to the President of the United States, after serving as Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President. Was, in effect, Legislative Counsel of the White House. Headed Task Force which prepared President Truman's Small Business Program, submitted to Congress May 5, 1950. In charge of drafting of bill which became Defense Production Act of 1950 and of presentation of this bill to Congress and handling on the Hill.

1950-September, 1953: Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission (the independent, bipartisan Federal Antimonopoly agency headed by 5 Commissioners). Handled most of FTC legislative and appropriation work. (During one period of over a year made more appearances before Congressional Committees than other 4 Commissioners combined.) Served frequently as Acting Chairman of the Commission. During FTC service, was particularly interested in antimerger, economic fact-finding, and Robinson-Patman Act work of Commission and ways and means to strengthen this work and protect small and independent business against monopoly practices.

September, 1953 to date: Has devoted himself primarily to personal affairs. At request of Members of Congress, has from time to time testified before Congressional Committees on questions of public policy. Served as Member of Small Business Advisory Committee of Democratic National Committee. Served as National Director of Special Activities for Kefauver Vice-Presidential Campaign, 1956, and as member of Senator Kefauver's Executive and Advisory Committee.

Bar Membership: Arizona State Bar (admitted 1933); and Bars of the U. S. District Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (admitted 1947).

Organizations: American Bar Association; Federal Bar Association (former National Officer); Sons of the Revolution (American); National Counter Intelligence Corps Association (former Member, Board of Governors); American Political Science Association; National Capital Democratic Club (Sponsor and member of Program Committee).

Miscellaneous Information: Wrote a series of three articles (cleared for security by the War Department) which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post of November 27, December 4, and December 11, 1948, under the title "How we Caught Spies in World War II."

Prepared a paper recommending various changes and improvements in U. S. Military Counter Intelligence. This was adopted by the National Counter Intelligence Corps Association, an association of 5,000 Counter Intelligence Corps veterans, as its national program in 1948, and was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A JCS staff committee held a hearing on these recommendations at which Springarn testified. A number of these recommendations have now been adopted by the Army.

Residence: Washington residence: The Anchorage, 1900 Que Street, N. W., DUpont 7-0666.

Permanent Domicile and Voting Address: 110 East 78th Street, New York City, RHinelander 4-5663.

(Note: From 1930 to January 1947 legal and voting address was Tucson, Arizona.)

PUBLICITY DIVISION
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE
1001 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington 6, D. C.

FOR RELEASE TO P.M. NEWSPAPERS
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1956

B-1399
10/30/56

Stephen J. Spingarn, who served as a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission under President Harry Truman, has been appointed a member of Senator Estes Kefauver's Executive and Advisory Committee. He will serve as Director of Special Activities for the vice-presidential candidate.

Mr. Spingarn also served as Administrative Assistant to President Truman. His other government assignments included service as Assistant General Counsel of the Treasury Department, Deputy Director of Contract Settlement, Legal Counsel of the U. S. Secret Service, and Special Assistant to the Attorney General.

In World War II, Mr. Spingarn served as a Lt. Colonel, participated in the African and Italian invasions, and saw action at the Salerno and Anzio beachheads. For two years he served as commanding officer of the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps. He holds the Legion of Merit and the Bronze Star with Valor Emblem.

Mr. Spingarn was educated at Phillips Exeter Academy, Yale University, the University of Grenoble (France), Rollins College (Florida), Stanford University (California), and the University of Arizona, where he received both his bachelor and law degrees. He is a member of the Arizona and District of Columbia Bars, and makes his home in Washington, D. C.

# # #

Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Que Street, N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.
DUpont 7-0666

MEMORANDUM

Subject: The Noblest Practical Occupation of Man -- Politics.

(Note: The following is excerpted from an article by my father, J. E. Spingarn, called Politics and the Poet, which appeared in the Atlantic Monthly of November, 1942 at page 73, with an introduction by Lewis Mumford. It was a reprint of one of six lectures which my father had given in 1931 at the New School of Social Research in New York.

J. E. Spingarn (1875-1939) was Professor of Comparative Literature at Columbia University; author of numerous scholarly books and articles; soldier (infantry battalion commander, World War 1); First Post Commander, American Legion Post, Amenia, N. Y.; farmer; small-town newspaper publisher; literary adviser and a founder and Vice President of the publishing firm of Harcourt, Brace and Company; candidate for Congress in 1908 with personal endorsement of President Theodore Roosevelt; President (1930-1939), National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP); and active in public and civic affairs. See any edition of the American or International Who's Who up to the date of his death. Spingarn High School in Washington, D. C., is named after him.

He was first inspired to enter politics by a speech made to a group of Columbia students in 1895 (when my father was a 20-year-old senior at Columbia University) by Theodore Roosevelt, then (as I recall) Police Commissioner of New York City. Teddy Roosevelt said that everybody said politics was a "mucker's game" and that a gentleman could only dirty his hands by entering it. It would continue to be that, he said, unless "you educated young men go into politics and work hard at it, and remember this: politics after all is how people decide how their society should be run." My father went into Republican precinct politics initially and was Republican leader of his Assembly District in New York City. Later he became a Bull Mooser and was delegate to the two Bull Moose conventions in 1912 and 1916. He was also Bull Moose Party Chairman of Dutchess County, New York and toured Teddy Roosevelt around the county when he came there and was toastmaster at the dinner for him in Poughkeepsie. When the Bull Moose Party broke up, my father became an Independent, voting Republican in 1920 and 1924 (to his later regret). In 1928 he voted for Al Smith and in 1932 for Franklin Roosevelt. In 1936 he campaigned for Franklin Roosevelt. He died in 1939. S.J.S.)

"I know that politics are out of fashion today among the intelligentsia of the world. We are told that politics no longer count, that the important thing today is economics. But the truth is that poetry and philosophy and religion and politics are the four noblest occupations of men, and that all of us who have not some profound realization of the meaning of each one of them misses something from the life of the spirit.

"Now, poetry and philosophy and religion belong to the realm of theory. And I take politics as the highest form representative of the practical spirit. That element of utility in life which is present in every act assumes its noblest form in politics. I wish to make clear that politics is a spiritual act exactly in the same sense in which poetry and religion and philosophy are spiritual acts.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

"When the politician governs men, which is the hardest job known to humanity -- the hardest and the noblest -- when the politician governs men he is to be judged first and foremost by his success in governing men, just as in the case of a bridge you want to know whether it is a good bridge according to the standards of engineering and not whether it is a moral bridge. The first test of the politician is whether he governs well, not whether he governs morally. That is a later question. Unfortunately those who sit on the sidelines and don't realize the innate character of government are always terribly troubled by the rottenness that goes on in politics. And I don't mean to imply that there are not times when that rottenness should be our main concern. But what I mean is that always the man outside of politics sees it as a matter of rottenness and evil and people tricking and scheming. He confuses the weakness of the statesman's materials with the corruption of government itself. And so the man who hasn't a philosophical view of life will take a life like Lincoln's and just rip it to pieces, as if the art of governing men were the work of a saint.

"Now the politician doesn't feel that sense that all is rotten in politics. He feels that the evil and good in the world are the very material with which he has to deal. He feels like the poet. The real poet, the great poet, doesn't say, 'My heavens, look at all this hard prosy material I have to conquer and transfigure!' The outsider who hasn't the poet's creative flow thinks that. --How can you ever make a poem out of this story? It is impossible; there is too much in it. --Or another one says: This is the machine age! How can we make poetry out of machines? --The poet doesn't bother about those questions.

"So the statesman, the politician, isn't worried as mere outsiders are worried by the clash of passions and the fact that some men are not to be trusted and the fact that others will stab you in the back. That is all part of the game of politics. That is the material with which the statesman works, human nature and its passions. In exactly the same way that the poet deals with the stubborn material of the world and makes out of it a poem, so the politician makes his poem, which is in the government of the State. And it is a noble poem."

JOHN W. McCORMACK
12TH DIST., MASSACHUSETTS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D. C.

December 31, 1956

Mr. Stephen J. Spingarn,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Steve:-

I remember you well, particularly during the years I was a member of the Ways & Means Committee.

I have just had an opportunity of reading your letter, and your proposal.

Congratulations to the Party Chairmanship, I do not

JOHN W. McCORMACK
12TH DIST., MASSACHUSETTS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D. C.

feel learning a practical way of the measure by way of accommodation.

I commend you with your proposal, and authorize the very strong — for something along the lines outlined by you. For a number of years I have advocated without success a close relationship between the National Committee and Congress — with the National Committee having

JOHN W. McCORMACK
12TH DIST., MASSACHUSETTS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D. C.

qualified persons to do research work and give support and merit checks for members of Congress to make use of outside of Congress. Your proposal covers this — and goes further, — and in the right direction.

Not to flatter you, but to compliment you, — I think your plan is a well conceived, practical, and productive, of excellent results.

JOHN W. McCORMACK
12TH DIST., MASSACHUSETTS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D. C.

I am glad to see that someone else — you, — are thinking along the same basic lines I have been thinking and talking, and urging, — unsuccessfully, for some years.

By the time you receive this letter I will be in Washington. After the early, busy days of organizing, I do

JOHN W. McCORMACK
12TH DIST., MASSACHUSETTS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D. C.

hope you will get in touch with me so we can discuss your plan in person.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

John W. McCormack

JOHN W. McCORMACK
12TH DIST., MASSACHUSETTS

EUGENE T. KINNALY
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

BOSTON OFFICE:
JAMES V. HARTREY
SECRETARY

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D. C.

December 13, 1956

Mr. Stephen Spingarn
1900 Q Street, N.W.
Washington 9, D. C.

Dear Friend Spingarn:

I am sending you these few lines to let you know I received your letter, and the data you sent to me, which I shall read and study with special interest. I appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending the same to me.

With kind regards and the Greetings of the Season to you and your loved ones, I am

Sincerely yours,

John W. McCormack

WRIGHT PATMAN
FIRST DISTRICT
STATE OF TEXAS

WASHINGTON ADDRESS:
1201 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

HOME ADDRESS:
P. O. BOX 968, TEXARKANA, TEXAS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

COMMITTEES:
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CHAIRMAN, SMALL BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ECONOMIC REPORT
JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION

SECRETARY:
MRS. LUCILLE SPAIN

December 8, 1956

Mr. Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Que Street, N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.

Dear Steve:

I have read over the material that you left with me concerning Operation KOED ("knock on every door"), and I agree with you one hundred percent that such a group will serve a wonderful purpose and should be established. In fact, the idea is an excellent one and I know that the group will serve a purpose that is not served adequately at the ~~proper~~ time.

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

Wright Patman

Wright Patman

cc: Honorable Paul Butler
Honorable Sam Rayburn
Honorable Lyndon Johnson

Approved

COPY

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C.

December 14, 1956

Hon. Paul M. Butler
Chairman
Democratic National Committee
Washington, D.C.

Dear Paul:

I have been talking with Steve Spingarn about what he calls his KOED plan. This is a wonderful idea and just what the Party needs. It will build a close relationship between the National Committee and the Members in Congress.

I hope you will make Steve your Deputy and set him to work on this program. Incidentally, Steve's energy and ideas make him a prime mover; he has many friends on the Hill and knows what the score is.

Sincerely,

s/ Wright Patman

(Note: Congressman Wright Patman of Texas is the Chairman of the House Small Business Committee and in the incoming Congress will also be Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee. He has been in Congress since 1928.)

HARRY S. TRUMAN
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK BUILDING
KANSAS CITY 6, MISSOURI

November 20, 1956

Dear Steve:

Thank you very much for your good letter of the 16th.

I do not understand the people and their viewpoint. It would seem that they were completely fooled on two or three matters which I'll discuss with you the next time we see each other.

Your idea for 1958 and 1960 seems as if it might be a good one, and if you and Charley and Dave Lloyd stick together, you should be able to work out something that will make us win in both years.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Hon. Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Que Street, N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON
231 So. LaSalle Street
Chicago

December 7, 1956

Dear Mr. Spingarn:

I know from Arthur how helpful you were during the campaign and want to say to you, inadequate as this has to be, how very grateful I am. I know that the campaign, as well as the election, fell short of our expectation and yet I hope that we are entitled to the satisfaction of having at least made as hard a try at it as we could.

Ever so much obliged.

Sincerely,

Adlai E. Stevenson

Mr. Stephen Spingarn
1900 Quebec Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS., CHAIRMAN
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EVERETT MC KINLEY DIRKSEN, ILL.
HERMAN WELKER, IDAHO
JOHN MARSHALL BUTLER, MD.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Rec'd
1 Dec 56
SJS

November 21, 1956

Mr. Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Que Street, N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.

Dear Steve:

Your letter of November 12th has just come to my attention and I appreciate your interest and all you have done for our cause.

The results were most disappointing but we are accepting our defeat as a challenge for the job ahead and shall continue working for the Democratic principles in which we believe.

Thank you for sending me the list of names of the many wonderful people who were interested in my behalf. I have written all of them as you suggested.

Nancy joins me in sending warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

Estes

Estes Kefauver

JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA., CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS
(CREATED PURSUANT TO S. RES. 98, 81ST CONGRESS)

Post Office Box 767
Huntsville, Alabama
December 11, 1956

Mr. Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Que Street, Northwest
Washington 9, D. C.

Dear Steve:

I was glad to get the material that you sent me on December 7. I had already written a letter to Paul Butler strongly urging you for the place. Needless to say, I hope that some good may result.

I am wishing for you and yours all the good things that a happy holiday season can bring.

Sincerely,

John

John Sparkman

JOHN A.
CARROLL
For U. S. Senate

Headquarters:
425 16TH STREET
DENVER 2, COLORADO
+
AC 2-3801

December 20, 1956

Mr. Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Q Street, N.W.
Washington 9, D. C.

Dear Steve:

Thank you for your kind message of congratulations of November 18th. Your doubts as to the possibility of my success were shared by many others; however, many of us here on the scene were confident of success from the beginning. Happily, our optimism was justified.

I will be happy to talk with you as to your ideas for coming campaigns after my arrival in Washington.

Mrs. Carroll and Diane join me in the hope that you and yours enjoy a wonderful Christmas and a happy and rewarding new year.

With warm regards,

John A. Carroll

John A. Carroll

JAC:ms

P.S. Just read your "ACEH" program - sounds excellent. Fine all for it. I will review my file. Best Regards B. - See you in March. Soon J.A.C.

RICHARD F. HARLESS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1410 NORTH CENTRAL AVENUE
PHOENIX, ARIZONA
ALPINE 2-1148

December 21, 1956

Mr. Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Que St., N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.

Dear Steve:

As far as Arizona is concerned, you are sure of being appointed to the job you seek with the National Committee. Stephen Langmade,** Leisa Bronson*** and the Governor have all written to Paul Butler in your behalf. I am sure that you will receive this position and I know your work with Congress will be outstanding. I wish I were a member of Congress now so that you could call upon me.

Meredith joins me in warm personal regards and we wish the best for you during the Holiday Season and the coming year.

Sincerely,

Richard F. Harless

RFH:jh

* Formerly U.S. Congressman from Arizona
** Rep. Nat'l Committeeman for Arizona
*** " " Committeewoman " "

Rep. Udall Backs Spingarn Drive

Arizona Daily Star, Friday December 21, 1956

Letter Recommends Former UA Grad To Succeed Fitchley As Party Official

U. S. Rep. Stewart L. Udall joined yesterday in a campaign to assure the election of Stephen J. Spingarn, a University of Arizona graduate, as deputy chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

In a letter to Stephen W. Langmade, Democratic national committeeman, Udall said he reliably has been informed that Clayton Fritchey, the present deputy chairman, will resign about Jan. 1.

Spingarn, the Representative pointed out, graduated from the University of Arizona in 1930 and from the University of Arizona Law College in 1934.

"Considering his (Spingarn's) Arizona background," Udall said, "it does seem to me that it would be advantageous for our state to have a friendly voice at this high station. I don't know Spingarn personally but our mutual friends all speak highly of him."

Udall enclosed, for Langmade's information, three pages of biographical data covering long legal service in various departments of the federal government: direction, between 1943 and 1945, of the Fifth Army Counter Intelligence Corps—with the rank of lieutenant colonel — and administrative assistant to the President of the United States in 1949-50.

From 1950 through 1953 Spingarn was a member of the Federal Trade Commission.

He is the author of several articles including three that apeared in the Saturday Evening Post in 1948 on "How We Caught Spies in World War II."

Spingarn has numerous medals and special commendations for his work in the Intelligence Corps.

ERNEST W. McFARLAND
GOVERNOR

Executive Office

State House

Phoenix, Arizona
December 13, 1956

Dear Mr. Spingarn:

I have your letter of December 10, regarding your candidacy for Deputy Chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

I have written a letter to Mr. Paul Butler recommending you and hope that this will be of some assistance to you.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Ernest W. McFarland

Ernest W. McFarland

Mr. Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Que St., NW
Washington 9, D.C.

COPE

Committee on Political Education

GEORGE MEANY chairman WM. F. SCHNITZLER secretary-treasurer JACK KROLL, JAMES L. McDEVITT co-directors

815 16TH STREET, N.W. ★ WASHINGTON 6, D.C. ★ EXECUTIVE 3-0220

January 2, 1957

Mr. Stephen J. Spingarn
1900 Que Street, N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

Dear Steve:

I have your letter of December 14th before me in which you express your interest in securing the Deputy Chairmanship of the Democratic National Committee which will be vacant in January.

You may rest assured that I will be happy to do all that I possibly can.

With kind regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Jim McDevitt

James L. McDevitt
Co-Director

JLMcD:rt
oeiu #2 afl-cio

December 28, 1956

Dear Mr. Butler:

I have a note from Mr. Stephen J. Spingarn who is a candidate for the post of Deputy Chairman of the Democratic National Committee when Mr. Fritchey leaves on January first. I have known Mr. Spingarn for sometime and I feel sure that he will work with great loyalty and effectiveness if you decide that you can use him. He is a Democrat of long standing and an excellent worker.

I hope at least that you will be able to see Mr. Spingarn and judge for yourself.

Very cordially yours,

(signed) Eleanor Roosevelt

Mr. Paul Butler
Chairman
Democratic National Committee
1001 Connecticut Avenue
Washington, DC.

WIDENER 95
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

UNIVERSITY 4-9710

November 23, 1956

Dear Steve:

Just a line to thank you for your good note. I am glad to hear about Operation KOED. I think it is a great mistake for the Democrats to be complacent about the 1956 election, and we will need a good deal more than Lyndon Johnson if we are to have a chance in 1960. I am very glad that the Humphrey group is showing some signs of life.

I have been meaning to write and say how grateful we all were for your help in the campaign. You are quite right in supposing that the "peace and prosperity" passage in Stevenson's wind-up rally in Chicago was based on a suggestion from you. The Camden speech, as originally written, was also based on the Rubin story.* I myself did not go to Camden and do not know exactly what happened. But I have the impression that the Governor did not stick to the script and suspect that he may have talked about some of the critical foreign policy developments. I do not think that there ever was a text of the speech as finally delivered.

You will be glad to know that Brooks, the former Republican town chairman of Canton, ended up as a strong Stevenson supporter. I was always sure that Wendy in time would deliver that vote! Hope to see you before too long.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur S.

Mr. Stephen Spingarn
1900 Que~~bec~~ Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.

* original draft by SJS

FOLEY AND LYNCH
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
1001 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

EDWARD H. FOLEY
THOMAS J. LYNCH

TELEPHONE REPUBLIC 7-0200
CABLE ADDRESS "FOLYN"

December 13, 1956

Mr. Paul M. Butler, Chairman
Democratic National Committee
1001 Connecticut Ave. N.W.
Washington 6, D.C.

COPY

Dear Mr. Butler:

Steve Spingarn has told me of his interest in serving under you as Deputy Chairman of the Democratic National Committee.

I want to put in a word for him on the basis of merit and ability - his outstanding capability, high intelligence, indefatigable energy and devotion to the Democratic Party.

I worked for years with Steve in the Treasury Department, where I was General Counsel and Steve served as Assistant General Counsel and in other important assignments. In devising and carrying out programs, in production and in accomplishments, Steve was virtually a Department in himself, not alone in his own efforts but also in his ability as a team player to lead and inspire others.

If the Committee currently needs top staff assistance, then I believe there is a tremendous chunk of it available in Steve Spingarn.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Thomas J. Lynch

FORM LETTER

1900 Que Street N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.
DUpont 7-0666
10 January 1957

Dear

I am a Democratic politician. Briefly, my story is as follows. I am trying to sell a program for the Democratic Party to the leaders of my Party and to other persons who are effective in Party circles. I enclose material describing my program which, for pusposes of identification, I call Operation KOED, which means "knock on every door" because it is designed to bring the story of the Democratic Party on every issue to every family in the most effective and forceful manner and also to select the issues which will be most effective so that we will go to bat on the right ones and not the wrong ones as we did in 1956 (the fact that one is logically right does not help if one is politically wrong).

Many Party leaders, including President Truman, Estes Kefauver, Tom Finletter, Hubert Humphrey, George Ball, and quite a few others have spoken well of my program. I enclose a copy of a letter from John McCormack, the House Majority Leader, which speaks for itself. He has authorized me to use it and I have shown it to President Truman and other Party leaders.

A Party program must consist of two important items: a political organization program and a political ammunition program. A political organization program is being prepared by Neil Staebler, who is Chairman of the National Committee's Committee on Political Organization, and his group. The KOED program is a political ammunition program. In short, one is the gun and the other is the bullet; neither is any good without the other. I am hopeful that the San Francisco meeting on February 15th will adopt a complete program covering both political organization and political ammunition.

Aside from the obvious importance of having a complete program for the Party, it seems to me you also need it for the all-important job of fund raising. No one can get very excited about pyaing off the installments on the funeral and that is what the Party deficit is. But if you go to interested people and organizations and say, "Look, we have a hard-hitting program for the Democratic Party which will help us to win the 1958 and 1960 elections, but we can't get this program unless we have some money. How about it?"; then you have an effective basis for raising money.

I will be in New York City from Sunday, January 13th to Sunday, January 20th, staying at the Vanderbilt Hotel. If you are interested, I should welcome an opportunity to talk with you.

Sincerely yours,

Stephen J. Spingarn

SJS/jb
Encls: McCor lh ltr, 2nd Pearson
clipping, KOED, Summ, PX 2, Pers. Hist,
Pr. Rel, JES art, Patman ltrs, Btlr FR ltr,
Truman ltr.

C O P Y

1900 Que Street N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.
DUpont 7-0666
11 January 1957

Honorable John W. McCormack
The Majority Leader
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Dear John McCormack:

Your letter of December 31st and our telephone conversation of January 5th meant a great deal to me. I know how busy you are and the fact that you would sit down at 1:00 in the morning, as you told me, and write an obscure guy like myself a five-page longhand letter praising his proposed program for the Democratic Party was more than I could possibly hope for.

I have known you since 1935 when I was a youngster fresh out of Law School, working as a legislative attorney in the Treasury, and I know that you have neither the time nor the disposition to waste words and to utter meaningless flattery to a fellow who has an idea which he is trying to sell to the leaders of his Party.

I appreciate very much, too, your generosity in telling me I could use your letter to help sell my program. I showed it to President Truman last Saturday. He read it sitting on the edge of his bed at the Mayflower and he was very much impressed, because, as you know, he holds you in the highest esteem. He told me to show it to Charley Murphy right away (who is my "campaign manager") and you can bet I did. I have also showed it to Governor Williams of Michigan and other Party leaders and it has been a very valuable document on behalf of the KOED program.

I talked a few days ago to Neil Staebler, the Michigan State Democratic Chairman, and one of the ablest and most popular men in the Party organization. He is also Chairman of the Democratic National Committee's Committee on Political Organization. His Committee is charged with preparing a program on political organization for submission to the San Francisco meeting on February 15th.

I told Neil, "Look, you have a program on political organization; I have a program on political ammunition. One is the gun and the other is the bullet; neither is useful without the other. Why don't you assimilate my program into yours and present the whole thing as a total forward program for the Party at the meeting of the National Committee in San Francisco? In addition to the intrinsic merits of the program, we will have a sound basis for raising money if we have a good program. You can't raise money by talking about a deficit because people aren't much interested in paying off the installments on a funeral, but if you go to them and say we have a hard-hitting forward program for the Party that will help us win in 1958 and 1960, then you have a basis for getting contributions."

I believe that Neil was interested because he said several times, "we are thinking along the same lines."

I am going up to New York City on January 13th to stay until the 20th (at the Vanderbilt Hotel). I am doing some politicking up there because I hope to run for Congress from New York in 1958 and I have been talking to a lot of people in the State organization, including Mike Prendergast, the State Chairman. Also, I have been on the trail of Carmine De Sapio and hope to see him during that period.

C O P Y

I will be in Washington from January 21st to January 25th and I will try to get in touch with you then in the hope that the preliminary organization work of Congress is more or less over and you may be able to spare some time to see me.

On January 25th, I go to Arizona for a few days (I went to College and Law School there and I am a member of the Arizona Bar). Senator Hayden, Representative Udall, Governor McFarland, the National Committeeman and woman, and Judge Evo De Concini, the State Chairman (a Law School classmate) have all written letters or talked to Paul Butler on my behalf. Dick Harless, whom you will remember well (I believe) from his service in the House, has been helping me very effectively. He is a former Law School classmate of mine, too. He is going to arrange for me to meet all of the politicos when I go out to Arizona.

On January 30th I go to Los Angeles where I'll be at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel in Beverly Hills and later up in San Francisco for the February 15th meeting.

I am naturally hopeful that I will be able to report some success to you after that meeting, but I am keeping my fingers crossed.

The best of 1957 to you and yours.

Sincerely,

Stephen J. Spingarn

SJS/hb

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MORTIMER MAY
Nashville, Tenn.
RABBI IRVING MILLER
New York, N. Y.
STEFANIE EHRLICH-SCHWERIN
New York, N. Y.
WILLIAM H. SYLK
Philadelphia, Pa.

January 17, 1957

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

With reference to your letter of December 7th, wherein you ask me to postpone our meeting until after the first of the year, I should like to suggest now that we get together as soon as possible.

As one of your staunch followers, may I compliment you on your series of year end programs which I found outstanding.

I do not know of a better man to whom I could turn for assistance and that is why I should like to see you as soon as you can possibly make it.

Hoping to hear from you by return mail.

Yours very sincerely,

WILLI W. APTOWITZER
Executive Vice-President

WWA:HS

Yes later

Stevenson, Adlai

ADLAI E. STEVENSON
231 So. LaSalle Street
Chicago

November 21, 1955

Dear Ed:

Thanks so much for that splendid recording of excerpts from Winston Churchill. I shall play it at once, and if you perceive any improvement in my utterances, well, you are to blame. Or do I mean Churchill!

Yours,

Adlai

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Mr. Shute

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SEE IT NOW
EDWARD R. MURROW
FRED W. FRIENDLY

23 March 1954

Dear Mr. Murrow,

Today, 23 March 54, 3 pm, a man calling himself Ralph Florio called me from the CBS lobby and asked to see me about something "confidential." He had obtained my name as a member of the staff from one of the secretaries, on an earlier call. He showed me a "certificate of Incorporation of Associated Stevenson Clubs of America, Inc.", a photostat of which is attached. Mr. Florio showed me "Stevenson Workers Kits", showed me a picture of a building at 11 East 52 St, NYC which he said he and his group would be renting for $20,000 a year; he said that he would be getting--or was getting--financial and other backing from people he identified as: "Marie Kramer of the Lincoln Hotel", "Roger Stevens, treasurer" "brother of the man who owns the Empire State Building", "Mr. Ganzer and Mr. Lippert who own the Shelton Hotel." He produced a letter with an "Encyclopaedia Brittanica" letterhead, a letter signed by a "Bill Benton", a letter which said the signer agreed with Mr. Florio on the reasons for Mr. Bowles' withdrawal from India, and which went on to wish Mr. Florio best success in his "Stevenson Clubs" venture.

Mr. Florio said the "Stevenson Clubs" project was aimed at 1956. He said Senator McCarthy would try his hardest to defeat Sen. Morse in Oregon. Florio said that if it were not for him--Florio--then Morse would not be in the Senate today.

I asked Mr. Florio what he wanted. Mr. Florio said he wanted a check from Mr. Murrow for the Stevenson Clubs--"not all the money in the world, just a check." I told Mr. Florio that I could not presume to speak for Mr. Murrow but I said that I thought Mr. Florio was wasting his time. I said I didnot know whom Mr. Murrow voted for in 1952. Mr. Florio said he knew Mr. Murrow was a good friend of Mr. Eisenhower's, and also a friend of Mr. Stevenson's. I said I assumed Mr. Murrow knew them both, but just how well, I did not know. I asked Mr. Florio for identification; he gave me a card with his name and address on it--a card that read: "Independent Congressional Voters of New York City." He offered

to show me his passport, but he said he did not have his passport with him. I asked Mr. Florio to leave the incorporation papers with me until Thursday, 25 March 54. I told him that I would pass his request along to Mr. Murrow's immediate staff, inasmuch as I had no concern with such a matter, and that my name had entered the matter merely as one of the reporters who interview numerous people to find out if their proposed stories are worth pursuing.

Mr. Florio said he was well known to Mrs. "Eleanor Traub" of Eastern Sound Studios, 550 Fifth Av, NYC. This is the studio used by "See It Now." Mr. Florio said he had approached Mrs. Traub to use her studios when he--Mr. Florio--and his associates would start turning out television films on behalf of "the Stevenson campaign" in 1956. Mrs. Eleanor Traub told me, after I phoned her, that she knew nothing of Mr. Florio's background, but that he had in fact approached her during the past summer "with some checks" and talked about using her studios. Mr. Florio told me--or implied it very strongly--that he had already made arrangements with Mrs. Traub to use herstudio. She told me no arrangements at all had bee made. She said it was just one of those things, that when someone comes around to talk abo renting her studio, she tells them--as she told Mr. Florio--to come back when he gets organized and has something definite to propose. Otherwise, she said, "I don't know him from Adam."

The lawyer on the incorporation papers is Sidney G. Madenberg, 545 Fifth Av, NYC. He said he was the lawyer who had represented the incorporators. He said he knew Mr. Florio only slightly, and had little recollection of any of the group which signed the incorporation papers. It was his recollection that Mr. Florio had worked with other political groups, a it was Laywer Madenberg's opinion that Mr. Florio was in the "publicity" field.

I am passing this note to you Mr. Murrow, with the thought that if Mr. Florio represents a legitimate group, then he is guilty of sheer impertinence. And if he and his group are not legitimate, then an investigation should be made of his purpose.

Respectfully,

Joseph Wershba

Joseph Wershba

$1.00

ELECTION Guide

A Nationwide Political Survey

by JOSEPH F. McCAFFREY

House	Sen
CONN	Del.
KEN.	OHIO
N.Y.	MICH
N.Y.	
Pa.	GOV
OHIO	
IND.	N.Y.
	Pa.
	VT.

FACTS, FIGURES, AND PERSONALITIES FOR '54

The Off Year Story

THE PARTY OUT OF POWER has won seats from the party in power in every modern off-year election *except* in 1934, the first ranklin D. Roosevelt went before the voters for 34, the Democrats gained ten seats in the Senate n the Hou as the party Republic ave mid-te ts" ('18 an on four o e under P regular ele d '46. id-term gai 0 and 193 n gain in an the Democra eats than they did in 1920. In 1946, the Republi- reatest gain, 56 members over the 1944 general election.

STEVENSON

A Democratic Congress would, I think, bring closer together the United States and its allies. The present Republican Congress has been singularly unconstructive in dealing not only with our friends abroad, but even with its own President.

The election of a Democratic Congress would remove from positions of leadership those Republicans who have so often obstructed and embarrassed us abroad and replace them with leaders and committee chairmen whose outlook—as shown by their records—is responsible and enlightened.

Policies and programs in the foreign field, like revision of our laws to increase foreign trade, which the present Republican Congress has refused to approve, could go ahead.

Equal Treatment for All

In domestic affairs, the Democratic objective would be, as it has always been, to give to the average American—the farmer, the house wife, the working man, the store keeper, the professional man—equal consideration along with those who may be more privileged or powerful.

What this means is that we Democrats would do what a Republican Congress has not done—show a genuine concern about falling farm prices, unemployment and three-day and four-day work weeks.

And we could expect a Democratic Congress to check the give-aways—unfair taxes, raids

NIXON

in the last Congress. That the gains the Democrats would make in states where election contests still remain to be decided, will add strength not to the moderate wing of the Democratic party, which at times gives support to the President's program, but to the A. D. A.-controlled Left-wing. This is the group which is determined to socialize basic American institutions; which has proved that it is still notoriously soft on the internal Communist issue and which so vigorously advocates a return to the Acheson foreign policy.

I am confident that the American people will not be fooled by this desperate, dishonest campaign.

If enough people go to the polls tomorrow there is no question but that a pro-Eisenhower Republican Congress will be elected.

If only those who are satisfied with the Eisenhower Administration and who like the fact that this Administration has restored honesty, loyalty and decency to Government and has brought peace and prosperity to America, stay at home, will this desperate and fanatical left-wing clique

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Jobs 'Assigned' By Democrats

By JACK STEELE,
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 23.—The Demo[illegible] counting political chickens before they hatch, hav[illegible]ced how they will divide up Senate commit[illegible] they have not yet won.

Their decision—formally [illegible] claimed late yesterday [illegible] ate Democratic L[illegible] B. Johnson (Tex.) [illegible] that the Democra[illegible]ed in advance a beh[illegible]-scenes battle over several key chairmanships.

The top fight was over the chairmanship of the powerful Foreign Relations Committee. The winner: Sen. Walter F. George (Ga.). His old post as Finance Committee Chairman will go—if the Democrats win Senate control—to Sen. Harry Flood Byrd (Va.).

Could Be Wrong.

Sen. Johnson's face will be red, of course, if the GOP retains control of the Senate Nov. 2. The Republicans have a good chance to do so unless the election is a Democratic sweep.

He might also be embarrassed if any of the Democratic committee chairmen he named prematurely were defeated. Seven are up for re-election.

Sen. Johnson took only a slight chance on that, however.

Under the projected Democratic line-up, 11 of the 1[illegible] ate committee chairma[illegible] would go to Southerners [illegible] East would get only one [illegible] manship; the Middle West none. [illegible]

Sen. Georg[illegible] lower of the Ro[illegible] man foreign polic[illegible] Sen. Theodore Fran[illegible] Gr[illegible] (R. I.) as the Democratic choice to head the Foreign Relations Committee.

The only other major Democratic shift would hand the chairmanship of the Labor Committee to a Southern liberal, Sen. Lister Hill (Ala.).

Sen. James E. Murray (Mont.), who previously headed the Labor group, would move to chairmanship of the Interior Committee.

The Democratic line-up for other chairmanships: Agriculture: Ellender (La.); Appropriations: Hayden (Ariz.); Armed Services; Russell (Ga.); Atomic Energy: Anderson (N. Mex.); Banking and Currency: Fulbright (Ark.); District of Columbia: Neely (W. Va.); Commerce: Magnuson (Wash.); Government Operations: McClellan (Ark.); Post Office and Civil Service: Johnston (S. C.); Judiciary: Kilgore (W. Va.); Public Works: Chavez (N. [illegible] Sparkman (Ala.).

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1954

by JOSEPH F. McCAFFREY

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word.

Now let us ask how the course of a Democratic Congress would differ from the Republican path of the last two years?

A Democratic Congress would, I think, bring closer together the United States and its allies. The present Republican Congress has been singularly unconstructive in dealing not only with our friends abroad, but even with its own President.

The election of a Democratic Congress would remove from positions of leadership those Republicans who have so often obstructed and embarrassed us abroad and replace them with leaders and committee chairmen whose outlook—as shown by their records—is responsible and enlightened.

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What this means is that we Democrats would do what a Republican Congress has not done—show a genuine concern about falling farm prices, unemployment and three-day and four-day work weeks.

And we could expect a Democratic Congress to check the give-aways—unfair taxes, raids **on our public domain and favors for the few at the expense of the many.**

STEVENSON

That Democrats voted against the Eisenhower program 60 per cent of the time in the last Congress. That the gains the Democrats would make in states where election contests still remain to be decided, will add strength not to the moderate wing of the Democratic party, which at times gives support to the President's program, but to the A. D. A.-controlled Left-wing. This is the group which is determined to socialize basic American institutions; which has proved that it is still notoriously soft on the internal Communist issue and which so vigorously advocates a return to the Acheson foreign policy.

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If only those who are satisfied with the Eisenhower Administration and who like the fact that this Administration has restored honesty, loyalty and decency to Government and has brought peace and prosperity to America, stay at home, will this desperate and fanatical left-wing clique **succeed in their efforts to elect an anti-Eisenhower Congress.**

NIXON

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Jobs 'Assigned' By Democrats

By JACK STEELE,
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 23.—The Democrats, counting political chickens before they hatch, have announced how they will divide up Senate committee chairmanships they have not yet won.

Their decision—formally proclaimed late yesterday by Senate Democratic Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (Tex.)—was a signal that the Democrats had settled in advance a behind-the-scenes battle over several key chairmanships.

The top fight was over the chairmanship of the powerful Foreign Relations Committee. The winner: Sen. Walter F. George (Ga.). His old post as Finance Committee Chairman will go—if the Democrats win Senate control—to Sen. Harry Flood Byrd (Va.).

Could Be Wrong.

Sen. Johnson's face will be red, of course, if the GOP retains control of the Senate Nov. 2. The Republicans have a good chance to do so unless the election is a Democratic sweep.

He might also be embarrassed if any of the Democratic committee chairmen he named prematurely were defeated. Seven are up for re-election.

Sen. Johnson took only a slight chance on that, however.

Under the projected Democratic line-up, 11 of the 17 Senate committee chairmanships would go to Southerners. The East would get only one chairmanship; the Middle West none. Three would go to the Southwest and two to the Northwest.

Green Loses Out.

Sen. George—a faithful follower of the Roosevelt and Truman foreign policies—beat out Sen. Theodore Francis Green (R. I.) as the Democratic choice to head the Foreign Relations Committee.

The only other major Democratic shift would hand the chairmanship of the Labor Committee to a Southern liberal, Sen. Lister Hill (Ala.).

Sen. James E. Murray (Mont.), who previously headed the Labor group, would move to chairmanship of the Interior Committee.

The Democratic line-up for other chairmanships: Agriculture: Ellender (La.); Appropriations: Hayden (Ariz.); Armed Services; Russell (Ga.); Atomic Energy: Anderson (N. Mex.); Banking and Currency: Fulbright (Ark.); District of Columbia: Neely (W. Va.); Commerce: Magnuson (Wash.); Government Operations: McClellan (Ark.); Post Office and Civil Service: Johnston (S. C.); Judiciary: Kilgore (W. Va.); Public Works: Chavez (N. Mex.); Small Business: Sparkman (Ala.).

Guide

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1954

by JOSEPH F. McCAFFREY

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

Party line-up in the present 83:

SENATE **Present:** GOP 49
Dem 46
Ind 1

SENATE RACE

38 full time seats up
Maine elected GOP Smith Sept. 13
Leaves 37 races tonite
plus 2 (N.C. & Neb.) for 2 month terms

HOUSE Of 38 seats, Dems had 22, GOP 16
Dems must pick up 2 for total 24 to control

Conceed to Dems: 13

That means Dems need 11 out 24 of these races:

Calif.	Ill.	Mich.	Nev.
Col.	Iowa	Minn.	N.H. 2
Del.	Kan.	Mont.	N.J.
Idaho	Mass.	Neb. 2	N. Mex.
Ken.	Ohio	Ore.	R.I.
S.D.	Wyo.		

BULLETIN—N

This reduces Democrats in present Senate to 46, leaves one vacancy. McCarran's successor probably will be a Republican. This changes the Forecast (page 4) to a probable line-up of: Democrats 48, Republicans 47, and Independents 1.

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GUIDE TO THE ELECTION: DETAILS ON TUESDAY'S VOTING FOR CONGRESS AND GOVERNOR

*Designates incumbent. †Denotes new candidate of party now holding office. ‡Maine candidates have already been elected, in voting held on Sept. 13. §In South Carolina, Thurmond is candidate of States' Rights Democrats.

State	Total Districts	Polls Close (N. Y. Time)	Popular Vote in 1952: Eisenhower	Popular Vote in 1952: Stevenson	Senate Contests: Rep.	Senate Contests: Dem.	House Seats at Stake: R.	House Seats at Stake: D.	Gubernatorial Contests: Rep.	Gubernatorial Contests: Dem.
ALABAMA	2,710	6:00	149,231	275,075	Guin	*Sparkman	0	9	Abernethy	†Folsom
ARIZONA	519	8:00	152,042	108,528	.....	.....	1	1	*Pyle	McFarland
ARKANSAS	2,328	7:30	177,155	226,300	(None)	*McClellan	0	6	Remmel	†Faubus
CALIFORNIA	22,911	10-11	2,897,310	2,197,548	*Kuchel	Yorty	19	11	*Knight	Graves
COLORADO	1,687	9:00	379,782	245,504	Allott	†Carroll	2	2	†Brotzman	Johnson
CONNECTICUT	169	7:00	611,012	481,649	.....	.....	5	1	*Lodge	Ribicoff
DELAWARE	329	6:00	90,059	83,315	Warburton	*Frear	1	0	.....	.....
FLORIDA	1,726	6:00	544,036	444,950	.....	.....	0	8	(None)	†Collins
GEORGIA	1,810	6-7	198,979	456,823	(None)	*Russell	0	10	(None)	†Griffin
IDAHO	883	9-10	180,707	95,081	*Dworshak	Taylor	1	1	†Smylie	Hamilton
ILLINOIS	9,776	6:00	2,457,327	2,013,920	Meek	*Douglas	16	9	.....	.....
INDIANA	4,236	7:00	1,136,259	801,530	.....	.....	10	1	.....	.....
IOWA	2,483	9:00	808,906	451,513	Martin	*Gillette	8	0	†Hoegh	Herring
KANSAS	2,922	8:00	616,302	273,296	*Schoeppel	McGill	5	1	†Hall	Docking
KENTUCKY	4,133	6:00	495,029	495,729	*Cooper	Barkley	2	6	.....	.....
LOUISIANA	2,029	9:00	306,925	345,027	(None)	*Ellender	0	8	.....	.....
MAINE	‡	...	232,353	118,806	‡Smith	.....	‡3	0	.....	‡Muskie
MARYLAND	1,338	7:00	499,424	395,337	.....	.....	4	3	*McKeldin	Byrd
MASSACHUSETTS	1,954	8:00	1,292,325	1,083,525	*Saltonstall	Furcolo	8	6	*Herter	Murphy
MICHIGAN	4,781	8:00	1,551,529	1,230,657	*Ferguson	McNamara	13	5	Leonard	*Williams
MINNESOTA	3,851	9:00	763,211	608,458	Bjornson	*Humphrey	5	4	*Anderson	Freeman
MISSISSIPPI	1,820	7:00	112,966	172,566	White	*Eastland	0	6	.....	.....
MISSOURI	4,635	8:00	959,429	929,830	.....	.....	4	7	.....	.....
MONTANA	1,094	8:00	157,394	106,213	D'Ewart	*Murray	1	1	.....	.....
NEBRASKA	2,110	9:00	421,603	188,057	†Curtis	Neville	4	0	†Anderson	Ritchie
NEVADA	380	[illegible]	36,503	31,688	*Brown	Green Bible	1	0	*Russell	Pittman
NEW HAMPSHIRE	297	8:00	166,287	106,663	*Bridges †Cotton	Morin Betley	2	0	†Dwinell	Shaw
NEW JERSEY	3,998	8:00	1,374,613	1,015,902	†Case	Howell	8	6	.....	.....
NEW MEXICO	930	9:00	132,170	105,661	Mechem	*Anderson	0	2	†Stockton	Simms
NEW YORK	10,436	7:00	3,952,815	3,104,601	.....	.....	27	16	†Ives	Harriman
NORTH CAROLINA	2,022	6:30	558,107	652,803	West (None)	†Scott *Erwin	1	11	.....	.....
NORTH DAKOTA	2,325	8:00	191,712	76,694	.....	.....	2	0	*Brunsdale	Bymers
OHIO	11,347	6:30	2,100,391	1,600,367	Bender	*Burke	16	6	Rhodes	*Lausche
OKLAHOMA	3,165	7-8	518,045	430,939	Mock	*Kerr	1	5	Sparks	†Gary
OREGON	2,499	11:00	420,815	270,579	*Cordon	Neuberger	4	0	*Patterson	Carson
PENNSYLVANIA	8,647	8:00	2,415,789	2,146,269	.....	.....	19	11	†Wood	Leader
RHODE ISLAND	292	4-9	210,935	203,293	Sundlun	*Green	0	2	Lewis	*Roberts
SOUTH CAROLINA	1,587	6:00	168,082	173,004	(None)	†Brown §Thurmond	0	6	(None)	†Timmerman
SOUTH DAKOTA	1,965	6-7	203,857	90,426	*Mundt	Holum	2	0	†Foss	Martin
TENNESSEE	2,591	6-10	446,147	443,710	Wall	*Kefauver	2	7	(None)	*Clement
TEXAS	254	8:00	1,102,878	969,228	Watson	*Johnson	0	22	Adams	*Shivers
UTAH	1,008	10:00	194,190	135,364	.....	.....	2	0	.....	.....
VERMONT	246	6:00	109,717	43,355	.....	.....	1	0	†Johnson	Branon
VIRGINIA	1,840	6:00	349,037	268,677	(None)	*Robertson	3	7	.....	.....
WASHINGTON	4,683	11:00	599,107	492,845	.....	.....	6	1	.....	.....
WEST VIRGINIA	2,825	7:30	419,970	453,578	Sweeney	*Neely	1	5	.....	.....
WISCONSIN	3,228	7-9	979,744	622,175	.....	.....	8	2	*Kohler	Proxmire
WYOMING	669	9:00	81,047	47,934	†Harrison	O'Mahoney	1	0	†Simpson	Jack
Totals	149,463	.....	33,937,253	27,314,992	Seats at stake: R-15, D-22		216	215	Seats at stake: R-22, D-11	

Party line-up in the present 83

SENATE: Present: GOP 49
Dem 46
Ind 1

HOUSE

SENATE RACE

38 full time seats up
Maine elected GOP Smith Sept. 13
Leaves 37 races tonite
plus 2 (N.C. & Neb.) for 2 month terms

Of 38 seats, Dems had 22, GOP 16
Dems must pick up 2 for total 24 to control

Conceed to Dems: 13

That means Dems need 11 out 24 of these races:

Calif.	Ill.	Mich.	Nev.
Col.	Iowa	Minn.	N.H. 2
Del.	Kan.	Mont.	N.J.
Idaho	Mass.	Neb. 2	N. Mex.
Ken.	Ohio	Ore.	R.I.
S.D.	Wyo.		

BULLETIN—N

This reduces Democrats in present Senate to 46, leaves one vacancy. McCarran's successor probably will be a Republican. This changes the Forecast (page 4) to a probable line-up of: Democrats 48, Republicans 47, and Independents 1.

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GUIDE TO THE ELECTION: DETAILS ON TUESDAY'S VOTING FOR CONGRESS AND GOVERNOR

*Designates incumbent. †Denotes new candidate of party now holding office. ‡Maine candidates have already been elected, in voting held on Sept. 13. §In South Carolina, Thurmond is candidate of States' Rights Democrats.

State	Total Districts	Polls Close (N. Y. Time)	Popular Vote in 1952 Eisenhower	Popular Vote in 1952 Stevenson	Senate Contests Rep.	Senate Contests Dem.	House Seats at Stake R.	House Seats at Stake D.	Gubernatorial Contests Rep.	Gubernatorial Contests Dem.
ALABAMA	2,710	6:00	149,231	275,075	Guin	*Sparkman	0	9	Abernethy	†Folsom
ARIZONA	519	8:00	152,042	108,528	.....	.....	1	1	*Pyle	McFarland
ARKANSAS	2,328	7:30	177,155	226,300	(None)	*McClellan	0	6	Remmel	†Faubus
CALIFORNIA	22,911	10-11	2,897,310	2,197,548	*Kuchel	Yorty	19	11	*Knight	Graves
COLORADO	1,687	9:00	379,782	245,504	Allott	†Carroll	2	2	†Brotzman	Johnson
CONNECTICUT	169	7:00	611,012	481,649	.....	.....	5	1	*Lodge	Ribicoff
DELAWARE	329	6:00	90,059	83,315	Warburton	*Frear	1	0	.....	.....
FLORIDA	1,726	6:00	544,036	444,950	.....	.....	0	8	(None)	†Collins
GEORGIA	1,810	6-7	198,979	456,823	(None)	*Russell	0	10	(None)	†Griffin
IDAHO	883	9-10	180,707	95,081	*Dworshak	Taylor	1	1	†Smylie	Hamilton
ILLINOIS	9,776	6:00	2,457,327	2,013,920	Meek	*Douglas	16	9	.....	.....
INDIANA	4,236	7:00	1,136,259	801,530	.....	.....	10	1	.....	.....
IOWA	2,483	9:00	808,906	451,513	Martin	*Gillette	8	0	†Hoegh	Herring
KANSAS	2,922	8:00	616,302	273,296	*Schoeppel	McGill	5	1	†Hall	Docking
KENTUCKY	4,133	6:00	495,029	495,729	*Cooper	Barkley	2	6	.....	.....
LOUISIANA	2,029	9:00	306,925	345,027	(None)	*Ellender	0	8	.....	.....
MAINE	‡	...	232,353	118,806	‡Smith	.....	‡3	0	.....	‡Muskie
MARYLAND	1,338	7:00	499,424	395,337	.....	.....	4	3	*McKeldin	Byrd
MASSACHUSETTS	1,954	8:00	1,292,325	1,083,525	*Saltonstall	Furcolo	8	6	*Herter	Murphy
MICHIGAN	4,781	8:00	1,551,529	1,230,657	*Ferguson	McNamara	13	5	Leonard	*Williams
MINNESOTA	3,851	9:00	763,211	608,458	Bjornson	*Humphrey	5	4	*Anderson	Freeman
MISSISSIPPI	1,820	7:00	112,966	172,566	White	*Eastland	0	6	.....	.....
MISSOURI	4,635	8:00	959,429	929,830	.....	.....	4	7	.....	.....
MONTANA	1,094	8:00	157,394	106,213	D'Ewart	*Murray	1	1	.....	.....
NEBRASKA	2,110	9:00	421,603	188,057	†Curtis	Neville	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	1	0	[illegible]	[illegible]
NEW HAMPSHIRE	297	8:00	166,287	106,663	*Bridges †Cotton	Morin Betley	2	0	†Dwinell	Shaw
NEW JERSEY	3,998	8:00	1,374,613	1,015,902	†Case	Howell	8	6	.....	.....
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NEW YORK	10,436	7:00	3,952,815	3,104,601	.....	.....	27	16	†Ives	Harriman
NORTH CAROLINA	2,022	6:30	558,107	652,803	West (None)	†Scott *Erwin	1	11	.....	.....
NORTH DAKOTA	2,325	8:00	191,712	76,694	.....	.....	2	0	*Brunsdale	Bymers
OHIO	11,347	6:30	2,100,391	1,600,367	Bender	*Burke	16	6	Rhodes	*Lausche
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PENNSYLVANIA	8,647	8:00	2,415,789	2,146,269	.....	.....	19	11	†Wood	Leader
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VIRGINIA	1,840	6:00	349,037	268,677	(None)	*Robertson	3	7	.....	.....
WASHINGTON	4,083	11:00	599,107	492,845	.....	.....	6	1	.....	.....
WEST VIRGINIA	2,825	7:30	419,970	453,578	Sweeney	*Neely	1	5	.....	.....
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	979,744	622,175	.....	.....	8	2	*Kohler	Proxmire
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	47,934	†Harrison	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	27,314,992	Seats at stake: R-32, D-33		218	218	Seats at stake: R-21, D-11	

FORECA

		LIBERAL-CONSERVATIVE
ILL.	SENATE	DOUGLAS-MEEK
ORE.	SENATE	GORDON-NEUBERGER
DEL.	SENATE	FREAR-WARBURTON
ARIZ.	HOUSE (2)	DEM. UDALL - GOP ZIPR
PENNA.	GOV.	GOP WOOD - DEM. LEADER
		FARM (GOP FOR FLEX.)
KAN.	SENATE	SCHOEPPEL-MCGILL
IDAHO	SENATE	DWARSHAK-TAYLOR
		UNEMPLOYMENT
MICH.	SENATE	FERGUSON-MCNAMARA
MICH.	GOVERNOR	WILLIAMS-LEONARD
ILL.	SENATE	DOUGLAS-MEEK
		COMMUNISM
CALIF.	HOUSE (6)	DEM. CONDON-GOP BALDWIN
IDAHO	SENATE	DWORSHAK-TAYLOR
WYO.	SENATE	O'MAHONEY-HARRISON
		MC CARTHYISM
N.J.	SENATE	CASE-HOWELL
ILL.	SENATE	DOUGLAS-MEEK
OHIO	SENATE	BURKE-BENDER
WISC.	HOUSE (5)	GOP KERSTEN-DEM. REUSS

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Senate:

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SYMBOL KEY

(R) designates Republican; (D) Democratic; (Ind.) Independent.

R+5,000 means a margin of 5,000 votes for the Republican candidate; D+5,000 means a margin of 5,000 votes for the Democratic candidate.

An asterisk (*) before a name designates the incumbent office-holder.

The candidate's name is followed by his party designation (R) or (D); his home town; his age; his occupation; his current Congressional committee assignments; and the date of the beginning of his present service in Congress.

House districts with color overlays indicate so-called "marginal" districts, where the office-holder was elected in 1952 by 55 per cent of the vote or less.

The percentage figure following the (R+) or (D+) voting margin indicates the victory percentage.

ARIZ.	2ND DIST.	(D) UDALL - (R) ZIFF R-16,550
CAL.	6TH DIST.	(D) CONDON - (R) BALDWIN D-8700
CONN.	1ST.DIST.	(D) DODD - (R) BARNES R-3781
CONN.	3RD DIST.	(D) GARTLAND - (R) CRETELLA R-11,610
DEL.	SENATE	(D) FREAR - (R) WARBURTON '48 D-3642
ILL.	SENATE	(D) DOUGLAS - (R) MEEK Dems. Cook Co. 150,000
IND.	HOUSE(11)	(D) BOSWELL - (R) BROWNSON R-58,000
KEN.	3RD DIST.	(D) ROBERTSON - (R) ROBISON GOP since'46;GOP 12,000
MD.	5TH DIST.	(D) LANKFORD - (R) SMALL R-1039
MICH.	SENATE	(D) MCNAMARA - (R) FERGUSON Dems. Wayne Co. 50,000
N.J.	4TH DIST.	(D) THOMPSON - (R) FREEMAN D-2608
N.J.	6TH DIST.	(D) WILLIAMS - (R) SHEPHERD R-44,549
N.Y.	6TH DIST.	(D) HOLTZMAN - (R) HALPERN D-541
OHIO	SENATE	(D) BURKE - (R) BENDER Dems. Cayugo by 75,000
OHIO	3RD DIST.	(D) TALBOT - (R) SCHENCK R-17,000
PENNA.	6TH DIST.	(D) HEMPHILL - (R) SCOTT R-6244
UTAH	1ST DIST.	(D) GRANGER - (R) DIXON(String) R-25,000
VA.	10TH DIST	(D) WEBB - (R) BROYHILL R-15,381

*Kenneth A. Roberts (D)	Anniston	UNOPPOSED
*Albert Rains (D)	Gadsden	UNOPPOSED
*Armistead I. Selden, Jr. (D)	Greensboro	UNOPPOSED
*Carl Elliott (D)	Jasper	UNOPPOSED
*Robert E. Jones, Jr. (D)	Scottsboro	UNOPPOSED
George Huddleston, Jr. (D)	Birmingham; succeeds Laurie Battle, unsuccessful candidate for U.S. Senate.	UNOPPOSED

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ARIZONA

To be elected: Governor; 2 House members. Polls close: 6 P.M., MST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 152,042; Stevenson 108,528: R+43,514 (58.3%)

GOVERNOR:

***Howard Pyle (R)** Temple; elected second two-year term '52

Ernest W. McFarland (D) Florence; member U.S. Senate '40-'52. Senate Democratic Leader '51-'52
1952: Pyle (R) 156,195; Joe Haldiman (D) 103,-789: R+52,406

U. S. SENATE:

***Carl Hayden (D)** Phoenix; 77; '26.
1950: Hayden (D) 116,246; Bruce Brockett (R) 68,846: D+47,400 (62.8%)

***Barry M. Goldwater (R)** Phoenix; '52
1952: Goldwater (R) 132,063; *Ernest W. McFarland (D) 125,338: R+6,725 (51.3%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

2 members to be elected

Present membership: 1 Republican; 1 Democrat

1

***John J. Rhodes (R)** Mesa; 38; attorney; Labor, Interior Cmtes; Nov. '52

L. S. Adams (D) Phoenix; State Representative
1952: Rhodes (R) 66,512; *John R. Murdock (D) 56,622: R+9,890 (54.1%)
Eisenhower 74,793; Stevenson 58,243: R+16,550

2

Stewart L. Udall (D) Tucson; Pima County Attorney. *Harold Patten (D) retired.

Henry Zipf (R) Tucson; attorney; former aide to Senator Goldwater
1952: Patten (D) 71,245; William C. Frey (R) 54,021: D+17,224
Eisenhower 74,793; Stevenson 58,243: R+16,550

VIEWPOINTS—ARIZONA:

Republican: All-out effort to hold gains here. Expect to re-elect Governor Pyle and Congressman Rhodes.

Democratic: This state is a good example of what having Ike at the head of the ticket can do to normally Democratic areas. With Ike not there this year, McFarland should come back as Governor and we should recapture the 1st House District.

Editor: Governor Pyle and Senator Goldwater give Arizona Republicans a double-barrelled campaign weapon. However, McFarland can't be under-sold, and without Ike on the ticket, the race here is wide open.

ARKANSAS

To be elected: Governor, 1 U.S. Senator, unopposed; 6 House members, all unopposed. Polls close: 6:30 P.M., CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 177,155; Stevenson 226,300: D+49,145

GOVERNOR:

Orval Faubus (D) Huntsville, publisher

Pratt Remmel (R) Little Rock; mayor of Little Rock
Faubus defeated incumbent *Gov. Francis Cherry (D) in Primary run-off

U. S. SENATE: (no contest)

***John L. McClellan (D)** Camden; 58; attorney; Appropriations, Judiciary and Government Operations Cmtes; Nov. '42; unopposed for his 3rd six-year term
McClellan defeated former Gov. Sid McMath (D) in the Primary

***J. W. Fulbright (D)** Fayetteville; Nov. '44

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

6 members to be elected, all unopposed

Present membership: 6 Democrats

1-6	***Ezekiel C. Gathings (D)**	West Memphis	UNOPPOSED
	***Wilbur D. Mills (D)**	Kensett	UNOPPOSED
	***James W. Trimble (D)**	Berryville	UNOPPOSED
	***Oren Harris (D)**	El Dorado	UNOPPOSED
	***Brooks Hays (D)**	Little Rock	UNOPPOSED
	***W. F. Norrell (D)**	Monticello	UNOPPOSED

U.S. SENATE ELECTIONS:

Elected: 1 (R), Maine (Election held September 13, 1954)

Three to be elected: Nebraska

Two to be elected: New Hampshire, North Carolina

One to be elected: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming.

G. O. P. IS TROUBLED BY ARIZONA TREND

Governor Pyle, Twice Winner, Hard Pressed by Veteran Ex-Senator McFarland

Special to The New York Times.

PHOENIX, Ariz., Oct. 23 — Arizona has only three noteworthy political contests this year—for the Governorship and two House seats—but their significance may be considerable.

Arizona was, along with New Mexico, a state that in 1950 presaged the national Republican sweep of two years later by disrupting a long-entrenched Democratic regime and installing a Republican Governor.

Today the trend seems to be the other way. That same Republican Governor, Howard Pyle, who outstripped General Eisenhower in rallying votes in 1952, is running for a third term and is hard pressed.

His challenger is a veteran Democratic wheel horse on the national level—Ernest McFarland, Senate majority leader during the last two years of the Truman Administration, who was edged out in 1952 by Barry Goldwater.

On the Congressional level, the Republicans have little hope of winning the Second District seat (all of the state outside of the Phoenix area), which has always been occupied by a Democrat.

First District in Doubt

And they have a fight on their hands to hold the First District seat, occupied by John J. Rhodes, which they captured in the 1952 Eisenhower landslide.

The Second District seat is being relinquished by Harold A. Patten. The Democratic aspirant is Stewart Udall, a young Tucson lawyer and a member of one of the state's first families. The Udalls are Mormons, and the Mormon vote is important in Arizona.

The Republican contender is Henry Zipf, wha has been Senator Goldwater's administrative assistant. He has been campaigning on a platform composed in equal parts of his pro-Eisenhower orientation, his familiarity with Washington, and the charge that Mr. Udall is "left wing" because he signed a 1948 petition to put Henry Wallace's Progressive party candidacy on the ballot.

In the First District Representative Rhodes is challenged by L. S. ("Dick") Adams, recent Democratic leader in the State Assembly.

Pyle Is Facile Speaker

Governor Pyle, a 48-year-old former radio commentator with considerable rhetorical facility, is somewhat a victim of the electoral disenchantment that goes with familiarity.

In 1950, as the underdog, he nosed out State Controller Ana Frohmiller for the Governorship. He marshaled impressive support in 1952. But he has conducted an Earl Warren-style "nonpartisan" administration in a traditionally partisan state, and has grappled with a divided Legislature.

His raid in July, 1953, on the Short Creek polygamous colony of renegade Mormons, and the breaking up of their families aroused widespread criticism and is believed to have cost him some support.

On Oct. 2 a survey by the Arizona Poll, a private organization which had a remarkable record of accuracy in 1952, indicated Mr. McFarland had 46.6 per cent of the support and Governor Pyle 43.4 per cent, with ten per cent undecided.

CALIFORNIA

To be elected: Governor; 1 U.S. Senator; 30 House members, 2 unopposed. Polls close: 8 P.M., PST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 2,897,310; Stevenson 2,197,548: R+699,762 (56.3%)

GOVERNOR:

***Goodwin J. Knight (R)** Los Angeles; succeeded Earl Warren when Warren was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in '53

Richard P. Graves (D) Lafayette; ex-officer of the League of Cities
Last general election for Gov. in '46; Warren won both nominations in '50

U. S. SENATE:

***Thomas H. Kuchel (R)** Anaheim; appointed to succeed Vice President Nixon in '53; Interior, Public Works Cmtes

Samuel W. Yorty (D) Los Angeles; House member '50-'54; Interior Cmte
1950: Last contested Senate race; Richard L. Nixon defeated Helen Gahaghan Douglas (59.2%)

***William F. Knowland (R)** Piedmont; Majority Leader; appointed Aug. '45, re-elected '46, '52
1952: Knowland (R) won both nominations, so there was no contested general election

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

28 members to be elected; 2 have no opposition

Present membership: 19 Republicans; 11 Democrats

1 ***Hubert B. Scudder (R)** Sebastopol; 56; Public Works Cmte; '48

Max Kortum (D) Petaluma; agriculturalist
1952: Scudder (R) & (D) 137,801; C. Sullivan (I-P) 21,734: R+116,067
Eisenhower 113,106; Stevenson 62,157: R+50,949

2 ***Clair Engle (D)** Won both nominations; first elected '46 UNOPPOSED

3 ***John E. Moss, Jr.** Sacramento; real estate; Post Office Cmte; '52

James H. Phillips (R) Sacramento; attorney
1952: Moss (D) 87,335; Leslie Wood (R) 82,133: R+5,202 (51.5%)
Eisenhower 92,023; Stevenson 85,947: R+6,076

4 ***William S. Mailliard (R)** San Francisco; 37; banker; Merchant Marine Cmte; '52

Phillip A. O'Rourke (D) San Francisco; union official
1952: Mailliard (R) 102,359; *Franck R. Havenner (D) 83,748: R+18,611 (55%)

5 ***John F. Shelley (D)** San Francisco; won both nominations; first elected '49 UNOPPOSED

6	*Robert L. Condon (D)	Walnut Creek; 42; attorney; Government Operations Cmte; '52
	John F. Baldwin, Jr. (R)	Martinez; lawyer 1952: Condon (D) 87,768; John F. Baldwin, Jr. (R) 85,756: D+2,012 (50.6%) Eisenhower 85,909; Stevenson 94,629: D+8,720
7	*John J. Allen, Jr. (R)	Oakland; 55; lawyer; Merchant Marine Cmte; '46
	Stanley K. Crook (D)	Berkeley; economist 1952: Allen (R) & (D) 120,666; J. A. Johnson (I-P) 22,408: R+98,258
8	*George P. Miller (D)	Alameda; 63; engineer; Armed Services Cmte; '44
	Jess M. Ritchie (R)	Oakland; manufacturer 1952: Miller (D) won both nominations
9	*J. Arthur Younger (R)	San Mateo; 65; real estate; Interstate Cmte; '52
	Harold F. Taggart (D)	San Mateo; professor 1952: Younger (R) 71,426; Taggart (D) 61,028: R+10,398 (53.9%) Eisenhower 87,780; Stevenson 50,802: R+37,978
10	*Charles S. Gubser (R)	Gilroy; 38; farmer; Post Office Cmte; '52
	Paul V. Birmingham (D)	San Jose; engineer 1952: Gubser (R) 106,375; Arthur Johnson (D) 70, 271: R+36,104 Eisenhower 113,967; Stevenson 72,321: R+41,646
11	*Leroy Johnson (R)	Stockton; 66; lawyer; Armed Services Cmte; '42
	Carl Sugar (D)	Stockton; engineer 1952: Johnson (R) & (D) 101,052; Leslie Schlingheyde (I-P) 14,999: R+86,053 Eisenhower 72,123; Stevenson 56,781: R+15,342
12	*Oakley Hunter (R)	Fresno; 37; lawyer; Appropriations Cmte; '50
	B. F. Sisk (D)	Fresno; businessman 1952: Hunter (R) won both nominations Eisenhower 70,823; Stevenson 71,899: D+1,076
13	Charles M. Teague (R)	Ojai; attorney; *Ernest Bramblett (R) not a candidate
	Timothy I. O'Reilly (D)	San Luis Obispo; attorney 1952: Bramblett (R) 79,496; Will Hays (R) 76,-516: R+2,980 (50.9%) Eisenhower 98,895; Stevenson 62,454: R+36,441
14	*Harlan Hagan (D)	Hanford; 40; lawyer; Veterans Affairs Cmte; '52
	Al Blain (R)	Visalia; real estate 1952: Hagan (D) 70,809; *Thomas H. Werdel (R) 68,011: D+2,798 (51.0%) Eisenhower 80,738; Stevenson 65,393: R+17,445
15	*Gordon L. McDonough (R)	Los Angeles; chemist; 59; Banking Cmte; '44
	Frank P. O'Sullivan (D)	Los Angeles; businessman 1952: McDonough (R) won both nominations
16	*Donald L. Jackson (R)	Pacific Palisades; 44; public relations; Foreign Affairs, Un-American Activities Cmtes; '46
	S. Mark Hogue (D)	Los Angeles; minister 1952: Jackson (R) 79,127; Jerry K. Harter (D) 53,337: R+25,790

17	***Cecil R. King (D)**	Inglewood; 56; businessman; Ways and Means Cmte; Aug. '42
	Robert H. Finch (R)	Inglewood; lawyer 1952: King (D) 114,650; Robert H. Finch (R) 92,587: D+22,063
18	***Craig Hosmer (R)**	Long Beach; 39; lawyer; Interior Cmte; '52
	Joseph M. Kennick (D)	Long Beach; welfare supervisor 1952: Hosmer (R) 90,438; Joseph M. Kennick (D) 72,457: R+17,981
19	***Chet Holifield (D)**	Montebello; 51; businessman; Joint Atomic Energy Cmte; '42
	Raymond R. Pritchard (R)	Downey; aero. enginer 1952: Holifield (D) won both nominations
20	***Carl Hinshaw (R)**	Pasadena; 59; real estate; Interstate Cmte; '38
	Eugene Radding (D)	Burbank; lawyer 1952: Hinshaw (R) won both nominations
21	***Edgar W. Hiestand (R)**	Altadena; retail manager; Banking Cmte; '52
	William E. Roskam (D)	Burbank; insurance broker 1952: Hiestand (R) 112,100; Everett G. Burkhalter (D) 97,007: R+15,093 (53.6%)
22	***Joe Holt (R)**	Encino; 30; public relations; Labor Cmte; '52
	William M. Costley (D)	Van Nuys; lawyer 1952: Holt (R) 85,039; Dean McHenry (D) 55,534: R+29,505
23	***Clyde Doyle (D)**	South Gate; 67; lawyer; Armed Services, Un-American Activities Cmtes; '46
	Frank G. Bussing (R)	Compton; Mayor of Compton 1952: Doyle (D) 138,356; Thompson (I-P) 17,501: D+120,855
24	***Glenard P. Lipscomb (R)**	Los Angeles; 39; accountant; Government Operations Cmte: '53
	George Arnold (D)	Los Angeles; lawyer; was Lipscomb's opponent in '53 special 1952: Norris Poulson (R), now Mayor of Los Angeles, won both nominations
25	***Patrick J. Hillings (R)**	Arcadia; 31; lawyer; Judiciary Cmte; '50
	John C. Sobieski (D)	San Marino; attorney 1952:Hillings (R) 135,465; Woodrow Wilson Sayre (D) 75,125: R+60,340
26	**Theodore R. Owings (R)**	Culver City; City Clerk. This is Samuel W. Yorty's seat
	James Roosevelt (D)	Los Angeles; insurance 1952: *Yorty (D) & (R) 157,973; Horace V. Alexander (I-P) 21,465: D+136,508
27	***Harry R. Sheppard (D)**	Yucaipa; 69; businessman; Appropriations Cmte; '36
	Martin K. Barrett (R)	Yucaipa; accountant 1952: Sheppard (D) 68,773; Carl Hilliard (R) 56,202: D+12,571 (55%) Eisenhower 73,921; Stevenson 54,615: R+19,306

28

***James B. Utt (R)** — Santa Ana; 55; attorney; Ways and Means Cmte; '52

Harriet Enderle (D) — Santa Ana; housewife
1952: Utt (R) 106,972; Lionel VanDeerlin (D) 62,779: R+44,193

29

***John Phillips (R)** — Banning; 67; educator; Appropriations Cmte; '42

Bruce Shangle (D) — Blythe; farmer
1952: Phillips (R) won both nominations
Eisenhower 59,336; Stevenson 32,349: R+26,987

30

***Bob Wilson (R)** — Chula Vista; 38; advertising; Armed Services Cmte; '52

Ross T. McIntyre (D) — Coronado; retired Naval Admiral, former physician to FDR
1952: Wilson (R) 121,332; DeGraff Austin (D) 82,311: R+39,021

VIEWPOINTS—CALIFORNIA:

Republican: Despite the fact that all Republicans have opposition this year after failing to win both primaries, the state should continue with a Republican Governor and a brace of Republican Senators. In the House, Republicans have an excellent chance of picking up the 3rd, 6th, 14th and 23rd.

Democratic: Better off in this state than in several years. Two years ago the Democrats lost a chance to even compete in the Senatorial by losing to Knowland in the primary. Sam Yorty is hard-driving, dynamic, and if anyone can turn over the state's recent Republican trend, he will do it. Chances to gain House seats are good in this state. Among the better possibilities are: 9th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 18th, 21st and 30th.

Editor: This year the cross-file was neutralized by a requirement for the candidates to list their party affiliations. All districts listed by the Republican and Democratic view above are question marks. There is general agreement that this state, as far as House seats are concerned, is the hardest to predict.

COLORADO

To be elected: Governor, 1 U.S. Senator, 4 House members. Polls close: 7 PM, MST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 379,782; Stevenson 245,504: R+114,278 (60.3%)

GOVERNOR:

Donald G. Brotzman (R) — Boulder; 32; State Senator

Edwin C. Johnson (D) — Craig; 70; ending 3rd term as U.S. Senator (elected '36); served one term as Lieutenant-Governor, two terms as Governor

*Gov. Dan Thornton (R) now finishing 2nd two-year term, not a candidate for re-election.
1952: Thornton (R) 349,920; John W. Metzger (D) 260,039: R+89,881

COLORADO'S RACES AT BOILING POINT

Off-Year Campaign Points Up Question of Power of the President's Personality

By SETH S. KING
Special to The New York Times.

DENVER, Oct. 30—Colorado' lusty off-year campaign entere its final wild round today wit the outcome apparently depend ing on whether the influence o President Eisenhower, the state' favorite son-in-law, could offse a strong Democratic trend an the vote-producing magic of Sen ator Edwin C. Johnson.

Regardless of who won, many persons here believed the election would serve as a testing ground for the President's reclamation policies and for his farm program.

Should the Democrats win the United States Senate race and upset Republican incumbents in two of the state's four Congressional districts, a change of direction in the Administration's public power, irrigation, and agricultural philosophies might be required before the 1956 Presidential elections.

Should the Republicans upset the pre-election form charts by capturing the Senate and Gubernatorial seats, and adding to their Congressional strength, it was believed the President and his Cabinet would have a strong argument for continuing their current policies.

Colorado's voting tendencies have been as variable through the years as the capricious winds that howl down out of the Rocky Mountains.

At the moment the Governor is a Republican. One Senate seat is held by a Democrat and the other by a Republican, and the four-man Congressional delegation is split evenly between the two parties.

This year, Senator Johnson, who has represented the state in Washington for 18 years, is the Democratic candidate for Governor, and his supporters were hoping he could pull the other members of his party into office behind him.

The Republican incumbent, Gov. Dan Thornton, is not seeking re-election. The G. O. P. candidate is Don Brotzman, a 32-year old former University of Colorado football star, who has served in both houses of the state's Legislature.

With Senator Johnson out of the Senate contest, the race is between former Representative John Carroll of Denver, the Democrat, and Lieut. Gov. Gordon Allott of Lamar, the Republican.

During the last few days the Senatorial race has taken a new turn. Mr. Allott and his headquarters have placed a series of advertisements in Colorado newspapers charging that Mr. Carroll, when in Congress, voted against appropriations for the House Un-American Activities Committee and against anti-Communist legislative measures.

Mr. Carroll, an Irish Catholic, has bitterly denounced this attack, labeling it a "poor form of McCarthyism." He said he voted against the Un-American Activities appropriation because he believed that a fair-play code for witnesses should have been included in the bill. He voted against the anti-Communist measure, he said, because President Truman, then in office, had contended it would be more of a hindrance than a help.

A newspaper poll concluded last night showed Senator Johnson holding a lead, but it had narrowed to a 3 to 2 margin. Mr. Carroll held an edge over Mr. Allott but it also had decreased to 5 to 4 margin.

0430

U. S. SENATE:

	John Carroll (D)	Denver; 53; attorney; House member '46, '48
	Gordon Allott (R)	Lemar; present Lieutenant-Governor. *Edwin C. Johnson (D) not a candidate for re-election; running for Gov. 1948: Johnson (D) 340,719; Will F. Nicholson (R) 165,069: D+175,650
	***Eugene D. Millikin (R)**	Denver; 63; Chairman Finance Committee and Senate Republican Conference; Nov. '42, '44, '50 1950: Millikin (R) 239,724; John Carroll (D) 210,442: R+29,282

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

4 members to be elected

Present membership: 2 Republicans; 2 Democrats

1	***Byron G. Rogers (D)**	Denver; 54; attorney; Judiciary Committee; Nov. '50
	(Mrs.) Ellen G. Harris (R)	Denver; former co-Chairman of National Citizens for Eisenhower Committee 1952: Rogers (D) 101,864; Mason K. Knuckles (R) 97,442: D+4,422 (51.1%) Eisenhower 119,792; Stevenson 92,237: R+27,555
2	***William S. Hill (R)**	Fort Collins; 68; educator; Agriculture Committee; Nov. '40
	Lacy L. Wilkinson (D)	Greeley; ex-Mayor of Greeley 1952: Hill (R) 113,566; Ralph L. Williams (D) 66,300: R+47,266 Eisenhower 121,397; Stevenson 63,559: R+57,838
3	***J. Edgar Chenoweth (R)**	Trinidad; 57; attorney; Rules Committee; Nov. '40, defeated '48, back in '50
	Alva Adams, Jr. (D)	Pueblo; son of the late U.S. Senator Adams 1952: Chenoweth (R) 84,739; *John H. Marsalis (D) 62,025: R+22,714 Eisenhower 87,859; Stevenson 61,138: R+26,721
4	***Wayne N. Aspinall (D)**	Palisade; 58; attorney; Interior Committee; Nov. '48
	Charles E. Wilson (R)	Glenwood Springs; hotel operator 1952: Aspinall (D) 39,676; Howard M. Shults (R) 39,647: D+29 (50.0%) Eisenhower 50,734; Stevenson 28,570: R+22,164

VIEWPOINTS—COLORADO:

Republican: Hope to gain a Senate seat with Democrat Ed Johnson shifting over to Governor. See possible gain of two House seats: 1st and 4th Districts.

Democratic: This is another of Eisenhower's adopted states. Yet he couldn't carry in his Republican House candidates against Rogers and Aspinall in '52. The Republicans won't be able to do it this year either. Senate seat is safe, and we may win the House seat in the 3rd District.

Editor: With Ike not on the ticket, Republicans here will concentrate on pushing Allott over the top and taking the 1st and 4th Districts from the Democrats. Ed Johnson regarded as state's greatest all-time vote-getter.



CONNECTICUT

To be elected: Governor; 6 House members. Polls close: 7 P.M., EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 611,012; Stevenson 481,649: R+129,363 (55.7%)

GOVERNOR:

***John Davis Lodge (R)** Westport; elected four-year term '50

Abraham A. Ribicoff (D) Hartford; House member '48-'52; defeated Senate candidate '52
1950: Lodge (R) 436,418; *Chester Bowles (D) 419,404: R+17,014

U. S. SENATE:

***Prescott Bush (R)** Greenwich; 59; elected '52 to fill unexpired term of Brien McMahon (D)
1952: Bush (R) 559,465; Abraham Ribicoff (D) 530,505: R+28,960 (51.3%)

***William A. Purtell (R)** Hartford; 57; Appointed Aug. '52 to replace McMahon (D); elected full term Nov. '52
1952: Purtell (R) 573,854; *William Benton (D) 485,066: R+88,788 (52.5%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

6 members to be elected, one at large

Present membership: 5 Republicans; 1 Democrat

of Sept 20,000 is in

1

***Thomas J. Dodd (D)** Hartford; 47; attorney; Foreign Affairs Cmte; '52

Wallace Barnes (R) Bristol; attorney
1952: Dodd (D) 160,080; John Ashmead (R) 136,540: D+23,540 (53.9%)
Eisenhower 150,332; Stevenson 146,551: R+3,781

Hartford

2

***Horace Seely-Brown (R)** Pomfret Center; 46; fruit farmer; Merchant Marine Cmte; '46, out '48, back '50

Henry Pierce (D) Clinton
1952: Seely-Brown (R) 90,827; William Citron (D) 72,868: R+17,959
Eisenhower 91,750; Stevenson 72,056: R+19,694

3

Switch dist: right one '46

***Albert Cretella (R)** New Haven; 57; attorney; Post Office, Veterans Cmtes; Nov. '52

James Gartland (D) East Haven; insurance
1952: Cretella (R) 111,018; *John A. McGuire (D) 99,408: R+11,610 (52.7%)

New Haven

GOP - 46
GOP - 52
Dem '48 '50

4

***Albert P. Morano (R)** Greenwich; 46; Foreign Affairs, House Administration Cmtes; Nov. '50

Edward Fay (D) Stamford; public relations
1952: Morano (R) 164,689; Joseph Lyford (D) 107,881: R+56,808
Eisenhower 167,278; Stevenson 106,403: R+60,875

LATE DRIVE STIRS CONNECTICUT RACE

Sizable Vote Is Expected as Apathy Dissolves in Face of Bias Accusations

Special to The New York Times.

HARTFORD, Oct. 30—More than 850,000 of Connecticut's 1,200,000 registered voters are expected to cast ballots in Tuesday's gubernatorial and Congressional election in the state.

The apparent apathy in various sections of the state appears to have dissipated in the last few days, and election experts expect a fairly sizable vote in the state.

In 1950, when the last gubernatorial election was held, 889,000 voters went to the polls to choose between Gov. John Davis Lodge, Republican, and former Gov. Chester Bowles, Democrat. Mr. Lodge won by 17,000 votes.

Up to a week or so ago, it appeared as if one of the lightest votes in a Gubernatorial election in recent years would be cast. But the visit of President Eisenhower to Hartford on Oct. 20, coupled with a controversy over race and religion, has stimulated interest in the election.

For instance, in Hartford, which is the Democratic center of the state, nonpartisan campaign analysts expect an 80 to 85 per cent vote of the city's 83,000 registered voters. The Democratic town chairman, John P. Kelly, said he expects his party to achieve a margin of 28,500 votes in the city.

The Republican town chairman, Patrick J. Depasquale, said the Democrats would be "lucky" to achieve a margin of 15,000. In 1950, Mr. Bowles took Hartford by a margin of 24,000 over Mr. Lodge.

Democrats think Abraham A. Ribicoff, their nominee for Governor, will exceed the margin achieved by Mr. Bowles in 1950. They say Mr. Ribicoff is a local resident and has always run well here. In 1952, as a nominee for the United States Senate, he had a 35,000 margin in Hartford.

The Lodge-Ribicoff contest has overshadowed most of the other races, including those for the six Congressional seats from this state.

The racial and religious question came into the picture last week-end when Mr. Ribicoff, who is a Jew, made identical talks in Bridgeport and Berlin in which he said that "only in the Democratic party could a man named Abe Ribicoff be nominated for Governor."

Republicans accused Mr. Ribicoff of injecting a racial and religious issue into the campaign,

5

A.L.

***James T. Patterson (R)** Naugatuck; 43; lawyer; Armed Services Cmte; Nov. '46

David Brady (D) Waterbury; Chamber of Commerce official
1952: Patterson (R) 83,848; John A. Speziale (D) 64,020: R+19,828

***Antoni N. Sadlak (R)** Rockville; 46; lawyer; Ways & Means Cmte; Nov. '48

Joseph P. Lyford (D) Westport
1952:Sadlak (R) 601,238; Stanley Pribyson (D) 489,645: R+111,573

VIEWPOINTS—CONNECTICUT:

Republican: Lodge will be re-elected. Hope to elect Barnes in the Hartford (First) District.

Democratic: Ribicoff, with an outstanding record as a member of Congress, has an excellent chance of winning the Governorship. Hope to recapture the 3rd District. Good chance in the 5th.

Editor: Ribicoff (House '48-'52) was the first Democrat to take the normally Republican 1st District in an off-year. This District reports early, and if it goes Republican it may tip off the National trend.

DELAWARE

To be elected: 1 U.S. Senator; 1 House member at large. Polls close: 6 P.M., EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 90,059; Stevenson 83,315: R+6,744 (51.8%)

GOVERNOR:

***J. Caleb Boggs (R)** Elected to four-year term '52
1952: Boggs (R) 88,977; *Elbert N. Carvel (D) 81,772: R+7,205

U. S. SENATE:

***J. Allen Frear, Jr. (D)** Dover; 51; attorney; seeking 2nd full term; Nov. '48

Herbert B. Warburton (R) Wilmington; 38; attorney; House member since '52
1948: Frear (D) 71,888; *Clayton Douglas Buck (R) 68,246: D+3,642 (50.9%)

***John J. Williams (R)** Millsboro; 50; Nov. '46
1952: William (R) 93,020; Alexis I. duPont Bayard (D) 77,685: R+15,335 (54.5%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

1 member to be elected at large

Present membership: 1 Republican

A.L.	**(Mrs.) Lillian J. Martin (R)**	Milford; 44; chief accountant, State Budget Commission
	Harris B. McDowell (D)	Middletown; State Chairman, Democratic Party This is Herbert B. Warburton's seat 1952: Warburton (R) 88,285; Joseph S. Scannell 81,730: R+6,555 (51.9%)

VIEWPOINTS—DELAWARE:

Republican: Both Senate and House candidates should win. Democrats are split between New Dealers and Conservatives on Frear, which helps Warburton considerably.

Democratic: This state can go Democratic. Frear is well liked and well known; he should win.

Editor: Could go either way, with Republicans now appearing to have the edge.

FLORIDA

To be elected: Governor; 8 House members, 6 unopposed. Polls close: 7 P.M., EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 544,036; Stevenson 444,950: R+99,086 (55%)

GOVERNOR:

LeRoy Collins (D) Tallahassee: State Senator
Collins defeated *Gov. Charley Johns in run-off May 25th

J. Tom Watson (R) Tampa; former Attorney General

U. S. SENATE:

***Spessard L. Holland (D)** Bartow; Sept. '46, elected 2nd full term '52.

***George A. Smathers (D)** Miami; '50

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

2 members to be elected; six have no opposition

Present membership: 8 Democrats

1	***Courtney Campbell (D)**	Clearwater Beach; 59; businessman; Merchant Marine Cmte; '52
	William C. Cramer (R)	St. Petersburg; attorney 1952: Campbell (D) 69,149; William C. Cramer (R) 67,286: D+1,863 (51%) Eisenhower 97,848; Stevenson 60,270: R+37,587
2-6	***Charles E. Bennett (D)**	Jacksonville — UNOPPOSED
	***Bob Sikes (D)**	Crestview — UNOPPOSED
	Dante B. Fascell (D)	Miami; *William C. Lantaff (D) did not seek re-election — UNOPPOSED

*A. S. Herlong, Jr. (D)	Leesburg	UNOPPOSED
*Dwight L. Rogers (D)	Fort Lauderdale	UNOPPOSED
7 *James A. Haley (D)	Sarasota: 55; businessman; Interior Cmte '52	
Ernest Bradford Sutton (R)	Polk City; former Mayor of Lakeland 1952: Haley (D) 36,973; Kent S. McKinley (R) 28,725: D+8,248 Eisenhower 45,477; Stevenson 34,681: R+10,796	
8 *D. R. Matthews (D)	Gainesville	UNOPPOSED

VIEWPOINTS—FLORIDA:

Republican: Florida is rapidly becoming a "two party" state. Both Cramer and Sutton probably will win.

Democratic: Ike isn't on the ticket this year. GOP will have let-down.

Editor: National interest centers on the 1st and 7th Districts, which should be much closer than the Gubernatorial.

GEORGIA

To be elected: Governor, unopposed; 1 U.S. Senator, unopposed; 10 House members, unopposed. Polls close: 7 P.M., EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 198,979; Stevenson 456,823: D+257,844 (69.7%)

GOVERNOR:

Marvin Griffin (D)	present Lieutenant-Governor Gov. Herman Talmadge forbidden by law from seeking another term	UNOPPOSED

U. S. SENATE:

*Richard B. Russell (D)	Winder; Nov. '32	UNOPPOSED
*Walter F. George (D)	Vienna; Nov. '22	

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

10 members to be elected, all unopposed

Present membership: 10 Democrats

1-10 *Prince H. Preston (D)	Statesboro	UNOPPOSED
*John L. Pilcher (D)	Meigs	UNOPPOSED
*Elijah L. Forrester (D)	Leesburg	UNOPPOSED
John J. Flynt, Jr. (D)	Griffin. Succeeds Albert Camp (D), deceased	UNOPPOSED
*James Curran Davis (D)	Stone Mountain	UNOPPOSED
*Carl Vinson (D)	Milledgeville	UNOPPOSED
*Henderson L. Lanham (D)	Rome	UNOPPOSED
(Mrs.) Iris Blitch (D)	Homerville. Defeated *Don Wheeler (D) in primary.	UNOPPOSED

*Phillip M. Landrum (D)	Jasper	UNOPPOSED
*Paul Brown (D)	Elberton	UNOPPOSED



IDAHO

To be elected: Governor; 1 U.S. Senator; 2 House members. Polls close: 8 P.M., MST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 180,707; Stevenson 95,081: R+85,626 (65.4%)

GOVERNOR:

Robert E. Smylie (R) Boise; U.S. Attorney

Clark Hamilton (D) Weiser
*Gov. Len B. Jordan (R) not a candidate for re-election; cannot succeed himself
1950: Jordan (R) 107,020; Wright (D) 95,922: R+12,098

U. S. SENATE:

***Henry C. Dworshak (R)** Burley; 60; publisher; elected short term '46, defeated '48, appointed Oct. '49, elected short term Nov. '50

Glen H. Taylor (D) Pocatello; 50; elected Senate '44, defeated 50 for Democratic nomination.
1950: Dworshak (R) 104,608; Claude Burtenshaw (D) 97,092: R+7,516 (51.9%)

***Herman Welker (R)** Payette; 48; attorney; '50
1950: Welker (R) 124,237; D. Worth Clark (D) 77,180: R+47,057 (61.7%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

2 members to be elected

Present membership: 1 Republican; 1 Democrat

1

(Mrs.) Gracie Pfost (D) Nampa; 48; chemist; Interior Cmte; '52

Erwin Schwiebert (R) Caldwell; educator
1952: Pfost (D) 54,725; *John T. Wood (R) 54,134: D+591 (50.2%)
Eisenhower 68,947; Stevenson 43,989: R+24,958

2

***Hamer H. Budge (R)** Boise; 44; attorney; '50

William P. Whitaker (D) Pocatello; farmer
1952: Budge (R) 103,047; W. H. Jensen (D) 52,692: R+50,355
Eisenhower 111,760; Stevenson 51,092: R+60,668

VIEWPOINTS—IDAHO:

Republican: Democrats are split over Taylor's nomination. Dworshak should win handily, and 1st District should return to Republican column.

RED ISSUE AROUSES IDAHO'S CAMPAIGN

Taylor, Accused of Accepting Communist Support in '48, Demands a Hearing

Special to The New York Times.

POCATELLO, Idaho, Oct. 23 —Idaho's Senatorial campaign, up to now conducted on a comparatively restrained basis, exploded this week with quasi-official charges that Glen H. Taylor, Democratic candidate, in 1948 knowingly accepted Communist support.

Mr. Taylor left the Democratic party that year to run with Henry A. Wallace as a Progressive. Throughout the current campaign, suggestions that the candidate was sympathetic to communism have been heard only as whispers.

But earlier this week, Senator Herman Welker, Republican of Idaho, revealed that he had conducted two one-man hearings in Washington as a member of the Senate Internal Security subcommittee, at which several witnesses testified to Communist domination of the Progressives.

Senator Welker cited testimony by Herbert Philbrick, Mary Millward and Matthew Cvetic, former undercover agents for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and John Lautner, former Communist now a consultant for the Justice Department. All, according to Senator Welker, said that both Mr. Wallace and Mr. Taylor had known they were accepting Communist backing when they formed the Progressive party.

Since Wednesday both Mr. Taylor and Mr. Welker have been burning up the wires with denials. The junior Senator from Idaho has charged that Mr. Taylor is "politically grandstanding" and "attempting to serve his own political ends" in demanding the opportunity to testify under oath before the election Nov. 2.

Taylor Issues Challenge

"If you can show me or the committee that anyone has falsely testified about you, I will be the first to have that person prosecuted for perjury," Senator Welker added.

He announced that a Senate Internal Security sub committee task force would meet before Election Day and give Mr. Taylor the opportunity to reply. No date has been set, but the hearing is expected to be called next week.

Mr. Taylor insists that the charges were politically inspired with Senator Welker serving as "Charley McCarthy" for his actual opponent Senator Henry C. Dworshak. Late today he challenged Senator Dworshak to meet him in open debate for a comparison of their respective voting records in Congress.

Mr. Taylor, leaving for another campaign swing through the northern counties of the state, said he doubted that there would be a "task force" hearing at all.

"The so-called charges," he said, "have been whispered for years. There is no substance to them at all. Philbrick and the others allegedly say I was Communist-dominated although I have yet to see official testimony to this effect. I say I was not. It amounts to a matter of their word against mine with no other evidence possibly in the hands of the committee since no other evidence exists."

Reversal of Form

The Taylor campaign has been a reversal of his form from the earlier days, when he took the road with a ten-gallon hat, a guitar and members of his family as a political glee club.

This time, although never admitting that he did wrong in principle when he deserted the Democratic party to run with Mr. Wallace, he has expressed his regret at not always having been a full Democrat.

He has conducted a restrained campaign, making hundreds of street corner appearances throughout Idaho, on a platform pledging more aid for the farmer, the miner and the laboring man in general.

His major attack against Senator Dworshak has been on the latter's voting record in Congress.

Glen Taylor in Idaho

The North and the West sometimes twit the South with electing the candidate with the best hillbilly band, but now Southerners can twit Westerners, at least, with being receptive to the openly lowbrow approach in politics. Glen H. Taylor as Democratic candidate for Senator from Idaho developed much more strength than seemed possible when he was nominated.

He collected a crowd by playing recorded band music over loud speakers on the battered automobile he drove, then gave the audience his one speech--mostly about corruption and Wall Street influence in the Administration, a foreign policy linking us with nations oppressing native peoples, the wickedness of Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, and a $100 a month pension for everybody on reaching 65.

Taylor was elected to the Senate in 1944 after a campaign in which he did much strumming of the guitar and singing of cowboy songs. In 1948 he ran for Vice President with Henry A. Wallace on the Progressive ticket, a political flop (Wallace-Taylor didn't even run second in a single state) that Taylor now calls a "disastrous blunder."

He was defeated for renomination in 1950, worked in California as a carpenter for several years, got a plurality in the Idaho Democratic primary for Senator on Aug. 10. Republicans in the state stressed the role of Communists and Fellow Travelers in the Progressive Party of 1948, and how well Taylor ran in Idaho on Nov. 2 showed something about the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the Red issue these days.

Democratic: Republican public power policies will help Democrats here. Taylor is a rebel first and a Democrat second. Mrs. Pfost has made an excellent record as a member of Congress, is a good, hard-working campaigner and should increase her victory vote over '52.

Editor: Will regular Democrats vote for Taylor? If they will, and the heat of the campaign may help them make up their minds, Taylor could make a good run. Mrs. Pfost won her seat by a small margin, but it was won in the face of an Eisenhower sweep. She should hold.

ILLINOIS

To be elected: 1 U.S. Senator, 25 House members, one unopposed. Polls close: 5 P.M., CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 2,457,327; Stevenson 2,013,920: R+443,407 (54.8%)

GOVERNOR:

***William G. Stratton (R)** Elected four-year term '52.
1952: Stratton (R) 2,317,363; Sherwood P. Dixon (D) 2,089,721: R+227,642.

must carry Cook Co. by 150,000

U. S. SENATE

***Paul H. Douglas (D)** Chicago; 62; educator; Banking, Labor Cmtes; elected 1st term '48.

Joseph T. Meek (R) Western Springs; business representative.
1948: Douglas (D) 2,147,754; *Wayland Brooks (R) 1,740,026: D+407,728 (55.1%)

***Everett M. Dirksen (R)** Elected 1st six-year term '50.
1950: Dirksen (R) 1,951,984; *Scott Lucas (D) 1,657,630: R+294,354 (53.9%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

24 members to be elected, one unopposed.

Present membership: 16 Republicans; 9 Democrats

1

***William L. Dawson (D)** Chicago; 68; lawyer; Government Operations Cmte; '42

Genoa S. Washington (R) Chicago; lawyer
1952: Dawson (D) 95,899; Edgar G. Brown (R) 34,571: D+61,328

2

***Barratt O'Hara (D)** Chicago; 70; lawyer; Banking Cmte; '48, defeated '50, back '52

Richard B. Vail (R) Chicago; House member '46-48; '50-'52
1952: O'Hara (D) 94,253; *Richard B. Vail (R) 89,080: D+5,173

3	***Fred Busbey (R)**	Chicago; 59; broker; Appropriations Cmte; '42, out in '44 & '48, back '50
	James C. Murray (D)	Chicago; Assistant State's Attorney 1952: Busbey (R) 102,328; Neil J: Linehan (D) 85,539: R+16,789
4	***William E. McVey (R)**	Chicago; 69; educator; Banking Cmte; '50
	William A. Rowan (D)	Democrat; House member '42-46 1952: McVey (R) 131,215; Arthur E. Dillner (D) 100,809: R+30,406
5	***John C. Kluczynski (D)**	Chicago; 68; restaurateur; Public Works Cmte; '50
	S. Charles Bubacz (R)	Chicago; lawyer 1952: Kluczynski (D) 104,900; Ernest L. Kaysen (R) 57,775: D+47,125
6	***Thomas J. O'Brien (D)**	Chicago; 76; House member '32-'38; former Sheriff Cook County; back '42; Ways & Means Cmte.
	Orville F. Corbin (R)	Chicago; insurance broker. 1952: O'Brien (D) 112,121; John L. Roach (R) 65,-537: D+46,584
7	***James B. Bowler (D)**	Chicago; Labor Cmte; July '53
	Charles M. Barrett (R)	Chicago; real estate broker 1952: *A.J. Sabath (D) 111,960; Louis F. Capuzi (R) 48,000: D+63,960
8	***Thomas S. Gordon (D)**	Chicago; 61; businessman; Foreign Affairs Cmte; '42
	James L. Doherty (R)	Chicago; newspaperman 1952: Gordon (D) 87,871; William Cooper (R) 61,-048: D+26,823
9	***Sidney R. Yates (D)**	Chicago; 45; lawyer; Appropriations Cmte; '48
	Ralph Lee Goodman (R)	Chicago; businessman 1952: Yates (D) 87,285 Robert Siegrist (R) 79,-429: D+7,856
10	***Richard W. Hoffman (R)**	Riverside; 61; executive; Interstate Cmte; '48
	Helen J. Kelleher (D)	Oak Park; attorney 1952: Hoffman (R) 138,560; J. Schaffenegger (D) 74,467: R+64,093
11	***Timothy P. Sheehan (R)**	Chicago; 45; businessman; Merchant Marine Cmtes; '50
	Harry H. Semrow (D)	Chicago; businessman 1952: Sheehan (R) 103,265; Stanley Morten (D) 70,691: R+22,574
12	***Edgar A. Jonas (R)**	Chicago; lawyer; Judiciary Cmte; '48
	Charles A. Boyle (D)	Chicago; lawyer 1952: Jonas (R) 113,762; Philip Fleischman (D) 90,444: R+23,318
13	***Marguerite Stitt Church (R)**	Evanston; 62; Foreign Affairs Cmte; '50
	Richard A. Griffin (D)	Libertyville; lawyer 1952: Church (R) 184,696; Lawrence Hayes (D) 77,068: R+107,628

ILLINOIS CAMPAIGN IN VIOLENT STAGE

But Senator Douglas, Despite Bitter Attacks on Him, Appears to Be Gaining

By RICHARD J. H. JOHNSTON

Special to The New York Times.

CHICAGO, Oct. 23—Whatever the outcome of the Illinois campaign for the selection of a United States Senator on Nov. 2, the campaign will be long remembered here for political animus.

Senator Paul H. Douglas, the Democratic incumbent, has become the target of Republican charges that he is guilty of everything from "emotional instability" to "protecting Communists." The Senator has stuck to what he calls "the issues" and asked re-election on his record.

The Republican outburst appeared almost simultaneously with a high-level, although carefully guarded, Republican conclusion that the party's candidate, Joseph T. Meek, would be defeated.

Some Republican strategists have asserted that Mr. Meek would support to the hilt Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin. Mr. Meek disclaimed responsibility for what his supporters were saying.

New Turns in Campaign.

During the week these developments characterized the opposition attack upon Senator Douglas.

¶James T. Igoe, a former Representative in the House, who left the Democratic party to become a supporter of Senator McCarthy, declared: "Anyone who votes for Douglas on Nov. 2 is voting to stop Joe McCarthy's courageous investigation of Communists in our Government."

¶Campaign material circulated this week by a group calling itself the Abraham Lincoln National Republican Club declared that Senator Douglas had been a "member, sponsor or officer" in a long list of organizations cited by the United States Attorney General's office as subversive.

Michael Howlett, the Senator's campaign manager, called upon Mr. Meek to repudiate the pamphlet. This Mr. Meek declined to do. He explained that none of "my money" had been used to finance the printing and distribution of the tract and that, he, therefore, felt no responsibility.

In a speech this week Mr. Meek told a Chicago audience that lists of "subversive organizations" to which, it is alleged, Mr. Douglas once belonged were distributed by his workers "in response to thousands of citizens who simply wanted to know the background of the candidate for one of the highest offices in the land."

At the end of the week denials were pouring from the Senator's campaign headquarters in a flood. Senator Douglas, however, found time to apologize for a "misstatement" he made at a political ward meeting in Chicago on Tuesday.

The Senator had been quoted by Morton H. Hollingsworth, Republican State Chairman, as saying, "virtually all former Republican [state] treasurers ended up as suicides or in the penitentiary." Mr. Hollingsworth said Mr. Douglas' remarks were "fresh proof of his complete irresponsibility."

In his statement of apology, issued yesterday, Senator Douglas said:

"I have had a careful check made of the past record of Republican State Treasurers and I find I was wrong in describing their records."

2 HELD

0438

Douglas vs. Meek: A Vital Race

No state's voters bear a heavier responsibility than do voters of Illinois in the congressional election a week from Tuesday. They will decide whether Paul H. Douglas is to continue in the Senate for a second term of six years—or is to be replaced by Joseph T. Meek.

Few Senators have records that are so well and favorably known as that of Paul Douglas. The Illinoisan has backed President Eisenhower on such important issues as foreign aid, social security, public housing, public health and defeat of the Bricker amendent to tie the executive's hands in international affairs. He has opposed the President on the offshore oil giveaway, the blank check features of the atomic energy measure, dangerous public lands bills and other proposed legislation that he felt was against the interests of the people.

* * *

This is not to say that Senator Douglas's record is perfect. We disagree with him on flexible farm price supports, for example. He worked for rigid 90 per cent supports and then voted for 82½ per cent rather than see the level drop to 75 per cent. But there can be no question that Paul Douglas has a very high batting average on the important issues. His readiness to support the President or to differ depending on the interests of the country, as he sees them, makes this high average possible.

When a Democratic President was in office, Senator Douglas's approach to public issues was the same. His masterful presentation of the economic facts was a major influence in the defeat of the natural gas grab into the pockets of consumers. He has been against wasteful spending on pork barrel projects in both Republican and Democratic administrations. For such services Washington correspondents and professional students of government chose him the "No. 1 Senator" in three different polls.

Paul Douglas was a distinguished citizen before the voters of Illinois sent him to the Senate in 1948 with a tremendous 407,000 majority over Republican Senator C. Wayland Brooks. He served on Illinois, New York and Pennsylvania boards and commissions on unemployment compensation, housing, utilities and pensions and prepared legislation on these subjects. For 17 years he was chairman of the Board of Arbitration for the newspaper publishing industry. By vote of his university colleagues he became head of the American Economic Association.

* * *

And soon after Pearl Harbor, at the age of 50, he enlisted as a private in the Marines with whom he served in combat in the Pacific. He was cited for heroism in battle and awarded the Purple Heart for a shattered arm.

In the light of this record it is no wonder that many newspapers, not only in Illinois but also in New York, Washington, Kentucky, Colorado, Wisconsin and other states are applauding Illinois voters on their opportunity to re-elect Paul Douglas to the Senate.

It is understatement to say that Mr. Meek's record suffers in contrast. The Republican nominee has had essentially two main jobs in his career. He was public relations agent for the Illinois Chamber of Commerce and later editor of its publication. Then in 1935 he organized the Illinois Federation of Retailers and has been its president since. Thus, for the last two decades, he has been a lobbyist at the Illinois Legislature. In that time he has opposed many pieces of important public welfare legislation, including minimum wage measures which he has described as "Socialistic in purpose and effect."

* * *

Slum clearance, fair employment practices, public housing—these are Socialism to Mr. Meek. Indeed as recently as last July in an address at Decatur he listed bank deposit insurance, installment buying regulation, social security, veterans' benefits, public works projects, new tariff regulations, "even the President's Economic Council of Advisers" as either Socialistic or Communistic.

This ridiculous catalogue led the pro-Eisenhower, Republican *Chicago Daily News* to call Mr. Meek's statement the "most nonsensical public utterance to come out of the campaign."

If Joseph T. Meek were a Republican such as Senator John Sherman Cooper in Kentucky or former Representative Clifford P. Case in New Jersey, independent voters might well think twice before they chose between him and Senator Douglas. But Mr. Meek is not that kind of Republican. He is just the opposite kind. He is pro-Bricker, pro-Jenner, pro-McCarthy.

For all his belated fealty to what he calls the "Eisenhower crusade," Mr. Meek is anti-Eisenhower. In his primary campaign he said at Urbana: "The mavericks and hybrids in Washington today, passing as Republicans, are enough to turn your stomach." He could have meant only President Eisenhower or the men around him who have had to come to grips with the primitive wing of the party.

* * *

There is precious little doubt as to which Republican side Mr. Meek would line up on were he to go to Washington. He would join the wrecking crew. He has said he would vote to pass, over President Eisenhower's opposition, the Bricker amendment which was defeated in the last session by only one vote—in effect by Senator Douglas's vote.

Judging from his own words, Mr. Meek would be against the Eisenhower foreign trade program. Apparently he would oppose the U.N., which the President regards as vital. He might even join in the backstage maneuvering to drive Dwight D. Eisenhower out of politics two years from now. Certainly all Mr. Meek's sympathies are with the bitter-end cabal.

That is the choice in Illinois. All the country will be watching to see how it is made. If Lincoln's state wants to give the Eisenhower Administration strong support where it most deserves support, at the same time retaining for itself the prestige that goes with possessing a distinguished Senator, it will welcome the chance to re-elect [illegible]

14	***Chauncey W. Reed (R)**	West Chicago; 64; lawyer; Chman Judiciary Cmte; '34
	Richard Plum (D)	Warrenville; union official 1952: Reed (R) 137,881; William Hartnett (D) 54,-953: R+82,928
15	***Noah M. Mason (R)**	Oglesby; 72; educator; Ways & Means Cmte; '36
	Richard A. Mohan (D)	Streator; lawyer 1952: Mason (R) 103,398; Stanley Hubbs (D) 59,-050: R+44,348; Eisenhower 105,154; Stevenson 63,061: R+42,093
16	***Leo E. Allen (R)**	Galena UNOPPOSED
17	***Leslie C. Arends (R)**	Melvin; 59; banker-farmer; Majority Whip; '34
	Branson Wright (D)	Normal 1952: Arends (R) 105,042; John Kinneman (D) 60,112: R+44,930; Eisenhower 110,929; Stevenson 60,343: R+50,586
18	***Harold H. Velde (R)**	Pekin; 44; lawyer; Chman Un-American Activities Cmte; '48
	Howard S. Beeney (D)	Peoria; businessman 1952: Velde (R) 83,706; John McNaughton (D) 67,905: R+15,801; Eisenhower 94,247; Stevenson 61,443: R+32,804
19	***Robert B. Chiperfield (R)**	Canton; 55; lawyer; Chman Foreign Affairs Cmte; '38
	John M. Kerwin, Jr. (D)	East Moline; lawyer 1952: Chiperfield (R) 94,141; Ray Simkins (D) 60,619: R+33,522; Eisenhower 98,380; Stevenson 62,315: R+36,065
20	***Sid Simpson (R)**	Carrollton; 60; businessman; Chman District of Columbia Cmte; '42
	James A. Barry (D)	Quincy; auctioneer 1952: Simpson (R) 84,994; John R. Roy (D) 52,-586: R+32,408; Eisenhower 86,882; Stevenson 56,295: R+30,587
21	***Peter F. Mack, Jr. (D)**	Carlinville; 38; businessman; Interstate Cmte; '48
	Edward H. Jenison (R)	Paris; publisher; House member '46-'52 1952: Mack (D) 94,026; *Edward H. Jenison (R) 85,248: D+8,778; Eisenhower 103,199; Stevenson 83,381: R+19,818
22	***William L. Springer (R)**	Champaign; 45; lawyer; Interstate, Veterans Cmtes; '50
	Robert W. Martin (D)	Sullivan; lawyer 1952: Springer (R) 92,851; David Beggs, Jr. (D) 54,576: R+44,275; Eisenhower 95,077; Stevenson 59,974: R+35,103
23	***Charles W. Vursell (R)**	Salem; 73; publisher; Appropriations Cmte; '42
	Albert R. Imle (D)	Hillsboro; lawyer 1952: Vursell (R) 89,428; W. C. Johnston (D) 65,-442: R+23,986; Eisenhower 96,019; Stevenson 66,494: R+39,525

24 ***Melvin Price (D)** East St. Louis; 49; newspaperman; Armed Services, Joint Atomic Energy Cmtes; '44

John T. Thomas (R) Belleville; former State Senator
1952: Price (D) 117,408; Phyllis Schlafy (R) 63,-778: D+53,630; Eisenhower 75,919; Stevenson 111,045: D+35,126

25 ***C. W. Bishop (R)** Carterville; 64; tailor; Armed Services Cmte; '40

Kenneth J. Gray (D) West Frankfort; auto dealer
1952: Bishop (R) 88,810; Edwin Hair (D) 69,245: R+19,565; Eisenhower 91,099; Stevenson 72,-787: R+18,212

VIEWPOINTS—ILLINOIS:

Republican: Illinois is a conservative state and Joe Meek, the Republican candidate, would be a more representative Illinoisan in the U.S. Senate. Republicans should pick up House seats in the 2nd, 9th and 21st, and there is one other possibility.

Democratic: Paul Douglas is one of the outstanding members of the U.S. Senate. The people of Illinois will return him to office. Among the House seats that should go Democratic are the 3rd, 4th and 11th.

Editor: As Illinois goes, so may go the nation in this off-year. Watch 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 9th and 21st Districts.



INDIANA

To be elected: 11 House members. Polls close: 6 P.M., CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 1,136,259; Stevenson 801,530: R+334,729

GOVERNOR:

***George N. Craig (R)** Brazil
Gov. elected four-year term '52; cannot succeed himself
1952: Craig (R) 1,075,685; John A. Watkins (D) 841,984: R+233,701

U. S. SENATE:

***Homer E. Capehart (R)** Washington; elected 2nd six-year term '50.
1950: Capehart (R) 844,303; Alex Campbell (D) 741,025: R+103,278 (52.8%)

***William E. Jenner (R)** Bedford; elected 2nd six-year term '52.
1952: Jenner (R) 1,020,605; Henry F. Schricker (D) 911,169: R+109,436 (52.4%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

11 members to be elected

Present membership: 10 Republicans; 1 Democrat

1	***Ray J. Madden (D)**	Gary; 62; attorney; Rules Cmte; '42
	Robert H. Moore (R)	Gary; attorney 1952: Madden (D) 93,187; Elliott Belshaw (R) 71,617: D+21,570 Eisenhower 74,073; Stevenson 90,721: D+16,648
2	***Charles A. Halleck (R)**	Rensselaer; 54; lawyer; Majority Leader; Jan. '35
	James H. Berg (D)	Logansport; salesman 1952: Halleck (R) 94,795; L. Dewey Burham (D) 54,025: R+40,770 Eisenhower 102,143; Stevenson 48,272: R+53,871
3	***Shepard J. Crumpacker, Jr. (R)**	South Bend; 37; lawyer; Judiciary Cmte; '50
	John Brademas (D)	South Bend; insurance broker 1952: Crumpacker (R) 107,839; Charles C. Price (D) 88,776: R+19,063 (55%) Eisenhower 111,380; Stevenson 85,820: R+25,560
4	***E. Ross Adair (R)**	Fort Wayne; 37; lawyer; Foreign Affairs, Veterans Cmtes; '50
	Fred W. Greene (D)	Fort Wayne; lawyer 1952: Adair (R) 95,613; Howard L. Morrison (D) 53,154: R+42,459 Eisenhower 98,418; Stevenson 50,956: R+47,462
5	***John V. Beamer (R)**	Wabash; 58; farmer; Interstate Cmte; '50
	John R. Walsh (D)	Anderson; lawyer; House member '48-'50 1952: Beamer (R) 114,081; Philip Dermond (D) 84,825: R+29,256 Eisenhower 116,747; Stevenson 83,221: R+33,526
6	***Cecil M. Harden (R)**	Covington; 59; Government Operations, Post Office Cmtes; '48
	John W. King (D)	Greencastle; accountant, farmer 1952: Harden (R) 86,899; Jack H. Mankin (D) 68,709: R+18,190 Eisenhower 91,932; Stevenson 64,501: R+27,431
7	***William G. Bray (R)**	Martinsville; 51; lawyer; Armed Services Cmte; '50
	George D. Gettinger (D)	Sullivan; implement dealer 1952: Bray (R) 85,601; Thomas J. Courtney (D) 66,218: R+19,383 Eisenhower 87,835; Stevenson 66,239: R+21,596
8	***D. Bailey Merrill (R)**	Evansville; 42; lawyer; Banking Cmte '52
	Winfield Denton (D)	Evansville; lawyer; House member '48-'52 1952: Merrill (R) 98,226: *Winfield Denton (D) 87,770: R+10,456 (53%) Eisenhower 105,088; Stevenson 83,471: R+21,617
9	***Earl Wilson (R)**	Bedford; 58; educator; Appropriations Cmte; '40
	Wilfrid J. Ullrich (D)	Aurora; druggist 1952: Wilson (R) 74,052; Edward Lewis (D) 56,759: R+17,293 Eisenhower 78,015; Stevenson 54,512: R+23,503

10

***Ralph Harvey (R)** — New Castle; 53; farmer; Agriculture Cmte; Nov. '47

Inez M. Scholl (D) — Connersville; housewife
1952: Harvey (R) 103,937; Fred V. Culp (D) 67,932: R+36,005
Eisenhower 106,166; Stevenson 67,430: R+38,736

11

***Charles B. Brownson (R)** — Indianapolis; 40; businessman; Government Operations, Public Works Cmtes; '50

Charles H. Boswell (D) — Indianapolis; Probation Officer
1952: Brownson (R) 160,929; John C. Carvey (D) 109,403: R+51,526
Eisenhower 164,466; Stevenson 106,387: R+58,079

VIEWPOINTS—INDIANA:

Republican: This is a battleground state for the House, but all present 10 Republican seats should be retained. Incumbents are good campaigners and have made good records.

Democratic: Indiana Republicans have been torn in a feud between Gov. Craig, on one hand, and Senators Capehart and Jenner on the other. The Democrats should profit from this split. Best hopes: 3rd, 5th, 8th, and 11th.

Editor: It would seem if the Democrats hope to win the House, this is one state in which they must make a gain. Watch 3rd and 8th.



IOWA

To be elected: Governor; 1 U.S. Senator; 8 House members. Polls close: 8 P.M., CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 808,906; Stevenson 451,513: R+357,393 (63.8%)

GOVERNOR:

Leo A. Hoegh (R) — Charlton; Attorney General

Clyde E. Herring (D) — Des Moines; Polk County Attorney
*Gov. William S. Beardsley (R) not a candidate for re-election
1952: Beardsley (R) 618,937; Herschel C. Loveless (D) 575,075: R+43,862

U. S. SENATE:

***Guy Gillette (D)** — Cherokee; 75; Foreign Relations, Rules Cmtes; '48

Thomas E. Martin (R) — Iowa City; 61; House member since '36
Gillette first elected Senate '36 in special, again in '38. Was defeated in '44 by Hickenlooper and elected to his first full six-year term in '48.
1948: Gillette (D) 578,226; George A. Wilson 415,778: D+162,448 (57.8%)

***Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R)** — Cedar Rapids; elected 2nd six-year term '50
1950: Hickenlooper (R) 470,613; Albert J. Loveland (D) 383,766: R+86,847 (54.8%)

GILLETTE FAVORED BY POLLS IN IOWA

Democrat Holds Advantage in Senate Race but G. O. P. Is Leading for Governor

By SETH S. KING

Special to The New York Times.

DES MOINES, Iowa, Oct. 23—With only a week of campaigning left, there appeared to be no major shifts developing in Iowa's political thinking. Party officials were now more concerned with getting out the vote than influencing it.

At the end of a long and at times surprisingly strenuous effort by major candidates of both parties, the State's Congressional line-up was expected to remain unchanged, although there appeared to be a good chance that the Republican vote might be lower than normal.

Senator Guy M. Gillette, remained a heavy favorite for reelection over Representative Thomas E. Martin, his Republican opponent.

Attorney General Leo A. Hoegh, the Republican gubernatorial candidate, has maintained his early season advantage over Clyde E. Herring, Democrat, and the eight Republican Congressional candidates, seven of whom are incumbents, are expected to win.

The most recent statewide public opinion polls placed Senator Gillette, one of the State's most effective campaigners, ahead of Mr. Martin, and gave Mr. Hoegh a similar lead over Mr. Herring.

Early this month the Iowa poll, sponsored by The Des Moines Register and Tribune, found Senator Gillettee was preferred by 38 per cent of those questioned, while Mr. Martin was favored by 32 per cent and 30 per cent were undecided.

In this same poll Mr. Hoegh had a preference of 38 per cent to 34 per cent for Mr. Herring, with 28 per cent undecided.

The latest October poll conducted by Wallaces' Farmer, an agricultural publication, gave Senator Gillette 51 per cent of the rural vote, while Mr. Martin got 41 per cent, with 8 per cent undecided.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

8 members to be elected

Present membership: 8 Republicans

1	**Fred Schwengel (R)**	Davenport; State legislator; Thomas E. Martin (R) running for Senate.
	John O'Connor (D)	Lone Tree; farmer 1952: Martin (R) 105,526; Clair Williams (D) 62,011: R+43,515 Eisenhower 113,128; Stevenson 86,280: R+26,848
2	***Henry O. Talle (R)**	Decorah; 62; educator; Banking Cmte; '38
	Ruben V. Austin (D)	Dubuque; ex-Mayor of Dubuque 1952: Talle (R) 114,553; T. W. Mullaney (D) 69,421: R+45,132 Eisenhower 126,025; Stevenson 73,635: R+52,380
3	***H. R. Gross (R)**	Waterloo; 55; commentator; Post Office Cmte; '48
	George R. Laub (D)	Cresco; lawyer 1952: Gross (R) 109,992; George Laub (D) 56,-871: R+53,121 Eisenhower 116,938; Stevenson 58,666: R+58,272
4	***Karl M. LeCompte (R)**	Corydon; 67; publisher; Chman. House Administration Cmte; '38
	Herschel C. Loveless (D)	Ottumwa; civil engineer 1952: LeCompte (R) 73,317; Earl Glassburner (D) 44,900: R+28,417 Eisenhower 76,142; Stevenson 49,609: R+26,533
5	***Paul Cunningham (R)**	Des Moines; 64; lawyer; Armed Services Cmte; '40
	James A. McLaughlin (D)	Des Moines; union official 1952: Cunningham (R) 95,057; Alvin Meyer (D) 66,303: R+28,754 Eisenhower 100,842; Stevenson 71,036: R+29,806
6	***James I. Dolliver (R)**	Fort Dodge; 60; lawyer; Interstate Cmte; '44
	Lumund F. Wilcox (D)	Jefferson; lawyer 1952: Dolliver (R) 86,842; Francis Cutler (D) 39,245: R+47,587 Eisenhower 93,687; Stevenson 49,304: R+44,383
7	***Ben F. Jensen (R)**	Exira; 62; merchant; Appropriations Cmte; '38
	Elmer G. Carlson (D)	Audubon; businessman 1952: Jensen (R) 82,462; Thomas Keleher (D) 39,999: R+42,463 Eisenhower 86,165; Stevenson 41,562: R+44,603
8	***Charles B. Hoeven (R)**	Alton; 59; lawyer; Agriculture Cmte; '42
	Roy Holland (D)	Lawton; farmer 1952: Hoeven (R) 94,561; Milo Price (D) 13: R+94,548 Eisenhower 95,975; Stevenson 43,020: R+52,955

VIEWPOINTS—IOWA:

Republican: Two years ago the vote in this state was almost 2 to 1 Republican. State House should stay Republican. All House seats are safe, and expectation is to pick up Gillette seat in the Senate.

Democratic: We look good in this state. Farm unrest will give Democrats good rural strength, coupled with the fact that Guy Gillette is the greatest vote-getter Iowa has ever known. Herring is the son of a former U.S. Senator and Governor. He is popular and a good campaigner.

Editor: Senate seat is the only contest of interest here.



KANSAS

To be elected: Governor; 1 U.S. Senator; 6 House members. Polls close: 7 P.M., CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 616,302; Stevenson 273,296: R+343,106 (68.8%)

GOVERNOR:

Fred Hall (R) Dodge City; present Lieutenant Governor

George Docking (D) Lawrence; banker

Chester A. Roberts (Prohibition) Wichita

W. W. Tamplin (Socialist) Hutchinson

*Gov. Edward F. Arn (R) not a candidate for re-election

1952: Arn (R) 490,341; Charles Rooney (D) 363,468: R+126,873

U. S. SENATE:

***Andrew F. Schoeppel (R)** Wichita; 60; attorney; Agriculture, Interstate Cmtes, seeking 2nd full term; Nov. '48

George McGill (D) Wichita; former U.S. Senator; elected Special '30, re-elected Nov. '32 for one term.

David C. White (Prohibitionist) Kingsdown

1948: Schoeppel (R) 393,412; George McGill (D) 305,987: R+87,425 (54.9%)

***Frank Carlson (R)** Concordia; 61; Chman Post Office Cmte; elected both short and long terms Nov. '50

1950: Carlson (R) 335,880; Paul Aiken (D) 271,365: R+64,515 (55.2%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

6 members to be elected

Present membership: 5 Republicans; 1 Democrat

1 ***Howard S. Miller (D)** Hiawatha; 75; farmer-lawyer; Education & Labor Cmte; '52

William H. Avery (R) Wakefield; member State Legislature

1952: Miller (D) 68,909; *Albert Cole (R) 64,963: D+3,946 (51.5%)

Eisenhower 103,097; Stevenson 41,567: R+61,530

2

***Errett P. Scrivner (R)** — Kansas City; 56; attorney; Appropriations Cmte; Sept. '43

Newell A. George (D) — Kansas City; attorney
1952: Scrivner (R) 91,676; Claude L. Rice (D) 68,396: R+23,280
Eisenhower 106,481; Stevenson 67,148: R+39,333

3

***Myron V. George (R)** — Altamount; 54; publisher; Banking & Currency, Public Works Cmtes; Nov. '50

William W. Monypeny (D) — Winfield; professor
1952: George (R) 57,126; Fred L. Hedges (D) 38,960: R+18,166
Eisenhower 67,943; Stevenson 37,472: R+29,471

4

***Edward H. Rees (R)** — Emporia; 68; attorney; Chman Post Office & Civil Service Cmte; Nov. '36

Robert M. Green (D) — El Dorado; member State Legislature
1952: Rees (R) 118,206; Bill Porter (D) 80,697: R+37,509
Eisenhower 148,572; Stevenson 62,581: R+85,991

5

***Clifford R. Hope (R)** — Garden City; 61; Chman Agriculture Cmte; Nov. '26

Robert L. Bock (D) — Macksville; former member State Legislature
1952: Hope (R) 90,967; Art McAnarney (D) 53,606: R+37,361
Eisenhower 102,280; Stevenson 37,331: R+64,949

6

***Wint Smith (R)** — Mankato; 61; attorney; Armed Services, Education & Labor Cmtes; Nov. '46

Elmo J. Mahoney (D) — Dorrance; farmer
1952: Smith (R) 66,723; Horace A. Santry (D) 39,955: R+26,768
Eisenhower 87,929; Stevenson 27,195: R+60,734

VIEWPOINTS—KANSAS:

Republican: Solid Republican

Democratic: Better spirit and organization among Democrats than evidenced in many years.

Editor: Democrat Howard S. Miller won in '52 on a purely local issue in the 1st District. However, that District is traditionally strong Republican.

KENTUCKY

To be elected: 1 U.S. Senator; 8 House members, 3 unopposed. Polls close: 5 P.M., CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 495,029; Stevenson 495,729: D+700 (50.2%)

GOVERNOR:

***Lawrence W. Wetherby (D)** — Elected four-year term '51
1951: Wetherby (D) 346,345; Eugene Siler (R) 288,014: D+58,331

U. S. SENATE:

	*John Sherman Cooper (R)	Somerset; 53; attorney; Armed Services, Labor, Post Office Cmtes; '46-'48 to fill unexpired term of Albert "Happy" Chandler (D); defeated '48 by Virgil Chapman (D); elected '52 to fill unexpired term after Chapman died.
	Alben W. Barkley (D)	Paducah; 76; House '13-'27; Senate '26-49; Vice President '49-'52 1952: Cooper (R) 494,576; Thomas R. Underwood (D) 465,652: R+28,924 (51.5%)
	*Earle C. Clements (D)	Morganfield; 58; Agriculture, Interior Cmtes; Nov. '50 1950: Clements (D) 334,249; Charles Dawson (R) 278,368: D+55,881 (54.4%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

5 members to be elected

Present membership: 2 Republicans; 6 Democrats

1-2	*Noble J. Gregory (D)	Mayfield	UNOPPOSED
	*William H. Natcher (D)	Bowling Green	UNOPPOSED
3	*John M. Robsion, Jr. (R)	Louisville; 50; lawyer; Judiciary Cmte; Nov. '52	
	Harrison M. Robertson (D)	Louisville; attorney 1952: Robsion (R) ~~95,041~~; Boman L. Shamburger (D) 80,347: R+14,694 (54.2%)	
4	*Frank L. Chelf (D)	Lebanon	UNOPPOSED
5	*Brent Spence (D)	Fort Thomas; attorney; ranking Democrat on Banking-Currency Cmte; Nov. '30	
	M. J. See (R)	Louisa; attorney 1952: Spence (D) 78,431; William D. Cochran (R) 63,058: D+15,373 Eisenhower 73,253; Stevenson 73,361: R+892	
6	*John C. Watts (D)	Nicholasville; 52; attorney, farmer; Public Works Cmte; April '51	
	Robert L. Milby (R)	Lexington; attorney 1952: Watts (D) 68,554; Leslie Henderson (R) 53,297: D+5,257 Eisenhower 58,080; Stevenson 69,404: D+11,324	
7	*Carl D. Perkins (D)	Hindman; 42; attorney; Labor Cmte; Nov. '48	
	Curtis Clark (R)	Prestonburg; Mayor of Prestonburg 1952: Perkins (D) 53,238; Curtis Clark (R) 38,290: D+14,948 Eisenhower 40,741; Stevenson 54,119: D+13,378	
8	Eugene T. Siler (R)	Williamsburg; attorney; defeated for Gov. in '51	
	Mitchel S. Fannin (D)	Whitley City	

This is seat of Congressman James Golden (R), who is retiring

1952: *James Golden (R) 78,584; W. D. Scalf (D) 38,556: R+40,028

D

AB2LX (ELN)

NIGHT LEAD ELECTION (470)

BY IRISH DONNELLY

LOUISVILLE, KY., NOV. 1 (AP)- ALBEN W. BARKLEY, "MR. DEMOCRAT" IN KENTUCKY, GAMBLES PERHAPS THE GREATEST POLITICAL RECORD OF THE STATE IN TOMORROW'S ELECTION.

THE FORMER VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, WHO HAS SERVED 47 YEAS IN PUBLIC OFFICE AND NEVER BEEN DEFEATED BY A REPUBLICAN, PUTS THIS REPUTATION AT STAKE IN A BID FOR THE U. S. SENATE SEAT NOW HELD BY REPUBLICAN JOHN SHERMAN COOPER.

THE REPUBLICANS IN THIS NORMALLY DEMOCRATIC STATE RECOGNIZE THE VOTE-GETTING MAGIC OF THE 76-YEAR-OLD BARKLEY. PRESIDENT EISENHOWER TWICE VISITED THE STATE TO HELP THEM.

WHEN BARKLEY ANNOUNCED HIS CANDIDACY FOR THE U. S. SENATE, WHERE HE SERVED 22 YEARS, MANY POLITICAL OBSERVERS CONSIDERED HIM AN ALMOST CERTAIN WINNER.

BUT THE VIGOROUS CAMPAIGNING OF THE 53-YEAR-OLD COOPER HAS CHANGED THE PICTURE. SOME OBSERVERS FEEL THAT IT WILL BE A CLOSE RACE.

NEVERTHELESS, WILLIAM FOSTER, DEMOCRATIC STATE CAMPAIGN MANAGER, TONIGHT PREDICTED BARKLEY WOULD CAPTURE THE SIX-YEAR SENATE TERM BY A MARGIN OF 85,000 TO 90,000 VOTES.

HENDERSON DYSARD, REPUBLICAN STATE CAMPAIGN MANAGER, DECLARED COOPER WOULD WIN BY 25,000.

THE RIVAL CAMPAIGN MANAGERS AGREED THAT TOMORROW'S TURNOUT OV VOTERS WOULD EXCEED 700,000 IF THE WEATHER IS NOT TOO HARSH. THE FORECAST IS FOR COLD WITH SNOW FLURRIES. KENTUCKY HAS BETWEEN 1,300,000 AND 1,500,000 REGISTERED VOTERS, ABOUT TWO THIRDS OF THEM DEMOCRATS.

BOTH BARKLEY AND COOPER ARE REGARDED AS LIBERALS, WITH SOMEWHAT SIMILAR POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES.

THEIR STATURE IS SUCH THAT THE LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL REMARKED EDITORIALLY:

"IT'S A LUCKY STATE THAT HAS AN EMBARASSMENT OF RICHES IN ITS

CHOICE OF CANDIDATES FOR THE U. S. SENATE...ANY STATE IN THE UNION COULD BE PROUD OF EITHER MAN."

THE NEWSPAPER, HOWEVER, SUPPORTED BARKLEY. TWICE BEFORE IT SUPPORTED COOPER.

COOPER, COMPLETING HIS SECOND TWO-YEAR UNEXPIRED TERM, IS THE FIRST REPUBLICAN ELECTED TO THE U. S. SENATE FROM KENTUCKY SINCE 1924.

A33LX

BARKLEY, WHO WAS VICE-PRESIDENT FROM 1949 THROUGH 1952, CAMPAIGNED ON THE THEME THAT THE REPUBLICANS FAVORED THE PRIVILEGED FEW WHILE THE DEMOCRATS ARE THE PARTY OF THE PEOPLE.

TODAY HE TOURED HIS 18-COUNTY HOME DISTRICT, THE FIRST, IN WESTERN KENTUCKY AND RETURNED TO HIS HOME IN PADUCAH FOR A STATEWIDE BROADCAST TONIGHT.

COOPER, FROM SOMERSET IN THE TRADITIONALLY REPUBLICAN EIGHTH DISTRICT, ALSO CONCLUDED HIS CAMPAIGN WITH A RADIO APPEAL. HE TOLD THE VOTERS THAT EISENHOWER MUST HAVE A GOP CONGRESS TO CARRY OUT HIS PROGRAM WHICH, HE SAID, HAS ALREADY PLACED THIS COUNTRY ON A SOUND PEACETIME ECONOMIC BASIS.

SEVEN OF KENTUCKY'S EIGHT CONGRESSMEN ARE SEEKING RE-ELECTION. THE EIGHTH IS RETIRING. SIX REPUBLICANS AND TWO DEMOCRATS NOW REPRESENT KENTUCKY IN THE U. S. HOUSE.

THREE CONGRESSMEN, ALL DEMOCRAGS, ARE UNOPPOSED FOR RE-ELECTION. THEY ARE NOBLE J. GREGORY, 1ST DISTRICT; WILLIAM N. NATCHER, 2ND, AND FRANK L. CHELF, 4TH.

REP. JAMES S. GOLDEN, REPUBLICAN, DIDN'T SEEK RE-ELECTION IN THE 8TH.

ALSO TO BE ELECTED IS A MEMBER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, KENTUCKY'S HIGHEST TRIBUNAL.

POLLS WILL BE OPEN FROM 6 A.M. TO 5 P.M. LOCAL TIME. (CENTRAL STANDARD IN CENTRAL AND WESTERN KENTUCKY; EASTERN STANDARD IN EASTERN KENTUCKY.)

MU6PCSNM

VIEWPOINTS—KENTUCKY:

Republican: John Sherman Cooper is the most popular Republican to ever stand for election in Kentucky. A younger, more vigorous man than his opponent, he has an excellent chance of winning.

Democratic: Alben Barkley is "Mr. Kentucky." He should win.

Editor: House seats appear steady. Cooper versus Barkley is a battle of giants. This is a Democratic state.

LOUISIANA

To be elected: 1 U.S. Senator, unopposed; 8 House members, 7 unopposed. Polls close: 7 P.M., CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 206,925; Stevenson 345,027: D+38,102 (52.9%)

GOVERNOR:

***Robert F. Kennon (D)** Elected to four-year term '52

U. S. SENATE: (unopposed)

***Allen J. Ellender, Sr. (D)** Houma; seeking his 4th full term; '36 UNOPPOSED

***Russell B. Long (D)** Shreveport; '50

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

1 member to be elected; 7 unopposed.

Present membership: 8 Democrats

1

***F. Edward Hébert (D)** New Orleans; newspaperman; Armed Services Cmte; Nov. '40

George W. Reese, Jr. (R) New Orleans; lawyer
1952: Hébert (D) 71,448; George W. Reese, Jr. (R) 36,161: D+35,287

2-8

***Hale Boggs (D)**	New Orleans	UNOPPOSED
***Edwin E. Willis (D)**	St. Martinville	UNOPPOSED
***Overton Brooks (D)**	Shreveport	UNOPPOSED
***Otto E. Passman (D)**	Monroe	UNOPPOSED
***James H. Morrison (D)**	Hammond	UNOPPOSED
***T. A. Thompson (D)**	Ville Platte	UNOPPOSED
***George S. Long (D)**	Pineville	UNOPPOSED

MAINE

ELECTION HELD SEPTEMBER 13, 1954

Elected: Governor, 1 U.S. Senator, 3 House members

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 232,353; Stevenson 118,806: R+113,547

GOVERNOR:

Edmund S. Muskie (D) Elected in September, the first Democratic Governor in 20 years.
Vote: Muskie (D) 135,613; *Burton M. Cross (R) 113,-210: D+22,403

U. S. SENATE:

***Margaret Chase Smith (R)** Re-elected in September to her 2nd term.
Vote: Smith (R) 143,539; Paul A. Fullam (D) 101,697: R+41,572 (58.4%)
(In '48 Mrs. Smith's victory percentage was 71.4%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

3 members elected

Present membership: 3 Republicans

1 ***Robert Hale (R)** Re-elected
Vote: Hale (R) 47,274; James P. Oliver (D) 43,577: R+3,697

2 ***Charles P. Nelson (R)** Re-elected
Vote: Nelson (R) 45,428; Thomas E. Delahanty (D) 38,973: R+6,455

3 ***Clifford G. McIntire** Re-elected
Vote: McIntire (R) 39,158; Kenneth B. Colbath (D) 25,751: R+13,407

MARYLAND

To be elected: Governor; 7 House members, 1 unopposed. Polls close: 7 P.M., EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 499,424; Stevenson 395,337: R+104,087 (55.4%)

GOVERNOR:

***Theodore R. McKeldin (R)** Elected two-year term '50

Harry Clifton (Curly) Byrd (D) College Park; retired President of University of Maryland
1950: McKeldin (R) 369,807; *Preston Lane (D) 275,824: R+93,983

U. S. SENATE:

*John Marshall Butler (R)	Baltimore; 57; attorney; Judiciary, Govn't Operations Cmtes; Nov. '50 1950: Butler (R) 326,291; *Millard Tydings (D) 283,180: R+43,111 (53%)
*J. Glenn Beall (R)	Frostburg; insurance; Banking-Currency, Public Works Cmtes; Nov. '52 1952: Beall (R) 449,823; George P. Mahoney (D) 406,370: R+43,453 (52.5%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

7 members to be elected, 1 unopposed

Present membership: 4 Republicans; 3 Democrats

1	*Edward T. Miller (R)	Easton; 59; attorney; Appropriations Cmte; Nov. '46
	Edward Turner (D)	Centreville; member State Senate 1952: Miller (R) 47,164; Dudley George Roe (D) 30,072: R+17,092 Eisenhower 46,199; Stevenson 34,336: R+11,863
2	*James P. Devereux (R)	Stevenson; 51; retired Marine Corps General; Armed Services Cmte; Nov. '50
	William P. Bolton (D)	Towson; House member '48-'50 1952: Devereux (R) 95,811; A. Gordon Boone (D) 60,121: R+35,690 Eisenhower 104,231; Stevenson 60,219: R+44,012
3	*Edward A. Garmatz (D)	Baltimore UNOPPOSED
4	*George H. Fallon (D)	Baltimore; 52; advertising; Public Works Cmte; Nov. '44
	Arthur W. Sherwood (R)	Baltimore; businessman 1952: Fallon (D) 54,215; Samuel Hopkins (R) 44,974: D+9,291 (54.6%) Eisenhower 60,236; Stevenson 49,437: R+60,236
5	*Frank Small, Jr. (R)	Clinton; 58; auto dealer; Public Works Cmte; Nov. '52
	Richard E. Lankford (D)	Annapolis; State Senator 1952: Small (R) 68,405; Richard E. Lankford (D) 67,366: R+1,039 (50.4%)
6	*DeWitt S. Hyde (R)	Bethesda; 45; attorney; Judiciary Cmte; Nov. '52
	Edward J. Ryan (D)	Frostburg; attorney 1952: Hyde (R) 94,603; Stella B. Werner (D) 69,050: R+25,553 Eisenhower 104,186; Stevenson 65,699: R+38,487
7	*Samuel N. Friedel (D)	Baltimore; 56; Banker; House Administration, D. C. Cmtes; '52
	Edward C. Dukehart (R)	Baltimore; real estate 1952: Friedel (D) 63,652; William F. Laukaitis (R) 60,277: D+3,375 (51.4%)

VIEWPOINTS—MARYLAND:

Republican: Democratic Party is torn apart by intra-party strife. McKeldin is a sure winner. Small, the only Republican to pick up a Democratic seat two years ago, has gathered enough strength to stay.

Democratic: At the organization level, where it really counts, the Democratic Party has healed after the Primary fight. Expect to pick up seats in 5th and 6th Districts.

Editor: For more than four years the Democratic Party in Maryland has been choosing up sides against itself. First, 5th and 6th Districts offer good contests.



MASSACHUSETTS

To be elected: Governor, 1 U.S. Senator, 14 House members, 4 unopposed. Polls close 8 P.M., EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 1,551,529; Stevenson 1,230,657: R+320,-872 (54.2%)

GOVERNOR:

***Christian A. Herter (R)** Millis; editor; served 5 terms U.S. House; seeking second gubernatorial term.

Robert F. Murphy (D) Malden; Democratic leader in State House.
1952: Herter (R) 1,175,955; *Paul A. Dever (D) 1,161,499: R+14,456

U. S. SENATE:

***Leverett Saltonstall (R)** Dover; 62; attorney; Chman Armed Services Cmte; GOP floor leader; seeking second full term; elected 1944 to fill unexpired term Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. Re-elected '48

Foster Furcolo (D) Longmeadow; 43; attorney; now State Treasurer; Served 2 terms U.S. House, '49-'52
1948: Saltonstall (R) 1,088,475; John I. Fitzgerald (D) 954,398: R+134,077 (50.5%)

***John F. Kennedy (D)** Boston; 37; Government Operations, Labor-Public Welfare Cmte; elected '52.
1952: Kennedy (D) 1,211,984; *Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (R) 1,141,247: D+70,737 (51.3%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

10 members to be elected, 4 are unopposed

Present membership: 8 Republicans; 6 Democrats

1

***John W. Heselton (R)** Deerfield; 54; attorney; Interstate-Foreign Commerce Cmte; Nov. '44.

John J. Dwyer (D) Pittsfield; attorney; member State Legislature.
1952: Heselton (R) 101,512: William H. Burns (D) 49,379: R+52,133

2

***Edward P. Boland (D)** Springfield; 43; attorney; Post Office-Civil Service Cmte; Nov. '52.

Vernon E. Bradley (R) Springfield; City Tax Assessor.
1952: Boland (D) 88,424; Troy T. Murray (R) 81,847: D+6,577. (51.9%)

BOSTON IS TARGET IN SENATE BATTLE

City Vital in Furcolo Drive to Unseat Saltonstall, Who Has Shifted to Offensive

By JOHN H. FENTON

Special to The New York Times.

BOSTON, Oct. 23 — Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Republican, and his Democratic opponent, Foster Furcolo, have begun closing in on Boston in search of the key votes that usually decide Massachusetts elections.

Veteran political reporters assert that on Nov. 2 Mr. Furcolo must carry Boston, a Democratic stronghold, by considerably more than 100,000 votes if he expects to keep the incumbent from a third term.

Republicans traditionally have held the balance of power in the outlying communities. Six years ago, John I. Fitzgerald, an obscure opponent of Senator Saltonstall, carried Boston by 61,297. The Senator rolled up 1,088,475 throughout the Commonwealth to win his second term by a plurality of 133,977.

That year President Truman and all Democratic candidates for state office carried Massachusetts by wide margins.

Until this week, the 1954 campaign in Massachusetts had been one of the dullest in years. Senator Saltonstall had talked about his accomplishments. Mr. Furcolo had sought to find holes in them.

In the last few days the strategy has changed. Senator Saltonstall has moved to the offensive He has accused Mr. Furcolo o: "distortions," asserting that thi: is the first time in seven statewide campaigns that an opponent has used these tactics.

How much this personal touch will stir the voters from thei non-Presidential-year lethargy i: worrying both camps.

Complete registration figure: for the Commonwealth are no available at this point. [An Associated Press survey, however estimates 2,666,000 persons ar registered and otherwise qualified to vote in Massachusetts. The Boston registration is 38,23 below the 412,838 of two year ago. It is the lowest since th 364,079 in 1942.

Scattered reports from th outlying towns indicate a somewhat better showing, althoug the figures are far below recor totals. In those communities Republicans usually do well.

The Senator this year has worked harder than ever to get about the Commonwealth to let the voters see him in person.

In the last four months, Mr. Furcolo has stumped the Commonwealth.

3	*Philip J. Philbin (D)	Clinton UNOPPOSED 1952: Philbin (D) 108,743; Frank Walker (R) 52,348: D+56,395.
4	*Harold D. Donohue (D)	Worcester; 53; attorney; Judiciary Cmte; Nov. '46
	Andrew B. Holmstrom (R)	Worcester; businessman; former Mayor of Worcester. 1952: Donohue (D) 93,530; Carl A. Sheridan (R) 77,536: D+15,994. (54.7%)
5	*Edith Nourse Rogers (R)	Lowell UNOPPOSED 1952: Rogers (R) 146,269; Helen Cullen (D) 45,650: R+100,619.
6	*William H. Bates (R)	Salem; 37; Naval officer; Armed Services Cmte; Feb. '50
	Andrew J. Gillis (D)	Newburyport; former Mayor of Newburyport. 1952: Bates (R) 139,657; Lula B. White (Prohibition) 7,237: R+ 132,420.
7	*Thomas J. Lane (D)	Lawrence UNOPPOSED 1952: Lane (D) 105,662; John Southwick (R) 34,663: D+70,999
8	*Angier L. Goodwin (R)	Melrose; 73; attorney; Ways and Means Cmte; 1942
	Torbert H. Macdonald (D)	Malden; attorney; one time Captain Harvard football team. 1952: Goodwin (R) 85,918; John C. Carr, Jr. (D) 82,114: R+3,804 (51.1%)
9	*Donald W. Nicholson (R)	Wareham; 66; Rules Cmte; Nov. 1947.
	James F. O'Neill (D)	New Bedford; real estate. 1952: Nicholson (R) 103,708; James F. O'Neill (D) 71,129: R+32,579.
10	*Laurence Curtis (R)	Boston; 61; attorney; Judiciary Cmte; Nov. '52.
	Jackson J. Holtz (D)	Brookline; attorney; former U.S. District Attorney. 1952: Curtis (R) 101,221; Frederick C. Hailer, Jr. (D) 84,021: R+17,200 (54.6%)
11	*Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (D)	Cambridge; 42; insurance; Merchant Marine Cmte; Nov. '52.
	Charles S. Bolster (R)	Cambridge. 1952: O'Neill (D) 86,532; Jesse Rogers (R) 37,816: D+48,716
12	*John W. McCormack (D)	Boston UNOPPOSED 1952: McCormack (R) 111,986; James Tremblay (R) 24,271: D+87,715
13	*Richard B. Wigglesworth (R)	Milton; 63; attorney; ranking Republican Appropriations Cmte; Nov. '28.
	James F. Gardner (D)	Quincy; union leader. 1952: Wigglesworth (R) 114,761; David Crowley (D) 74,730: R+40,031
14	*Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (R)	North Attleboro; 70; publisher; Speaker of House, 83rd, 80th Congresses; elected to Congress first, November 1924.
	Edward F. Doolan (D)	Fall River; labor leader 1952: Martin (R) 108,215; Edward F. Doolan (D) 62,554: R+45,661

VIEWPOINTS—MASSACHUSETTS:

Republican: Staking much on record of Governor Herter and on the support given the Eisenhower administration by Senator Saltonstall. Have high hopes of regaining Springfield seat lost in 1948 to the Democrats.

Democratic: Murphy and Furcolo, heading the ticket, will wage one of the most vigorous campaigns in Bay State history. This state is basically Democratic and it should return to Democratic column this fall.

Editor: Democrats have able campaigner in Furcolo. While Republicans are shooting at second district and fourth districts, Democrats are shooting at eighth and tenth districts.

MICHIGAN

To be elected: Governor; 1 U.S. Senator; 18 House members. Polls close: 8 PM, EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 1,551,529; Stevenson 1,230,657: R+320,-872 (55.4%)

GOVERNOR:

***G. Mennen Williams (D)** Grosse Pointe Farms; elected two-year term '48, re-elected '50, '52

Donald S. Leonard (R) Detroit; former police official
1952: Williams (D) 1,431,893; Fred Alger, Jr. (R) 1,423,275: D+8,618

U. S. SENATE:

***Homer Ferguson (R)** Detroit; 65; attorney; ranking Republican Appropriations Cmte, Chman GOP Policy Cmte; seeking 3rd full term; elected '42, re-elected '48

Patrick V. McNamara (D) Detroit; member Detroit Board of Education. Only Primary opponent of former Senator Blair Moody (D), who died before the '54 Primary.
1948: Ferguson (R) 1,045,156; Frank Hook (D) 1,000,329: R+44,827 (50.7%)

***Charles E. Potter (R)** Cheboygan; 38; administrator; '52
1952: Potter (R) 1,428,352; *Blair Moody (D) 1,383,416: R+44,936 (50.6%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

18 members to be elected

Present membership: 13 Republicans; 5 Democrats

1 ***Thaddeus M. Machrowicz (D)** Hamtramck; 55; attorney; Public Works Cmte; Nov. '50

Rudolph G. Tenerowicz (R) Hamtramck; House member '38 and '40. Served then as a Democrat.
1952: Machrowicz (D) 118,695; Ralph G. Tenerowicz (R) 21,442: D+97,253

WILLIAMS IS SEEN MICHIGAN WINNER

Ferguson Race for the Senate Against A.F.L. Leader Is Expected to Be Close

By FOSTER HAILEY

Special to The New York Times.

LANSING, Mich., Oct. 23—A few days ago the students of Mercy College, a girls' school on the outskirts of Detroit, held a preview of the Nov. 2 election. The vote for Governor and Senator was:

Gov. G. Mennen Williams, Democrat, 110.

Donald S. Leonard, Republican, 43.

Senator Homer Ferguson, Republican, 78.

Patrick V. McNamara, Democrat, 74.

That is about the way the situation looks to political observers too. Ten days before the balloting Governor Williams appears an easy winner, and Senator Homer Ferguson and Mr. McNamara are locked in a very close race.

Professional bettors in Detroit were reported offering 15,000 votes and even money on Governor Williams to win his fourth term. They weren't quoting odds on the Ferguson-McNamara race.

Chairmen are Cautious

Neither John Feikens, Republican state chairman, nor Neil Staebler, Democratic state chairman, were giving any figures and claiming election of the tickets they are backing. They were agreed that indications now were that only about 2,000,000 of Michigan's estimated 3,500,000 registered voters would cast their ballots.

A spokesman for Mr. Staebler said the Democrats' main hope for victory for Mr. McNamara and the rest of the state ticket was that there would be more than 2,000,000 votes cast.

Mr. Feikens said that if "normal" patterns were followed this year there would be 1,200,000 upstate votes cast and 800,000 cast in Wayne County, which includes Detroit. The vote normally is 60 per cent Republican upstate and 40 per cent of the total in Wayne County. A little arithmetic brings a total of 1,040,000 Republican votes and 960,000 Democratic votes.

Democrats cite these factors, among others, as bolstering their belief that their campaign is picking up speed and votes:

¶Close working arrangements in upstate industrial areas between Congress of Industrial Organizations and American Federation of Labor officials to get out the vote and to get it cast "right." Mr. McNamara has been an A. F. L. official for over thirty years.

¶More work and better organized work by upstate Democratic groups than in many years.

¶Constantly dropping farm prices, especially for dairy products and for the calves and culls the dairy farmer is selling for beef. That there is a real revolt brewing among dairy farmers is indicated by roadway surveys being taken by newspapers.

¶Not enough improvement in the unemployment situation to bring any change in labor's vote, which will be pretty solidly Democratic this year, most observers believe.

¶Persistence of talk, and resentment, in upstate communities against the off-the-cuff remark at a press conference in Detroit by C. E. Wilson, Defense Secretary, drawing an analogy between dogs and the unemployed.

G. O. P. Cites Factors

Against these favorable Democratic factors, Republicans cite these in their favor:

¶That most of the leaders of farm groups are openly supporting the Republican ticket, and there have been no clear indications of a farm revolt against Republican policies.

¶That they have the better known and more able candidates for state and county offices and that although Governor Williams is the best known and probably the best liked candidate running on either ticket even the names of his running mates are little known.

¶The Democratic party is concentrating on the Governorship and this does not make for good relations with minor candidates.

One interesting aspect of the Michigan campaign as it nears its end is the almost complete elimination of McCarthyism and communism as issues.

The Democrats have concentrated on unemployment and farm policy with a few side flings at foreign policy "bungling." The Republicans have stressed the "back-Ike" theme.

2	***George Meader (R)**	Ann Arbor; 47; lawyer; Govn't Operations, Juliciary Cmtes; Nov. '50
	J. Henry Owens (D)	Ypsilanti; professor 1952: Meader (R) 101,341; John P. Dawson (D) 58,024: R+43,317 Eisenhower 105,830; Stevenson 52,891: R+52,939
3	**August E. Johansen (R)**	Battle Creek; newspaperman. (*Congressman Paul Shafer (R) died Aug. '54)
	Charles C. Wickett (D)	Kalamazoo; attorney 1952: Paul W. Shafer (R) 95,061; Kenneth Brown (D) 57,666: R+37,305
4	***Clare E. Hoffman (R)**	Allegan; 79; attorney; Chman Govn't Operations Cmte; Nov. '34
	Gordon A. Elferdink (D)	Three Oaks; businessman 1952: Hoffman (R) 87,703; Murle E. Gorton (D) 43,450: R+44,253 Eisenhower 91,429; Stevenson 42,073: R+49,356
5	***Gerald R. Ford, Jr. (R)**	E. Grand Rapids; 41; attorney; Appropriations Cmte; Nov. '48
	Robert S. McAllister (D)	E. Grand Rapids; attorney 1952: Ford (R) 109,807; Vincent E. O'Neill (D) 55,147: R+54,660 Eisenhower 101,975; Stevenson 55,056: R+46,919
6	***Kit Clardy (R)**	East Lansing; 62; attorney; Un-American Activities, Merchant Marine Cmtes; Nov. '52.
	Don Hayworth (D)	East Lansing; professor 1952: Clardy (R) 108,263; Don Hayworth (D) 96,682: R+1,581 (52.8%) Eisenhower 123,513; Stevenson 83,964: R+39,549
7	***Jesse P. Wolcott (R)**	Port Huron; 61; attorney; Chman. Banking & Currency Cmte; Nov. '30
	Ira D. McCoy (D)	Bad Axe; doctor 1952: Wolcott (R) 101,936; Ira D. McCoy (D) 66,699: R+35,237 Eisenhower 108,916; Stevenson 60,426: R+48,490
8	***Alvin M. Bentley (R)**	Owosso; 36; Diplomatic service; Foreign Affairs Cmte; Nov. '52
	Clarence V. Smazel (D)	St. Louis; newspaper publisher and editor 1952: Bentley (R) 91,731; Clarence V. Smazel (D) 45,431: R+46,300 Eisenhower 93,626; Stevenson 41,469: R+52,157
9	***Ruth Thompson (R)**	Whitehall; attorney; Judiciary Cmte; Nov. '50
	Theodore E. A. Engstrom (D)	Muskeegon; businessman 1952: Thompson (R) 70,456; John H. Piercey (D) 47,456: R+23,000 Eisenhower 73,153; Stevenson 43,330: R+29,823
10	***Elford A. Cederberg (R)**	Bay City; 36; businessman; Appropriations Cmte; Nov. '52
	William J. Kelly (D)	Bay City; dental supplies 1952: Cederberg (R) 69,727; William J. Kelly (D) 33,602: R+36,125 Eisenhower 71,294; Stevenson 31,453: R+39,841

11	***Victor A. Knox (R)**	Sault Sainte Marie; 55; busniessman; Ways & Means Cmte; Nov. '52
	Harold Beaton (D)	St. Ignace; attorney 1952: Knox (R) 54,883; Prentiss M. Brown, Jr. (D) 37,701: R+17,182
12	***John B. Bennett (R)**	Ontonagon; 50; attorney; Interstate Cmte; Nov. '44
	Frank E. Hook (D)	Ironwood; former House member and defeated Senate candidate 1952: Bennett (R) 47,160; E. Burr Sherwood (D) 33,892: R+13,268 Eisenhower 44,850; Stevenson 38,580: R+6,270
13	**Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D)**	Detroit; member State Senate; defeated *George O'Brien (D) in Democratic Primary.
	Landon Knight (R)	Detroit 1952: O'Brien (D) 88,473; Clarence J. McLeod (R) 47,881: D+40,592
14	***Louis C. Rabaut (D)**	Grosse Pointe Park; 68; attorney; '34-'46; defeated '46 back '48-'52; Appropriations Cmte
	Joseph A. Moynihan, Jr. (R)	Grosse Pointe Park; attorney 1952: Rabaut (D) 117,027; Richard Durant (R) 103,366: D+13,661 (53%)
15	***John A. Dingell (D)**	Detroit; 60; businessman ;Ways & Means Cmte; Nov. '32
	Gregory M. Pillon (R)	Detroit; attorney 1952: Dingell (D) 109,109; Gregory M. Pillon (R) 54,236: D+54,873
16	***John Lesinski (D)**	Dearborn; 66; businessman; Post Office, Civil Service Cmte; Nov. '50
	Stanley A. Grendel (R)	Dearborn; insurance business 1952: Lesinski(D) 133,215; Harold J. Smith (R) 84,998: D+48,217
17	***Charles G. Oakman (R)**	Detroit; 51; real estate; Banking & Currency, Public Works Cmtes; Nov. '52
	Martha W. Griffiths (D)	Detroit; attorney 1952: Oakman (R) 94,517; Martha W. Griffiths (D) 84,001: R+10,516 (52.9%)
18	***George A. Dondero (R)**	Royal Oak; 71; attorney; Chman Public Works Cmte; Nov. '34
	Paul Sutton (D)	Royal Oak 1952: Dondero (R) 108,673; Arthur J. Law (D) 84,308: R+24,365

VIEWPOINTS—MICHIGAN:

Republican:	Ferguson is in no trouble. Williams can't continue to "edge" into office. Hope to pick up 14th District.
Democratic:	Williams won in the face of Eisenhower '52 sweep. He'll win with a better margin this year. There is hope of picking up 6th, 12th, and 18th Districts.
Editor:	Closest fight will be between Williams and Leonard. House seats should remain fairly steady, although there were several turn-overs here in the off-year Republican sweep of '46.



MINNESOTA

To be elected: Governor, 1 U.S. Senator, 9 House members. Polls close: 8 PM, CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 763,211; Stevenson 608,458: R+154,753 (55.3%)

GOVERNOR:

***C. Elmer Anderson (R)** Brainerd; Assumed Governorship in Sept. '51, when *Luther Youngdahl (R) was appointed to the U.S. District Court for D.C. Elected full 2-year term in '52

Orville L. Freeman (D) Minneapolis; attorney
1952: Anderson (R) 785,125; Orville L. Freeman (D) 624,480: R+160,645

U. S. SENATE:

***Hubert H. Humphrey (D)** Minneapolis; 43; pharmacist-educator; elected 1st term '48

Val Bjornson (R) Minneapolis; State Treasurer
1948: Humphrey (D) 729,494; *Joseph H. Ball (R) 485,801: D+243,693 (59.8%)

***Edward J. Thye (R)** Northfield; 58; farmer; Agriculture, Appropriations Committees; '46, '52
1952: Thye (R) 785,649; William E. Carlson (D.F.L.) 590,011: R+195,638 (56.6%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

9 members to be elected

Present membership: 5 Republicans; 4 Democrats

1 ***August H. Andresen (R)** Red Wing; attorney; Agriculture Committee; first elected '24, defeated '32, back '34

Robert C. Olson (Democrat-Farm-Labor) Waseca; farmer
1952: Andresen (R) 103,218; George Alfson (D.-F.L.) 45,496: R+57,722
Eisenhower 98,399; Stevenson 50,400: R+47,999

2 ***Joseph P. O'Hara (R)** Glencoe; 59; attorney; Interstate, D.C. Committees; '40

Harry Sieben (D.-F.L.) Hastings; small businessman
1952: O'Hara (R) 101,641; Richard T. Malone (D.-F.L.) 48,404: R+53,237
Eisenhower 98,730; Stevenson 48,475: R+50,255

3 ***Roy W. Wier (D.-F.L.)** Minneapolis; 66; union leader; Labor Committee; '48

Edward Willow (R) Minneapolis; executive secretary YMCA
1952: Wier (D) 115,008; Edward Willow (R) 105,320: D+9,688 (52.1%)

4 ***Eugene J. McCarthy (D.-F.L.)** St. Paul; 38; educator; Banking Committee; '48

Richard C. Hansen (R) St. Paul; real estate
1952: McCarthy (D.-F.L.) 98,015; Roger G. Kennedy (R) 60,827: D+37,188
Eisenhower 76,093; Stevenson 93,783: D+17,690

5	***Walter H. Judd (R)**	Minneapolis; 56; medical doctor; Foreign Affairs Committee; '42
	Anders Thompson (D.-F.L.)	Minneapolis; member Minneapolis School Board 1952: Judd (R) 99,027; Karl Rolvaag (D.-F.L.) 68,326: R+30,701
6	***Fred Marshall (D.-F.L.)**	Grove City; 48; farmer; Appropriations Committee; '48
	Oscar J. Jerde (R)	St. Cloud; college professor 1952: Marshall (D.-F.L.) 74,041; J. Arthur Bensen (R) 66,764: D+7,277 (52.6%) Eisenhower 83,546; Stevenson 51,668: R+31,878
7	***H. Carl Andersen (R)**	Tyler; farmer; Appropriations Committee; '38
	Douglas P. Hunt (D.-F.L.)	Montevideo; probate judge 1952: Andersen (R) 87,460; James M. Youngdale (D.-F.L.) 52,144: R+35,316 Eisenhower 83,482; Stevenson 52,932: R+30,550
8	***John A. Blatnik (D.-F.L.)**	Chisholm; 43; administrator; Public Works Committee; '46
	Ernest R. Orchard (R)	Duluth; program director 1952: Blatnik (D.-F.L.) 91,465; Ernest R. Orchard (R) 54,756: D+36,709 Eisenhower 54,787; Stevenson 85,987: R+31,200
9	***Harold C. Hagen (R)**	Crookston; 53; editor; Post Office, D.C. Committees; '42
	(Mrs.) Coya Knutson (D.-F.L.)	Oklee; former state legislator 1952: Hagen (R) 70,402; Curtiss T. Olson (D.-F.L. 45,874: R+24,628 Eisenhower 64,429; Stevenson 47,784: R+16,645

VIEWPOINTS—MINNESOTA:

Republican: Humphrey has spent six years campaigning, but Bjornson is beginning to cut his lead. Anderson should win again. Hope to pick up Wier seat in Minneapolis (3rd District) and Marshall seat in 6th.

Democratic: Humphrey now looks unbeatable and the push is behind Freeman. If farm unrest shows at polls, there is a chance to pick up a Republican House seat.

Editor: Humphrey is front-running. Bjornson gaining, but as of now this state appears to favor incumbents for all posts.

MISSISSIPPI

To be elected: 1 U.S. Senator; 6 House members, all unopposed. Polls close: 6 P.M., CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 112,966; Stevenson 172,566: D+59,600

GOVERNOR:

***Hugh L. White (D)** Elected four-year term in '52

U. S. SENATE:

***James Oliver Eastland (D)** Doddsville; 50; Agriculture, Judiciary Cmtes; June '41

James A. White (R) Durant
1948: Eastland had no opposition.

***John C. Stennis (D)** DeKalb; 53; Nov. '47
1952: Stennis had no opposition

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

6 members to be elected, all unopposed

Present membership: 6 Democrats

1–6	***Thomas G. Abernethy (D)**	Okolona	UNOPPOSED
	***James L. Whitten (D)**	Charleston	UNOPPOSED
	***Frank Ellis Smith (D)**	Greenwood	UNOPPOSED
	***John Bell Williams (D)**	Raymond	UNOPPOSED
	***William A. Winstead (D)**	Philadelphia	UNOPPOSED
	***William M. Colmer (D)**	Pascagoula	UNOPPOSED

MISSOURI

To be elected: 11 House members. Polls close: 7 P.M., CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 959, 429; Stevenson 929,830: R+29,599

GOVERNOR:

***Phil M. Donnelly (D)** Elected four-year term '52
1952: Donnelly (D) 976,092; Howard Elliott (R) 879,969: D+96,123

U. S. SENATE:

***Thomas C. Hennings, Jr. (D)** St. Louis; attorney; Nov. '50
1950: Hennings (D) 685,732; *Forrest C. Donnell (R) 592,922: D+92,810

***Stuart Symington (D)** Creve Coeur; business executive; Nov. '52
1952: Symington (D) 1,008,521; *James P. Kem (R) 858,170: D+158,351

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

11 members to be elected

Present membership: 4 Republicans; 7 Democrats.

1	*Frank M. Karsten (D)	St. Louis; 41; attorney; Govn't Operations Cmte; Nov. '46
	Bill Bangert (R)	Berkeley City 1952: Karsten (D) 126,583; Eugene Miller (R) 70,479: D+56,104
2	*Thomas B. Curtis (R)	Webster Groves; 43; attorney; Ways & Means Cmte; Nov. '50
	Eugene H. Buder (D)	Clayton; attorney 1952: Curtis (R) 125,625; Donald McClanahan (D) 95,208: R+30,417
3	*Leonor K. Sullivan (D)	St. Louis; widow of the late Congressman John Sullivan (D); Merchant Marine Cmte; Nov. '52
	George W. Curran (R)	St. Louis; attorney-businessman 1952: Sullivan (D) 107,428; *Claude Bakewell (R) 58,413: D+49,015
4	*Jeffery P. Hillelson (R)	Kansas City; 35; Govn't Operations Cmte; Nov. '52
	George H. Christopher (D)	Butler; House member '48-'50 1952: Hillelson (R) 96,988; *Leonard Irving (D) 84,899: R+12,089 (53.3%)
5	*Richard Bolling (D)	Kansas City; 38; educator; Banking-Currency Cmte; Nov. '48
	Samuel Lee Chaney (R)	Kansas City; insurance broker 1952: Bolling (D) 90,357; Frank C. Rayburn (R) 70,898: D+19,459 Eisenhower 133,093; Stevenson 138,792: D+5,699
6	*William C. Cole (R)	St. Joseph; 57; attorney; House Administration, Post Office Cmtes; '42, defeated '48, back '52
	W. R. Hull, Jr. (D)	Weston; warehouse operator 1952: Cole (R) 89,428; Robert O. Richardson (D) 81,237: R+8,191 (52.4%) Eisenhower 96,475; Stevenson 76,300: R+20,175
7	*Dewey Short (R)	Galena; 56; educator, minister; Chman Armed Services Cmte; '28, defeated '30, back in '34
	J. M. Lowry (D)	Springfield; businessman 1952: Short (R) 115,842; John Hosmer (D) 71,-936: R+43,906 Eisenhower 123,324; Stevenson 66,825: R+56,499
8	*A. S. J. Carnahan (D)	Ellsinore; 57; educator; Foreign Affairs Cmte; '44, defeated '46, back '48
	Dorman L. Steelman (R)	Salem; attorney 1952: Carnahan (D) 69,068; Frances E. Howard (R) 61,621: D+7,447 (52.8%) Eisenhower 67,590; Stevenson 66,037: R+1,553

9	***Clarence Cannon (D)**	Elsberry; 75; educator; ranking Democrat Appropriations Cmte; '22
	Noel Carpenter (R)	High Hill; social worker 1952: Cannon (D) 98,965; S. W. Arnold (R) 81,806: D+17,159 (54.7%) Eisenhower 95,692; Stevenson 87,161: R+8,531
10	***Paul C. Jones (D)**	Kennett; 53; publisher; Agriculture Cmte; Nov. '48
	Clyde Whaley (R)	Sedgewickville; farmer 1952: Jones (D) 71,156; Andrew Sandegren (R) 46,033: D+25,123 Eisenhower 54,591; Stevenson 65,559: D+10,968
11	***Morgan M. Moulder (D)**	Camdenton; 50; attorney; Un-American Activities Cmte; Nov. '48
	(Mrs.) L. C. Davis (R)	Boonville; housewife 1952: Moulder (D) 74,362; Max Schwabe (R) 73,104: D+1,258 (50.4%) Eisenhower 82,610; Stevenson 66,721: R+15,889

VIEWPOINTS—MISSOURI:

Republican: Hope to gain three seats here: 5th, 8th, and 11th Districts.

Democratic: Eisenhower trend couldn't upset present seats. Should pick up at least 4th and 6th, with another possible.

Editor: Watch 4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th.

MONTANA

To be elected: 1 U.S. Senator; 2 House members. Polls close: 6 P.M., MST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 157,394; Stevenson 106,213: R+51,181 (59.4%)

GOVERNOR:

***J. Hugo Aronson (R)** Elected to four-year term '52
1952:Aronson (R) 128,139; *John W. Bonner (D) 124,015: R+4,124 (51%)

U. S. SENATE:

***James E. Murray (D)** Butte; 78; attorney; ranking Democrat Interior-Insular, Labor, Public Welfare Cmtes; seeking 4th full term; elected Nov. '34, re-elected '36, '42, '48.

Wesley A. D'Ewart (R) Wilsall; 65; House member since June '45; Banking & Currency, Interior-Insular Cmtes.
1948: Murray (D) 125,193; Tom Davis (R) 94,458: D+30,735 (56.6%)

***Michael J. Mansfield (D)** Missoula; former House member; elected Senate '52.
1952: Mansfield (D) 133,109; *Zales Ecton (R) 127,360: D+5,749 (50.7%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

2 members to be elected

Present membership: 1 Republican; 1 Democrat

1 ***Lee Metcalf (D)** — Helena; 43; attorney; Education & Labor Cmte; '52

Winfield E. Page (R) — Missoula; landscape architect
1952: Metcalf (D) 55,679; Wellington D. Rankin (R) 54,086: D+1,593 (50.7%)
Eisenhower 65,570; Stevenson 48,330: R+17,240

2 **Orvin B. Fjare (R)** — Big Timber; merchant. This is Wesley A. D'Ewart's

LeRoy H. Anderson (D) — Conrad; wheat farmer, state Senator
1952: D'Ewart (R) 90,210; Willard E. Fraser (D) 55,203: R+35,007
Eisenhower 91,824; Stevenson 57,783: R+34,041

VIEWPOINTS—MONTANA:

Republican: This is a state where Republicans should pick up a Senate seat and a House seat. D'Ewart is a younger man, well known, and he should be helped by President Eisenhower's popularity in Montana.

Democratic: Mike Mansfield licked an Eisenhower tide in Montana to unseat a Republican incumbent in '52. Murray and Metcalf will be re-elected, and Anderson will pick up the Republican 2nd District.

Editor: Montana is a wheat state. Do the voters love Eisenhower in '54 as they did in '52 after the new Benson farm bill was adopted? On that question the Senatorial race may hinge.



NEBRASKA

To be elected: Governor; 3 U.S. Senators (1 "token" term); 4 House members. Polls close: 8 PM, CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 421,603; Stevenson 188,057: R+233,456 (69.2%)

GOVERNOR:

Victor E. Anderson (R) — Lincoln; former Mayor of Lincoln.

William Ritchie (D) — Omaha; lawyer
*Gov. Robert B. Crosby (R) not a candidate for re-election to the two-year term; he was defeated in the Primary for U.S. Senate.
1952: Crosby (R) 366,009; Walter R. Reacke (D) 229,700: R+136,309

U. S. SENATE:

(6-year term to fill the seat previously held by *Dwight Griswold (R) (died April 12, '54), who was elected Nov. '52 to the unexpired term of *Kenneth Wherry (R) (died Nov. '51). Seat now held by appointment by *Eva Bowring (R).)

	Carl T. Curtis (R)	Minden; House member '40-'54
	Keith Neville (D)	North Platte; served as Gov. during World War I.
		(4-year term to fill the unexpired term of *Hugh Butler (R) (died July '54). Seat now held by appointment by *Sam W. Reynolds (R).)
	Roman L. Hruska (R)	Omaha; House member '52-'54
	James F. Green (D)	Omaha; attorney
		(2-month "token" term to fill the unexpired Griswold term pending the January '55 swearing-in of the winner of the Curtis-Neville contest.)
	(Mrs.) George Abel (R)	Lincoln
	William Meier (D)	Minden; attorney

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

4 members to be elected

Present membership: 4 Republicans

1	**Phil Weaver (R)**	Falls City; auto dealer. This is Carl T. Curtis' seat.
	Frank B. Morrison (D)	McCook; attorney 1952: *Curtis (R) 117,336; Samuel Freeman (D) 45,523: R+71,813 Eisenhower 124,102; Stevenson 49,238: R+74,864
2	**Jackson B. Chase (R)**	Omaha; judge. This is Roman L. Hruska's seat.
	James A. Hart (D)	Omaha; attorney 1952: Hruska (R) 81,185; James A. Hart (D) 63,485: R+17,700 Eisenhower 90,046; Stevenson 64,346: R+25,700
3	***Robert D. Harrison (R)**	Norfolk; 57; oil business; Agriculture Cmte; Dec. '51.
	Ernest M. Luther (D)	Hooper; cattle buyer 1952: Harrison (R) 89,879; Alan A. Dusatko (D) 35,213: R+54,666
4	***A. L. Miller (R)**	Kimball; 62; medical doctor; Chman Interior-Insular Affairs Cmte, D.C. Cmte; Nov. '42
	Carlton W. Laird (D)	Scottsbluff; business man. 1952: Miller (R) 98,032; Francis D. Lee (D) 35,628: R+62,404 Eisenhower 167,278; Stevenson 106,403: R+60,-875

VIEWPOINTS—NEBRASKA:

Republican:	If they all only were like Nebraska!
Democratic:	2nd District went Democratic in '48 Truman victory. Hope to carry it again this year.
Editor:	2nd District is a good long shot, but this is a Republican state.



NEVADA

To be elected: Governor; 1 House member at-large. Polls close: 6 P.M., PST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 50,502; Stevenson 31,688: R+18,814 (61.4%)

GOVERNOR:

***Charles H. Russell (R)** Ely

Vail Pittman (D) Ely; former Governor '45-'50.
1950: Russell (R) 35,609; *Pittman (D) 26,164: R+9,455

U. S. SENATE:

***Pat McCarran (D)** Reno; elected 4th six-year term '50. (58%)

***George W. Malone (R)** Reno; elected 2nd six-year term '52. (51.7%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

1 member to be elected at-large

Present membership: 1 Republican

A. L.

***Clifton Young (R)** Reno; 32; lawyer; Interior Cmte; '52

Walter S. Baring (D) Reno; House member '48-'52
1952: Young (R) 40,683; *Walter S. Baring (D) 39,912: R+771 (50%)

VIEWPOINTS—NEVADA:

Republican: Governor Russell should hold and Young, a hard-working, personable campaigner, should increase his majority.

Democratic: Pittman due for a come-back and Baring, not faced with Eisenhower's vote-getting strength, should return to Congress.

Editor: Changing population has made this a 50-50 state and an unpredictable battleground.



NEW HAMPSHIRE

To be elected: Governor; 2 U.S. Senators; 2 House members. Polls close: local option

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 166,287; Stevenson 106,663: R+59,624 (60.9%)

GOVERNOR:

Lane Dwinell (R) Lebanon; President of the State Senate

John Shaw (D) Rochester: Mayor of Rochester
*Gov. Hugh Gregg (R) not a candidate for re-election

U. S. SENATE:

(Six-year term)

***Styles Bridges (R)** — Concord; 56; businessman-attorney; President Pro Tempore of the U.S. Senate; Chairman Appropriations Committee; elected '36, '42, '48.

Gerard L. Morin (D) — Laconia; Mayor of Laconia
1948: Bridges (R) 129,600; Alfred E. Fortin (D) 91,760: R+37,840 (58.1%)

(Two-year term to replace *Robert Upton (R), who was appointed to the seat vacated by the death of *Charles Tobey (R) in July, '53. Upton defeated in the primary by Norris Cotton (R).)

Norris Cotton (R) — Lebanon; 54; House member since '46; Appropriations Committee.

Stanley J. Betley (D) — Manchester; former member State Legislature
1950: Charles W. Tobey (R) 106,142; Emmet J. Kelley (D) 72,473: R+33,669 (56%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

2 members to be elected

Present membership: 2 Republicans

1

***Chester E. Merrow (R)** — Ossipee; 48; educator; Foreign Affairs Committee; '42

Thomas J. McIntyre (D) — Laconia; attorney
1952: Merrow (R) 82,689; Peter Poirier (D) 54,-746: R+27,943
Eisenhower 85,038; Stevenson 59,840: R+25,198

2

Perkins Bass (R) — Peterborough; attorney. This is Norris Cotton (Senate Candidate) seat.

George F. Brown (D) — Winchester; businessman
1952: Cotton (R) 79,861; John Guay (D) 40,373: R+39,426
Eisenhower 81,249; Stevenson 46,823: R+34,426

VIEWPOINTS—NEW HAMPSHIRE:

Republican: Safe as always. Bridges and Cotton shoo-ins. Governor and state legislature are safe.

Democratic: New Hampshire Democratic party is more active now than in recent history. Has good slate of officers and will be aided by recent Democratic triumph in Maine.

Editor: Good, solid Republican state; but the Democratic party is well organized there this year, building not so much for this election as for the future.

NEW JERSEY

To be elected: 1 U.S. Senator; 14 House members. Polls close: 8 P.M., EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 1,374,613; Stevenson 1,015,902: R+358,-711 (56.8%)

GOVERNOR:

***Robert B. Meyner (D)** elected to four-year term '53
1953: Meyner (D) 962,710; Paul Troast (R) 809,068: D+153,642

U. S. SENATE:

Charles R. Howell (D) Pennington; 50; insurance; House member since '49; Labor Cmte

Clifford P. Case (R) Rahway; 50; lawyer; House member '45-'53

Sen. Robert C. Hendrickson (R) did not seek re-election
1948: Hendrickson (R) 934,720; Archibald Alexander (D) 884,414; R+50,306 (50.0%)

***J. Alexander Smith (R)** elected 2nd six-year term '52
1952: Smith (R) 1,286,782; Archibald Alexander (D) 1,011,187: R+275,595 (55.5%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

14 members to be elected

Present membership: 8 Republicans; 6 Democrats

1 ***Charles A. Wolverton (R)** Camden; 74; lawyer; Chman Interstate Cmte; '26

J. Frank Crawford (D) Collingwood; attorney
1952: Wolverton (R) 118,367; Alfred Pierce (D) 96,162: R+22,205
Eisenhower 109,464; Stevenson 113,342: D+3,878

2 ***T. Millet Hand (R)** Cape May; 52; lawyer; Appropriations Cmte; '44

Clayton A. Burdick (D) Hammonton; real estate
1952: Hand (R) 79,955; Charles E. Rupp (D) 46,174: R+33,781
Eisenhower 77,296; Stevenson 54,866: R+22,430

3 ***James C. Auchincloss (R)** Rumson; 69; broker; District of Columbia and Public Works Cmtes; '42

Charles F. Sullivan (D) New Brunswick; City Sealer
1952: Auchincloss (R) 124,292; John Zimmerman (D) 67,642: R+56,650

4 **William G. Freeman (R)** Camden; former FBI agent. This is Charles R. Howell's seat

Frank Thompson, Jr. (D) Trenton; lawyer
1952: Howell (D) 84,733; John Inglesby (R) 70,076: D+14,657 (55%)
Eisenhower 80,625; Stevenson 83,233: D+2,608

JERSEY VOTE SEEN CLOSEST IN YEARS

Impartial Survey Gives Howell Edge, With G.O.P. Likely to Sweep Legislature

By GEORGE CABLE WRIGHT
Special to The New York Times.

TRENTON, Oct. 30—As the New Jersey political campaign nears its end, there is increasing evidence that the outcome of many of the contests is virtually unpredictable.

A survey of trends throughout the state leads impartial observers to believe that the balloting on Tuesday may be closer than at any time in recent years.

At stake this year is a United States Senate seat, fourteen House seats, one state Senate post and four berths in the State Assembly. Voters throughout New Jersey will also be asked to accept or reject a proposal for a $25,000,000 bond issue to finance the erection of what would be the state's first medical-dental college.

Most impartial observers give Representative Charles R. Howell, Democratic candidate for United States Senator, a definite edge over his Republican opponent, Clifford P. Case. Robert C. Hendrickson, the Republican incumbent, is not seeking re-election. Should Mr. Howell emerge victorious, he would be the first Democrat elected to the Senate from this state since 1936, and the third in forty years.

House Races Analyzed

Republicans now hold eight of the state's seats in the House of Representatives and the Democrats hold six. The Republicans are considered certain to retain their seats in the First, Second and Fifth Districts, and their opponents are equally sure of recapturing the Fourth, Tenth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Districts.

In doubt are seats in the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Districts. All but the Sixth and Eleventh are presently represented by Republicans. The G. O. P. probably has its best chance of picking up a seat in the Sixth, where Representative Harrison A. Williams Jr. is struggling to retain a post won last year by a margin of 2,000 votes.

The Democrats, meanwhile, find their greatest opportunity for picking up seats in the Third, Eighth and Twelfth Districts. These are represented at the present time, respectively, by James C. Auchincloss of Rumson, Gordon Canfield of Paterson and Robert W. Kean of Livingston.

Present indications are that the Democrats will retain all of their House seats and perhaps pick up the Eighth and Twelfth District seats. On the other hand Republican candidates are expected by non-partisan observers to triumph in all of the contests for seats in the State Legislature.

Despite reports of widespread voter apathy, registration this year totaled 2,645,973, a drop of but 12,693 from the 1953 figure. Increases over last year were noted in ten counties and in most instances admittedly reflect a rise in Democratic activity.

Hudson Registration Off

By far the greatest decline occurred in Democratic Hudson County, where registration fell off by more than 13,000. However, observers point out that not all this represents lost votes, inasmuch as several thousand Hudsonites took up residence in Bergen County during the last two years.

Republicans concede but four counties to Representative Howell—Hudson, Camden, Mercer and Middlesex—and privately expect Mr. Case to win by a plurality of at least 75,000. Democratic leaders, on the other hand, privately admit that Mr. Case may carry as many as ten counties. At the same time they insist that Mr. Howell's plurality will exceed 100,000.

Impartial observers, although giving the Democratic candidate the edge in Hudson, Camden, Middlesex, Mercer, Burlington, Warren, Salem and Hunterdon, look for an extremely close contest with a Howell plurality not exceeding 30,000.

They emphasize that the Senate race will undoubtedly be decided in Hudson, Essex and Bergen Counties. Both parties privately agree that Hudson will produce a Democratic plurality ranging from 60,000 to 75,000. To offset this, sizable Republican pluralities must be obtained in the other two counties.

Indications are, however, that the voting in Essex will be extremely close and that the Republican majority in Bergen will be insufficient.

The list of candidates (asterisks denoting incumbents) and the text of the medical-dental referendum proposition follow:

U. S. SENATE

Clifford P. Case (Republican).
Charles R. Howell (Democrat).
Henry Krajewski (American Third party).
George Breitman (Socialist Workers).
Albert Ronis (Socialist Labor).

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Republicans	Democrat
First District	
*Charles A. Wolverton	J. Frank Crawford
Julius Levin (Socialist Labor)	
Second District	
*T. Millet Hand	Clayton E. Burdick
Morris Karp (Socialist Labor)	
Third District	
*James C. Auchincloss	Charles Sullivan
Fourth District	
William G. Freeman	Frank Thompson Jr
Fifth District	
*Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen Jr.	Luther H. Martin
Sixth District	
Fred E. Shepard	*H. A. Williams Jr.
Seventh District	
*William B. Widnall	Eugene E. Demarest
Eighth District	
*Gordon Canfield	Charles S. Joelson
Harry Ganthouse (Socialist Labor)	
Ninth District	
*Frank C. Osmers Jr.	Walter J. O'Connell
Tenth District	
William E. McGlynn	*Peter W. Rodino Jr
Eleventh District	
Philip Insabella	*Hugh J. Addonizio
William H. Smullen (Independent)	
Twelfth District	
*Robert W. Kean	Martin S. Fox
Thirteenth District	
Norman S. Roth	*Alfred D. Sieminski
Jeremiah J. O'Callaghan (Independent)	
Fourteenth District	
Vincent J. Dellay	T. James Tumulty
James F. McGovern (Independent)	
Charles Gumino (Independent)	

5	***Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr. (R)**	Morristown; 38; lawyer; Labor, Veterans Cmtes; '52
	Luther H. Martin (D)	Highland Park; Registrar of Rutgers University 1952: Frelinghuysen (R) 133,276; A. Appleton (D) 80,922: R+52,354
6	***Harrison A. Williams (D)**	Plainfield; 35; lawyer; Government Operations Cmte; Nov. '53
	Fred E. Shepherd (R)	Elizabeth; attorney 1952: *Case (R) 121,252; H. F. Pettit (D) 67,159: R+54,093 Eisenhower 122,885; Stevenson 78,336: R+44,549
7	***William B. Widnall (R)**	Saddle River; 48; lawyer; Banking Cmte; Feb. '50
	Eugene E. Demarest (D)	Hackensack; member City Council 1952: Widnall (R) 130,603; Vito Concilio (D) 60,553: R+70,050
8	***Gordon Canfield (R)**	Paterson; 56; lawyer; Appropriations Cmte; '40
	Charles S. Joelson (D)	Paterson; attorney 1952: Canfield (R) 97,338; John J. Winberry (D) 54,367: R+42,971
9	***Frank Osmers, Jr. (R)**	Haworth; 47; real estate; Government Operations Cmte; '39-'41, Nov. '51
	Walter J. O'Connell (D)	North Arlington; accountant 1952: Osmers (R) 125,402; William McNulty (D) 63,175: R+62,227
10	***Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D)**	Kearny; 45; lawyer; Judiciary Cmte; '48
	William E. McGlynn (R)	Newark; attorney 1952: Rodino (D) 78,612; Alexander Matturri (R) 57,740: D+20,872
11	***Hugh Addonizio (D)**	Newark; 40; Banking Cmte; '48
	Philip Insabella (R)	Newark; attorney 1952: Addonizio (D) 68,273; William Barnes (R) 60,461: D+7,812 (54%)
12	***Robert Winthrop Kean (R)**	Livingston; 61; broker; Ways and Means Cmte; '38
	Martin S. Fox (D)	Newark; attorney 1952: Kean (R) 84,949; Martin Fox (D) 70,046: R+14,903 (54.8%)
13	***Alfred D. Sieminski (D)**	Jersey City; 43; businessman; Appropriations Cmte; '50
	Norman H. Roth (R)	Jersey City; attorney 1952: Sieminski (D) 72,987; Julius D. Canter (R) 54,581: D+18,406
14	**T. James Tumulty (D)**	Jersey City; attorney; *Edward J. Hart is retiring
	Vincent J. Dellay (R)	West New York 1952: *Hart (D) 67,109; William T. Bozzuffi (R) 59,112: D+7,997 (54.6%)

VIEWPOINTS—NEW JERSEY:

Republican: New Jersey is a Republican state. Case is an outstanding candidate with a good record in the House. He should win, and three House seats in the 4th, 6th and 11th should go Republican, with at least one other a possibility.

Democratic: The Republican party, torn by scandals, is attempting to hold the Hendrickson Senate seat by running a "non-organization" man. However, even that won't help them. Howell should win, and with power enough to hold the present Democratic House seats.

Editor: Watch 4th, 6th, and 12th. Howell has even chance against Case.



NEW MEXICO

To be elected: Governor; 1 U.S. Senator; 2 House members at-large. Polls close: 7 P.M., MST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 132,170; Stevenson 105,661: R+26,509 (55.4%)

GOVERNOR:

Alvin Stockton (R) Raton: Speaker, State House

John F. Simms, Jr. (D) Albuquerque; lawyer; former State legislator
*Gov. Edwin L. Mechem (R) now running for U. S. Senate
1952: Mechem (R) 129,116; E. Grantham 111,-034: R+18,082

U. S. SENATE:

***Clinton P. Anderson (D)** Albuquerque; 59; Agriculture & Interior Cmtes; '48

Edwin L. Mechem (R) Santa Fe; present Governor
1948: Anderson (D) 108,269; Patrick Hurley (R) 80,226: D+28,043 (57.4%)

***Dennis Chavez (D)** Albuquerque; elected 4th six-year term '52
1952: Chavez (D) 122,543; Hurley (R) 117,168: D+5,375 (51.1%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

2 members to be elected at-large

Present membership: 2 Democrats

A. L.

***John J. Dempsey (D)** Santa Fe; 75; Public Works Cmte; '34-'40, Gov. N. Mex. '43-'47, back '50

Warren R. Cobean (R) Roswell; ex-Mayor of Roswell.
1952: Dempsey (D) 121,477; Homer J. Berkshire (R) 112,297: D+9,180 (53%)

A. L.

***Antonio M. Fernandez (D)** Santa Fe; 52; Appropriations Cmte; '42

Thomas H. Childers (R) Santa Fee; businessman
1952: Fernandez (D) 119,925; Berkshire (highest Republican) 112,297: D+7,628 (52%)

VIEWPOINTS—NEW MEXICO:

Republican: A study of the figures for the last few years shows New Mexico becoming a Republican state. Mechem, a popular Governor, should unseat Anderson. Excellent chance to win both House seats.

Democratic: Clint Anderson is one of the most popular men to serve New Mexico. Teamed with veteran campaigners Dempsey and Fernandez, the state should go Democratic.

Editor: May be overshadowed by larger states, but this should be hottest political state in '54. Pay your money, take your choice.



NEW YORK

To be elected: Governor; 43 House members. Polls close: 7 P.M., EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 3,952,815; Stevenson (D) 2,687,890, (Liberal) 416,711=3,104,601: R+848,214 (55.5%)

GOVERNOR:

*Governor Thomas E. Dewey (R) retiring at end of present term after serving 3 four-year terms.

Irving M. Ives (R) Norwich; 58; banker-insurance; U.S. Senator, elected Nov. '46. Member New York State Assembly 1930, Minority Leader '35, Speaker '36, Majority Leader '37-'46.

W. Averell Harriman (D) New York City; 63; financier; ambassador, Russia Oct. '43-Feb. '46, Great Britain April '46-Oct. '46; Secretary Commerce Oct. '46-Apr. '48; Roving Ambassador ECA, April '48-'53.
1950: Dewey (R) 2,811,683; Walter A. Lynch (D) 2,246,839: R+564,844

needs 1/2 mil. in N.Y.C.

U. S. SENATE

***Irving Ives (R)** Elected second six-year term 1952. Expires Jan. '59
1952: Ives (R) 3,853,934; John Cashmore (D) 2,521,736: R+1,332,198 (55.2%)

***Herbert H. Lehman (D)** New York City; 76; former governor; elected present six-year term Nov. '50
1950: Lehman (D) 2,632,313; Joseph Hanley (R) 2,367,353: D+264,960 (48.1%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

43 members to be elected

Present membership: 27 Republicans; 16 Democrats

1	*Stuyvesant Wainwright (R)	Wainscott; 33; attorney; Education-Labor, Merchant Marine Cmte; Nov. '52
	Ernest Greenwood (D)	Bay Shore; 69; educator; House member '51-52 1952: Wainwright (R) 114,135; *Ernest Greenwood (D) 74,174: R+39,961
2	*Steven B. Derounian (R)	Roslyn; 36; attorney; Interstate Cmte; Nov. '52
	William R. Brennan (D)	Franklin Square; attorney 1952: Derounian (R) 132,512; Joseph Liff (D) 54,725: R+77,787
3	*Frank J. Becker (R)	Lynbrook; 55; insurance; Public Works Cmte; Nov. '52
	John Cogley (D)	Baldwin, editor 1952: Becker (R) 128,007; Richard A. O'Leary (D) 60,800: R+67,207
4	*Henry J. Latham (R)	Queens Village; 46; attorney; Rules Cmte; Nov. '44
	Thomas A. Dent (D)	Bayside; attorney 1952: Latham (R) 123,132; Joseph J. Perrini (D) 70,755: R+52,377
5	*Albert H. Bosch (R)	Richmond Hill; 46; attorney; Education-Labor Cmte; Nov. '52
	William Kerwick (D)	South Ozone Park; Assistant District Attorney 1952: Bosch (R) 86,168; *Gary Clemente (D) 73,083: R+13,085 (54.1%)
6	*Lester Holtzman (D)	Rego Park; 41; attorney; Government Operations Cmte; Nov. '52
	Seymour Halpern (R)	Forest Hills; State Senator 1952: Holtzman (D) 105,261; Robert Tripp Ross (R) 104,720: D+541 (50.1%)
7	*James J. Delaney (D)	Long Island City; 54; attorney; Merchant Marine Cmte; Nov. '44
	Joseph Stockinger (R)	Long Island City; attorney 1952: Delaney (D) 87,204; William A. Schulz (R) 80,896: D+6,308 (51.9%)
8	Victor L. Anfuso (D)	Brooklyn; attorney; served in 82nd Congress. *Congressman Louis Heller (D) resigned
	Eugene J. Renne (R)	Brooklyn; attorney 1952: Louis Heller (D) 75,772; Benjamin Westervelt, Jr. (R) 37,884: D+37,888
9	*Eugene J. Keogh (D)	Brooklyn; 47; attorney; Merchant Marine Cmte; '36
	Harry Keller (R)	Brooklyn; investigator, State Labor Department 1952: Keogh (D) 83,841; Joseph M. Soviero (R) 48,998: D+34,843
10	*Edna Flannery Kelly (D)	Brooklyn; 48; research director; Foreign Affairs Cmte; Nov. '49
	Abraham Sher (R)	Brooklyn; attorney 1952: Kelly (D) 105,302; George W. Thomas (R) 42,498: D+62,804

11	***Emanuel Celler (D)**	Brooklyn; 66; attorney; ranking Democrat Judiciary Cmte; Nov. '22
	Henry D. Dorfman (R)	Brooklyn; attorney 1952: Celler (D) 127,091; Henry D. Dorfman (R) 37,244: D+89,747
12	***Francis E. Dorn (R)**	Brooklyn; 43; attorney; Merchant Marine Cmte; Nov. '52
	Donald L. O'Toole (D)	Brooklyn; 52; attorney; served in 8 Congresses; elected '36, defeated '52 1952: Dorn (R) 75,895; *Donald O'Toole (D) 65,650: R+10,245 (53.6%)
13	***Abraham J. Multer (D)**	Brooklyn; 54; attorney; Banking-Currency Cmte; Nov. '47
	Joseph Moriber (R)	Brooklyn; attorney 1952: Multer (D) 112,152; P. Vincent Landi (R) 45,664: D+66,488
14	***John J. Rooney (D)**	Brooklyn; 51; attorney; Appropriations Cmte; June '44
	Alfred A. Manti (R)	Brooklyn; real estate 1952: Rooney (D) 86,952; Jacob P. Lafkowitz (R) 45,004: D+41,948
15	***John H. Ray (R)**	Staten Island; 68; attorney; Merchant Marine Cmte; Nov. '52
	Vincent R. Fitzpatrick (D)	Staten Island; attorney 1952: Ray (R) 97,023; *James J. Murphy (D) 69,538: R+27,485
16	***Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (D)**	Manhattan; 46; minister; Education-Labor Cmte; Nov. '44
	Harold C. Burton (R)	Manhattan; secretary Board of Elections 1952: Powell (D) 72,562; Richard L. Baltimore, Jr. (R) 15,937: D+56,625
17	***Frederic R. Coudert, Jr. (R)**	Manhattan; 56; attorney; Appropriations Cmte; Nov. '46
	Anthony Akers (D)	Manhattan; attorney 1952: Coudert (R) 84,821; Harry Grossman (D-L) 60,624: R+64,197
18	***James G. Donovan (D.-R.-L.)**	Manhattan; 56; attorney; Interior-Insular Affairs Cmte; serves as Democrat; Nov. '50 1952: Donovan (D-R-L) 88,629; Vito Magli (Am. Labor) 7,047: D-R-L+81,582
19	***Arthur G. Klein (D)**	Manhattan; 50; attorney; District of Columbia, Interstate Cmte; July '41
	Henry E. Del Rosso (R)	Manhattan; businessman 1952: Klein (D) 77,267; Edward I. Goldberg (R) 34,795: D+42,472
20	**_____ (D)**	*Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr. (D); not a candidate for re-election; running for State Attorney General
	Warren L. Schnur (R)	Manhattan; attorney 1952: Roosevelt (D) 81,591; Clarence Vam Bell (R) 49,905: D+31,686

21	_____ (R)	*Jacob K. Javits (R); not a candidate for re-election; running for State Attorney General
	Herbert Zelenko (D)	New York City; attorney 1952: Javits (R) 89,866; John C. Hart (D) 47,637: R+42,229
22	***Sidney A. Fine (D)**	Bronx; attorney; Judiciary Cmte; Nov. '50
	Henry Rose (R)	Bronx; attorney 1952: Fine (D) 90,474; Martin Greene (R) 38,681: D+51,793
23	***Isidore Dollinger (D)**	Bronx; 51; attorney; Banking-Currency Cmte; Nov. '48
	Philip Myer (R)	Bronx; attorney 1952: Dollinger (D) 78,350; Sidney S. Flaum (R) 23,238: D+55,112
24	***Charles A. Buckley (D)**	Bronx; 64; contractor; ranking Democrat, Public Works Cmte; Nov. '34
	Charles V. Scanlan (R)	Bronx; attorney 1952: Buckley (D) 82,343; Solon S. Kane (R) 58,096: D+24,247
25	***Paul A. Fino (R)**	Bronx; 41; attorney; Veterans' Affairs Cmte; Nov. '52
	Salvatore J. Milano (D)	Bronx; attorney 1952: Fino (R) 85,308; Bernard J. O'Connell (D) 68,862: R+16,446
26	***Ralph A. Gamble (R)**	Larchmont; 69; attorney; ranking Republican Banking-Currency Cmte; Nov. '36
	(Mrs.) Julia L. Crews (D)	Scarsdale; housewife; vice-chairman Westchester County Democratic Committee 1952: Gamble (R) 116,091; Flora Chudson (D) 55,184: R+60,907
27	***Ralph W. Gwinn (R)**	Bronxville; 70; attorney; ranking Republican Education-Labor Cmte; Nov. '44
	John R. Harold (D)	Yonkers; labor attorney 1952: Gwinn (R) 108,575; George A. Brenner (D) 75,781: R+32,794
28	***Katharine Price St. George (R)**	Tuxedo Park UNOPPOSED 1952: St. George (R) 102,476; Marion Sanders (D) 52,994: R+49,482 Eisenhower 111,537; Stevenson 48,206: R+63,331
29	***J. Ernest Wharton (R)**	Richmondville; 55; attorney; Interior-Insular Affairs Cmte; Nov. '50
	Robert Byron (D)	Athens 1952: Wharton (R) 115,502; Walter Donnaruma (D) 46,727: R+68,775 Eisenhower 121,940; Stevenson 48,465: R+73,475
30	***Leo W. O'Brien (D)**	Albany; 54; newspaperman; Interior-Insular Affairs Cmte; April '52
	James W. Smith (R)	South Troy; Assistant District Attorney 1952: O'Brien (D) 101,178; John F. Forner, Jr. (R) 86,651: D+14,527 (53.9%)

31	***Dean Park Taylor (R)**	Troy; 52; attorney; Judiciary Cmte; Nov. '42
	Joseph R. MacLaren (D)	Hudson Falls; businessman 1952: Taylor (R) 114,656; Helen Nolan Neil (D) 44,367: R+70,289
32	***Bernard W. (Pat) Kearney (R)**	Gloversville; 65; attorney; Un-American, Veterans Affairs Cmte; Nov. '42
	David C. Prince (D)	Schenectady; retired executive 1952: Kearney (R) 111,025; David C. Prince (D) 50,307: R+60,718 Eisenhower 114,813; Stevenson 54,322: R+60,491
33	***Clarence E. Kilburn (R)**	Malone; 61; banker; Banking-Currency Cmte; Feb. 1940
	Harold Blake (D)	Fulton 1952: Kilburn (R) 98,653; Maurice N. McGrath (D) 41,803: R+56,850 Eisenhower 103,411; Stevenson 45,988; R+57,423
34	***William R. Williams (R)**	Cassville; farmer; Agriculture Cmte; Nov. '50
	Vernon Olin (D)	Whitesboro; Farmer 1952: Williams (R) 97,488; Charles Ray Wilson (D) 65,080: R+32,408 Eisenhower 108,347; Stevenson 61,390: R+46,967
35	***R. Walter Riehlman (R)**	Tully; 55; bakery owner; Government Operations Cmte; Nov. '46
	James H. O'Connor (D)	Syracuse; attorney 1952: Riehlman (R) 113,778; Arthur B. McGuire (D) 65,763: R+48,015 Eisenhower 119,268; Stevenson 64,022: R+55,246
36	***John Taber (R)**	Auburn; 74; attorney; Chairman Appropriations Cmte; Nov. 1922
	Daniel J. Carey (D)	Groton 1952: Taber (R) 110,304; Donald J. O'Connor (D) 47,189: R+63,115 Eisenhower 118,520; Stevenson 42,843: R+75,677
37	***W. Sterling Cole (R)**	Bath; 50; attorney; Chairman Joint Atomic Energy Cmte; Nov. '34
	John Bloomer (D)	Binghamton; City Comptroller 1952: Cole (R) 131,172; Jean Ivory (D) 57,474: R+73,698 Eisenhower 138,848; Stevenson 53,975: R+84,873
38	***Kenneth B. Keating (R)**	Rochester; 54; attorney; Judiciary Cmte; Nov. '46
	Rubin Brodsky (D)	Rochester; attorney 1952: Keating (R) 128,566; Victor Kruppenbacher (D) 56,177: R+72,389
39	***Harold C. Ostertag (R)**	Attica; 58; businessman; Appropriations Cmte; Nov. 1950
	George W. Cooke (D)	Rochester; attorney 1952: Ostertag (R) 107,501; O. Richard Judson (D) 55,483: R+52,018

40	***William E. Miller (R)**	Lockport; 40; attorney; Government Operations, Judiciary Cmte; Nov. '50
	Mariana Lucca (D)	Buffalo; publisher 1952: Miller (R) 102,565; E. Dent Lackey (D) 69,087: R+33,478
41	***Edmund P. Radwan (R)**	Buffalo; 43; Foreign Affairs, Veterans Affairs Cmtes; Nov. '50
	Bernard J. Wojtkowiak (D)	Buffalo; businessman 1952: Radwan (R) 95,755; Anthony Tauriello (D) 75,552: R+20,203
42	***John R. Pillion (R)**	Lackawanna; 50; attorney; Interior Cmte; Nov. 1952
	John J. Jablotny (D)	Cheektowaga; Supt. of Highways 1952: Pillion (R) 100,434; Chester C. Gorski (D) 81,201: R+19,233
43	***Daniel Alden Reed (R)**	Dunkirk; 79; attorney; Chman, Ways and Means Cmte; Nov. 1918; Dean of N.Y. delegation
	James F. Crowley (D)	Olean; attorney 1952: Reed (R) 91,534; Harry D. Johnson (D) 44,276: R+47,258

VIEWPOINTS—NEW YORK:

Republican: Ives is a sure winner. May gain two seats: 6th and 7th, both on Long Island.

Democratic: The peak of Republican strength in the state is now past. Democrats should make substantial gains this November. Best chance to capture the governorship since Lehman won in 1938 (last Democratic victory). Should regain some House seats lost in the Eisenhower wave of '52: 5th, 12th and 25th.

Editor: 1952 vote established New York as solidly Republican. Watch these House districts: 5th, 6th, 7th, 12th, 24th, 25th, and 41st.

NORTH CAROLINA

To be elected: 2 U.S. Senators; 10 House members. Polls close: 6:30 P.M., EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 558,107; Stevenson 652,803: D+94,696 (53.9%)

GOVERNOR:

***William B. Umstead (D)** elected four-year term '52
1952: Umstead (D) 796,306; Herbert Sewell, Jr. (R) 383,329: D+412,977

U. S. SENATE:

W. Kerr Scott (D) Haw River; former Gov. '48-'52

Paul C. West (R) Raleigh, former Judge.
This contest is for a full six-year term.

CAROLINA DISTRICT LEANS TO THE G.O.P.

Party's Only Holder of House Seat Since 1930 Is Popular in the Charlotte Area

By JOHN N. POPHAM

Special to The New York Times.

CHARLOTTE, N. C., Oct. 23—This state's Tenth Congressional District, a six-county area with the city of Charlotte as its commercial center, has received more attention from national figures of both major political parties than any other district in the South.

Captured by the Republicans in 1952, the district has been visited during the year by President Eisenhower and Adlai E. Stevenson, Democratic Presidential nominee two years ago. Both men spoke in Charlotte before crowds numbered in the thousands.

Stephen A. Mitchell, Democratic National Chairman, and Leonard W. Hall, his Republican counterpart, have made political speeches in the district.

With the general election a little more than a week away, it appears to most observers that the Republicans have a slight edge in the race.

Second of Family in House

The incumbent is Charles Raper Jonas, 49 years old, a lawyer in Lincolnton. His father, Charles A. Jonas, made similar Republican political history in North Carolina in 1928 by his election to the House of Representatives when Herbert Hoover carried this state.

Mr. Jonas, the first Republican Representative from North Carolina since his father's defeat in 1930, is one of the most popular public figures in this part of the state. In 1952 he swept every county in the district to defeat the Democratic incumbent, Hamilton C. Jones, by 21,000 votes.

His opponent this year is City Court Judge J. C. Sedberry of Charlotte.

The Democrats are vigorously pressing such issues as unemployment and reduced working hours among the district's textile mill workers and lower farm prices.

Mecklenburg County (Charlotte) usually accounts for about 62 per cent of the district's total vote. It gave Mr. Jonas a 10,000-vote majority in 1952.

Democrats Claim Negro Vote

Democratic leaders, who have concentrated on precinct organization in Charlotte, say that in 1952 Representative Jonas received 8,000 of 9,000 ballots cast by Negroes in the city. They assert that Judge Sedberry will receive some 7,500 Negro votes in this election.

Republican workers counter that Representative Jonas' popularity has its strongest bipartisan following in Charlotte, that the Negro vote will be split and that the party's organization work at precinct level in Charlotte is the equal of Democratic efforts.

Meanwhile, North Carolina Republicans have uncovered a surprisingly strong candidate in the neighboring Ninth District, a nine-county area with several traditionally Republican counties. The district was represented for forty years by the state's "Mr. Democrat," the late Robert L. Doughton.

The Ninth District seat is now held by Hugh Quincy Alexander, a Kannapolis lawyer. His Republican opponent is William E. Stephens Jr., 32 years old, of Lenoir, the son-in-law of J. E. Broyhill, wealthy furniture manufacturer and Republican national committeeman from North Carolina.

	*Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (D)	Morgantown; House member Jan. '46-Jan. '47; appointed to succeed Clyde Hoey, June '54 UNOPPOSED This contest is for the un-expired term of two years

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

12 members to be elected; 2 unopposed.

Present membership: 1 Republican; 11 Democrats

1	*Herbert C. Bonner (D)	Washington; 63; Merchant Marine Cmte; '40
	W. T. Love (R)	Elizabeth City: consultant 1952: Bonner (D) Unopposed. Eisenhower 12,333; Stevenson 39,806: D+27,473
2	*L. H. Fountain (D)	Tarboro; 41; lawyer; Government Operations Cmte; '52 UNOPPOSED
3	*Graham A. Barden (D)	New Bern; 58; lawyer; Labor Cmte; '34
	(Mrs.) Christine P. Odom (R)	Goldsboro; housewife. 1952: Barden (D) 45,458; Everette Peterson (R) 14,239: D+31,219 Eisenhower 22,662; Stevenson 40,406: D+17,744
4	*Harold D. Cooley (D)	Nashville; 57; lawyer; Agriculture Cmte; July '34; UNOPPOSED
5	*Thurmond Chatham (D)	Winston-Salem; 58 industrialist; Foreign Affairs Cmte; '48
	Joe New (R)	King; businessman 1952: Chatham (D) 74,884; Write-ins 1,410: D+73,474 Eisenhower 56,404; Stevenson 61,114: D+4,710
6	*Carl T. Durham (D)	Chapel Hill; 62; pharmacist; Armed Services, Joint Atomic Energy Cmtes; '38
	Rufus K. Hayworth, Jr. (R)	High Point; lawyer 1952: Durham (D) 84,203; Louis F. Ferree (R) 36,912: D+47,291 Eisenhower 56,404; Stevenson 61,114: D+4,710
7	*F. Ertel Carlyle (D)	Lumberton; 57; lawyer; Interstate Cmte; '48
	J. O. West (R)	Dunn; attorney 1952: Carlyle (D) 62,884; Write-ins 981: D+61,903 Eisenhower 32,906; Stevenson 49,473: D+16,567
8	*C. B. Deane (D)	Rockingham; 56; law; Banking Cmte; '46
	Harold W. Gavin (R)	Sanford; lawyer 1952: Deane (D) 67,764; Walter B. Love (R) 45,451: D+22,313 Eisenhower 57,223; Stevenson 59,768: D+2,545
9	*Hugh O. Alexander (D)	Kannapolis; 43; lawyer; Post Office Cmte; '52
	William E. Stevens, Jr. (R)	Lenoir; executive 1952: Alexander (D) 68,624; Walter P. Johnson (R) 64,662: D+3,562 (52%) Eisenhower 78,121; Stevenson 56,361: R+21,760

10 ***Charles Raper Jonas (R)** — Lincolnton; 50; lawyer; Appropriations Cmte; '52

J. C. Sedberry (D) — Charlotte; lawyer
1952: Jonas (R) 82,428; *Hamilton Jones (D) 61,149: R+21,279
Eisenhower 86,223; Stevenson 59,919: R+26,304

11 ***Woodrow W. Jones (D)** — Rutherfordton; 40; lawyer; Judiciary Cmte; '50

R. R. Ramsey (R) — Walnut; farmer
1952: Jones (D) 61,540; George M. Pritchard (R) 36,157: D+25,383
Eisenhower 50,125; Stevenson 50,100: R+25

12 ***George A. Shuford (D)** — Asheville; 59; lawyer; Interior Cmte; '52

Charles W. Cunningham (R) — Arden; retired Army officer.
1952: Shuford (D) 63,045; Hugh Montieth (R) 47,752: D+15,292
Eisenhower 58,121; Stevenson 54,663: R+3,458

VIEWPOINTS—NORTH CAROLINA:

Republican: This is another major test of the two-party system in the South. We are hopeful that Jonas, with an excellent record in Congress, will hold this seat.

Democratic: Jonas is personally popular, but there is a capable candidate opposing him, and that seat should be recaptured by the Democrats.

Editor: A review of the Presidential vote shows the Republican strength in the Western part of North Carolina. The 10th District is the one to watch.



NORTH DAKOTA

To be elected: Governor; 2 House members, At Large. Polls close: 7 P.M., CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 191,712; Stevenson 76,694: R+15,018 (71%)

GOVERNOR:

***Norman Brunsdale (R)** — Mayville; elected two-year term '52

Cornelius Bymers (D) — Ellendale; farmer
1952: Brunsdale (R) 199,944; Ole S. Johnson (D) 53,990: R+145,954

U. S. SENATE:

***William Langer (R)** — Bismarck; farmer-lawyer; Chman. Judiciary Cmte; Foreign Relations Cmte; '40, '46, '52
1952: Langer (R) 157,907; Harold Morrison (D) 55,347: R+102,560 (66.3%)

***Milton R. Young (R)** — La Moure; 56; farmer; appointed Mar. '45, re-elected June '46, '50; Appropriations, Agriculture Cmtes
1950: Young (R) 126,209; Harry O'Brien (D) 60,507: R+65,702 (67.6%)

A. L.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

2 members to be elected at large

Present membership: 2 Republicans

***Usher L. Burdick (R)** — Williston; 75; attorney; Judiciary Cmte; '36, out '44, back '48

***Otto Krueger (R)** — Fessenden; 64; auditor; Appropriations Cmte; Nov. '52

P. W. Lanier (D) — Fargo; attorney

Raymond G. Vendsel (D) — Carpio; farmer
1952: Burdick (R) 181,218; Krueger (R) 156,829; Edward Nesemeier (D) 49,829

VIEWPOINTS—NORTH DAKOTA:

Republican: Safe state.

Democratic: Have full slate; expect to make good showing.

Editor: Voting majorities above tell the story.

OHIO

To be elected: Governor; 1 U.S. Senator; 23 House members. Polls close: 6:30 P.M., EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 2,100,391; Stevenson 1,600,367: R+500,-024 (56.8%)

GOVERNOR:

***Frank J. Lausche (D)** — Cleveland; first elected '44, out '46, won '48, '50, '52

James A. Rhodes (R) — Columbus; State Auditor
1952: Lausche (D) 2,015,110; Charles Taft (R) 1,590,058: D+425,052

U. S. SENATE:

***Thomas Burke (D)** — Cleveland; 56; appointed to succeed Robert A. Taft (R) Oct. '53; District of Columbia, Public Works Cmtes

most Cleve (Cahoon) by 100th

George H. Bender (R) — Chagrin Falls; 58; House member '39-'49, '51-'54
1950: Taft (R) 1,645,643; Joe Ferguson (D) 1,214,459: R+431,184 (57.5%)

***John W. Bricker (R)** — Columbus; 61;elected 2nd six-year term '52
1952: Bricker (R) 1,878,961; Michael DiSalle (D) 1,563,330: R+315,631 (54.6%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

23 members to be elected

Present membership; 16 Republicans; 6 Democrats; 1 Independent

1	***Gordon H. Scherer (R)**	Cincinnati; 48; lawyer; Un-American Activities Cmte; '52
	(Mrs.) Warwick Hobart (D)	Cincinnati; civic worker 1952: Scherer (R) 96,385; Walter Kelly (D) 60,015: R+36,370
2	***William E. Hess (R)**	Cincinnati; 56; lawyer; Armed Services Cmte; '28, out '36 & '48, back '50
	Earl Wagner (D)	lawyer; House member '48-'50 1952: Hess (R) 90,417; Earl Wagner (D) 69,341: R+21,076
3	***Paul F. Schenck (R)**	Dayton; 46; real estate; Interstate Cmte; Nov. '51
	Thomas B. Talbot (D)	Dayton; lawyer 1952: Schenck (R) 112,325; Thomas Talbot (D) 107,551: R+4,774 (51%) Eisenhower: 127,674; Stevenson 110,611: R+17,063
4	***William M. McCulloch (R)**	Piqua; 53; lawyer; Judiciary Cmte; Nov. '47
	Forrest L. Blankenship (D)	Covington; lawyer 1952: McCulloch (R) 93,442; Carleton Reiser (D) 43,426: R+50,016 Eisenhower 96,610; Stevenson 52,241: R+44,369
5	***Cliff Clevenger (R)**	Bryan; 69; businessman; Appropriations Cmte; '38
	Martin W. Feigert (D)	Van Wert; insurance 1952: Clevenger (R) 72,168; Don Batt (D) 42,-104: R+30,064 Eisenhower 84,509; Stevenson 39,363: R+45,146
6	***James G. Polk (D)**	Highland; 63; farmer; Agriculture Cmte; '31-'39, retired, back '48
	Leo Blackburn (R)	Portsmouth; educator 1952: Polk (D) 67,220; Leo Blackburn (R) 66,-896: D+324 (50%) Eisenhower 83,424; Stevenson 63,300: R+20,224
7	***Clarence J. Brown (R)**	Blanchester; 61; publisher; Rules Cmte; '38
	G. Louis Wren (D)	Belle Fontaine; Mayor of Belle Fontaine 1952: Unopposed Eisenhower 94,088; Stevenson 56,224: R+38,864
8	***Jackson E. Betts (R)**	Findlay; 50; lawyer; Banking Cmte; '50
	Thomas M. Dowd (D)	Kenton; lawyer-farmer 1952: Betts (R) 75,768; Henry Drake (D) 34,474: R+41,294 Eisenhower 82,123; Stevenson 38,284: R+43,839
9	***Frazier Reams (Ind.)**	Toledo; 57; lawyer; Post Office Cmte; '50
	Irving G. Reynolds (R)	Sylvania; business executive
	Thomas L. Ashley (D)	Waterville; lawyer 1952: Reams (Ind.) 74,821; Thomas Burke (D) 61,047; G. Flues (R) 46,989: (Ind.)+13,774 Eisenhower 97,490; Stevenson 91,043: R+6,447

lay,Oct.25,1954) (By Bertram Benedict)

For Senator from Ohio

Two members of Congress, neighbors, are running against each other for junior Senator from Ohio. The Democrat is the incumbent, soft-spoken Sen. Thomas A. Burke, 55, graduate of Holy Cross, lawyer, mayor of Cleveland for eight years. The Republican, voluble Rep. George H. Bender, 58, businessman, represents a District made up of Cleveland suburbs.

Burke was appointed by Democratic Gov. Frank J. Lausche on Oct. 12, 1953 to fill the seat of the late Sen. Taft until an election was held. Bender is serving his seventh term in the House, non-consecutive because in 1948 he was defeated for re-election as Representative-at-large.

Bender is probably the better known to Buckeye State voters inasmuch as most of his service in the House was as Representative-at-large, elected from the state as a whole. On the other hand, Burke has the advantage of the support of popular Gov. Lausche, favored by the betting odds for his own re-election on Nov. 2.

Bender, an ardent advocate of Taft for the G.O.P. presidential nomination in 1952, has nevertheless voted almost without deviation in the last two years for the Eisenhower program, including flexible farm price supports. In the pre-Eisenhower era he was considered one of the more conservative Republicans in Congress.

Burke seems middle-of-the-road rather than "liberal." In his one year in the Senate, he voted <u>for</u> greater tax cuts than the Administration wanted, public housing, a three-year extension of the Trade Agreements act, the Bricker Amendment, and <u>against</u> more funds for T.V.A. and commercial power production by the Atomic Energy Commission. He voted for flexible farm price supports and for dairy price supports at 80 instead of 75 per cent of parity.

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REPUBLICAN LOSS INDICATED IN OHIO

Polls and Economic Factors Show Democratic Victory —Farm Votes Is Vital

By FOSTER HAILEY

Special to The New York Times.

COLUMBUS, Ohio, Oct. 30—Ohio political leaders and observers were inclining today to the opinion that the Democrats on Tuesday would win the Senate seat held for fourteen years by the late Robert A. Taft.

The candidates are Senator Thomas A. Burke, four times Cleveland Mayor who is serving by appointment and is the Democratic nominee for the remaining unexpired two years of Mr. Taft's term, and George H. Bender, seven-term Republican Representative in Congress.

The one-hour visit of President Eisenhower to the Cleveland airport yesterday is not believed to have helped Mr. Bender matrially. For one thing, the President did not mention Mr. Bender by name in his brief talk there and only indicated he wanted Mr. Bender returned to Washington when the candidate called over a reporter and asked him to ask Mr. Eisenhower the direct question.

"I want him (indicating Mr. Bender by wave of the hand) in Washington quick," was the President's response to the inquiry.

Airport Crowd Small

The small crowd at the airport —estimated by Mr. Bender at 5,000, by the police at 2,500 and by reporters at less than 1,000—did not show that any great enthusiasm had been aroused among Republican workers by the President's visit.

It is the consensus that there is a lot of apathy but that it seems to be mostly among Republicans. The story everywhere is that the Democratic organizations never have worked harder. Labor organizations also have been diligent and state labor leaders are confident labor will vote solidly Democratic.

Republican apathy was particularly evident in Dayton last night where not more than 500 persons turned out to see three elephants, listen to a dance band, some singers, and Charles E. Wilson, the Defense Secretary, make his fourth speech of the campaign.

Wednesday night, Democrats filled the same hall—the University of Dayton Field House—with 5,000 persons to eat a $1.50 box supper and hear Senator Estes Kefauver speak in behalf of Thomas B. Talbot, the Democratic candidate for Congress from that district, the Third.

Admission last night was free. Several members of the small audience left before Mr. Wilson had finished his speech.

One question that still made many chary of predicting a real Democratic sweep was just how big a turnout there would be Tuesday. Ted W. Brown, the Secretary of State, estimated not more than 2,750,000 would vote. That is 1,000,000 under 1952.

Mr. Burke's main strength lies in the eight urban industrial counties where 35 per cent of the vote is cast. A small turnout Tuesday apparently would hurt his chances.

Farm Reaction Important

Another question is, how deep is rural resentmeent against the Eisenhower Administration's farm policies? Everyone admits there is much "talk" among the farmers and that any considerable defection would be fatal to Mr. Benders' chances. In 1948 it was the rural Ohio vote that gave Harry S. Truman Ohio's electors.

All economic facts and most political polls indicate a sweeping Democratic victory.

This state has 150,000 to 200,000 unemployed. The latest report of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland on retail sales show every reporting station in Ohio except Portsmouth below 1953 totals through September.

Farm income is down, with dairy farmers in revolt against the cutback in crop supports from 90 to 75 per cent of parity.

One newspaper survey is reported to have shown an indicated 23 per cent swing in the rural vote. The same survey indicated a 9 per cent swing to the Democrats in urban areas and a surprising 18 per cent switch in small towns.

A newspaper reporter who has just completed a tour of the state believes that the farm survey at least comes close to the fact. Contrary to other years, he found many farmers who were willing to say they were going to vote Democratic.

Lausche Still Popular

He said he found no diminuition anywhere in the popularity of Gov. Frank J. Lausche, the Democratic Governor, who is seeking his fifth term. In 1952 the Governor carried the state by 426,000 votes while President Eisenhower was winning it by 500,000.

Governor Lausche's opponent is James A. Rhodes, 44-year-old State Auditor and former Columbus Mayor.

Despite all these indications of a Democratic trend in Ohio, no one is sure of anything except Governor Lausche's re-election.

The Democrats today still were claiming three sure victories in contests for House seats now held by the Republicans. These are the Second, Third and Fourteenth Districts, with a possible victory in sight in the Sixteenth.

They also think they have a chance to pick up the Ninth District seat in Toledo that now is held by Frazier Reams, the only Independent in the House. They concede the loss of a seat in the Fifteenth District, a normally Republican area that Robert T. Secrest relinquished to accept appointment to the Federal Trade Commission.

10	***Thomas A. Jenkins (R)**	Ironton; 74; lawyer; Ways and Means Cmte; '24
	Truman A. Morris (D)	Gallipolis; General Manager of three radio stations 1952: Jenkins (R) 63,339; Delmar Canaday (D) 35,666: R+27,673 Eisenhower 66,150; Stevenson 43,003: R+23,147
11	***Oliver P. Bolton (R)**	Mentor; 36; lawyer; Post Office Cmte; '52
	Edward C. Kaley (D)	Warren; former County Recorder 1952: Bolton (R) 91,204; Robert Kilpatrick (D) 63,930: R+27,274
12	***John M. Vorys (R)**	Columbus; 58; lawyer; Foreign Affairs Cmte; '38
	Jacob F. Myers (D)	Columbus; union official 1952: Vorys (R) 134,693; George Tarbutton (D) 81,665: R+53,028 Eisenhower 138,894; Stevenson 91,620: R+47,274
13	**A. D. Baumhart, Jr. (R)**	Vermillion; House member '40-'42; *Alvin Weichel (R) not a candidate
	George C. Steinemann (D)	Sandusky; attorney 1952: Alvin Weichel (R) 63,344; George Steineman (D) 44,467: R+18,877 Eisenhower 75,381; Stevenson 44,666: R+30,715
14	***William H. Ayres (R)**	Akron: 38; businessman; Veterans Cmte; '50
	John L. Smith (D)	Barberton; former National Commander AMVETS 1952: Ayres (R) 117,475; Walter Huber (D) 83,463: R+34,012
15	**Max L. Underwood (D)**	New Lexington; Attorney. This seat vacated by Democrat Robert Secrest to accept position on Federal Trade Commission.
	John E. Henderson (R)	Cambridge; lawyer 1952: Secrest (D) 62,913; P. W. Griffiths (R) 34,966: D+27,947 Eisenhower 105,601; Stevenson 103,514: R+2,087
16	***Frank T. Bow (R)**	Canton; 53; lawyer; Appropriations Cmte; '50
	Thomas H. Nichols (D)	Canton; former Mayor of Canton 1952: Bow (R) 98,447; John McSweeney (D) 82,522: R+15,925 (54%) Eisenhower 111,623; Stevenson 79,777: R+31,846
17	***J. Harry McGregor (R)**	West Lafayette; 58; contractor; Public Works Cmte; Feb. '40
	Robert W. Levering (D)	Fredericktown; attorney 1952: McGregor (R) 94,624; James Mayer (D) 44,117: R+50,507 Eisenhower 95,783; Stevenson 49,463: R+46,320
18	***Wayne L. Hays (D)**	Flushing; 40; farmer; Banking Cmte; '48
	Walter J. Hunston (R)	Salem; lawyer 1952: Hays (D) 78,277; Clarence Wetzel (R) 62,081: D+16,196 Eisenhower 74,982; Stevenson 78,063: D+3,081

19	***Michael J. Kirwan (D)**	Youngstown; 66; Chman. Democratic Congressional Campaign Cmte; '36
	David S. Edwards (R)	Youngstown; lawyer 1952: Kirwan (D) 91,074; Allen Russell (R) 46,202: D+44,872 Eisenhower 37,793; Stevenson 39,062: D+1,269
20	***Michael A. Feighan (D)**	Cleveland; 50; lawyer; Judiciary Cmte; '42
	John H. Ferguson (R)	Cleveland 1952: Feighan (D) 109,211; John Ferguson (R) 58,271: D+50,940
21	**Charles A. Vanik (D)**	Cleveland; Municipal Judge; defeated *Robert Crosser (D) in May '54 Primary.
	Francis E. Young (R)	Cleveland; minister 1952: Robert Crosser (D) 100,340; L. Payne (R) 45,896: D+54,444
22	***Frances P. Bolton (R)**	Lyndhurst; 69; Foreign Affairs Cmte; Feb. '40
	Chat Patterson (D)	Cleveland Heights; real estate 1952: Bolton (R) 87,316; Chat Patterson (D) 61,-197: R+26,119
23	**William E. Minshall, Jr. (R)**	Cleveland; ex-General Counsel Maritime Commission; This is George Bender's House seat
	Bernice S. Pyke (D)	Lakewood; former Collector of Customs 1952: *George Bender (R) 85,752; Michael O'Brien (D) 47,090: R+38,662

VIEWPOINTS—OHIO:

Republican: As past voting statistics indicate, this is a Republican state. Bulk of the House seats are already held by GOP, but both 6th and 18th should be added to the present 16 Republican seats.

Democratic: Bound to make gains in the House delegation. Among the possibilities are 2nd, 11th, 14th and 16th.

Editor: Both parties admit Senate race is toss-up, each claiming advantage. Ohio is an off-year "swing" state, with "outs" usually picking up some House seats.

OKLAHOMA

To be elected: Governor; 1 U.S. Senator; 6 House members. Polls close: 7 P.M. CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 518,045; Stevenson 430,939: R+87,106 (54.6%)

GOVERNOR:

Raymond Gary (D) Madill; State Senator

Reuben K. Sparks (R) Woodward; attorney
*Gov. Johnston Murray (D), elected four-year term '50, cannot succeed himself.
1950: Murray (D) 329,308; Ferguson (R) 313,025 D+16,283

U. S. SENATE:

***Robert S. Kerr (D)** Oklahoma City; oil executive; Finance, Public Works Cmtes; '48

Fred M. Mock (R) Oklahoma City; lawyer
1948: Kerr (D) 441,654; Gomer Smith (R) 265,169: D+176,485 (62.3%)

***A. S. (Mike) Monroney (D)** Oklahoma City; newspaperman; Interstate, Post Office Cmtes; Nov. '50
1950: Monroney (D) 345,953; W. H. Alexander 285,224: D+60,729 (54.8%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

6 members to be elected

Present membership: 1 Republican; 5 Democrats

1

***Page Belcher (R)** Enid; attorney; 55; Agriculture Cmte; Nov. '50

Ben Crowley (D) Tulsa; real estate
1952: Belcher (R) 121,442; H. G. Dickey (D) 85,647: R+35,795
Eisenhower 137,309; Stevenson 73,407: R+63,902

2

***Ed Edmondson (D)** Muskogee; 35; attorney; Veterans Cmte; Nov. '52

Percy Butler (R) Adair; oil man
1952: Edmondson (D) 92,407; Edward E. Easton (R) 60,550: D+31,857
Eisenhower 81,974; Stevenson 77,567: R+4,407

3

***Carl Albert (D)** McAlester; 46; attorney; Agriculture Cmte; Nov. '52

Jasper N. Butler (R) Wilburton
1952: Albert (D) 73,185; Frank D. McSherry (R) 20,735: D+52,450
Eisenhower 60,101; Stevenson 35,409: R+24,692

4

***Tom Steed (D)** Shawnee; 50; newspaperman; Public Works Cmte; Nov. '48

Owen E. Acton (R) Guthrie; oil leasee
1952: Steed (D) 67,024; John L. Goode (R) 46,446: D+10,578
Eisenhower 60,555; Stevenson 55,731: R+4,824

5

***John Jarman (D)** — Oklahoma City; 39; attorney; Post Office Cmte; Nov. '50

George E. Young (R) — El Reno
1952: Jarman (D) 128,627; Edwin W. Burch (R) 77,425: D+51,202
Eisenhower 117,658; Stevenson 90,637: R+27,021

6

***Victor Wickersham (D)** — Mangum; 48; Insurance; Armed Services Cmte; April '41, defeated '46, back '48

Reece L. Russell (R) — Lawton; real estate
1952: Wickersham (D) 98,823; K. B. Cornell (R) 57,261: D+41,562
Eisenhower 85,140; Stevenson 73,496: R+11,644

VIEWPOINTS—OKLAHOMA:

Republican: Eisenhower ran well here in '52. If this enthusiasm can be transferred to the House candidates, now that Ike isn't on the ticket, it should be possible to even the odds in the 2nd and 6th Districts.

Democratic: First District is traditionally Republican, but with Ike off the ticket there is an opportunity to pick it up.

Editor: Should run according to form.

OREGON

To be elected: Governor, 1 U.S. Senator, 4 House members. Polls close: 8 P.M., PST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 420,815; Stevenson 270,579: R+150,236 (60.5%)

GOVERNOR:

***Paul Patterson (R)** — Salem

Joseph K. Carson, Jr. (D) — Portland; former Portland Mayor
Patterson succeeded Douglas McKay in Jan. '53, when McKay resigned to become Secretary of Interior under Eisenhower.
1950: McKay (R) 334,160; Austin Flegel (D) 171,750: R+162,410.

U. S. SENATE:

***Guy Cordon (R)** — Roseburg; 64; '48, seeking 2nd full term.

Richard L. Neuberger (D) — Portland; member State Senate, writer
Cordon appointed to succeed Charles L. McNary in Mar. '44, elected Nov. '44.
1948: Cordon (R) 299,295; Willis Mahoney (D) 199,275: R+100,020 (60%)

***Wayne L. Morse (Ind.)** — Elected 2nd six-year term as Republican in '50
1950: Morse (R) 376,510; H. Latourette (D) 116,780: R+259,730 (74.8%)

Cordon v. Neuberger v. Morse v. Eisenhower

President Eisenhower hopes you'll re-elect Sen. Guy Cordon. Interior Secretary Douglas McKay has been telling his fellow Oregonians, who elected McKay their governor in 1948. This Eisenhower preference for Cordon must be due largely or chiefly to their joint Republicanism, for the senior Senator from the Beaver State has voted against the present Administration on many key issues.

Cordon was against raising unemployment benefits--trials for G.I.'s in foreign courts--a five per cent tax credit for dividends (most other G.O.P. Senators also voted against this one)--extending the reciprocal trade act for three years--admitting 200,000 more refugees. And was for the Bricker Amendment. On the other hand, he was with Eisenhower in supporting flexible (vs. rigid) farm price supports.

Sen. Cordon's Democratic opponent is Richard L. Neuberger, a "liberal," for whom the junior Senator from Oregon, Wayne L. Morse (Ind.), has been campaigning vigorously. Indeed, one Republican slogan in the campaign is, "Oregon can't afford two Morses in the Senate."

Certainly Morse and Cordon have been on opposite sides of many or most issues, even if Morse had been re-elected in 1950 on the Republican ticket. He voted differently from Cordon on five of the seven issues cited above, the same way as Cordon only on opposing the trial of G.I.'s in foreign courts and a 5 per cent tax credit for dividends.

LATE OREGON ODDS SHIFT TO THE G. O. P.

Cordon Is Given a Slight Margin Over Neuberger—Neither Side Confident

By LAWRENCE E. DAVIES

Special to The New York Times.

PORTLAND, Ore., Oct. 30—The State of Oregon is nearing its most critical election in years with this question foremost:

Will Oregonians, conditioned by custom to sending Republicans to Congress, follow their time-tested pattern, or has the "supreme effort" mustered by the Democrats been enough to give this state its first Democratic Senator in forty years?

Neither the forces of Senator Guy Cordon, 64-year-old Republican conservative, nor those of Richard L. Neuberger, 41-year-old New Deal Democrat, were overconfident today.

Some polls gave Senator Cordon the edge, others favored Mr. Neuberger. Betting odds slightly favored the Republicans, having changed this week-end from even money.

There is no doubt—Democrats agree to this—that Senator Cordon has taken the offensive during the last two or three weeks.

At the outset he called for a gentlemanly, high level campaign. Now he has delighted his backers by taking off the gloves, seriously and in caustically humorous fashion.

He has been forced into this, Cordon managers declared, by constant "baseless" charges and "distortion" of his record. Each side charges the other with campaigning on lies and smears. Personalities, war records and charges of excessive expenditures have had a tendency of late to overshadow discussion of the issues.

In support of their charges that Mr. Neuberger distorts his rival's record and indulges in half truths, the Cordon campaigners have circulated pamphlets and used full-page newspaper advertisements quoting from the Democratic nominee's writings.

The voters' attention is being called to the fact that in 1947 after a campaign for a seat in the Legislature he wrote for Harper's magazine:

"As long as the business of rounding up votes dominated my thoughts, I discovered an unconscious inhibition on what I wrote. Truth * * * became not the sole test. My eraser modified original conclusions so they would be more generally acceptable. And I was seeking only minor office. What might the inhibitors have been if I had glimpsed ahead the prospect of * * * a United States Senatorship?"

The Cordon forces, in the opinion of even some of Mr. Neuberger's close friends, hit a jackpot this week with a widely used advertisement quoting much of a column in The Oregon Statesman by its publisher, Charles A. Sprague, a former Governor of Oregon, who is personally friendly to the Democratic nominee.

The column berated "big guns" and "little guns" among the Democrats—and named Mr. Neuberger personally—for "laying down such a barrage on 'give-away' that an utterly fantastic portrait of Republicans of known integrity is being fashioned."

It denounced them as dressing up Senator Cordon and Douglas McKay, Secretary of the Interior, in "pirate" suits and classifying these officials as "yeggs out to plunder the public domain," whereas, Mr. Sprague continued, they knew these Republicans were men of "high character, conscientious in the performance of their public duty, not subject to ulterior influence."

Should Mr. Neuberger emerge the victor, the opinion is rather general that the Democrats also would break the solidly Republican national House delegation of four members by sending Mrs Edith Green a former teacher, to Washington. Her Republican opponent is Tom Lawson McCall, a radio commentator, regarded as an internationalist, whereas Senator Cordon is being attacked as failing to support the Eisenhower foreign policy. The Green-McCall contest is in the Third District, Multnomah County.

Gov. Paul Patterson, Republican, generally is picked to beat Joseph Carson, Democrat, a former Mayor of Portland.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

4 members to be elected

Present membership: 4 Republicans

1	*Walter Norblad (R)	Stayton; 46; lawyer; Armed Services Cmte; Jan. '46
	Donnell Mitchell (D)	Willamina; salesman 1952: Norblad (R) 124,720; Robert Jones (D) 58,796: R+65,924 Eisenhower 122,227; Stevenson 68,111: R+54,116
2	*Sam Coon (R)	Baker; 51; farmer; Appropriations Cmte; Nov. '52
	Albert C. Ullman (D)	Baker; real estate 1952: Coon (R) 57,155; John G. Jones (D) 40,-550: R+16,605 Eisenhower 63,455; Stevenson 38,291: R+25,164
3	Tom Lawson McCall (R)	Portland; radio commentator; primary winner May '54 over *Homer D. Angell (R)
	(Mrs.) Edith Green (D)	Portland; housewife 1952: Angell (R) 125,504; Alfred H. Corbett (D) 107,099: R+18,405 (54%) Eisenhower 132,602; Stevenson 107,118: R+25,484
4	*Harris Ellsworth (R)	Roseburg; 55; publisher; Rules Cmte; '42
	Charles O. Porter (D)	Eugene; lawyer 1952: Ellsworth (R) 100,970; Walter Swanson (D) 51,298: R+49,672 Eisenhower 102,311; Stevenson 57,005: R+45,306

VIEWPOINTS—OREGON:

Republican: Oregon is and has been a good Republican state; there is no reason why it won't continue that way in '54.

Democratic: With Wayne Morse aiding his campaign, Neuberger has an excellent chance to win the Senate. In the House, Mrs. Green should win over McCall, as she will get the labor and liberal vote which Angell was able to hold. There is a chance Ullman may win over Coon in the 2nd.

Editor: Hinges on whether Morse can lead enough of his supporters into the Democratic column to swing the Senatorial. Watch 3rd District.



PENNSYLVANIA

To be elected: Governor; 30 House members. Polls close: 8 P.M., EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 2,415,789; Stevenson 2,146,269: R+269,-520 (52.7%)

GOVERNOR:

Lloyd H. Wood (R) Collegeville; present Lt.-Gov.

George M. Leader (D) Dover; member State Senate, farmer.

*Gov. John S. Fine (R) not a candidate for re-election.
1950: John S. Fine (R) 1,810,146; Richardson Dilworth (D) 1,722,809: R+87,337

U. S. SENATE:

***Edward Martin (R)** Washington; 75; elected 2nd six-year term '52
1952: Martin (R) 2,331,034; Guy Bard (D) 2,168,546: R+162,488 (51.6%)

***James H. Duff (R)** Carnegie; 71; elected 1st six-year term '50
1950: Duff (R) 1,820,400; *Francis Myers (D) 1,194,076: R+626,334 (51.3%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

30 members to be elected

Present membership: 19 Republicans; 11 Democrats

1

***William A. Barrett (D)** Phil.; 58; realtor; Banking Cmte; '44, out '46, back '48

Joseph A. Graham, Jr. (R) Phil.; educator
1952: Barrett (D) 89,879; James Iannucci (R) 41,948: D+47,931

2

***William T. Granahan (D)** Phil.; 59; builder; Interstate Cmte; '44, out '46, back '48

Albert A. Ciardi (R) Phil.; accountant
1952: Granahan (D) 105,553; Daniel McCauley (R) 65,159: D+40,394

3

***James A. Byrne (D)** Phil.; 48; funeral director; Veterans Cmte; '52

Charles H. Sporkin (R) Phil.; attorney
1952: Byrne (D) 81,837; Morton Witkin (R) 58,191: D+22,646

4

***Earl Chudoff (D)** Phil.; 47; lawyer; Government Operations Cmte; '48

W. Beverly Carter, Jr. (R) Phil.; publicist
1952: Chudoff (D) 90,077; Joseph Burns (R) 38,228: D+51,749

5

***William J. Green, Jr. (D)** Phil.; 44; insurance; Armed Services Cmte; '44, out '46, back '48

Francis P. McCusker (R) Phil.; State Senator
1952: Green (D) 104,112; Philip Richman (R) 88,040: D+16,072 (54%)

DEMOCRATS GAIN IN PENNSYLVANIA

Analysts Cite Labor Support, Idleness, Farm Discontent in Fight for 30 Seats

By WILLIAM G. WEART

Special to The New York Times.

PHILADELPHIA, Oct. 23—The outcome of the contests for Pennsylvania's thirty seats loomed today as a major factor in the nation-wide battle for control of the House of Representatives in the Eighty-fourth Congress.

If history repeats itself, as expected, this off-year election will produce many changes in the Commonwealth delegation, now composed of nineteen Republicans and eleven Democrats. The contests are being fought hard in every district.

G. Mason Owlett, Republican National Committeeman and leader of the faction once headed by former Senator Joseph R. Grundy, looks for the Republicans to add four members to the delegation.

David L. Lawrence, Mayor of Pittsburgh and Democratic National Committeeman, believes his party will pick up five or six Representatives.

Impartial political analysts feel that the odds strongly favor the Democrats, who have the support of organized labor. They also base their deductions on Democratic strength because of unemployment in the coal fields and industrial areas, some discontent among farmers, and the fact that five Republican incumbents "just made it on Ike's coattails in 1952."

Conversely, they contend that the five Democratic incumbents who won by narrow margins two years ago should do better because President Eisenhower's name is not on the ballot.

Another imponderable stems from apathy among the voters. Both sides are making eleventh-hour drives to stir interest, the Republicans with the aid of the Citizens for Eisenhower and the Democrats with the backing of organized labor groups.

The Republican campaign is now stepping up and will reach its peak, Mr. Owlett declared, with a "decisive victory" for Mr. Wood over his Democratic opponent, State Senator George M. Leader.

In Philadelphia the Democrats contend they will re-elect five incumbents and pick up the Republican seat that Hugh D. Scott Jr., onetime Republican National Chairman, has held for twelve years.

Mr. Scott, who carried the Sixth District by 6,244 votes in 1952, is opposed by Alex Hemphill, 32-year-old attorney and son of John Hemphill, unsuccessful Democratic nominee for Governor in 1930. Both are waging aggressive campaigns.

While admitting that Mr. Scott has a real battle on his hands, the Republicans say he will win and that they will take a couple of Philadelphia seats from the Democrats.

6	*Hugh Scott (R)	Phil.; 54; lawyer; Rules Cmte; '40, in Service '41-43, back '46
	Alexander Hemphill (D)	Phil.; attorney 1952: Scott (R) 93,368; Harrington Herr (D) 87,124: R+6,244 (52%)
7	*Benjamin F. James (R)	Rosemont; graphic arts; Appropriations Cmte; '48
	O. Arthur Cappiello (D)	Drexel Hill 1952: James (R) 127,918; M. Zealor (D) 79,423: R+48,485
8	*Karl C. King (R)	Morrisville; 57; farmer; Agriculture Cmte; Nov. '51
	John P. Fullam (D)	Fairless Hills; Borough Solicitor 1952: King (R) 83,966; Wilson Stephenson (D) 57,723: R+26,243
9	*Paul B. Dague (R)	Downington; 56; engineer; Agriculture Cmte; '48
	Edward C. Wilson (D)	Lancaster; businessman 1952: Dague (R) 100,578; Philip Ragan (D) 51,268: R+49,310
10	*Joseph L. Carrigg (R)	Susquehanna; 53; lawyer; Interstate Cmte; Nov. '51
	Robert H. Jones (D)	Scranton; educator 1952: Carrigg (R) 89,820; *Harry O'Neill (D) 77,758: R+12,062 (54%)
11	*Edward J. Bonin (R)	Hazleton; 50; lawyer; Post Office Cmte; '52
	Daniel J. Flood (D)	Wilkes Barre; Member '44-'46; '48-'52 1952: Bonin (R) 80,310; *Daniel Flood (D) 79,722: R+588 (50%)
12	*Ivor D. Fenton (R)	Mahoney City; 65; physician; Appropriations Cmte; '38
	Charles E. Lotz (D)	Pottsville; businessman 1952: Fenton (R) 79,859; Peter Krehel (D) 51,-736: R+28,123 Eisenhower 80,298; Stevenson 52,776: R+27,522
13	*Samuel K. McConnell, Jr. (R)	Wynnewood; 54; banker; Chman Labor Cmte; '44
	Joseph C. Mansfield (D)	Phil.; attorney 1952: McConnell (R) 114,672; Frank Keegan (D) 57,974: R+56,698
14	*George M. Rhodes (D)	Reading; 68; editor; Post Office Cmte; '48
	Donald F. Spang (R)	Wyomissing; attorney 1952: Rhodes (D) 48,427; James Bertolet (R) 48,019: D+408 (51%)
15	*Francis E. Walter (D)	Easton; 60; lawyer; Judiciary, Un-American Activities Cmtes; '32
	LeRoy Michels (R)	Stroudsburg; auto dealer 1952: Walter (D) 61,566; John R. Craig (R) 50,871: D+10,695 (55%)
16	*Walter M. Mumma (R)	Harrisburg; 64; construction; Banking Cmte; '50
	Richard A. Swank (D)	Duncannon; newspaper publisher 1952: Mumma (R) 83,493; David Randall (D) 51,825: R+31,668 Eisenhower 89,707; Stevenson 48,343: R+41,346

17	***Alvin R. Bush (R)**	Muncy; 61; farmer; Interstate Cmte; '50
	William T. Longe (D)	Renovo; hotel owner 1952: Bush (R) 82,058; Patrick McGowan (D) 44,376: R+37,682 Eisenhower 85,132; Stevenson 44,318: R+40,814
18	***Richard M. Simpson (R)**	Huntingdon; 54; lawyer; Chman Republican Congressional Campaign Cmte; May '37
	Robert M. Meyers (D)	Lewistown 1952: Simpson (R) 75,723; Shoemaker (D) 43,555: R+32,168 Eisenhower 78,203; Stevenson 42,511: R+35,692
19	***S. Walter Stauffer (R)**	York; 66; executive; Public Works Cmte; '52
	James M. Quigley (D)	Camp Hill; attorney 1952: Stauffer (R) 72,466; *James Lind (D) 66,165: R+6,301 (52%) Eisenhower 81,807; Stevenson 75,961: R+23,846
20	***James E. Van Zandt (R)**	Altoona; 56; transportation; Armed Services, Joint Atomic Energy Cmtes; '39-'43, in Service, back '47
	John R. Stewart (D)	Altoona; educator 1952: Van Zandt (R) 62,804; Joseph Moran (D) 37,152: R+25,652 Eisenhower 62,858; Stevenson 37,618: R+25,240
21	***Augustine B. Kelley (D)**	Greensburg; 70; mine operator; Labor Cmte; '40
	Herbert O. Morrison (R)	Scottdale; commentator 1952: Kelley (D) 73,223; J. C. McKenna (R) 65,252: D+7,971 (53%) Eisenhower 58,923; Stevenson 80,068: D+21,145
22	***John P. Saylor (R)**	Johnstown; 46; lawyer; Interstate, Veterans Cmtes; Sept. '49
	Robert S. Glass (D)	Johnstown; attorney 1952: Saylor (R) 77,391; William Shettig (D) 70,218: R+7,173 (52%) Eisenhower 72,922; Stevenson 75,615: D+2,693
23	***Leon H. Gavin (R)**	Oil City; 61; Armed Services Cmte; '42
	Fred C. Barr (D)	Tidioute; educator 1952: Gavin (R) 73,001; Fred Barr (D) 34,633: R+38,368 Eisenhower 74,203; Stevenson 34,823: R+39,380
24	***Carroll D. Kearns (R)**	Farrell; 54; educator; Labor Cmte; '38
	Edmund T. Rogers (D)	Erie 1952: Kearns (R) 90,276; Clinton Bebell (D) 67,790: R+22,486 Eisenhower 94,339; Stevenson 67,263: R+27,076
25	***Louis E. Graham (R)**	Beaver; 74; lawyer; Judiciary Cmte; '38
	Frank M. Clark (D)	Bessemer; trucker 1952: Graham (R) 77,577; Frank Clark (D) 76,214: R+1,363 (50%) Eisenhower 80,262; Stevenson 74,595: R+5,667

26	***Thomas E. Morgan (D)**	Fredericktown: 48; physician; Foreign Affairs Cmte; '44
	Branko Stupar (R)	Washington; attorney 1952: Morgan (D) 105,581; *Edward Sittler (R) 72,981: D+32,601 Eisenhower 70,353; Stevenson 109,771: D+39,418
27	***James G. Fulton (R)**	Pittsburgh; 51; lawyer-publisher; Foreign Affairs Cmte; '44
	Charles J. Chamberlin (D)	McKees Rocks; Registrar of Wills, Alleghany County 1952: Fulton (R) 118,915; Thomas O'Toole (D) 71,039: R+47,876
28	***Herman P. Eberharter (D)**	Pittsburgh; 62; lawyer; Ways and Means Cmte; '36
	Guy C. Read (R)	Pittsburgh; insurance broker 1952: Eberharter (D) 98,432; *Harmer Denny (R) 69,288: D+29,134
29	***Robert J. Corbett (R)**	Pittsburgh; 49; publisher; Post Office Cmte; '39-'40, back '44
	William G. Foley (D)	Valencia; businessman 1952: Corbett (R) 115,069; Lee Sellars (D) 71,-573: R+43,496
30	***Vera D. Buchanan (D)**	McKeesport; Public Works Cmte; July '51
	David J. Smith (R)	McKeesport: businessman 1952: Buchanan (D) 115,292; Peter Bender (R) 65,926: D+49,366

VIEWPOINTS—PENNSYLVANIA:

Republican: A Democratic intra-party fight in Philadelphia should tip the scales in several House seats in favor of the Republicans. 1st through 5th Districts are vulnerable. 14th, 15th, and 21st are possibles.

Democratic: The 6th, 10th, 11th, 19th and 22nd are possibles.

Editor: It is likely that the Philadelphia friction will be smoothed over and the Democrats will retain their Philadelphia seats. Districts not listed by Republican or Democratic opinions appear quite safe.

RHODE ISLAND

To be elected: Governor, 1 U.S. Senator, 2 House members.

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 210,935; Stevenson 203,293: R+7,642 (50.9%)

GOVERNOR:

***Dennis J. Roberts (D)**	Elected two-year term in '52.
Dean Lewis (R)	former Mayor of Newport 1952: Roberts (D) 215,587; Raoul Archambault, Jr. (R) 194,012: D+21,575

U. S. SENATE:

***Theodore Francis Green (D)** — Providence; 87 (oldest in Congress); lawyer & banker; ranking Democratic member Foreign Relations Cmte; Nov. '36

Walter Sundlan (R) — Providence; attorney
1948: Green (D) 190,287; Thomas P. Hazard (R) 130,672: D+59,615 (59.3%)

***John O. Pastore (D)** — Providence; 46; attorney; Joint Atomic, Interstate Cmtes; Nov. '50
1952: Pastore (D) 225,128; Bayard Ewing (R) 185,850; D+39,278 (54.8%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

2 members to be elected

Present membership: 2 Democrats

1

***Aime J. Forand (D)** — Cumberland; 59; newspaperman; Ways & Means Cmte; Nov. '36

Arthur Carrellas (R) — Newport; attorney
1952: Forand (D) 105,404; Berthelot A. Leclaire (R) 86,523: D+18,881 (54.9%)
Eisenhower 97,832; Stevenson 98,183: D+351

2

***John E. Fogarty (D)** — Harmony; 41; union official; Appropriations Cmte; Nov. '40

James O. Watts (R) — Narragansett; former Assistant Attorney General
1952: Fogarty (D) 115,057; James O. Watts (R) 100,305: D+14,752 (53.4%)
Eisenhower 113,103; Stevenson 105,110: R+7,993

VIEWPOINTS—RHODE ISLAND:

Republican: '52 Eisenhower victory may well have changed the political complexion of this state. There is a good chance of breaking the Democratic grip this year.

Democratic: Green, Forand and Fogarty are good campaigners; we have little to worry about here.

Editor: Republicans are eyeing this Senate seat as a dark horse win. If soundings continue to be encouraging, an all-out drive will be made during the closing weeks of the campaign.

SOUTH CAROLINA

To be elected: Governor; 1 U. S. Senator; 6 House members, all unopposed. Polls close: 6 P.M., EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 168,082; Stevenson 173,004: D+4,922 (50.7%)

GOVERNOR:

George Bell Timmerman (D) — Lexington; present Lieutenant-Governor
UNOPPOSED

*Governor James F. Byrnes (D). Not a candidate for re-election, under state law.

SENATE RACE HOT IN SOUTH CAROLINA

Unusual Contest Is Enlivened by 'Tissue-of-Lies' Charge Hurled by Brown

Special to The New York Times.

COLUMBIA, S. C., Oct. 30—South Carolina's unusual general election contest for the United States Senate warmed up considerably during the closing week.

Developments included:

¶A "tissue-of-lies" charge that largely evaporated, to the embarrassment of Edgar A. Brown, Democratic nominee for the seat held by the late Senator Burnet R. Maybank.

¶Gov. James F. Byrnes' announcement of open support for J. Strom Thurmond, write-in candidate who is riding the crest of a wave of popular protest over the state committee's by-passing of a primary whn a full Senate term was at stake.

¶Entrance into the active campaign of Senator Olin D. Johnston—on the side of Mr. Brown. Senator Johnston and Mr. Thurmond slugged it out in a bitter primary race in 1950 and Senator Johnston won by a fairly narrow margin.

The "who's-lying?" episode started Tuesday when Mr. Thurmond hit back at the charge that he was not a loyal Democrat by reading this quotation from a speech prepared for radio delivery by Mr. Brown in 1952:

"We voted for Thurmond and Wright four years ago because they were the candidates of the Democratic party of South Carolina and because they were the best Democrats in the race. * * *"

Mr. Brown, taking advantage of a Thurmond error in describing the source of his information, called the entire Thurmond statement "a tissue of lies" and said he never had supported Mr. Thurmond in any race. He added that Mr. Thurmond had "more gall and less ability" than any other public official he had ever known.

Mr. Thurmond came back next day with photocopies of the text of Mr. Brown's prepared speech containing the exact words he had quoted earlier—but in another newspaper a week earlier than he had first reported. Mr. Thurmond added that if Mr. Brown had not voted for him in 1948, then Mr. Brown was disloyal to the state Democratic party, which supported his States' Rights candidacy.

Mr. Brown replied yesterday that the latter part of the disputed quotation about Mr. Thurmond and Mr. Wright being the best Democrats in the race—was deleted before the speech was delivered. And in the first part, Mr. Brown said, he was speaking as chairman of the state party in saying "we supported Thurmond" and was not giving his personal stand.

Brown Complains of Byrnes

The net effect was to dissipate somewhat Mr. Brown's charge that Mr. Thurmond was a party maverick and a thinly masked Republican puppet.

Governor Byrnes' open support for Mr. Thurmond drew a plaintive statement from Mr. Brown that his "good friend," who wa best man at his wedding, ha been influenced by Republican to the point of turning his bacl on him.

Senator Johnston televised speech on behalf of Mr. Brow over a number of South Carolin stations. He said a primary wa not possible under the circun stances.

The outcome is highly unce tain. Mr. Thurmond, whose car paign started off with speed, lo some ground at mid-point b regained the initiative and t spotlight this week. The l question is whether any can date, no matter how effective issues and personal followi can win a state-wide race a write-in candidate.

BYRNES SUPPORTS THURMOND IN RACE

Opposes Party's Candidate for Senate—Cites Lack of Primary Election

Special to The New York Times.

COLUMBIA, S. C., Oct. 23—Gov. James F. Byrnes today openly threw his support behind J. Strom Thurmond, write-in candidate, in South Carolina's unusual United States Senate contest.

It was the second time the Governor had bolted the regular Democratic ticket. In 1952, both Mr. Byrnes and Mr. Thurmond supported General Eisenhower through the medium of an independent slate of Democratic electors.

The Governor said a vote for Mr. Thurmond's opponent, State Senator Edgar A. Brown, would constitute approval of the method of Mr. Brown's nomination—by state party committee instead of a primary election.

Election of Mr. Brown "may encourage other committees to deny the people the right to elect other officials," Governor Byrnes added.

Praising Mr. Thurmond as a man of courage, with a clean record in public and private life, the Governor said:

"I follow his leadership in this fight with full realization of the difficulties."

The Governor had reference to the obvious handicaps of a write-in candidate.

The general election contest grew out of the sudden death of the Democratic Senator Burnet R. Maybank, on Sept. 1, two days before the normal deadline for certification of the party's nominee. Senator Maybank had been renominated without opposition.

The state Democratic Executive Committee met a few hours after Senator Maybank's funeral. It rejected a motion for a special primary by a 31-to-18 vote and then voted unanimously to nominate Mr. Brown. Mr. Thurmond announced a few days later as a write-in candidate. Marcus Stone of Florence is a second, but minor write-in candidate.

Governor Byrnes has contended all along that a primary could have been arranged, if the committee had wanted one. After the committee had acted, he called on Mr. Brown to resign and let the committee arrange a primary. Mr. Brown refused.

The Governor's open support is expected to bolster Mr. Thurmond's chances considerably. He already has the support of several county Democratic committees and the great majority of the newspapers.

U. S. SENATE:

Edgar Brown (D) — Barnwell, 66, State Senator and Democratic National Committeeman. Brown was nominated by the State Democratic Executive Committee after the death on September 1, 1954 of *Burnett R. Maybank (D)

Strom Thurmond (D) — Aiken, 51, former governor, States Rights' candidate for President 1948. Not on ballot. Write-in candidate.

***Charles Daniel (D)** — Appointed to unexpired term ('til Jan. 5, '55) of Maybank

***Olin D. Johnston (D)** — Spartanburg; Nov. '44, '50.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

6 members to be elected, all unopposed

Present membership: 6 Democrats

1-6

***L. Mendell Rivers (D)**	Charleston	UNOPPOSED
***John J. Riley (D)**	Sumter	UNOPPOSED
***W. J. Bryan Dorn (D)**	Greenwood	UNOPPOSED
***Robert T. Ashmore (D)**	Greenville	UNOPPOSED
***James Richards (D)**	Lancaster	UNOPPOSED
***John T. McMillan (D)**	Florence	UNOPPOSED

SOUTH DAKOTA

To be elected: — Governor; 1 U.S. Senator; 2 House members. Polls close: 5 P.M., MST

1952 Presidential: — Eisenhower 203,847; Stevenson 90,426: R+113,431 (69.3%)

GOVERNOR:

Joe J. Foss (R) — Sioux Falls; State legislator, Marine hero of World War Two

Edward C. Martin (D) — Chamberlain; rancher
*Sigurd Anderson (R), present Governor, not a candidate for re-election.
1952: Anderson (R) 203,102; Sherman Iverson (D) 86,403: R+116,689

U. S. SENATE:

***Karl E. Mundt (R)** — Madison; 54; educator; elected 1st six-year term '48

Kenneth Holum (D) — Groton; former State legislator
1948: Mundt (R) 144,084; John Engle (D) 98,749: R+45,355 (59.3%)

***Francis Case (R)** — Custer; elected 1st six-year term '50 (63.9%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

2 members to be elected

Present membership: 2 Republicans

1 ***Harold O. Lovre (R)** — Watertown; 50; lawyer; Agriculture Cmte; '48

Francis G. Dunn (D) — Sioux Falls; attorney
1952: Lovre (R) 151,449; Goldie Wells (D) 69,-777: R+81,672

2 ***E. Y. Berry (R)** — McLaughlin; 52; lawyer-publisher; Labor, Interior Cmtes; '50

Ray Satterlee (D) — Martin; farmer
1952: Berry (R) 45,688; George Bangs (D) 20,-561: R+25,127

VIEWPOINTS—SOUTH DAKOTA:

Republican: State is sure Republican. Hope for a higher victory margin with such vote-getters as Mundt and Foss heading the ticket.

Democratic: Farm discontent should help chances here.

Editor: Vote statistics listed above seem to tell the story. No contest.

TENNESSEE

To be elected: Governor, unopposed; 1 U.S. Senator; 9 House members, 5 unopposed. Polls close: 7 P.M., CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 446,147; Stevenson 443,710: R+2,437 (50%)

GOVERNOR:

***Frank G. Clement (D)** — Unopposed for his second two-year term.

U. S. SENATE:

***Estes Kefauver (D)** — Chattanooga; 51; attorney; Armed Services, Judiciary Cmtes; Nov. '48

Thomas P. Wall, Jr. (R) — Nashville; attorney
1948: Kefauver (D) 326,142; B. Carroll Reece (R) 166,947: D+159,195 (65.3%)

***Albert Gore (D)** — Carthage; Nov. '52
1952: Gore (D) 545,432; Hobart F. Atkins (R) 153,479: D+391,953 (74.2%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

4 members to be elected; 5 have no opposition.

Present membership: 2 Republicans; 7 Democrats

1	***B. Carroll Reece (R)**	Johnson City; attorney, banker; Rules Cmte; Nov. '20, defeated '30, back '32, not a candidate '46 and '48, back '50
	***Arthur W. Bright (D)**	Kingsport; lawyer 1952: Reece (R) 70,556; Arthur W. Bright (D) 36,477: R+34,079
2	***Howard H. Baker (R)**	Knoxville; attorney; '50 UNOPPOSED
3	***James B. Frazier, Jr. (D)**	Chattanooga; 64; attorney; Judiciary, Un-American Activities Cmtes; Nov. '48
	O. Milligan Spence (R)	Chattanooga; businessman 1952: Frazier (D) 56,473; Joseph M. Parker (D) 24,177: D+32,296
4-5	***Joe L. Evins (D)**	Smithville UNOPPOSED
	***James Percy Priest (D)**	Nashville UNOPPOSED
6	**Ross Bass (D)**	Pulaski; attorney
	Len Brewer (R)	Lawrenceburg Congressman Pat Sutton (D) not a candidate: Lost Senate primary to Kefauver
7-8	***Tom Murray (D)**	Jackson UNOPPOSED
	***Jere Cooper (D)**	Dyersburg UNOPPOSED
9	***Clifford Davis (D)**	Memphis: attorney; Public Works Cmte; Feb. '40
	W. A. Danielson (R)	Memphis 1952: Davis (D) 101,427; William P. Chenault (Ind.) 16,972: D+84,455

TEXAS

To be elected: Governor; 1 U.S. Senator; 22 House members, 16 unopposed. Polls close: 7 P.M., CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 1,102,878; Stevenson 969,228: R+133,650 (53.1%)

GOVERNOR:

***Alan Shivers (D)** seeking an unprecedented third two-year term as Gov.

Tod R. Adams (R) Crockett.
Democratic nomination is tantamount to election.

U. S. SENATE:

***Lyndon Baines Johnson (D)** Johnson City; 46; attorney; Senate Democratic Leader; Nov. '48.

Carlos Watson (R) Brownsville; contractor
Democratic nomination is tantamount to election

***Price Daniel (D)** Liberty; Nov. '52

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

6 members to be elected, one at-large. 16 have no opposition

Present membership: 22 Democrats

1-4	*Wright Patman (D)	Texarkana	UNOPPOSED
	*Jack B. Brooks (D)	Beaumont	UNOPPOSED
	*Brady Gentry (D)	Tyler	UNOPPOSED
	*Sam Rayburn (D)	Bonham	UNOPPOSED
5	Wallace Savage (D)	Dallas; former Mayor of Dallas. *J. Frank Wilson (D) not a candidate	
	Bruce Alger (R)	Dallas 1952: Eisenhower 118,218; Stevenson 69,394: R +48,824	
6-7	*Olin E. Teague	College Station	UNOPPOSED
	*John Dowdy (D)	Athens	UNOPPOSED
8	*Albert Thomas (D)	Houston; Appropriations Cmte; Nov. '36	
	William Buttler (R)	Houston	
9-11	*Clark Thompson (D)	Galveston	UNOPPOSED
	*Homer Thornberry (D)	Austin	UNOPPOSED
	*William R. Poague (D)	Waco	UNOPPOSED
12	Jim Wright (D)	Weatherford; former State Representative; defeated incumbent *Wingate Lucas (D) in Primary.	
	T. S. Christopher (R)	Fort Worth 1952: Eisenhower 72,462; Stevenson 55,704: R+ 16,758	
13	*Frank Ikard (D)	Wichita Falls	UNOPPOSED
14	John Bell (D)	Cuero. *John Lyle (D) not a candidate for re-election	
	D. C. DeWitt (R)	Yorktown 1952: Eisenhower 56,490; Stevenson 53,806: R+ 2,684	
15-17	Joe Kilgore (D)	McAllen. *Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr. (D) not a candidate.	UNOPPOSED
	J. T. Rutherford (D)	Odessa; defeated incumbent *Ken Regan (D) in Primary.	UNOPPOSED
	*Omar Burleson (D)	Anson	UNOPPOSED
18	*Walter E. Rogers (D)	Pampa; Interior & Insular Cmte; Nov. '50	
	Leroy LaMaster (R)	Perryton 1952: Eisenhower 58,506; Stevenson 40,539: R+ 17,967	
19-21	*George H. Mahon (D)	Lubbock	UNOPPOSED
	*Paul J. Kilday (D)	San Antonio	UNOPPOSED
	*O. C. Fisher (D)	San Angelo	UNOPPOSED
A. L.	*Martin Dies (D)	Lufkin; 54; lawyer; House member '31-'44; first Chman Un-American Activities Cmte; Nov. '52	
	Tom Nolan (R)	San Antonio	



UTAH

To be elected: 2 House members. Polls close: 8 P.M., MST (Northwestern part of state on PST)

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 194,190; Stevenson 135,364: R+58,826

GOVERNOR:

***J. Bracken Lee (R)**

Elected four-year term '52
1952: Lee (R) 180,516; Earl J. Glade (D) 147,-188: R+33,328

U. S. SENATE:

***Arthur V. Watkins (R)**

Orem; Nov. '46; '52
1952: Watkins (R) 177,435; Walter K. Granger (D) 149,598: R+27,837 (54.3%)

***Wallace F. Bennett (R)**

Salt Lake City; Nov. '50
1950: Bennett (R) 142,427; *Elbert Thomas (D) 121,198: R+21,229 (53.9%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

2 members to be elected

Present membership: 2 Republicans

1

***Douglas R. Stringfellow (R)**

Ogden; 32; radio; Banking Cmte; Nov. '52

Walter K. Granger (D)

Cedar City; House member '41-'52; defeated Senate candidate '52
1952: Stringfellow (R) 76,825; Ernest R. McKay (D) 49,898: R+26,647
Eisenhower 76,825; Stevenson 51,086: R+25,739

2

***William A. Dawson (R)**

Salt Lake City; 51; attorney; '46, out '48, back '52.

Reva Beck Bosone (D)

Salt Lake City; attorney; '48, '50, defeated '52
1952: Dawson (R) 105,296; *Bosone (D) 95,084: R+10,212 (52.5%)
Eisenhower 117,365; Stevenson 84,278: R+33,087

VIEWPOINTS—UTAH:

Republican: Feel we can hold these seats with State government in Republican control.

Democratic: Here is where we can pick up two House seats: Granger is a sure bet, while Bosone now is running ahead.

Editor: If Republicans can bring out their '52 vote they can hold, but the off-year vote here never is good.



VERMONT

To be elected: Governor, 1 House member, At Large. Polls close: 6 PM, EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 109,717; Stevenson 43,355: R+66,362 (71.5%)

GOVERNOR:

Joseph B. Johnson (R) Springfield; manufacturer, present Lieutenant Governor

E. Frank Branon (D) Fairfield; farmer, present State Senator
*Gov. Lee E. Emerson (R) not a candidate for re-election
1952: Emerson (R) 78,338; Robert W. Larrow (D) 60,051: R+18,287

U. S. SENATE:

***George D. Aiken (R)** Putney; elected '50, '44, '50

***Ralph E. Flanders (R)** Springfield; appointed Nov. '46, elected '46, '52

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

1 member to be elected at large

A.L.

***Winston L. Prouty (R)** Newport; 52; businessman; Foreign Affairs, Veterans Committees; Nov. '50

John J. Boylan (D) Burlington; member State legislature
1952: Prouty (R) 109,871; Herbert B. Comings (D) 43,187: R+66,684

VIRGINIA

To be elected: 1 U.S. Senator; 10 House members. Polls close: 7:30 P.M. EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 349,037; Stevenson 268,677: R+80,360 (56.3%)

GOVERNOR:

***Thomas B. Stanley (D)** Stanleytown; elected four-year term '52
1952: Stanley (D) 226,218; Theodore R. Dalton (R) 181,394: D+44,824

U. S. SENATE:

***A. Willis Robertson (D)** Lexington; elected to succeed Carter Glass '46; re-elected '48; Appropriations, Banking-Currency Cmtes

Charles W. Lewis, Jr. (Ind.) Retired diplomat.
1948: Robertson (D) 253,865; Robert Woods (R) 119,366: D+134,499 (65.7%)

***Harry Flood Byrd (D)** Berryville; appointed March '33; re-elected '33, '34, '40, '46, '52; 1952: No opposition

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

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'HERO'S' EXPOSURE HURTS UTAH G.O.P.

Replacement for Stringfellow, Dr. Dixon Is Reluctant, Inexperienced, Late

Special to The New York Times.

SALT LAKE CITY, Utah, Oct. 23—Republican leaders here admit privately today that the spectacular departure from the political scene of Representative Douglas R. Stringfellow has left them small hope of holding the First Congressional District.

Mr. Stringfellow withdrew from his race for re-election after making an emotional television confession that for ten years he had invented and proclaimed a heroic war record.

His replacement on the Republican ticket is Dr. Henry Aldous Dixon, whose opponent is ex-Representative Walker K. Granger.

Dr. Dixon, 62 years old and almost wholly without political experience, was drafted by the Republican State Central Committee Monday night.

Not only is Dr. Dixon a most reluctant candidate, but his position as president of Utah State Agricultural College at Logan and ex-president of Weber Junior College at Ogden puts him in an uncomfortable position.

The circumstances surrounding his draft made Dr. Dixon appear the hand-picked candidate not only of the popular Senator Arthur V. Watkins, who was chairman of the McCarthy censure committee, but of Gov. J. Bracken Lee.

Governor Lee, momentarily at least, is highly unpopular in Weber and Carbon Counties, two of the most populous areas in the First Congressional District.

College Shifts at Issue

Governor Lee who has pressed for the closing of Carbon Junio College and transfer of Webe College to the Church of Jesu Christ of Latter-Day Saints. Th closing and transfer of the col leges remains a hot issue in th campaign—with both Weber an Carbon County voters certain t resoundingly defeat the colleg status change propositions ap pearing on the Nov. 2 ballot.

Mr. Granger, a veteran twelve years in the House pri to the 1952, Eisenhower swee already is linking Dr. Dixon wi Governor Lee and the colle issue. The G. O. P. obviously h sought to lessen this possibili by selecting a distinguished ed cator and opponent of the "c lege giveaway" as their can date.

Meantime, what with the ne to tear down Stringfellow ca paign posters, prepare campai literature, revise television a radio announcements and t like, Dr. Dixon's candidacy barely "getting off the ground.

Mr. Granger, a sheepman, ha been conceded a majority of th votes in the State's ranching re gions even prior to the Stringfellow exposé. Democrats now expect he will do at least as well as the new Republican candidate in the cities of Ogden and Price—main population centers of Weber and Carbon counties.

A Sunday "nonpolitical" visit by Vice President Richard M. Nixon to Salt Lake City, in which he will attend a tabernacle concert by the famed Mormon Choir, should help the G. O. P. hold a hard core of "church votes," a major factor in any Utah election.

But a victory for Dr. Dixon Nov. 2, after a campaign of little more than a week, would rank as a sizable political miracle.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

10 members to be elected

Present membership: 3 Republicans; 7 Democrats

1	*Edward J. Robeson, Jr. (D)	Newport News — UNOPPOSED
2	*Porter Hardy, Jr. (D)	Churchland; 51; businessman; Armed Services Cmte; Nov. '46
	George V. Creadle, Jr. (R)	Norfolk; attorney 1952: Hardy (D) was unopposed Eisenhower: 24,499; Stevenson 26,598: D+2,099
3	*J. Vaughan Gary (D)	Richmond; attorney; Appropriations Cmte; Nov. '44
	J. Calvitt Clarke, Jr. (R)	Attorney 1952: Gary (D) 36,085; Walter R. Gambill (R) (R) 26,488: D+9,597 Eisenhower 45,360; Stevenson 28,955: R+16,405
4-5	*Watkins M. Abbitt (D)	Appomattox — UNOPPOSED
	*William M. Tuck (D)	South Boston — UNOPPOSED
6	*Richard H. Poff (R)	Radford; 31; attorney; Judiciary Cmte; Nov. '52
	Ernest Robertson (D)	Salem; member House of Delegates 1952: Poff (R) 34,041; Burton (D) 31,997: R+2,044 (51.5%) Eisenhower 47,119; Stevenson 27,884: R+9,235
7	*Burr P. Harrison (D)	Winchester; 50; lawyer; Foreign Affairs Cmte; '46
	John P. Ruddick (R)	Monterey; cattle farmer 1952: Harrison (D) 37,360; Glen W. Ruebush (R) 9,876: D+27,484 Eisenhower 35,888; Stevenson 19,595: R+16,293
8	*Howard W. Smith (D)	Broad Run; Rules, D.C. Cmtes; '30
	Dr. Charmenz S. Lenhart (Ind.)	Fredericksburg; professor 1952: Smith (D) was unopposed
9	*William C. Wampler (R)	Bristol; 28; newspaperman; Agriculture Cmte; Nov. '52
	Pat Jennings (D)	Marion; Sheriff of Smythe County 1952: Wampler (R) 35,047; M. M. Long (D) 32,735: R+2,312 (51.7%) Eisenhower 39,476; Stevenson 34,921: R+4,555
10	*Joel T. Broyhill (R)	Arlington; 35; contractor-realtor; Post Office, D.C. Cmtes; '52
	John C. Webb (D)	Fairfax; member House of Delegates, attorney
	W. Huiet Phillips (Ind.)	Alexandria; Retired Army officer 1952: Broyhill (R) 33,152; Edmund D. Campbell (D) 32,830: R+322 (50.2%) Eisenhower 45,143; Stevenson 29,762: R+15,381

Near D.C.

VIEWPOINTS—VIRGINIA:

Republican: Eisenhower brought Virginia into the ranks of a two-party state in '52. Broyhill, Wampler and Poff have made good, impressive records in Congress, and should be able to hold the gains of '52. Admittedly they will have a harder fight than two years ago.

Democratic: The romance between some Virginia Democrats and Ike ended many months ago. Democrats will regain all three Republican House seats.

Editor: Strength of the three Republican incumbents seems to be in this order: Poff, Broyhill, Wampler. Will the old-line conservative Democrats return to the fold?



WASHINGTON

To be elected: 7 House members; one At Large. Polls close 8 PM, PST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 599,107; Stevenson 492,845: R+106,262 (54.3%)

GOVERNOR:

***Arthur B. Langlie (R)** Elected four-year term '52
1952: Langlie (R) 567,822; Hugh B. Mitchell (D) 510,675: R+57,147

U. S. SENATE:

***Warren G. Magnuson (D)** Seattle; 49; appointed Dec. '44, elected '44, '50
1950: Magnuson (D) 397,719; Walter Williams (R) 342,464: D+55,255

***Henry M. Jackson (D)** Everett; elected first six-year term '52
1952: Jackson (D) 595,288; *Harry P. Cain (R) 460,884: D+134,404

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

7 members to be elected; one At Large

Present membership: 6 Republicans; 1 Democrat

1

***Thomas M. Pelly (R)** Seattle; 52; businessman; Interstate Committee; Nov. '52

Hugh B. Mitchell (D) Seattle; U.S. Senator Jan. '45-Dec. '46; House member '48-'50
1952: Pelly (R) 121,926; Stimson Bullitt (D) 114,617: R+7,309 (51.2%)

2

***Jack Westland (R)** Everett; 50; insurance; '52 National Amateur Golf Champion; Interior Committee; Nov. '52

Harry F. Henson (D) Everett; former Democratic State Chairman
1952: Westland (R) 91,853; Harry F. Henson (D) 77,179: R+14,674 (54.3%)

3

***Russell V. Mack (R)** Hoquiam; 63; publisher; Public Works, Veterans Committees; June '47

Jim Carty (D) Woodland
1952: Mack (R) 75,165; Gordon M. Quarnstrom (D) 65,715: R+9,450 (53.3%)
Eisenhower 79,258; Stevenson 68,105: R+11,153

4	***Hal Holmes (R)**	Ellensburg; 52; educator; Ways and Means Committee; Nov. '42
	Fred Yoder (D)	Pullman; professor 1952: Holmes (R) 92,551; William Bryan (D) 44,464: R+48,087 Eisenhower 90,041; Stevenson 55,729: R+34,312
5	***Walt Horan (R)**	Wenatchee; 56; fruit grower-packer-shipper; Appropriations Committee; Nov. '42
	Art Garton (D)	Chelan; orchardist 1952: Horan (R) 82,530; Robert D. Dellwo (D) 64,820: R+17,710 Eisenhower 87,294; Stevenson 67,335: R+19,959
6	***Thor C. Tollefson (R)**	Tacoma; 53; attorney; Merchant Marine Committee; Nov. '46
	John T. McCutcheon (D)	Steilacoom; former State Senator 1952: Tollefson (R) 110,169; John J. O'Connell (D) 74,143: R+36,026
A. L.	***Don Magnuson (D)**	Seattle; 43; newspaperman; Merchant Marine Committee; Nov. '52
	Al Canwell (R)	Spokane; former State Senator 1952: Magnuson (D) 515,213; Al Canwell (R) 504,783: D+10,430 (50.5%)

VIEWPOINTS—WASHINGTON:

Republican: Concentrating on the only major state-wide office, the Congressional At-Large seat. We expect to win it while holding the other four GOP Districts.

Democratic: Should gain two seats here. Until the Ike sweep of '52, both the 1st and 2nd Districts were Democratic. In '52, however, Hugh Mitchell gave up the 1st to run for Governor, and Henry Jackson left the 2nd to run for the Senate. This year we believe both these Districts will go Democratic.

Editor: When Democrats talk of controlling the next House they usually point to expected gains in Washington State. However, a Republican State administration will make them fight for any such gains down to the second the polls close.

WEST VIRGINIA

To be elected: 1 U.S. Senator, 6 House members. Polls close: 7:30 PM, EST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 419,970; Stevenson 453,578: D+33,608

GOVERNOR:

***William C. Marland (D)** Elected four-year term '52. Gov. cannot succeed himself.
1952: Marland (D) 454,898; Rush D. Holt (R) 427,629: D+27,269

U. S. SENATE:

	*Matthew M. Neely (D)	Fairmont; 79; ranking Democratic member D. C. Cmte; elected House '13; elected Senate '22; defeated '28; elected Senate '30; re-elected '36; resigned to become Gov. '41; elected House '44; elected Senate '48.
	Tom Sweeney (R)	Wheeling; attorney. 1948: Neely (D) 435,354; *W. Chapman Revercomb (R) 328,534: D+106,820 (57%)
	*Harley Martin Kilgore (D)	Beckley; 61; attorney; Appropriations, Judiciary Cmtes; '40, '46, '52. 1952: Kilgore (D) 470,019; Revercomb (R) 406,554: D+63,465 (53.6%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

6 members to be elected

Present membership: 1 Republican; 5 Democrats

1	*Robert H. Mollohan (D)	Fairmont; 45; administrator; Govn't Operations Cmte; Nov. '52
	Arch A. Moore, Jr. (R)	Moundsville; attorney 1952: Mollohan (D) 72,218; Francis J. Love (R) 64,216: D+8,002 (52.9%) Eisenhower 65,605; Stevenson 70,615: D+5,010
2	*Harley O. Staggers (D)	Keyser; 47; educator; Interstate Cmte; Nov. '48
	Albert M. Morgan (R)	Morgantown; prosecuting attorney 1952: Staggers (D) 67,172; Kermit R. Mason (R) 63,320: D+3,852 (51.5%) Eisenhower 67,362; Stevenson 62,255: R+5,107
3	*Cleveland M. Bailey (D)	Clarksburg; newspaperman; Education-Labor Cmte; Nov. '48
	Joseph B. Lightburn (R)	Jane Lew; merchant. 1952: Bailey (D) 71,926; Frank Love (R) 62,839: D+9,087 (53.4%) Eisenhower 65,244; Stevenson 69,220: D+3,976
4	*Will E. Neal (R)	Huntington; 79; medical doctor; Public Works Cmte; Nov. '52
	M. G. Burnside (D)	Huntington; educator; House member '48-'52 1952: Neal (R) 82,104; *Burnside (D) 71,819: R+10,285 (53.3%) Eisenhower 85,422; Stevenson 68,092: R+17,330
5	*Elizabeth (Mrs. John) Kee (D)	Bluefield; Veterans Cmte; elected July '51 to succeed her late husband.
	Fred O. Blue (R)	Bluefield; attorney 1952: Kee (D) 83,653; Cyrus H. Gadd (R) 47,519: D+36,134 Eisenhower 52,223; Stevenson 78,641: D+26,418
6	*Robert C. Byrd (D)	Sophia; 36; House Administration Cmte; Nov. '52
	Pat B. Withrow, Jr. (R)	Charleston; businessman 1952: Byrd (D) 104,387; Latelle M. LaFollette (R) 83,429: D+20,958 Eisenhower 84,114; Stevenson 104,755: D+20,641

VIEWPOINTS—WEST VIRGINIA:

Republican: Hope to gain at least three House seats here: 1st, 2nd and 3rd District. Neely has been beaten before and this might be the year to do it again. The age issue will play a strong part in the campaign.

Democratic: Burnside should regain his seat from Neal, a colorless campaigner. Democrats can hold all other seats. Neely is in no trouble.

Editor: Republicans have used West Virginia as a "test" campaign area. It is near enough to Washington to import speakers, yet far enough away to remain untouched by Potomac "fever." This testing may drain off some normally Democratic votes. The first four House districts could swing either way.

WISCONSIN

To be elected: Governor; 10 House members. Polls close: 8 PM, CST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 979,744; Stevenson 622,175: R+357,569 (61%)

GOVERNOR:

***Walter J. Kohler (R)** Sheboygan; 50; manufacturer; elected first 2-year term 1950

William Proxmire (D) Blooming Grove; 38; executive.
1952: Kohler (R) 1,009,171; William Proxmire (D) 601,844: R+407,327.

U. S. SENATE:

***Alexander Wiley (R)** Chippewa Falls; 70; attorney; Chman Foreign Relations Cmte; first elected '38; 3rd term
1950: Wiley (R) 595,283; Thomas E. Fairchild (D) 515,539: R+79,744 (53.3%)

***Joseph R. McCarthy (R)** Appleton; 45; attorney; Chman Government Operations Cmte, first elected '46; 2nd term
1952: McCarthy (R) 870,444; Thomas E. Fairchild (D) 731,402: R+139,042 (54.2%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

10 members to be elected.

Present membership; 8 Republicans; 2 Democrats.

1 ***Lawrence H. Smith (R)** Mt. Pleasant; 62; attorney; Foreign Affairs Cmte; August '41.

Edward A. Krenzke (D) Racine; District Attorney.
1952: Smith (R) 99,742; Arnie W. Agnew (D) 68,269: R+31,473
Eisenhower 102,237; Stevenson 68,935: R+33,302

2	***Glenn R. Davis (R)**	Waukesha; 40; attorney; Appropriations Cmte; August '41
	Gaylord A. Nelson (D)	Madison 1952: Davis (R) 116,542; Horace W. Wilkie (D) 68,665: R+47,877 Eisenhower 113,277; Stevenson 72,843: R+40,434
3	***Gardner R. Withrow (R)**	La Crosse; 62; union official; Post Office-Civil Service Cmte; Nov. '30
	Joseph A. Seep (D)	Westford; farmer 1952: Withrow (R) 96,908: Edna Brown (D) 32,165: R+64,743 Eisenhower 92,156; Stevenson 41,327: R+50,829
4	***Clement J. Zablocki (D)**	Milwaukee; 42; educator; Foreign Affairs Cmte; Nov. '48
	John C. Schafer (R)	Milwaukee; elected 1922, served five terms, defeated '32, '34, re-elected '38, defeated '40, 42 and '52. 1952: Zablocki (D) 131,098; John C. Schafer (R) 72,869: D+58,229
5	***Charles J. Kersten (R)**	Milwaukee; 52; attorney; Education Labor Cmte, elected '46, defeated '48, re-elected '50, '52.
	Henry S. Reuss (D)	Milwaukee; 42; attorney; unsuccessful candidate for '52 Democratic Senate nomination 1952: Kersten (R) 112,048; Andrew Biemiller (D) 105,013: R+7,035 (51.6%)
6	***William K. Van Pelt (R)**	Fond du Lac; 49; businessman; Banking-Currency Cmte; Nov. '50.
	Russell S. Johnson (D)	Eldorado; union official 1952: Van Pelt (R) 103,464; Ralph A. Norem (D) 40,910: R+62,554 Eisenhower 100,981; Stevenson 46,527: R+54,454
7	***Melvin R. Laird (R)**	Marshfield; 33; businessman; Appropriations Cmte; Nov. '52.
	Kenneth E. Anderson (D)	Stevens Point; attorney 1952: Laird (R) 95,049; Ernest Kluck (D) 36,387: R+58,662
8	***John W. Byrnes (R)**	Green Bay; 41; attorney; Ways and Means Cmte; Nov. '44
	Jerome J. Reinke (D)	Kewaunee; registrar of deeds 1952: Byrnes (R) 114,183; Robert C. Schultz (D) 40,980: R+73,203
9	***Lester R. Johnson (D)**	Black River Falls; '53; attorney; Veterans' Affairs Cmte; Oct. 13 '53
	William E. Owen (R)	Menomonie; State Senator 1952: *Merlin Hull (R) 81,258; Kent L. Pillsbury (D) 43,437: R+37,821 (Hull died in office '53)
10	***Alvin E. O'Konski (R)**	Mercer; 50; publisher; Armed Services Cmte; Nov. '42
	Basil G. Kennedy (D)	Mellen; attorney 1952: O'Konski (R) 73,527; Roland Kennenberg (D) 35,597: R+37,930

VIEWPOINTS—WISCONSIN:

Republican: This is a solid Republican state. The 9th district which was lost in a special election last year will be regained and there is reason to believe the other Democratic seat in Milwaukee (4th district) will go Republican.

Democratic: Running for governor two years ago Proxmire polled the greatest number of Democratic votes in history. He has been campaigning ever since and will give Kohler a run for his money. Zablocki is safe, but admit that Johnson will have to fight to survive. Sure he will. Kersten seat should be taken by Reuss, an excellent campaigner. Watch First District.

Editor: Republicans are as sure of taking Johnson's 9th district as the Democrats are of taking Kersten's 5th district. The first district is only other possible tight contest.

WYOMING

To be elected: Governor; 1 U.S. Senator; 1 House member At Large. Polls close: 7 P.M., MST

1952 Presidential: Eisenhower 81,047; Stevenson 47,934: R+33,113 (62.7%)

GOVERNOR:

Milward L. Simpson (R) Casper; attorney

William Jack (D) Casper; Vice-President Rocky Mt. Oil and Gas Association, former State House Speaker

*C. J. Rogers, acting Gov. since Republican Gov. Frank Barrett was elected to the U.S. Senate in '52, was defeated in Republican primary by Simpson.

1950: Barrett (R) 54,492; John J. McIntyre (D) 41,987: R+12,505

U. S. SENATE:

William H. Harrison (R) Sheridan; 58; attorney; House member since Nov. '50

Joseph C. O'Mahoney (D) Cheyenne; 70; attorney; appointed to Senate Jan. '34, elected to full terms '34, '40, '46; defeated '52.

This seat now is held by appointment by E. D. Crippa (R) of Rock Springs. It was vacated by the death of Senator Lester C. Hunt (D) on June 19, '54.

1948: Hunt (D) 57,953; *Edward V. Robertson (R) 43,527: D+14,426 (57.1%)

***Frank A. Barrett (R)** Lusk; 62; attorney; former House member and Governor; Nov. '52

1952: Barrett (R) 67,176; *O'Mahoney (D) 62,921: R+4,255 (51.6%)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:

1 member to be elected at large

Present membership: 1 Republican

A.L.

E. Keith Thomson (R) — Cheyenne; State Representative. This is William H. Harrison's seat.

Sam Tully (D) — Rawlins; Mayor of Rawlins
1952: Harrison (R) 76,161; Robert R. Rose, Jr. (D) 50,559: R+25,602

VIEWPOINTS—WYOMING:

Republican: Harrison has been before the voters of the State twice and won handily each time. He is the grandson and great-great-grandson of Presidents Benjamin Harrison and William Henry Harrison. He should win over O'Mahoney and both Simpson and Thomson will be elected.

Democratic: Unrest among the farmers bolsters O'Mahoney's chances. He was swept out in '52 by the Eisenhower tide, which now has receded very noticeably in Wyoming.

Editor: Democrats have better chance of winning Senate than House. But as of now, Republicans have the edge for both.

O'MAHONEY HOLDS LEAD IN WYOMING

G.O.P., However, Is Pressing Furious Windup Campaign in the Senate Contest

By WILLIAM S. WHITE

Special to The New York Times.

CHEYENNE, Wyo., Oct. 23—The Democrats have a good chance of picking up a seat in Wyoming in the national struggle for control of the next Senate, but heavy battling yet remains.

Every objective indicator suggests that former Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney is ahead of the Republican candidate, Representative William Henry Harrison.

At stake is the seat held by E. D. Crippa, Republican, who was appointed to serve in place of the late Senator Lester C. Hunt, Democrat, who shot himself in July. Thus, a victory for Mr. O'Mahoney would mean a net gain for the Democrats in the Senate of the Eighty-fourth Congress.

While Mr. Harrison is generally believed to be running behind today—leading Republicans privately acknowledge as much—the Republicans are putting on a furious final campaign that has the Democrats somewhat worried.

At the heart of the campaign is an effort to link Mr. O'Mahoney, one of the state's most prominent Roman Catholic laymen, to "leftwingism."

Law Practice an Issue

This effort is not so much by Mr. Harrison or the regular state Republican organization as by avowedly unofficial sources for whom the chief spokesman is Martin Littleton, a Cody attorney, who also is attacking Senator James E. Murray, Democrat of Montana, in radio and broadcasts beamed into that state.

Ralph Linn, the Republican state chairman, says he neither endorses nor disavows Mr. Littleton, who is calling Mr. O'Mahoney "foreign agent 783," citing that since he returned to private law practice he has represented the United States Cuban Sugar Council.

Mr. Littleton's "foreign agent" charge, however, is so worded—for example, in full-page newspaper advertisements—as to stress that Mr. O'Mahoney has been one of the attorneys for Owen Lattimore. Mr. Lattimore, an early target of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin, has been reindicted for perjury in denying any association with Communist intrigue. The courts threw out the heart of the original indictments.

Mr. O'Mahoney has not only refused to apologize for legally defending Mr. Lattimore, but in speeches has gone further to make two traditional points:

1. That Mr. Lattimore is entitled to the presumption of innocence until and unless a jury finds otherwise.
2. That Anglo-Saxon justice and the United States Constitution require that the accused writer on Far Eastern affairs have counsel of his own choosing and his day in court.

This explanation, however, has not gone too well with some in Wyoming and Mr. O'Mahoney's principal advisers have now urged him to avoid asserting his right as a private attorney to represent Mr. Lattimore.

While Mr. Harrison is seeking some self identification with President Eisenhower, he is on the whole running on the contention that Mr. O'Mahoney is too liberal and has, since his defeat for re-election in 1952, spent too much time in Washington and not enough in Wyoming.

As to other races here, few Democrats really believe that Mr. Harrison's Republican seat in the House of Representatives can be taken by their party. The expectation is that in that at-large contest Keith Thompson, the Republican nominee, will prevail over Sam Tully, Democrat, barring something approaching a landslide victory for Mr. O'Mahoney.

NOTES FOR NOVEMBER

ON ELECTION NIGHT, keep an eye on returns from the following areas, which usually are among the first to report. If a majority of these races appear to be going to the same party, a trend favoring that party would be indicated which might hold up nationwide:

Connecticut: Gubernatorial, and 1st (Hartford) House seat

Pennsylvania: Sixth House seat, in Philadelphia (Hugh Scott) (R)

Virginia: Tenth House seat (Joel Broyhill) (R), which borders Washington, D. C.

Maryland: Fifth House seat (Frank Small) (R).

● ● ●

LITTLE PATRONAGE hangs on the change of House and Senate control. Not more than 450 jobs would be available in the Senate and about 300 jobs in the House.

● ● ●

THE 83RD CONGRESS was brightened by the largest number of feminine members in history. Including Mrs. Betty Farrington (R), non-voting Delegate from Hawaii who was elected to succeed her late husband, Delegate Joseph Farrington (R), there are fourteen. Nine are Republicans; 5 are Democrats.

Women in the Senate:

Eva Bowring (R), Nebraska; Margaret Chase Smith (R), Maine.

Women in the House:

Frances P. Bolton (R), Ohio; Vera Buchanan (D), Pennsylvania; Marguerite Stitt Church (R), Illinois; Cecil M. Hardin (R), Indiana; Elizabeth Kee (D), West Virginia; Edna F. Kelly (D), New York; Gracie Pfost (D), Idaho; Edith Nourse Rogers (R), Massachusetts; Katharine St. George (R), New York; Leonor Sullivan (D), Missouri; Ruth Thompson (R), Michigan; Betty Farrington (R), Hawaii.

● ● ●

IN 1952, Republican Presidential candidate Dwight D. Eisenhower carried 76 more Congressional Districts than his own Republican party.

● ● ●

DEMOCRATS HAVE THE JUMP in the House elections. The 13 Southern states have a total of 120 seats in the House. The Republicans will win only about five of these, giving the Democrats a head start of 115 seats. Thus, the Democrats have only to pick up 102 seats, or about one-third of the 215 seats outside the South, to have the 218 necessary to win control of the House. The Republicans must win at least 213 seats outside the South, or more than two out of every three in the North, to control the House.

THE "HIDDEN VOTE" may hold the key to the election outcome. People came out and voted two years ago who had never taken part in an election before. For example, the incumbent Democrat in Arizona's first Congressional District, John R. Murdock, polled more than 56,000 votes in 1952. This was the greatest vote total he ever registered in nine elections, dating from 1936, yet he was defeated by almost 10,000 votes. Will this hidden vote go to the polls again this year? If it does and if it still favors Eisenhower it could well cancel out the traditional slump of the "ins" during an off year.

• • •

ALL STATES ELECT governors this year except: Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Washington and West Virginia.

• • •

ALL STATES HOLD ELECTIONS for state legislatures this year except Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia.

• • •

IF THE DEMOCRATS win control of the House and Senate the probable committee chairmen would line up like this:

SENATE:

Agriculture: Allen J. Ellender (La.)
Appropriations: Carl Hayden (Ark.)
Armed Services: Richard B. Russell (Ga.)
Banking, Currency: J. W. Fulbright (Ark.)
Finance: Walter F. George (Ga.)
Foreign Relations: Theodore Green (R.I.)
Government Operations: John L. McClellan (Ark.)
Interior, Insular: Clinton P. Anderson (N.M.)
Interstate: Warren G. Magnuson (Wash.)
Judiciary: Pat McCarran (Nev.)
Labor, Public Welfare: James E. Murray (Mont.)
Post Office, Civil Service: Olin D. Johnston (S.C.)
Public Works: Dennis Chavez (N.M.)
Rules: Guy M. Gillette (Iowa)

HOUSE:

Agriculture: Harold D. Cooley (N.C.)
Appropriations: Clarence Cannon (Mo.)
Armed Services: Carl Vinson (Ga.)
Banking, Currency: Brent Spence (Ky.)
Education, Labor: Graham A. Barden (N.C.)
Foreign Affairs: James P. Richards (S.C.)
Government Operations: William L. Dawson (Ill.)
House Administration: Omar Burleson (Tex.)
Interior, Insular: Clair Engle (Cal.)
Interstate: J. Percy Priest (Tenn.)
Judiciary: Emanuel Celler (N.Y.)
Merchant Marine: Herbert C. Bonner (N.C.)
Post Office, Civil Service: Tom Murray (Tenn.)
Public Works: Charles Buckley (N.Y.)
Rules: Howard W. Smith (Va.)
Un-American Activities: Francis Walter (Pa.)
Veterans: Olin E. Teague (Tex.)
Ways and Means: Jere Cooper (Tenn.)

BATTLEGROUND STATES FOR CONTROL OF THE 84th CO



Numerals in states (1) designate the number of "marginal" House seats in that state. (S) denotes states where there are key Senate races.

"Marginal" House seats: 84
Key Senate races: 18

CONGRESS

MAINE
VT.
N.H.
4S
5
MASS.
NEW YORK
CONN.
2S
PENNSYLVANIA
10
2
4S
N.J.
MD.
DEL.
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W.VA.
S
3
3
VIRGINIA
N. CAROLINA
1
CAROLINA
LORIDA
1

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Politicians Seeking Keys To Presidential Campaign In Outcome of Vote Nov. 2

Returns from New York, California, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan and New Jersey Will Get Close Scrutiny — Each of These States Has a Presidential or Vice-Presidential Possibility Involved in Election.

By RAYMOND P. BRANDT
Chief Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 23.

LEADERS of both parties, and objective students of politics, are looking beyond election day, Nov. 2, to discern the personalities and issues that are likely to be in the forefront of the 1956 presidential campaign.

This is not as speculative and unrealistic as might appear on the surface. Practicing politicians are, of course, primarily concerned in winning the battles they are currently waging and publicly deny that they are thinking two years ahead. But each battle is only part of an unending war for which tentative plans must be made.

Impartial observers—if there are any in politics—study the constantly changing pattern of politics and government because nothing really new has much chance of immediate success in a democracy. Issues and personalities need time for experimentation, development and public acceptance. Trends and changes can often be spotted and charted before they become obvious.

* * *

BY SIMPLE ARITHMETIC and ample precedent, the election returns which will get the closest study for prospects in 1956 will be those from New York, California, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan and New Jersey.

Each of these states has a presidential or vice presidential possibility on the ticket or in office. They have a total of 165 presidential electoral votes, or a little more than 30 per cent of the nation's 531. They represent more than 60 per cent of the required 266 electoral votes.

Although Republican Gov. Thomas E. Dewey of New York, after two unsuccessful tries, has taken himself out of the 1956 presidential contest, the state, which casts 45 electoral votes, has two Democrats who will be powerful in the party national convention if they win in state contests. They are Averell Harriman, New and Fair Dealer, who is running against Republican Senator Irving M. Ives for the governorship; and Representative Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., who is seeking the Attorney Generalship against Republican Representative Jacob J. Javits.

Harriman is ahead of Ives in the New York Daily News poll and betting odds have switched from 8 to 5 in favor of Ives to 6 to 5 in favor of Harriman. In the 1952 Democratic National Convention, Harriman took his candidacy for the presidential nomination seriously, although most politicians thought he had been given nearly all the New York delegates as a "favorite son" device to keep the delegation in deliverable shape. He received 123½ votes on the first ballot but after he lost a couple on the second roll call he withdrew. Although pressured by the "young Turks" to throw his support to Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, he turned his delegates over to his old personal friend, Adlai Stevenson.

If he wins the governorship for a four-year term, he and Carmine De Sapio, the Tammany Hall leader who arranged his nomination for this office, will be the co-bosses of the New York delegation to the National Convention in 1956. If he loses this first attempt at elective office, De Sapio will try to take over the delegation.

The other New Yorker with something to say in 1956 is young Roosevelt, who teamed up with Democratic Senator Lehman of New York, Gov. G. Mennen Williams of Michigan and Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois for Kefauver for President in 1952.

Roosevelt was a maverick at the recent Democratic State Convention. He tried for the governorship nomination with the support of upstate leaders but De Sapio and the other New York City bosses were too much for him. He said that he would not take second place on the ticket, presumably because the lieutenant governorship is tied up with the governorship on the ballot as a single shot proposition. To the surprise of many local politicians, however, he accepted the nomination for the Attorney Generalship. This office has a separate place on the hand ballots and voting machines, and the voters for Roosevelt—a magic name in New York—can be compared with those for Harriman.

If Harriman is defeated and Roosevelt wins, the young man—he is 40 years old—will be in a favorable position to argue that the city bosses made a great mistake and that he, not Harriman, should have been given the governorship nomination.

In recent history nearly every New York governor has been regarded as a possible presidential candidate and several have reached the White House. But in 1956 Harriman will be 64 years old, while Roosevelt Jr. will be only 42. For many persons these figures might make Harriman too old and Roosevelt too young for the presidency. There is the vice presidential nomination, however, and a precedent was established when Theodore Roosevelt took the second place on the Republican ticket in 1900. Because of its 45 electoral votes and its nearly 100 votes in a Democratic National Convention, New York is definitely a state to watch.

* * *

FOR REPUBLICANS, the place to watch is California, although none of the presidential possibilities is up for election this year. This state, with its 32 electoral votes, is important because Vice President Richard Nixon and Republican Senator William Knowland, the Senate Majority Leader, are jockeying for position in the event President Eisenhower will not accept renomination.

The stakes this year are the governorship, the senatorship and 30 House seats. The outcome of these elections could greatly influence the trends, local and national, to Nixon or Knowland.

In his present official position, Nixon is heir-apparent to the President, and many believe that Mr. Eisenhower, should he decline renomination, would back the Vice President for the top leadership. Substance is given to this guess by the designation of Nixon as the Administration's spokesman in place of Mr. Eisenhower for senatorial and congressional campaigns where extraordinary help is needed. He has criss-crossed the continent and made valuable local political friendships that would serve him well in 1956 if the President should insist on retirement.

The California political situation this year is more mixed up than usual with Nixon, Knowland and Goodwin Knight, the gubernatorial candidate, trying to take over the Republican organization left by former Gov. Earl Warren when he came to Washington to be Chief Justice of the United States. The senatorial contest is between Republican Senator Thomas H. Kuchel and Democratic Representative Samuel W. Yorty.

In Illinois, as in California, the immediate campaign has an indirect but influential bearing on the national elections two years away, particularly for former Gov. Stevenson, at present the leading prospect for the Democratic presidential nomination. If his friend, Democratic Senator Paul H. Douglas, wins re-election over Republican lobbyist Joseph T. Meek, Stevenson's stock will go up nationally because a Democratic victory would be interpreted as a great trend away from 1952, when Republican Eisenhower carried the state by almost 450,000 majority over its own Governor.

If Meek should win, credit for the victory would go to Republican Gov. William Stratton and his political machine, said to be one of the most efficient in the country. A Republican victory would draw attention to the ambitious 40-year-old Governor and the state's 27 electoral votes.

* * *

THREE OTHER GOVERNORS are believed to have high ambitions: Democrats Frank Lausche of Ohio, who is seeking a fifth term this year; Williams of Michigan, up for a fourth term, and Robert B. Meyner of New Jersey, who was elected to his first term last year.

Lausche, 59 years old, is running on the same ticket as his appointee to the Senate, Thomas A. Burke, who succeeded the late Republican Senator Taft. The Governor has always been a lone-wolf runner and refused to associate himself with Presidents Roosevelt and Truman in their campaigns. Political pollsters assert he will be a walk-in for an unprecedented fifth term, and if he carries Burke in with him in this election, politicians are certain to think of him as a presidential prospect in 1956, primarily because he has repeatedly demonstrated he can win normally Republican Ohio and its 25 electoral votes.

Williams is in a similar situation in Michigan, which has 20 electoral votes. His running mate is Patrick V. McNamara, an AFL official who is trying to unseat Republican Senator Homer Ferguson. Williams is touted as an easy winner for re-election but the McNamara-Ferguson contest is said to be close. Even without a combined Williams-McNamara victory, Williams, a leader of the "Young Turks" in the 1952 Democratic National Convention, is a person to be considered for first or second place in 1956.

Gov. Meyner is not up for re-election this year but he and his newly rehabilitated Democratic machine is backing Representative Charles R. Howell for Senator against Republican Representative Clifford P. Case.

New Jersey has only 16 electoral votes but a former Democratic governor, Woodrow Wilson, was elected President in 1912. No incumbent is likely to forget that, especially one like Meyner who will be 48 years old in 1956. There is already talk in Trenton about his chances for the first place and when a vice presidential nomination is mentioned, his supporters quote an anonymous politician that "only a creep would seek to be Veep." A substantial majority for Howell over Case would direct attention to New Jersey and its present Governor, his record and his political machine.

In the weeks and months after the election the politicians and political students will scrutinize the local and state returns to see if they can find the winning and losing issues on a national scale. Spotty unemployment and decline in farm income are the talking points in many campaigns this year; public-versus-private-power is important in the Pacific West; centralization of Government, Government economy and taxes are issues in other places; President Eisenhower's popularity is stressed in some regions. Only a clairvoyant could say whether these issues will still be important in 1956. The job in both parties will be to take these and other issues and match them with the personalities that will emerge after a week from next Tuesday to see if they can put together a winning combination for 1956.

1 in Every 3 Won't Take The Time to Vote

By CHARLES LUCEY,
Scripps-Howard Staff Writer.

WASHINGTON, Nov. 2.—Estimates of the number of Americans voting today ranged from 40,000,000 to 46,000,000 — but whatever the total it will be proportionately far below recent votes in other democracies.

The U.S. Census Bureau estimates there are about 100,000,000 Americans 21 or over, but this includes many millions who are not naturalized or who are disqualified for other reasons. Therefore, the total actually eligible to vote probably is not far from 75,000,000.

Thus at least one in every three who could vote probably will not take the trouble to go to the polls today.

In 1952 the total vote set an all-time record—61,547,343. But the U.S. was electing the President then and was stirred by a lively campaign.

In every midterm election in the last 20 years the vote for House candidates has been reduced from the vote for House candidates in the preceding Presidential election.

In the 1950 election the 40,300,000 vote for the House was almost 6,000,000 below the House vote in 1948 and nearly 8,500,000 under the 1948 Presidential vote.

Both parties claim that a big vote means victory for them. After 1952, the GOP said President Eisenhower's election proved any time the voters really got to the polls it meant Republicans were elected. But Democrats have argued the same way in the past.

This year political leaders in most states have reported apathy, but people could be soaking up the big debate by newspaper and radio and still come out today and vote in considerable number.

In 1952, Harry Truman cited the record of voting in the U.S. as against voting in other countries. He observed that "Americans are mighty proud of their democratic system of government, but when it comes to voting many other countries put us to shame."

DAILY SERVICE
1205 NINETEENTH ST.
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EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS

(Thursday, Sept. 16, 1954) (By Bertram Benedict)

THE RACES FOR GOVERNOR

Thirty-three states elect governors on Nov. 2. In 14 others the incumbents hold over, and in one, Maine, a Democrat was elected on Sept. 13 for the first time in 20 years.

Fourteen present governors are not candidates to succeed themselves, in some instances because of constitutional provisions. Among the 14 retiring are Thomas E. Dewey of New York, James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, Herman Talmadge of Georgia, John S. Fine of Pennsylvania.

Three present governors were defeated for renomination---Francis Cherry (D.) in Arkansas, Charles E. Johns (D.) in Florida, C.J. Rogers (R.) in Wyoming. In New Mexico Gov. Edwin L. Mechem (R.) is running for the Senate. Conversely, Sen. Edwin C. Johnson (D.) is running for governor in Colorado, and Sen. Irving M. Ives (R.) in New York.

In the 33 gubernatorial elections this November, 10 incumbent Republicans and five incumbent Democrats will try to succeed themselves; in 18, neither major party contestant is the incumbent. At stake are 22 governorships held by Republicans and 11 held by Democrats.

* * * * * * * * * * *

Two incumbent Democratic governors running for re-election will, if successful, be more widely discussed as possibilities for the 1956 Democratic presidential nomination. One is Frank J. Lausche of Ohio, the other, G. Mennen ("Soapy") Williams of Michigan.

Lausche, a Catholic, former judge and former mayor of Cleveland, is serving his fourth term (two years) as head of the Buckeye State. He was re-elected in 1952, over Charles P. Taft, by more than 400,000 votes while the state was giving Eisenhower a majority of over 500,000 for President. Williams, popular with the C.I.O., barely scraped through in 1952 for his third two-year term by a margin of about 8500 votes while Michigan was going for Eisenhower by over 320,000.

State governors are usually preferred over members of Congress by the major parties for their presidential nominees. Governors are apt to have been more successful than members of Congress in keeping away from political positions that antagonize some groups of voters somewhere. In the last 40 years six occupants of governor's mansions have been nominated for president (Wilson, Smith, F.D. Roosevelt, Landon, Dewey, Stevenson) to only one member of Congress (Harding).

* * * * * * * * * * *

Some Democrats are pointing to the recent election of a Democrat as governor of Maine as an augury of a Democratic landslide in the Congressional elections on the coming Nov. 2. But other Democrats remember that (1) the Republican governor, candidate for re-election, was unusually unpopular; (2) the Democratic candidate was an unusually strong one; (3) more and more voters these days split their tickets for state and national offices.

For instance, in 1952 six states elected Democratic governors while voting for Eisenhower (Florida, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee; no contest in Texas). In 1953 the big governorship election upset came in New Jersey, where the Democrats dispossessed the G.O.P. by over 150,000 votes.

The Republican candidate had asked for clemency for a convicted labor extortionist, and graft had been uncovered in certain localities under G.O.P. control. In commenting on this result, and on the 1953 loss of a G.O.P. House seat in New Jersey and another in Wisconsin, President Eisenhower said he had lost skirmishes before but never a major campaign.

nday, Nov. 1, 1954)

(By Bertram Benedict)

Presidents and Midterm Elections

If Republican candidates for Congress do better on the whole on Nov. 2 than had been originally expected, much of the credit will "rub off" on President Eisenhower because of his last-minute appeals for a Congress of his party. His earlier non-partisan approach to the midterm elections would have deprived him of any such glory from a G.O.P. victory, yet also would have spared him the discredit if the Democrats scored resounding gains.

Undisguised Presidential intervention in midterm elections of the past proved either harmful or ineffective. It started with Woodrow Wilson on Oct. 25, 1918, when with victory over Germany in World War I in sight, he asked "my fellow-countrymen" to "return a Democratic majority to both the Senate and the House" if they "have approved of my leadership."

Wilson said that though the Republicans had been "unquestionably pro-war," they had been "anti-Administration," so that the election of G.O.P. majorities to Congress would hamper him in his peace negotiations. This was widely interpreted as impugning the patriotism of the Republicans, who were given a plurality of 36 seats in the House and one in the Senate.

In 1938 F.D. Roosevelt intervened directly, not in the elections, but in certain of the preceding Democratic primaries, only to be slapped down in all except one case. In 1942, with the country at war, he made pre-election "inspection trips" of war plants, and the Democrats retained their Senate and House majorities, though with reduced margins.

In 1950 President Truman went even further than Wilson had gone in 1918, and took to the stump. Result: the Democratic majority in the Senate fell from 12 to two, in the House from 90 to 34; outstanding Fair Dealers were defeated; the G.O.P.-Southern coalition in Congress was strengthened in its opposition to the Truman domestic program.

SEE THE WEEKLY REPORT OF SEPT. 23, 1954: MID-TERM ELECTIONS, P. 708.

INFLUENCE OF PRESIDENTS ON CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS

The President was asked by many candidates to make local appearances in their behalf. But with the exception of his trip through 16 states earlier this year, Mr. Truman confined himself to the radio and television broadcast he made last Saturday night.

On the record - and it's often wrong - Mr. Truman is more successful in influencing voters when he makes his appeal in person.

Two years ago, he covered 22-thousand miles, made more than 300 speeches and led the Democrats to an unexpected victory.

But in 1946, the President stayed at home. He came out publically for Rep. Slaughter of Missouri, Mead and Lehman in New York... and all three lost.

FDR campaigned with considerable success, though in 1938 he tried to "purge" a dozen unfriendly democrats in the primaries (against Jim Farley's advice) and got only one: Rep. O'Connor of N.Y.

You may also remember 1918. Wilson made a written appeal, addressed to "my fellow citizens." He asked for the election of a Democratic Congress, implied that the Republicans couldn't be trusted to support the war effort. The appeal fell on deaf ears. And the Democrats were repudiated at the polls.

Millions of Americans are quite familiar with Alben Barkley's simple, homespun face. They have a vague feeling that he ~~is more than~~ just another politican, but less than a statesman, but they don't know exactly why. The story of Alben Barkley is not widely known, partly because it's a rather commonplace story, yet commonplace in a wonderfully American way. Barkley, it so happens, really was born in a log cabin, which still stands, still just as inaccessible up the rutted roads of the persimmon and sassafrass country in the Jackson Purchase, the most Westerly part of the State of Kentucky. He's big and awkward; he's slow to wrath but crowned, at times, with a most engaging smile. He's unhandsome, certainly; so were his brothers unhandsome and the four boys, beginning with Alben the eldest, used to be called by their playmates, Big Monk, Baboon, Ape, and Little Monk. He wasn't much to look at, but people liked him, and he was listenable, even as a youth; he imitated his youthful hero, William Jennings Bryan, and the farmers who sat on the grass to hear the local debates nearly always gave the palm to Big Monk. Big Monk, his old father once said, "Was the smartest son of a so and so to come from that part of the country."

Democrats just always win in that part of Kentucky. Barkley was reared in the Andrew Jackson tradition that carried on through the Populist and Greenbacker period, the Bryan Era, and reached its peak with Wilson and Roosevelt; all these men heroes to Barkley, Wilson perhaps the greatest influence on his life because he had just come to Congress when Wilson was in his prime, and it was Wilson's liberalism in domestic matters, his inter-nationalism in world matters, which formed the political mind of Alben Barkley.

Barkley ran his first campaign -- for county attorney -- on foot, then on a grey mule, then on a horse. He will be running what will probably be his last,

(MORE)

this fall, on a special train; and if he loses this fall, it will be the first general election he's lost in all his career; but his is a special case, and it will not mean that his career ends with failure for he has the vice-presidency nomination now as a kind of accolade, a final tribute to an old man of seventy who has earned this reward. Barkley runs as Vice President for the Democrats, not as the man pushing on the wave of the future, but as the old Democratic soldier who best defends and justifies the past. That is the meaning of his nomination, and his immediate role is that of the party unifier, the one man best able to hold the warring factions of the party together -- if any man, indeed can now do that. Geographically the Kentuckian is perfect for that role, and intellectually he is a liberal, yet a Southern-minded liveral, offensive to neither side, and liked by both; and as the man who held the longest tenure in our history as majority leader of the Senate, acting as go-between in the party is the thing he knows best of all.

As a boy he was a law clerk in the office of Judge Bishop of Paducah, made famous in the works of Irvin Cobb as Judge Priest. When he won election to the House of Representatives at the age of thirty-five, he called attantion to his youth, as the main reason folks should vote for him. When he runs for the Vice Presidency now, his opponents will surely call attantion to his age, as the main reason folks should vote <u>against</u> him.

But age, of course, is a relative matter and Barkley seems to defy it. He has campaigned around Kentucky making a half dozen long speeches in a single day. In nineteen thirty eight, he was then sixty, Happy Chandler ran against him. Happy was a famous athlete and twenty years younger. And Happy boasted at the political rallies, how he would have Old Alben, as he called him, down in bed within six weeks. J. B. Shannon, one of Barkley's biographers, relates that the campaign actually ended with Happy in bed, exhausted, and Barkley going strong.

Many people here in Washington use the word "loyal" when they speak of Barkley, almost, now, out of habit. He comes from an era, remember when Americans wore their

(MORE)

party label almost with the same fierce pride that they wore their nationality. Barkley has never let his party down; he stuck doggedly behind Al Smith, despite what that meant in those dry and protestant Kentucky counties. He supported almost everything Roosevelt asked for, partly out of loyalty, partly because he sincerely believed in almost everything Roosevelt believed. Except once; once in forty-four when the President vetoed a tax bill against Barkley's advice. Then Dear Alben, as the President called him, rebelled in heat and passion, almost in tears. Strangely, instead of weakening his position as majority leader, it strangthened it; no longer was he regarded merely as the party wheel horse.

But certainly his sense of loyalty governs Barkley more strongly than his ambition drives him on. He has wanted the Vice Presidential nomination before this, but despite his keynote speeches at Roosevelt conventions, despite his nomination speech for Roosevelt in forty-four, the honor of second place on the ticket was always passed over his steady shoulders to somebody else. And so he came to last week's fantastic Democratic Convention in Philadelphia. Last week Barkley's enduring loyalty was really put to the test, and you will have to make up your own mind, whether he is a weak man for doing what he did, or a very big man. There was no particular move to nominate Barkley for Vice President. When his devoted friend, the quiet little arranger, Les Biffle, passed out the word that Barkley was top contender for the spot, Biffle was really <u>starting</u> a movement, in his canny way, not revealing one. The hours passed; Douglas was still the man Truman wanted. No word came to Barkley from the White House at all. Up till Barkley made his fiery keynote speech, which convulsed the dead convention with sudden life, the White House still searched for a running mate from anywhere but Capitol Hill. The tremendous demonstration for the surprised and delighted Barkley - this too, partly organized by quiet little Leslie Biffle -- made it clear the President had no choice. For once, a Presidential candidate had not picked his own running mate, the convention had done it for him.

(MORE)

Truman's stock was very low at that period of the convention and the word began flaring around the hall, "Why not Barkley for the Presidential nomination?" Historians will speculate on this for a long time; and I may be wrong, but my own feeling was that if Barkley had given the sign, a drive would have started which might have given him the nomination and shut Truman out. A tough and really ambitious man in Barkley's position at that moment, would have given the sign. Maybe because he's old and mellow now, maybe just because of that ingrained loyalty streak, Barkley discouraged the move, which puts Mr. Truman in his debt forever.

Barkley was heard to say, a little wistfully, "It would be a great thing to see the delegates pick their own candidate for President." A straying sentiment, which he will not repeat. He will go on, in secondary position as before, doing his best for his leader, still loyal as before. And, as before, making a terrific campaign.

# # # #

HARRIMAN, W(ILLIAM) AVERELL
Nov. 15, 1891- United States Secretary of Commerce

Address: b. c/o Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.; c/o Brown Brothers, Harriman and Co., 59 Wall St., New York; h. Harriman, N.Y.

To W. Averell Harriman's career of banker, railroad director, diplomat, and non-elective Government official, President Truman added in September 1946 the post of Secretary of Commerce, vacated shortly before by Henry A. Wallace '40. Under the Roosevelt Administration, Harriman had served as Lend-Lease coordinator between the United States and Britain, and as Ambassador to Russia; under President Truman, he had been Ambassador to Great Britain for a short period. Harriman, who had been born and bred a Republican, became a Democrat during Al Smith's '44 campaign for the Presidency. He was also a close friend of President Roosvelt and was associated with the New Deal after its inception in 1932.

The son of financier Edward Henry Harriman (who "feared neither God nor Morgan") and his philanthropic wife, Mary (Williamson) Harriman, William Averell Harriman was born on November 15, 1891. At seventeen, just when he was entering Yale from Groton, his father died, leaving him and his brother E. Roland Harriman various railroad holdings and a fortune reputed to be between seventy and one hundred million dollars. During summer vacations from college, the young millionaire worked as a clerk and a section hand in the Union Pacific Railroad yards at Omaha, Nebraska. Upon graduation from college in 1913, he once again went to work for the railroad, and by the following year had risen to be vice-president in charge of purchases and supplies for Union Pacific.

Shortly before the United States entered World War I, Harriman bought a small shipyard at Chester, Pennsylvania, where he built the first partially prefabricated ships in the country. Out of this grew the Merchant Shipping Corporation, which, with Harriman as chairman of the board from 1917 to 1925, became one of the largest merchant fleets under the American flag. In 1920 the twenty-nine-year-old railroad and shipping magnate established W. A. Harriman and Company, a private bank. For the next decade Harriman was chairman of the board of this concern, but when it was merged with the Brown Brothers firm in 1931 to form Brown Brothers, Harriman and Company, he accepted a partnership in the new corporation. (He had already disposed of his shipping interests in 1927 in order to devote more time to finance.)

Harriman became chairman of the board of the Union Pacific Railway in 1932. During the depression of the thirties, while other railroads were retrenching, he poured millions into streamlined aluminum trains, low-priced diner meals, and trained-nurse stewardesses. As a result, at the lowest point of the depression, in 1934, Union Pacific's receipts from passenger traffic rose 66 per cent. Two years later board chairman Harriman called in public relations man Steve Hannagan '44 to look into the possibilities of establishing a winter resort on some thirty-three hundred acres of Idaho valley land owned by the railroad. The result was the famous playground Sun Valley.

Through a chance meeting on the croquet field at the Long Island estate of Herbert Bayard Swope '44, which initiated Harriman's friendship with Harry Hopkins '41, the railroad magnate was brought to the attention of President Roosevelt '42. "Harriman," said *Time*, "reacted to the New Deal like a weathercock in a gale." Roosevelt, while not yet completely convinced of Harriman's talent for organization, appointed him Administrator of Division II of the NRA in January 1934. In dealing with business problems, Harriman showed himself to be a middle-of-the-road arbitrator, with a capacity for ironing out the trouble spots between the Administration and industry. In March 1934 he was appointed special assistant administrator for the NRA, and two months later, when General Hugh Johnson resigned, he became administrative officer, a post which he held until the following year. At Secretary of Commerce Roper's invitation, Harriman joined the Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce in 1933, and was eventually chosen chairman of the council for the years 1937 to 1940. In this capacity, as *PM* put it, he spent a good deal of time trying "to get Government and business to swap concessions." Harriman's diplomacy was double-edged: in business conventions, he would block anti-Administration moves, and at the White House, he would complain about tax and labor legislation.

Harriman brought his experience as a transportation and procurement man into the service of the national defense while the United States was still neutral in World War II. When he was chosen chief of the raw materials branch of the Office of Production Management in 1941, he introduced a speed-up system of armaments production. With proof of Harriman's executive ability, President Roosevelt appointed him "defense expediter" in London shortly before the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941. As liaison officer between the American and British Governments, Harriman was entrusted with keeping the President informed of British needs and the British apprised of American production.

Although Roosevelt gave Harriman the rank of Minister, he told newspapermen that the job "did not conform to any job reporters had ever heard of." Harriman was supposed to devote his attention to three problems: transportation, financing, and purchasing. Gradually the orbit of his activities widened and he was soon shuttling to the Near East (May 1941) to make surveys for the installation of American supply bases and to Russia (August 1941) on a joint Anglo-American mission with Lord Beaverbrook for the purpose of discussing Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union. The joint mission agreed on the immediate necessity of sending material aid to Moscow, and Harriman promised that hundreds of planes and tanks would be sent to Russia. "The flow," he said, "will be constantly increased and eventually will be limited only by problems of transport." Returning in October to report to President Roosevelt, he told reporters that "Hitler will never destroy Russia." In the following three years, he frequently reiterated this statement, calling for "quick and increasing" aid to Russia.

During 1942 Harriman often accompanied Prime Minister Churchill '43 on missions. One of these was another trip to Moscow in August 1942, when Churchill and Premier Stalin discussed the question of the second front. Meanwhile, "work-minded" Harriman continued his activities as Lend-Lease expediter, and to them added the duties of representative in London of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board (February 1942) and of member of the London Combined Production and Resources Board (July 1942). At Casablanca in January 1943, he joined President Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins. (Harriman was present at the conferences in Quebec, Casablanca, Moscow, Teheran, San Francisco, and Potsdam.)

President Roosevelt on October 1, 1943, named Harriman Ambassador to Russia. By then the American financier, who had already met Stalin twice, renewed the acquaintance toward the end of that month when he and Secretary of State Cordell Hull '40 conferred with Stalin and Molotov. Throughout the three years of his ambassadorship, Harriman consulted with Stalin an average of once a month—a courtesy supposedly not accorded any other diplomat. The new Ambassador completely reorganized the American Embassy in Moscow, both as an office and residence, and installed Kathleen, his daughter by his first wife, as hostess.

Harriman worked closely with Russian Foreign Minister Molotov '40 and the English Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr '42. At his first press conference in the new post, Harriman said: "One matter I think deserves the greatest possible consideration at this time is the assistance the United States can give to the Soviet Union in the rehabilitation of devastated areas and the repairing of other dislocations caused by the war." Toward the end of his embassy, however, it became increasingly evident that the United States and Russia were not agreeing about postwar policy. The American Ambassador often acted in concord with the Russians, as when he told the Polish Committee of National Liberation that the United States would not oppose Russian wishes in regard to the Polish question. In February 1945 he was appointed to the committee conferring in Moscow with the various Polish factions. He attended the conference at Potsdam in July and soon after Christmas of 1945 transmitted the terms of the peace treaty to the Rumanians, which facilitated the broadening of the Bucharest Cabinet as a condition of recognition.

After Harriman had tried several times to resign, according to the *Christian Science Monitor,* President Truman acceded to his wish in February 1946 by accepting his resignation. Harriman returned home via Chungking (where he conferred with Chiang Kai-shek '40 and General George C. Marshall '40), Korea, and Tokyo. The ex-Ambassador reported to the President, the Secretary of State, and the House Rules Committee before holding a press conference. To the reporters he said, "Russia does not want war with the United States and is trying to cut off avenues of invasion by surrounding herself with friendly small nations." Through the press, Harriman warned the country that the "chief hope of the world is collective security through the United Nations organization." He added: "It is a fact that the Russian ideology is completely different from ours, but if we both adopt the attitude of live and let live, as to internal affairs, and if we both respect the right of all people to choose their own way of life, this barrier needn't be insurmountable. Most of the people of the world know that this is the attitude of the United States and are counting on us to stand firm against any nation that won't abide by this principle." Harriman also voiced his disapproval of Russia's failure to carry out certain agreements. (It was assumed at this time that he was referring to Russia's failure to withdraw her troops from Iran by March 2, 1946.) About a month after Harriman's return to the United States he and his daughter received a gift of two thoroughbred horses from Stalin.

The last week of March 1946, when John Winant '41, Ambassador to England, was sent to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, President Truman appointed the fifty-four-year-old Harriman to be Winant's successor at the court of Saint James, thus making him the only man in United States history to have held the rank of Ambassador both to Moscow and London. In this way, commented *Time,* the former polo player's "diplomatic rating was raised to a ten-goal top." Harriman knew London from long familiarity ("I have been there on and off ever since I was a boy"), and was described by the British press as a "very close friend of Britain."

Scarcely seven months later, at the end of September 1946, the Ambassador was called home to enter President Truman's Cabinet as Secretary of Commerce. The previous incumbent, Henry Wallace, had been forced to resign after broadcasting a proposal for a changed foreign policy toward Russia, in which he spoke against "getting tough" with the Soviet power. Harriman's appointment was variously regarded as "a consolidation of Truman's decision to intensify a diplomatic challenge of Russia" (*PM*), and as an Administration attempt "to cultivate more cordial relations with American business" (New York *World-Telegram*); Arthur Krock wrote in the New York *Times* that "his [Harriman's] record, the present value of his past political sponsorship, and his educated realism as to Soviet Russia have produced the general expectation that the Secretary will effectively meet his new responsibilities." The new Secretary is expected to revitalize the forty-five-member Business Advisory Board of which he was once chairman. He will have the task of reorganizing the Commerce Department to be what it was originally intended to be, said Krock further—"a liaison between American business and the Government of the United States," without a policy "designed to proclaim the faults of capitalism."

Immediately after his appointment, Secretary Harriman announced that he was in complete accord with Secretary of State Byrnes's foreign policy. (It is believed that Harriman's reports at the San Francisco conference helped to formulate the then Secretary of State Stettinius' policy of firmness towards Russia which Byrnes inherited.) In reference to Russia, he declared, "A country which attempts to gain security through unilateral action, through aggressive independent action, is only opening the gates of disaster." Referring to his work in various missions, the Secretary of Commerce said, "I had an opportunity to learn first-hand the grave economic problems that face the people of Europe and Asia. . . .In playing our part in world reconstruction, development of a stable and expanding economy at home is of primary importance."

Harriman considers himself a public servant, hired by the American people to promote the commercial interests of the whole nation, without favoritism to either "big" or "little" businesses. He intends to continue ex-Secretary Wallace's plans for the reorganization of the Commerce Department. (Congress had substantially curtailed the annual appropriation of the Department under Mr. Wallace's administration, and he had therefore not been able to complete his plans.) A reorganization of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce is projected. It will be organized into five divisions: domestic trade, international trade, small business, field operations, and business economics, with new secretaries appointed to the first three branches.

On October 11, 1946, Harriman held his first conference with members of the Department of Commerce. He assured the war veterans in the department that "experience overseas is just as important in developing men as sticking to the job at home is. Therefore, the experience of service men will be recognized in department promotions." To the women employees, Harriman declared: "There will be absolutely fair treatment in the department as to race and religion and as between men and women." In his capacity as Secretary of Commerce, Harriman will also serve on the Presidential Research Board, which will determine "the allocation of research resources between the universities, research foundations, industry, and the Federal Government."

As his father did, Harriman has devoted a good deal of his time to his railroad interests. From 1931 to 1942 he was chairman of the executive committee of the Illinois Central Railroad Company; he is, in 1946, a director. He is also chairman of the board of the Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroad Company, the Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, and the Oregon and Washington Railroad and Navigation Company. Harriman is the father of two daughters, Mary and Kathleen, by his first wife, the former Kitty Lanier Lawrance. After their divorce, in 1931 he was married to Mrs. Marie Norton Whitney. The Harrimans are collectors of modern art, and have acquired paintings by Van Gogh, Renoir, Cézanne, Picasso, and Derain. The Secretary of Commerce used to be an outstanding polo player, with an eight-goal rating. He is described by *Time* as a "glossy," young-looking man, with "an ingratiating if aristocratic charm."

PROSPERITY AND ELECTIONS

April 13/50 Truman said: "Country is in good shape. Some say it wou be so even if Moron in White House but I'm taking credit for it."

Only 4 times in history has administration been turned out in good times: twice on contested votes, once because of Bull Moose third party movement...and only real exception in 1852 when Pierce defeat Fillmore.

Prosperity & prices were direct factors in only 4 times party in po lost control of the House since 1896 in a mid-term election.

1910 & 1918 - recession followed a boom on eve of election

1930 - depths of depression

1946 - times were good but prices were high -- ("Had Enough" was GO slogan and it won for them).

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(Friday, Sept. 24, 1954) (By Bertram Benedict)

G.O.P. BUCKS PRECEDENTS

The Republicans will keep control of both branches of Congress in the November elections, according to Vice President Richard M. Nixon at Indianapolis on Sept. 23. Two days before, at Denver, Republican national chairman Lenoard W. Hall had gone farther: "We'll pick up 15 to 22 House seats."

SEE WEEKLY REPORT OF SEPT. 23, 1954: MID-TERM ELECTION.

Yet on Sept. 15, in Washington, the Vice President had agreed that the Republicans "might be behind at this time," and Hall, that they were "running scared." After all, the party in power has lost House seats in 12 of the preceding 13 midterm elections in this century. And in four of the 13 House control changed hands:

1910 (Taft)--High prices, unemployment, tariff policy unpopular with farmers, revolt of G.O.P. "progressives."

1918 (Wilson)--Let-down after war victory was in sight, backfire from "he kept us out of war" Democratic slogan in 1916, boomerang of President's appeal to elect Democrats on patriotic grounds.

1930 (Hoover)--Depression. G.O.P. retained thin control in the national elections, lost it in subsequent special elections.

1946--Reaction delayed from 1944, end of war but not of war controls and scarcities, replacement of Roosevelt by Truman.

The single 20th century exception to the general trend came in 1934, when the Democrats increased their House majority from 191 (!) in 1932 to no less than 209. The depression under the Republicans had been of unprecedented severity, most voters wanted the New Deal to have the chance to carry its recovery steps further, the Republicans were sadly disorganized.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Five reasons are usually given why the party in power almost always loses some House seats, net, in the midtern Congressional elections--(1) The party in power had promised more than it could perform in order to get elected two years before. (2) Apart from such promises, some voters always expect a new Administration to accomplish more than it can. (3) Any move taken by an Administration is bound to step on some toes somewhere. (4) After two years some voters tend to forget, or at least to forgive, what they hadn't liked about the party they had voted against two years before. (5) No winning presidential candidate furnishes coattails on which Congressional cnadidates can ride to victory, even if he does take part in the campaigns.

In the midterm elections for the Senate, as distinguished from those for the House, the above factors can be blurred by the geographical and political distribution of the one-third-plus of the Senate seats contested. This year, for instance, 50 per cent more Democratic than Republican Senate seats must be re-filled. Two years ago it was the other way around--half again more Republican than Democratic seats were at stake.

Louis H. Bean, who has perhaps the highest of the political forecaster reputations, predicts that the Democrats will gain from 25 to 30 seats in the new House, but refuses to predict on the Senate. It may be pointed out that the Bean prediction appears in a publication of the Americans for Democratic Action, which Republicans call a mere adjunct of the Democratic party.

With the presidency not involved, local issues are apt to decide more Congressional elections in midterm than in Presidential election years. Professor James M. Burns of Williams College told the annual meeting of American Political Science Association at Chicago on Sept. 11 last that the 1954 Congressional elections will provide no test of national trends because most of them in doubtful states or Districts will "turn largely on local issues."

THE KEY ISSUES: AS THE TWO PARTIES SEE THEM

Excerpts From Speeches That Define G.O.P. and Democratic Positions

The quotations that follow on the major issues in the Congressional campaign were taken from speeches and statements by principals of both parties. On the Republican side, those quoted are President Eisenhower, Vice President Richard M. Nixon; Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson; Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell and Chairman Leonard W. Hall of the Republican National Committee. On the Democratic side, spokesmen quoted are former President Truman; Adlai E. Stevenson, Democratic Presidential candidate in 1952; Sam Rayburn, Minority Leader of the House of Representatives; Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee and Chairman Stephen A. Mitchell of the Democratic National Committee.

THE BIG ISSUE

THE REPUBLICAN POSITION

EISENHOWER: In the election two years ago, our citizens showed their determination to have a government dedicated * * * to the accomplishment—over a four-year period—of a new program of progressive and vigorous action * * *. This program is midway in its progress toward enactment.

* * * All of us who believe in the aims of this program should join together to elect Republican Senators and Congressmen who will work effectively with the leaders of the Executive Branch * * *. When the Congress is controlled by one party and the Executive Branch by the other * * * the conduct of government tends * * * to deteriorate into an endless round of contests for political advantage, * * * of stagnation and inaction. * * *

For the next two years the Executive Branch will be Republican. Confusion can be avoided and steady progress assured only by electing a Republican majority to the Congress .

When the Administration deals with the human and his problems * * * it tries to be human, considerate and sympathetic, and that means true liberalism. But when it comes to the economy of this country and your pocketbook and * * * taxes, it tries to be conservative. So it is conservative in economy, liberal in human affairs.

NIXON: We are on the eve of an election that poses the alternative of continuing President Eisenhower's program of integrity, firmness and moderation or * * * restoring a program of discredited Trumanism * * *. In 1952 * * * Trumanism meant hopeless inability to deal with the four-headed monster that was Korea, communism, corruption and controls.

THE DEMOCRATIC POSITION

TRUMAN: It seems to me that President Eisenhower should be secretly wishing for a Democratic Congress * * *. If he wants to continue [his] policy, he needs the help of the Democrats * * *. He needs a Democratic Congress if he is to go down in history as a successful President.

What concerns me greatly is the fundamental attitude and outlook of * * * this Republican Administration. It is now clear that they do not represent the best interests of our people, and in twenty months they have changed dangerously our liberal form of government to one of reaction at home and confusion abroad.

STEVENSON: * * * It is as important in 1954 as in any other year that party not be placed above country; * * * it is more important that candidates * * * be right than that they be Republican.

Where the Eisenhower program has been responsible and constructive it has * * * received unstinting Democratic support * * * that * * * has * * * in many cases provided the President his margin of victory. This would strongly suggest that a Democratic majority in the Congress could be trusted to support the President on basic questions of security and welfare.

* * * The real question that the people must decide this fall is whether the Congress will function more effectively under a divided, quarrelsome, squabbling Republican regime than it will under the Democratic party.

DOMESTIC ECONOMY

THE REPUBLICAN POSITION

EISENHOWER: At last our nation's economic strength is of an enduring kind. It is not a prosperity based on the froth of inflation. We flatly reject the idea that, for America to stay prosperous, we must constantly run a high economic fever. We flatly reject the idea that, for America to stay prosperous, the Government must always spend more than it has. No longer do we have a prosperity pegged to the battlefield sacrifices of our husbands, sons and brothers.

Without war our economy is working at near record levels. Over 62,000,000 people have jobs. The number is steadily increasing. The hours of work are getting longer. Consumers are spending at a higher rate than ever before. * * * Wage rates are at their all-time peak. * * * Our people have more personal income after taxes than ever before. Our national production surpasses even the war peak of 1944. It is far above the levels of 1945 through 1952.

* * * The latest report on unemployment [shows that] in this month it has been reduced by 400,000 jobs. In that period unemployment has fallen from 3,100,000 to 2,700,000. * * * We can foresee that in less than a decade the national output will increase from today's $356,000,000,000 to $500,000,000,000. * * * And these can be real dollars—dollars of stable buying power, not simply more dollars of cheaper value.

Without the economic collapse so widely forecast by professional pessimists, our nation has moved from war to peace.

SECRETARY MITCHELL: For twenty years, until President Eisenhower was elected, * * * unemployment in this country averaged 9 per cent of all the working people—twice what it is today. * * * We think the unemployment we have today of 2,700,000 is still too much and we are doing all we can to reduce it.

THE DEMOCRATIC POSITION

STEVENSON: Stabilization is not good enough; moving sidewise is not good enough; a second-best year, like a second-best poker hand, is not good enough. * * * America must grow. There are 7,000 more Americans today than * * * yesterday. The * * * economy must provide 1,600 new jobs every day * * *.

Our national income is about $20 to $25 billion less than it should be. The economy should have grown about 3 per cent this year. Instead it has shrunk about 3 per cent. * * * One out of every twenty people in the labor force is unemployed * * * . The cost of living is at an all-time peak. * * * The average weekly earnings of workers in industry have declined. * * * Per capita disposable income is down; after paying our taxes we have less income this year than last. * * * Corporation profits are down, too * * *

TRUMAN: Over 3,000,000 people are out of work. Many more are on a part-time basis, which causes a loss in take-home pay. The Administration keeps telling us that it is not unmindful of human misery. But I see no bold steps being taken by this * * * Government to deal with unemployment.

TAXES

THE REPUBLICAN POSITION

EISENHOWER: A comprehensive tax program * * * since Jan. 1 of this year will have provided for tax cuts totaling $7,400,000,000—the largest dollar tax cut in any year in the history of the nation. * * * Economic growth will be fostered by * * * more flexible depreciation and better tax treatment of research and development costs, thus encouraging all business to modernize and expand. And, partial reduction of the double taxation of income from dividends will stimulate the investment of savings by our private citizens * * *.

NIXON: [The Democrats] gave America fourteen out of its fifteen tax boosts since 1913. They decreased the tax exemptions of the little man * * * from $1,500 to $500. They skyrocketed his income taxes 700 per cent since 1933. They slapped a 300 per cent increase on his automobile taxes, 200 per cent on his gasoline and radio taxes, 25 per cent on his cigarette taxes. * * * If the little man or the medium-sized man * * * wants a decent tax break, only the Eisenhower Administration and a Republican Eighty-fourth Congress are prepared to give it.

THE DEMOCRATIC POSITION

RAYBURN: There was a Federal tax revision * * * but * * * 80 per cent of the nation's taxpayers got only 9 cents of the reduction while 73 cents of the tax-cut dollar went to the corporations and 18 cents to families whose incomes are above $5,000 a year.

To show the unfairness of this tax bill, the man with a wife and two children who makes his living with his brain and his brawn and earns $4,000 a year, will pay $240 a year income tax. The man who has an income of $4,000 a year from dividends pays only $184.

* * * The Republicans continue to claim credit for the 11 per cent tax reduction on individual income, which the Democrats provided for in the Eighty-first Congress. The individual income taxpayers will save $3 billions through positive action taken by the Democrats, yet the Republicans claim they did it.

CHAIRMAN MITCHELL: Tax relief does not fully serve its purpose of stimulating the economy if it is concentrated in the upper income brackets. Prosperity never trickled down from the top under an Andy Mellon tax bill—and it won't under a George Humphrey tax bill. The trickle-down theory has never worked.

FOREIGN POLICY

THE REPUBLICAN POSITION

EISENHOWER: Over the world we have brought strength where there was weakness * * * realism, * * * candor and force to foreign policy which at last insists on distinguishing words from deeds. Two years ago, war was raging in Korea and Indochina. All Asia lay exposed to the * * * Reds. Iran * * * was in deadly danger. Suez and Trieste posed constant threats to peace in the West. Europe [was] unable to build a position of reliable strength. Even in the Western Hemisphere Communist imperialism had ominously appeared.

In London * * * an agreement * * * was signed that can powerfully strengthen the defenses of the West. * * * Yugoslavia and Italy [have] settled their differences over Trieste. Iran today has new strength, new hope * * * disaster has been averted. At Suez, ancient * * * quarrels have been resolved. Peace has been preserved. Pakistan has become a valued new ally. In Guatemala, the first Communist beachhead in the Western Hemisphere has been destroyed.

Throughout the world a series of alliances among our friends has enhanced the strength of the free world, upon which our security so largely depends. * * * At the Berlin and Geneva conferences our nation sought serious negotiation on German unity, on a treaty for Austria, and on a political settlement for Korea. * * * We shall press on in search of agreement. * * *

* * * It is important to all of us that the seemingly endless and frustrating war in Korea [has been] ended * * *. Today we have peace.

For the first time in twenty years there is no active battlefield anywhere in the world. And at last we are harnessing the atom to the work of peace. This Administration has maintained a continuing bipartisan discussion of the foreign problems of this nation—a record of bipartisan consultation unmatched in any previous administration.

THE DEMOCRATIC POSITION

STEVENSON: Let us state our successes with modest realism and not boastful reassurance. For we confront a trembling alliance in Europe, less than confidence in Asia, the growing attraction of monstrous China, Russia's military and economic might, a restless Africa and a South America we have too long taken for granted.

The harsh fact is that in twenty months of bluff and bluster, confusion and contradiction, we have lost influence and friends faster of late than at any time since * * * Republican repudiation of international cooperation after the First World War.

* * * About the bipartisanship in our foreign problems * * * the facts are that not only have no Democrats been appointed to policy-making positions in the State Department and our foreign activities, but they [the Administration] don't even want Republicans who worked for the Democrats, regardless of competence. * * * What they have brought to our foreign policy is a long procession of ringing slogans that lie forlorn but not forgotten * * * "liberation," "unleashing Chiang Kai-shek," "seizing the initiative," "massive retaliation," "the new look."

TRUMAN: Our own security and the peace of the world is jeopardized by a diplomacy that is ever shifting. A chorus of conflicting voices * * * has so confused our friends and allies as to endanger the friendly cooperation we need. * * * This babel of voices can lead only to uncertainty * * * . The worst thing the Republicans have done is to weaken the position of the free nation in their fight against Communist imperialism.

FARM POLICY

THE REPUBLICAN POSITION

EISENHOWER: At last we have a program which attacks our farm problem on both crucial fronts—markets and production. We have a farm program geared not to war, but to peace—a program that will encourage consumption, expand markets, and realistically adjust farm production to markets. It will begin the movement toward that full parity in the market place which * * * I set as a goal. * * * For the consumer it will mean adequate, steady supplies of agricultural products at reasonable prices.

BENSON: I am for aid to agriculture. I am for price supports. I am for a fair share of the national income for agriculture. But I am also unalterably opposed to programs that substitute government aid for reasonable self-help * * * crop controls are unpopular, uneconomic, unfair * * *.

NIXON: * * * A major objective of the Administration is to develop a program aimed at 100 per cent of parity in the market place.

THE DEMOCRATIC POSITION

TRUMAN: [The Eighty-third Congress] drove down the farmer's income; in fact they tried to bankrupt him as they did in 1921. The prices the farmer now gets for his product have declined on the average 20 per cent in the last two years. But the cost of living, for him, as for others, has gone up to an all-time high.

STEVENSON: There [is no] historical basis for concluding that lower farm prices will reduce production and thus solve the surplus problem. On the contrary, * * * lower prices induce farmers to raise more to make up * * * loss of dollar income * * *. There cannot be in today's hungry world a surplus of corn or wheat. There can only be a shortage of ideas [on] how to use God's gifts * * *.

I object to the downright dishonesty of representing that * * * flexible price supports will reduce our taxes. * * * About 1 per cent of the national budget is applied to all agricultural programs * * * including price supports. * * * The House Agriculture Committee has estimated that farm subsidies over the past twenty years have cost a little over a billion dollars, compared with over forty-five billion dollars on business subsidies.

INTERNAL SECURITY

THE REPUBLICAN POSITION

NIXON: The previous Administration's lack of understanding of the Communist danger and its failures to deal with it firmly * * * [have] led to our major difficulties today. The previous Administration unfortunately adopted policies which were soft, vacillating and inconsistent in dealing with the Communist threat.

* * * The Eisenhower Administration, with the solid backing of the Republican Eighty-third Congress, has finally put the Reds on the run in America. * * * Laws have been passed [providing] more effective legal weapons to use against the Communist conspiracy. * * * The Communists and their sympathizers have been driven from Federal employment * * *. During the Truman years * * * the Communist Fifth Column made a shambles of our domestic security.

The Communist party is right when it says the 1954 elections are crucial in determining the path America will take. It has determined to conduct its program within the Democratic party * * * to infiltrate the Democratic party and to make its policies the policies of the Democratic party.

THE DEMOCRATIC POSITION

STEVENSON: As to the * * * Republican campaign theme, model C3K1—crime, corruption controls and Korea—well, I doubt that the market for yesterday's slogans is any better than the market for yesterday's newspapers * * *. President Eisenhower has begun to talk about Communists in Government and red herrings, after assuring us months ago that his Administration's record was the only issue.

It looks as though the Great Crusade, under the leadership of the Vice President, is going to end up * * * on the elevated note of subversion, perversion and denunciation of President Truman. I suppose that's what they call McCarthyism in a white collar. [They have] maligned and impugned the very loyalty of a former President of the United States—a man * * * who has done more to fight communism on all the fronts than all the Republican politicians put together—and I mean Harry S. Truman.

PUBLIC POWER

THE REPUBLICAN POSITION

EISENHOWER: The issue is not * * * public power versus unregulated private power. The issue * * * is Federal monopoly of power, as against public or private regulated power, freely chosen in each instance by the citizens of each area, with the Federal Government drawn in as a cooperating partner where this seems necessary or desirable.

We shall neither withdraw from the power field nor federalize all electric power generators in the U. S. Instead we shall continue to advance in a spirit of helpfulness to localities, and in a spirit of cooperation with local citizens. * * * Private industry [has been] enabled to participate more fully in the development of economic nuclear power [under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954] while the Government continues to assist * * * with basic research and the building of experimental reactors. * * * I want our people to know that these provisions [of the law] are designed eventually to relieve the taxpayer of the enormous cost of the enterprise, while fully protecting the public interest in atomic energy.

HALL: The Eisenhower Administration and the Eighty-third Congress [have] established a new and healthy system of 'partnership' development of our water and power projects.

THE DEMOCRATIC POSITION

TRUMAN: Within twenty months this Administration has confronted the country with a historic and dangerous program to give away the resources and rights carefully developed by Republicans as well as Democrats over thirty years * * *. These precious rights are in grave danger of being given away to special monopolistic interests.

STEVENSON: Now there has come this 'local partnership' proposition * * * whereby the Government and the private utilities will build the project and the private utilities get the profitable part—the electricity—and the Government, you and I, get the flood control, storage and reclamation part.

* * * It is hard for us to see why all of us, as taxpayers, should support the non-paying part of these developments while private utilities take a guaranteed return out of the profitable part.

GORE: Atomic energy has been developed with taxpayers' money. Twelve billion dollars of your money has been spent to develop this vast new resource. * * * But * * * the Republicans voted to turn this power over to the big utility firms so that these gigantic, privately owned companies could add their profit to the taxpayer's electric bill.

TRUMAN: Let's look at the mysterious Dixon-Yates contract award by the Administration. * * * It is just a plain give-away of public money and national resource. * * * Bad as the contract is, it would be tragic if it were used to destroy the T. V. A., one of our greatest public assets.

EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS • DAILY SERVICE • 1205 NINETEENTH ST. WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

(Tuesday, Oct. 19, 1954) (By Richard M. Spong)

MIDTERM SWEEPS AND WHY

On the basis of past performance, the odds are against a sweeping victory for either party in the midterm elections of Nov. 2. The party in power usually tends to lose some seats in Congress at midterm elections; the Republicans will obviously be happy to maintain the paper-thin majorities they now hold in both branches.

Similarly, the odds also are against a Democratic sweep. In only five of the 13 midterm elections since 1900 has either party scored a landslide.

Louis H. Bean, widely known as a political statistician, suggests that the record of voting in midterm elections for the House is a dependable gauge of "political tides." Bean points out that normally only a third-plus of the 96 senators are elected every two years, whereas all the members of the lower house are elected every two years.

A check on the record since the turn of the century shows that only twice did a landslide midterm victory change control of the House. The Democrats gained control in the midterm elections of 1910, gaining 56 seats in the House while the Republicans were losing 57. The Republican landslide in 1946, in which the G.O.P. gained 56 seats and the Democrats lost 55, also reversed House control.

* * * * * * * * * * *

In the landslide of 1930, the Democrats won 51 new seats and the Republicans lost 47. The Republicans retained technical control of the House in the elections, only to lose it by deaths in the following months.

In 1922, the G.O.P. lost 75 seats to the Democrats but kept House control by an 18-seat margin. In the landslide of 1938, the Republicans gained 80 House seats while the Democrats were losing 71, but the Democrats controlled the lower branch by a comfortable 93-seat margin. In a semi-sweep in 1942 the Republicans gained 47 seats --the Democrats lost 45 --but the Democrats still held a 13-seat edge.

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SEE REPORT OF SEPT. 14, 1948: PRICES AND POLITICS (VOL. II, 1948, p. 631).

High prices lost the 1910 midterm elections for the Republicans. Voters blamed the stiff Payne-Aldrich tariff rates for the high cost of living. Also in 1910, the country had had two years of a Republican President --Taft-- who certainly lacked the political glamour of his Republican predecessor, "Teddy" Roosevelt. And the Taft proposal of tariff reciprocity with Canada was unpopular with many farmers.

Low farm prices and business depression accounted in large part for the swing to the Democrats in 1922. And again in 1930 the Democratic victory in the House, with a light vote, was attributable to a sharp depression in agriculture and industry.

The vote was light in 1938, too. President Roosevelt's attempt to pack the Supreme Court undoubtedly had an adverse effect on Democratic fortunes. So did increasing unemployment, labor-management squabbles, another sharp recession in industry and agriculture. The vote was unusually small again in 1942, when the Republicans scored a semi-coup.

Resentment of price controls and a meat shortage hurt the Democrats in 1946. So did rising living costs and confusion over foreign policy. The vote was unusually small, and war weariness and reconversion problems aided the Republican candidates.

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DAILY SERVICE
1205 NINETEENTH ST. WASHINGTON 6, D. C.
EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS

(Monday, Oct. 18, 1954) (By Richard M. Spong)

IN THE NAME OF UNITY

In the two weeks before the midterm elections, President Eisenhower is expected to repeat his pleas not to elect a Democrat Congress that would block his legislative program in 1955 and 1956. But the prospect of a "cold war" between the White House and Capitol Hill often appears more dire two weeks before the elections than it does two weeks after them.

The Republican-controlled 80th Congress clashed repeatedly with President Truman in 1947 and 1948. Truman in the '48 campaign was to castigate it as a "do-nothing" Congress, the second worst in history. But no continuous deadlock between the Executive and Legislative branches of government actually materialized.

Bipartisan support for the Truman-Marshall foreign policy was maintained throughout 1947 and 1948 sessions. To the credit of the 80th Congress must be listed the Greek-Turkish Aid Act, the Army-Navy Unification Act, the General Foreign Relief Act (all 1947), and the European Recovery Program, Military Aid for China, Draft Revival and Rearmament, the Voice of America Act, Trade Agreements Extension, the Displaced Persons Act (all 1948). Much of the praise for this record in foreign policy was paid to the persuasive leadership of the late Sen. Vandenberg, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

SEE REPORT OF AUG. 7, 1948: RECORD OF 80TH CONGRESS (VOL. 1, 1948, P. 359).

The real battle came on domestic issues. The 80th Congress enacted over presidential vetoes two important measures pledged by Republicans in the 1946 campaigns--the Taft Hartley Act (1947) and a $4.8 billion tax reduction (1948). Truman vetoed nine major bills. Six of these vetoes were overridden with the assistance of substantial numbers of Democrats; three vetoes were sustained.

Truman's 10-point civil rights program was largely unsuccessful in the 80th Congress. But in general it found wider acceptance among Republicans than among Democrats. And, again in general, the President's anti-inflation program was defeated by Republicans only with the support of conservative Democrats.

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In the latter half of the Hoover administration, Democrats controlled the House and a combination of insurgent Republicans and Democrats controlled the Senate. A compromise relief measure was enacted after a large-scale public works-relief measure had been vetoed. Tariff rates were unchanged, although Congress did attempt to transfer the flexibility power from the White House to the Capitol. Hoover's veto of that measure, like his vetoes of other major bills, was not overridden.

The President was defeated outright on tax and economy measures, but the totals finally carried by these measures approximated the amounts the administration requested. Hoover's appointments gave rise to few contests.

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In the last two years of the Wilson administration, Republicans controlled both branches. Vetoes of bills ending Daylight Saving Time and the Volstead bill for enforcement of Prohibition were overridden.

A bill increasing tariff protection of farm products was vetoed. Wilson was defeated on the League of Nations, but popular sentiment in favor of the League forced the Republican candidate in 1920, Warren G. Harding, to propose an "association of nations."

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DAILY SERVICE
1205 NINETEENTH ST. WASHINGTON 6, D. C.
EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS

(Monday, Oct. 25, 1954) (By Richard Spong)

IF THE DEMOCRATS WIN

Democratic strategists are reported already mapping out a program to be followed if their party wins control of the next Congress in the Nov. 2 elections. This report places high on the Democratic agenda the extension and liberalizing of the Reciprocal Trade Act, as recommended by the Randall Commission.

SEE WEEKLY REPORT OF AUG. 21, 1954: RECORD OF THE 83RD CONGRESS

Action on President Eisenhower's comprehensive freer trade program was postponed at the 1954 session of Congress. Democrats had strongly supported the three-year liberalized extension requested by the President on Mar. 30. But on the advice of Republican leaders on Capitol Hill, the President on May 20 accepted a straight one-year extension. The compromise, it was explained, would give Congress more time to study the proposed liberalizations.

Just as the Republican-controlled Congress of 1947-48, in general, supported the Truman administration foreign policy with legislation and appropriations, so a Democratic-controlled Congress in 1955-56 could be expected to support the Eisenhower foreign program. On domestic issues less cooperation could be expected between Congress and White House, judging from Democratic votes in the 1953-54 Congress.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Organized labor is going all-out to support Democratic candidates this year, expecting to be repaid for that support in the next two years. But Labor supported the Democratic ticket in 1948; the four following years could hardly be called a period of "collecting big" for Labor. Certainly the Democrats could be expected to attempt to revise the Taft-Hartley Act. Attempts at repeal and revision after the 1948 Democratic victory were blocked by a coalition of conservative Democrats and Republicans.

Depending on economic conditions, a Democratic Congress would be more likely than a Republican Congress to vote low-bracket tax concessions, and to rip out dividend tax credits. In the House in 1954 more than 98⅓ per cent of Republicans voted against a cut in the proposed dividend tax relief. Almost 88 per cent of Democrats voted for the cut. But the administration might get from the Democrats the indefinite extension of the 52 per cent corporation income tax rate the administration had asked for in 1954--only to settle for a one-year extension.

* * * * * * * * * * * *

A Democratic Congress might consider it had a mandate to restore rigid high farm price supports. In 1954, almost 78 per cent of Senate Democrats voted against flexible supports. Only 17 per cent of Senate Republicans opposed the administration-requested principle.

Democrats would attempt, on their past record, to increase appropriations for national defense. And they would try to reverse the administration private industry-public funds "partnership" power policy. Democrats would be expected to vote more funds for multi-purpose dams and for flood control and emergency farm relief.

In the area of social welfare legislation, a Democratic Congress would tend to follow the administration's lead, particularly in supporting the President's health reinsurance program, defeated this year. As for public housing: Congress this year scaled down the President's request from authorization for 140,000 starts over four years to 35,000 starts for one year. Democrats in general favored an even larger program.

Special Session of Senate

The Senate session opening on Monday, Nov. 8 is unique in that the Senate is summoning itself back without the House, under the adjournment resolution of Aug. 20. Although there have been 46 previous special sessions of the Senate alone, the last in 1933, all were summoned by a President.

The forthcoming session is unique also in being convened to consider censure of a Senator. Most special Senate sessions of the past were called to act on major nominations immediately after a new President had been inaugurated. (Before the 20th amendment was adopted in 1933, a new Congress was not due to meet in regular session until 13 months after a President took the oath of office.)

A few special sessions of the Senate were called also to act on a treaty or to consider some aspect of foreign relations not requiring legislation. The House has never been called into special session by itself.

And this special Senate session is unusual, although not unique, in running on (probably) for some weeks. Of the 46 preceding special Senate sessions, 34 lasted for 15 days or less, including Sundays. The last previous of the 12 which lasted for more than 15 days was away back in 1893.

Whether the present session keeps strictly to passing judgment on Sen. McCarthy is probably up to the Senate leaders. In the special Senate session of March 1917, a point of order was raised and sustained against even the introduction of a bill alien to the purpose for which the session had been called. But nothing can prevent any Senator from discussing anything--for instance, election results.

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ELECTION *Guide*

A Nationwide Political Survey

by JOSEPH F. McCAFFREY



FACTS, FIGURES, AND PERSONALITIES FOR '54

CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION

-of-

ASSOCIATED STEVENSON CLUBS OF

AMERICA, INC.

Pursuant to the Membership Cor-

poration Law.

[illegible]
Attorney at Law
[illegible]
New York [illegible]

CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION

-of-

ASSOCIATED STEVENSON CLUBS OF AMERICA, INC.

Pursuant to the Membership Corporations Law.

We, the undersigned, for the purpose of forming a membership corporation pursuant to the Membership Corporation Law of the State of New York, do hereby certify:

I. The name of the proposed corporation shall be ASSOCIATED STEVENSON CLUBS OF AMERICA, INC.

II. The purposes for which it is to be formed are:

a. To promote and foster by political and informative means, the nomination and election of ADLAI STEVENSON to the office of President of the United States.

b. To solicit, collect and otherwise raise money for the furtherance and accomplishment of the aforementioned purposes; to expend, contribute, disburse and otherwise handle and dispose of the same for such purposes, either directly or by contributions to other agencies or organizations; and to do any and all other things necessary or proper in connection with or incidental to any of the foregoing, subject to such limitations as are provided by law.

III. The territory in which its operations are principally to be conducted is New York State.

IV. The city, village, town or courty in which its office and headquarters are to be located is the City and County of New York, with sub-headquarters elsewhere in the United States, as may be deemed necessary and desirable.

V. The number of its directors shall be not less than five (5) nor more than eleven (11).

VI. The names and residences of the directors until the first annual meeting are:

NAMES	RESIDENCES
VICKI BURKE	53 East 75 Street, New York, N.Y.
PEGGY A. LEE	1215 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y.
ALFRED RONALD	110-12 - 64th St. Forest Hills, N.Y.
ADELA LA ROSA	170 West 109th Street, New York, N.Y
DOROTHY WILSON	72 Carmine Street, New York, N.Y.
ANGELO M. SEIJO	1442 Austin Road, Bronx, N.Y.
MARY RUBINSTEIN	1553 Nostrand Avenue, Bklyn., N.Y.

VII. All of the subscribers to this certificate are of full age; at least two-thirds of them are citizens of the United States; at least one of them is a resident of the State of New York. Of the persons named as directors, at least one is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of New York.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have made, subscribed and acknowledged this certificate this 24th day of September, 1953.

Vicki Burke

Vicki Burke

Peggy A. Lee

Peggy A. Lee

Alfred Ronald

Alfred Ronald

Adela La Rosa

Adela La Rosa

Dorothy Wilson

Angelo M. Seijo

Angelo M. Seijo

Mary Rubinstein

Mary Rubinstein

STATE OF NEW YORK)
CITY OF NEW YORK) SS.:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

On this 24th day of September, 1953, before me personally came VICKI BURKE, PEGGY A. LEE, ALFRED RONALD, ADELA LA ROSA, DOROTHY WILSON, ANGELO M. SEIJO and MARY RUBINSTEIN, to me known and known to me to be the same persons described in and who executed the foregoing certificate of incorporation, and they thereupon severally duly acknowledged to me that they executed the same.

Notary Public

Notary Public [illegible]
[illegible]
Certificate filed in N.Y. [illegible]
Commission Expires March 30, 1955

I, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, First Judicial District, hereby approve the foregoing certificate of incorporation.

DATED: SEPTEMBER 25, 1953.

James B. M. McNally

Justice of the Supreme Court
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
JAMES B. M. McNALLY

STATE OF NEW YORK)
CITY OF NEW YORK) SS.:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

SIDNEY G: MADENBERG, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the attorney for the subscribers to the within certificate of incorporation; and that no previous application for the approval of said certificate by any Justice of the Supreme Court has ever been made.

Sidney G. Madenberg

Sidney G. Madenberg

Sworn to before me this
24th day of September, 1953.

Notary Public

[illegible]
Certificate filed in N.Y. [illegible]
Commission Expires March 30, 1955

LO HOELSCHER
125 EAST 73RD STREET
NEW YORK 21, NEW YORK

11.11.52

Dear Mr. Mercer,

On one of the pre election days I wrote you a pretty mad letter after you spoke about "daisy diaries" when we were fighting for Stevenson and all he means. On most of the other days you were hiding behind quotations of Will Rogers. Knowing you through all these years from "This is Lawton" days – it was not possible that you lost your courage now.

Tonight, one week after that fateful election, you pay tribute to the last 20 years. You never resented those lies and attacks on those 20 years and its Creators Why! Why!

If you thought a "change" necessary you could have explained that too in many ways. I listened to nearly everybody and every site but nobody was so massive.

I never sent that other letter but this I have to get off my chest.

Sincerely Yours
Lo Haelscher

S/D

February 6, 1952

Dear Adlai:

I think Sunday was useful. Your performance, if I may use the word, was excellent. You have, as I was sure you would have, the indispensable quality for this crazy medium, which is believability. Thanks again.

As ever yours,

The Honorable Adlai Stevenson
Governor of Illinois
Springfield, Illinois

Haddard, N. Thos.

VIA WESTERN UNION

12/22/58

MRS. THOMAS STODDARD
234 S.W. Broadway
Portland, Oregon.

DEAR CATHERINE: EVERYONE WHO KNEW TOM IS SOMEWHAT DIMINISHED BY HIS DEATH STOP MY OLDEST AND BEST FRIEND HAS GONE WHEREVER GOOD MEN OF FAITH AFFECTION AND INTEGRITY GO TO REST STOP ONLY UNBREAKABLE COMMITMENTS HERE PREVENT MY FLYING OUT TO BE WITH YOU ON WEDNESDAY STOP LOVE.

ED MURROW.

Charge to E.R. Murrow: 485/17

Stoddard, R. Thomas

November 24, 1958

The Rushing Chairman
Kappa Sigma Fraternity
University of Oregon
Eugene, Oregon

Dear Brother:

I write from this considerable distance to suggest that your chapter might want to have a look at Norman Stoddard, who is a freshman at Oregon and presently resides at McClure Hall. I have known him for many years and have known his father for more years than either one of us cares to remember. He is intelligent, amiable and, I should imagine, a fair student, although I don't know about that. But I do know him well enough to suggest that he might be worth looking over.

Fraternally yours,

KRM:skh

November 24, 1958

Dear Tom:

I knew all along that Norm was a boy of unusual judgement and discernment. If the Kappa Sigs won't pledge him, Ole Olson and I will both withdraw from the fraternity.

Yours in haste, as usual,

KRM:skh

Mr. N. Thomas Stoddard
Stoddard and Company
234 S.W. Broadway
Portland 5, Oregon

CAPITOL 8-9691

STODDARD
AND COMPANY
Properties
234 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

November 19, 1958

Edward R. Murrow,
% CBS,
485 Madison Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

A very special request. This will take you back a long ways! Norman is interested above all other fraternities, of all things, in Kappa Sigma. He is in his fall term at The University of Oregon. The Phi Delts are at a low ebb there, living in altogether too old a house, etc. I have cleared the path by telling him that it won't bother me a bit if he doesn't pledge them.

I would like to ask you to direct a letter of recommendation of Norman to the "Rushing Chairman, Kappa Sigma Fraternity, University of Oregon, Eugene, Oregon." Though it could be ever so brief, I am sure a letter from you would be of help to him.

You might mention that you have been with him on a fishing outing or two--and that it would please you if they looked him up. Norm is living at McClure Hall on the campus. All Freshmen must live in the dorms their Freshman years.

I would surely consider this a special favor, and in reciprocation will work toward the goal of making Casey a Phi Delt come 1962.

~~Sincerely,~~

Tom

N. Thos. Stoddard

NTS/S

November 7, 1958

Dear Tom:

How long can we wait, without inconvenience, before deciding the exact date for the Brooks River trip? Unless something really comes unstuck, we can do it in August, but I would like to wait as long as possible before making a definite commitment. At the same time I realize the people up there won't want to wait indefinitely.

As ever yours,

ERM:skh

Mr. N. Thos. Steddard
234 S.W. Broadway
Portland 5, Oregon

N. THOS. STODDARD
234 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

October 27, 1958

Edward R. Murrow
c/o C. B. S.
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Ed:

I have written an initial letter to my fishing and hunting operative in Ankorage, Alaska relative to our possible trip to that area for the coming summer of 1959.

I received a letter back today advising me that everything is in order and that he awaits confirmation as to dates before confirming the reservation. If everything works out we will take the Brooks River trip and I know you and Casey will enjoy it. I guarantee you fish. I told Murray (my operator) that it would be sometime in August. When and if your plans firm up so that we can set a date, please let me know. We should plan at least a week in Alaska with at least three or four days at Brooks River, just three hours flight out of Ankorage.

Everything is fine with the Stoddards. Norm is at college and getting along fine. Whenever you are through with the pictures have Casey send them along. We attended the Washington State vs. Oregon football game last Saturday and painfully watched the Cougars spoil a very nice Oregon homecoming.

I am giving a great deal of thought to the subject of our discussion at the Century Club and feeling like you that by 1960 I will be prepared to test my wings. Am pleased that you are planning along the same line.

With warm regards to you and yours, I am

Sincerely yours,

Tom

N. Thos. Stoddard

NTS/mm

Stoddard, N. Thos.

N. THOS. STODDARD
234 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

November 21, 1958

H. MI. 4-8152

Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

I have today written my Alaska operative to obtain the latest date, without inconvenience, that we can make a reservation for our Brooks River trip. I will hear in a few days and will advise you.

I am delighted that you are giving this trip serious consideration, as I feel that since we have jointly undertaken on such a wholesome scale the woodsmanship education of Casey, we should not let it drop this year. The quasi-international flavor of this Alaskan trip would be most worthwile just at his entrance into high school, plus the fact that it will give his Dad and his Dad's friend a real excuse to "get away from things".

Ole has been on some sort of trip and wrote me that he had made brief connections with you in New York. I explained to Ole that it was not easy to get on your schedule and that it would be particularly difficult for a man who held the hands he did against you in our last summer poker sessions.

As ever yours,

Tom m.m.

NTS/mm

~~Pending~~
F Tom Stoddard

September 26, 1958

Dear Tom:

I was altogether serious and am determined to do something about it by 1960. It was wonderful to see you again and I am delighted that your mission was a success.

As ever yours,

ERM:skh

Mr. N. Thomas Stoddard
208 S.W. Broadway
Portland 5, Oregon

N. THOS. STODDARD
208 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

9/22/58

Dear Ed:—

Thanks for taking the time to have lunch on the 26th last at the dear "Dreary" Century Club. As usual it was the highlight of my trip.

Ed - I have thought over the subject that kept referring itself to us - that of a public life to finish out the lives of a couple of lucky Western boys. I'm going to do it - & I hope you do, too.

I will keep you posted.

As ever,

Tom.

Tom Stoddard

F

June 20, 1958

Dear Tom:

I regret to say that I am not sure when we arrive in Portland, but believe me, we will be there by noon July 5th. Perhaps earlier. I will telephone you from Spokane or Seattle.

I am afraid Janet must fly back on the 5th or the 6th. This is due to the fact that her father, who is 82, recently broke his hip and she must make the necessary arrangements to house him and a nurse at the farm.

Casey is busy practicing his spinning gear and we are both eager to get going.

As ever yours,

Mr. Tom Stoddard
234 S.W. Broadway
Portland, Oregon

fc

CAPITOL 8-9691

STODDARD
AND COMPANY
Properties
234 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

E

June 18, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

Pleased to get your letter of June 12th, and to hear that nothing short of a major war is going to prevent the Rogue River trip. Catherine is anxiously awaiting word from Janet as to her plans and I do hope they can arrange to spend the time together in Portland.

As to your ETA in Portland. We should plan to leave Portland Saturday, July 5th, around noon and drive to Grants Pass which is approximately 275 miles of good roads. We have a reservation at a motel for Saturday night, July 5th, and will shove off from Grants Pass by boat for Gold Beach by noon, Sunday, July 6th. We will be on the water July 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th and arrive at Agnes on the morning of July 10th. We will eat lunch at Agnes and take the afternoon U. S. Mail Boat into Gold Beach where we can meet Janet and Catherine late that afternoon.

I am presuming that Janet and Catherine will drive down to Gold Beach and meet us the afternoon of the 10th of July. An alternative that might be pleasant to them would be that they plan to arrive at Gold Beach in time to take the U. S. Mail Boat up to Agnes to meet us and then we could all return together. As you may know this is a beautiful trip and I am sure both Catherine and Janet would enjoy it. The mail boat leaves Gold Beach for Agnes at 8:30 A. M. Thursday, July 10th, and gets back from Agnes about 5 P. M. the same day.

Now as to your arrival in Portland. If you would like to get here at the latest possible date, you should be here on the morning of Saturday, July 5th. If you would like to get here a day early in order that I can partially finance my portion of the trip by playing you a game of golf at the Portland Golf Club, I would suggest that you arrive either the night of July 3rd or the morning of July 4th. This would be particularly pleasing to me as well as remunerative, so---the earlier you get here the more golf we can play and there will be plenty for Casey to do as well.

All you need in the way of clothing is slacks and sport shirts or shorts. Rubber soled tennis shoes are recommended in the boat and Bob Pruitt says that all we will need for warmth is a light sweater and some sort of light rain jacket. As to fishing tackle, he said that he could either set you up with what he has or you could buy some inexpensive tackle at Grants Pass. Pruitt said that we shouldn't take too much luggage as we would not need it. He said to bring all we wanted and he would sort it out at the Boat Landing at Grants Pass and what was not needed could come around to Gold Beach in the car.

I am anxiously awaiting your arrival as well as word from Janet as to what her plans are. Please let me know when to expect you and try to come a day early for a day of golf if you can.

Sincerely,

Tom

N. Thos. Stoddard

NTS/bk

My Telephone numbers.

Bus - Co 8-9691

Res - M. 4-8152

F T.S.

June 12, 1958

Dear Tom:

Sorry to have delayed writing you. Nothing is going to prevent this trip except a major war - a small one we will merely ignore.

I don't know about Janet's plans, but I am sure she will be writing Catherine direct.

When will you want Casey and me to arrive in Portland? I gather we will be driving from there.

As ever yours,

Mr. N. Thomas Stoddard
234 S.W. Broadway
Portland 5, Oregon

fc

CAPITOL 8-9691

STODDARD
AND COMPANY
Properties
234 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

June 9, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
% Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

Everything appears to be in readiness for your Rogue River cuting starting July 6th. Reservations are all made and confirmed and I am advised that we have the two best boatsmen on the river. This is too early for the steelhead runs but trout fishing will be at its peak.

I have not heard from you since we firmed up all these dates over the telephone but I am assuming that no news is good news and that you have had no alterations in your schedule that would prevent your ETA.

Catherine has written Janet that she would be delighted to have her stop over at our home while we are on the trip. Perhaps she and Catherine could drive down and meet us at Gold Beach, and we could go our various ways from there. My son, Norman, is working at a logging camp above Hood River, so Janet, Catherine and Ann would have the house to themselves. I do hope she can work this out as Catherine is most anxious to make her visit as gaddy or as quiet as Janet would like. Catherine's invitation to Janet was sent late only for the reason that I had neglected to tell her that Janet would be with you as far as Washington. Please let me have a word from you about the above matters.

Very truly yours,

Tom

N. Thos. Stoddard

NTS/bk

Upcoming

N. THOS. STODDARD
234 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

May 12, 1958

Edward R. & Casey Murrow
580 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Edward & Casey:

I have just been advised by our Rogue River Guide, Bob Pruitt, that our ETA at Gold Beach will be early afternoon, July 10th instead of July 11th as I previously advised you. I thought that it was important that you know this in order that you make your plans from there.

We will be too early for the steelhead runs that make this the greatest steelhead fishing in the world, but we will be at the height of the trout season and that will be something. Pruitt tells me that the trout fishing is wonderful all the way and that there are some big luggers underneath some of those rocks midway on the trip about one hundred miles from the nearest road.

Let me hear from you when your plans are set.

Very truly yours,

Tom

N. Thos. Stoddard

NTS/bk

N. THOS. STODDARD
208 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

April 10, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
% Columbia Broadcasting System
New York, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

I wrote you on February 5th, relative to plans we had discussed about a fishing trip with you and Casey in Eastern Oregon at Earnest Stoddard's 10,000 acre retreat on Eagle Creek near Baker. In that letter I told you that this place is unavailable and I also offered a suggestion that we take the famous Rouge River trip from Grants Pass to Gold Beach.

I have not heard from you on this suggestion and will need to hear rather shortly in order to tie up the necessary boats and guides that I want to use for the trip. This is the greatest outing in the world, Ed, and I hope you can work your plans out to make it. Please let me know as soon as possible, and I hope the answer is "yes"!

I went into some detail in my letter of February 5th, so please re-read that one before you make a decision. Please arrange time for a day or two for golf and other things we might want to do.

Sincerely yours,

Tom

N. Thos. Stoddard

NTS/bk

Stoddard, Thomas
upcoming

EDWARD R. MURROW
485 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, N.Y.

February 25, 1958

Dear Tom:

I have just returned from a couple of weeks quail hunting to find your letter of February 5th.

There is a possibility that I may have to go to the Brussels Fair during July, otherwise the Eagle Creek trip will be fine. So please count Casey and me in and set the date at your convenience.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Thomas Stoddard
208 S. W. Broadway
Portland 5, Oregon

mcc

CAPITOL 8-9691

STODDARD
AND COMPANY
Properties
208 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

February 5, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
% Columbia Broadcasting System
New York, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

While in New York last October, I told you of plans I had to get you and Casey out to Oregon for a fishing trip and outing at my cousin Earnest Stoddard's 10,000 acre retreat on Eagle Creek near Baker in Eastern Oregon. This sounded good to you, and you accepted on behalf of you and Casey for the second or third week in July.

Earnest died very suddenly last December, which throws these plans out for the reason that Earnest won't be there to set the deal up properly for us, make the necessary arrangements, etc. I regret this very much because this would simply have been ideal, and both the fishing and outing accommodations (and privacy) would have been superb.

I still want you to come and I still want to arrange a fishing trip and outing that you two will never forget. My thoughts have been turning to a boat trip down the famous Rogue River from Grants Pass to Gold Beach. Have you ever made this trip? This is unquestionably the greatest trip of its kind in the west. The boats are handled by expert river-men and there are two people to a boat. You and Casey could take one boat and Norman and me another. The trip takes five days, and stops are made at specific places where mountain cottages have been built and are run by people who provide sleeping accommodations and real food. July will be a little early for steelhead fishing, but we will be at the height of trout fishing season.

This trip, Ed, is five days through completely virgin territory and through the greatest stand of timber left in Oregon. There are lots of white water rapids and only three short portages. I have never taken the trip but have always wanted to. Your joining me will give me the excuse I need. I assure you that this is a trip neither you or Casey will ever forget. I am sure you know some of the details of this river through your association with Earl Foster in the lumber association in Gold Beach.

Incidentally many women take this trip with their husbands. If Janet would like to join the trip with you, I am sure that I could interest Catherine in coming along and we would need only to hire another boat.

This letter is too long but please read it carefully as I want to convince you that this is the thing we should do. It is necessary for me to reserve these Rogue River boats early and now is not too late. If this all sounds good, please let me know if you can by return mail and what dates will be satisfactory to you.

Sincerely,

Tom

N. Thos. Stoddard

NTS/bk

Stoddard Tho

N. THOS. STODDARD
208 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

April 4, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

The surprise dinner by my friends on the event of my 50th Birthday last Wednesday at the Multnomah Club in Portland is an occasion that will live in my memory forever. A very beautiful letter from you was read at the dinner, and I merely want to tell you that my gratitude is unbounded for this salute from so valued and dear a friend. The affair was really beautiful and some thirty five of my friends throughout the northwest were in attendance. Some very nice things were said which affected me very much and which made any kind of sensible response quite impossible. A beautiful camera and set of photographic equipment was given to me and nothing could have pleased me more. I understand that you shared in this gift and I express my thanks to you for it.

Among the choicest blessings of my life, Ed, has been the deep and warm friendship which has existed between you and me over a long period of years. It is my hope that the coming years will afford us numerous opportunities to even enrich, if that is possible, this relationship.

Sincerely yours,

Tom

N. Thos. Stoddard

NTS/bk

Stoddard N.T.

November 1, 1957

Dear Tom:

Delighted you had a pleasant trip home. Casey and I are already looking forward to next July.

There was an error about the series tickets. How it occurred I don't know, and it doesn't matter, but the guy who got them for me returned $40.00 which I am herewith returning to you.

You will be glad to know that I did manage to see one game on your ticket. I took the pollster, Elmo Roper and we enjoyed it right much.

As ever yours,

Mr. N. Thomas Stoddard
208 S.W. Broadway
Portland 5, Oregon

fc

N. THOS. STODDARD
208 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

October 23, 1957

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

I am in receipt of volume one, two and three of "See It Now", and spent the entire evening last night listening to them.

I had heard volume one and two before but they mean so much more now that I have them in my library as a personal gift from you. Volume three is really stupendous. Thank you very much, old friend.

Catherine and I drove up to Pullman last Saturday and saw a terrific game between Oregon and Washington State in which Oregon emerged the victor by a scant 1 point, 14 to 13, resulting from the ball hitting the crossbar after WSC's last touchdown. I was never so glad to have a game end in my life. We toured the downtown area and the campus and you can imagine that plenty of my thoughts went back to the days when you were giving the local Police Department and School faculty hell with your multifold activities!

Sincerely yours,

Tom

N. Thos. Stoddard

NTS/bk

FINANCIAL STATEMENT

Commonwealth, Inc.

EQUITABLE BUILDING
421 S. W. SIXTH AVE.
PORTLAND, OREGON

MORTGAGE LOANS

TITLE INSURANCE AND ESCROWS

PROPERTY MANAGEMENT

BUSINESS AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTIES

RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT

COMMONWEALTH, INC.

EQUITABLE BUILDING
421 S. W. SIXTH AVE.
PORTLAND 4, OREGON

☆

BALANCE SHEET AS AT DECEMBER 31, 1954

Assets

CASH IN BANKS AND ON HAND:			
General Funds		$ 448,249.10	
Trusteed Funds		814,079.89	
Escrow Funds		223,184.40	$ 1,485,513.39
TITLE GUARANTEE FUND:			
Securities deposited with State Treasurer			107,919.90
ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE			
Title and Fire Insurance		89,578.43	
Other		227,033.76	316,612.19
LOANS:			
First Mortgages—Pledged		9,398,592,78	
First Mortgages—Not Pledged		351,244.09	
Other Loans		213,259.92	9,963,096.79
REAL ESTATE CONTRACT EQUITIES			66,406.53
INVESTMENTS:			
Real Estate (Less Depreciation)		323,642.10	
Stocks—Wholly owned Oregon Title Plants		372,878.15	
Stocks—Others		168,121.32	864,641.57
CAPITAL ASSETS:			
Furniture and Fixtures	$138,405.62		
Tract Offices	7,265.64		
Merchandise Inventory	2,784.99		
	148,456.25		
Less: Provision for Depreciation	75,952.01	72,504.24	
Title Plant		200,000.00	
Tenants Improvements, less amortization		18,681.73	291,185.97
CASH VALUE OF LIFE INSURANCE			53,861.06
			$13,149,237.40

Liabi

DEPOSITS HELD IN TRUST:	
Trusteed Funds	
Escrow Funds	
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE:	
Clients Accounts	
Accrued Expenses	
Dividend Payable January 1, 1955	
Other	
LOANS PAYABLE:	
Notes Payable—Banks	
Notes Payable—Others	
Mortgage Commitments Payable	
Contracts Payable	
DEFERRED INCOME	
CAPITAL, SURPLUS AND RESERVES:	
Capital Stock—Preferred	
Capital Stock—Common	
Earned Surplus	
Reserve for Pension Plan	
Reserve for Contingencies	
Reserve for Taxes on Income	
STATUTORY RESERVE FOR	
Unearned Premiums and	
Title Insurance Losses	

abilities

. . . . .	$ 814,079.89	
. . . . .	223,184.40	$ 1,037,264.29
. . . . .	19,805.08	
. . . . .	4,079.23	
, 1955.....	33,132.00	
. . . . .	37,618.25	94,634.56
. . . . .	7,786,945.36	
. . . . .	25,000.00	
able . . .	1,800,031.75	
.....	41,150.00	9,653,127.11
.....		1,679.60
VES:		
. . . . .	104,400.00	
. . . . .	1,000,000.00	
. . . . .	796,655.95	
. . . . .	48,268.96	
. . . . .	50,000.00	
. . . . .	104,693.88	2,104,018.79
. . . . .		258,513.05
		$13,149,237.40

Directors

RALPH H. CAKE
President, Equitable Savings and Loan Association

JAMES C. DEZENDORF
Koerner, Young, McColloch & Dezendorf, Attorneys-at-Law

ARTHUR L. FIELDS

JOSEPH R. GERBER
President, Joseph R. Gerber Company

ALFRED A. HAMPSON, JR.
Maguire, Shields, Morrison & Bailey, Attorneys at Law

GUY R. HARPER
Tax Consultant

H. M. HAWKINS
President

FRANK C. McCOLLOCH
Koerner, Young, McColloch & Dezendorf, Attorneys-at-Law

CHESTER A. MOORES
Vice President

N. THOS. STODDARD
Vice President

JOHN A. ZEHNTBAUER
President, Jantzen Knitting Mills

Officers

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N. THOS. STODDARD, *Vice President*
WILLIAM J. ROSE, *Treasurer*
D. K. DENNIS, *Assistant Treasurer*
FRANK C. McCOLLOCH, *Secretary*
SHIRLEY A. DeHAVEN, *Assistant Secretary*
A. C. HUTCHINSON, *Assistant Secretary*

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Vice Presidents
A. L. BUCHNER
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The Washington Hotel in Pullman, Washington; home of Washington State College. Newly decorated - all outside rooms. Finest foods served in coffee shop & dining rooms. Modern, attractive cocktail lounge.

SToddard

10/19/57

PULLMAN, WASH.
OCT 21
2 30 PM
1957

Ed: Here for Ore-WSC game into California — a every site brings thoughts of you & days of yore. Regards,

Tom Stoddard.

Genuine Natural Color Made By DEXTER PRESS, Inc., West Nyack, N.Y.

Pub. by The Ross Hall Studio, Sandpoint, Idaho 94747

POSTCARD

Edw. R. Murrow
485 Madison Ave
New York, N.Y.

HOTEL

Stoddard, Tom

OCTOBER 9, 1957

TOM STODDARD
208 S.W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

DELIGHTED ALL WENT WELL. LET'S MAKE IT ANNUAL AFFAIR NEXT YEAR. I WILL JOIN YOU. REGARDS.

ED MURROW

514-43
fe

Stoddard, N.T.

N. THOS. STODDARD
208 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

September 14, 1957

Dear Ed:

Just returned from a trip south to find your considerate and appreciated wire telling me that my World Series Tickets were secure and offering to aid me in getting reservations both in New York and Milwaukee.

You can't know how much I appreciate your arranging for the tickets. As for reservations, am pleased to be able to relieve you of this responsibility. I was successful in obtaining adequate reservations at the Commodore in New York and The Wisconsin in Milwaukee. Neither would be my choice under normal circumstances, but both are entirely satisfactory. Thanks for the offer of help.

I do hope we will be able to see you while in New York, and you may be sure that it will all be up to you--since we are available any time and anywhere. I would be disappointed if we didn't get together--but would understand if your schedule didn't allow it. We will arrive Saturday, September 28th around noon at the Commodore. I have some business the first two days of the following week--then the Series games on the 2nd and 3rd of October. Anytime that we can get together during those days--I'll be ready. I'll give you a call when we get in and arrange to get the tickets. Your Miss Criseau has been wonderful. Hope you are paying her in like proportion.

Harold "Ole" Olson is with me. He is one of my best friends, a real honest-to-God man among men, and a Kappa Sig to boot. He is looking forward to meeting you.

See you the latter part of the month, old friend.

Sincerely,

Tom

Stoddard, Tom

OCTOBER 2, 1956

MR. N. THOS. STODDARD
208 S.W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

WIRE WAS MISQUOTED STOP THE DATE IS OCTOBER NINE STOP

THANK YOU.

REBECCA HOLDER
SECRETARY TO MR. MURROW

414-43

N. THOS. STODDARD
208 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

Sept. 28, 1956

Miss Rebecca Holder
Secretary to Mr. Edward R. Murrow
CBS
480 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Miss Holder:

I received the following wire from you from Hollywood, California. "Have managed to get two tickets to $64,000 dollar question for Mr. & Mrs. Paul Hunt for October 19. Please ask them to contact me when they arrive Plaza 1-2345, Ext 7494 and I will get the tickets to them."

Since the $64,000 dollar question program is on Tuesday night I am wondering if the wire wasn't misquoted in transmitting and should have read October 9?" Would you please let me know about this? If the October 9th date is correct Mr. Hunt will contact you at CBS for the tickets on that date, which is the date he is arriving in New York. He will be stopping at the Waldorf Astoria.

Please convey my regards and thanks to Mr. Murrow.

Very truly yours,

N. Thos. Stoddard

N. Thos. Stoddard

NTS:dm

Stoddard, N.T

September 9, 1957

Mr. N. Thomas Stoddard
Stoddard and Company
208 S. W. Broadway
Portland 5, Oregon

WORLD SERIES TICKETS ALL SET STOP DO YOU HAVE HOTEL RESERVATIONS MILWAUKEE AND HERE STOP REGARDS

Ed Murrow

414-43

August 23, 1957

Dear Tom:

I have just returned to my shop and was delighted to learn that the matter of tickets for the World Series had been settled. I assume that part, at least, of the game will be played here in New York and will give me a chance to see you.

Sorry we missed you during the brief visit to my mother's at the end of July. Things got a little messed up for a variety of reasons. Not the least of which, was while we were salmon fishing at Neah Bay, Earl Foster who was Athletic's Manager when I was in school dropped dead of a heart attack, and I had to make a lot of arrangements including flying down to Mc Minnville for the funeral.

Do drop me a wire when you know exactly when you will be arriving and we will plan a rendezvouz.

As ever yours,

Mr. N. Thomas Stoddard
Stoddard and Company
208 S. W. Broadway
Portland 5, Oregon

mcc
(Dictated but not signed by Mr. Murrow)

CAPITOL 8-9691

STODDARD
AND COMPANY
Properties
208 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

July 8, 1957

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
518 Madison Avenue
% Columbia Broadcasting System
New York, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

This letter is to ask a very special favor from a very special friend. Harold Olson and I are planning to take in the World Series this year. We don't care who plays or where. Since I was a little boy, (like you, No. 50 is coming up) I have had a long unsatisfied ambition to see a World Series. Since Olson has had the same thwarted ambition, we have decided to join forces and take one in this year.

My favor is this. I would like to ask you to have your secretary arrange to get me two tickets to the full series, whereever the games are played. I am sure that with your connections this won't be too difficult. Even with my connections I know it would be difficult from here. If we can have a choice we would like to be on the first base line as close in as possible and the ticket price is no item. As soon as the ticket prices are established, please have your secretary let me know and I will forward you a check.

This is quite a favor to ask of a very busy man and the only reason that I have fortitude enough to ask it is because I would do the same for you if I were in a position to do so.

My recovery from the Coronary of 1956 has been wonderful thus far. I am back to pretty much of a normal life again. I play golf, do some hunting and fishing, and work to the same capacity I always did. I know my limitations however,

and stay well within them. I could recommend this last item to someone else I know very well! The Stoddard's are all fine. We have a new home in the country and I keep my idle hours quite busy "straw-bossing" the maintenance of my one-half acre of ground. My son Norman is 18 and has all of the promise of being as good a "blade" as his father. My daughter Ann is 15 and becomming fetching, as you and I understand the term. Catherine is just fine and tolerates us quite well. The entire family, of course, watch all of your programs and I listen to your daily newscast which is released in Portland conveniently at the time I am driving from my office at 5 P.M. If it is possible, you are getting even better as the years roll on. I almost feel as though I have has a visit with you at the conclusion of one of your programs.

Are there any plans for your being out this way this year? If so let me know, I have the perfect place to take you trout fishing in Oregon's beautiful Blue Mountains. This is an invitation. With very best wishes to you and yours, I am

Sincerely yours,

Tom

N. Thos. Stoddard

NTS/bk

CAPITOL 8-9691

STODDARD
AND COMPANY
Properties
208 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

August 14, 1957

Mrs. Crissau,
Secretary to Mr. Murrow,
% Columbia Braodcasting Company
485 Madison Avenue,
New York, N.Y

Dear Mrs. Crissau:

Thank you for your thoughtful telephone call with regard to my request from Mr. Murrow for help in obtaining tickets for the World Series this coming October. I take from your call that you are obtaining for me two tickets to each of the games, wherever they are played, and that you will let me know when and where to pick them up. At that time I will settle with you for their cost.

My present plans call for me being in New York from September 29th until October 4th--and I believe the Series will begin within a day or two following the latter date. So--I will be in a position to pick them up in New York rather than have you go to the trouble of sending them to me somewhere. I will expect to hear from you or Mr. Murrow on this.

I do hope this is not causing you or Ed too much trouble. I appreciate that noone knows at this date whether the series will go four games or the limit of seven games--and that you can only be sure of the first four. I wouldn't think of making this request were it not for the fact that it becomes quite a maneuver to get World Series tickets that are any good from way out here. Tell the old boy that I'll return the favor someday, and I'm sure I will think of a way to get even with you, too.

Sincerely,

N. Thos. Stoddard

N. Thos. Stoddard

NTS/S

Stoddard, Tom

September 27, 1956

Dear Tom:

The tickets for the Hunts have been arranged and will be waiting for them, and I will certainly make it my business to meet them.

I made a quick trip to Bellingham after the Republican Convention and had hoped to come down to Portland, but had to go to Suez for two weeks, so that was that.

Sorry you are not coming East, I will make you a signal if I get West again. This is written in great haste, but I did want to tell you that everything has been arranged for the Hunts.

As ever yours,

Mr. N. Thomas Stoddard
226 S. W. Broadway
Portland 5, Oregon

rh

N. THOS. STODDARD
226 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

Sept. 15, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
CBS
580 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

I was disappointed that you didn't route yourself northward from the Republican Convention at San Francisco, but presumed the large bill you compiled for CBS on that event necessitated an early return to New York to defend the expenditure. On the point of the convention let me say that your coverage was terrific and the feature of the whole program was your daily recapitulations with Eric Severeid.

I am not making my annual trip east and therefore, we aren't going to get together this year. This is a disappointment, of course, to me. The purpose of this letter is to advise you that one of my best, closest friends, Paul D. Hunt, general manager of the Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., mortgage loan division here in Portland, has asked me for a favor which I would very much like to arrange. Paul and his wife are going to be in New York City at the Waldorf Astoria from Oct. 9 through the 13th. Like any sizzerbill from the sticks, among other things he would like to see in New York City is a leading television show. Since he knows we are friends and since from me he has gained the general impression that the only good television shows are those of CBS, he has asked

N. THOS. STODDARD
226 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

me if I can arrange for he and his wife to attend one of the CBS shows within those dates. It would be a very personal favor to me if you would have one of your staff arrange this. I have asked Paul to give you a call when he arrives in New York. However, should he miss connections I wonder if it would not be well for you to have your secretary contact him at the Waldorf with whatever answer you are able to give. I leave this to you but would appreciate hearing from you as to whom he should contact, or how he is to be contacted.

have done RH

Paul Hunt is one of God's chosen people. He graduated with me from Oregon and is our age. He is one of those friends who is always by your side though miles may separate you. His friendship, as a result, always reminds me of those words of Robert Browning, "Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp - - - or what's a heaven for?" Other less important factors from Paul's past life is that he is a member of Kappa Sigma Fraternity, likes a drink, always appreciated the turn of a feminine ankle - - - and married a very lovely lady much too good for him. It would be wonderful if you could meet the Hunts, but I know your busy schedule denys you many of these pleasures.

I am getting along fine and I am back to a full day's work once again. My recovery from the coronary attack in April has been a splendid one and my life is becoming very normal once again. I am starting to play golf next week and only last week had the pleasure of a two hour boat fishing trip on the Rogue River in Southern Oregon.

N. THOS. STODDARD
226 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

Let there be no doubt in your mind that I am as good a man as ever - - - which leaves you with the job of making the appraisal!

Sincerely yours,

Tom

N. Thos. Stoddard

NTS:jh

Stoddard, Thomas

SEPTEMBER 26, 1956

MR. N. THOS. STODDARD
226 S.W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

HAVE MANAGED TO GET TWO TICKETS TO 64,000
DOLLAR QUESTION FOR MR. AND MRS. PAUL HUNT
FOR OCTOBER 9 STOP PLEASE ASK THEM TO CONTACT
ME WHEN THEY ARRIVE, PLAZA 1-2345 EXT. 7494
AND I WILL GET THE TICKETS TO THEM.
THANK YOU.

REBECCA HOLDER
Secretary to Mr. Murrow

444-43

Rm. 909

Stoddard, N. Th.

June 28, 1956

Dear Tom:

Glad you liked the Churchill album and I'm delighted that you continue to progress. My own plans are still indefinite, and now it looks like I am going to Yugoslavia immediately after the Republican Convention, but I will let you know.

As ever yours,

Mr. N. Thomas Stoddard
226 S. W. Broadway
Portland 5, Oregon

rh

N. THOS. STODDARD
226 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

June 15, 1956

Dear Ed:

Received the Winston Churchill album and the copy of "See it Now, and hasten my thanks to you for both of these wonderful gifts. The album just received completes my collection of your recordings, so get busy on another one. This last one I believe is the best. Have played it a dozen times or more, and get something new each time. What a man!

I am getting along fine, and it appears my recovery will be good. Will be playing 18 holes of golf in a couple of months, so if you come west later this summer, bring your clubs. You may be sure I won't use the heart as an excuse--for it is my considered opinion after viewing your game the last time we played that I could beat you without one (a heart)!

Am getting lazier than hell. Let me hear of your plans to come west as soon as they are completed.

As ever,

Tom

Edw. R. Murrow,
485 Madison Avenue,
New York, 22, N.Y.
se

Stoddard, Tho

May 28, 1956

Dear Tom:

A brief note to say that I have heard from Roger and unhappily had to decline since I will be covering the political conventions where there will be plenty of fish, but I won't be able to identify them as such.

Have hopes of coming up to the Coast after the Republican performance in San Francisco and if I do, we will make a rendezvous.

Hurry up and get out of there and go back to work, the government needs you.

As ever yours,

Mr. Thomas Stoddard
226 S. W. Broadway
Portland 5, Oregon

rh

The following is from Tom Stoddard:

5/17/56

Dear Ed:

Hate to have you labor thru my penmanship -- but am still in the hospital (1 month yesterday) and don't yet have the privilege of my stenographer -- so please bear up. Thanks for your thoughtful letter, which helped a good deal the general state of my mind. Will look forward to the book and recording you mentioned -- and thanks for them in advance.

The old "Iron man" is down but by long odds not out! Your jaunty phrase that "you refuse to take this think seriously" exactly records my own feelings -- and lately I have been getting confirmation of this attitude from "the scientists" I had a heart attack at 9:30 am on April 20th at my office, which landed me here. Was getting along perfectly and feeling like a million when I apparently had another and much more severe one at 10:00 pm on April 28th. I really thought they had me this time for sure!. But it was fortunate I was in the hospital and with oxygen, hypos, etc. they brought me around okay. Tho not without a little sweating on my part.

I have been completely immobilized until day before yesterday. I guess that is the only treatment now -- to just rest your heart till it heals -- so that's what they have done. I have recently received the wonderful news that the healing process has been successful and that, with a few applied here and there, I can expect to lead a perfectly normal and productive life. After a few months I can hunt & fish & play golf and work as I normally have always done. So, my friend,when you get out this way -- bring those left-handed golf bats -- and I'll <u>continue</u> the lesson I gave you on your last visit!

Roger Keane, a WSC Sigma Nu around your era, is my doctor. He says you two know each other. He and I had been planning an 11 day horseback ride into the Salmon River country of the Idaho Panhandle this August, of course I am now "grounded" for this year - but he wants you to make the trip with him. You will get trout fishing that just doesen't exist anymore -- and of course you know how beautiful that country is. He told me he would write you an invite - and I just want to urge you to do it if you can take the time. I know you have a government "to support," but to hell with it for eleven days. Other men going from Portland with Roger will be Ed Dwyer, about 52 and President of Dwyer Lbr Co here, and Ray Deiter, about 62 and one of the best fly fisherman (almost as good as me) in that country. There will be about 20 in the saffari - and you'll be bedded down, cooked for, etc. Hope you can make it. Again thanks for your letter and thought. Don't worry -- I'll be okay in a couple of months. I hear you every nite at 5:00 pm (your radio news report) and it never fails to bring back some 27 & 28 year old memories of a couple of young punks with big ideas!

The best always,

Tom

N. THOS. STODDARD
226 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

5/17/56

Dear Ed:—

Hate to have you labor thru my penmanship — but am still in the hospital, (1 month yesterday) and don't yet have the privilege of my stenographer — so please bear up. Thanks for your thoughtful letter, which helped a good deal the general state of my mind. Will look forward to the book and recording you mentioned — and thanks for them in advance.

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attack at 9:30 A.M. on Apr 20th at my office, which landed me here. Was getting along perfectly — + feeling like a million when I apparently had another and much more severe one at 10 P.M. on April 28th. I really thought they had me this time for sure! But it was fortunate I was in the hospital — + with oxygen, hypo's etc — they brought me around O.K. — tho not without a little stocking on my part.

I have been completely immobilized until day before yesterday. I guess that is the only treatment now — to just rest your heart till it heals — so that's what they have done. I have recently received the wonderful news that the healing process has been successful, and that, with a few brakes applied here and there, I can expect to lead a perfectly normal + productive life. After a few months I can hunt + fish + play golf + work as I normally have always done. So, my friend, when

N. THOS. STODDARD
226 S.W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

you get out this way - bring that left-handed golf bats - and I'll continue the lesson I gave you on your last visit!

Roger Keane, a W.S.C. Sigma Nu around your ears, is my doctor. He says you two know each other. He + I had been planning an 11 day horseback ride into the Salmon River country of the Idaho Panhandle this August. Of course I am now "grounded" for this year - but he wants you to make the trip with him. You will get trout fishing that just doesn't exist anymore - + of course you know how beautiful that country is. He told me he would write you a minute - + I just want to urge you to do it if you can take the time. I know you have a government "to support", but to hell with it for eleven days. Other

men going from Portland with Roger will be Ed Dwyer, about 52 + President of Dwyer Lbr Co here, and Ray Dexter, about 62 + one of the best fly fishermen (almost as good as me) in the country. There will be about 20 in the safari — + you'll be headed down, cooks for, etc. Hope you can make it.

Again thanks for your letter and don't worry — I'll be O.K. in a couple of months. I hear your every nite at 5 P.M. (your radio news report), and it never fails to bring back some 27 + 28 year old memories of a couple of young punks with big ideas!

The best always,

Tom.

Stoddard, Thomas

May 8, 1956

Dear Thomas:

Just had the most distressing news that you are having trouble with your ticker. My own suspicion is that your inherent laziness has overtaken you and you just wanted to rest. I refuse to believe that this is anything more than a temporary business. If there is anything I can send along that would amuse you during your convalescence, which I hope will be brief, do make me a signal. Meanwhile, I am sending you a book and a record that I turned out during my spare time.

I am no good at writing this sort of letter, but even from this distance I take you firmly by the hand and announce that when I come to the Coast next summer, I will beat the bejesus out of you on the golf course, and the heart will be no alibi.

As ever yours,

Mr. Thomas Stoddard
226 S. W. Broadway
Portland 5, Oregon

rh

sent

CAPITOL 8-9691

COOLEY RINEHART
STODDARD
AND COMPANY
226 S. W. BROADWAY
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

May 3, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
CBS
580 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Personal & Confidential

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Mrs. Thos. Stoddard has asked me to write and let you know that Mr. Stoddard had a heart attack April 20th and is in the hospital. He is showing progress but will be hospitalized a bit longer and it will be two or three months before he will be back to his normal way of life.

I'm sure a card from you would be appreciated.

Very truly yours,

Dorothy Morrow

Dorothy Morrow
Secretary

DM:

Stoddard, N.T.

JUNE 30, 1955

MR. N. THOMAS STODDARD
731 S.W. STARK STREET
~~XXXXXX~~
PORTLAND, OREGON

WILL BE IN OLYMPIC HOTEL, SEATTLE NIGHT OF JULY 6 ON QUICK TRIP AND WILL TELEPHONE YOU. REGARDS.

ED MURROW

411-43

1/

N. THOS. STODDARD
731 S. W. STARK STREET
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

6/2/55

Dear Ed: —

Sorry to hear that you can't get out to the Advertising Convention here — but even if you could I can see a dozen reasons why you'd decline! You mention that the Murrows might possibly be in this area in early July — and wonder about a fishing trip. You may be sure I will kick up a trip of some kind should you come — so keep me advised of any plans.

After almost twenty years with Commonwealth — I have tendered my resignation effective July 1st this year. As you may see from the enclosed financial statement — I am executive vice-President — and a member of our board. We are the largest mortgage

banking concern in the Northwest — and do an extensive business in the five western States and Alaska. We have, in addition to our mortgage loan division, a business and industrial property department, a property management department, and a state-wide Title Insurance department. With pardonable pride I may say that I have worked up from the bottom of this Company to the 2nd position salary-wise + otherwise over the past twenty years — and have had a major part to do with our tremendous growth and expansion.

My decision to resign is based on business-company situation having to do with further advancement in the reasonably near future. The President reached retirement age this year — and since he has concluded not to retire in the forseeable future — I don't want to wait that long for a final advancement. I am a fairly strong stockholder — + will continue on the Board.

I have no immediate plans, tho

N. THOS. STODDARD
731 S. W. STARK STREET
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

may eventually, if nothing else turns up to my liking, launch a real estate and mortgage company of my own. I am wondering if you have any ideas for me. The thought occurs to me that perhaps you might, among your contacts or within your own organization, have a thought as to a location that I would like and that could profitably employ my talents, if any. Understand, I am not soliciting anything more than your appraisal of the opportunities surrounding you. Though I am far from being rich — we are rather comfortably fixed for a considerable length of time — but certainly not forever. I have, like you, no desire (if I could) to retire at 47!

Ed, I am + have been, one of the higher paid executives in Portland

business among the younger men. I have virtually run this Company for the past Ten years - & prior to the war was Sales Manager for six years. As you know - I have headed most every thing in Portland on the side - having always taken a pretty strong position in the civic life of the city & state. I do a lot of public speaking during a year - and have almost a fetish for organization and promotion. Give it some thought - & let me know if you have an idea. Would like to hear of any possibilities as early as possible - else I will probably go ahead on plans as stated above. I will be here (Res phone Beacon 9812) until June 13th - then am driving my family to Wisconsin and can be reached at Frank Hauzlik, The Pelledge Home, Chippewa Falls, Wisc from the dates of June 17th - 20th. Then I'll be back here after June 23rd. My business phone here is Atwater 8141.

Before closing want to tell you

5

N. THOS. STODDARD
731 S. W. STARK STREET
PORTLAND 5, OREGON

that both of your TV programs go great out here.

"Person to Person" is really striking a responsive chord in the public mind — and of course the other program is the most intelligent one on the air today. This tobacco subject is the talk of the town as a result of it.

But to you and yours — and if the principal subject of this letter sounds ridiculous to you — just ignore it. Hope to see you in July — + in the meantime best of luck.

Sincerely,

Tom.

Am writing this at home. Please pardon the scribbling.

Stoddard, Tom

May 5, 1955

Dear Mr. Collier:

Very many thanks for your letter and your cordial invitation to speak at the 52nd Annual Convention of the Advertising Association of the West to be held in Portland, Oregon, June 26-29.

I regret very much that I cannot accept. Quite apart from the fact that my schedule makes it impossible for me to leave New York during June, I have finally had to make a choice between doing five quarter hours and two half hours of television each week and making speeches.

I am sorry to have to miss so pleasant an occasion as your Convention.

Sincerely,

Mr. Charles W. Collier
Advertising Association of the West
425 Bush Street
San Francisco 8, California

fe

May 5, 1955

Dear Tom:

I am sorry, but it is absolutely impossible for me to get away from New York and come to the West Coast in June.

I have regretfully had to write Mr. Collier to this effect. I find that I have finally had to make a choice between doing five quarter hours and two half hours of television each week and making speeches.

There is a bare chance that Janet, Casey and I will be on the Coast the first week in July. If this materializes, do you think there would be a possibility of arranging a fishing expedition?

With best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Mr. N. Thomas Stoddard, Vice President
Commonwealth, Inc.
Equitable Building
421 West Sixth Avenue
Portland 4, Oregon

fc

COMMONWEALTH, INC.

EQUITABLE BUILDING
421 S.W. SIXTH AVENUE
PORTLAND 4, OREGON

March 30, 1955

Mr. Edward R. Murrow, Vice President
Columbia Broadcasting System
New York, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

I have been asked by H. Quenton Cox, a prominent radio and TV advertising representative here in Portland, to encourage you to accept an invitation which is being made to you by the Advertising Association of the West to - attached appear before the Association's annual convention in Portland on Wednesday, June 29, at 2:15 P.M. at the Multnomah Hotel. If you have not already received their invitation, it is on its way. They are most anxious to have you accept the assignment before their convention of approximately 500 people.

Since the last week in June is just when the fishing gets good in this country, I am particularly anxious that you work out a reason for making a trip out here. It is entirely probable that I could arrange a three or four day fishing trip starting immediately after your appearance at the convention, and I believe I could assure you a very wonderful outing. Please give this some serious thought and let me know if it works into your schedule.

Last night I viewed your program on the watch industry on "See It Now", and I send you my compliments on this fine program. It was not only interesting, but amazingly educational to the rank and file of people on the complex tariff situation that confronts the country. It is very commendable that programs of this type are forthcoming from CBS. Your "Person to Person" program is going over big out here, and everyone I talk to finds it most interesting. I think it is one of the best programs today.

Everything is going fine here. Should it be possible for you to bring Casey with you on this western

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
March 30, 1955

trip in June, I would be happy to see that he has company on any fishing excursion we might undertake. Let me hear from you as soon as you have an answer.

Sincerely,

Tom

N. THOS. STODDARD
Vice President

NTS:SD

Representing Organized Advertising in the
Eleven Western States, Western Canada, Hawaii & Alaska
Affiliated with The Advertising Council

ADVERTISING ASSOCIATION OF THE WEST

CHAS. W. COLLIER
Executive Vice-President

425 Bush Street • San Francisco 8, California • Garfield 1-6868

April 12, 1955

Mr. Edward Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
New York City

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I am sure that by this time word has reached you from our various friends that we want you to speak at the 52nd Annual Convention of the Advertising Association of the West to be held in Portland, Oregon, June 26-29, 1955. We feel that this occasion offers the kind of scene which Ed Murrow would thoroughly enjoy.

The theme of our convention is "New Frontiers for Business and Advertising". This 52nd annual convention is being held during the year celebrating the 150th anniversary of the arrival of Lewis and Clark in the Northwest. So, not being content with inviting ordinary speakers, our convention committee has gone out for the best in the land. The program committee wants you to give the climax talk the afternoon of the 29th. The subject, as we visualize it, might be "New Frontiers in Selling Ideas and Ideals". We want to give you sufficient latitude so you may talk about the problems of communication either on a national or an international basis.

Both as an individual and as an officer of CBS you have demonstrated your abilities in this field and, in this instance, you will be talking to an audience that is intensely interested, as indicated by the enclosed resolution unanimously adopted by this Association at its Mid-Winter Conference in January of this year.

As you know, the week previous to our convention, there will be held in San Francisco the 10th anniversary meeting of the United Nations. We are hoping that your plans might be made already so that you will be in this part of the country at that time and can easily go from San Francisco to Portland to speak at our convention.

We have discussed the possibility of your coming with such friends of yours as Arthur Hull Hayes, KCBS, San Francisco; Tom Swafford, and managers of CBS stations throughout the western area, and they all hope you can be with us.

We know that demands on your time are such that you cannot accept many invitations. We do assure you, however, that with our 5600

members we will have an audience of between four and five hundred people prominent in business and advertising in the West, and that very broad publicity will be given to your appearance. We will provide you with pleasant room accomodations and registration book covering all dinners and other events of the convention.

Our committee would greatly appreciate hearing that you will accept this invitation. You are the man they want.

Cordially,

Chas W. Collier

CHAS. W. COLLIER

CWC:C

RESOLUTION ADOPTED AT
MID-WINTER CONFERENCE
ADVERTISING ASSOCIATION OF THE WEST
Hollywood, California
January 30, 1955

This Association is soberly mindful of the immensity of the stakes in the continuing cold war competition with the ungodly and militant forces of world communism which threatens the very survival of the free world.

We are painfully aware of the viciously distorted version of our country being spread throughout the world by the ruthless and tellingly effective propaganda of the communists.

We are conscious of the transcendent need for combating this force by portraying to the world more extensively, aggressively and effectively the true story of America and of our nation's peaceful and constructive desires.

This Association therefore faces our responsibilities as good citizens and as the organized voice of advertising in the west by declaring our policy as follows:

1. We endorse the necessity for and the objectives of the U. S. Information Agency and related programs and deplore the relative inadequacy of appropriations for this vital activity.

2. We pledge the active interest of this Association and urge all organized advertising to lend its knowledge, counsel, techniques and proven skills toward helping sell America as effectively as advertising has proved its ability to sell goods and services.

3. We call on our government to expand this activity and to utilize more fully the abilities and usefulness of the advertising profession and industry toward this objective and also to rely on those possessing proven skills in these techniques and crafts.

4. We recommend appointment of a committee of this Association to establish such liaison as appears practicable with the appropriate agencies and organizations, both public and private. The committee further will explore the problem and make recommendations to this Association regarding the value, desirability and means of doing our part in helping tell America's story abroad honestly and effectively for the welfare of our country and cause.

- - -

Following passage of this resolution, AAW President Clair G. Henderson, Denver, named Robert R. Gros of San Francisco to serve as Chairman of the Committee to implement the recommendations.

FACTS ABOUT THE

ADVERTISING ASSOCIATION OF THE WEST

AND WHAT IT MEANS TO YOU!

Reading time **5** minutes

THIS IS THE FOUR-WAY PROGRAM OF THE

ADVERTISING ASSOCIATION OF THE WEST

FOR ADVANCEMENT OF BUSINESS AND ADVERTISING IN THE WEST

1 Promoting Better Understanding of Advertising

AAW sponsored the first Advertising Recognition week, now a national event. Each year materials for use in all media go to the individual clubs and media along with suggestions on how to make the most of this presentation to the public.

AAW prepares, publishes and distributes pamphlets and other material to help business do a better job of advertising.

AAW circulates films and other material to help increase public understanding of advertising and our economic system.

2 Improving Advertising and Advertising Practices

AAW has long been active in serving as clearing house for observance of ethical standards of advertising. AAW, through its national, regional and local affiliations has presented organized front to thwart unfair legislative restrictions on advertising. This effort alone warrants full support of all advertisers.

AAW works constantly with schools and universities to promote better understanding of advertising among teachers and students and also to raise standards and practices for all entering the advertising field.

AAW conducts eight advertising craft competitions in cooperation with media annually, to constantly improve quality of advertising produced in the West.

AAW works directly with Better Business Bureaus, 4-A, Assn. of National Advertisers, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, Direct Mail Advertising Assn., National Industrial Advertising Association, Adv. Fed. of America, Magazine Adv. Bureau, Am. News. Publ. Assn., Outdoor Advertising Association, Western Transit Advertising Assn., Brand Names Foundation, Nat. Assn. Radio & TV Broadcasters, Freedoms Foundation, Alpha Delta Sigma, Gamma Alphi Chi, SCAAA and others.

3 Supporting Public Service Campaigns

AAW, through its affiliation with the Advertising Council, coordinates western support of all important campaigns including Traffic Safety, Better Schools, Forest Fire Prevention, Ground Observer Corps, and many others.

AAW represents the western states at the annual Advertising Council White House Conference.

THE MAJOR ACTIVITIES LISTED ABOVE ARE SUPPORTED BY CONTRIBUTING SPONSORS OF AAW. THE CLUB ACTIVITIES LISTED BELOW ARE SUPPORTED BY DUES FROM THE ADVERTISING CLUBS. THESE CLUBS, HOWEVER, SUPPLY THE MANPOWER TO CARRY OUT THE ASSOCIATION PROJECTS.

4 Coordinating Activities of Western Advertising Clubs

AAW is the "central office" of more than 40 individual advertising clubs (list on back). It supplies information on speakers, programs and projects. It conducts club contests and arranges awards to stimulate advertising through the local clubs. Frequent bulletins on tips, trends and projects are sent to all clubs and contributing sponsors.

AAW has 35 working officers and directors selected from the 11 western states, Hawaii and British Columbia, who keep in touch with local problems relating to advertising and business. These people serve without pay.

All AAW activities are coordinated through a central office in San Francisco under policy supervision of President and Board of Directors. All accounts are audited annually by a CPA and all expenditures are budgeted by a central finance committee.

AAW holds an annual convention. National authorities on all phases of advertising appear on the program. This annual meeting also promises a valuable interchange of information for all advertising people in the West.

Here are things A the past

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l activities in advertising.

AAW is the voice of advertising in the West. Its work is vital. If there were no such organization, one would have to be formed. Fortunately there is such an organization. It is the only one in the entire West working full time in the interests of all phases of advertising.

Too many times the activities of this worthwhile association are taken for granted. This fact folder points out what AAW is, what it does and why it is a vital force in furthering the interests of advertising.

Facts presented here have been boiled down for brevity. Additional information is available on any function of the Association.

We believe that after you have read this folder you will agree with all the other sponsors of the Association that it is a worthwhile activity deserving your support.

CONTRIBUTING MEMBERS OF A.A.W.

include over 300 representative firms among advertisers, agencies, media and suppliers.

•

AAW has advertising clubs or affiliates in the cities listed below. Total list of 45 includes regular clubs, women's clubs, Junior clubs and advertising and journalism honoraries.

Boise, Idaho	Sacramento, California
Boulder, Colorado	Salt Lake City, Utah
Denver, Colorado	San Diego, California
Eugene, Oregon	San Francisco, California
Fresno, California	San Jose, California
Hollywood, California	Santa Barbara, California
Honolulu, T. H.	Seattle, Washington
Long Beach, California	Spokane, Washington
Los Angeles, California	Stockton, California
Oakland, California	Tacoma, Washington
Ogden, Utah	Tucson, Arizona
Pasadena, California	Tempe, Arizona
Phoenix, Arizona	Vancouver, B. C.
Portland, Oregon	Whittier, California

For further information on any of the activities of AAW, write:

ADVERTISING ASSOCIATION OF THE WEST

425 BUSH STREET • SAN FRANCISCO 8, CALIFORNIA

AGENCY LITHOGRAPH CO., PORTLAND, ORE.

THE Voice OF A.A.W.

VOL. XVI
No. 3

Official Publication of Advertising Association of the West
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.
FEBRUARY 1955

New Frontiers for Advertising in the West

Portland Adopts Challenging Theme For 52nd AAW Convention, June 26-29

Delegates to the Mid-Winter Conference in Hollywood were delighted with the imaginative presentation made by Portland Ad Convention leaders outlining plans for the AAW Convention June 26th to 29th. Presenting the plans were Oregon Club President Roald Lund, General Convention Chairman Ted Tracy, and committee member Jack Fitting. Backing up their claims was AAW Treasurer Carroll O'Rourke, also of Portland.

Portland leaders at Hollywood: Mrs. Jack Fitting, Ru Lund, Jack Fitting, Carroll O'Rourke, and Mrs. O'Rourke.

The year 1955 marks one hundred and fifty years since Lewis and Clark opened new frontiers in the West. The sesquicentennial of that event is being celebrated in Portland, so the convention theme will appropriately be "New Frontiers for Advertising in the West." Multnomah Hotel will be headquarters. Countless hours are being spent by members of the Oregon Advertising Club and the Women's Advertising Club of Portland planning entertainment and the program for all the important details for a successful convention.

Reata Howard Trombly

Program chairman is Bryce Spruill, vice-president of Botsford, Constantine & Gardner. Working with him is a strong committee of Portland men. Representing AAW on the committee are President Clair Henderson, Past President Robert R. Gros, and Charles Collier. The theme of the convention will be carried out during the entire three days, with famous speakers now on the list to receive invitations to discuss such challenging subjects as "New Frontiers for Western Business," "New Frontiers for Advertising," "New Creative Frontiers in Advertising." Authoritative talks will be given on new concepts and art treatment in television commercials; advertising copy, advertising arts, and research.

Similarly fresh will be the approach to advertising club program discussions, as well as those pertaining to programs of the Advertising Association of the West.

And in addition to these serious minded frontiers, will be new frontiers in diversion. Oregon's wonderland is being explored again so that the very finest in entertainment tours will be offered. Visiting wives will be graciously received and entertained. Chairmanning this feature will be Reata Howard Trombly and Grace Phipps, former vice-presidents-at-large and presidents of Portland Advertising Women. Giving counsel and advice on the program building are present officers of the Association, Carroll O'Rourke, treasurer; Harry McLain, district vice-president; Neva Elliott, associate vice-president; Arthur House, past president, still on the AAW Board and representing our liaison committee with AFA; and other past presidents Vernon Churchill, Walter May and Marshall Dana.

A strong committee representing top advertising in Portland will carry out the plans. A Junior Committee, with cooperation of the Seattle Junior Advertising Club will make full provision for the Juniors.

Hollywood Mid-Winter Conference Largest Yet

On January 28-31 Hollywood was the scene of the largest and in many respects the finest Mid-Winter Conference this Association ever had. Those who came strictly for business, really had it, for all day Saturday, January 29, was business, with many important reports.

High in importance among the many actions taken was unanimous approval of a special resolution presented by Past President Robert R. Gros urging our government and the advertising industry to join hands in meeting effectively communist propaganda discrediting America and the American way of life.

Committee and Board meetings and a final general assembly were on Sunday. The Hollywood Advertising Club, headed by Robert Coleson, hosted the affair. Frank Crane was general chairman. Plans started with a Friday afternoon at Santa Anita, and included a cocktail party compliments of the Hollywood advertising fraternity, a dinner dance, a luau, visits to NBC, CBS and Mutual studios. Those who stayed over for Monday were treated to a preview of MGM's "Hit the Deck."

President Clair G. Henderson, of Denver, assisted by Senior Vice-President John Kemp, Hollywood, and Audrey Calder, vice-president-at-large, Oakland, presided. Such subjects as the operations of advertising clubs, Advertising Recognition Week plans, and important projects of the Association, such as improvement of advertising content, advertising education, legislation, small business, and a prospective survey of consumer attitude toward advertising, gave all a fine picture of advertising at work in the West. The meeting was well attended by AAW officers and club representatives.

Senior Veep Kemp and President Henderson open Conference.

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VOICE OF A. A. W.
CHAS. W. COLLIER, *Executive Vice President*
MARIE CARLTON, *Office Manager*
Published quarterly by the Advertising Association of the West, 425 Bush Street, San Francisco, Calif. Subscription price, 50 cents per annum. Single copies, 10 cents. Entered as second-class matter August 20, 1942, at the Post Office, San Francisco, Calif., under Act of March 3, 1879.

Actions by Board and Members At Mid-Winter Conference

Passage of a Resolution to combat communist propaganda.

AAW and its Fifty-two Years, a saga of the West, has been completed by Chairman E. J. Murphy, a past president of the Association. A publication committee to consider ways and means of making this story available to all is headed by Herbert Kirschner as chairman, and includes K. L. Hamman, Elliot Epsteen, Howard Willoughby and Leland Phillips.

Club Competitions. All AAW Club Contests will be continued as usual, except that the Arthur E. House Sweepstakes Award will be decided not only on the place awards in each of the five classifications but also on the overall excellence of the entries.

Improvement of Advertising Content. A plan for a contest to be publicized within AAW and directed by the Improvement of Advertising Content Committee will be announced. The general membership will be urged to submit its ideas of the best and most practical code of practices to reflect the ideals of those practicing advertising.

Membership Card. The Association approved a general membership card to be made available to Advertising Clubs, either to serve as their own club membership cards, or to be used as an additional card which each member of an Advertising Club may possess. Audrey Calder and Jim Morgan are in charge of development. Frank Crane is to present ideas for a plaque for Contributing Members.

Small Cities Groups. Smaller cities not wishing to maintain an Advertising Club may form chapters of the Advertising Association of the West, if they have ten or more members. Such groups will be furnished with materials by AAW and be kept informed of advertising developments.

Direct Mail Competition. A new direct mail competition sponsored by the Direct Mail Advertising Association, has been approved, with Robert Hemmings in charge.

Point of Purchase Contest has been approved. Details to be developed.

Farm Paper Contest has been approved and will be conducted this year.

AAW Financing, under direction of Treasurer Carroll O'Rourke. Advertising Club presidents will be asked to appoint chairmen in their communities.

Ayres' Three Minute Speaking Competition, subject selected "My Part in Advertising of the Future." Open to all advertising club members thirty years old, or under, with district elimination contests.

Spokane Junior Advertising Club has been admitted to the Association.

President's Competition for Juniors will be on the same basis as last year, with points for both over-all work and club project.

Resolution expressing appreciation to Benet Hanau and Arthur Strader for work in preparing "Mind Your Advertising Manners" was adopted.

Highlights of Conference Reports

Charles W. Collier expressed appreciation to all officers and committee and club members who have done so much to weld AAW into a strong unit for the advancement of business and advertising in the West. He reported approximately 5,600 members of advertising clubs, 300 contributing members, and affiliate memberships with the American Association of Advertising Agencies, Direct Mail Advertising Association, Gamma Alpha Chi, and Alpha Delta Sigma. After telling of the services of clubs and committees, he urged organized advertising and AAW to speak out boldly for better practices, better ethics, better advertising education; otherwise we may be judged by the bad apple in the barrel.

Buzz Capener, chairman Junior Executive Committee, reported on Junior activities throughout the area, urging help from the seniors in advertising education. He said they need the experience of seniors and support of all groups. If seniors could help pay the fees and dues of junior members, they will derive more benefits directly and indirectly. "Give more responsibility to the Juniors; they are working for the industry and for the clubs."

Professor Arthur Kroeger, of Stanford, expressed the appreciation of educators for the interest of AAW. Said that letter had been sent to sixty-eight colleges in the Western states asking if they were interested in more help from practical advertising men in the field, such as speakers for classes, help in organizing classes, and assistance to young men and women who wish to go into advertising. He urged that when a speaker appears before a college group they not spend too much time selling and defending advertising, but should discuss the fields of advertising in which they function. He suggested that advertising make a very careful study before recommending courses for colleges, and should also consider the problems of the colleges. Prof. Kroeger commended the clubs throughout the area for worthwhile work with the schools at different levels.

Neva Elliott, Portland, chairman of the Legislative Committee, called attention to bills being introduced in Washington, California, Oregon and Utah. "Somewhere along the line the advertising profession," said she, "has forgotten how to make love to the public. The public becomes disenchanted with advertising and it is then when legislation is proposed. Why can't this group do more about avoiding legislation by improving itself?"

Robert R. Bauer, Los Angeles, chairman Advertising Improvement, stated that the committee formed two years ago recommended certain standards for consideration and adoption by the Association. These standards were presented but never adopted. He announced that the new committee consisting of representatives of practically every advertising association, had received reports on the large amount of work being done by these groups individually.

Mr. Gros emphasized the great need for increased funds to counteract the impact made on world opinion by Soviet propaganda. We in advertising, he said, should not become so involved with selling goods or services that we fail also to take an interest in and responsibility for the continuation of the American way of life. His Committee recommended that AAW go on record first, as endorsing the objective of the U. S. Information Agency program and, second, that we both offer and urge greater use of advertising experts and the tools and techniques of advertising to implement that program of telling the American story abroad.

Market Study, Warwick Carpenter, chairman, outlined what has been done to date in investigating possibilities of an authoritative consumer attitude study. He said that he is corresponding with the American Association of Advertising Agencies and the Association of National Advertisers and other groups, and he believes that such a survey will eventually be made. Such a survey, he thought, should be qualitative rather than quantitative, and based on depth interviews, designed for maximum use with the congressmen and state legislators.

Ad Recognition Week Hits New High

In its sixth year, with the U. S. Chamber of Commerce and the Advertising Federation of America cooperating with the Advertising Association of the West, millions of people across America were made aware of how advertising benefits everyone. Each organization had its own program, and yet all coordinated their efforts. The week opened with a national telecast over four networks, with John Nance, president of Studebaker-Packard, as the speaker.

In the Advertising Association of the West area, forty advertising clubs had large committees working on programs. Some communities had as many as forty speakers appear before other organizations. Seniors and Juniors alike took on assignments. Over 500 newspaper mats of ads prepared by task force Young & Rubicam, Los Angeles, were used. Many also used extensive editorial and news space. Five hundred radio stations used recordings and script. Ten thousand car cards were shown, and more than 40 painted bulletins were used throughout the area at strategic spots. Many will remain for long periods. Twenty business magazines used full page advertisements; fourteen farm papers carried ads and editorials; thousands of direct mail leaflets were distributed. Governors of eleven Western States and British Columbia proclaimed the week, as did many mayors and business organizations. John Kemp was general chairman; Eric Lifner was account executive for Young & Rubicam; Burroughs, Inc., Los Angeles, mailed much of the material. All materials, labor and creative thought were contributed.

(1) Governor Knight proclaims Advertising Recognition Week. (Left to right) John Kemp, Eric Lifner, Martha Jeffres, TV actor Ronald Reagan. (2) AAW Past Presidents still serving: K. L. Hamman (1929), chairman, Finance Committee; E. J. Murphy (1936), chair (3) AAW officials see NBC color Television c Henderson, Frank Crane, Bob Coleson. (4)

Club and Craft Contests Announced

Ed Niederkorn, of Portland, will chairman the Club Contests for the Portland Convention. All judging will be done in Portland in advance of the convention. Dick Ryan, of San Jose, is vice-chairman.

The contests include Membership Gain, Attendance, Programs, Advancement of Business & Advertising Activities, Public Interest Committee, Publicity Book. These will be in five divisions based upon size of club. Entries must be received in Portland by June 11.

Other special contests will be held, including the Arthur E. House sweepstakes trophy; the President's trophy for Juniors; Herbert H. Kirschner trophy for the best promotion of Advertising Recognition Week; the Advertising Council trophy for best Public Service program; *Printers' Ink* trophy for best advertising education activity; the Double A award for Advertising Achievement, open to university and college men and women; and of course the Ayres' 3-Minute Speaking competition. The Ramsey Oppenheim award, to be given to the club president who has done the most for understanding of advertising in his community, will again be offered.

Craft Competitions. Entries in the 1955 annual AAW advertising craft competitions covering all media, winning exhibits of which will be displayed at the Portland convention, are now being solicited from AAW members, advertisers, agencies and others in the West. Material entered must have been prepared and used in the West between May 1, 1954 and April 30, 1955. Last year over 1,600 entries were received.

Newspaper Advertising, for general and retail advertising, sponsored by Pacific Coast Division, Bureau of Advertising, ANPA.

Magazine Advertising, sponsored by Magazine Advertising Bureau.

Outdoor Advertising, the Max Schmidt Memorial Award, sponsored by Schmidt Lithograph Co.

Transit Advertising, sponsored by Western Transit Advertising Association.

Radio Advertising, sponsored by Southern California Broadcasters Association, with the winner retaining for one year the Vancouver Advertising & Sales Association trophy.

Television Advertising, sponsored by the Hollywood Advertising Club.

New competitions will be Farm Paper Advertising, Direct Mail Advertising, and Point of Purchase Advertising.

Entry fees will apply in each of these competitions, and special announcements and entry blanks will be available.

Sweepstakes trophy for the entry considered best in all competitions is offered again by Western Advertising magazine.

AAW Resolution to Fight Red Propaganda

(Presented by Robert R. Gros and passed at Mid-Winter Conference)

This Association is soberly mindful of the immensity of the stakes in the continuing cold war competition with the ungodly and militant forces of world communism which threatens the very survival of the free world.

We are painfully aware of the viciously distorted version of our country being spread throughout the world by the ruthless and tellingly effective propaganda of the communists.

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Following passage of this resolution, AAW President Clair G. Henderson, Denver, named Robert R. Gros of San Francisco to serve as chairman of the Committee to implement the recommendations.

AAW Participates in Education Meeting

Activated by a meeting held in San Francisco last October and participated in by representatives of AAW, National Industrial Association, AAAA, Alpha Delta Sigma, and others, a meeting was held in New York City February 14 in which representatives of these and other organizations discussed steps that might be taken by all advertising organizations to coordinate their work with educational institutions teaching advertising courses.

Thor Smith, vice-president of *The American Weekly* and former secretary-treasurer of AAW, represented AAW. Suggestion was made to exchange educational material of each association at least every three months, and it was recommended that each organization extend invitations to all other interested organizations for attendance at meetings held on the subject of education. It was suggested also that each organization urge inter-organization coordination at the local level, between the chapters of various advertising and marketing associations.

Clair Henderson will represent AAW at the annual White House meeting with The Advertising Council officers, staff and members in Washington, D.C., March 22. President Eisenhower and top members of his cabinet and staff will discuss America's domestic and international situation and suggest how advertising may play a greater part.

"Mind Your Advertising Manners"—A Success

Following the initial printing of ten thousand copies of "Mind Your Advertising Manners" by the publishers, Reynard Press, Inc., nearly four thousand copies have been sold to date—many of these in the East and in foreign countries.

This book has been pronounced by the U. S. Chamber of Commerce and by others as among the finest on advertising they have seen. Among others this recent expression by a western banking official, E. M. Johnson of the Bank of America, Los Angeles headquarters, indicates the fine reception for this little book: "Congratulations to everyone concerned—you, AAW, Miss Benet Hanau and any others who had anything to do with 'Mind Your Advertising Manners.' I read this peachy dandy little book first for just the enjoyment and then for the additional enlightenment I could get. It is now a distinguished little member of our advertising book family."

The books are available in individual copies or in quantity lots, as follows: 1 copy, 75 cents; 3 copies, $2.00; 10 copies, $5.00; 100 copies, $35; 100 copies with your imprint on back, $50; 500 copies with your imprint on back, $170; 1,000 copies with your imprint on back, $300.

), chairman, History Committee. vision camera: John West, Clair . (4) Audrey Calder, veep-at-large; Earl Glade, Jr., secretary; Elliot Epsteen, AAW general counsel. (5) John Wills; Florence Gardner, executive director S. F. Ad Club; Robert R. Gros, Harrison Davis, Jim Frost. (6) Buzz Capener, Junior chairman, and Mrs. Capener. (7) Los Angeles Women's Club celebrating 40 years: Jacqueline Britton Johns, president, greets two past presidents, Agnes White Tizzard (1929-30) and Mary Sweeney (1941-42).

WITH THE ADVERTISING CLUBS

The Advertising Clubs of the West are going to town this year. It seems that each club is doing more and better jobs for themselves, their community and for advertising. Each seems to be a beehive of activity. Notes below indicate only a few of the ways in which they are serving. It was an inspiration to see nearly every club president and a number of officers attend the Mid-Winter Conference.

BOISE AD CLUB, under President John Greenlee, who attended the conference, really did a terrific job on Advertising Recognition Week. In cooperation with the Idaho Press Association, their efforts reached out through the State of Idaho. Attending also from Boise was AAW Secretary, Earl Glade, Jr.

ADVERTISING CLUB OF DENVER, under the presidency of Lee Fondren, is enjoying one of its best years. For Advertising Recognition Week, Governor Johnson of Colorado spoke to a combined meeting of the Club, Chamber of Commerce and others, on the subject "Advertising and Colorado." Lee and V.P. Bill Prescott were at Hollywood.

FRESNO ADVERTISING AND SALES CLUB is having an excellent year, meeting regularly, covering projects such as Advertising Recognition Week, and various meetings on craft subjects. M. E. Forslind was one of many club presidents at the Mid-Winter Conference.

HOLLYWOOD ADVERTISING CLUB, just over the hump of one of the biggest Mid-Winter Conferences and having recently completed their great "Y" Day, now settles down to its routine of heavy business. The "Hollywood Grape-Vine" issue which was used as the Conference program, was the largest issue the club ever had.

LONG BEACH ADVERTISING CLUB, President Fred Sykes, has produced a fine new club roster with pictures of all the club members, by-laws of the club, and much other useful information. Advertising paid the cost of this book. Long Beach had fine representation at Hollywood.

LOS ANGELES ADVERTISING WOMEN, Mrs. Jacqueline Britton Johns, president, is busy now with plans for the Frances Holmes Award, which will be held on May 1. This club is one of the most active in our Association. The LAAW handled registration at the Hollywood Conference.

ADVERTISING CLUB OF LOS ANGELES, president Glenn Carter, in addition to being actively engaged in his work of heading the large and busy Los Angeles Club, has been twice cited by Washington for his work on public service activities. The Club itself is enjoying successful programs and did great work on Advertising Recognition Week. Norman Watts, managing director of the club, has made himself a host of friends and is giving valuable service to advertising. Many officers and members were present at Hollywood.

LANE ADVERTISING & SALES CLUB of Eugene, Oregon, recently changed from an advertising to an advertising and sales club, in order to become a greater factor in the community. President Herb Michael attended the Mid-Winter Conference with his charming wife.

ADVERTISING CLUB OF OAKLAND, headed by Frank Hogan, is enjoying an excellent year with fine programs. Their meeting notices, discussed at the Mid-Winter Conference, are considered the most outstanding and original gotten out by any club.

OGDEN ADVERTISING CLUB has had a good year under President Joe Sullivan, but since he is now moving to Denver, a new president will be appointed. Chick Collier will meet with the club on March 2. This club has made itself famous in its community by conducting retailing clinics.

OREGON ADVERTISING CLUB, Portland. Roald Lund, president, is giving that leadership to the club which he promised and which will see fruition in what he and many others believe will be one of our greatest conventions.

ADVERTISING CLUB OF PASADENA has just lost its excellent president, Jim Emerson, who is now engaged in business in Brea. He is succeeded in office by Stewart Hayward. Many members of this club attended the Mid-Winter Conference.

PHOENIX ADVERTISING CLUB has been a perpetual winner of sweepstakes trophies. Jackson Hoagland, aggressive president, promises that Phoenix will be in there again and that if anyone beats them, they will know they have been in a competition. District V. P. George Christie, Jack Hoagland, Sally Hoagland, and four of the club directors attended the conference.

WOMEN'S ADVERTISING CLUB OF PORTLAND. President Ilene Rose and her husband journeyed to Hollywood for the Mid-Winter Conference, thoroughly enjoyed it and report great benefit from it. The club is busy on plans for the convention as well as their own projects, emphasizing always that Portland is the Rose City.

SACRAMENTO ADVERTISING & SALES CLUB. Bill Queale, president, and Dave Williamson attended the conference and were enthused and delighted with the whole affair. The club will host President Clair Henderson when he visits there on April 4 and 5.

SALT LAKE ADVERTISING CLUB is losing its president, Fred Barlow, who has just announced that he is moving to Denver to take over the Transit Advertising Lines there. He is being succeeded by newspaperman John Carver. Fred Barlow and John Carver attended the conference.

ADVERTISING CLUB OF SAN DIEGO. President Harry Green has established himself as one of the finest ad lib presiding officers of any club. He keeps everyone on their toes. He missed the Mid-Winter Conference, but Paula Sullivan, Muriel Tolle and a host of Juniors were present.

SAN FRANCISCO ADVERTISING CLUB finds President Tony Mattes giving it another great year. Week after week their programs are tops. They are planned many months ahead. Any speakers who have something to offer must contact the club early. Florence Gardner, executive director; Bob Gros, past president; Harry Borden, treasurer, and other club leaders were at Hollywood.

SAN JOSE ADVERTISING CLUB. Its new president, Henry Haggland, retailer, is putting real pep and fire into the club. Henry, Benet Hanau, Dist. V. P. Dick Ryan were at Hollywood.

ADVERTISING & MERCHANDISING CLUB OF SANTA BARBARA, with its excellent radio program of "Hats Off," is making a name for itself in the community and its work is being watched. The plan is to take some person in the community who has done something outstanding and to recognize that citizen both at the meeting and in a radio program conducted by Claire Walker. The club was well represented at the Conference.

ADVERTISING & SALES CLUB OF SEATTLE. While Trevor Evans, president, and chairman of Schools Committee for AAW, was unable to be present at the Conference, the club was well represented by Frank McCrillis, former president. The club is now engaged in its annual Advertising Competition, as well as planning for its Art Day.

AD & SALES ASSOCIATION OF SPOKANE. President Hal Bacon at Hollywood reported for District Veep Thor Myhre, also on the Spokane club in Ad Recognition Week last year, when they captured the Kirschner award. Clair Henderson will visit the club May 4. Art Madsen, education chairman, advises that President Eisenhower agreed to speak at the Whitworth commencement when the first advertising class graduates.

STOCKTON ADVERTISING CLUB. Probably no club was so well represented in proportion to its membership as Stockton at Hollywood. Delegation included Robert O'Brien, president, winner of the Ayres Award two years ago; Mrs. Billye Luedtke, treasurer, Marian Jacobs, Bill Golden and Mrs. Bob O'Brien. A night meeting is being planned in April for President Henderson's visit.

TACOMA ADV. & BUSINESS WOMEN. President Margaret Kulgren reports club doing very well with many projects. Members are looking forward to the Portland convention. They were sorry not to have been represented at the Mid-Winter Conference.

TUCSON ADVERTISING CLUB. President Mac Matheson, who chairmanned the Mid-Winter Conference last year, led a delegation to Hollywood, and talked on the Club Service program on how to get maximum attendance at meetings. Mrs. Matheson was one of the finalists in "Queen for a Day" program. Bessye Pittman, Associate V.P. from Tucson, and Ella Breazeale, Senior Advisor for Juniors, Dist. 7, also were in attendance.

ADV. & SALES BUREAU OF VANCOUVER. Frank Baker, who incidentally is considered one of the outstanding presiding officers of any advertising club, came to the Conference with Mrs. Baker from a vacation in Hawaii, and thoroughly enjoyed it from start to finish, as did others from Vancouver, including Harold Merilees and Allan Klenman.

ADVERTISING CLUB OF WHITTIER. We missed Joe Walsh and other members at Hollywood. Wish they could have been with us.

JUNIOR DIVISION

JUNIOR ADV. CLUB OF LOS ANGELES. President Jack Abrams and many other Juniors hosted the fine Junior Conference, considered by many to have been the best Junior Mid-Winter Conference in history.

SAN DIEGO JUNIORS stole the show with a host of Juniors up for the meeting, led by President Danny Hale, who was elected vice-chairman of the Junior Executive Committee. The Juniors have named Muriel Tolle as their choice for the San Diego Woman of the Year.

SAN FRANCISCO DEPARTMENTAL has selected its project for the President's Trophy, an advertising campaign for a hypothetical Seafood Advisory Board. The club was represented at Hollywood by Past Chairman Bill Simons and Dorothy Whelan.

SEATTLE ADV. CLUB JUNIORS were well represented at the Conference by their general chairman, Buzz Capener, formerly of Salt Lake City, who also reported for the Salt Lake Juniors.

SALT LAKE JUNIOR DEPARTMENTAL again took over promotion of Ad Recognition Week for this year and is doing a fine job.

VANCOUVER JUNIORS were unable to have representation at the Conference, but report is that they are meeting regularly and doing well.

UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA ADV. CLUB was represented at the Conference by Senior Advisor Ella Breazeale.

The new INTERCOLLEGIATE SALES & ADV. CLUB OF SPOKANE is headed by Robert Phillips. The club is made up of students at Gonzaga and Whitworth colleges.

HONOLULU FORMS ADVERTISING CLUB

Final organization of the Honolulu Advertising Club, started in meeting with Florence Gardner in 1954, has now taken form. Donald Woodrum, of Woodrum, Carney & Staff, Ltd., is president; Mark Pinkston, Honolulu *Star-Bulletin,* vice-president; Allan Clarke, Honolulu Gas Company, treasurer; and the following directors: F. Gordon Chadwick, Hawaiian Telephone Co.; Ralph Davison, KGBM-TV; Vance Fawcett, Vance Fawcett Associates; George Mansfield, KGU; William O. Paine, KGU; C. R. Pope, Jr., Holst & Cummings & Myers, Ltd.; Harry Chu, KAHU; Charles Nolan, Hawaiian Electric Co.; Bryan Renwick, Honolulu Chamber of Commerce; Robert Rice, Honolulu Rapid Transit, and Shigeo Soga, Hawaii *Times.*

President Clair Henderson met with officers of the club on his recent visit to Honolulu and we are advised that they will soon affiliate with AAW.

L.A.A.W. CELEBRATES BIRTHDAY

The Los Angeles Advertising Women recently celebrated forty years of service to the advertising field with a Past President's luncheon held at the Chapman Park Hotel in Los Angeles. More than sixty members and guests attended, with fifteen past presidents of L.A.A.W. as honor guests. Toasts were given by special guests Glenn Carter, president of the Los Angeles Advertising Club; Bob Coleson, president of Hollywood Advertising Club, and John Kemp, senior vice-president of Advertising Association of the West.

(1) Past Presidents of Advertising Club of Denver: (first row) Harold Martin, Morris Townsend, Lee Fondren (present president), Clifford Werner, Cecil Connor; (middle row) Harold Benson, Steve Russell, Numa James, Gene McKim, Ed Porter, James Holme; (back row) Clair Henderson, Joe Tracy, Galen Broyles, Ray Frey, Bruce McLeran, Grover Kinney. (2) Stockton group: Bob O'Brien, Mrs. O'Brien, Bill Golden, Marian Jacobs, Billye Luedtke, Bill Winter. (3) Members of Junior Division, San Diego Ad Club, touring Union Tribune Publishing Co.

McCANN-ERICKSON INC.
ADVERTISING

PUBLIC SERVICE BLDG. PORTLAND, 4 ORE.

April 13, 1955

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting Studios
New York City, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

A few days ago, an invitation to speak at the 1955 Convention of the Advertising Association of the West was extended to you by Mr. Charles W. Collier. As you know, the convention is to be held here in Portland, June 26-29. I have the privilege of serving as General Chairman of this convention, and my purpose in writing to you at this time, Mr. Murrow, is to second Mr. Collier's invitation and to express the hope of all of us here in Portland that our invitation will receive your favorable consideration.

Our convention is entitled "New Frontiers in Advertising". Through a carefully planned program and universally high caliber of speakers, we intend to present just exactly that --the new frontiers in many of the vital phases of this business. As you know, the title of your address will be "Advertising's Most Important New Frontiers". I am sure you will agree that this topic presents a genuine challenge and a real opportunity to deliver an important and meaningful message to an audience of 500 or more advertising executives from all parts of the West. In a real sense, the audience you will be reaching will be all Western business and advertising leaders.

Perhaps you, too, will find much worthwhile interest in the messages of the other speakers on our program. And, while we plan this to be primarily a "working" convention, Western hospitality is not to be pushed into the background, by any means. The Pacific Northwest has much to offer visitors at any time of the year -- we feel certain that our guests will find it particularly enjoyable at this time, and know you will enjoy the special entertainment features that are being planned. Our efforts are dedicated to presenting a convention for advertising people that is outstanding in every respect -- one that is both well worth attending and very enjoyable as well.

We hope you will give our proposal every consideration, that you will agree with us that this is indeed a most worthwhile speaking engagement and that you will honor us by appearing as a featured speaker on our program.

Many, many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

McCANN-ERICKSON, INC.

T. N. Tracy

T. N. Tracy
Pacific Northwest Manager

TNT:rww

Clarence K. Streit
The Ontario, 501
Washington 9, D. C.

Cla

August 28, 1960

Dear Ed:

Please forgive my delay in thanking you for your very generous and spontaneous offer to help the new edition of Union Now by discussing it on TV when it comes out.

That will help more than I can say or you imagine. I hope it will be ready by early October, and certainly will let you know. Meanwhile, my heartfelt thanks.

My delay in sending them is due to the work of meeting the book's deadline, dead-tired, plus our big story which has been pending in Congress since 1949 - and in the public since 1939 - and which got done Wednesday when the House approved the proposed Atlantic Convention 288 to 103. I enclose our release which brings out what an unprecedented approach to international problems this launches.

Now, all depends on getting big men to serve as delegates - such men as Truman, Stevenson, Gruenther, McCloy . . If they will serve, it will set the tone for the other countries, and great things may be done. (We would have no United States today if Washington had not agreed, despite the apathy and his own feeling that the people were "not ripe" for it, to attend the Philadelphia Federal Convention in 1787.) I see no Washington around just now, and the next best will be very hard to get - especially since the New York and Washington press has ignored every step in the present, and treated even this last decisive one as of no importance. If you can help bring this story to the public, you will be adding another great service to your record.

With warmest regards,

Hastily,

Clarence

Edward R. Mirrow
CBS NewYork City

(over)

P.S. I quite understand your difficulty about the introduction, with such short notice.

Vince Streit

August 9, 1960

Mr. Clarence K. Streit
International Movement for Atlantic Union
2700 Ontario Road N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

Dear Clarence:

It is with real regret that I must tell you I simply cannot find the hours in the day to write the foreword you suggest. This is indeed a sad business but I am sure you can find someone whose words will carry more weight.

I will try to do better than write a bad foreword which, under the circumstances, it would have to be. I will try to sell the new edition when it appears. I am now doing a twenty-five minute radio show at 12:05 E.S.T. on Sundays, and this gives me time to talk occasionally about something other than the news of the week or day. Please have your publisher send me an advance copy as soon as available and I will try to do a little selling.

As ever yours,

ERM:skh

INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT FOR ATLANTIC UNION
MOUVEMENT INTERNATIONAL POUR L'UNION ATLANTIQUE

Chairman: General Pierre Billotte (Paris). *Vice Chairman:* Lord Shawcross of Friston (London). *President:* Clarence K. Streit (Washington, D. C.). *Vice Presidents:* Frans van Cauwelaert (Antwerp); Senator Wishart McL. Robertson (Ottawa). *Secretary-Treasurer:* Ambassador Robert de Dampierre (Paris). *Secretary for North America:* Mrs. Chase S. Osborn (Washington, D. C.)

Other Members of the Board: Herbert Agar (London); Maurice Allais (Paris); P. F. Brundage (Washington, D. C.); Air Marshal Sir Lawrance Darvall (London); Augusto de Castro Sampaio Corte Real (Lisbon); Dr. Alexander Johannesson (Reykjavik); Alfred Max (Paris); Baron W. Michiels van Kessenich (Maastricht); Walden Moore (New York); Patrick Nicholson (Ottawa); Elmo Roper (New York); Melvin Ryder (Washington, D. C.); A. W. Schmidt (Pittsburgh); Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupé (Philadelphia); Maitre Lucile Tinayre-Grenaudier (Paris); Lord Tweedsmuir (London); H. A. van Nierop (New York); Dr. Rudolf Wagner (Munich)

European Headquarters:
39, BD. du CDT. CHARCOT, NEUILLY s/SEINE (PARIS)
Phone: MAIllot 10-10

North American Headquarters:
2700 ONTARIO RD. N.W., WASHINGTON 9, D. C.
Phone: ADams 4-2211 *Cables:* FEDUNION

August 7, 1960

Dear Ed:

I wonder if you could find time to do me the great favor of writing a brief introduction - 400 to 600 words - to a new edition of Union Now? We are getting it out by arrangement with Bantam Books because:

1. Congressional decision to call the proposed convention to explore Atlantic unification now awaits only House approval, which is expected to come soon after it reconvenes, since it cleared the Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously, and the Rules Committee nine to three, is approved by both Kennedy and Nixon. House approval means the Convention would be meeting through 1961.

2. The Nixon-Rockefeller agreement proposed "North Atlantic Confederation;" the Democratic platform called for a "broader partnership."

3. Transformation of NATO into a federal union is the No. 1 debate proposition which 10,000 high schools - 50,000 to 80,000 students - are debating this Fall.

4. The 1949 paperback Postwar edition of Union Now is out of print, only a couple of hundred of the cloth edition remain, students are clamoring for the book.

We are having Bantam print 20,000 copies, of which 10,000 have been bought by one of our supporters, F. Gilbert Lamb, who is present a copy to each of the debate squads. Incidentally, he is a frozen food packer in northeastern Oregon, near your old country.

Instead of revising the text I am following the policy I adopted in the Postwar edition - presenting the original abridged text, and adding about 25,000 words in new chapters at the end to focus the book on the presentsituation. The attached Foreword explains why.

I also attach the two introductions to the Postwar edition, one written in 1948 by Senator Kefauver, the other in 1939 by Oscar Jaszi. I plan to retain the latter but replace the former with one done in 1960.

What is needed, I think, is an introduction aimed primarily at encouraging those who read the book before to take a fresh look at it, and introducing it to the rest. I fear most people will assume that a book published in 1939 must be too dated now to read. Yet it seems to me its age is an advantage. No other proposal in the field, I believe, can be put to so searching a test as one can put Atlantic Union by reading this 1939 text in 1960, in the light of all that has happened since. This could be a new and interesting reading experience for many. Certainly now when problems are growing so

complex and confusing, we need such tests to gain perspective, help distinguish sound reasoning from false, and lessen the fearful cost of learning by trial and error.

How many proposals for securing peace and making the world safe for democracy you and I have seen reach the front pages, fade away or fall in disastrous failure . . . Through the 21 years since I left the Times you have been reporting all this daily, as I did the 10 years before in Geneva. In those 21 years a student at Harvard in 1939 has become now a candidate for President of the United States, many other college students of that year have reached other positions of leadership, or been buried far away. The children born in 1939 with Union Now are now bearing arms, voting, and those who were reading nursery tales when the last edition of it appeared in 1949 are now in high school - about to debate Atlantic federation.

Those in their 20s, 30s, 40s in 1939 on whom Union Now made some impact then are now parents or grandparents; their most vital problem is even more dangerous now than then - and meanwhile a whole new generation of readers has arisen . . one that has never known a world without guided missiles, jet planes, atomic bombs . . but does not yet know this proposal for governing in freedom and peace the international community our inventions have been building.

If you agree that they should read it now, and that their parents and grandparents should re-read it, no one could do more than yo, Ed, to get them to do this.

Knowing the problems of reporters, I don't ask you to endorse the book's proposal and philosophy - immensely as I would value that. All I seek in this introduction is help in getting the book a new or renewed hearing.

If you think it deserves this, please let me know if you can find time to write such an introduction before August 18. The book should go to press then to be in the hands of all the debaters by Oct. 1 - already a bit late in their season. I regret this allows so little time - I don't like to do such a rush job myself as I have to do on the new chapters. If, with a few more days time, you could crowd this in, let me know and I'll see what can be done.

I enclose a reprint of chapter 1 of Union Now, giving the essence of its proposal, and chapter 13, giving its philosophy. They may suffice to show how it reads today. If you don't have the book and want to examine it all, please ask Harpers to send you the cloth edition of the Postwar edition and charge it to me.

I also enclose our July-August Freedom & Union which will give more details about our situation, as regards Congress, high school debate, and the bokk - especially on the marked pages.

If enough interest is aroused in the new edition of the book, Bantam may put it in the newsstands, drug stores etc. A consummation devoutly to be wished! You can be sure I shall deeply appreciate your help, and understand perfectly if you can't give this last-hour aid. With warmest regards,

Sincerely,

Clarence

Clarence Streit

Edward R. Murrow
CBS
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

UNION NOW

A Proposal for an Atlantic Federal Union of the Free

POSTWAR EDITION
With Five New Chapters

By
Clarence K. Streit

For the Great Republic, For the Principle It Lives By and Keeps Alive, For Man's Vast Future. - Lincoln

HARPER & BROTHERS PUBLISHERS
New York

UNION NOW, POSTWAR EDITION
Copyright, 1940, 1949, by Clarence K. Streit
Printed in the United States of America
M-Z

Third Printing

To the Memory of Emma Kirshman, My Mother

And to all those for whom she spoke when with two sons away in the war she wrote:

> Surely some great good will come out of so much suffering... Our home is broken and empty, but I am not without hope. Some day you will return improved by this awful experience, for by experiences we grow bigger and get a deeper insight in life and its mysteries.

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Sphere by *Marthe Rajchman*

Foreword
to the Postwar Edition

Union Now first went into type ten years ago, in September, 1938, in a private edition of 300 copies. I printed it at my own expense for free distribution to influential leaders when I could find no publisher who would bring it out. The book was thereafter published by Harper & Brothers in New York on March 2, 1939, and a few days later by Jonathan Cape, Ltd., in London. In June of that year the Librairie de Médicis in Paris published a French translation, *Union ou Chaos*; in August, Natur och Kultur published a Swedish translation, *Union Nu*, in Stockholm. Nearly 300,000 copies of *Union Now* have been sold. Many readers in many countries soon banded together to achieve its aims. The headquarters of the organization it led to, Federal Union, Inc., are at 300 ~~Ninth Street~~ N. W., Washington 9, D. C.

After Hitler over-ran or cut off the democracies on the European Continent, *Union Now With Britain* was published in early 1941 as a provisional proposal to meet the existing emergency. Its title led many to jump to the mistaken conclusion that the basic Union Now proposal was limited to the English-speaking peoples. After the United States entered the war and the liberation of the continental democracies began, I returned to the original proposal, and the wartime edition of *Union Now* appeared in the fall of 1943. All the American editions of *Union Now*, unabridged, abridged and wartime, are now out of print.

To meet the demand for *Union Now* which has risen with the spectre of a third World War, this postwar edition became necessary. It raised the question: Should the original text be revised, or should it be left unchanged, and new chapters added at the end to bring it down to date, deal with the tremendous events since 1939 and with the great opportunity and danger the free now face? I have adopted the latter course. The years that have crowded by since this book first appeared provide a test of its wisdom and foresight which anyone can apply—but

only if the author refrains from changing the text in his own favor as hindsight may suggest, and puts his present comments and views in new chapters at the end.

With the exception of those additions, and the Introductions, for which I am indebted to Congressman Estes Kefauver and Dr. Oscar Jaszi, the text of this edition is printed from the plates of the "Shorter Version" of *Union Now* which the Book of the Month Club distributed in 1941. That version is a condensation about a third shorter than the original unabridged edition, and omits entirely two Annexes, those showing how national sovereignty wrecked the gold standard and the Locarno treaty.

I wish I had space to express my deep gratitude to all the tens of thousands who by their encouragement and support have converted this book's philosophy and proposal into a living, growing Federal Union movement. I must acknowledge my debt, however, to these few typical representatives of the many whom I cannot name but do not forget:

John Howard Ford, president of the Union Iron Works and chairman of the Board of Federal Union, Inc.; its secretary, Rev. A. Powell Davies; its treasurer, Brice Toole, a principal attorney of the U. S. Department of Justice; its New York City representative, P. F. Brundage, senior partner of Price, Waterhouse & Co.; its Pacific coast director, Edgar Bissantz, architect; its southern director, Edmund Orgill, president of the Southern Hardware Association; its representative in Britain, Herbert Agar, author of *A Time for Greatness* and founder of Freedom House; the other men and women who have served or serve on the Board or as branch officers; Don Dennis, its executive director and his predecessors; Justice Owen J. Roberts, formerly of the U. S. Supreme Court, and Russell W. Davenport, former managing editor of *Fortune*, who are contributing editors of Federal Union's magazine, *Freedom & Union*; Helen Hamer, its managing editor, and Howard Chapman, its art director. In all this I speak also for my wife, who has been from the beginning of this enterprise a helpmate indeed.

C. K. S.

Lake Inez, Montana
September 17, 1948

Two Introductions to the Postwar Edition

I. By a Recent Reader

I wish that every person interested in world peace would take the time to read this masterful work.

The first time I saw a copy of *Union Now*, I dismissed it as probably another wild dream of peace. Later I heard more about Clarence Streit and his background, his experience and his devotion to a noble cause, and so I recently decided to take another look at *Union Now*. I have now read this book twice. I find it contains the one idea and plan around which we can build a peaceful world for the generations to come.

All of us hoped that the United Nations would be the answer to the perplexing problem of peace. We know now that something more than the United Nations is required. That organization is performing a vital service, but it has the inherent weaknesses of all leagues, which are well pointed out in *Union Now*.

Free people—those who enjoy individual and constitutional liberties—do not make aggressive war. The greatest strength in the world is now divided among the governments that guarantee the most liberties and rights to the individual citizen. If only all these free people could stand together for the prevention of war as they do for the winning of a war! *Union Now* shows why they should do this, and how they could. Its detailed suggestions of how a Union of the Democracies could be constituted form a blue-print to guide the deliberations of world statesmen. Naturally such a federation faces many complicated problems. In *Union Now*—if you will only read it through—you will find that Mr. Streit tackles every major problem—currency, debts, trade, immigration, and so on—and gives a reasoned answer.

I reflected frequently in reading this book that World War II might have been prevented if the United States after the first World War had fostered and secured the acceptance by

other democracies of a plan similar to that of *Union Now*. We now have another chance. We should waste no time in making the most of it. A Convention to consider a Federal Constitution for a Union of Democracies would not conflict with the United Nations; such a Union would strengthen its efforts.

The truths and principles set forth in *Union Now* are fundamental—they will never grow old or dated. Time and experience add to this book's undeniable logic. I hope that enough people all over the world will become familiar with it, and will demand that their constituted governmental authorities put into effect this one workable plan for preventing further devastating conflicts.

Clarence Streit is a great American. He has faced many obstacles in securing consideration for *Union Now*, but with vision and determination he has persisted. Events have now proved the soundness of the idea. To be put into effect it awaits only the force of public opinion. That force, I hope, may soon be forthcoming.

ESTES KEFAUVER
U. S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE

Nov. 5, 1948

II. BY AN EARLY READER

Union Now is remarkable because it was born out of the kind of circumstances which produced the few great books of the world's political literature. Our matter-of-fact era commits a great mistake in believing that the really significant accomplishments of political literature are simply the result of long and dispassionate research, which the investigator carries on from sheer curiosity or—what is worse—from the exigencies of professorial competition. This is manifestly not enough. Those few works that constitute landmarks in our political history were creations of men who on the one hand were keenly suffering under the burdens of unsolved problems which threatened to crush their own lives and who on the other hand grasped those problems with the greatest sincerity and the most universal human outlook possible in their time.

And when these two conditions of creative activity are pres-

ent, works appear like the *Republic*, the *De Monarchia*, the *Defensor Pacis*, the *Prince*, the *Vindiciae*, the *Six Books of the Republic*, the *Two Treatises of Civil Government*, the *Spirit of the Laws*, the *Social Contract*, the *Wealth of Nations*, the *Essay on Liberty*, *Das Kapital*—to mention only the most portentous for the future. Accomplished scholarship, sophisticated terminology are not necessary attributes of these works. Many of them appeared to contemporary scholars as dilettante attacks against their professional monopoly.

I do not hesitate to class Mr. Streit's *Union Now* among these great works of human emancipation. One might say that it combines the acute, realistic analysis of a Hamilton with the exuberant vision of a Walt Whitman. As a matter of fact, his book is the new *Federalist*, a carefully and minutely elaborated plan for a federal union of democracies, which may serve as a stepping stone to broader and more universal union. In writing this book, he has practically written his own personal history, from the moment when the World War snatched him from his own home, through his experiences as war correspondent, and through his sad disillusionment with the League of Nations. [See Annex, "My Own Road to Union," p. 231; some prefer to begin the book by reading this first.] From that time he realized keenly that the present anarchy of the world, with all its disasters, was and *is* primarily not a problem of the states but a problem of the individual; that the League of Nations was doomed to failure because it was not a union of free men but a league of jealous and egotistic governments; that our present misfortunes were due not to narrow-minded and wicked statesmen but to a system which must necessarily and inevitably sacrifice the individual to the Moloch of state and national sovereignty.

And here appears the great eighteenth century animus of the book, by which it becames a successor to the spirit of the American and French Revolutions. It shows magnificently how a system in which the individual abandons his moral sovereignty will make of him a tool or slave of the state [Chaps. VI, IX]. It shows no less forcefully that a truly individualistic conception of society leads unavoidably to the highest amount of human cooperation, both inside and outside of the state, until it reaches the ultimate possibilities of the world-community [Chaps. VI, IX, XIII].

These are not *all* new ideas. On the contrary, there is noth-

ing in the author's argument which would not be understandable to the Stoics, the philosophers of Christian universality, the founders of international law, and the fighters for English, French and American democracy. But his new and creative vision is the sober and at the same time inspired elaboration of the remedy. He demonstrates that the task for the union of the democracies is *not* essentially different from the task which the United States has accomplished, and that this union would not only be a protection against war but the most spectacular step ever taken to solve our social problems while maintaining individual liberty and human dignity.

The great significance of the book seems to me to lie in the future, rather than in the immediate possibility for realizing this plan [in 1939], but it will show to all intelligent men of good will that any other peace proposal is only a palliative and not a remedy, and that there is no other alternative for the future than War or Union.

I venture to say that from no textbook or series of textbooks will you understand the essence of the political process and the dynamics of international relations so clearly as from the study of *Union Now*. At the same time, it makes you conscious participants in a supreme moral task. It will convince you that the future does not lie in the hands of the dictators or of the bankrupt democratic statesmen of Europe but rather in the determination of courageous individuals conscious of their own power. Or, as Mr. Streit puts it: "For man's freedom and vast future, man must depend on man. It is ours together or no one's, and it shall be ours."

OSCAR JASZI
PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
OBERLIN COLLEGE

P. S. I gave the preceding introduction first as a review of *Union Now* on April 13, 1939, at Oberlin College Chapel. The eventful years since then have confirmed, not changed my opinion of it then.—O. J., PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, OBERLIN COLLEGE, *August 16, 1948*.

UNION NOW—*Now*

The Essence of this Timely Plan for Safeguarding Life, Liberty and Jobs the American Way



The boy born in March, 1939, when UNION NOW appeared with its plan to prevent World War, is now old enough to fight in a third one. But today he can read "UNION NOW — now" . . . and so can you.

How the World Ranks "UNION NOW"

***N. Y. Herald-Tribune*—"With realism, faith, audacity and prudence . . . the postwar edition of *Union Now* comes with with earmarks of a classic. A book with life of its own, one of the very few in any generation that rise above the influences which gave them birth to shape and to direct the future."**

What they say about the book:

STATESMEN

The late Justice Owen J. Roberts: "Streit has added five admirable chapters [to the postwar edition] that show the unparalleled opportunity we now have. The whole book deserves to be read and reviewed afresh. It is a clarion call to act."

Jean Monnet, ("Mr. Europe"): "Ten years have passed since I first read *Union Now*. Ten years of suffering that could have been prevented. Today the same problem faces us anew. The danger is as great, if not greater. One thing gives reason to hope: 'Union' is now a rallying cry for millions."

Lord Altricham: "Very gallant and challenging, possessing a peculiar American quality of punch."

Senator Kefauver, in his introduction to the postwar edition: "I wish every person would read this masterful work. First I dismissed it as a dream. I took another look (in 1948). I have now read it twice. It contains the one plan around which we can build a peaceful world. *Union Now* will never grow old or dated."

The late Lord Lothian: "Streit has pointed unerringly to the fundamental cause of the return of militarism and war. In his courageous advocacy of the only true remedy he stands in the direct succession from Washington and the Fathers of the American Constitution, the writers of the *Federalist* and Abraham Lincoln. The time for men to consider it is now. The greatest thing in this great book is the title, *Union Now.*"

BOOK REVIEWERS

Minneapolis Tribune—"Streit's case was a formidable one when he first made it in 1939. It is even more formidable in this postwar edition which ought to be read by every citizen concerned for the survival of free institutions."

Akron (Ohio) Beacon-Journal—"Streit pours himself into controversial questions with a strength born from study, sincerity and human knowledge . . . his straight arrow points the way out . . . onto a sure-footed platform of freedom, union and happiness that can be built as broad and high as men wish."

Tulsa (Okla.) World—"Read it! Buy this provocative book, rent it, borrow it, or just plain take it, but get it and read it."

Memphis Commercial Appeal—"It was a Book-of-the-Month then (1941), and time, the ultimate test of a classic, has only enhanced its prospects of becoming the Book-of-the-Century."

Chicago Sun-Times—"I hesitate not at all in saying you will profit from *Union Now*. It's a big idea for $1. (Non-profit paper edition.) No one profits from its sale except the reader."

Boston Post—"Is a dream less practical than a nightmare?"

Houston Post—"No fuzzy thinking anywhere in this book . . . no vague idealism. . . . Any tenth grade child could understand its proposal and the true intellectual will find it provocative of more and better thought."

"Some day . . . something like what Mr. Streit suggests will have to come to pass, either now or after we and our children's children have waded anew through flowing rivers of blood." — The late James Truslow Adams in The New York Times, 1939.

COVER:
Photo by the late
Dr. Wallace Partch

UNION NOW —*now*

"History is catching up with UNION NOW," *Fortune* has said. See for yourself how Clarence Streit's book answers today's challenge in Chapter 1, given here, abridged, 18 years after Harper & Bros. first published it on March 2, 1939. It sums up the proposal for preventing war and depression by forming an Atlantic Federal Union which the book develops in detail.

NOW WHEN MAN'S FUTURE seems so vast, catastrophe threatens to cut us from it. The dangers with which depression, dictatorship, false recovery and war are hemming us in have become so grave and imminent that we no longer need concern ourselves with proving how grave and near they are. We need concern ourselves instead with the problem of escaping them and the cruel dilemma we face: Whether to risk peace or freedom? That is the problem with which this book is concerned. I believe there is a way through these dangers, and out of the dilemma, a way to do what we all want, to secure both peace and freedom securely, and be done with this nightmare. It promises not only escape, but life such as I, too, never hoped could be lived in my time.

It is not an easy way—who expects one?—and to many it will seem at first too hard to be practical. But this is because its difficulties and dangers are greatest at the start; other ways that seem easier and safer to begin with, grow increasingly hard and dangerous, and lead nowhere.

Since 1933 when I stumbled on this way I have been exploring it all I could and trying, in the writing of this book, to clear away the things hiding it. By all the tests of common sense and experience I find it to be our safest, surest way. It proves in fact to be nothing new but a forgotten way which our fathers opened up and tried out successfully long ago when they were hemmed in as we are now.

The way through is Union now of the democracies that the North Atlantic and a thousand other things already unite — Union of these few peoples in a great federal republic built on and for the thing they share most, their common democratic principle of government for the sake of individual freedom.

This Union would be designed (a) to provide effective common government in our democratic world in those fields where such common government will clearly serve man's freedom better than separate governments, (b) to maintain independent national governments in all other fields where such government will best serve man's freedom, and (c) to create by its constitution a nucleus world government capable of growing into universal world government peacefully and as rapidly as such growth will best serve man's freedom.

By (a) I mean the Union of the North Atlantic democracies in these five fields:

- a union government and citizenship
- a union defense force
- a union customs-free economy
- a union money
- a union postal and communications system.

By (b) I mean the Union government shall guarantee against all enemies, foreign and domestic, not only those rights of man that are common to all democracies, but every existing national or local right that is not clearly incompatible with effective union government in the five named fields. The Union would guarantee the right of each democracy in it to govern independently all its home affairs and practise democracy at home in its own tongue, according to its own customs and in its own way, whether by republic or kingdom, presidential, cabinet or other form of government, capitalist, socialist or other economic system.

By (c) I mean the founder democracies shall so constitute The Union as to encourage the nations outside it and the colonies inside it to seek to unite with it instead of against it. Admission to The Union and to all its tremendous advantages for the individual man and woman would from the outset be open equally to every democracy, now or to come, that guarantees its citizens The Union's minimum Bill of Rights.

The Great Republic would be organized with a view to its spreading peacefully round the earth as nations grow ripe for it. Its Constitution would aim clearly at achieving eventually by this peaceful, ripening, natural method the goal millions have dreamed of individually, but never sought to get by deliberately planning and patiently working together to achieve it.

This goal will seem so remote now as to discourage all but the strong from setting out for it, or even acknowledging that they stand for it. It is not now so remote, it does not now need men so strong as it did when Lincoln preserved the American Union "for the great republic, for the principle it lives by and keeps alive, for man's vast future." It will no longer be visionary once the Atlantic democracies unite. Their Union is not so remote, and their Union is all that concerns us here.

The American Way Through

One hundred and fifty years ago a few American democracies opened this Union way through. The dangers of depression, dictatorship and war, and the persuasiveness of clear thinking and courageous leadership, led them then to abandon the heresy into which they had fallen. That heresy converted the sovereignty of the state from a means to individual freedom into the supreme end itself, and produced the wretched

"League of Friendship" of the Articles of Confederation. Abandoning all this the democrats of America turned back to their Declaration of Independence—of the independence of Man from the State and of the dependence of free men on each other for their freedom, the Declaration:

"That all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever a new form of government becomes destructive of these ends it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."

Finding they had wrongly applied this philosophy to establish Thirteen "free and independent States" and organize them as the League of Friendship so that "each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence," they applied it next as "We the people of the United States" to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." To do this they invented and set up a new kind of interstate government. It has worked ever since as the other, league, type has never worked.

It has proved to be an "astonishing and unexampled success," as Lord Acton said, not only in America but wherever democracies have tried it regardless of conditions — among the Germans, French and Italians of Switzerland, the English and French of Canada, the Dutch and English of the Union of South Africa. It is the kind of interstate government that Lincoln, to distinguish it from the opposing type of government of, by and for states, called "government of the people, by the people, for the people." It is the way that I call Union.

To follow this way through now our Atlantic democracies—and first of all the American Union—have only to abandon in their turn the same heresy into which they have fallen, the heresy of absolute national sovereignty and its vain alternatives, neutrality, balance of power, alliance or League of Nations. **We the people of the Atlantic have only to cease sacrificing needlessly our individual freedom to the freedom of our nations,** be true to our democratic philosophy and establish that "more perfect Union" toward which all our existing unions explicitly or implicitly aim.

Can we hope to find a safer, surer, more successful way than this? What democrat among us does not hope that this Union will be made some day? What practical man believes it will ever be made by mere dreaming, or that the longer we delay starting to make it the sooner we shall have it? All it will take to make this Union—whether in a thousand years or now, whether long after castastrophe or just in time to prevent it—is agreement by a majority to do it. Union is one of those things which to do we need but agree to do, and which we can not possibly ever do except by agreeing to do it. **Why, then, can we not do it now in time for us to benefit by it and save millions of lives? Are we so much feebler than our fathers and our children that we can not do what our fathers did and what we expect our children to do?** Why can not we agree on Union now?

Are not liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable as in Webster's day? We can not be for liberty and against Union. We can not be both for and against liberty and Union now. We must choose.

Definitions

Democracy I would define more closely than the dictionary that defines it as "government by the people," (though I would not attempt needless precision and would indicate an ideal rather than an average). I would add with Lincoln, and I would stress that democracy is also government for the people and of the people—the people being composed of individuals all given equal weight, in principle.

Democracy to me is the way to individual freedom formed by men organizing themselves on the principle of the equality of man. That is, they organize government of themselves, in the sense that their laws operate on them individually as equals. They organize government by themselves, each having an equal vote in making law. They organize government for themselves, to secure equally the freedom, in the broadest sense of the term, of each of them.

By democracy I mean government of the totality by the majority for the sake equally of each minority of one, particularly as regards securing him such rights as freedom of speech, press and association. (If merely these three rights are really secured to all individuals they have the key, I believe, to all the other rights in all the other fields, political, juridical, economic, etc., that form part of individual freedom.)

Union to me is a democracy composed of democracies—an interstate government organized on the same basic principle, by the same basic method, and for the same basic purpose as the democracies in it, and with the powers of government divided between the union and the states the better to advance this common purpose, individual freedom.

Union and *league* I use as opposite terms. I divide all organization of interstate relations into two types, according to whether man or the state is the unit, and the equality of man or the equality of the state is "the principle it lives by and keeps alive." I restrict the term *union* to the former, and the term *league* to the latter. To make clearer this distinction and what I mean by unit, these three points may help:

First, a *league* is a government of governments: It governs each people in its territory as a unit through that unit's government. Its laws can be broken only by a people acting through its government, and enforced only by the league coercing that people as a unit, regardless of whether individuals in it opposed or favored the violation. A

These Led to Union Then

Now it is proposed to form a Government for men and not for Societies of men or States—*George Mason in the U.S. Constitutional Convention.*

I am convinced that this is the safest course for your liberty, your dignity and your happiness. . . . I frankly acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. . . . My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which will not disgrace the cause of truth—*Alexander Hamilton, opening* The Federalist.

(*These quotations head Chapter 1 in* Union Now—*Editors.*)

union is a government of the people: It governs each individual in its territory directly as a unit. Its laws apply equally to each individual instead of to each government or people, can be broken only by individuals, and can be enforced only by coercing individuals.

Second, a *league* is a government by governments: Its laws are made by the peoples in it acting each through its government as a unit of equal voting power regardless of the number of individuals in it. A *union* is a government by the people: Its laws are made by the individuals in it acting, each through his representatives, as a unit of equal voting power in choosing and changing them, each state's voting power in the union government being ordinarily in close proportion to its population. A union may allow in one house of its legislature (as in the American Senate) equal weight to the people of each state regardless of population. But it provides that such representatives shall not, as in a league, represent the state as a unit and be under the instructions of, and subject to, recall by its government, but shall represent instead the people of the state and be answerable to them.

Third, a *league* is a government for governments or states: It is made to secure the freedom of each of the states in it, taken as units equally. A *union* is a government for the people: It is made for the purpose of securing the freedom of each of the individuals in it taken as units equally. To secure the sovereignty of the state a league sacrifices the rights of men to justice (as in the first point) and to equal voting power (as in the second point), whereas a union sacrifices the sovereignty of the state to secure the rights of men: A *league* is made for the state, a *union* is made for man.

This may suffice to explain the sense in which the terms *democracy*, *union* and *league* are meant in this book.*

Fifteen Founder Democracies

In the North Atlantic or founder democracies I would include at least these Fifteen (or Ten): The American Union, the British Commonwealth (specifically the United Kingdom, the Federal Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Ireland), the French Republic, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Swiss Confederation, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland.

These few include the world's greatest, oldest, most homogeneous and closely linked democracies, the peoples most experienced and successful in solving the

problem at hand—the peaceful, reasonable establishment of effective interstate democratic world government. Language divides them into only five big groups and, for all practical political purposes, into only two, English and French. Their combined citizenry of nearly 300,000,000 is well balanced, half in Europe and half overseas. *None of these democracies has been at war with any of the others since more than 100 years.*

These few democracies suffice to provide the nucleus of world government with the financial, monetary, economic and political power necessary both to assure peace to its members peacefully from the outset by sheer overwhelming preponderance and invulnerability, and practically to end the monetary insecurity and economic warfare now ravaging the whole world. These few divide among them such wealth and power that the so-called world political, economic and monetary anarchy is at bottom nothing but their own anarchy—since they can end it by uniting to establish law and order among themselves.

Together these fifteen own almost half the earth, rule all its oceans, govern nearly half mankind. They do two-thirds of the world's trade, and most of this would be called their domestic trade once they united, for it is among themselves. They have more than 50 per cent control of nearly every essential material. They have more than 60 per cent of such war essentials as oil, copper, lead, steel, iron, coal, tin, cotton, wool, wood pulp, shipping tonnage. They have almost complete control of such keys as nickel, rubber and automobile production. They possess practically all the world's gold and banked wealth. Their existing armed strength is such that, once they united it, they could reduce their armaments and yet gain a two-power standard of security.

The Union's existing and potential power from the outset would be so gigantic, its bulk so vast, its vital centers so scattered, that all the autocracies even put together could not dream of defeating it. Once established the Union's superiority in power would be constantly increasing simply through the admission to it of outside nations. A number would no doubt be admitted immediately. By this process the absolutist powers would constantly become weaker and more isolated.

Power and Responsibility

Tremendous world power brings with it tremendous responsibility for the world. It is no use blaming today's chaos or tomorrow's catastrophe on Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin, the Japanese militarists. It is still less use to blame the Japanese, German, Italian and Russian peoples. It has never been in their combined power to establish law and order and peace in the world. They are not the source of the danger our whole species now faces, they are only its first victims. They are today where we dread to be tomorrow.

When the really powerful members of a community refuse to organize effective government in it, when each insists on remaining a law unto himself to the degree the democracies, and especially the United States, have done since the war, then anarchy is bound to result, and the first to feel the effects of the chaos are bound to be the weaker members of the community. When the pinch comes the last to be hired are the first to be laid off, and the firms working on the narrowest margin are the first to be driven to the wall or to desperate expedients. That makes the pinch worse for the more powerful and faces them with new dangers, with threats of violence. It is human for them to blame those they have unwittingly driven to desperation, but that does not change the source of the evil.

*All that has been said here about leagues applies with still greater force to alliances, such as NATO, for these, too, take the state as unit.—C.K.S.

So it has been in the world. The younger democracies have been the first to go. The first of the great powers driven to desperate and violent measures have been those with the smallest margin. There is no doubt that their methods have since made matters worse and that there is no hope in following their lead. Their autocratic governments are adding to the world's ills but they are not the real cause of them. They are instead an effect of the anarchy among the powerful democracies.

The dictators are right when they blame the democracies for the world's condition, but they are wrong when they blame it on democracy. The anarchy comes from the refusal of the democracies to renounce enough of their national sovereignty to let effective world law and order be set up. But their refusal to do this, their maintenance of the state for its own sake, their readiness to sacrifice the lives and liberties of the citizens rather than the independence of the state—this we know is not democracy. It is the core of absolutism. Democracy has been waning and autocracy waxing, the rights of men lessening and the rights of the state growing everywhere because the leading democracies have themselves led in practicing, *beyond* their frontiers, autocracy instead of democracy.

The rising power of autocracy increases the need for Union just as the spread of a contagious disease increases the need for quarantine and for organizing the healthy. But it is essential to remember that though the victims carry the disease they did not cause it, and that quarantine of the victims and organization of the healthy are aimed not against the victims but against the epidemic, the purpose being to end it both by restricting its spread and by curing its victims.

It is wrong, all wrong, to conceive of Union as aimed against the nations under autocracy. There is a world of difference between the motives behind Union and those behind either the present policy in each democracy of arming for itself or the proposals for alliance among the democracies. For such armament and such alliance are meant to maintain the one thing Union does attack in the one place Union does attack it—the autocratic principle of absolute national sovereignty in the democracies. Unlike armament and alliance policies, Union leads to no crusade against autocracy abroad, to no attempt to end war by war or make the world safe for democracy by conquering foreign dictatorship. Union is no religion for tearing out the mote from a brother's eye—and the eye, too—while guarding nothing so jealously, savagely, as the beam in one's own eye.



—American Swedish News Exchange

"Merely uniting the democracies in one free trade area would increase trade and prosperity and raise the standard of living."

Union calls on each democracy to remove itself the absolutism governing its relations with the other democracies, and to leave it to the people of each dictatorship to decide for themselves whether they will maintain or overthrow the absolutism governing them not only externally but internally. Union provides equally for the protection of the democracies against attack by foreign autocracy while it remains, and for the admission of each autocratic country into The Union once it becomes a democracy in the only possible way—by the will and effort of its own people.

To become thus equal sovereigns of the world, they would first have to prove, by overthrowing their autocrats and establishing democracies at home, that they believe in and hold supreme the equality and freedom of individual Man, regardless of the accident of birth.

The attraction membership in The Union would have for outsiders would be so powerful, and the possibility of conquering The Union would be so hopeless that, once The Union was formed, the problem the absolutist powers now present could be safely left to solve itself. As their citizens turned these governments into democracies and entered The Union, the arms burden on everyone would dwindle until it soon disappeared.

Thus, by the simple act of uniting on the basis of their own principle, the democracies could immediately attain practical security, and could proceed steadily to absolute security and disarmament.

They could also increase enormously their trade and prosperity, reduce unemployment, raise their standard of living while lowering its cost. The imagination even of the economic expert can not grasp all the saving and profit democrats would realize by merely uniting their democracies in one free trade area.

They need only establish one common money to solve most if not all of today's more insoluble monetary problems, and save their citizens the tremendous loss inherent not only in depreciation, uncertainty, danger of currency upset from foreign causes, but also in the ordinary day-to-day monetary exchange among the democracies.

Merely by the elimination of excessive government, needless bureaucracy, and unnecessary duplication which Union would automatically effect, the democracies could easily balance budgets while reducing taxation and debt. To an appalling degree taxes and government in the democracies today are devoted only to the maintenance of their separate sovereignties as regards citizenship, defense, trade, money and communications. To a still more appalling degree they are quite unnecessary and thwart instead of serve the purpose for which we established those governments and voted those taxes, namely, the maintenance of our own freedom and sovereignty as individual men and women.

By uniting, the democracies can serve this purpose also by greatly facilitating the distribution of goods, travel and the dissemination of knowledge and entertainment. With one move, the simple act of Union, the democrats can make half the earth equally the workshop and the playground of each of them.

Creation of The Union involves difficulties, of course, but **the difficulties**

are transitional, not permanent ones. All other proposals in this field, even if realizable, could solve only temporarily this or that problem in war, peace, armaments, monetary stabilization. These proposals would be as hard to achieve as Union, yet all together they could not do what the one act of Union would — permanently eliminate all these problems. *These are problems for which the present dogma of nationalism is to blame. We can not keep it and solve them.* We can not eliminate them until we first eliminate it.

Which Way Advances Freedom More?

This does not mean eliminating all national rights. It means eliminating them *only* where elimination *clearly* serves the individuals concerned, and *maintaining them in all other respects*— not simply where maintenance clearly serves the general individual interest but also in all doubtful cases. **The object of Union being to advance the freedom and individuality of the individual, it can include no thought of standardizing or regimenting him, nor admit the kind of centralizing that increases governmental power over him. These are evils of nationalism, and Union would end them. Union comes to put individuality back on the throne that nationality has usurped.**

Everywhere nationalism, in its zeal to make our nation, instead of ourselves, self-sufficing and independent, is centralizing government, giving it more and more power over the citizen's business and life, putting more and more of that power in one man's hands, freeing the government from its dependence on the citizen while making him more and more dependent on it—on the pretext of keeping him independent of other governments. Everywhere the national state has tended to become a super-state in its power to dispose of the citizen, his money, job, and life. Everywhere nationalism has been impoverishing the citizen with taxes, unemployment, depression; and it is poverty—the desert, not the jungle—that stunts variety, that standardizes. Everywhere nationalism is casting the citizen increasingly in war's uniform robot mold.

Union would let us live more individual lives. Its test for deciding whether in a given field government should remain national or become union is this: Which would *clearly* give the individual more freedom? Clearly the individual freedom of Americans or Frenchmen would gain nothing from making Union depend on the British converting the United Kingdom into a republic. Nor would the British be freer for making Union depend on the Americans and French changing to a monarchy. **There are many fields where it is clear that home rule remains necessary for individual freedom, where the maintenance of the existing variety among the democracies helps instead of harms the object of Union.**

It is clear too that a Union so secure from foreign aggression as this one would not need that homogeneity in population that the much weaker American Union feels obliged to seek. **Our Union could afford to encourage the existing diversity among its members as a powerful safeguard against the domestic dangers to individual freedom. Just as the citizen could count on The Union to protect his nation from either invasion or dictatorship rising from within, he could count on his nation's autonomy to protect him from a majority in The Union becoming locally oppressive. The existence of so many national autonomies in The Union would guarantee each of them freedom to experiment politically, economically, socially, and would save this Union from the danger of hysteria and stampede to which more homogeneous unions are exposed.**

Clearly, individual freedom requires us to maintain national autonomy in most things, but no less clearly it requires us to abolish that autonomy in a few things. There is no need to argue that you and I have nothing to lose and much to gain by becoming equal citizens in The Union while retaining our national citizenship. Clearly you and I would be freer had we this Great Republic's guarantee of our rights as men, its security against the armaments burden, military servitude, war. It is self-evident that you and I would live an easier and a richer life if through half the world we could do business with one money and postage, if through half the world we were free to buy in the cheapest market what we need to buy, and free to sell in the dearest market what we have to sell.

In five fields—citizenship, defense-trade, money, and communications—we are sacrificing now the individual freedom we could safely, easily have. On what democratic ground can we defend this great sacrifice? We make it simply to keep our democracies independent of each other. We can not say that we must maintain the state's autonomy in these few fields in order to maintain it in the many fields where it serves our freedom, for we know how to keep it in the latter without keeping it in the former. We have proved that in the American Union, the Swiss Union, and elsewhere.

What then can we say to justify our needless sacrifice of man to the state in these five fields, a sacrifice made only to maintain the nation for the nation's sake? *How can we who believe the state is made for man escape the charge that in these five fields we are following the autocratic principle that man is made for the state?* How can we plead not guilty of treason to democracy? Are we not betraying our principles, our interests, our freedom, ourselves and our children? We are betraying, too, our fathers. They overthrew the divine right of kings and founded our democracies not for the divine right of nations but for the rights of Man.

Clearly absolute national sovereignty has now brought us to the stage where this form of government has become destructive of the ends for which we form government, where democrats to remain democrats must use their right "to abolish it, and to institute new government."

The Alternatives to Union

Fantastic? Visionary? What are the alternatives? There are only these: Either the democracies must try to stand separately, or they must try to stand together on some other basis than Union; that is, they must organize themselves as a league or an alliance.

Suppose we try to organize as a league. That means seeking salvation from what Alexander Hamilton called "the political monster of an *imperium in imperio*." We adopt a method which has failed in the League of Nations,

which before that led the original thirteen American democracies to a similar failure, and failed the Swiss democracies, the Dutch democracies, and the democracies of ancient Greece. We adopt a method which has been tried time and again in history and has never worked, whether limited to few members or extended to many; a method which, we shall see, when we analyze it later, is thoroughly undemocratic, untrustworthy, unsound, unable either to make or to enforce its law in time.

Suppose we try to organize instead an alliance of the democracies. But an alliance is simply a looser, more primitive form of league, one that operates secretly through diplomatic tunnels rather than openly through regular assemblies. It is based on the same unit as a league —the state—and on the same principle —that the maintenance of the freedom of the state is the be-all and the end-all of political and economic policy. It is at most an association (instead of a government) of governments, by governments, for governments. It has all the faults of a league with most of them intensified and with some added.

The lack of machinery for reaching and executing international agreement in the economic, financial and monetary fields in time to be effective did much to cause the depression that led us through Manchuria and Hitler and Ethiopia to where we are today. What could be more fantastic than the hope that any conceivable alliance could provide this machinery, or that without this machinery we can long avoid depression and war?

The Worst Alternative

Only one thing could be more visionary and fantastic, and that is the third possible alternative to Union, the one that would seek salvation in rejecting every type of interstate organization and in pursuing a policy of pure nationalism,—the policy of isolationism, neutrality, of each trusting to his own armaments, military and economic.

The experience of the United States shows that even the most powerful nations can not get what they want by isolationism.

Hard times led to war dangers which the United States in 1935 sought to lessen by the neutrality variation of isolationism.

The United States has never armed in peace time as it has since it adopted this policy. And the end is not near. In proposing, Jan. 4, 1938, that Congress spend $990,000,000 on armaments, President Roosevelt referred "specifically to the possibility that, due to world conditions over which this nation has no control, I may find it necessary to request additional appropriations for national defense."

Clearly he did not expect this huge expenditure to remove the cause for it and put under control those "world conditions over which this nation has no control." Has the United States come nearer to controlling world conditions? It is now spending four times as much on its arms as it did in 1933, and its control over world conditions has meanwhile lessened.

Here is a policy enjoying the overwhelming support of the American people, most of all in its basic isolationist principle. It results in the national debt passing $38,000,000,000 while the national and world situations darken, and so it is proposed to add more billions to the debt—and the proposal is accompanied with a warning that the failure may continue. Is not such a policy fantastic? Is it not sane to propose instead that the democracies gain control of their common world by organizing effective government in it, by each bringing its part of the conditions now outside the control of the others under the common control of them all through Union?

Balance or Unbalance of Power?

There is no more sterile, illusory, fantastic, exploded and explosive peace policy than the balance of power. Look at it. Take it apart. What does it mean in common words? It means seeking to get stability by seeking to equalize the weight on both sides of the balance. One can conceive of reaching stability this way—but for how long and at the cost of what violent ups and downs before? And when the scales do hang in perfect balance it takes but a breath, only the wind that goes with a word spoken or shrieked in the Hitlerian manner, to end at once the stability, the peace that was achieved. Stability can never be more in danger, more at the mercy of the slightest mistake, accident or act of ill will than at the very moment when the ideal of the balance of power is finally achieved.

We do not and can not get peace by balance of power; we can and do get it by *unbalance* of power. We get it by putting so much weight surely on the side of law that the strongest lawbreaker can not possibly offset it and is bound to be overwhelmed. *We get lasting stability by having one side of the balance safely on the ground and the other side high in the air.*

Even the moment's stability which the balance of power may theoretically attain is a delusion since each side knows it can not last. Therefore neither can believe in it and the nearer they come to it the harder both must struggle to prevent it by adding more weight on their side so as to enjoy the lasting peace that unbalance of power secures—and the race is to the strongest.

The Test of Common Sense

The race is to the strongest, and the democracies to win need only scrap this balance of power and neutrality nonsense and directly seek peace in the unbalance of power that Union alone can quickly and securely give them.

The problem facing the democracies is simply one of uniting their existing power; but the problem before the autocracies is to get that much power, and more, to unite. The speed at which the autocracies have increased their power in recent years has blinded many to this basic difference, and to the fact that despite all their gains their power put together remains weak compared to the combined power of the 15 democracies.

Because Union is a fresh solution of the world problem it appears to be something new. The deeper one goes into it, however, the better one may see that there is in it nothing new, strange, untried, nothing utopian, mystic. The fact is that we democrats have already strayed away from the road of reason and realism into the desert of make-believe and mysticism. We strayed away seeking the mirage utopia of a world where each nation is itself a self-sufficing world, where each gains security and peace by fearing and preparing war, where law and order no longer require government but magically result from keeping each nation a law unto itself, *where the individual's freedom is saved by abandoning at the national frontier the principle that the state is made for man and adopting there the dogma that man is made for the nation.* It is proposed here that we have done with

these dangerous delusions, that we return to the road of reason and seek salvation by tested methods, by doing again what we know from experience we can do. I ask nothing better than that we stick to the common interests of us individual men and women and to the simpler teachings of common sense.

Common sense tells us that it is in our individual interest to make the world safe for our individual selves, and that we can not do this while we lack means of governing our world.

It tells us that the wealthier, the more advanced machinery, the more civilized a people is and the more liberties its citizens enjoy, the greater the stake they have in preventing depression, dictatorship, war. The more one has, the more one has to lose.

Common sense tells us that some of the causes of depression, dictatorship, war, lie inside the nation and that others lie outside it. It tells us that our existing political machinery has let us govern strongly the conditions of life within the nation but not outside it; and that all each people has done to overcome the dangers inside it has been blighted by its failure to reach the dangers outside it, or remains at the mercy of these ungoverned forces.

Common sense advises us to turn our attention now to finding means of governing the forces still beyond our control. It warns us that no matter how strong or perfect we each make our national government, it can never end those outside dangers, and that we individuals can not know how long we can wait to end those dangers before they end us.

Common sense reminds us Americans that we are part of the world and not a world apart, that the more we keep our lead in the development of machines the more important to us we make the rest of the world, that *we can not, without catastrophe, continue, through good times and bad, improving these machines while refusing to develop political machinery to govern the world we are thus creating.*

It tells us that the principles of this Union of the Free are the principles that America was born to champion, that Americans can not deny them and still remain Americans. For the loyalty of the American is not to soil or race. The oath he takes when he enters the service of the American Union, is altogether to the principles of Union, "to support and defend the Constitution." That Constitution is already universal in its scope. It allows for the admission to its Union of any state on earth. It never even mentions territory or language. It mentions race and color only to provide that freedom shall never on that account be denied to any man.

The American Example

Common sense may seem to say that the American example does not apply, that it was much easier for the Thirteen States to unite than it would be for the Fifteen Democracies today, that the possibility of their forming a Union is now too remote to justify practical men trying to solve the immediate problem this way. It may seem to say that one needs only consider current American public opinion to realize that, unlike 1787, Union now is a dream that can

not possibly be realized for many years. This seems convincing, but is it so?

American opinion has always been remarkable for seeing from afar danger to democracy and quickly adopting the common sense solution, however remote and radical and difficult and dangerous it seemed to be. What other people ever revolted at less oppression? Independence was so remote from American thought at the start of 1776 that it was not even proposed seriously until Jan. 10, when Paine came out for it. Yet his *Common Sense* then so swept the country that within six months the Declaration of Independence was adopted.

To understand how difficult and remote the Union of the Thirteen States really was when 1787 began, and how encouragingly the example they set applies to our democracies today, common sense suggests that we turn back and see the situation then as contemporaries saw it.

"If there is a country in the world where concord, according to common calculation, would be least expected, it is America," wrote Paine himself. "Made up as it is of people from different nations, accustomed to different languages, and more different in their modes of worship, it would appear that the union of such a people was impracticable."

Conditions among the American democracies of the League of Friendship were such that John Fiske wrote, "By 1786, under the universal depression and want of confidence, all trade had well-nigh stopped, and political quackery, with its cheap and dirty remedies, had full control of the field." Trade disputes threatened war among New York, Connecticut and New Jersey. Territorial disputes led to bloodshed and threat of war among New York, New Hampshire and Vermont, and between Connecticut and Pennsylvania.

War with Spain threatened to break the League of Friendship in two camps. The League could not coerce its members. Threats of withdrawal from it were common. Its Congress rarely had money in the treasury, could no longer borrow.

The total membership of Congress under the League of Friendship was ninety-one, but the average attendance in the six years preceding Union was only about twenty-five. Often Congress could not sit because no quorum came. Things reached the point where little Delaware, though it had the same voting power in Congress as the largest state and though it was not thirty miles from Philadelphia, where Congress met, decided it was no longer worth the expense to send a delegate.

The states issued worthless currency, misery was rife, and courts were broken up by armed mobs. When these troubles culminated early in 1787 with the attempt of Shay's rebels to capture the League arsenal in Massachusetts, so strong was state sovereignty and so feeble the League that Massachusetts would not allow League troops to enter its territory even to guard the League's own arsenal.

Everything seemed to justify the words of the contemporary liberal philosopher, Josiah Tucker, Dean of Gloucester:

"As to the future grandeur of America, and its being a rising empire under one head, whether republican or monarchical, it is one of the idlest and most visionary notions that ever was conceived even by writers of romance. The mutual antipathies and clashing interests of the Americans,

their differences of governments, habitudes, and manners, indicate that they will have no centre of union and no common interest. They never can be united into one compact empire under any species of government whatever; a disunited people till *the* end of time, suspicious and distrustful of each other, they will be divided and sub-divided into little commonwealths or principalities, according to natural boundaries, by great bays of the sea, and by vast rivers, lakes, and ridges of mountains."

The idea of turning from league to union was so remote in 1787 that it was not even seriously proposed until the end of May when the Federal Convention opened. And the opening of the Convention had to wait ten days in order to have even the bare majority of the Thirteen States needed for a quorum. The Convention itself had been called by Congress merely to reform the League—"for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation." It was not deflected away from patching and into building anew until the eve of its session—and then thanks only to George Washington's personal intervention. Even then the Union as we know it now was more than remote: It was unknown, it still had to be invented.

Yet, once the Convention decided to build anew, it completed this revolutionary political invention within 100 working days. Within two years—two years of close votes and vehement debate in which Hamilton, Madison and others, now called "men of vision," were derided as "visionary young men" even by Richard Henry Lee, the revolutionist who had moved the Declaration of Independence in 1776—within two years the anarchy - ridden, freedom - loving American democracies agreed to try out this invention on themselves. Twenty months after they read its text the American people established the Constitution that still governs them — but now governs four times as many democracies and forty times as many free men and women.

Is it really visionary to believe that the American people can still be trusted quickly to understand and act upon the common sense of Union?

Can it be hard-headed reason that holds it easier for the American democracies to invent and agree to try out Union in the infancy of self-government than it is for our more mature democracies to adopt it now?

It does seem practical to ask first how all the difficulties in changing from national sovereignty to Union are to be met. Yet the makers of the first Union were not delayed by such considerations. They abolished each State's rights to levy tariffs, issue money, make treaties, and keep an army, and they gave these rights to the Union without waiting for a plan to meet the difficulties of changing from protection to free trade, etc. They did not even bother trying to work out plans to meet all these difficulties of transition. And they were right in treating all this as secondary and leaving it to the Union itself so solve, for the lack of such plans neither prevented the swift adoption of the Union nor caused any serious difficulty thereafter.

Yet they lived in a time when New York was protecting its fuel interests by a tariff on Connecticut wood, and its farmers by duties on New Jersey butter, when Massachusetts closed while Connecticut opened its ports to British shipping, when Boston was boycotting Rhode Island grain and Philadelphia was refusing to accept New Jersey money, when the money of most of the States was depreciated and that of Rhode Island and Georgia was so worthless that their governments sought to coerce the citizens into accepting it. In those days New York was massing

troops on its Vermont frontier while the army of Pennsylvania was committing atrocities in the Wyoming valley against settlers from Connecticut.

Can it still be said that the difficulties of transition to Union were simpler then than now? That it was then more practical to risk establishing Union without a transition plan than to risk delaying Union until such a plan was worked out? That it is now more practical to delay Union at the risk of complete catastrophe than to adopt it at the risk of transition dangers and difficulties? Common sense answers, No.

Some factors, of course, made Union easier for the American democracies than for us; others made it harder. It can be urged that they were all contiguous states that had been colonies of the same country. Their peoples, though much more divided than we now assume, did have a common language, a predominantly British background and nationality, the same pioneering traditions and problems. It can be urged on the other hand that they lacked some tremendous advantages our fifteen democracies now enjoy. One of them is political experience, another is speed of communications.

They lived in the infancy of modern democracy, when it was a bold experiment to let men vote even with a property qualification. They had to invent federal union. We have behind us now 150 years of experience with democracy and federal union they lacked.

Although it does seem to me, on balance, that Union is easier now than then, I would grant that it is hard to strike this balance. But we can not have it both ways. **Those who say that I am wrong, that conditions were so much more favorable to Union of the American democracies then than they are for Union in our day, are also saying implicitly that conditions then were also much more favorable than now to all the alternative solutions — league, alliance, or isolationism. If a common language, a common mother country, a common continent and all the other things the American democracies had in common, made Union easier for them than us, they also made it easier for them to make a league succeed. If even they could not make a league work, then how in the name of common sense can we expect to do better with a league than they did? Even if Union is harder now than then, we know we can succeed with it.**

Common sense leads to this conclusion: If we the people of the American Union, the British Commonwealth, the French Republic, the Lowlands, Scandinavia and the Swiss Confederation can not unite, the world can not. *If we will not do this little for man's freedom and vast future, we can not hope that Europe will; catastrophe must come, and there is no one to blame but ourselves.* But the burden is ours because the power is ours, too. If we *will* Union we can achieve The Union, and the time we take to do it depends only on ourselves.



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★

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An Elmo Roper survey in 1953 showed that about 6,000,000 Americans believe in a union of democratic nations. It also reported that only 2 per cent of them belong to any organization working for this, and that 84 per cent confess they are doing or giving nothing whatever to achieve this, not even talking or writing letters about it to their friends. The millions who favor Union of the Free do not seem to realize how strong their common cause would be and how rapidly it would advance if they all worked together for it.

The Federal Union Organization

. . . originated when public-spirited readers of *Union Now* began joining together, immediately after its publication in 1939, to achieve its purpose. It was incorporated in 1940 as a non-profit membership association, "to promote education in the basic principles of federal union as exemplified in the Constitution of the U. S., with a view to attaining world order by a Federal Union of the Democratic Peoples." Anyone favoring such educational work is invited to join. Membership does *not* commit you to details, but makes your name count for the basic principles of individual freedom and federal union which this pamphlet sets forth, and helps provide the means to spread them.

The officers of Federal Union are: president, Clarence Streit; chairman of the board, Lester B. Vernon, manufacturer; vice-presidents, Melvin Ryder, publisher, and Nicholas Doman, attorney; secretary, Janice Holland, artist; treasurer, F. Joseph Donohue, attorney. **Dues and gifts to Federal Union are deductible from taxable income.**

Freedom & Union Magazine

. . . is published by Federal Union for the general public. Edited by Clarence Streit, it is indispensable to anyone who would follow progress in this field. On its 10th anniversary, in 1956, General Marshall, General Gruenther, General Norstad, Lord Ismay, Clare Boothe Luce, Arthur Krock, Erwin Canham, Senators Humphrey, Mundt, Neuberger, Alexander Smith and many other distinguished readers testified to the "stimulating" and "creative" character of this unique monthly, devoted to liberty, union, peace and the growth of the free Atlantic Community.

The Atlantic Union Committee

. . . was incorporated in 1949 to supplement the educational work of Federal Union with action in Congress, aimed particularly at passage of a resolution for a convention of delegates from NATO democracies to explore the possibility of their forming a Union. Its founder-president was the late Justice Owen J. Roberts. Its president is Elmo Roper; vice-president, W. L. Clayton, former Under Secretary of State; secretary, Lithgow Osborne, former ambassador to Norway; treasurer, John Q. Robinson, insurance executive; executive committee chairman, Gerald B. Henry, manufacturer. Its Council includes more than 600 nationally known leaders. To obtain free information about the organization or to join this association, write to its executive secretary, Justin Blackwelder, 1028 Connecticut Ave., Washington 6, D. C.

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OF FREEDOM AND UNION NOW

By

Clarence K. Streit

In response to popular demand, the publishers here offer an independent pamphlet edition of Chapter XIII from Clarence K. Streit's famous book, *Union Now*. This chapter sets forth the basic philosophy of the Union Now idea.

Harper & Brothers

UNION NOW

By

Clarence K. Streit

This is the book responsible for one of the most extraordinary developments of public interest in support of a political idea that has been seen in our generation. One outgrowth of the author's idea has been the formation in the U. S. A. of Federal Union, Inc., an organization which, in less than a year, spread through every state in this country. The Union Now idea has been featured in *Life, Collier's, Time, Fortune* and many others. It is being discussed from pulpits and lecture platforms, by radio, and in innumerable bulletins and pamphlets. According to the Gallup poll, it won 2,000,000 supporters in less than a year.

Clarence Streit proposes that the democracies unite to form a common government for their people—organized on the broad lines of the American Constitution. Such a union would have a common citizenship, defense force, customs, money and communications system. It would guarantee each democracy the right to govern its home affairs as it pleased.

The Union Now idea has been endorsed by prominent men and women everywhere. The book was selected by *Current History* as one of the ten best non-fiction books of 1939 by John Dewey, Henry Seidel Canby, Carl Van Doren, Amy Loveman, Burton Rascoe, Dorothy Thompson, and John W. Withers. *The Nation, The New Republic, Time Magazine,* and reviewers for daily newspapers throughout the country have included *Union Now* in their selections of outstanding books.

"I hold it to be the most important book for international democracy written in this generation."—*Dorothy Thompson.*

"You are dead right. Union is the only satisfactory, maybe, the only possible way out. . . . I for one am positively grateful to you. . . . Count on me to help you all I can."—*Wickham Steed, former editor, The Times, London.*

"Your book gives me more faith than I have ever had before in the possibility of realizing this ideal in a measurable time."—*Dr. Frank Aydelotte, Director, Institute for Advanced Study.*

"Ought to be read by every thinking person. Deserves the same kind of reception as that given to the Federalist."—*Manley Hudson, Judge, World Court.*

OF FREEDOM AND UNION NOW

By

Clarence K. Streit

One's-self I sing, a simple separate person,
Yet utter the word Democratic, the word En-Masse.

Of physiognomy from top to toe I sing,
Not Physiognomy alone nor brain alone is worthy
for the Muse,
I say the Form complete is worthier far,
The Female equally with the Male I sing.

Of Life immense in passion, pulse, and power,
Cheerful, for freest action form'd under the laws
divine,
The Modern Man I sing.

Whitman, opening Leaves of Grass, 1867

Out of the trouble and tragedy of this present time may emerge a moral and intellectual revival; a religious revival, of a simplicity and scope to draw together men of alien races . . . into one common and sustained way of living for the world's service. We cannot foretell the scope and power of such a revival; we cannot even produce evidence of its onset. The beginnings of such things are never conspicuous. Great movements of the racial soul come at first "like a thief in the night," and then suddenly are discovered to be powerful and world-wide. Religious emotion . . . may presently blow through life again like a great wind, bursting the doors and flinging open the shutters of the individual life, and making many things possible and easy that in these present days of exhaustion seem almost too difficult to desire.—H. G. Wells, *Outline of History.*

In the story told in these pages I can point to no time which appears so fraught with disaster to the human race as a whole as the present, the moment at which I am bringing this book to a close. . . . We have now reached a stage in the growth of civilization which cannot go further, and is doomed to go back, until we discover the means of passing from the national to the international state. . . . Human nature has made immeasurable strides since our Lord showed in His own person how divine it can be. But it cannot advance further till men learn to think of the scheme of human relations which He conceived as one to be brought from the realm of dreams to the earth in which they live, to be made incarnate in the flesh and blood of a living society. That is the world situation, as I see it, today.—Lionel Curtis, closing in 1936 his monumental "Attempt to Show How the Past [from ancient times on through] has Led to the Present Position in World Affairs," in his work, *"The Commonwealth of God."*

Of Freedom and Union Now

If you would be freer than all that has been before, come listen to me . . .

I swear I begin to see the meaning of these things . . .

I swear nothing is good to me now that ignores individuals,
The American compact is altogether with individuals,
The only government is that which makes minute of individuals,
The whole theory of the universe is directed unerringly to one single individual—namely to You . . .

I am for those that have never been master'd
For men and women whose tempers have never been master'd,
For those whom laws, theories, conventions, can never master.

I am for those who walk abreast with the whole earth,
Who inaugurate one to inaugurate all.

I will not be outfaced by irrational things,
I will penetrate what it is in them that is sarcastic upon me,
I will make cities and civilizations defer to me,
This is what I have learnt from America—it is the amount, and it I teach again.

—*Whitman,* By Blue Ontario's Shore.

Of Freedom

One can not repeat it too often: There is nothing so fertile in marvels as the art of being free.—*De Tocqueville.*

We have too petty a notion of freedom. We are bound to, since freedom is so great and growing. And yet our understanding of it need not be so petty.

We talk as if freedom of trade were simply a problem for the legislator and economist, a matter of freeing trade from this or that tariff or other legal or theoretical barrier. We talk as if neither the steamship that freed man from the accident of wind and the accident of calm, nor the express train that freed the producers of perishable foods from the tyranny of time and northern tables from the monotony of winter, had done anything to free trade. We forget the air-driven drill and the dynamite that enables us, when a mountain bars our road, to take a short cut through it. We forget a host of things that free us from the limitations of tongue and ear and eye, and let seller and buyer find each other swiftly anywhere on earth. Yet trade can lose its statutory freedom and be encumbered by politicians and economic experts with all sorts of man-made barriers, and still grow greater because other men have been freeing it from more stifling natural barriers.

As it is with trade, so it is with everything. The story of the freedom of man, of the freeing of man by man, is the whole story of man. It is the story of the invention of language, of the freeing of man's tongue to tell his thoughts to his neighbor and of the freeing of his ear to understand his neighbor's thoughts, of the freeing of his thoughts from space and time and the tricks of memory and death by the invention of writing. It is the story of the freeing of his tongue, ear, eye, mind by the invention of grammar, and still more by the invention of paper, and still more by the invention of printing, and still more by the discovery of America and of electricity and rubber, and by such political inventions as the freedom of the press and democracy and Union and such mechanical inventions as the steam engine and the locomotive and the high speed newspaper press, and the telegraph, photograph, phonograph, and the tele-

phone, airplane, moving picture, wireless, talking picture and television.

This is not even a meagre outline of the freeing of man (insofar as he is free) in respect of his mind and thoughts and tongue and ear and eye. There is no word in this about the freeing of the eye to peer into the worlds of microbes and of stars, nor the freeing of the ear to the harmonies of music, nor the freeing of the mind from error thanks to logic and from terror thanks to the accumulated experience of generations, nor the freeing of the mind to think honestly about anything regardless of the taboos of society or the self-interest of the body. And when we have outlined this vast field we have only begun.

We have still to tell of the freeing of the power in the arm of man from the time he extended it with a club or rock on through to where he extends it with a bullet or electric button, the freeing of his lungs until he can cross the ocean in a submarine, the freeing of his skin from cold and heat, of his stomach from famine, of his body and mind from disease,—and when we have told all this our tale of the freeing of man by man remains a fragment. It is a tale that can never be told. This is not only because of its vast range and the intricate inter-relation of every detail to the others and to the whole. It can never be told because in the telling it is growing; somewhere, wittingly, unwittingly, some of the two billion of men and women are at work freeing man, adding to a glorious tale new glories that men will not be free enough to recognize or use, perhaps, for a hundred years to come.

It is a myriad-sided, never-ending task and tale and joy, the freeing of man by man; and it is the myriad-sided, never-ending variety among individual men and women, the rich resources given mankind by the fact that no two individuals are precisely the same, that each forms a distinct combination of character, talent, knowledge, skill, tastes, curiosity, heredity, environment and physical, moral and mental strength,—it is this that allows the task to be advanced and the tale to be faintly imagined and the joy enjoyed. It is because the democratic principle of the equality and rights of man allows mankind to free all this power it has in men, and to let men enjoy themselves freeing mankind still more, that it is the most fertile and powerful political,

economic, social, and philosophical principle that men have ever discovered.

The power in this principle lies in its guarantee by society to the individual of the right to do freely that which most interests him, and its guarantee to all other men of their right to judge freely his work.

Government of gasoline and electricity by the people does not consist in every man being able to build an automobile or dynamo, any more than the government of microbes by men consists in every one of us having a thorough medical and scientific knowledge. Hardly more does government of the people by the people consist in every man interesting himself deeply in political problems and trying to work them out himself.

We govern the power in gasoline, first, by insuring any man who is interested in the problem of governing that power the freedom to tackle it as hard as he pleases, and, secondly, by remaining free to pass judgment broadly on his solutions.

One of these engineer-minded men has it clear in his mind that gasoline can be so governed as to run a wagon, but he can not make it clear to the rest of us who are not so engineer-minded. And so to make it clear he makes us the first automobile. When we see it running we then see clearly that he was right. But it still is not at all clear to most of us that his automobile is safer than a horse, or cheaper, simpler, better. The more engineer-minded men, however, see that all this is true, too; in a widening circle they become interested in the problem of man governing gasoline. They fight out among themselves the technical questions, and when and as long as they all agree, we readily follow them. No buyer demands solid tires on a pleasure car, now when all engineers favor pneumatic ones.

But when these men of technical sense disagree they come to us, the men of common sense, and ask us, not to solve their problems, but to pass judgment on their different solutions. And through purchase we accord our highest prize in the long run to the engineer who has solved the problem most clearly—for that means he has solved it in a way that those of us who are least mechanically endowed can understand is the best solution.

The government of gasoline by man began with a contraption so simple in its structure that one could see or hear its every

organ, but so complicated in its operation that even the genius who contrived it could never be sure of getting home without a horse. Then by the democratic process of freedom mankind developed a machine so amazing that it makes the gasoline not only drive it far faster than a mile a minute but light its way at night, herald its arrival, and stop it shortly,—a machine so complicated structurally that no one genius could ever have developed it and so simple to run that a child can run it. Gasoline is being governed by the people when any man without engineering knowledge can make it take him where he wants to go with a touch of the finger, a touch of the foot, and a few simple rules.

The thing to note is that the human freedom that government of gasoline by the people brings is achieved, first, by freeing all engineer-minded men to tackle this problem, and second, by keeping the rest of mankind free to pass judgment on their work. This system discourages the engineer from turning to the best engineer as his supreme judge. It forces the best engineer to make himself so clear that a moron can see his solution is the best. It insures him that the greater his technical achievement is, the more he will gain the votes of the simplest laymen.

This is noteworthy because this system is the one through which government by the people for the people has been established, insofar as it is established, over everything they govern, whether it be gasoline, electricity, microbes, animals, music, fire, water, wind, earth or light. It is, too, the system whereby government of the people by the people for the people has been or is being established. This last is the most difficult and the most productive of man's problems in government. It means the government of the most powerful of the elements by the most marvelous and unaccountable among them, the government of man himself by man himself for man himself.

The way to solve this problem of self-government is to follow these free principles, while carefully avoiding an error, tricked out as truth, on which despotism, benevolent or malevolent, is based.

So well hidden is this trap that Plato himself fell victim to it. In his argument for government of all men by the wisest men, Plato seems to base his reasoning on the government of sheep by men. The statesman, he said, is the shepherd of the

human flock, and since it would be absurd to reason that the sheep should elect and direct the shepherd, the conclusion seems to follow that the democratic theory is absurd. And so Plato divided his ideal state into three specialized classes,—rulers, fighters and farmers. He thought out elaborate machinery to make sure that the human shepherds shall never be responsible to the human sheep but only to other shepherds,—that the philosophers need answer only to the philosophers. And so men less wise and generous defend the principle of government through dictatorship by a single autocrat, or by an hereditary despot, or by some single class of men, whether the propertied or the proletariat, the oldest families or the *giovinezza*, the chosen Aryans or the chosen Jews.

The error in all this is the same. There is a difference between the shepherd and the statesman, a fundamental difference. The shepherd is a man governing, for men, a different animal, the sheep. The statesman is a man governing, for men, these same men.

The fact that in all cases, except that of man himself, the government by man of whatever he seeks to govern, whether sheep or gasoline, is invariably marked by his refusal to obey the governed, does not make this refusal the *sine qua non* or cause of success; it makes it simply a worse trap for human reason. It is not this negative detail that the shepherd and engineer are not answerable to the sheep and gasoline that is essential, but the positive principle that the shepherds and engineers are answerable to other men,—in last analysis to all other men, and not simply to shepherds and sheep-owners, or to engineers and owners of oil wells. Under this principle the supreme judges of the specialists are not the best of specialized minds but the commonest of lay minds. It results that the specialists must bring the government of sheep and gasoline by men to that point of perfection where a child can govern them. Thus does this principle lead to success.

The way, then, to solve the great central problem of freedom,—that of government of the people by the people for the people,—is neither to depend on the bulk of men to work out the solution, nor to make those who are the best political engineers or philosophers, or statesmen or rulers, answerable only

to themselves, but to insure man, alone and in society, equally the rights of man. This means allowing any one who is politically-minded to devote himself freely to political problems, while allowing the rest of men,—the engineer-minded, farmer-minded, artistic-, financial-, economic-, business-, doctor-, research-, artisan-, manual-, and other-minded men, the right of passing judgment freely and frequently on his work.

These men do not want to think out their political problems for themselves any more than the man with a bent for governing men wants to work out for himself the problem of the automobile. The man who delights in making the soil grow two ears of corn where one grew before does not want to stop and fumble with the problem of how to distribute the extra ear, or of how to make his own body cease growing a cancer. The cry for leadership in politics is simply the demand by us all that our political inventors and explorers invent and discover for us as all our other inventors and explorers are doing—as each of us who is following his natural bent is doing. We are tired of seeing politicians blame our stupidity when we reject their truths, we want them to get down to their business of making their political truths so clear that a child can understand them.

They need not worry then about our verdict. They need only fear that we will vote so overwhelmingly for their truth as either to handicap by our gratitude their further search for truth, or to cause us to overreach their truth and fall again into error. When our vote is expressed by purchase we vote so readily for the man who makes his truth most clear in automobiles, or oil, or steel, or other things, that we load him now with a tremendous fortune liable to give him a diseased idea of his own importance, or dull his children's enterprise. Or we force him to leave the thing he can best do and try to solve a problem for which he may have no aptitude,—the problem of the distribution of wealth, of making the most of it to bring more freedom to himself and children and everyone by encouraging art, scholarship, medicine, industry, men. When the vote is by applause instead of purchase we give our Lindberghs so much applause that we deprive them of that freedom to live and act as simple folk which allowed them to do their greatest work.

When a Washington's firm grasp of truth liberates us our

gratitude is such that, to show our pious respect, we make it heresy to follow his example and meet the problems of our time so boldly as to rebel against the "thus far and no farther" of the past. When a Lincoln makes the equality and rights of man clearer, we are so grateful that we make a myth of a man who was proud of being common; we forget that in so doing we fall into the very fault from which he sought to save us—that of disprizing or dishonoring members of our own species. What Jesus rebuked the Jews for doing to Abraham, the Christians soon were doing to Jesus, and for the same reason, to show their gratitude.

We are so ready to admit any man's truth if it is only made clear enough, so grateful to those who make it clear and so cursed with an inferiority complex about our species, that great teachers and liberators who seek to bring men to a truer concept of the equal dignity and rights of man need to guard against our deifying them more or less, or otherwise emotionally clouding over their central truth,—that Man, as Paine said, is Man's "high and only title, and a higher cannot be given him."

There is no more effective way than this democratic way for each of us to free ourselves from the tyranny of poverty, and disease, and ignorance, and matter, and time. There is no simpler, safer, cheaper way. No elaborate machinery is required: This is simply a question of freeing men so that their nature can most naturally take its own course. Everyone wants to do what gives him joy, and everyone is doing best his share in society when he is doing that which gives him the most joy.

The profit motive? True, it exists, and it is a mistake to rail at it or try to remove it. Whether he measures it in money, power, or whatnot, man will seek profit, and he should, for it is the fuel that moves perhaps the greatest force on earth, individual enterprise. Profit is but the surplus difference between what one puts into a thing and what he gets out of it, and nothing living grows except by getting back all it expends and something more. It is not profit we need weed out but the three evils, too much profit, too little profit, and dead loss,—for each of these dulls or kills individual enterprise. Provide a condition of freedom and security for the individual to develop his natural talent, and let him profit enough materially from his work

to live fairly well, and usually he needs little or no further encouragement to bring us the best he has. When he is really bringing us his best, he is not working for money beyond what he needs to live comfortably and do his work.

The proof is that when he finds some way of further freeing us we cannot keep him silent with bribes or even with comforts. He will do without comfort, spend all his money, borrow all he can, slave through day and night, wear himself out, risk his life; he will do anything he needs to do simply to solve a problem he has freely set for himself and force us by our common sense to agree that he is right,—that we *can* free ourselves from malaria by killing a certain mosquito, that we *can* free ourselves from earth and fly. We do not need to encourage with millions in money men who are doing what they can do best; we can not contrive to discourage the men who are doing what they were made to do.

Every revolution, every great human crisis invariably shows that there is far more talent scattered through our species, and in the most unexpected places, than we imagine. There seems to be no limit to the power of individual enterprise, and there is no resource in which we are richer than individual men and women, and none we use less or waste so appallingly.

All manner of means for freeing men are to be found widespread among men. We had no way of divining that the man who would give us paper would be born in China, that an Arab would bring it to us, an Englishwoman would give us a Turk's idea of vaccinating against smallpox, an Italian would give us wireless, a German Jew would find the cure of syphilis with the help of a Japanese, and that negroes instead of white men would be the first slaves to establish an enduring republic of self-freed slaves. No one could have predicted that a Pole would be the writer who would bring the salt of the sea best in English to the English, or that a Dutch dry-goods merchant would be the man to make the lens that freed our eyes to discover the microscopic world. We can no more tell today what bargeman on what river will rise to steer our freedom through a dangerous conflict than our great-grandfathers could tell that a lanky Mississippi raftsman would be the man to save the first great union of the free.

We have no way of telling from what family, nation, race or class our future liberators will come, or from what farm, village, city, country, empire. We have no way of knowing that our cook will never change one day into a poet, our miller into a chemist, our farmer into a flier.

Yet there are some things we know, for they have been proved a million times. We know that men will not stay put, that great changes are continually happening in them, that the liberating genius of man is concentrated in no family or place but is scattered generously through the whole species. We know a ray of it was here yesterday, there today. We can divine only that it may be somewhere else tomorrow. We know that not even one beam of it is the monopoly of any man.

We know that our greatest liberators are those who make their liberating truth most clear to all of us. Their greatness is in proportion to the speed with which they can get us voluntarily to absorb and assimilate their truth as fully as they have themselves. The sooner they can free us from the need of their expert services, the more they allow us to build further on the top brick they have laid, until that top brick becomes indistinguishable from all the bricks above and below and around it.

We are beholden the least to those who seek to maintain themselves longest in a position of superiority to us and convert a truth they have found into a permanent source of tribute to themselves. Our true benefactors never seek to impose themselves or their children on us, never seek in any field, political or other, to be answerable to us only once for all time, or to alienate in the slightest those inalienable rights of man that allowed them to do themselves whatever they have done. The mark of the spurious liberator, of the autocrat in every field, is the desire to make oneself more indispensable to mankind. We know that our true liberator frees us more and more from dependence on him and seeks only to enable others to outstrip him,—he is a man of the great, proud line of Whitman:

> I am the teacher of athletes;
> He that by me spreads a wider breast than my own proves the width of my own;
> He most honors my style who learns under it to destroy the teacher.

We know all this, and in our hearts we know, too, that for each of us to gain the most freedom we must all keep all the doors to life forever freely open to every man and woman.

At the heart of our freedom, then, lies the democratic principle of the equality and rights of man, the freedom of the individual to follow his natural bent and to bring his findings to mankind for judgment, and to pass judgment on the findings of his fellows. And at the heart of the rights of man lies the freedom of speech and of the press. Do you still think that freedom of speech and of the press is concerned simply with politics and words? Read then this letter written by the School Board of Lancaster, Ohio, in 1826 and unearthed in 1920 by the *Cleveland Press*:

> You are welcome to use the schoolhouse to debate all proper questions in, but such things as railroads are impossibilities and rank infidelity. There is nothing in the Word of God about them. If God designed that His intelligent creatures should travel at the frightful speed of 15 miles an hour by steam, He would have clearly foretold it through His holy prophets. It is a device to lead immortal souls down to hell.

The glory of Elizabethan England to me is Peter Wentworth. He was the one who reminded the House of the rumors of what the Queen would do to those who opposed certain bills, and of her messages commanding Parliament not to consider certain measures, and who then spoke out: "I would to God, Mr. Speaker, that these two were buried in hell, I mean rumors and messages." For this the House itself sent him to the Tower. When he came back a year later he spoke again for the right to speak freely in at least the House of Speech, and again he was sent to the Tower.

The glory of Elizabethan England is likewise John Stubbs and his printer, and those who stood with them. John Stubbs wrote a pamphlet protesting against Elizabeth's proposed marriage with Alençon, and for this he and his printer were condemned to have their right hands cut off. The lawyers and judges who protested were put in the Tower, and the right hands of John Stubbs and his printer were cut off at the wrist by a knife driven through with a mallet. With his left hand John Stubbs

then waved his hat and cried, "God save the Queen!" And though her Star Chamber might a little while continue to assert the need of limiting "the excessive multitude of printers," her cruelty shocked and his fortitude encouraged the people, and their children rose up in one hundred years and made the first king subject to the first Bill of the Rights of Man.

And now their chilren's children and all of us may go freely to the National Portrait Gallery in London and find one small room on the top floor big enough not only for Elizabeth and the great men of her time (not Wentworth, not Stubbs), but also for Henry VIII and the greater of those whose heads he had cut off. But as we go on down chronologically through the rooms and centuries, and the crude absolutist method of men governing men by cutting off their heads and hands gradually gives way to men governing men by the free speech principles of the Wentworths, and by the free press principles of the Stubbses, and by the other rights of man they led to, the scene changes.

Where there were only a few portraits for each reign, and these, mainly of rulers, generals, priests, the number and the variety of portraits grows more and more, until on the ground floor we find the nineteenth century needing room after room to house the great of England. There the rulers, generals and priests become a minority amid the Shelleys and Jane Austens and Butlers, the Disraelis and Gladstones, the Benthams and Mills, the Stephensons and Faradays and Listers and Huxleys and Darwins.

Such is the great flowering of the genius of man that every people has enjoyed and is enjoying as they have enjoyed and are enjoying equally the rights of man.

In another gallery I looked at Leonardo's works after coming up through the centuries at the Italian Art Exposition in Paris in 1935, and it dawned on me that before his century the best eyes in Italy had been blind to the beauty in the play of light, blind to shadow. I walked back then through the centuries seeking shadow: Cimabue, Giotto, blind to shadow; Uccello discovering perspective but ignoring shadow; then here and there a painting with here and there a shadow,—the shell in Botticelli's *Birth of Venus* casting a shadow, but not Venus nor any of the figures nor the trees, no real perception of shadow there.

Shadow always everywhere, and everyone blind to it until somehow one man saw shadow clearly, and then everyone thereafter seeing shadow.

Why did we need so long to make the simple, invaluable wheel? Could man ever help but see the circular? Nature is all curves. It would seem that man must have made the wheel long before achieving that miracle of abstract reason, the brick. For men could not see so easily the square, cube, or straight line in Nature. These man created. Yet America knew the square before Columbus came, but not the wheel. Ages before mentioning the wheel, the Bible celebrates in the tale of Babel not only the confusion of tongues but the discovery of how to "make brick" and all it meant to men. To understand what a marvel the common brick is, one needs to read the Bible afresh: Since "this they begin to do . . . now nothing will be restrained from them" while "the people is one" and "have all one language,"—not even the achievement of the great ideal that mankind then at once magnificently set out for: The building of "a city and a tower whose top may reach unto heaven."

The wheel, despite all Nature's hints, also required a miracle of pure reason. To turn the first natural disk into the first wheel one had to see something that was there no more and no less than the straight line. Something invisible, abstract, yet so tangibly there that one needed only to put finger and thumb on it to make all men see—the axis, and wheels everywhere.

The marvelous thing about us is not simply that it took so many men for one to see the axis. It is perhaps even more marvelous that it took only one to see it and demonstrate it clearly for each of us to see it at once, and for all of us to keep it forever after. It is this marvelous power in our species that democracy harnesses through its equal interest in and equal freedom for every individual.

Underlying alike the brick and the wheel is a greater miracle—Man's creation of the straight line. How could it have taken us eras to see a truth so simple and precious as the straight line? How many simple things of truth, of beauty, of priceless value, lie today around us all, unseen, awaiting the marvel of sight by some one becoming sight by all?

Surely in such a world we can not fail to keep building on

the simple truth of which we have had such proof: That Man's vast future lies in the democratic philosophy that would give every one an equal chance, an equal freedom to tell us all whatever truth he alone has seen or believes that he has seen, an equal obligation to express his truth with that clarity and simplicity that makes us all see it and thereby proves it true, and an equal right to refuse to accept whatever one alone still doubts is true, an equal veto against whatever one alone believes is false.

Of Cain and Abel, Socrates, Jesus and Mohammed

To understand is what is hard. Once one understands, action is easy.—*Sun Yat Sen.*

We learn to understand the new by studying the old.—*Confucius.*

We shall now combine our individual power into one great power which is this confederacy and we shall therefore symbolize the union of these powers by each nation contributing one arrow, which we shall tie up together in a bundle which, when it is made and completely bound together, no one can bend or break . . . This bundle of arrows signifies that all the lords and all the warriors and all the women of the Confederacy have become united as one person.—*Laws of the Confederacy of the Five Nations, or Iroquois Indians.*

Man's freedom began with men uniting. Both love of kin and love of country have served our species as a means of freeing man by uniting men. Blood patriotism built the family into the nomad tribe and allowed man, through the taming of the horse, sheep and cow, to free himself from some of his natural limitations. As he freed himself from subjection to the accidents of the hunt, he settled down and land patriotism rose to free him and his beasts from Winter's hunger and cold and from the accidents to which the hunter and nomad herdsman are prey. It grew through blood barriers, brought tribes together, tied the nomads not only to the land but packed them together and built the City. It grew through centuries of warfare between nomad and husbandman, which (as I learned from George Cram Cook one day in the ruined temple of the Delphic oracle) are compressed in the tale of Cain and Abel.

Cain was the first man known to love his country. Before his

time there was no fatherland. There was only father. The nomad patriot abhorred the thought of being bound to the land where he happened to be born. He roamed the earth. Love of a common father and common aversion to the land held together the nomad tribe. Then came Cain.

Cain settled down. "Cain was a tiller of the ground." He brought to the Lord Judge the fruits of the soil as his offering. But Abel remained "a keeper of sheep," and "brought of the firstlings of his flock and of the fat thereof. And the Lord had respect unto Abel and to his offering: But unto Cain and to his offering he had not respect. And Cain was very wroth." Neither the Judge who in favoring the conservative had promised the innovator, "If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and . . . thou shalt rule over him," nor the tribal bond of blood could prevent the conflict. "Cain rose up against his brother, and slew him . . . and builded a city."

The city united more men in a closer compass than the flock or farm, and with it rose great empires, Nineveh, Babylon, spreading through mankind the fruits of the city's work in freeing man from his limitations. So it was that human wisdom grew strong and brave enough in Athens to take "Know thyself" for motto and to begin to think and talk in terms of individual freedom and universal union. It looked upon the slaves tilling the earth and revolted against the dogma that man's freedom must remain bound to the soil. It questioned the love of country on which the city's civilization was based, and asked, as did the philosophers whose horrified countrymen called them Cynics, dogs, "Why should I be proud of belonging to the soil of Attica with the worms and slugs?" And it realized primitively, as Plutarch said of Alexander, "the Cynic ideal on its political side by the foundation of universal empire."

"The Cynics," says Professor Barker, "were descended from Socrates; and the Cynics were cosmopolitans, who found their own reason and knowledge sufficient for their needs, and, craving no guidance or instruction from any city, took the world to be their home." With them, as he points out, "two new ideas are entering the world, both destined to a long history—the idea that all men are naturally equal, and the idea that they are all by nature brothers in a single human society."

Then came Jesus teaching men to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's,—to decide each in his own conscience which things are Caesar's and which things are God's, to decide each for himself what he owes to the gods of other men and what he owes to the god within himself.

> Jesus went unto the mount of Olives . . . saying, I am the light of the world: he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life.
>
> The Pharisees therefore said unto him, Thou bearest record of thyself; thy record is not true.
>
> Jesus answered . . . Though I bear record of myself, yet my record is true . . . And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.
>
> They answered him, We be Abraham's seed, and were never in bondage to any man: how sayest thou, Ye shall be made free?
>
> Jesus answered them, . . . I speak that which I have seen with my Father: and ye do that which ye have seen with your father.
>
> They answered . . . Abraham is our father.
>
> Jesus saith unto them, If ye were Abraham's children, ye would do the works of Abraham. But now ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth, which I have heard of God: this did not Abraham . . . Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day.
>
> Then said the Jews . . . Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou seen Abraham?
>
> Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was, I am.

Then came Mohammed to be hailed too as a liberator, and first by the slaves, and first of all by woman. He came into a society where a man inherited his mother as part of his father's property, wore sackcloth and ashes when a girl-child was born, and buried alive in the sand the sex that brought poverty-ridden men more mouths to feed. Mohammed stood out against that society "in the name of the Compassionate, the Merciful, the most Beneficent, who hath taught the use of the pen." He freed the girl-child from burial alive, and her mother from slavery, and through him tens of millions of women received economic rights that Christendom did not allow until modern times. He

freed not only man from the myth that he was made of earth but woman from the myth that she was made of man. Mohammed rationally taught, "He hath created the sexes, male and female, from the diffused germs of life," and he preached a single standard of morality for man and woman.

The truth that Jesus brought to make men free was so misunderstood that his followers soon converted one of the most liberating of doctrines into an authoritarian institution and a dogma that has kept many men and women from striving after and enjoying truer and freer lives by promising them paradise when they die if only they suffer till then the evils of this world. The freedom Mohammed brought was corrupted until Mohammedan came to connote the seclusion of woman, and Islam, which means "to make peace," came to connote Holy War.

Yet the teaching of Jesus with its appeal to the individual and to all mankind, instead of to the rulers of men, or to this or that tribe or nation of men, survived to do great service to human freedom. So, too, with the teachings of Mohammed: They led to the wisdom of many of the Cynic and other Greek philosophers being saved from the Christians, and to the printed Bible being made possible by the bringing of paper from China to the West, and to Voltaire pointing to the Turks, when he wrote his *Essay on Tolerance,* as an example for the world to follow.

Like the means of uniting men that preceded it the modern dogma of nationalism is but an idea of men, no more, no less. It is a combination of the patriotism of blood and the patriotism of land, of the ideas of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* as the lawyers who try to separate them say,—a confused and confusing mixture of our throwback to the nomad bound to his beasts and to the peasant bound to the soil.

It is historically a *parvenu.* It was not known in the time of Jesus nor during the long centuries when what a European believed about God mattered more than his blood or land. As for the Moslem world, until the Turkish Republic was established Islam asked the traveller for his religious belief rather than his nationality; it organized men politically in its empires by religions and not by nations. There was so little nationalist patriotism in the great century of discovery that scarce an im-

portant explorer sailed under the flag of his birth, and a Portuguese captain, Magellan, angry when refused an increase in pay in Portugal, went over to Charles V of Spain, and, to prove to him that the Spice Islands were not in the zone the Pope had given Portugal, set out on the voyage that proved the world is round.

Nationalism really began to flourish only in the nineteenth century when it did for freedom the great service of uniting the numerous petty states of Italy and Germany into two great peoples. It rose as a means of securing those wider and stronger political organizations which the steam engine and other inventions were making more and more necessary. It rose too as a democratic offshoot, as a lever for supplanting absolute royal sovereignty with popular sovereignty, and alien rule with home rule.

Nationalism reached its crest early in our century when the major nations were united to the point where further application of this principle was bound, because of the multiplicity of small nations in such states as Austria, Russia and Turkey, to begin dividing the world more into small compartments than integrating it on the greater scale that the gasoline engine and electrical and other inventions were making increasingly necessary. Since nationalism united men by making all-important, not Man's need of union, but things separating one group from others, it could not possibly unite into one state the groups it had united as nations, except by the imperialist methods to which the greater nations turned. Its stress on points of difference between nations, once this stress had brought most of their nationals together, could only keep mankind divided and make for greater misunderstandings, quarrels and wars.

Nationalism's main positive, constructive, integrating work being done, all the human force and sentiment and gratitude which its liberating work had gathered behind it could only pour into and operate the negative, destructive, disintegrating principles inherent in it from the start. And so we had the World War of Nations, for the place in the sun of big nations, for the rights of small nations to independence and self-determination, and, as the need of organizing the world to prevent a return of this nationalist inferno grew more imperious, for a league of nations.

This period of transition was marked, as all such periods must be, by both the forces involved, by the one ending and by the one beginning. The constructive, liberating side of nationalism in its death agony served human freedom by creating in the League and International Labor Organization and Court and Bank the first such world institutions to live, and by thus preparing the way for The Union of free men.

It served human freedom in other ways too. It replaced the remaining hereditary autocracies in the West—Russian, German, Austrian and Turkish—with more democratic governments. It restored to the human equality and dignity that all men crave such peoples as the Poles and Czechs, whose position became intolerably inferior once the theory of nationalism succeeded religion and dynasty as the basis of politics and the popular criterion of liberty. It gave new life to other peoples such as the Chinese and Turks and made them a better medium for their own westernization than imperialism could possibly have been.

But when all is said, it remains true that in our generation nationalism reached its logical limits, its constructive elements began to wane and its destructive ones to wax, until its spiral definitely turned downward. It is operating less and less to bring men together and more and more to keep men apart. It has turned against both society and the individual, it has changed masters and quit serving the freedom of man to serve the freedom of the state—as was shown so strikingly when 3,000,000 Sudetens were deprived of their individual freedom and delivered to autocracy in the name of democratic self-determination. Like everything that has outlived its usefulness nationalism has changed from a beneficent into a maleficent force.

The political theories which the tribesman and the countryman and the nationalist represent have the same motive and method. They seek to free men from the tyranny of accident by uniting them, and they try to unite men by subjecting them to the accident of how or where they happened to be born. They make this accident the all-determining tyrant for each individual by circling it with magic or mysticism.

Nationalism was saved for a while from its basic irrationalism by its early connections with democratic rationalism. Its rapid degeneration now may be seen from the way it is galloping

back behind Guide Hitler to the nomad's belief in the superiority of the tribal blood and tribal gods. Such priestcraft may still be necessary among the more backward peoples—and it is for each people to say for itself through its institutions and its leaders how politically backward it is.

But while nationalism was growing, there was also growing up another means of uniting men, democratic Union. It stemmed from Socrates and Jesus rather than from Cain and Abel. It grew out of the Renaissance of that democratic appeal to reason that produced Greek philosophy and made Athens great in the days when Pericles said, "These things are made for men, not men for them." It rose too from the Reformation that sent the individual back from authority to the Word itself, to its doctrine that "the sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath," and its insistence on the equality of the soul of man and the importance of the humblest person.

It came up with the English and the American and the French Revolutions to unite men for their *Bill of Rights*, for the principle that *all men are created equal*, for the ideals of *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité*. The men it has freed no longer need mysticism to keep them together. They need only Union now to bring them all together to free mankind still more. They have now enough experience behind them and intelligence in them to understand that freedom lies in free men freely uniting, trusting in each other and depending on each other. They are mature enough to understand that the way to man's freedom can not possibly lie in worshiping the accident of birth. They know that freedom for each can lie only in men freeing all the billion possibilities that the billions of men can alone supply for the billion-sided task of freeing man from accident's arbitrary rule. They know that to free man from the accident of death they must begin by freeing his mind from the accident of birth.

Of Union

Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable.—*Webster.*

There never was an independent man, or nation, or empire, and there never will be. To think these possible is foolish. It is

worse to believe that one has achieved them, to glory proudly in one's independence or his nation's. It is shameful.

There is no shame in admitting one's dependence on his fellows, and the dependence of one's nation on one's species—dependence not only on the living but on the billions and billions of men who have brought us painfully up. We need not blush to remember that in the sweat of arms like ours was paved the path on which we stroll, that through a human patience perhaps surpassing ours our enemy the wolf was made our friend the dog, that we owe much to the boldness of Xerxes in defying the gods by throwing the first bridge across the Hellespont, and to the courage of the Spartans at Thermopylae, and to the wisdom that Socrates by his way of dying carried far beyond the grave.

We need not hang our heads in recognizing that minds and hands like ours are somewhere in nearly everything we see, and are protectingly around us wherever we may be, that they discovered the microbes that cling to fingers and made the waxed paper and invented the machines to put it round the food we announce "no human hand has touched." There is no shame in being mindful of our dependence on the men who today are tapping the rubber tree in the tropics, braving the explosive gas of the coal mine, feeding the hungry silkworm, watching the whirring spindles, cleaning the streets and the surgeons' lances, tracking storm to its Arctic lair and fever to its African marsh, guarding the thoroughfare we crowd and the lonely reef that lies in ambush for us.

The shame lies instead in forgetting all we owe our species, exaggerating what little mankind owes to us, combining ingratitude, conceit and usurpation to make a patriotic virtue and profess that we are self-made and independent. The shameful thing is for a man to think that mankind is in his debt when the balance is struck between what mankind has done and is doing every day for him, and what he has done to make his species freer and happier. It is still more shameful to act as if mankind were so much in his debt as to justify his receiving, and his children and his children's children receiving, millions more than other men, or political, social or other title and position whose possession needs no further justification—no matter how

many other benefactions other men confer thereafter on society. The shame is not lessened when such delusions of grandeur are enjoyed by masses of men instead of by individuals, when a whole nation assumes that it has given more than it has received, that there is something naturally superior and peculiarly sacred in it, that it is the Elect of God or the Chosen People, that it was meant to be the lord of others. These are the things that are shameful in men, and they are shameful because they are so tawdry and false and unworthy of a species whose name gives us the adjective, *manly*.

The freedom of man goes hand in hand with the interdependence of men, whether organized or tacit. This is true in every field, it has always been true, and the more our freedom and self-reliance have grown, the more interdependent we have become, and the more we have needed union with more men.

It is a common thing to find a man who treats all the rest of us as stupid, as obstacles in his path from which he longs to be free. Each of us has sometimes felt that way about some, or all, of the rest of us. It is natural that each man should always be ready to indict the mass of mankind as stupid. We are all ignorant and awkward and stupid in far more ways than we are skilled and wise. That makes us esteem more our own wisdom where we have it. The fewer the things in which we are wise, the more value we set, of course, on our wisdom, and the more irritating becomes the stupidity of our fellows in the field where we are wise.

But the interesting side of this is the other side of the medal, for it is the positive side. Though a man may be stupid in no matter how many things, he is almost certainly more skilled or wiser than most of us in some few things, or at least in some one thing. "In every god there is something divine," Anatole France remarked, and we can add that in every man there is some of Man. I once had a cook who I thought was a hopeless moron until one day she made an apple pie. It was the one thing she knew how to do, it was her specialty, but she could do it so succulently well that one forgave her a heap of other things.

The man who was no good at pie-making would be a fool not to depend on her for apple pies, and the one who could make pies, but not so well, would be a fool not to depend on her for

instruction. This example being typical, we can smile while minorities of different experts nearly 2,000,000,000 strong accuse our (and their) species of a hundred million stupidities. We can be sure our species will survive and each of us will grow richer, wiser, freer, so long as we enjoy this wealth in minorities of experts—and are not so stupid as to try to be independent of any of them.

Put in other terms, the wildest reactionary is never 100 per cent conservative, and the wildest revolutionary is never 100 per cent rebel. Our Neville Chamberlains are the first to rebel at the cut-and-dried methods of diplomacy, our Lenins are conservative not only in their habit of dress but in a host of other things. Conservatism and radicalism partly result from men differing in the velocity of their adaptability to change, and from this standpoint the most hide-bound among us would appear a flighty revolutionist to his own great-grandfather. Some of course in every generation welcome change in general relatively more than others, but usually we are each conservative about many things and actively rebellious against only a few.

But the result of our division into conservatives and rebels is that we each can depend absolutely on our species never lacking plenty of men either to rebel against every conceivable obstacle to the freedom of man, or to conserve every bit of the freedom won by yesterday's rebels until those of today prove the new bit of freedom that they bring is really worthy of acceptance. This may not conduce to our independence, but can we have a better way than this to free ourselves?

It is not our greatest men who think it beneath them to acknowledge their dependence on others. They teach us not to depend on ourselves alone if we would free what is individual in us, but to study diligently other men who are masters, for, as Sir Joshua Reynolds said, "The more extensive your acquaintance with the works of those who have excelled, the more extensive will be your powers of invention . . . and what may appear still more like a paradox, the more original will be your conceptions."

As it is with those lonely venturers, our great men in every field, so it is with those who are pioneers in the narrower sense of the word. If any man can be called independent it is the

pioneer who goes out into the wilderness and carves out his home, the man of the type of Mr. Bulow, the Connecticut farmer who took Brillat-Savarin on a turkey hunt in 1794 in the forest near Hartford, and who, the great epicure narrates, thus described himself:

"You see in me, Sir, a happy man, if there is one under Heaven: Everything around you and everything you have seen in my home come from my own property. These stockings, my daughters knitted them; my shoes and my clothes came from my flocks, which contribute, too, with my garden and poultry-yard, to supply me with plain and substantial food."

Yet in the next breath Mr. Bulow (with Shays's Rebellion and the hard times of the Confederation only seven years gone and the American Union only five years old) attributes his happy lot to union with and trust in his fellows, saying, "All we have comes from the freedom we have won and founded on good laws."

These pioneers of Connecticut were among the first to sacrifice the sovereignty of the state and ratify the Constitution of the United States. Their forebears, the first men to pioneer in Connecticut, Lord Acton notes, "possessed so finished a system of self-government in the towns, that it served as a model for the federal Constitution."

It was precisely in these conditions, when in the American wilderness civilized man was thrown most upon his own resources, that his dependence on his fellows was most driven home to him, and men came to realize that their freedom lay in trusting in each other, in uniting freely on the basis of the equal rights and dignity of each of them. It was in these pioneering conditions that the men of these American colonies, before they constituted their Union, united under state constitutions that form the first written constitutions in history superior to and limiting the government and alterable only by the people themselves.

As the pioneers moved westward for 200 years men had to depend on women to do not only a woman's work but a man's work too,—to seize the reins and drive the covered wagon while the man stood off the Indians, to take his rifle and defend the children when he fell or was away. Pioneering conditions made

so clear the dependence of men and women on each other that there finally began in the Rocky Mountains the liberation of half the human race. There never were men more independent than the cowmen and prospectors and homesteaders of Wyoming in 1868, and they were the first to recognize and extend their dependence on women by giving them the vote.

Our freedom has always been inseparably bound to our faith in our fellows, and the more of them we have trusted, and the more implicitly, blindly, we have depended on each of our fellowmen—no matter what race, nation, class or sex—the more we have been rewarded with freedom. Truly of the stuff of dreams is our species made.

Men talk excitedly of crime waves. We are so good at heart that for every house built as a prison there are a hundred thousand homes where live law-abiding men. No country needs more than a tiny fraction of its population for police, and the freer the people the fewer the police. There were 160 crimes for which men were put to death in England when Blackstone wrote and George III reigned. In that century, when England grew such men as Paine and Burke, a man guilty of high treason was cut down when half hung, disembowelled and his bowels burned before him, and his body then was quartered. Down to 1790 Englishwomen who murdered their husbands were publicly burned to death. There is no such ferocity now in England, and though the population is far greater there is much less crime and only one prisoner to 4,000 people. There is also now far more freedom and trust by Englishmen in each other.

Two hundred, one hundred, fifty years ago one finds everywhere in every field far less dependence of men upon each other, and far less freedom. Then perhaps ten or a dozen men entrusted themselves for fifty miles to a stage-coach driver with four or six horses, after making inquiry, and scrutinizing their man. Now a thousand men rush into a train and are whisked off sixty miles in an hour. They may do it twice a day through every year or they may cross a continent without ever going up to the locomotive to see what manner of man is there with his hand on the reins of hundreds of horses, with his eye now

on his watch and soon searching vigilantly through the mist for the signal lamps.

They may do this all year without it once occurring to them that they are all trusting their lives to a man at the throttle, and to the unknown men who made his watch, and to the man at the throttle of the train hurtling toward them, and to the maker of his watch, and to distant train dispatchers and their watches and clocks, and to the signal men, and to the brakemen, and to the long line of men who made the brakes and the wheels and the cars and the locomotives, and to the men who made and inspected and laid the rails, and to the section hands, and track-walkers, the bridge-builders, the tunnelmakers. We can not enjoy the freedom from the horse's limitations that a train gives without trusting our lives blindly to the good faith of thousands of unknown men.

And they, in turn, have to trust in millions of passengers having faith enough in the railway to use it. The *Great Eastern*, that forerunner of our Atlantic liners, failed not from lack of room for passengers,—she was longer than nearly all the ocean greyhounds afloat sixty years later,—but because she lacked passengers. She failed because ocean travellers in 1857 lacked faith in steamships, in their makers and their crews and in men generally.

The train and the ocean liner are two of many wonders that are possible only through the willingness of men to depend utterly on their fellow-men. Wherever we go, whatever we do, we need but keep our eyes open to see the same phenomenon of freedom for each man through faith in every man.

It is in every item in our newspaper as it is in every bed in our hospital. Our newspapers, now that they reach to the ends of the earth for men who are interested in and need to know everything on earth, require for their functioning far more confidence all round than ever before, far more faith in unknown men. The statesman, the banker, the businessman who closes his door on the press, who impatiently tries to dodge when the newsmen surround him may not realize, when he suppresses or distorts or falsifies to them the news of what he has been doing, that he is hurting most himself. Yet, however important he may be, he has only a few items of news

to give compared to all those he needs to get, and the more he handicaps the newsmen in their work of accurately and quickly reporting the essentials in every field to everyone, the more he contributes to a condition that poisons the air which he himself must breathe.

The newsman who jazzes a story to sell himself to the editor and public, or who is not alert for the true interest and essential in everything, or who fails to do his best to put himself in the shoes of those whose actions or words he is reporting so as to understand the gist of what they are trying to tell the world,—the newsman may not realize it either, but the worse he does his job the more he hurts himself, if only because he too must depend on the newspapers for his facts.

Our great-grandfathers rarely trusted their lives to men they did not know, our grandfathers did so only sparingly, but we are doing it all the time, many of us nonchalantly many times a day. Yet it is now, and especially among the more trusting peoples, which is to say the freer peoples, that the death rate is far lower and the span of life is growing. We eat and drink almost anywhere on earth without the fear that man once had that strangers might poison him. We pile into elevators and go dizzily down, we dodge through streets crowded with cars more powerful than the monsters of antiquity, we jump into taxicabs without worrying whether the driver may possibly be drunk—and we never suffer half the qualms that grandfather did.

In his time there were never on the roads nearly so many horse-drawn vehicles as there are now horseless ones. When he was out driving in the buggy he did not need to trust that the men driving the few buggies he met would keep to their side of the road and not run into him and kill him. He could depend on the other man's horse and his own horse not colliding even if both drivers went to sleep, and he could be reasonably sure that an accident would not be fatal.

Paradoxically, the more that men depend upon machines, the more they must depend on men, and on more men. The number of slaves who labored up the Great Pyramid is small compared to the world-scattered, ungeneralled army of free men who

now help bring each tourist to see that work of autocrats and slaves.

The doing of a book may seem an independent enterprise, one requiring few hands compared to those needed to bridge the Golden Gate. Yet I would sooner try to count the hairs of my head than the men and women who have lent a hand merely on the mechanical side of the writing of this book: The men who felled the trees, who brought them to the paper mill, and mined and smelted its minerals and provided it with chemicals and fuel and grease, who loaned the money to build the mill and provide the machinery for it, who ran the mill and distributed the sheet of paper on which these words are now being written by a typewriter,—and all the world-scattered men who put that typewriter on this desk, among them far away natives who helped bring it bits of rubber and provided its inked ribbon (we must count in, too, the cotton-pickers).

And then there is the host of men behind this desk, this chair, this house, this fountain pen, this ink, and behind the universal postal system that carries this "manuscript," and the machines that set in type every letter in it, and the presses that print that type,—and the tale is neither finished nor complete as far as it goes.

And when we have finished with the mechanical side there would remain the substance of the book. That seems to be something independent, personal, but the book is studded with allusions to only some of those who have lent me a hand. If I sought merely to list all the men and women, great and obscure, known and unknown to me, whom I thank for encouraging me and helping give this book what substance it has, there would be no space left in it. Even to express my thanks I must depend on Lincoln who solved the problem so well when he wrote in his letter to Conkling and the "unconditional Union men" of 1863:

Thanks to all—for the great Republic, for the principle it lives by and keeps alive, for man's vast future,—thanks to all.

I can not even number the individuals, living and dead, upon whom I have had to depend, and upon whom I am glad to depend to bring before your eyes these words:

Let us then all keep clearly in our minds and tightly in our hearts that in Union there is freedom, and that each shall be the freer and happier the more we all recognize our dependence on the individual, on each other and on all our species. We are all the losers when one of us is not doing the work that is joy for him. We are all the gainers when he is doing what he loves to do, for he is then doing his share best. The more deliberately and fully and trustingly we unite with each other and depend upon each other for our freedom, the more we shall solve the problem of so arranging our society that each lives in it more happily and freely. For freedom is like love, the more of it we give, the more of it we can enjoy, and love is like union, too. True love can not do without union, nor can there be full union without love, nor freedom without either, nor either without freedom.

We have too long forgot that freedom and love were born together, and we have yet to learn that they can not live and grow without each other. As a child sometimes sees deeper than a man, so Man, when he was making words for those ethereal solid things that he has never touched and always reached for, saw into them more deeply than we do, and he made his word for *love* his word for *free*. We have too long forgot that we began *to free* with the Gothic *frijon* and the Sanskrit *pri*, which means, *to love;* we have yet to learn that not simply through the Gothic *frijonds* up from the Sanskrit *priyon* for *beloved* but from the very nature of things stem together *friend* and *freedom*.

Man has on earth no one but Man to help him, and what a mighty, what a generous, what a kindly and abiding and dependable friend and liberator is Man to Man. Man has already wrought miracles of Man by Man for Man. These are great, and they are but a hint of those that will be done when our Union opens Man's vast future as each Man pledges each.

Thy freedom is my freedom as is my freedom thine.

Man

Here in a thimble
seed of Man
enough to fill every womb in the land
womb within womb
seed within seed
all in a thimble
Say
what shall we say
of Man?

Myriad myriad
seed of Man
born and dead and back in the land
myriad myriad
still to be sown
and then one day Man shall be grown
Man who shall be
finally free
Then he shall say
who he is
why he is
all he is
Man.

Federal Union, Inc.

The membership association, Federal Union, Inc., was formed in July, 1939, to further the basic "Union Now" proposal and to enable individual supporters to make their influence felt through a permanent, nation-wide organization. Prominent leaders of public opinion in many fields are represented on its National Committee and Council of Advisors.

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Freedom & Union

MAGAZINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD

EDITOR, CLARENCE STREIT



House Set for August Vote on Atlantic Convention—Senate & All Presidential Candidates Approve It—(P. 37)

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What are Soviet intentions?



by Elliot R. Goodman
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Freedom & Union

"For the Great Republic, for the Principle it Lives by and Keeps Alive, for Man's Vast Future."—LINCOLN.

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Cover: Recently Erwin O. Christensen, Curator, Decorative Arts and Index of American Design, of the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D. C., requested permission to reproduce the black and white drawing of Independence Hall, which Iris Beatty Johnson did for the July 1947 cover of Freedom & Union. He wished to use it as an illusttration in Volume II of *The History of American Art,* a college text published by The New American Library of World Literature. Permission was granted. No more fitting cover could be given our Special Student Debaters Issue this month than this honored work of art by Mrs. Johnson. It is the more appropriate since this issue reports the history-making decisions in Congress—173 years after it was constituted by the Federal Convention in Independence Hall—toward calling another Convention, patterned on the 1787 one, to explore Atlantic unification.

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[*On Second Thought*]

Dedicated to Student Debaters-- What Youth & Age Can Do

WE DEDICATE THIS ISSUE — the greatest we have yet published—to the high school debaters, 50,000 to 80,000 strong, who will be tackling the question of Atlantic Federal Union in 10,000 schools all over the U.S.A. in the scholastic year that begins in September. Thanks to the vision and generosity of a subscriber who prefers to be anonymous, a copy of it will be presented free to each of the 10,000 debate squads.

We have tried to make this issue of special value to them, as well as to our older subscribers. Nothing, I think, could help do this more than to give the extensive reports and texts we print in it of major recent news events that make it highly probable that Atlantic unification will also be debated this Winter by experienced leaders in a Convention of NATO Nations patterned on the one that wrote the Federal Constitution.

The "Academic" Myth. Of the obstacles facing Atlantic Union, perhaps the toughest is the assumption that it is too remote" to be practical politics"—or even a subject for academic debate. The High School Debate Leagues in 46 States that decide what their topic will be, brushed this objection aside last February. They had then to pick one of three topics. They repected two that none would call academic: "How may television best serve the public interest?" and "How can the U.S. best use water resources?" They chose instead: "How can the security of the free world best be maintained?" This topic, too, was, and is in the news—but not the No. proposition for debate under it—"Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization be transformed into a federal government."*

Singular Foresight. Dr. Bower Aly, Executive Secretary of the National Committee on Debate, who proposed the Atlantic Union question, and the members of the Committee who back in December voted to include it on the ballot, merit congratulation for their singular foresight. So, too, do the State Leagues who voted six months ago to make free world security the coming debate topic. Since February, events—U-2, Tokyo, Cuba—have made it the No. 1 election issue. Meanwhile the long-pending proposal that the U. S. call a convention of NATO nations to explore how they might best unite, has reached the point where, approved by Administration and Senate, it lacks only House approval—and the outlook is bright that this will be given when the House returns in August.

6 Battles Won in 6 Months. We summarize on page 37 the six battles this proposal had to win since February—in each of which defeat meant death—to reach now the doorsill of success.

Newspaper Curtain? The daily and weekly U. S. press—with a few notable exceptions which, bafflingly, do not include *The New York Times*—has reported none of these six battles. By ignoring all the contrary evidence, it has continued to keep alive the myth that Atlantic Union is "remote." We give

*There are two other propostions under this topic which debaters can choose to uphold: "Resolved: That the U. N. should be significantly strengthened" and "Resolved: That the U. S. should initiate a federal world government." Debate teams taking the negative against the above two could uphold Atlantic Union as a better alternative.

not merely the fullest report of these battles that has appeared in the press but, starting on page 40, nine pages of the text of the Senate debate June 15 that ended with 51-44 approval of the Atlantic Convention resolution—and with all candidates for the Presidential nomination voting for or endorsing it.

Politicians Lead, Press Lags. June also brought speeches from Governor Nelson Rockefeller and Adlai Stevenson that went far beyond mere endorsement of a convention to explore greater Atlantic unity. The former called for a "North Atlantic Confederation" or "Community" to "tighten all political, economic, military and cultural bonds linking Great Britain, Western Europe and North America." The latter urged "a permanent economic and social union in the Atlantic world." The press, led by *The New York Times*, omitted these creative proposals from the headlines—and thus many remain unaware that the once "academic idea" is now openly favored by leading politicians. We report this news fully on pages 6-7.

New Yorker "Letter from West." Almost simultaneously, *The New Yorker* ran June 18 a long, beautifully written "Letter from the West" by E.B. White which advanced with powerful argument "the vision of a federal union of free democratic capitalist states." Although Mr. White still cautiously called it "the distant shore," he made clear that he would welcome "political union with the United Kingdom, with France, with Scandinavia, with all the Western European nations—with any nation, in fact, that could show a long and successful record of government by consent of the governed." We deeply regret it proved impossible for us to reprint his article in full and warmly recommend it.

By November What New Disaster? Events will keep on making Atlantic Union increasingly imperative. Until November the election will absorb the U. S.—which invites communism to deal it a surprise. In our 1956 July-August issue I wrote apropos to U. S. election-year vulnerability: "The Kremlin can be counted on to exploit to the fullest in the coming weeks the present weakness of Washington. It will certainly consider the advantages of striking in this period of uncertainty to stop the flow of oil through Suez. Three weeks before the Canal was seized July 26, I sent this to Secretary Dulles. No heed was paid, Congress deferred the Atlantic Convention — and before November Atlantica was split . . . just when Hungary revolted. Such was the tragedy disunion brought in the last election summer. This one has begun worse.

Will Cuba Be 1960 Suez? Where will the next surprise come? Possibly in Space. Or the Mideast. More likely the Far East. Most dangerous of all seems the Caribbean—Cuba in particular. Suez began July 26; on that day this year Havana opens a huge conference of youth from all Latin America—a field day for communism. Mr. K must be tempted to seek a triumphal entry in Cuba, after the Eisenhower fiasco in Tokyo. The lure of winning a base at Uncle Sam's doorstep is heady vodka for Moscow. It knows the dangers that beset U. S. intervention in Cuba. It recalls that Suez failed to bring Europe down because the Caribbean replaced its lost oil. But what if this source, too, were cut? The stage is set for explosion—but the worst may come alsewhere in the Caribbean, in Venezuela, Panama. For the Atlantic Convention to fail in such conditions to clear its last hurdle must invite worse disaster than that which its postponement in 1956 produced.

Providential Debate. If the House approves the proposed Convention, it means that while Atlantic Union is being debated by 50,000 politically—talented boys and girls who have no memory of World War or depression, Atlantic unification will also be debated by 100 leaders from all round its ocean who *have* experienced two World Wars and the Great Depression—debated with a view to producing a plan that can save tomorrow's leaedrs from such calamities, and let them open wider"Man's vast future." It is providential indeed that so great a debate may take place simultaneously on both levels . . . among those at the threshold of leadership who have never known a non-atomic world, and those at the summit of their lives who can remember when men could not fly . . . youth's boldness and age's experience stimulating and balancing each other dynamically.

What Youth & Age United Can Create. The U. S. Federal Constitution proves how creative this interplay can be. That "miracle" (as men rightly called it hen) could never have been achieved by youth—wise though Hamilton and Madison were beyond their years—nor alone by Washington with his authority and Franklin with his wide and long experience. The problem had baffled the wisest philosophers and statesmen ever since the failure of such men as Solon, Pericles, Aristotle, to unite their city states ended Greek democracy . . . for 2,000 years. Such was the problem the Federating Fathers solved in 1787 —by the light which the sunrise and the sunset generations *together* threw upon it then.

Whether life is in its morn, at its noon, or near a glorious sunset, could one ask for more inspiring opportunity than now lies in each one's grasp?—Clarence Streit

FREEDOM & UNION'S POLICY

To think, write and act always in terms of all the democratic world, and not of any one country in it.

To mean by "we" (except editorially) the citizens of the coming Atlantic Union or Federation of All the Free, not merely those of any existing democracy.

To speed its coming by helping its people understand better the principles of individual freedom and federal union, and their importance to peace, production, higher living standards and greater spiritual growth and happiness.

To advance it also by helping the people of this Free Atlantic Community to see that they do form a community which they need to govern democratically.

To provide a forum for all views in the vast field of freedom and federation.

To bring out the facts in this field by objective, imaginative research.

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

FOR THE PAST HALF CENTURY Sir Norman Angell has campaigned tirelessly for peace through reason. He has written 40 books and countless articles for the cause of freedom. *The Great Illusion*, his most famous and pioneering work, published at his own expense in 1908 "spread through the world," said Max Eastman, "as though a dam had burst." A year before World War II began, this same book in a re-edition sold over a quarter million copies. "Few men," expressed Radio-TV Commentator H. V. Kaltenborn, "do so much for so great a cause." Sir Norman's year-in year-out efforts brought him a knighthood in 1930 and the Nobel Peace Prize in 1933. Two years ago Norman Angell celebrated his 85th anniversary, and on this occasion *Freedom & Union* published the best of his thought, as chosen by himself, together with other commemorating articles. (See November and December 58, and January 59 issues). There follows an article written especially for U. S. high school debaters.

What the Youngsters Have to Face

By SIR NORMAN ANGELL

WE OLDER PEOPLE cannot too often remind ourselves that the youngsters in the high school debates face a situation the like of which was unimaginable in our own school days. Its like, indeed, has never before confronted mankind in all its history, written or unwritten.

Heretofore men have fought wars endlessly—as tribes, as clans, as nations, as adherents of rival kingly dynasties, or rival religious beliefs, rival political doctrines. But through it all mankind survived. We of this twentieth century have survived two world wars, fought with all the weapons we could command. But we know now that we of the urbanised West, living in closely packed communities, in vast cities of skyscrapers and chronic traffic jams, would not survive a third world war fought with the weapons we now possess; that survivors, if any, would be limited to the Arctic wastes, the Asian deserts or the African jungles.

Furthermore, destruction on that scale could be brought about by a good deal less than world war. It is now possible for a single government, a single dictator—European, Asian, African—to wipe out much, if not all, of the human race. The instruments by which it could be done are being made increasingly available to all and sundry by the physicists, chemists and technicians which many nations are training.

Russia—whose capacity for industry and technology was yesterday regarded as a joke—possesses them already; China will possess them tomorrow and new African nations very shortly. And we may note in passing that half a dozen H Bombs dropped as the result of orders given by some little dictator in some small African state who had managed to get his hands on those toys, would be just as annihilating as if dropped by some really big boss—a Hitler, a Stalin, a Mao.

Which is part of the reason why even deep-dyed conservatives are coming round to the view that in the new nuclear age the most elementary security of all—security for continued existence—demands some world authority, world government with police powers of inspection and control directing an international police force.

It was well before the second world war and before the coming of nuclear weapons that Clarence Streit first pointed out, not merely the necessity of some such world authority, but the road

which must be followed if we are to attain it. The counsel he then gave is more important, more vital, than ever; has indeed, for all the reasons above indicated, a life and death urgency it did not possess in the pre-nuclear age.

More than a quarter of a century ago Streit pointed out that any world government able to ensure freedom as well as peace should begin by a union of those democracies which accepted the principle that the state was made for man not man for the state; that the union so founded was not to be regarded as a final alternative to a larger internationalism but as the road thereto; and as assurance that world government, when it came, would not be dominated by the totalitarian powers and totalitarian methods; that peace would not be bought at the cost of allowing freedom to founder in a world police state.

He recognized even then the struggle going on between the democracies and the dictatorships and also the fact that "the democratic peoples are tending more and more to engage in a disruptive nationalism which is the precise antithesis of the democratic principle . . . that the athletic and organised dictatorships will steadily outstrip the chaotic democratic countries unless some effective union is achieved."

His forecast in this respect has been verified by the event. He pointed out the way of escape but the generation he then addressed did not recognise it as the way of escape, and rejected it. That rejection raises the whole question of the quality of public judgment in the mass electorates of our democracies (who by their power to unseat one government and set up another, have the final word in the direction of policy); the question of how far our culture as transmitted by our educational apparatus really equips the masses to understand the nature of the society which as voters they are called upon to manage or direct.

No statesman, no politician, no diplomat, no Foreign Office, no State Department belonging to those countries can carry through a policy which runs counter to the mood of the voters, to what the politician is apt to call "the climate of opinion." The record in that respect is disturbing and should be examined for just that reason.

Western disunity is rooted largely in the internal political instability of the nations who should compose the union.

The most important nation of Continental Western Europe, France, provided the spectacle about three years ago of nearly a dozen separate parties within the state at such odds with each other that they could not agree on any government at all; a condition of instability finally ended by resort to an adaptation of the Napoleonic method. Just as the conditions produced by the eighteenth century revolution produced Napoleon, so the twentieth century conditions following upon two world wars and endless constitutional changes, produced de Gaulle. But what happens after de Gaulle?

The largest single party in France yesterday was the Communist party. That may prove to be the case after de Gaulle. In Italy, also, the largest party has been that of the Communists. Even in Britain small groups of fanatical, active, persistent Communists are able to dominate several of the largest Trade Unions of the country, occupying strategic positions, so that a tiny minority of the workers in for instance, selected power stations, are able to paralyse the whole industry of the country.

Warning of the Last War

The same Communist minority have helped bring about the disintegration of the Labor Party as a prelude to a Left Wing domination. The most anti-communist of the Western European nations, those in which no Communism is permitted, are Spain and Portugal. And one would hardly cite them as patterns of democracy.

The situation hinted at above, in which it would be possible for one man —seized, it might be, with a sudden fit of hate or madness—who happened to be the head of some totalitarian government, to destroy a great part of the human race, seems, at first glance so fantastic that we refuse to take it seriously. "That sort of thing simply does not happen." Yet the last war gave us warning. We know now that if Hitler had possessed the hydrogen bomb he would have used it in that moment when he had decided upon his own suicide, and Hitler came near to possessing the bomb. He had already got as far as the pilotless self-guided plane carrying buzz-bombs. And the man who was able to make sure that his orders to massacre six million Jews would be carried out, was certainly in a position to ensure this larger massacre.

African Case Against the Whites

But the lesson of the Hitlerian episode does not end there. The people who chose Hitler for their master, and composed the bureaucratic machine which carried out the abominations we associate with the names of Belsen and Buchenwald, were highly cultured, thoroughly educated Europeans, a nation which had produced great music, deep philosophies, efficient technicians. If such a people could be guilty of crimes, the very memory of which still makes the blood run cold, why should we deem it unlikely for dictators of equal recklessness and equal wickedness to arise in one of these new states of Africa or Asia, the background of which is not deep culture and education, but, as in some of the African cases, one of very recent cannibalism and human sacrifice.

And we can hardly forget what the African peoples have suffered at the hands of the Whites—those centuries of slavery, of mass deportation to strange lands, of deprivation of elementary human rights. No such wrongs had been suffered by Germans at the hands of Jews. The fact did not save the Jews from wholesale massacre at the hands of Germans. The African will have a better case against the Whites.

During the two wars it was common for Englishmen to explain German behavior as arising from the special qualities attaching to the German "race," thus disregarding the fact that we English are not "British" in any racial sense, but are so largely German or Germanic, that the commonest words we use—*man* and *God*, *flesh* and *blood*, *father* and *mother*—are German words; that we are invaders who drove the "natives" into the Welsh mountains.

Surely very recent events should have made it clear that the forces which explain the failure of Western unity, the manifest defects in democracy, the tendency to war and dictatorship, are not special to any one people but are universal attributes of human nature. After all, Hitler was preceded by Mus-

solini, Mussolini by Lenin; Stalin's slave camps were hardly less horrifying than Belsen and Buchenwald, and, in sheer number of victims, Mao may outdo Stalin and Hitler.

The quality of electoral judgment shown by the three great Western democracies is indicated by certain features of the twentieth century record.

When the U. S. A. entered the first world war, President Wilson in his speech to Congress on April 2nd, 1917, indicated the conditions of stable peace. Henceforth neutrality was impossible for a power like the U. S. when major aggression occurred. It must co-operate with others in some system of collective defense, so that the potential aggressor could not apply the method of picking off his victims one by one. The case was simple, clear, unanswerable. And when the President outlined the project of a world League, he received support of world opinion, including that of the U. S. A.

But after the war it all changed. Far from American neutrality, isolationism being abandoned, it was made ironclad by a series of Neutrality Acts. Britain and France asserted their isolationism by appeasement. Note the further changes. The internationalism warmly supported in 1917, rejected in 1920, was re-adopted 25 years later in the form of the United Nations. If the three democracies had done early what they did late it is extremely unlikely that there would have been a second war. And not what followed that second war. Because the U. S. A. and Britain could not agree on the political purposes of the war and on the strategic situation which should follow it, Stalin was able to turn Hitler's defeat into the means of a stupendous expansion of the Communist Empire. All the new national states—the famous sanitary cordon—created by the Western Allies at the end of the first world war became Communist satellites at the end of the second. As did East Germany. One of the main purposes of both wars was the destruction of German militarism. The Western Allies are now engaged, at considerable cost to their tax payers, in rearming Germany as a condition of their own security.

One further point: both wars throw light on the assumption, so widespread at the moment, that a prime condition of peace is the ending of all colonialism, the assurance of national independence for all peoples. But the *two world wars are complete proof that national independence, however desirable on other grounds, does not ensure peace.* All the major combatants in both wars were completely independent. None of them was suffering from colonial status. Both wars came precisely because the combatants were independent and sovereign. Their passionate refusal to qualify their independence or sovereignty made it impossible to achieve any secure union, any dependable collective defense which might have deterred the aggressor.

Issue Confronting the Younger Generation

The climate of opinion which makes any international society so difficult, is sustained by slogans having the quality of martial music which, without precise meaning, can nevertheless deeply stir emotion. If the current demands for unqualified freedom and independence are to be taken at their face value, they are either meaningless or falsehood. There can be no freedom for men or states, unless freedom is restricted. If each were free to drive his automobile as he saw fit, there would not be more freedom on the road; there would be none, for all would go in constant danger of sudden death.

I would emphasize three points. First, the emotions which explain our political errors are very ancient, very deeply rooted in human nature. Second, experience proves that they can be profoundly changed. Third, our culture, as transmitted by schools, has played little part in the change, higher learning even less. How small the part of learning, erudition, a glance at history reveals. Greece could produce an immortal political history we still study. But it could not maintain peace between its own city states.

In the modern world, as already noted, the most intensely schooled nation of all chose Hitler for its master. The churches of Christendom could proclaim the message of the Prince of Peace, a message of mercy, pity, compassion, brotherhood. The message was explained, elaborated, by learned theologians in a mountainous theological literature, added to century after century. But the learned theologians fought each other, using the weapons of torture and death, the rack, the burning alive, prolonged religious war. Earlier centuries showed other aspects of the human spirit. For thousands of years men believed that God, or the gods, would be pleased if little children were cut to pieces with stone knives on Holy Altars.

All that has gone, at least in the West. Human sacrifice is no more; religious wars have ceased, the torture chambers are closed. It is an immense change. What was once right has become wrong; what wrong, right. Religion has not been destroyed and religious differences remain. But the ordinary, unlearned man in Main Street now knows that true religion cannot be promoted by one army defeating another; he knows that the real defense of religious truth is not military but psychological. How has a change so profound taken place in the minds of the multitude?

The question is vital because the means which have brought peace between rival religious groups are the only means now left to us in the nuclear age for bringing about peace between rival political groups, between one kind of society and another.

Without better understanding of the psychological forces which explain the immense changes already achieved in human behaviour—and human feeling—the constitutional plans, however good in themselves, are almost certain to fail. How we may so modify our culture as to discipline the emotions of the short-sighted savage which exists in all of us, is the fundamental issue confronting the younger generation—the generation shortly destined to take over the direction of our rapidly changing society.

Reprints of this article, and of the three by Sir Norman we ran in marking his 85th anniversary, are available from *Freedom & Union*, 10c each, postpaid.—Editors.



Rockefeller for "North Atlantic Confederation;" Stevenson for Atlantic "Economic Union"

GOVERNOR NELSON ROCKEFELLER and Adlai Stevenson—the boldest "presidential timber" on Atlantic unification—set a new high level in bold leadership toward this goal in late June. The New York Republican Governor called for "a North Atlantic Confederation to tighten all political, economic, military and cultural bonds linking Great Britain, Western Europe and North America," in speaking to the Binghamton (N.Y.) Rotary Club June 21. On June 23, Mr. Stevenson, twice Democratic presidential candidate, urged the "creation of a permanent economic and social union in the Atlantic world," in addressing the Illinois State Bar Association in Waukegan, without going into such detail as did Mr. Rockefeller.

Gov. Rockefeller reaffirmed his proposal on July 1 in testifying at the Senate hearing in Washington on "national political machinery." The *Washington Post*, after giving almost a column to what it deadlined—his "Prescription for Alert and Creative Executive"—added this on his Atlantic proposal:

"Globally, the U. S. must assume" said Rockefeller, "a much more permanent political association with the free peoples of the world, in a much more intimate relationship than is conceived of today.

"Whether it is through 'confederation' or an 'Atlantic Community,' he said, the U.S. must decide whether it is going to enter a system that can give a 'more compelling' answer to what the Soviet Union is offering—'a system of world organization.'* This nation, said Rockefeller, could well consider associating with such developing forces as the six-nation European Common Market."

The text of what Rockefeller said at Binghamton on confederation follows:

I am deeply disturbed by the present state and strength of freedom in the world, as well as the security of our own country. I know these matters and their true appraisal must concern you, as individual citizens and thoughtful Americans, and as members of a great international organization [Rotary] dedicated to fostering world understanding in no less than 116 nations.

Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York

The facts before us permit no one to be either serene or complacent. For the fate of our freedom—yours and mine and America's—is decisively affected by the fate of freedom in the world at large.

If freedom is really to become a dynamic and irresistible force in the world, free men and free nations must join together in a truly great design—a design to assure that our deepest spiritual and political values shall live and thrive. Two great and explicit challenges and needs are involvde:

First, we must give to the Government of the U.S. a structure so cohesive, so efficient, so strong that it can both inspire and execute the policies and programs necessary in a world of revolutionary change.

Second, we must lead and encourage the free nations to develop and deepen their bonds with one another so that regional alliances can grow into working confederations.

I have spoken of developing confederations out of regional alliances. This is neither a dream nor an abstraction. It simply suggests the logical and inevitable next step in the history of free nations.

We must face the fact that we have reached a point in history at which the nation-state, standing alone, is becoming as obsolete as the city-state of ancient Greece or Medieval Europe.

No nation today, large or small, can meet the needs of its people or insure their security from within its own borders alone. We have already seen the peril of allowing Communist imperialism to pick off, one by one, the free nations standing in its path of aggression. We can see that the pattern of relationship between America and these other free nations must be something deeper and broader than a series of military alliances and bilateral treaties. There must be more lasting and rational political structure to these relationships.

Furthermore, we know in the economic realm that we cannot indefinitely treat or support the many needy free nations as dependents upon America. Rather must we help them to evolve political and economic structures that sustain their own unity, cooperation, prosperity and strength.

Our great task, then, is to help build these structures, so that the forces of democracy throughout the world can be strong and purposeful, dynamic and confident. We must be concerned primarily with political associations. As the political structures are sound—and only thus—the strength needed for common effort and common defense will follow.

We are not and cannot be striving merely to meet crises on a sporadic basis—but striving to serve the needs and aspirations of free peoples everywhere on a continuing basis.

We are not trying merely to baffle enemies of freedom. We are trying to build freedom itself—by building the structures in which it can live and thrive. These are the ideas and purposes beneath the regional concept of confederation.

The outlines of confederation are already present throughout the world. They exist in the Organization of American States, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in the "Inner Six" and "Outer Seven" of European trade, and other like

STEVENSON CALLS FOR "ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL UNION IN ATLANTIC"

Adlai Stevenson, according to a *New York Times* report from Waukegan, Ill., in addressing the State Bar Association there on June 23, "called for 'grounding our real strength in the creation of a permanent economic and social union in the Atlantic world.

"Such a union, he said, might undertake with the U. N. 'a revolution of economic modernization in the decisive under-developed areas of the world where the Communists are working so hard.'

"Such a move would insure greater unity in the non-Communist world, he asserted. On this 'fundamental basis of strength,' he said, renewed efforts could be made to achieve complete disarmament under international control.

*For more on the communist plan see Prof. Goodman's article, "The 'Gospel' of Red World Government' According to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mr. K," on page 26.—*Editors.*

associations. These can be starting points for the work ahead of us.

This work of moving toward confederation does not involve any super-states. Nor does it substract from or conflict with the authority of the U. N. Quite the contrary: Article 51 of the U. N. Charter specifically makes provision for regional associations and the growth of these associations would, in fact, add immeasurably to the strength of the U. N.

The whole spirit and concept of confederation would be gradual and evolutionary. It provides occasion for firmer bonds between nations, joined in common effort on any level of national life—whether it be social, economic, or monetary; juridical, cultural, or military. Thus the principles of confederation can be applied at whatever level the parties agree to be in their mutual interest.

Let me try to put the idea of confederation into clear focus by proposing specific confederations and the great tasks they would accomplish: 1. *A North Atlantic Confederation to tighten all political, economic, military and cultural bonds linking Great Britain, Western Europe and North America.* It would offer in the economic area a larger framework within which to work toward resolving present conflict between the "Inner Six" and the "Outer Seven."

It would be dedicated to the ultimate achievement of free competition and free trade throughout its area. It would work toward greater unity of armed forces—a unity that, as it grew, America could recognize by placing nuclear weapons under the command of NATO.

It would share among the prosperous Western nations the burden, now falling largely upon America, to bring economic assistance and technical training to underdeveloped areas—and it would inspire this essential help to be given as a joint undertaking.

It would work toward a single Western plan for enforceable programs of disarmament to be negotiated with the Soviet Union—rather than allow the Soviets to confront and exploit a variety of divergent Western programs as they do today.

Finally, it would be a confederation so strong and so confident as to be ever ready to enlarge its numbers to include any of the Soviet-controlled satellites wanting to break away from the Soviet system and to join a union of free nations clearly capable of defending themselves.

2. *A Western Hemisphere Confederation.* This would give hope and help to the peoples of Latin America who today are the world's most rapidly growing population. It would make possible a kind of Marshall Plan for Latin America that would work toward long-range industrial development and a Hemisphere free-trade area, allowing a free flow of men and goods and money from Point Barrow to Tierra del Fuego. In my opinion, only action of this scope can check anti-democratic forces, spurred on by Communist influences from abroad, as are so evident in Cuba today.

It would join efforts everywhere to make the land serve the people, by supporting land reform wherever necessary and by fostering so great a joint project as an East Andes Development Authority. Such an authority could open up the fertile soils and abundant power along this great frontier reaching from Caribbean shores 3,000 miles southward through the heart of the continent.

It would inspire progressive social action on a broad front. It would quicken the growth of universities. It would encourage scientific research development. And it would tackle such urgent social problems as the need to finance, through a hemispheric credit mechanism akin to F.H.A., a massive program of low-cost housing in the fast-growing metropolitan centers of the Hemisphere.

3. *An African Confederation.* To begin with, this would respect and echo the spirit of African unity already voiced by African leaders who are themselves impatient with old forms of nationalism that have no real roots in Africa.

With the cooperation of the North Atlantic Confederation, it would then begin with the most urgent task before the newly free African peoples, that of providing skills and training to millions just learning to govern themselves and to direct their own economies.

It would establish specific institutes of training in these subjects, from civil administration and auditing to telephone communication and road-building. These institutes could largely be financed by the combined resources from public and private sources.

* * *

These, then, are some concrete examples of work to be done. The challenges are no less great in the Middle East and the Far East. Here, too, the rewards of working confederations can be enormous—for the cause of freedom. Ultimately, effective confederation can mean the proving that freedom can work—and that the needs and aspirations of free peoples everywhere can be met by bold and imaginative leadership of the free world.

This is a cause to challenge the greatness of America—to stir its peoples—to inspire its leaders.

This is a time in history when the skeptics and the cynics must not be allowed to make us shy from great endeavor, boldly conceived and bravely executed. Nor can we be turned aside by over-simplified warnings in terms of costs and expenses—warnings that, while seeming to be realistic, take little account of the facts.

We must remember the basic truth that only as the free nations of the world share in growth and strength can they share cost. Only as world productivity expands can the free peoples find a more sound and just source of help than the income of the individual American taxpayer. Only as the American economy grows in size and strength can it fulfill the opportunities of freedom and meet the challenge of communism. And this growth of ours can come only in a world whose productivity is speeding and whose economy is expanding.

[Statements to House Foreign Affairs Committee]

ATLANTIC CONVENTION "URGENTLY NEEDED"—HENRY FORD II

I am in thorough accord with provisions of Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 17 which you later introduced in House of Representatives. I believe that prompt and favorable action by the Congress will make possible a more determined and more effective effort to unify and strengthen the free world nations against growing stresses. Such effort is needed and needed urgently.—HENRY FORD II.

"GREAT VALUES" IN CITIZENS MEETING—ERWIN CANHAM

I am delighted to join all those who are supporting the resolutions for a convention of citizens of NATO nations. I only regret that I have to be on the Pacific coast, and will be unable to testify personally. I was a delegate to the Atlantic Congress, and recognized there the great values of this kind of citizen participation. If we are to intensify the bonds of community within the Atlantic area, we will do so through the activity of citizens quite as much as we will through governmental action.—ERWIN D. CANHAM, Editor, *Christian Science Monitor.* (Mr. Canham was President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce the past year.—Editors.)

Note—The above statements appear in the printed report of the hearing which the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held May 17 on the Atlantic Convention resolution. For oral testimony then see June FREEDOM & UNION.

MAURICE ALLAIS EXPLAINS WHY

An Atlantic Common Market Would Be More Realistic And Advantageous Than a European One

THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED OPINION is that a European common market is both possible and desirable, but that the differences in structure between Europe and the U. S. are such that the Atlantic common market must be considered a dream. Is this opinion correct?

The following discussion aims to show briefly the essential elements that must be considered to give a correct answer.

In our opinion, the realization of an Altantic common market would raise very great difficulties, but those difficulties would be exactly the same as those of a freeing of trade in Europe; and one should in no way assume that these difficulties would be greater. They would probably be less.

The basis of the argument that follows is founded on the fact that on the average, disparities of real wages and productivities are compensated by exchange rates; that the only difficulties arise from residual relative differences; and that the orders of magnitude of these residual relative differences are altogether comparable, whether between the U. S. and a European country or between two European countries.

Common Market and Competition

A perfect great market supposes the triple liberation of the movements of capital, goods, and persons. The freeing of the movement of people (freedom of establishment) has essential advantages *of a political nature*, but it should in no way be considered indispensable to obtain most of the economic advantages of a great market. We will then limit ourselves to an examination of the liberation of the movements of goods and capital.

Two contradictory these confront us, which, if taken literally, are equally false.

Some maintain that the economy of poor countries with low productivity of labor could not effectively resist the competition of economies of high productivity and that for lack of sufficient protection for former would be unavoidably ruined and their workers unemployed.

Others insist that countries with high standards could not resist the competition of countries with high standards could not resist the competition of countries with low living standards. The former are, they say, "artificially" handicapped by high costs of production corresponding to the payment of high real wages.

The countries of high productivity being precisely those where the standard of living is the highest, it is immediately obvious that one, at least, of the two theses is necessarily false, but, in fact, as we are going to show, they both are.

In fact, if country A has an average productivity three times as great as country B, the rate of exchange in a free market will tend to set itself at a level such that an hour of work in country A exchanges for three hours of work in country B. On the whole, taking account of this rate of exchange which imposes a handicap on the high-productivity country in price competition, country B will be in no way ruined by country A.

By the same token, if it is true that the producers of country B have to pay, at the going rate of exchange, lower real wages than the producers of country A, the latter are not at all disadvantaged in competition; for if the producers of country B pay real wages only one-third as great, their productivity is one-third as great; and, on the whole, the advantage gained from the lower real wages is exactly compensated by the handicap of a lower productivity.

Relative Disparities of Prices

On the whole, if the *relative* prices of the different products in the two countries were exactly the same, the complete freeing of trade would bring about no difficulty, for the exchange rate would set itself at such a level that the average level of prices would be equal. Then the prices of all goods in the two countries would be the same.

But, in reality, the relative prices of the different products are not the same in the two countries, so that while the rate of exchange equalizes the average levels of price, *this compensation takes place only on the average.*

In every country certain industries tend to be systematically favored and others systematically disfavored. For example: Suppose that the average ratio of productivities is 3 but that the productivity in the refrigerator industry is 6 times as great in country A as in country B. The exchange rate that becomes established and at which one hour of labor in country A exchanges for 3 hours in country B compensates for

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

This is the first in a series of articles drawn from the latest book by Maurice Allais, "L'Europe Unie"—United Europe —published early this year by Calmann-Lévy in Paris, where it won the Grand Prix de la Communauté Atlantique.

The author, who is Professor of Political Economy at the famous School of Mines in Paris, was visiting professor at the Thomas Jefferson Center for Studies in Political Economy at the University of Virginia last year; he is now lecturing in Japan. Widely known throughout Europe for his books, he has been a frequent contributor to Freedom & Union.

only half of the difference of productivity, which is 1 to 6. The result is that the refrigerator industry in B country cannot, if the conditions remain identical, fight against the competition of country A.

Similarly, if in the clothing industry the productivity of country A is only one and a half times that of country B, the clothing industry of country B will benefit by comparative advantage, since the exchange rate penalizes A's industry in the ratio of 1 to 3, while the ratio of productivities is only 1 to 1.5. Taking account of the exchange rate, the prices of B will thus be, in the clothing industry, half those of country A.

This is the essential reason why two countries in competition are led to protect their economies in different sectors, each one protecting its own economy wherever the ratio of productivities differs from the average ratio of productivities in an unfavorable direction.

If no obstacle were opposed to trade, each of the two countries would tend to specialize in the sector in which it is relatively most capable, that would be to the greatest advantage of each. This is the well-known mechanism of Ricardo's law of comparative cost.

But the advantage of specialization which emerges exists only if the difference between the costs arises from permanent and natural causes. It does not exist if the causes have only an *artificial and temporary* character.

The Play of Distortions in International Competition

In order to see things clearly, it is essential to distinguish general distortions from specific distortions. *General distortions, which derive from average differences of productivity and real wages, can be corrected by exchange rates. The distortions special to each industry cannot be removed this way.*

The distortions particular to each industry can themselves be classified into natural, market, and institutional distortions.

Natural distortions derive from more or less important natural advantages of which the enterprises benefit; for example because of the proximity of natural resources and energy.

Market distortions come from the greater or lesser abundance of a temporary character of certain factors of production in different countries, such as capital or skilled labor.

Institutional distortions derive from different institutional frameworks: For example women's wages in relation to men's wages may be relatively lower in country A than in country B. Country A will then find itself more favored than country B for those of its industries which employ relatively more female labor. As far as we can judge, this is true of Italy and France in the textile industry, female labor being relatively less well payed than male labor in Italy than in France.

Influence and Correction of Distortions

Taking account of their extreme practical importance, let us consider these different aspects in some detail.

As we have indicated, on the average the differences of productivities, of standards of living, and of social charges* cannot be considered as a factor artifically falsifying the competition between the different economies, systematically and dangerously disfavoring the countries with high living standards to the benefit of countries with low living standards, or crushing the industries of the nations of lesser productivity under the competition of the industries of countries of high productivity.

From the standpoint of international competition, the richest countries are handicapped by their high real wages, but, on the average, they are favored in equal measure by their higher productivities; similarly the poorest countries are handicapped by their lower productivities, but, on the average they are favored in equal measure by their lower real wages.

Practically speaking this compensation is effected by the exchange rate, this rate being fixed at a level so that the national hours of work are exchanged on the international market in a ratio whose order of magnitude is precisely equal to the average ratio of their productivities.

But this compensation is only an average compensation, which prevails only on the whole for the whole range of industries of a given country. Because of specific distortions, it does not work for each industry considered alone.

Taking account of the fact that, as a result of specific distortions, the differences of productivities between each two countries vary quite considerably according to the industry considered, there is no doubt that an immediate abolition of restrictions (quota and customs duties) on the movement of goods could suddenly put certain industries in very great difficulties, even insurmountable ones, which would make extremely difficult, where it is necessary, their reconversion in the right direction.

Where the differences in productivities are greater than the average difference compensated by the rate of exchange, international competion would in fact favor the countries whose average productivity is higher; where the differences in productivity are less great than the average difference of productivity, it would favor the countries whose average productivity is less high.

If the divergence between the ratio of productivities in a certain industry and the average ratio depends on permanent structural conditions, such as the greater or lesser abundance of different natural resources in the different countries, the new specialization provoked by the liberation of international competition, however painful they may be, must be considered as eminently useful for all. In other words, there is no ground for trying to compensate in any way for the natural distortions, and it would be certainly a great error to try to compensate away the advantages caused by geographic protection.



—20 Siecle Federaliste

'The Markets of the European "Six" (Marché Commun — Common Market) and "Seven" (Libre Echange—Free Trade Association) are not ready to meet yet," the cartoonist believes, but Maurice Allais is confident that it would be less difficult to create a larger Atlantic common Market.

*This means "cost of fringe benefits of social security."

If, on the contrary, this difference depends on specific market distortions, conditions that must be considered as temporary, such as the greater or lesser wealth in capital, the brutal play of a complete and immediate liberation of commodity movements would be liable to provoke adjustments in the wrong direction and thus to entail disorders and suffering (disappearance of whole industries, unemployment, etc.) *which would finally turn out to be useless and costly*. But this incontestable danger could not exist if the transition period were sufficiently long.

If, finally, this divergence depends on institutions, one may consider that the enterprises of the different countries find themselves in discriminatory conditions that must be made to disappear. This is notably true of women's wages and differences of fiscal systems.

In fact, specific distortions are incontestably extremely numerous. They create conditions of discriminatory competition, and their abolition presents difficulties which should not be underrated.

However, one should not unduly exaggerate the importance of this abolition, for this type of distortion occurs, in fact, only on a secondary level, the first level being compensated by exchange rates. Only a few specific institutional distortions can be considered as very important, and it suffices in practice to abolish them partially.

Atlantic and European Common Markets Compared

The obvious result of the preceding is that the obstacles to the liberalization of trade do not come from the average absolute difference in productivities (general distortions) but from differences in various productivity ratios relative to the average ratio (specific distortions). These differences can be caused either by natural conditions (specific natural distortions) or by market conditions (specific market distortions) or by institutional conditions (specific institutional distortions).

So, these relative differences are exactly of the same order, whether it be a question of France and Germany, for example, or of France and the U. S. Similarly, the relative differences existing among fiscal systems are quite comparable.

If then, we state the problem of the liberalization of trade on the Atlantic scale, the difficulties to be expected are therefore no greater than those to be expected in the European case. They are quite comparable, which does not mean that they are negligible.

The problems faced here are of the same nature as those created in Europe by the elimination of customs barriers, tariffs and quotas. They are posed on a larger scale, but the benefits to be derived are also much greater. The thorough studies made in the past 15 years as regards European Union show that these problems are technically capable of solution and that, in reality, they would even be easier to solve within the wider framework of an Atlantic union than within the more restricted one of the European community.

U.S. and European Fears

Whether one considers the problems resulting from dollar or other monetary shortages, or from the extension of the preferential system of the Commonwealth to Western Europe (which is incompatible with the most-favored-nation clause) there seems to be no solution outside an Atlantic framework.

The liberation of exchange regulations between countries separated by customs barriers on the one hand, and rapid technical progress on the other, raise identical problems. They bring a much higher standard of living, but they require the various economies to adapt themselves to new conditions; the drawbacks in doing this are only temporary, but the advantages are permanent.

Europeans fear they cannot compete with the greater economic productivity of the U.S., but the Americans have no less a fear of being submerged by European goods produced by relatively cheaper labor. Both fears would be partly justified if one sought an immediate liberalization of trade, but not if it were effected gradually.

The solution of the problem of creating an Atlantic Economic Community lies in the gradual elimination — say within a period of 20 years—of the obstacles of all kinds which now hinder the free movement of goods, capital and men among the Atlantic nations.

The economic advantages to be expected from an Atlantic common market are very much greater than those that can be obtained from a European common market, for the scale of the liberation is greater. The advantages are self evident. The prospects are on the same scale as the market of more than 400 million people that would be created by Atlantic Union. This project is not in contradiction with the plan for economic integration of the European Six. It is its natural and necessary corollary—and is much more realistic.

The realization of such a common market would offer no more difficulties than the realization of a European common market. It would indeed offer even fewer problems. Certainly the difficulties corresponding to the specific distortions would be comparable; but in two respects the operation would be easier. First, the vaster the scale of liberalization, the easier it is to find compensations. Second, and on the monetary plane, it is, in our opinion, easier to make an Atlantic international monetary system function than a purely European monetary system.

One could not over-estimate the advantages to be expected of a liberalization of trade on an Atlantic scale, whether in the U. S. or in Europe.

Politically, we may affirm that the prodigious prosperity which would result for the Atlantic world from this liberation would alone suffice to undo the Soviet totalitarian empire of slavery, which its own very system condemns to permanent and considerable difficulties.

Is the creation of some form of political community on an Atlantic scale a utopia? I do not think so. It is true that, on the whole, public opinion in the U. S. at present would be opposed to such a union, which would bring about the free movement of goods, capital and men; but experience has shown that American public opinion can change rapidly. It seems to me that if Europe proved its ability to overcome its own ideological and nationalistic differences, the resulting shock would be strong enough to change public opinion in the U. S. and to make some form of Atlantic political community possible.

It should be pointed out that, once embarked on this road, Europe would not need fear eventual U. S. domination. In fact, the 175 million Americans would face 250 million Europeans.

If in face of its catastrophic decline during the past few years, the Atlantic world does not want to continue down the road which leads to the disappearance of its civilization and to its servitude, it should make the creation of an Atlantic community of free men, based on a common cultural ideal and a truly common economic market, the major objective of its policy.

The Rule of Law--What It Truly Means

By ROBERT N. WILKIN
U.S. Federal Judge (Retired)

THE GREATEST OBSTACLE to peace is the general want of understanding of Law—its history, its purpose, its function.

That law is the only practical substitute for war is generally understood. The President's proposal to substitute "The rule of law for the rule of force" has had a cordial response.

But there is no constructive action to accomplish such a proposal, and no public demand for such action. Our nation fails to insist on a convention to amend the Charter of the U. N. Our government has declined to call a convention to consider the creation of an Atlantic Union or Federation of Free States. The Senate refused (by the Connally Reservation) to concede unqualified jurisdiction to the International Court of Justice over international disputes.

We sentimentalize over peace, but refuse to do the only thing that will insure peace. We acquiesce in the need for lawful order in the world, but obstinately refuse to proclaim that in world affairs we will hold our sovereignty subject to Law. We boast of a government of law for national and interstate affairs, but refuse to accept government of law for international affairs.

The chief cause of such inconsistency is a very general misconception of law. Law is thought of as command, as the assertion of will. Most people think of law as being all those arbitrary rules and regulations imposed by government for the maintenance of civil order. Such rules and orders are phases or detailed expressions of law, but they are not The Law.

The Law that is needed for international relations is the Law of laws. It is not arbitrary will or capricious command. It is the universal and eternal principles of right and justice. It was not proclaimed by government, but is the natural restraint on government. It was established by the providence that created the universe and made it subject to law. Like the laws of chemistry and physics, it can not be violated with impunity.

Man is endowed with free will. He is also endowed with reason which enables him to learn the law, and should enable him to exercise his will according to the law of his individual — social nature. Dean Pound defines the Law as "Experience developed by reason and reason tested by experience." Now the will of a nation is generally referred to as sovereignty; but the will of a nation is no more exempt from the law than is the will of an individual. As C. H. McIlwain has said, "the problem of law *versus* will remains the most important of all practical problems." Since the world has become one community, the problem is world-wide, and since the munitions of war are totally destructive, the issue is life or death.

To gain an understanding of the Law, it must be considered in historic perspective. As we study human evolution through the ages, with failures and accomplishments, we perceive what Rudolf von Ihering referred to as "The struggle for law." Peace and prosperity followed in the wake of established law, as shown by the Pax Romana and Pax Britannica. Just as the physical sciences

advanced by the discovery and application of the laws of physical nature, so political science advanced by the observance of the laws of human nature, in spite of the differences between physical and human nature.

Greek philosophers of classical antiquity expounded the theory of universal principles of law that ruled all nature. This became a basic tenet of Stoic philosophy. The Stoics taught that there were standards of righteousness and justice which were revealed to man through reason according to nature, and which, if strictly heeded, were manifest and clear—almost as evident as things perceived by the external senses. They taught therefore that law in its very essence rests not upon the arbitrary will of a ruler or upon the emotional decree of a multitude, but upon nature and the innate ideas of man's moral and social nature.

Stoicism made a strong appeal to educated Romans, and this was important at the time of the dissolution of the city-states. In place of a law embodied in the closely unified political tradition of a single city, it was necessary to conceive of law for the whole civilized world.

When Rome became the supreme political power, it also became the commercial center of the world. A large body of alien residents settled in the city. The magistrates and lawyers of Rome were compelled to recognize the differences of customs and local rules among these aliens and the provinces and countries from which they came. In the process it was discovered that underlying the differences of formalities and procedure, there were principles of honesty, fair dealing, and good business practice. The Roman administrators and lawyers called this *ius gentium*, law common to all peoples.

The great lawyers and magistrates of the second and third centuries B.C. saw in *ius gentium* an exemplification of the Stoic principle of universal law, and, they, with the aid of the juris-consults, made it a basic tenet of Roman jurisprudence. They spoke of it as *vera lex*, true law.

The Romans not only rationalized true law, they also gave it practical application. They demonstrated that where true law was honestly and fairly administered the people prospered and were satisfied. The accomplishments of Scaevola, Cato, Sulpicius, and Cicero, serving as pro-praetor or colonial governors, enabled Cicero to inform the Senate that there were provinces and foreign countries where the Roman rule of law was preferred to the despotic rule of native kings.

The Church Fathers found the ethics of Stoicism and the jurisprudence of Rome consonant with their religious teaching. They became expositors of true law, and preserved it after the disintegration of the Roman Empire. Offi-

cers of the Church were educated in Latin and studied Roman jurisprudence. As administrators and justiciars they gave the impress of Roman law to all Europe. Throughout the Middle Ages and well down into modern times the existence and validity of true law were taken for granted. Its central idea, as Sir Frederick Pollock has said, "was an ultimate principle of fitness with regard to the nature of man as a rational and social being, which is or ought to be, the justification of every form of positive law." It embraced such conceptions as equality before the law, faithfulness to engagements, equity and fair dealing.

For hundreds of years the judges of England were officers of the Church. By the end of the thirteenth century the Common Law had become more Roman than Anglo-Saxon. One of its basic principles was "the supremacy of law" Chief Justice Coke quoted Bracton, a judge and a priest, when he told King James that he was "under God and the law." It was these conceptions of true law that led to the Bill of Rights.

It was true law that prompted the establishment in his counry of "government not of men but of law." Through colonization, Roman Law and Common Law, with their central idea of true law, were carried to all parts of the world, and when colonies established their independence they retained the law of the colonists. So true law has strong roots extended throughout the world today.

When the Roman Empire disintegrated and Europe separated into many different states, nationalism became strong, sovereignty was emphasized and universal law was neglected or opposed. Will prevailed over law. When the national kings and feudal rulers asserted their sovereignty as against other states or the papacy, the people generally, prompted by an inherited clan instinct, supported their monarch. In time, however, the movement for freedom opposed the claim of absolute sovereignty at home. The evolution of popular government suppressed the "divine right of kings," but then absolute sovereignty was assumed by the legistlative agents of the people, and finally the popular movement, in its tendency to draw all power into its "impetuous vortex," vested absolute sovereignty in the people.

Democracy, like nationalism, has a strong tendency to exalt the will above the law. Pandering politicians and demagogues acclaim the "sovereign people" and the "popular will," and legislative agents, instead of exercising their own best judgment, are motivated by what they assume to be the will of their constituents. The assumption that the majority should rule, creates the impression that the majority is always right. But often the instant, emotional opinion of the majority is not right.

The problems of government require learning, study, discussion and deliberation. That is why wise Founders established here a representative republic. The truth is revealed first, not to the majority, but to the saints, scientists, savants and patriots who discipline themselves to receive it, and evolution follows in their wake.

The ultimate, informed and considered judgment of the people can be trusted, because they are imbued with the principles of the true law of human nature. But their arbitrary will is no more sovereign than the will of a king or parliament.

In recent times true law has been opposed by another influence. The modern revolt against traditional standards of morals, taste and decorum (most evident in modern art, music and literature) was also directed against the objective standards of true law. Truth, justice, right were to the modern sophisticates only subjective standards, at best mere principles of ethics; and law to them was only the commands which government had the power to enforce. Such "positivist" philosophy of law was soon found to be at one with the idiologies of the dictatorships of recent years. The willful and inhuman conduct of the dictatorships has caused legal scholars and statemen to appreciate the inter-relations of law and value, and now almost everywhere there is a revival of interest and faith in the higher law—true law.

Thus the history of law repeats. When the city-states failed to meet the needs of expanding Mediterranean civilization, universal law supplied the needs of that time; and now when the nation-states fail to meet the needs of expanding world-civilization, universal law again comes to the fare.

Next to the history of true law the most urgent need is an understanding of its purpose. The basic purpose of law is to maintain civil order—to restrain crime and violence and keep the peace. Its aim is the commonwealth, and the just settlement of disputes by impartial tribunals.

It is not the purpose of true law to control or regulate the economic or social affairs or other details of the life of individuals, local communities or nations. Under true law humanity would be free to enjoy and profit by the interesting variations in life, and evolution would continue without interruption from arbitrary will.

It is also important to understand the function of true law, its method of operation. Law requires implementation. As a great Roman lawyer said 2,000 years ago, "The law is a voiceless magistrate; the magistrate is the voice of the law." In order to accomplish its purpose thet law must have a sustaining organization with three departments: one to promulgate, one to adjudicate, and one to enforce.

Since true law exists in universal, general principles, political life requires from time to time more specific directions for control of details; and experience indicates that this need is best met by some representative agency empowered to enact statutes, ordinances and orders. Dean Pound distinguishes such enactments and commandments from Law by designating them "rules of law." They help to serve the purpose of law so long as they do not contravene the principles of true law. Such legislative agencies as town councils, state assemblies and congress would conserve local self government while true law, if properly implimented, would preserve world peace.

The most essential and important function of true law is the function as to which there is the greatest misunderstanding and reluctance. It is in the judicial court that law finally prevails over will. That is why the most wilful (gangsters, unions and nations) most bitterly oppose the judicial functions.

When a dispute arises that cannot be settled by negotiations or arbitration, the only way it can be settled peacefully is by "third party judgment." Any dispute that threatens the peace or commonweal of the community must be justiciable because the community welfare transcends other interests. So today the welfare of the world community has become supreme.

As law was the gift of Rome to the world, the best way of administering it

was the gift of England. In England the judicial function was separated from other branches of government and judges were given independence and security of tenure so that they might be wholly devoted to the law. The U. S. Constitution made strict provision for an independent judiciary.

Judicial history is a record of commendable accomplishment. It shows that when men are given a fair chance they prove worthy of trust and confidence. History has dealth generally with dynasties, wars and political campaigns. The devotion of judges to the law has advanced and stabilized civilization, and their moral courage has equalled the physical courage of military and political patriots. When men of character and learning in law have been chosen for judicial office their service has been uniformly free from racial, religious, national or other bias.

The judicial function affords the means of restraining the action of local, state, national and international agencies and officers within the legal limits of their respective jurisdictions. It acts only, however, on what it submitted; it cannot initiate action; and with final judgment its power ends. Another limitation on the judicial function is the requirement that its procedure be in accordance with what has come to be known as "due process of law," a term that includes such concepts as impartial tribunal, fair trial, due notice to interested parties, right to call and examine witnesses and right of counsel. The judgment must be, not the arbitrary will of the court, but "the voice of the law."

The administration of law requires that some agency be empowered to protect the lawful from the lawless. Cities, states and nations maintain police and law enforcement officers who are authorized to restrain violations of the law and to arrest and suppress law violators. The possession and use of fire-arms and dangerous weapons are restricted to law enforcement officers. Similiar provisions should now be made for the protection of the world community. The munitions of war have become so devastating that they dare not be entrusted to the arbitrary will of nations. The welfare of humanity requires that such munitions and armament must be under lawful control.

President Eisenhower in his New Delhi address said: "What is now needed is to infuse into international law the finest traditions of all the great legal systems of the world."

Six of the great legal systems are:

1. The Law of the Sea, or Admiralty
2. The Torah, or Talmudic Jurisprudence
3. Roman Law
4. Canon Law, or Law of the Church
5. Code Napoleon
6. Anglo-American Common Law.



The Law of the Sea is the oldest system. It had its origin in custom and is administered today in all lands bordering on navigable waters. U. S. Courts were vested with jurisdiction over this law by the Constitution. Lawyers are now attempting to formulate a similar system of law to regulate navigation of the air and outer space.

The Talmudic Law had its origin in the theism of the Hebrew people. It was based on a belief in a divine creation and conduct of the Universe. It is still observed by Orthodox Jews.

Roman Law has based on Greek philosophy and Roman jurisprudence. Its principle of universal order led to what Cicero described as True Law. His definition is accepted today as "one of the finest expressions in all political literature."

Canon Law, while the law of the Church of Rome, contains both spiritual and temporal provisions. Its temporal rules resulted from the temporal power exercised by the papacy after the decline of the Roman Empire. It is still the universal law of Catholicism and respected by devout Catholics everywhere.

The Code Napoleon was the work of the great jurists of the Napoleonic period. It was founded on Roman jurisprudence and became the basic law of all the countries of Continental Europe. It is frequently referred to as The Civil Law to distinguish it from the Common Law. It is the basic law of most of the countries of Central and South America, one of the provinces of Canada and the state of Louisiana.

How to Promote True Law

Anglo-American Common Law had its origin in the customs of the Anglo-Saxon tribes and in feudal polity. After the Norman Conquest it became predominantly Roman in principle. It is the prevailing law of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is also the law of the U. S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and India.

The predominant characteristic of all these great systems of law is that they recognize and embody the principles of true law. When the United Nations Organization adopted the Statute of The International Court of Justice, it recognized the established sources of international law, but it also authorized such world tribunal to decide cases *ex aequo et bono,* according to equity and good conscience. That provision definitely impressed the principles of true law on International Law.

The recommendation of President Eisenhower that the rule of law be substituted for the rule of force, and that international law be impressed with the fine traditions of the great systems of law is sound, logical, and practicable. The recommendation, however, will not be accomplished unless it is supported by public opinion. There will be no such support until the people of character and intelligence who create and express public opinion become informed as to the history, purpose, and function of law.

People who obey the law learn to love the law and are blessed by the law. It manifests itself unto them and abides with them, and they find in it the source of their freedom, the protection of their rights, and the greatest possible assurance of peace. All nations that believe in true law must now unite to maintain it in the world, and all people will in time join that union. They will believe "for the very work's sake."

King Nation or King Citizen?

By CLARENCE K. STREIT

CONFUSION has been rife ever since the American Revolution established the U.S. on a new concept—one that reversed the Old World dogma of sovereignty.

In the international field where the sovereignty issue most imperils life and liberty, there is such fog now that some who pride themselves most on being Sons or Daughters of the American Revolution are fighting today against the very principle of sovereignty that the Founding Fathers fought to establish. In the misguided belief that they are upholding the work of the Founders, they uphold instead the notion of sovereignty that George III fought for. Some veterans, and many other worthy citizens, have fallen into the same confusion. It has become, indeed, so widespread that some Senators and Representatives either suffer from this confusion themselves, or fear to help remove it.

"A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles . . . [is] absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty, and keep a government free," Pennsylvania's Declaration of the Rights of Man asserted in 1776. It is high time we did this in regard to sovereignty.

Sovereignty Before 1776. The concept of sovereignty which the American Revolution challenged ruled the world then even more than it does now. This concept held the State supreme, and reduced man to the role of subject, made him a mere cell in the body politic. Nearly everywhere the State then meant in reality one man, the Sovereign—otherwise known as King, Emperor, Kaiser, Czar. This Sovereign was alleged to have a divine right to rule absolutely, to be a law unto himself, as regards not only all foreign national Sovereigns, or Kings, but all the people of his own nation. In practice the Sovereign had to make some concessions, but in principle he accepted no diminution of his supreme or absolute power, his freedom to do as he pleased with all other men, both in domestic and foreign affairs. This concept of sovereignty was summed up most brutally and briefly by the Bourbon Louis XIV who said, "*L'état, c'est moi*"—"I am the State."

True, the English Revolution in the 17th Century temporarily overthrew one divine right sovereign. But "about the year 1770," as Lord Acton says in his *History of Freedom*, "things had been brought back . . . nearly to the condition which the Revolution had been designed to remedy forever. Europe seemed incapable of becoming the home of free States. It was from America that the plain ideas that men ought to mind their own business . . . burst forth like a conqueror upon the world they were destined to transform, under the title of the Rights of Man."

1776's Revolutionary Idea. Against the Old World dogma that Man is made for the Sovereign State, the American Revolution raised the principle that the State is made for Man—that sovereignty is lodged equally in every man, that the citizen is the supreme Sovereign. This new concept reduced the State from a sacred end in itself—a deity to which men should sacrifice their own lives and liberties—to the role of a mere means to serve Man.

In sweeping terms, the Declaration of Independence proclaimed its revolutionary principle of sovereignty—"that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government. . ."

The Daughters and Sons of the American Revolution—and the far larger number of citizens who, like Lincoln, feel a spiritual rather than a blood relationship with the Founding Fathers—may be excused for the confusion that tricks them into fighting for George III's concept of sovereignty in the fond belief that they are upholding the Declaration of Independence. There is this extenuating circumstance they can plead today: The majority of the Founding Fathers themselves fell for a while into the same confusion, and some of them, such as Patrick Henry, never thought their way out of it.

How Confusion Arose. Through confusion, the Founding Fathers abolished at first only half of the George III concept of sovereignty. As regards their domestic affairs, the people of each of the 13 States made State government subordinate to them. But as regards the foreign affairs they had in common with the citizens of the other 12, they clung in each State to George III's idea. Taking the State instead of citizen as sovereign——as we have done in the Atlantic Alliance—they formed the alliance of the Articles of Confederation.

In their confused Confederation, the Americans operated simultaneously on two opposing principles: The citizens governed their common affairs within each State on the principle that the citizen was sovereign and the State was made equally for the people in it, but they governed their common affairs with other States on the principle that the State was sovereign and the people were made for the State. In other words, they sought to preserve their citizen sovereignty, as the supreme purpose of government, by a system whose supreme purpose was, instead, to preserve the State's sovereignty.

It is understandable that the Founding Fathers should have become confused over sovereignty. The concept of citizen sovereignty was then so new they had no name for it. Moreover, they had to deal not merely with States that shared this concept but also with nations that upheld the opposite idea—the dogma that the Royal Sovereign was a law unto himself.

The people of the 13 States obviously could not govern their affairs with their ally, the King of France, on the basis that the people were sovereigns there. They had to base their relations with such nations on the Old World concept of sovereignty. The people in each of the 13 States unthinkingly slid from this necessity into the notion that they must

The Confusion Over Sovereignty

deal with the other 12 States too on the same principle which they had to apply to States whose people were not its Kings.

How Confusion Continues. The same confusing situation that befuddled the American people in the 18th Century exists for the people of each of the Atlantic democracies now. The sovereign people of the U.S., Britain, France and other States of Atlantica obviously cannot govern their relations with the Soviet Dictatorship by the theory that the citizen is the real sovereign in the Communist Empire. They must deal with Moscow on the basis of the Kremlin's concept of national sovereignty. But the people of these Atlantic democratic States are now upholding this concept against each other, too, even in their joint efforts to preserve their citizen sovereignty from being overthrown by this Kremlin concept which makes Man the slave of the State. This confusion makes no more sense now than it did when the 13 States fell into it. It divides freedom against itself no less dangerously now.

Sovereignty in Federal Union. The Founding Fathers came to their senses before the confusion over sovereignty had led to anything like the massive dangers which it has already produced for the people of the Atlantic Community in our day. They sent delegates to the Federal Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 to explore how to reorganize the relations of the 13 States on a basis that would make the government of their common affairs serve the lives and liberties of their people, instead of the sovereignty of their States at the expense of the citizens. The result was the U.S. Federal Constitution.

By Federal Union, the American people doubly maintained the principle of the sovereignty of the citizens of each State. First, they effectively placed the united power of all the 13 States behind the right of each State to govern its domestic affairs independently. At the same time they established the sovereignty of the people of the U.S. as a whole, so that the citizens could govern their inter-State affairs by the same principles they used for governing their domestic affairs. As an adjoining box reminds us, this simple but revolutionary change was achieved only after such clear-headed, courageous leaders as Washington, Hamilton, and Madison had tackled head-on the false Old World concept of sovereignty which had slunk like a wolf in sheep's clothing into the 13 States, much as it is fooling the people of the free Atlantic Community now.

Creating U.S. Sovereigns. When the people of the 13 States applied the principles of the Declaration of Independence to establish their Federal State, they surrendered none of their sovereignty as citizens. To set up their State governments, they had delegated certain portions of their citizen sovereignty to the representatives they elected to its government. In setting up their Federal Government, they simply transferred to the men they chose to represent them in it, certain powers which they had previously delegated to their State Government. They merely shifted some jobs from one set of agents to another, while remaining boss of both.

When the citizens of Pennsylvania agreed to transfer power over defense from the State to Federal Government, their representatives in the State Government lost power. But the people lost none, since the citizen retained exactly the same sovereign vote in choosing those to whom he delegated his power, whether in the Federal or the State Government. Thus the Founding Fathers made the citizen of every State a U.S. sovereign, too, and sacrificed none of the revolutionary American concept of sovereignty in establishing their Federal Union. But the present American generation has been sacrificing this sovereignty tragically, increasingly—by refusing to go forward with it.

Sacrificing U.S. Sovereigns. If you agree that U.S. sovereignty is not vested in the President or the Government but equally in all the citizens, then every citizen who is burdened with excessive taxation is sacrificing that much of his share of the national sovereignty. Every citizen who is drafted into the armed services is sacrificing another big portion of his share of the national sovereignty. And every citizen who is slain in war is sacrificing all the rest of his share of U.S. national sovereignty.

Look at the way we Americans are

Washington, Hamilton, Madison on Sovereignty

"A THIRST FOR POWER, and *the bantling, I had liked to have said monster* [his emphasis] for sovereignty, which have taken such fast hold of the States individually will . . . form a strong phalanx against it [the proposed Federal Government]. . . . Yet I would fain try what the wisdom of the proposed Convention will suggest. . . . It may be the last peaceable mode. . . . My name is in the delegation to this Convention."—*Washington, March 10, 1787.*

"As States are a collection of individual men, which ought we to respect the most, the rights of the people composing them, or of the artificial beings resulting from the composition? Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter."—*Alexander Hamilton, in the Federal Convention, June 29, 1787.*

"Was then the American Revolution effected . . . was the blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty and safety, but that the government of the individual States . . . might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New in another shape—that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to . . . political institutions of a different form? . . . As far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let the former be sacrificed to the latter."—*James Madison, No. 45 of* The Federalist, *1788.*

now sacrificing the citizen's sovereignty.

In 1938 the bill for U.S. defense amounted to only $16 a citizen. Now it is $256 for every man, woman and child—16 times as much as it was before the worst war in history. In 1938 no American citizen was subject to draft. Now millions are drafted and subject to draft. In World War I, the U.S. called into the services 4,609,190 men, of whom 53,403 were killed in battle. In World War II, 15,513,657 U.S. citizens were called into the armed services and 293,105 sacrificed in battle their entire share of the nation's sovereignty. All this adds up to an appalling sacrifice of U.S. sovereignty.

How much more of U.S. sovereignty will be sacrificed by the cost of a third World War, with taxation already so high, and the dollar's value already halved by war?

How much more of the citizen's sovereignty will be sacrificed in military service by World War III, with so many drafted now?

How many, many more Americans will sacrifice all their share of the national sovereignty in the third World War toward which we are steadily moving, despite all this taxing and drafting —a war in which millions can be killed by a single H-bomb?

We Atlantic Federal Unionists are anxious to prevent more fearful, flesh-and-blood sacrifice of national sovereignty than our nation has already suffered. We want to save the real sovereigns of this republic, and of every democratic nation. We are not pacifists; we realize that some sacrifice of liberty and even of life is necessary to preserve freedom. We want to save the citizens from *unnecessary* sacrifice and make them stronger sovereigns. We believe this can be done by extending U.S. federal principles around the North Atlantic.

Washington Warned. To keep from sacrificing needlessly the sovereign citizens, Americans, in particular, should be ready to sacrifice the power of those who now govern them: The Founding Fathers set the example. They sacrificed the sovereignty of King George III when they set up their independent State Governments. Then they sacrificed some of the sovereign powers of those State Governments when they set up the Federal Constitution. George Washington foresaw that this second move would be opposed by those who lost power by it, just as the revolution before it angered the British Sovereign. Referring to the proposal to federate the 13 States, Washington wrote in a letter to Henry Knox dated Feb. 3, 1787.

> "I believe that the political machine will yet be much tumbled and tossed, and possibly be wrecked altogether, before such a system as you have defined will be adopted. The darling Sovereignties of the States individually, the Governors . . . the Legislators . . . whose political consequence will be lessened, if not annihilated, would give their weight of opposition to such a revolution."

Some of the Governors and legislators of the 13 States tried hard to make the people believe that their loss of power was a loss to the citizens. But the people were not fooled. They saw that the Federal Constitution simply transferred some powers which they themselves had given their State officers, to Federal officers whom they retained the same right to elect. They didn't mind lessening the "political consequence" of their State representatives so long as they, the people, gained in the process.

The establishment of an Atlantic Federal Union, it must be said, would lessen the political importance of the President of the U.S. and of U.S. Senators and Congressmen. Certain powers they now have over the citizens would be transferred to the Executive and Senators of the Atlantic Union Government. But the citizens would remain the sovereigns who elected them all.

It is natural that Senators should not want to lose any of the power the citizens have given them. It is understandable that they should be more concerned with the government's sovereignty than with that of the citizen. Senators and Representatives who favor Atlantic Union are therefore indeed unselfish statesmen.

Present Pioneers. Members of Congress who favor Atlantic federation represent not only the people who elect them, but the pioneering American spirit and its concept of national sovereignty. Each is willing to sacrifice some of the present official power he has if his constituents find this will help secure their own life and liberty, prevent further sacrifice of their sovereignty as citizens, give them each more power individually.

Such Senators and Representatives would have you explore carefully whether you might not reduce your tax burden, lessen military service, and save your family and freedom from extinction by sacrificing instead some of their official power and giving it to some other representative you elect to an Atlantic Federal Union. It is evident from what George Washington wrote to Knox in 1787 that, were the Father of this Country alive today, he would warmly applaud this self-sacrificing stand—not the view of sovereignty taken so selfishly, or thoughtlessly, by other Members of Congress.

To Gain Sovereignty. You would not only sacrifice none of your sovereignty as a citizen but would gain sovereignty through an Atlantic Union. Let Americans remember this: When the sovereign citizens of your State approved the Federal Constitution, they remained not merely the sovereigns of their State but gained citizen sovereignty in another State, a much greater State—the United States—where before they had no vote, no sovereign rights.

Similarly, when you help constitute an Atlantic Federal Union, you retain your sovereign right to govern your State affairs as you please, and your national U.S. affairs as you please, without the interference of anyone in England, France or any other member of the Atlantic Union. But you gain another, greater sovereignty: You become one of the equal sovereigns of the United States of the Atlantic. You gain as much direct voice in handling all Atlantic world affairs as you gained in American national affairs through the U. S. Federal Constitution, and in your State affairs through the establishment of your democratic State Constitution.

Far from surrendering any of your sovereignty as a citizen by constituting this Greater Atlantic Union, you gain sovereignty, power, rights; you gain a vote where you personally have none whatever now—and you gain this citizen sovereignty in the very fields where you need it most, the fields on which peace and war depend.

What Powers? What are the fields you would begin to help govern through your representatives in an Atlantic



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FREEDOM & UNION'S POLICY

To think, write and act always in terms of all the democratic world, and not of any one country in it.

To mean by "we" (except editorially) the citizens of the coming Atlantic Union or Federation of All the Free, not merely those of any existing democracy.

To speed its coming by helping its people understand better the principles of individual freedom and federal union, and their importance to peace, production, higher living standards and greater spiritual growth and happiness.

To advance it also by helping the people of this Free Atlantic Community to see that they do form a community which they need to govern democratically.

To provide a forum for all views in the vast field of freedom and federation.

To bring out the facts in this field by objective, imaginative research.

To favor calling now a federal constitutional convention, representing the experienced civil liberty democracies, to work out and submit to their people a plan for uniting them in a Federal Union of the Free, or United States of the Atlantic, under a Constitution that would: 1) guarantee their Bill of Rights; 2) give them a free government in those fields where they agreed this would best advance individual freedom; 3) provide that this government shall be elected by, be responsible to, and operate on, the citizens and be federally balanced in its representation of them; 4) secure the right of each nation in the Union to continue to govern all its national affairs in complete independence.

To seek to extend the Union's free federal relationship to other nations peacefully and as rapidly as this will advance liberty and peace until eventually it grows into a free federal world republic.

To assure that, pending universality, this union shall be a loyal member of the United Nations.

Union Government? Its creation would involve no change whatever in the structure or powers of any State Government. Nor would it involve any change in the basic structure of the U.S. Government. It would involve only the transfer of certain powers from the U.S. Government to the Atlantic Union Government. Which powers? *At most*, only those powers which the people of the 13 Original States transferred from their State Governments to their Federal representatives when they replaced the Confederation with the Constitution.

By this transfer they created not only a common citizenship, but a common defense force, a common foreign policy, a common currency and the great common free market which has been the making of American prosperity.

How Citizens Win by Union. The citizens of all the 13 States gained in sovereignty not only by becoming sovereign citizens of the U.S., but by all the other transfers of their delegated power from the State to the Union.

Consider how much the people have gained in all the 50 States by having a common U.S. force to defend their individual liberties and their State rights. What if each State had to uphold the liberty and State rights of its citizens all by itself, be prepared to fight not only Old World dictators but neighboring States? Before the 13 federated, the troops of New York and of Massachusetts were massing on their frontier, threatening war over Vermont. What taxes, military service and war we would suffer now if each of our 50 States had to defend its rights alone!

Consider the gain to all the citizens of all the 50 States from having a common foreign policy. Let any American ask himself: What if my State could have a tough policy toward Soviet Russia, while neighboring States could appease Moscow? Before the 13 federated, when Massachusetts closed its ports to British ships, Connecticut welcomed them, made the most of this chance to get business—much as the British recognized Red China when the U.S. refused to . . . while the master of the Kremlin chuckled scornfully, and attacked the divided democracies, first in Korea, then in Indo-China.

Consider the gain to all the citizens of the 13 States when federation freed them from the vexation and cost of doing business with 13 currencies. Think of the enormous advantages we Americans now have from having one currency throughout the 50 States. . . .

Consider how much American citizens everywhere gained when federation removed the tariffs between their States, and allowed every American to sell whatever he had to sell in the highest market in the U.S. and buy whatever he needed in its cheapest market—all without any State Government interfering with his trade. How our American standard of living would be cut down if our States regained the "sovereign right" to vex the citizens with trade barriers as do the States of Europe. . . .

By every one of the U. S. transfers of power from the State to the Federal Government, the citizens in every State gained immensely, became much stronger, freer sovereigns.

How Far Now? How far should we follow now the U.S. example in constituting a great Atlantic Union with the other democracies? In my *personal* view, we should transfer to it the same powers that the 13 States originally transferred to the Federal Government. We know from experience that this combination creates prodigious power and freedom. We had better take no chances these days in having too little of either power or freedom if we wish to risk the lives of no more of our sons, sacrifice no more of our sovereign rights, and lives. That is my personal conviction. Others believe a Union as regards only defense and foreign policy would suffice for the present.

How far we should, and can, go depends of course not only on agreement among Americans but on agreement with the other democracies. The best way to reach agreement on this, and on other obvious problems that Atlantic Union involves, is to send delegates to a convention to thresh these things out with delegates from the other democracies, and have them report whatever agreement they reach back to the people for action by them. That is the way the U. S. Constitution was created through the Federal Convention that met in Philadelphia in 1787. And that is how the proposed Atlantic Exploratory Convention would tackle the problem.

√The Sovereignty Battle in the 1787 Convention

"We are met here as the deputies of 13 independent sovereign States, for federal purposes. Can we consolidate their sovereignty and form one nation, and annihilate the sovereignties of our States who have sent us here for other purposes?"—*William Patterson of New Jersey, June 9, 1787.*

"Had the legislature of the State of New York apprehended that their powers [those of the delegates] would have been construed to extend to the formation of a national government, to the extinguishment of their independency, no delegates would have appeared on the part of that State."—*John Lansing, Jr., New York, June 16.*

"I cannot support the General Government at the expense of the State Governments, but will contend for the Safety and Happiness of the particular States at the expense of the U.S."—*Luther Martin, Maryland, June 18.*

"It will be said that if the people are averse to parting with power, why is it hoped that they will part with it to a National Legislature? The proper answer is, that in this case they do not part with power; they only transfer it from one set of immediate Representatives to another set."—*George Mason, Virginia, June 20.*

"As the separation from the British Empire, the people of America preferred the establishment of themselves into 13 separate sovereignties instead of incorporating themselves into one. . . . They are afraid of granting powers unnecessarily . . . lest the powers should prove dangerous to the sovereignties of the particular States."—*Luther Martin, Maryland, June 20, 1787.*

"Can we forget for whom we are forming a Government? Is it for *men*, or for the imaginary beings called States?"—*James Wilson, Pennsylvania, June 30, 1787.*

"This Magistrate [the U.S. President] is not the King. . . . The people are the King."—*Gouverneur Morris, Pennsylvania, July 19,1787.*

Principles of Federal Institutions

By MICHEL MOUSKHELY

Michel Mouskhely is professor of International Law and International Relations at the University of Strasbourg. He is also Director of the Soviet Russia Research Center at the same university.

FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS tend to vary in the forms they assume. The flexibility of the principle involved is such that each federal union has its own individual aspect because this system seeks to respect individual situations. However, above and beyond these individual situations, certain common characteristics may be discerned which cause some of these unions to resemble each other and which set them apart from the others. To define the federal structure, it is appropriate to concentrate on these common characteristics, even to the point of overemphasis, so as to single out a few general types. This purely scientific classification will enable us to find our way through the labyrinth of positive achievements and to pass reasonable judgments upon them.

Principal Types of Federal Associations

Past and present experience shows us two types of association of States both of which are sometimes loosely called federal in Europe:

A. The *international* association or league, or alliance, sometimes called *Confederation*. Examples: the GERMANIC CONFEDERATION in 1815; the UNITED NATIONS, the ARAB LEAGUE, the COUNCIL OF EUROPE, NATO.

B. The true *federal* association, called a Federal Union, Federation or Federal State. Examples: the UNITED STATES, SWITZERLAND, WEST GERMANY.

The above classification encounters nowadays rather harsh criticisms as artificial and rigid. In support of this criticism, frequent references are made to such specialized communities as the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, (Common Market), Euratom, etc., which do not belong either to the group of international associations nor to the group of federal associations, but which represent an intermediate form: the supranational Community.

These criticisms are without foundation: the principle of supranationality already belongs to the past. The Iron, Coal and Steel Community, the only one with power to make decisions, has used its authority with extreme caution. It has preferred the classic method of negotiation with the delegates of its member governments. The coal crisis of 1958-1959 and the inability of the High Authority to break the resistance of these governments show undeniably that the real power is concentrated in the hands of the member States. The High Authority was not able to impose the necessary measures. As for the European Economic Community and EURATOM, they are a reversion to the classic type of inter-governmental association, for the ministers, as representatives of the States, keep the real power in their own hands.

Indeed, the problem is to know where the real power lies. Experience teaches us that power eventually settles somewhere. The vital distinction between an association of States and a Federal State lies in the different location of the seat of power. Last preliminary remark: It is important, before approaching the heart of the subject, to make a few general observations which can serve as a guide in the choices to be made.

Component Elements of the Federal Principle

The principle of federalism has been summed up in such succinct formulas as "unity in diversity," or "liberty with order;" this implies a sort of equilibrium between the rights of the Union and those of its individual members. The autonomy of the associated States is as necessary as the authority of the Federation.

This presupposes a genuine democracy, which implies the active participation of the people in the organization. A bond must be established between the several States and their peoples on the one hand, the Union and the federal population on the other. In simpler terms, each individual must feel a twofold allegiance: on one hand, to the entire Union, on the other, to the smaller collectivity of which he is a member.

The principle of federalism must be accompanied by the supremacy of the Law, by the rule of law, by legal institutions. The tension, which is unavoidable in a federation, may give rise to conflicts. Certainly, a peaceful means of settling disputes must be found; but tensions must be preserved as a source of life and progress. The Law alone is in a position to solve differences of opinion without completely suppressing them.

The differences between a league, alliance or Confederation of states and a Federal State may be observed in the three following respects; as regards—

1. Their basis; 2. Their structure; 3. Their powers.

Let us examine these three in turn.

I. The Basis of the Association

A Confederation of States, league or alliance—hereafter called a "league" for brevity—is based on a *treaty*, a Federal Union on a *constitution*. Each constitutes a new society: a society composed of pre-existing societies. But they do not evolve in the same institutional and juridical framework: a League is under the jurisdiction of international public law; a Federal State is under that of internal or domestic public law.

A League operates within an international framework, or more precisely, an interstate framework. It is a group of States, not a people. The individual never makes a direct appearance. Between him and the association there intervenes the massive bloc of state col-

lectivities. His individual will is hidden behind that of the State to which he belongs. In this way a League is an aristocratic society, perhaps even an oligarchic one; it disregards the principle of democracy.

A League pact is, of course, subject to amendment. Since it is based exclusively on the will of the States, to revise it requires their unanimous consent and the slow procedure in order to conclude international treaties: Negotiation, signature, and above all, ratification. All of which means that a pact worked out by a League is rarely modified and never amended, thereby crystallizing for an indefinite period of political situation and a balance of forces which are basically temporary. A League of States therefore does not take at all into account social dynamics.

That is why it suffers from congenital weakness and cannot create an indissoluble bond between its members. The latter have the right to secede from the association whenever they see fit. It is not necessary that the right of secession be spelled out in the pact: It is tacitly included. Like any permanent treaty or long-range commitment, the league, alliance or confederate pact is accompanied by the famous clause *"rebus sic stantibus"*: the commitment cannot outlast the situation which brought it into being.

A League is more responsive to political factor than to the rule of law. The former always involves arbitrariness, instability and struggle for power. The associated States, masters of their own fate, carry on within the association the same struggle in which they were engaged before its creation. To realize this, it is sufficient to take a look at the difficulties within the Arab League, the U.N or NATO.

The situation is quite different within a federal union.

A Federation is placed within a constitutional framework, which is to say an intra-state framework. It is a group made up not only of States, but also of peoples. It is therefore both a society of States and a society of individuals. Its strength comes from these two sources: by appealing to the people, it can dominate the States; by appealing to the latter, it can stem popular pressure. In this way, it stands at the juncture where the collective and individual wills meet; whence come its flexibility and its firmness. It establishes a federal democracy half way between the anarchy of international associations and the authoritarianism of centralized democracies.

This is why a federation does not consider its constitution as unchangeable, nor insist on unanimous agreement of the federated States in order to revise it. Any modification is carried through according to the procedure which it itself defines. This procedure generally involves the agreement of a certain number of States: in the U.S.A., three-fourths of the states, two-thirds of Congress; in Switzerland, a majority of the cantons as well as the approval of a

majority of the citizens by means of a referendum. Thus the constitution, without too many jolts or violent shocks, can follow the evolution of the political situation and of the balance of forces.

For the same reason, a federation creates an indissoluble association safeguarded against the fluctuations of the selfish interests of the States. There is no question of the right to secede nor of the clause *"rebus sic stantibus."*

If by chance, as was the case in the U.S. in 1861, certain states seek to secede, to separate, this is rebellion and not the legitimate exercising of a right.

The fact is that the rule of Law is dominant in the life of a federal union. It follows that the various States, by joining in a federation, thereby renounce the use of force. The guarantee of legal procedure is substituted for arbitrary diplomatic procedures. Internal struggles do not automatically cease, of course, but they occur within a legal framework and are settled by recourse to Pascal's "neutral third party," that is to say, a judge.

II. The Institutions

On the institutional level the differences between a league, confederation or alliance of States and a federal State appear to be just as profound. As an interstate association the former type of association is comprised only of intergovernmental institutions and diplomatic machinery.

In the first place, the internal organization of the associated states is kept intact. The existence of the league has no effect whatsoever on the internal structure of their component parts. Although the league possesses an organization distinct of that of its members, this organization, however, is very rudimentary.

In the past, the member States were content to endow it with a single agency of government called a Congress or a Diet. As it was made up of their plenipotentiaries, this agency was nothing more than a permanent diplomatic conference.* Modern leagues such as the various European communities possess a more evolved organization: An assembly of the representative type, a council of ministers, an executive and an administration. However, there is no essential difference. In both cases the will of the individual States prevails over the common authority and the personnel of the home governments yield more influence than the representatives in the Community organizations.

League Depends on Diplomacy

No doubt the collective will of the association cannot be reduced to the sum of the individual will of the various States. The principle of unanimity is not strictly applied. Moreover, it is often substantially a compromise agreed to by the States, but this compromise is nearly always established along the line of greatest resistance, in other words, upon the will power of the most unyielding State. Nor should one be deceived by the multiplicity and variety of the common agencies. In all essential aspects, these agencies preserve their representative national character, with power concentrated in the hands of the Council of Ministers whose character is the most exclusively national of them all.

So it is that, in the traditional as well as in the modern structures of a confederation or alliance, its interstate character remains predominant. Such associations have, properly speaking, neither legislative power, nor executive power, nor judicial power. Usually its decisions assume the character of simple recommendations addressed to the member

*This is true of the NATO Council now.—*Editor.*

States. In order to breathe life into them and to make sure that they are carried out, the league must resort to diplomatic procedures. Either these deliberations are incorporated in a convention signed and ratified by the States, or, after their adoption by the latter, they are incorporated into internal statutes which each State enacts into law. In any case, except in rare cases, they are never applied directly and immediately to individuals.

The same thing holds true in the settling of disputes which may arise within the association. To deal with them the preferred method is to have recourse to International Law: negotiation, good offices, mediations, conciliation, arbitration. The creation of a Federal Court which would impose its jurisdiction on the allied or confederated States is carefully avoided.

Why Federation is More Effective Than Confederation

As distinct from such associations, a federation is endowed with an infinitely more effective organization.

It compromises two kinds of government institutions: federal and national.[1] The individual States possess their legislative bodies, their administrations and their law courts. Each has a constitution which serves as its base and regulates its affairs. In this way federal union preserves their individuality as States. In its turn, the federal constitution institutes the various governing bodies of the Federation. Some of these are in keeping with the double nature of the federation and guarantee the representation of the States as well as of the people. The same is true in the case of the legislative power which comprises two Houses: the body representing the States (the American Senate, the Swiss Council of States), and the body elected by universal suffrage (House of Representatives in the United States, the Federal Assembly in Switzerland).

It is important to note, however, that although each American State, large or small—New York with around 16,000,000 population and Alaska with 160,000— has two Senators, these Senators represent the people, not the government of their State. Unlike diplomatic representatives, they are elected by its people, hold office for six years, are paid by the Federal Treasury, are not subject to instructions by nor responsible in any sense to their State government. Often the Senators from a State belong to one party, while the other party controls the State government. Often the Senators are of opposing parties. Even when they are of the same party they can differ as radically in policy as did the two Republican Senators from Wisconsin in the early 50s—Senators Joseph McCarthy and Senator Alexander Wiley. Thus, in a very real sense, neither the government of a State or even the people (in the sense of a unit) are represented in the U. S. Senate.[2]

Other Federal organs are purely Federal: this is the case of an Executive including the Administration, and the judicial system, headed by a Federal Supreme Court. The organization of a Federation is thus complete as is that of any of the States composing it.

The superiority of a federation is still more marked from another point of view: Its will is not, as that of a league, reduced to a haphazard combination of the wills of its various members; a federal union's will is entirely its own, and is a result of a meeting of wills between the States and the people. It has no need to seek lame compromises; it can take decisions in the light of the general interest, for the common good, showing as much respect for the rights of the States as for the rights of individuals.

This is why, in order to achieve its purpose, a federation follows institutional methods rather than diplomatic means. In this way its decisions take the form of laws with their ordinary attributes: their compulsory aspect and their enforceable character. It is immaterial whether the laws are enforced by the State administration—a system which takes effect immediately and directly; they will be enforced in any case under the direction and control of the federal government.

The settlement of any conflicts likely to arise within the federation will also find a solution through federal institutions. Whether it is a case of disagreements among states, or between the federation and one of the States, or else between one State and the nationals of another State, these litigations will all have to be submitted to the courts, either national or federal, or both in succession.

"Compacts" Within a Union

In this way, the entire political life of a federation becomes institutionalized; in other words, ordered and peaceful. However, this same institutionalization does not preclude recourse to more flexible methods suited to interstate relations. In fact, the Federation often resorts to persuasive methods, encouraging the States to come to terms with each other and to cooperate in such and such a field. It often happens that, before taking any decision, the Federation consults the individual States unofficially. These methods of cooperation which are ineffective when applied to sovereign States, prove rewarding when they are supported by an institutional apparatus.

This is also true of the many "compacts" that in recent years have been made in the U.S.A. between States in the same region or with a particular joint interest. These compacts are made as directly between the State governments as are treaties between sovereign nations. One such compact between the States of New York and New Jersey established the "Port of New York Authority," which administers the harbor both States share. Other interstate compacts govern fishing waters shared by two or more States, or the control and use of rivers that traverse several States. These compacts can be brought before the Federal Courts for interpretation and enforcement—which has no doubt contributed greatly to the fact that these treaties have not suffered the infractions and violations that are common to those between sovereign States not linked by Federal Union.*

(To be concluded in next issue.)

[1] In the U.S.A., federal and state; in Switzerland, federal and cantonal.—*Editor.*

[2] According to Clarence Streit, this does not handicap the Senate in carrying out one of its main purposes in the U.S., namely, to help preserve the division of power between the Union and the State governments which is basic to the federal system. Mr. Streit points out that the fact that the two Senators from a state may have opposing views on any measure, and that each has an equal vote and an equal right to speak for the people of his State (who are always divided in their views, too), gives the people of each State double the opportunity to curb the majority that they would have if both Senators voted as a unit according to the instructions of their State government.

As a representative of the people of a sovereign State, each U. S. Senator (unlike Members of the House) has the right to hold the Floor as long as he can keep speaking. This right—called filibustering when misused—has more than once permitted a single Senator, Mr. Streit notes, to delay or block the whole Congress and Federal Government. "Without the Senate," Mr. Streit writes in *The New Federalist* (p. 54), "there would be little to check the tendency of the central government to encroach on the local government, which can lead to tyranny such as Hitler's. One of his early steps . . . was to abolish state's rights in Germany."

*For a full discussion of these interstate compacts which provide an obvious solution to the purely regional problems of Western Europe and of North America in an Atlantic Federation, see "Interstate Compacts in the U.S.," by F. L. Zimmermann & M. Wendel, in the December, 1951, *Freedom & Union.*

ANNOUNCING

The 1960 Debaters Edition of World Famed

UNION NOW

With Fresh Chapters Added on the Present Situation of the World and of Atlantic Federation

By CLARENCE K. STREIT

The 1949 Postwar paperback edition of UNION NOW is out of print, although Harper & Bros. still have a small number of their clothbound copies of it ($3). In view of the urgent demand by high school debaters and others for this book — which sets forth the original proposal and philosophy of Atlantic Federal Union — we have arranged with Harper & Bros. and with Bantam Books for the latter to print for *Freedom & Union* another edition of this "classic . . . with a life of its own"—to quote the *New York Herald-Tribune*.

UNION NOW has already had seven distinct American editions — with many more printings, and a sale of more than 250,000 copies in U. S., British, French and Swedish editions, since it was first privately printed by the author in 1938 when no publisher would bring it out.

The Library of Congress in December 1958 exhibited UNION NOW in a group of books named for Phi Beta Kappa's *American Scholar* by a distinguished panel it asked to select "the most undeservedly neglected book of the past quarter-century." Erwin Canham, editor of the *Christian Science Monitor* and Past President of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce wrote for that occasion of UNION NOW: "This book may be one of the turning points in history . . . the clearest and most compelling statement of the urgent need of Western unity if civilization is to survive."

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A few months ago Bower Aly, Executive Secretary of the National Committee on Debate Materials for the current interscholastic debate question, wrote: "I wish I knew some man with money and enough perception to supply a copy of UNION NOW to every high school debate squad in the U.S. It is the best single book for our purposes."

The coming edition which aims to meet this need will include the text of the concise 1939 Harper edition of the book unchanged — so that each may judge for himself how this book has stood the test of time — plus several new chapters which the author is now writing. The new edition is expected to be available early in September. It will be paperbacked, and priced 87¢ for single copies, and 50¢ each in orders of 10 or more. Student debaters and teachers may purchase single copis for 50¢ and orders of 10 or more for 40¢ each

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The Little Dog Laughed

Army With a Field Night

Large posters in London advertise for a motion picture promoting the Women Corps of the British Army. The slogans read: "Soldiers by Day—Women by Night."

Fooling the Horses

Quite puzzled, an American tourist, visiting a Soviet collective-farm near Kiev, listened to an elderly man shouting at his horse. The horse wore a huge pair of blinders and was attempting to pull a heavily laden wagon, while the driver shouted: "Davai, Fyodor! Quicker, Lisaveta! Get going, Pyotr! Davai, davai, you miserable pack!" and swung his whip in the air above the horse's head. "Why do you call out all those names? There's only one horse pulling the wagon," queried the stranger. "I do it like the Soviet press, comrade," admitted the old man, "so that the horse thinks that there are others helping him!"

The Pleasure of Having His Say

A group of repatriates to Poland from the U.S.S.R. were being processed at the border. At first they were rather shy of talking to the Polish officials, but finally one of them started a conversation. An official asked him how things were in the Soviet Union?

"Not too bad. I couldn't complain," he said.

"How were wages there?" asked the Polish official.

"Well, we couldn't complain."

"But didn't you have to do forced labor for a while?"

"Yes, sort of, but I really couldn't complain."

"But I thought there wasn't much to eat, and when you got something it was pretty lousy?"

The repatriate shrugged. "I couldn't complain," he said.

"Then what the devil did you come back for?" demanded the official.

"What a question! Here at least I can complain."

Rule of Law

The latest book by Juliet Lowell is "Dear Justice," a collection of unusual letters received by lawyers and jurists. Some samples follow:

Dear Mr. Sedgwick:

When you appeal for reversal of my death sentence, please do the best you can as this means a lot to me. . . .

—*Jack T.*

Dear Mr. Buckman:

I have just looked over the papers you sent me. Don't you think it's a little long for a brief?—*Conrad L.*

Dear Mr. Meyers:

In answer to your query, yes, I was at the American Legion Hall on the night of the raid, but I can't identify the girls. They will be wearing clothes in court.

—*Lawrence K.*

Dear Mr. Josefburg:

Thank you for your offer to represent me but I do not need a lawyer. I am going to tell the truth. . . . —*Laird Y.*

Dear Mr. Geisler:

I am happy to be able to inform you that my husband who was reported missing is now dead. . . .

—*Mrs. Myra O.*

Dear Mr. Riegel:

I understand you are making out a will for Martin Thurstand. He had no children or any living survivor as far as I know. If you can't find a beneficiary, please feel free to use my name. . . .

—*Christian R.*

Dear Mr. Vienot:

The prosecutor still has the carving knife with which my mother-in-law was killed. Will you please get it back for us if you can as it is good and sharp and belongs to a set. . . . —*Mrs. Frank S.*

Forget the Funnies—Read Ads

"Get a steal of a deal from our near-sighted appraiser"

—*Thomas Colt Used Cars*

"Our new chapel is a holy-owned subsidiary."—*St. Marks Methodist Church*

"There is no plate like home"

—*Architectural Forum*

"By the time you have money to burn, the fire has gone out."

—*Wall Street Journal*

*

An old Indian said to his son, "Someday all this land will belong to the red man again. Paleface all go to the moon."



—*Munchner Merkur*

Natural Lesson in Geography

The Atlantic Federal Union Answer

How to keep both peace and freedom—to keep them securely and be done with this lifelong nightmare . . . and enjoy a greater individual liberty and higher standards, spiritual and material?

That is The Question. The answer is to do now between democracies on an oceanic scale what our Fathers did on a continental scale when they established the United States Constitution—form a Federal Union of the Free. We should start by uniting the democracies of the North Atlantic (those of NATO) in a great Federal Republic built of, by and for the thing they all hold dearest and have most in common—the principle of government for the sake of individual life and liberty. This Union of the Free would be designed (a) to provide the free with effective common government in those fields where they agree that such government will clearly serve freedom and peace better than separate governments, and (b) to guarantee the continuance of their independent national governments in all the other fields where such separate governments will serve freedom and peace better than a common government.

An exploratory Convention of Delegates, representing the participating peoples (rather than their governments) would work out a Constitution embodying this division of fields of power, the Union's Executive, Legislative and Judicial Departments, its Bill of Rights, etc. This would then be submitted to the people of each country concerned for full discussion and decision. A commission of 20 U.S. citizens named by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House to organize and participate in a convention with similar delegations from other NATO nations to explore how to unite their peoples more effectively was approved by the Senate June 15 (S. J. Res. 170) and now awaits final approval by the House.

This convention is modelled on the Federal Convention of 1787. Its unique procedure enabled it to reach mankind's first successful answer to this age-old issue—the U. S. Constitution, the original Federal Union of the Free. Although this has proved to be the most astonishing and enduring answer to the problem in all history, the American people have never yet sought to explore its possibilities in this jet-atomic age, nor tried to tackle any international question by the 1787 Convention method which produced the greatest success ever achieved at a conference of sovereign State.

The Federal Union of the Free we advocate is—like the United States itself—an interstate government so constituted as to keep *you,* the citizen, free and sovereign. It puts the accent on the sovereignty of the citizen, rather than on national sovereignty; it keeps the latter the servant of the former, and aims to save the citizen from having his life and liberty sacrificed merely to serve the sovereignty of his nation. It holds that supreme sovereignty in the United States—and in any true democracy—is vested equally in its citizens, rather than in the national government, that so-called national sovereignty is really merely a means to serve the citizen, not something more sacred than the people who made it.

In a Federal Union of the Free, as in your nation or state, you elect the lawmakers, and their laws are enforced on you individually. Power is divided between the Union and your national government. A Federal Union's major powers normally are limited to the right to conduct foreign relations, maintain armed forces, issue currency, regulate interstate commerce and communications between member nations, and grant Union citizenship.

Far from "abolishing the nation," Federal Union would guarantee the right of each nation to govern as independently as it does now all its purely national affairs—namely, every field except the few which it agreed itself were common Atlantic affairs. Each nation would remain free to practice democracy at home in its own language, according to its own customs and in its own way, so long as it did not infringe the Union's Bill of Rights for the citizens.

The proposed Union would be designed to grow gradually by federating with other nations as this became practicable, much as the United States grew from 13 to 50 States. Pending its growth into an eventual government of, by and for all mankind, which is far distant, it would belong to the U. N.

Because the Federal Union Answer would begin federation with the more experienced and like-minded democracies, and because nearly all of these are situated in the North Atlantic Community—the United States, Canada, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, etc.—and are already allies in NATO, our answer is often called Atlantic Union. And because of the title of the book that first gave this answer, and the stress we lay on action in time to prevent another world war or depression, Federal Union is often known as Union Now.

We cordially invite those to whom this answer makes sense to join in giving it as a member of

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—*Drawing from* Het Europese Volk

Europe says: "Common Market . . . Free Trade Area . . . that's not all that I need."

EUROPEAN UNION ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH

By MRS. CHASE S. OSBORN

FEDERATION OF THE SIX NATIONS of the European Common Market, if it goes through, would mean that the citizens of each of the six countries will see their individual sovereignty extended through the five other countries. Every Frenchman, whose country has so often suffered from German invasion, will thenceforward have a voice in *that* affair in West Germany though not, of course, in purely German affairs. For every citizen of West Germany such a union would mean that henceforward he and his country will be equal in the military councils and in the economic and political destiny of Western Europe.

If the armies of France and Germany become indivisible under the same European government, by consent of both peoples, it would mean that they will have gone very far toward wiping out the possibility of another war between them.

European federation would mean for the people of The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg that they would never again be trapped between large, warring neighbors.

Italians in a European federation would never cease to be as proud of Italy as Virginians in the U.S. federation are proud of Virginia. By ceding something of their national sovereignty to the larger and stronger framework of a United Europe, the sadder and wiser peoples of six Western European nations would have invested happily in peace among themselves.

We all see that this would be true and advantageous for Europeans; does it not apply as much—if not even more—to us and them, if we all federate in an Atlantic Union? The bad habits of many wars between the French and Germans would surely be ended sooner and more surely if, instead of facing each other as the two main peoples (and potential rivals) in a European federation, they were federal partners at the same time with the Americans, British and Canadians in an Atlantic Union.

However much a European federation may make for peace between the peoples who create it, there would still remain grave dangers in the relationships of their larger government with the world around it. There are, indeed, already heated problems of trade between the European Six and the European Seven—which are sharpening the threat from Moscow, particularly the sword that hangs over Berlin.

Might not European political Union divide and weaken the West even more, at an hour when the free need to be strongly united?

With its fresh developing armed might, and its prosperous trade lines already laid in the new nations around the world where it is unembarrassed by a recent imperial past, might not West Germany soon dominate a United Europe? Might not West Germany split off from the infant Union, become, if not an enemy, a third force, bargaining for its own peace and betterment alternately with both sides? To bring Germany within the larger, stronger framework of an Atlantic Union would surely be a far better safeguard for peace.

The regional peace of a United Europe would be no guarantee of security for us Americans or for any of the West

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Stellanova Osborn, widow of the distinguished Governor Chase S. Osborn of Michigan, was educated in public schools in Hamilton, Canada, and at the University of Michigan, where she became a Phi Beta Kappa and earned a master's degree in medieval English.

She has pioneered for Atlantic federation in a number of European countries—notably in Germany, the Netherlands, Iceland—as a member of the Board of Governors of the Atlantic Union Committee and as North American Secretary of the International Movement for Atlantic Union.

not in the European Union. A European Union could even aggravate the German problem with Russia. Let us not forget how a wrong settlement of the German problem after World War I contributed to World War II.

Russia, calling the situation in Berlin abnormal, is pushing for its own kind of settlement there. Its inflexible terms are the withdrawal of Western protection from the Western sector of the city, leaving it helpless.

There are those, in both East and West, who propose withdrawal of military forces from all of Germany, leaving all of Germany a neutral zone. One objection to this is that it would let the Russians withdraw a few hundred miles to firm footing on the Eurasian mainland, while the West would have to withdraw to North America, or to a narrow fringe of Europe that would offer no foothold against a surprise Soviet return—like the infamous one in Hungary.

Union Must Be Atlantic in Scale

Small wonder that the people in West Germany and West Berlin oppose this solution. Their voice must surely weigh, and it is for strong unity with the West. Even most Socialists, who often look askance at NATO and West Germany's military build-up, want West Germany to stay with the West. It is also safe to say that the West German people want a tie with the West that will be permanent. Some of them wish to wait a while to see if East Germany cannot first be regained, but many more wish to go ahead quickly into a permanent Atlantic union and wait for that union to attract the East Germans back to them at some time in the future. West German leaders, realizing that European Union is not big enough, increasingly believe that the Union must be Atlantic in scale.

It is time the American people became aware of the tremendous opportunity that is ours to discuss this possibility with them. The people of West Berlin and West Germany cannot express their opinion about the desirability of federating with us, as well as the European Six, until we express our willingness to discuss such a relationship with them. The initiative is ours.

We cannot otherwise escape the Berlin-German danger. To retreat before the threats of Moscow would be weak. It would be weak also to agree to a withdrawal, "compensated" by Russian withdrawal from East Germany. (Moscow wishes to "buy" our withdrawal with the withdrawal they refused to make at the time England, France, and the U. S. gave up their zones in occupied Germany.)

To Restore German Morale

Without any belligerency, we can give the strongest possible answer—based both on defense good sense and moral principle—by exploring with the West German people and our other NATO allies the proposition: "That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should be transformed into a federal government."

If, in that non-academic debate, the affirmative should win—which seems fairly certain, so far as the West Germans are concerned—a number of good things would happen at once. First, it would advance the settlement of the German problem. It would provide the soundest possible legal foundation for West Berlin's claim that it is a part of the West. It would give the West German people the inner satisfaction of gaining full citizenship and full partnership in the West—the restoration of German morale which has been in bad order ever since the Treaty of Versailles.

While facilitating German contributions to the military strength of Atlantica, it would remove the danger of a renewal of national German military power. It would thus erase the fear of the latter that haunts Eastern Europe, many NATO countries, and many of the West German people themselves.

What would such an Atlantic Union mean for us Americans? It would mean a sound approach to many dangerous problems—in particular, the German one; the stirring gain of secure partners of great and varied powers; the tremendous augmentation of our industrial capacity; and the better preservation and growth of all the treasures of our common Atlantic culture. Strength instead of weakness, great hope instead of fear, great progressive purpose instead of paralyzed confusion—all this we can gain by Atlantic Federal Union. Western Europeans have shown they have the vision and courage to move toward federation. Have not we Americans—who invented Federal Union?

It is worth noting that, whereas Communism approaches the problem of "consolidation for peace" by getting students to riot, American students are approaching it by discussion and debate.



—Ficklen, The Dallas News

European federal shield is too little to bar the Russian "b'ar."

The "Gospel" of Red World Government, According to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, & Mr. K

By ELLIOT R. GOODMAN

This is the first in a series of eight articles drawn from *The Soviet Design for a World State* and condensed for *Freedom & Union* by its author, Dr. Goodman. He is associate professor of political science at Brown University in Providence, R. I.

We are privileged to run this series exclusively by special permission of the Columbia University Press, which published his book last Spring. In February we ran an article, "Moscow's Grand Design . . . and Washington's Inapt Answer," drawn from its concluding chapter; reprints of it are available from us for 10c each.

In a foreword to the book, Philip Mosely, head of Columbia's Russian Intitute under whom Dr. Goodman studied, says that he is "able to assure his readers that Professor Goodman approached his subject without predetermined conclusions, that he has built up his findings piecemeal through a conscientious examination of both ideology and action, and that the powerful structure of his analysis stands firmly on the bedrock of evidence."

This article is a digest of chapters 1 and 2. The book, clothbound, 512 pp., can be had for $6.75 from us, or the publisher, or at bookstores.—*Editors.*

MARX LIVED IN A WORLD of nation-states, and yet it was not the struggle between nations but the class struggle that held his attention. He believed that the tangible economic interests that unite social classes are stronger and more important than the more intangible complex of interests and emotions called nationalism.

Since Marx viewed society as a dynamic, constantly changing organism, nations would have an end, just as they had had a beginning. Once international class warfare had engulfed all nations, the loyalties that bound men to nations would be readily dissolved and absorbed by the higher interests of an international class.

In *The Communist Manifesto* in 1848 Marx and Engels raised the battle cry, "the workers have no country," but it would be a mistake to take this at face value. The *Manifesto* explains, "we cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself *the* nation, it is, so far, itself, national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word." Apparently Marx and Engels meant that no worker could rightfully call his country his own until the exploiting bourgeoisie had first been overthrown.

Engels even doubted that an isolated national revolution would be possible. In his *Principles of Communism*, written in 1847, Engels asked: "Can this [proletarian] revolution take place in merely one country?

The answer is no. Large-scale industry, by creating the world market, has established so close a connection among all the peoples of the globe, especially in the case of the civilized peoples, that each of them depends on what happens to the other. Then, too, large-scale industry has so levelled the social development in all civilized countries that everywhere the bourgeoisie and the proletariat have become the two determining social classes, and the struggle between them is the chief struggle of our time. The Communist revolution, therefore, will not be merely national, but will take place simultaneously in all civilized countries; that is, at least in England, America, France and Germany. . . . It is a world revolution and will, therefore, have the whole world as its arena.

It is clear that he and Marx did not expect the revolution to start in Russia. but in the advanced industrial nations of the world. But when Marx began to study conditions in Russia in his later years, he discerned so great a potential for revolution there that he had to reconsider the order in which revolutions might occur. Any shock to the Tsarist autocracy, he wrote hopefully at the time of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, might permit the East to be more revolutionary than the West.

When the world had become unified under socialism, Marx and Engels believed, all tensions between nations would be so diminished that all hateful differences, rivalries, national exploitation, and wars would be utterly erased from the face of the earth. While international socialism was not expected to produce a universal cultural uniformity, at least not at first, Marx and Engels apparently believed that all harmful differences between nations would soon be doomed to oblivion.

Their *Communist Manifesto* said: The national differences and antagonisms between people are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to the uniformity in the mode of production and in the corresponding conditions of life. The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. . . . In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put to an end, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put to an end. In proportion as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, so will



Marx favored a highly centralized world dictatorship.

the hostility of one nation to another come to an end.

This reduces all the causes that might lead to war to one phenomenon: the economic exploitation of man by man. Marx could not conceive of man being oppressed and exploited by the exercise of *political* power in a state that had socialized all forms of property, since, for him, political power did not exist as a force in its own right, capable of exploitation regardless of the economic base upon which it rested. He would not concede that the love of power might be more dangerous than the love of money, or that the two might ever be separated.

Engels expressed the corollary of this idea, namely, that so long as capitalism existed, neither a just world order nor a lasting peace could be attained. He blamed the liberal, bourgeois democratic leaders of the Revolution of 1848 for dangling before the people a vision of world order which, he insisted, could only issue from a world proletarian revolution. "We have often enough called attention to the fact that the gentle dreams . . . such as the sentimental fantasies of a universal brotherhood of peoples, of a European Federative Republic and eternal world peace, were basically nothing more than the disguises for the boundless perplexity and inactivity of the spokesmen of the time."

Engels alluded to the state form of this future brotherhood of nations as a "World Republic." During the lifetime of Marx and Engels, the abortive and scattered attempts of the proletariat to seize and organize state power in the Revolution of 1848 were crowned with the momentary success of the Paris Commune of 1871. The Paris Commune foreshadowed the coming of a proletarian world state, and for this reason Engels hailed the motto of the Communards that "the flag of the Commune is the flag of the World Republic." Marx characterized the state form of this World Republic as a "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat," designed to endure for a transitional interim, "a period of revolutionary transformation" lying "between capitalist and Communist society."

When the proletariat had established its revolutionary dictatorship throughout the world, would each nation have its own dictatorship of the proletariat, with the various nations loosely bound by some sort of confederate or federal tie in a World Republic, or would there be one highly centralized dictatorship of the proletariat for the entire world? If we were to frame an answer based solely on economic considerations, it would seem undeniable that Marx would have preferred centralization to federation. Capitalism had already made the existing national state obsolete, and national seclusion and self sufficiency were becoming more and more impossible. Marx criticized Proudhon, who advocated a loose federalist structure, on the grounds that only a thoroughly integrated, centralized society could provide that highly productive economy upon which socialism was to be based. In *The Civil War in France* Marx praised the Commune of 1871 for its alleged rejection of federalism. Engels in his 1891 introduction to this work concluded that "the proletariat can only use the form of the one and indivisible republic."

Though Marx and Engels rejected federalism on economic grounds, it seems that in certain exceptional cases involving difficulties among ethnic groups Marx did condone federation as a second-best. But when Marx considered federation, it always seemed to come as an afterthought. Neither he nor Engels paid much attention to the possibilities of federalism as a serious political principle which could be used to ease the national problem within a multi-national union.

They had no theory for the self-determination of nations which might point the way to the evolution of a higher unity of nations, no consistent policy for the liberation of subject nations to bring them to a status of independence, and no program for their further integration, as nations, into a world society.

Certainly nationality would have no special claim in their world proletarian state, since Marx and Engels specifically stated in 1846 in *German Ideology* that "the Communist revolution . . . is in itself the expression of the dissolution of all classes, nationalities, etc., within present society."

Once the world proletarian revolution had succeeded, it would seem that Marx favored a highly centralized world dictatorship of the proletariat, modified by the federal principle only if necessary, and then only as a transitory measure to complete centralism. . . . As the world state withered away, nations would fuse, and the ultimate world community would evolve from an international into a cosmopolitan world society.

How have the Soviet leaders developed their Marxist heritage? First, let us see if they have made the world state an explicit Soviet goal.

The World State as an Explicit Soviet Goal

The Bolsheviks inherited the Marxist belief that the age of nationalism was but a momentary stage in history, and that the capitalist nation-state system was destined to be transformed into a socialist world state. This led the Bolshevik theoreticians to make a number of explicit pronouncements on their goal.

The early writings of Lenin and Stalin on the nationality problem were concerned primarily with the difficulty of organizing the proletariat on an international scale, and though the objective of a proletarian world state could be implied throughout, it was not Lenin or Stalin, but Trotsky who first began to articulate the goal of a world state.

In October, 1913, Lenin supplied an important insight into the complex development of national states, by emphasizing the dual and contradictory processes in their growth.

Developing capitalism knows two historical tendencies in the national question. First, the awakening of national life and national movements, the struggle against all national oppression, and the creation of national states. Second, the development and acceleration of all kinds of intercourse between nations, the breakdown of national barriers, the creation of the international unity of capital, of economic life in general, of politics, science, etc. Both tendencies are a world-wide law of capitalism. The first predominates at the beginning of its development, the second characterizes mature capitalism that is moving towards

its transformation into socialist society.

This formula, like others before it, assumed that the nation-state was the highest political authority that the bourgeoisie was capable of producing and that the transformation of a world capitalist society into a world socialist society would elevate the level of highest political authority from nation-states to a world state. But Lenin went beyond this by drawing a distinction between an incipient and a mature nationalism under the bourgeoisie, indicating that a nation-state could be a progressive or a reactionary symbol, depending upon its stage of development. This subtlety was overlooked by some of Lenin's associates, who took little notice of the uneven rate at which different nations had developed. Their tendency to attribute virtue only to the proletarian world state, and evil to all bourgeois nation-states, led them into a violent conflict with him.



—Lewis, Milwaukee Journal

"The Russian Soviet Republic," said Steklov when introducing the Constitution before the 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets in 1918, "sooner or later will be surrounded by daughter and sister Republics, which uniting will lay the basis for a federation, first of Europe, and then of the entire world."

At the outbreak of World War I, Lenin and Trotsky attacked the Social Democrats of the Second International who came to the defense of their bourgeois fatherlands, first, because it was a bourgeois fatherland that they were defending, and second, because these fatherlands were too small to encompass the forces of a world socialist revolution. "The proletariat can have no interest in defending the outlived and antiquated national 'fatherland,'" Trotsky asserted. "The task of the proletariat is to create a far more powerful fatherland . . . the republican United States of Europe, as the foundation of the United States of the World.

Similarly, Lenin insisted that "the proletariat must not participate in the defense of the old framework of bourgeois states, but must create a new framework of socialist republics."

The socialist movement cannot be victorious within the old framework of the fatherland. It creates new, higher forms of human life under which the best demands and progressive tendencies of the laboring masses of all nationalities will be fully satisfied in an international unity while the present national partitions are destroyed.

By August, 1915, Lenin was declaring that "the United States of the World . . . coincides with socialism." "The United States of the World (and not just of Europe) is that state form for the unification and freedom of nations which we identify with socialism." However, he cautioned against using "the United States of the World" as an immediate tactical slogan, since it might cause some socialists to ignore the uneven rate at which different capitalist nations had developed, as well as the possible necessity for achieving socialist world state only through a series of stages.

What was objectively necessary was also supremely desirable. The creation of this world state was considered part of a preordained process of man's salvation. This was a secular vision of human redemption, since its appearance was to symbolize the end of all forms of human oppression and exploitation. It was this vision that infused the Bolshevik Revolution with its dynamic and universal character, and it was under the spell of this image that all sacrifices could be justified.

"Union of the Oppressed"

The Bolsheviks assumed that their coup d'état in Russia was only the first step toward the creation of a Soviet world state. On Nov. 8, 1917, Trotsky announced to the Second Congress of Soviets: "The union of the oppressed everywhere. That is our course." Lenin appealed to the proletariat of all countries to fight for a Soviet world state, since it alone could produce the millennium of world peace.

By the time the Third Congress of Soviets had convened in January, 1918, Lenin was predicting confidently that "a new era in the history of the world" had begun. He told the Congress that the state power that the proletariat had seized in Russia "pointed the way toward the future socialist structure of the whole world, for the toilers of all countries." It was Lenin's expectation that "the time was not far distant when the toilers of all countries will unite in a single world state."

The Soviet leaders looked upon the Constitution of the newly formed Russian Soviet Federated Socalist Republic as a tangible symbol of their future world state. Steklov, who introduced the Constitution before the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in July, 1918, made it clear that this new state was to be more than a nucleus for reuniting those territories that had been torn away from Russia: "The Russian Soviet Republic sooner or later will be surrounded by daughter and sister Republics, which uniting will lay the basis for a federation, first of Europe, and then of the entire world."

Lenin felt certain that the task before the Russian workers was to "maintain the power of the Soviets till the working class of all countries revolts and raises aloft the banner of a World Socialist Republic!"

Bukharin, in his widely distributed

pamphlet of 1918, *Program of the Communists*, also called upon the proletariat of the world to revolt and create a world state: "Overthrow of the imperialist governments by armed uprisings and the organization of the International Republic of Soviets—that is the way to the international dictatorship of the working class." He particularly directed the messianic appeal of this world state to the backward and oppressed areas of the world.

At the founding of the Communist International (Comintern) in March, 1919, its Executive Committee plainly stated its purpose of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and of laying the foundations for an International Soviet Republic. The Platform proclaimed that the proletariat must "wipe out boundaries between states, transform the whole world into one cooperative commonwealth, and realize the freedom and brotherhood of nations."

All through 1919 there was hardly a public statement that Lenin made on any topic which did not include some reference to the world state, even the expectation of its imminent realization.

On March 31, 1919, for example, he declared: "It will not be long and we shall see the victory of communism in the entire world; we shall see the founding of a World-wide Federal Republic of Soviets." This outcome was inevitable for Lenin. In the short-lived Soviet Republics of Hungary and Bavaria that spring Lenin saw the beginning of a rapid-fire chain reaction. "Every day brings news that the red flag of liberation has been raised first in one place and then in another. . . . You will soon see how the World Federal Republic of Soviets will come into being."

That summer Lenin even set a date by which it would be created. "We say with conviction . . . that by next July, we shall greet the victory of the International Soviet Republic, and that this victory will be complete and irreversible." This probably marked the high point of Lenin's hopes.

Despite later reverses, he maintained that "this struggle will end in the victory of a World-wide Soviet Republic," adding somewhat apologetically, "it is only a question of time."

At the end of 1919 Lenin addressed an appeal to the Ukraine, which was then a separate republic, urging it to prepare for a union with the RSFSR as an example for "the creation of a World Federated Soviet Republic," because

> We are opponents of national hostility, national antagonisms, and of national particularism. We are internationalists. We aim at the firm union and full fusion of the workers and peasants of all nations of the world into one World-wide Soviet Republic.

When the Second Comintern Congress opened in July, 1920, and Lenin's prophecy of the previous July had proven false, Soviet leaders began lengthening the time span required for the birth of the world state. Zinoviev, its President, admitted that "perhaps we were carried away by our enthusiasm, perhaps it is true that not one year, but two or three years will be necessary before all Europe becomes Soviet."

Red World State Held "Inevitable"

The end of 1922 witnessed the formation of the U.S.S.R. One theme ran through all the speeches and declarations: The U.S.S.R. is not an end in itself, but rather the embryo of a Soviet world state. In his speech of Dec. 26, 1922, to the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, Stalin reiterated the proposition that the collective ownership of property facilitates the collection of nations into a higher unity. Soviet power, based on collective property, "is so constructed that being international by its intrinsic nature, it systematically fosters the idea of unity among the masses and impels them toward amalgamation." The unification of nations in a world state was depicted as the unraveling of the inexorable forces of history.

On Dec. 30, the Congress of Soviets approved a treaty creating the U.S.S.R. The same day its First Congress of Soviets was convoked. Before this gathering Stalin repeated his view of the meaning of the act of union. Stalin then read to the Congress the Declaration of Union, which was subsequently incorporated as Part I of the Constitution. The Constitution received final approval at the Second Congress of Soviets of the USSR on Jan. 31, 1924. The Declaration of Union anticipated the growth of the USSR into a world state by including the specific provision "that admission to the union is open to all Socialist Soviet Republics, both those now in existence and those which will arise in the future." The Declaration added that "the new union state is . . . a new decisive advance toward the amalgamation of the toilers of all countries into a World Socialist Soviet Republic."

Stalin used the occasion of Lenin's death in January, 1924,, to intone the solemn vow to expand the Soviet Union into a world state.

> In departing from us, Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us the duty of strengthening and expanding the Union of Republics. We vow to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will honorably fulfill this, your bequest. . . . Lenin never regarded the Republic of Soviets as an end in itself. He always regarded it as a necessary link for . . . facilitating the victory of the toilers of the whole world over capital. Lenin knew that only such an interpretation is the correct one, not only from the international point of view, but also from the point of view of preserving the Republic of Soviets itself.

Lenin bequeathed to us the duty of remaining loyal to the principles of the Communist International. We vow to you, Comrade Lenin, that we will not spare our lives to strengthen and expand the union of the toilers of the whole world.

When the Comintern Program was presented to the Sixth Comintern Congress, in August, 1928, Stalin commended its formula for expanding the Soviet federation: "The draft puts in place of the slogan of the United States of Europe, the slogan of a federation of Soviet Republics of advanced countries and colonies that have fallen away or are falling away from the imperialist system." The Program accordingly devoted special attention to the prospect of joining the colonial areas to the Soviet Union. Ultimately the time will come when "the federation of these Republics has finally been transformed into a *World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, uniting the whole of mankind under the hegemony of the international proletariat organized as a state."

In the meantime the workers of all nations must look to the USSR which "is the prototype of those fraternal relations among nationalities of all countries which will exist in the World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the prototype of that economic unity of the toilers of all countries operating within a single world socialist economy, which the world proletariat must establish, once it has conquered state power."

In March, 1929, Stalin wrote an essay on *The National Question and Leninism,* published for the first time only in 1949. Looking forward to "the period of the victory of socialism on a world-wide scale," Stalin said that this period would be distinguished by the fact that "nations will unite in one world socialist economic system and will thereby create the real conditions necessary for the gradual fusion of all nations into one whole.

Because of the failure of the Soviet regime to fulfill its early expectations and to create a world state in short order, a gradual, but decided, change took place, however, in Soviet thinking. Starting with the theory of "socialism in one country," Stalin gave priority to building up a strong, highly industrialized state which, competing for survival in a world of nation-states, itself took on some of the familiar features of other nation-states. Part of the transformation involved a rebirth of Russian nationalism.

This shift in tactics had the effect of sharply reducing the number of forthright and explicit statements on the objective of a Soviet world state, since it led to an increasing reliance upon the traditional weapons and terminology of national diplomacy.

Can this policy of retreat be equated with abandonment of the fundamental, long-range objective of a world state? It would seem prudent to recall some of Stalin's prior theoretical pronouncements, such as, for example, his warning of 1924 that it was not enough to know how to attack. Citing a passage from Lenin, Stalin said that the proletariat "must understand that it is necessary to supplement this knowledge with the knowledge of how to retreat properly." Only by learning to use and to alternate both of these techniques will victory be possible. Stalin was very clear about the purpose of a period of retreat. It was "to gain time, to disintegrate the enemy, and to accumulate forces in order to assure the offensive later on."

The Seventh Comintern Congress, meeting in July and August, 1935, epitomized the height of this conciliatory period. Its speeches were cast in the phraseology of nationalism, but a careful reading makes it apparent that nationalism was interpreted in the Soviet lexicon in a manner that made it entirely consistent with an abiding design for a Soviet world state. Dimitrov as head of the Comintern said:

"The wheel of history is turning forward and will continue to turn forward toward a World-wide Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The new 1936 Constitution for the USSR likewise reflected the period of retreat in which it was written. Gone was the open assertion of the 1924 Constitution that the USSR was the nucleus of a world state. The closest this idea came to receiving open expression in the 1936 version was article 143, which provided that the official motto of the USSR remain, "Workers of All Countries, Unite!" However, Stalin continued to nurture the messianic image of the USSR as a model union of nations, as the fulfillment of what "millions of honest people in imperialist countries have dreamed of and still dream of."

Hails "Indefinite Expansion"

With the signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August, 1939, the period of retreat was transformed into a period of advance. Within a year the Soviet Union had swallowed a piece of Finland, the three Baltic States, the western Ukraine, western Belorussia, northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, and was set for bigger stakes. An editorial in *The Communist International* of September, 1940, represented this expansion of the USSR as "an outstanding example of a genuine solution of the national question, making possible the peaceful and fraternal collaboration of numerous peoples within a multinational socialist state. The increase in the number of Soviet Constituent Republics from 11 to 16 . . . is a brilliant confirmation of the correctness of the national policy of Lenin and Stalin." But these limited accretions were considered merely the beginning of a process of indefinite expansion, according to another 1940 editorial in *The Communist International.*

Upon Hitler's attack in 1941, the Soviet regime was forced into a new period of retreat. The aggressive goal of a world state disappeared from Soviet writings. On May 15, 1943, Stalin dissolved the Comintern, a move most likely designed as a further encouragement to the Allies to give all-out aid in the common fight against the Axis. Again, as in the mid-1930s, many non-Soviet observers declared that the Soviet Union was really just another national state, with no desire, either apparent or latent, to transform itself into a world state.

Yet it would be dangerous to assume that the goal of a world state is no longer of any importance to the Soviet leaders. It is more likely that this goal is now regarded as the object of achievement of a number of generations of future Soviet citizens. Though there has been a decided lowering in the level of expectation as to its immediate attainment, the goal itself remains as the polestar of Soviet policy.

The years since the Second World War have been marked once more by a flurry of direct statements about a Soviet world state. On the occasion of Stalin's seventieth birthday in 1949 several works on the nationality problem were published by members of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, some of which were given a wide distribution both in the Soviet Union and in foreign languages, including English. One of these, by M. D. Kammari, stated that "Stalin appraised the creation of the U.S.S.R. . . . as a new and decisive step towards the amalgamation of the working peoples of all countries into a single World Socialist Republic, as the prototype of such an amalgamation."

The subsequent denigration of Stalin in no way affected the theme that the U.S.S.R. is the model for the future organization of all mankind. In July, 1956, for example, *Pravda* pointed to "Lenin's concern about implementing a correct nationality policy, about the need to strengthen untiringly the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics . . . in the interests of all mankind. The relations among the peoples of the Soviet Union, based on equality and friendship, Lenin noted, will have enormous significance as the model for the peoples of the whole world.

Similarly, in 1958 a Soviet ideologue, E. Modrzhianskaia, reiterated the validity of Lenin's vision for the future of mankind.

Lenin repeatedly emphasized that Communists are confirmed opponents of national enmity, of national separation, of national isolation. "We are internationalists. We aim at the close union and full fusion

of the workers and peasants of all nations of the world." . . . The fusion of nations remains the aim of Communists. . . . The unification of peoples in a single world economy is conceivable only on the basis of the destruction of the entire imperialist system and the victory of socialism. . . . There can be no other basis for the future merger and union of nations.

Finally, on March 27, 1959, Khrushchev speculated upon the nature of the future world Communist society in which nations would no longer be partitioned off from each other as sovereign independent units in a nation-state system:

With the victory of communism on a world-wide scale, borders between states will disappear, as Marxism-Leninism teaches. In all likelihood only ethnic borders will survive for a time. . . . They will simply demarcate the historically formed location of a given people or nationality in a given territory. That this will be so is shown by the process going on in the Soviet Union, which is a multinational state.

Khrushchev looked forward to the amalgamation of nations in a single Communist family. The question of borders as it is presently conceived will gradually cease to exist. No sovereign socialist country can shut itself up within its own borders and rely solely upon its own forces and its own wealth. If this were the case, we would not be Communist internationalists but would become national socialists.

Reiterating the familiar image of the future fusion of all nations into a single world economic unit, Khrushchev continued:

It seems to me that the further development of the socialist countries will in all probability proceed along the lines of the consolidation of a single world socialist economic system. The economic barriers that divided countries under capitalism will fall one after another. The common economic foundation of world socialism will grow stronger, eventually rendering pointless the question of borders.

Thus, direct and open avowals on the objective of a Soviet world state have continued to appear in official Soviet sources. This has been true despite the strong trend in recent years to disguise these intentions by the heavy use of national symbols and by reference to the theories of "socialism in one country" and "peaceful coexistence" with the non-Soviet world. To a discussion of these hidden and indirect methods of stating the goal of a Soviet world state we shall turn later. (*To be continued.*)

Young Soldier Advises Student Debater

NOTE: This is an excerpt from a letter I wrote, as a former inter-scholastic and inter-collegiate debater, to my sister, Helen, on July 21, 1918. I was then 22, and serving in France as a sergeant in the American Expeditionary Force.—CLARENCE K. STREIT

You wanted the sum of my knowledge of debating . . . I am pleased to see the interest you are taking in public speaking and debating. The latter is good training if you don't let it get the best of you and become merely an arguer. You know, in all school contests, so much emphasis is placed on winning the contest that the vote of the judges has come to assume far more importance than it should. A debate should be a search for the truth by means of placing in contrasting relief the arguments on both sides of a question. It is a strong temptation in the heat of a debate to employ arguments and facts which one knows are not true in the hope that the opponent will not know his subject well enough to detect the falsity. And especially is that temptation strong for the last speaker, for he knows the other side has no chance to answer him.

For my part, Helen, I don't think the personal or school glory of victory is worth such a price. If you don't believe in your side of the question, after you have studied it thoroughly, I wouldn't argue for it. And if I did argue its good points I would never employ arguments which could not stand up against my own reason. Sincerity is a far better ally for the debater than clever sophism. Train yourself, by debating, not to express merely *an* opinion, but *your* opinion . . . to express clearly your ideas on whatever questions may come up.

"Use Your Own Style" but "Be Simple"

As for the manner of expression, use your own style. Don't follow any stiff form too much. Study your question first—go to Poole's index, etc., search for references, read them, both sides of the question, noting down points that strike you as important and copy short quotations of opinion by men who have studied the question enough to be considered as authorities. But use these opinions sparingly, merely as re-forcements for the facts in the case. (In quoting any one, mention where and when he made the statement and why his opinion is entitled to special consideration in the question concerned. Thus the author, Sir Gilbert Parker's opinion would be perhaps of value on a literary question, but as a recommendation for a medicine, it is of no more value than that of any man who has not studied medicine or dietetics.)

When you have got the broad outlines of the subject arranged in your head, you can sketch out an outline. In it arrange your material so that it will drive home with the force of cumulated fact, logic and clearness. Arrange your material so that your argument keeps getting stronger and stronger, leading up to your trump cards for climax. Reiteration is often useful for emphasis but don't use it in a rubber-stamp way. Put some life into it. Always try to be persuasive. Don't try to cover too much. Better take two or three of the main arguments, show why they are the more important (do this in a few words) and treat them as thoroughly as possible.

And in time of refutation, don't permit your opponent to befuddle the debate with petty details. If he doesn't answer the main arguments you put out, point this out and do it strongly. Then take up his big arguments and answer them, or point out that, if true, they aren't important enough to uphold his side.

Be simple in your language and use short sentences. Remember the audience—talk to it, not the judges—does not know as much about the subject as you, and it is up to you to acquaint them in 10 or 15 minutes' talk with the results of several months of work.

Answering Questions on Atlantic Union

Wouldn't the British, Canadians, French and others fear that they would be outvoted by us in an Atlantic Union Congress, since there would be more American members than theirs, with representation on a population basis?

No doubt some of them will object on this ground, but the objection is easy to answer. If this isn't a fair basis, then Ontario should give Alberta an equal voice with it in the Canadian Parliament, and England should give an equal voice to Scotland.

As a matter of fact, we borrowed from the English the idea of representation on a population basis when we drafted our Federal Constitution. There was a very sharp fight in the Convention on this question of putting representation in the Union government on a population basis, for the small states were afraid they would then be dominated by the larger ones. Benjamin Franklin then helped save the day by pointing to the example of the United Kingdom. He said (Madison noted):

"I do not at present clearly see what advantage the greater States could propose to themselves by swallowing the smaller, and therefore do not apprehend they would attempt it. I recollect that in the beginning of this Century, when the Union was proposed of the two Kingdoms, England & Scotland, the Scotch Patriots were full of fears, that unless they had an equal number of representatives in Parliament, they should be ruined by the superiority of the English. They finally agreed however that the different proportions of importance in the Union of the two Nations should be attended to, whereby they were to have only forty members in the House of Commons, and only sixteen in the House of Lords; A very great inferiority of numbers! And yet to this day I do not recollect that any thing has been done in the Parliament of Great Britain to the prejudice of Scotland; and whoever looks over the lists of public officers, Civil & military of that nation will find I believe that the North Britons enjoy at least their full proportion of emolument."

The American contribution to this problem was to safeguard the position of the small states much more than England did with Scotland; this was done by giving each state two Senators, while putting representation in the House on a population basis. Since experience proves that no small state has suffered under the Federal Union system, there is no cause now for the British or others to fear we would "swallow" them.

Granted, our small states do not feel in an inferior position. Yet you would think there might be some danger to them in this inequality. Why isn't there any?

Because there is no real inequality between the people of the large and small states in a Federal Union. In the division of powers between the Union and the state governments, all the state governments, large and small, get exactly the same powers. Pennsylvania has no more rights than Delaware, and the whole Union guarantees every small state from encroachment by its larger neighbors. Moreover, as regards the powers given the Union government, the citizen of the small state is at no disadvantage; he has the same voice as the voter in the large state in exercising these powers because the Union representatives are apportioned according to the number of citizens. And so in an Atlantic Union a Canadian would gain no greater power by moving here, and Americans moving to Canada would lose no power.

Would the party system help remove the fear of one state dominating another in an Atlantic Union?

Of course, it would be a great help. Once power is based on the citizen, as in a Federal Union, the party system can operate, whereas it cannot work in a league or alliance, where each state has only one vote, which is cast by the party governing it. Once the Atlantic Union is formed, the divisions in the Union government would be along party lines, and no longer between British and Americans, French and Germans, etc. American, British, French, German and other conservatives would be voting together against American, British, French, German and other liberals. The lines of capital and labor would divide Union citizens in the different member nations as they now divide New Yorkers and Pennsylvanians. The Americans and Canadians who came to the Union Congress from the wheat belt in their countries would vote together where wheat was concerned, just as the representatives from the Dakotas, Nebraska, Kansas and other wheat states now make common cause in Washington.

No doubt one of the first party divisions in an Atlantic Union would be between those now working in each democracy for the establishment of the Union and those opposing it—between the Federal Unionists and the nationalists. Curiously enough, establishment of the Union would serve to bring together in one party the extreme American, British, French and other nationalists who now criticize each other so—just as the creation of the American Union brought the nationalists of that time together to defend state's rights.

Could not Russia unite the other nations against an Atlantic Union?

How? It could not gain new satellites by force, for that would be challenging the Union, and risking atomic war. Because of its relative weakness in sea power, Russia could hardly hope to unite any nations with it, except those on its borders. These have the least motive to join it voluntarily. The Atlantic Union would be no threat to them. Rather, it would be their best guarantee against absorption by Russia, and their best hope for recovery. Any serious attempt at Russian expansionism would encourage the Union to admit more countries to it. It could do this far more easily than Russia could unite them against it.

Would not creation of an Atlantic Federation divide the world dangerously into two camps?

No. It would remove the *danger* from the existing division. The danger of war in such division is in direct ratio to the strength of dictatorship compared to the free. The greater the possibility of the dictator's conquering the free, the more willing they both are to fight; remove this possibility and you practically remove the danger of war. Whereas many fear war between the U.S. and Russia now, no one feared was between the U.S. and the Soviet dictatorship in the 20s and 30s, when Russia was relatively much weaker.

Isn't this power politics?

Not unless the U.N. and all plans to change it into a world government are power politics. They all seek to put such preponderant power behind peace that no aggressor will attack. The difference in this respect between the Atlantic Federal Union plan and all others is that it does this effectively, and they do not. World government plans are based, like the U.N. itself, on the assumption that the greater the number of nations in an organization—no matter how diverse they are—the greater the power behind peace. But the greater the number and the diversity of the founders, the looser and more unreliable their organization is bound to be. And so this

Debaters—Send your questions about Atlantic Federal Union to us and our Mr. Unifedat (created with little cost and without any electronics) will try to answer them. Each month during the debating season we shall publish answers to the questions of widest interest. This month Clarence Streit is Mr. Unifedat.—Editors.

method fails to put preponderant power behind peace—or world development. The Atlantic Federal Union plan proceeds on the opposite principle.

How would Atlantic Union affect the atomic bomb problem?

The U.S., the British, and the French Atomic Authorities would become the Union Atomic Authority; thenceforth it would be under the Union government. It would internationalize the atomic authority, as far as the members of the Union are concerned. All the people in the Union, through their elected representatives in its Congress, would have a voice in atomic policy. But their national governments would have nothing to do with it, just as the government of the State of Tennessee has nothing to do with the atomic plant in its territory at Oak Ridge. No elaborate inspection system would be needed, for the same reason that none is needed in the U.S. to prevent the various State governments from learning such secrets.

By this Union plan, as Dr. Harold C. Urey, the atomic scientist, said in urging it in FREEDOM & UNION July, 1947, "we would not give the atomic secrets to France, to England, to Holland, any more than we give our present secrets to the State of Illinois. There might be citizens of other countries who would know these secrets, but if so, they would be controlled by law, just as are the citizens of the State of Illinois at present."

As it is, he pointed out, "There are people in England, France, Denmark, who know a great deal about our atomic secrets. We have no control over their actions by any legal methods. The Union plan," he continued, "would replace the situation in which we have no legal control over people who know atomic bomb secrets, with one in which some sort of control would be set up, and thus from the standpoint of military secrets, the situation would be improved. Whatever leaks might occur through Union," he adds, "would not be as important as the greatly increased military strength of such a Union."

There would still remain the problem of securing atomic agreement with the nations outside the Union, particularly Russia. The Union, however, would be much better off in this respect than the U.S. is today. The Union would merely need to admit new nations to it to extend the jurisdiction of its Atomic Authority. As the Union's gigantic power thus grew, the outlook for catching up with it in the atomic arms race would become ever more hopeless. It would be so hopeless even at the start that the Kremlin might well prefer to reach atomic agreement with the Union soon after it was born.

Has the possession of atomic weapons by the Kremlin changed the situation decisively since *Union Now* proposed Atlantic Union?

No. Whatever atomic destruction the Kremlin might wreak on some of the cities of the Union by surprise attack, it could not hope thereby to knock out the latter's means of visiting worse atomic destruction on it in return. From the outset the Union would enjoy far more than the U.S. now does two tremendous strategic advantages: (1) Its territory and industrial and military centers would be widely dispersed—and (2) it would have advanced bases much closer to the Kremlin's citadel than the latter would have to the Union's citadel in North America.

The use of U.S. bases in Britain, France and other NATO nations is now subject to veto by the nation on whose soil they are situated; this encourages the Kremlin to gamble that the U.S. will be unable to use them at the showdown. Once an Atlantic Union is formed, its government would have the same sure power to use its bases throughout the Union as Washington has in all the 50 States of the U.S. today.

An aggressor is highly unlikely to attack unless he has a reasonable chance to win not merely the opening battle but

the war. For the Kremlin to have such a chance, it would need to back up its atomic weapons with a force stronger than the Union's *all around*—in guided missiles, warplanes, navy, army, productive plant, raw materials. This could hardly happen; any attempt to do this would spur the Union to develop its huge potentialities.

The Union would have enormous general power superiority from the start. The less hope a dictatorship has *of winning the less it is inclined to arms racing.* The strongest Latin American dictator has never tried to outarm the U.S.

Do you still fear the Kremlin would dare attack this gigantic Union? Then you must fear even more that Russia will attack the U.S. alone.

What about Latin America, the Monroe Doctrine, hemisphere defense?

The formation of the Union would enormously strengthen the Monroe Doctrine, for it would put behind it the combined power of the U.S. and Western Europe. It would do the same for hemisphere defense.

Once we put the U.S., British, and French fleets and air forces under the Union government, the Union would control the seas, and there would no longer be any danger to the Latin-American states of Soviet penetration, whether military, economic, or otherwise.

Under the present policy we have to do all the defending of the western hemisphere, supply practically all the soldiers, sailors, fliers, and dollars, for the Latin-American republics are debtor nations, almost unarmed for modern war. Only by Union do we get any real help all along the line in this job, for the western Europeans are the only ones in position to help effectively.

What would be the status of the Latin-American republics?

The same as now as regards the U.S. and the rest of the world. If they desired to enter the Union they would apply for admission. It is to be hoped that at least some of them would apply and be admitted soon.

It would be for the Union Congress to decide whether those with a very high rate of illiteracy and instability of government should wait till they gave better guarantees of democracy, or whether their standards could be raised more rapidly by admission into the Union. And it would be for each Latin-American republic to decide for itself if it wanted to join the Union. We should lean backwards not to appear to be trying to force any of them in.

A good many Americans seem to think that the Latin Americans would be so eager to enter the Union that they would be offended if they weren't included among the founders. But the fact is that it has always been possible for them to ask admission as states in the United States—a similar Union. Yet they have shown no inclination to do so, and no offense at not being urged by us to enter our Union.*

Nor was there anything to prevent the Spanish-speaking American colonies from joining together in a federal union as the English-speaking American colonies did. But they have never done so, or seriously tried to unite this way. Even the little republics of Central America cling to their own absolute national sovereignty. And they have not worked together too well even on that basis in existing international organizations.

Latin-American genius so far, in short, has shown little natural inclination toward federal union, least of all on a big scale. Until the Latin-Americans have shown strong evidence that they have changed their minds in this respect, it should not be assumed that simply because we and the Europeans want to unite they will want to unite with us at once—even before we unite ourselves.

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*On the contrary, Latin Americans have taken offense at proposals to include them in the U.S. Thus, *The New York Times* reported Jan. 26, 1941, in a special dispatch from Havana—long before the Castro regime.

"The Cuban Secretary of State, José Manuel Cortina, today issued a statement observing that a resolution to admit Cuba as a State of the Union introduced in the United States Congress by Senator William H. Smathers (Democrat, New Jersey) was contrary to President Roosevelt's foreign policy, to pan-Americanism and to the opinion and decision of all Cubans. He said he believed it would be forgotten within a few days since it had no basis and no reason. . . .

"A group of youths late last night threw several bottles through the plate glass windows of the Woolworth store here. Police said the bottles contained notes that said 'Down with the American Senate. This reply to the American Senator.' "

The reaction to any such proposal would be far more violent, of course, in Castro's Cuba today.

The high cost of living—that's the question. What has Atlantic Federal Union got to do with it?

Plenty. At bottom, the high cost of living is a most urgent reason for Atlantic Union of the Free. The danger it symptomizes is—perhaps—even more urgent than the communist danger and the atomic threat. The rising cost of living that hits you and millions of others individually adds up to a rising trend toward a collective crash. A general economic collapse would speed both the communist and atomic dangers. World recovery would mean not only better living for you at less cost but greater freedom, stabler peace.

Is there danger of an economic crash?

No one can be sure—except sure that a key to Communist world policy lies in the conviction (a) that the U.S. is headed toward an economic crash, and (b) that this crash will come sooner or later.

Most of our authorities deny that we Americans are near a crash ourselves and give good reasons for doubt. But they did that right before the 1929 crash, too. Let us hope they are right. But it will be safer if we do all we can to prevent economic collapse.

What causes the economic danger?

The war, and the Cold War, and the urgent demand in the "new" nations for help in developing their economies—and the fact their political policies toward West and East depend on the aid they get —and, perhaps above all, the heavy and highly inflationary cost of the arms race. All this helps raise prices.

The higher prices go, the greater aid and loans they need overseas—and the more taxes we must pay to continue to give or lend them aid—and the more loans and aid we citizens need to continue *our* standard of living. Taxes help keep the cost of living high. That leads to demands for higher wages, over here and over there. Wage increases raise prices higher. Strikes do this too.

We cannot go on forever materially giving away much of our exports, via "mutual security" aid and loans that never will be repaid, but keep our taxes high. But if we reduce taxes by cutting off such aid, this will have a dangerously depressing political and economic effect here, while making prices skyrocket in black markets over there. Such a move would cause unemployment here, to the delight of the communists everywhere, and encourage communism still more directly in Asia, Africa, Latin America. We change shortage to famine for "uncommitted" nations, and the high cost of living into real misery.

Already the communist danger in Asia, Africa, Latin America, has encouraged heavier arming. But this means keeping more men in military service, out of production. And it keeps other men supplying non-productive soldiers and building machines of destruction. It greatly worsens the heart of our trouble.

How can we escape from this economic dilemma?

Only by finding some means of reducing *both* the shortage of goods *and* the tax burden, *without* thereby increasing the dangers of famine, collapse and communism, or lessening freedom's military security. A hard and urgent problem. But the toughest puzzle has an answer. And the answer is Atlantic Union.

How would Atlantic Federal Union avert the economic danger?

The key to the Union answer lies in this neglected fact: *The world's freest peoples are also the world's top producers.*

The burden of aiding world development now rests almost entirely on the Atlantic democracies. Soviet Russia has more than it can do to raise its own standard of living to even that of Eastern Europe.

A Federal Union of the Atlantic democracies would mobilize the world's best productive assets at maximum efficiency and minimum cost.

The construction methods that rapidly built ports, airfields and bases under the worst war conditions would then be building Latin America, Asia, Africa. Teamwork even closer than the Anglo-Canadian-American teamwork which produced the atomic bomb would then be hastening higher living standards everywhere.

The productive resources of the democracies would thus be pooled for construction even more effectively than they were for destruction during the war. Once we and the others agree to become fellow-citizens, we shall all pitch into the task of building up the new nations areas in quite a different spirit than any of us tackle any part of it today.

How would Atlantic Federal Union promote our economy—and the world's

One stable Union currency—backed by all that wasted gold buried in Kentucky—would then replace all the different, dubious currencies now holding back production among the democracies.

The Union would also remove, as rapidly as practicable, the national tariffs that now hamper production among the democracies. It would also cut out all the passports, visas, clearance papers and other red tape that now hinder trade among them. Private enterprise would then greatly reduce the need for governmental loans; this in turn would reduce the cost of economic development in taxes, thus further speeding recovery.

There would be no end to the demand for the Union's goods. The upbuilding of its European states would be but part of the much vaster task of world upbuilding, of helping supply all that Latin America, India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Middle East, and Africa need to improve their living standards. And all this would mean more demand for Americans and the things they make.

Atlantic Unionists frequently refer to early U.S. history, but, after all, it was much simpler than ours now. Is the analogy valid?

Of course, the parallel is faulty; all historical parallels are. But it is the best we have, and no one yet has gone wrong who followed it to the extent of trying out the Federal system. And what is the alternative to seeking guidance from our own experience? It is to rely on pure guesswork, logic, speculation. Is that safer, less open to error? As for its being harder now to form a Union, was it really simpler, easier, to invent Federal Union, as they did then, and get people to try it out for the first time on themselves, than to apply these same principles after 171 years of successful experience with them?

But an Atlantic Union would be so much larger than the U.S. in 1789.

The vast size of the proposed American Union was one of the chief arguments against the Constitution when it was established, though the U.S. then extended only to the Mississippi. Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut argued in the Federal Convention that "each of these states [Massachusetts and Virginia] is too large for a republican system." Even Hamilton, bold as he was, kept recurring to this difficulty, and went so far as to tell the Convention, "I have grave doubts whether a more energetic government can pervade this wide and extensive country."

The fact is that democracy was never tried, before or since, on so vast a scale as when the Constitution was established. Before then democracy had worked only in small areas. Thereafter, the advent of steam and of ever faster means of communication have lessened the difficulties of big-scale democracy. If we measure size by minutes rather than miles—and the former is the measure that counts in this problem—an Atlantic Union would be much easier to form and govern than the American Union in 1789. Eight years after its formation Washington still felt the need of pleading, in his Farewell Address, that Union on so great a scale be given a fair trial.

Yet only a few years later, in 1803, Jefferson got the American people to go still further and double the size of the country by purchasing Louisiana. They were bold then, able to see and secure our future needs when most of America hadn't yet reached the horse-and-buggy stage, when men nowhere dreamed of railroads—let alone airplanes and wireless—when the argument against a big Federal Union was a really stout argument. If we are afraid of size and cannot look ahead in our jet-atomic age as boldly and as far as they did then, we are not fit to govern even what we have inherited, we are already too big for ourselves—MR. UNIFEDAT



Ways to Strengthen the U.N. Significantly

By THOMAS J. HAMILTON
United Nations Correspondent for The New York Times

—UNITED NATIONS, N. Y.

THE FIFTEENTH anniversary of the signing of the U. N. Charter finds the structure of the organization very much the same as that of its predecessor, the League of Nations.

In 1945, when the Charter was drafted in San Francisco, the aim was much higher. It was assumed that the five great powers which had survived the war would enforce the peace, through the Security Council, which was to have sufficient military force at its disposal to compel the smaller powers to refrain from aggression or threats to the peace.

The break-down of great power cooperation doomed these hopes to failure. The Soviet Union's wholesale use of the veto focused attention in the early years of the cold war upon the question of restricting its use. The U. S. and like-minded countries campaigned for the abolition of the veto in the admission of new members, the election of the secretary general, and in most decisions taken under Chapter VI of the Charter, covering disputes and situations threatening the maintenance of international peace and security.

In those days the thoughts of everyone were centered on 1955, since the Charter provided that the question of calling a Charter Review conference would be placed automatically on the agenda of the tenth session of the General Assembly. Moreover, the Charter provided that in that year the Charter Review conference could be called whether or not one of the five permanent members of the Security Council was opposed.

But since the Charter saddled the veto upon the U. N. for keeps—it provided that no amendment could take effect unless it was accepted by all the permanent members—there were ample grounds for questioning the value of holding a Charter Review conference.

Realistically, the only way to get rid of the veto would have been to set up another U. N. Since the U. S. and the other western powers were not prepared to go that far, abortive moves to amend the Charter would merely have stirred up the Russians and accomplished no practical result.

These considerations, as it turned out, assumed greater validity as a result of three unexpected developments in 1955:

1. The tenth U. N. birthday celebration in San Francisco proved remarkably harmonious, since the Russians at that time were engaged in one of their more imaginative peace offensives. There were widespread appeals for a revival of the "spirit of San Francisco" of 1945.

2. The summit conference, held later in the year, also was harmonious, and was widely interpreted as meaning that both President Eisenhower and the Khrushchev-Bulganin team of those days had renounced the idea of nuclear war.

3. At the 1955 session of the General Assembly, the membership deadlock, which had produced half of the Soviet vetoes, was resolved by a deal under which universality of membership—with the exception of the divided governments of Germany, Korea and Viet Nam—was adopted by the U. N.

The General Assembly committee which was set up to examine the question of a Charter Review conference is still in existence, but the idea of holding one is now dead. So are the ex-

pedients adopted at the behest of the U. S.—the Interim Committee in 1947, the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950—under which the General Assembly was to take over the peace-keeping functions of the Security Council.

As far as the structure of the U. N. is concerned, there now seems to be little point in striving for other changes. The continued rise in the number of Afro-Asian countries, with their marked preference for neutralism as well as anti-colonialism, makes it increasingly difficult to obtain a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly for resolutions challenging Communist aggression in Hungary, Tibet and elsewhere, even though no action is envisaged.

For Summits at U.N.

Only by moderating its position in the light of this altered parliamentary situation has the U. S. been able to obtain acceptance of its proposals at recent sessions of the General Assembly. At least a dozen additional African countries are now expected to gain admission at the 1960 session of the General Assembly, and this will have a pronounced effect.

In these circumstances, what can be done to advance the security of the free world by strengthening the U. N.?

The most important means, surely, is to *use* the U. N. and to abandon the growing habit of holding great power negotiations outside the organization on matters which it is especially fitted to deal with.

The recent unlamented summit conference, together with the exchange of personal visits among the Big Four heads of government which led up to it, is so fresh in people's minds that it is scarcely necessary to point out that such negotiations should have been held in the U. N.

What is sometimes overlooked is that three separate sets of negotiation in the disarmament field—on detecting surprise attack, on halting nuclear test explosion, and in the general field of disarmament—have been held by the great powers in Geneva, and outside the U. N., since 1958.

According to a theory that is widely held among the Western European countries, the tendency to go outside the U. N. results from the belief that the Afro-Asian group in the General Assembly has become so strong that neither the Soviet Union nor the Western powers want to give it a chance to interfere.

This attitude has been strongly criticized by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, but there is no question that it exists. Moreover, there can be no doubt of the fact that there would have been a strong movement in the Assembly to add Asian, African and Latin American countries to the ten-power group if the Assembly had been given an opportunity to interfere with the slate—which is composed exclusively of European and North American countries—agreed upon by the Big Four.

However, disarmament is of such paramount importance to all countries that it is difficult to see why the U. N. consented to negotiations outside the U. N.

The liquidation of the British, French and Belgian colonial possessions in Africa, which threatens to produce widespread disorder in the initial stage, confronts the U. N. with a great opportunity as well as an onerous responsibility.

It is difficult, however, to see what the U. N.—or any other organization—can do if there is simply a break-down of government in the new African states. For this reason the African aid program drawn up by Mr. Hammarskjold early in 1960 ranks as one of the most important recent moves for strengthening the organization.

The expenditure envisaged by Mr. Hammarskjold is pitifully small—only $2,500,000 a year—but it should enable the U. N. to make a start in providing a certain number of competent government officials for the new African states.

However, Africa is not the only region that badly needs outside help, whether it is in the form of experts or the money to build dams and other public works. The political prestige of the U. N. suffered severely from the decision to give it no share in administering the Marshall plan, yet even at this late date it would rally if the organization were permitted to administer a larger share of the assistance being provided the under-developed countries.



—Embassy of Switzerland

If the tendency to negotiate and settle international disputes outside the U.N. is not reversed, Mr. Hamilton believes, the U.N. will soon go the way of the League of Nations, whose palace in Geneva is shown above.

A decade after its inception the U. N. Technical Assistance Program—including the newly-established Special Fund—still has not risen to $70,000,000 a year. In contrast, the U. S. is spending about $2,000,000,000 a year in foreign aid (not including the military equipment program). Comparable Soviet figures have not been published, but the Kremlin is spending an increasing amount on bi-lateral programs, with only 8,000,000 rubbles a year for the U. N.

If the U. N. were permitted to step into this field, its potentialities for political settlements would certainly be enhanced, and this—pending a return to the use of the organization for great power negotiations—surely offers the most promising opportunity for strengthening it.

House Set for August Vote on Atlantic Convention Senate & All Presidental Candidates Approve It

THE ATLANTIC CONVENTION resolution cleared in June all but the final hurdle facing Congressional authorization of it*—approval by the House. It was the next item on the agenda when the House recessed July 3 until August 15. It is definitely scheduled for one hours debate and the decisive vote on the Floor soon after the House returns then. It almost got throgh before the recess. Its House sponsors say the outlook for victory "by a big majority" will be "much better" after the recess.

To reach this climax it had first to win this series of battles—with its life at stake in each of them:

January 19: The Atlantic Convention resolution as introduced in both Houses in early 1959** was granted a hearing by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at which the State Department gave its positive endorsement to the bill, if amended to make clearer that Congress would call the convention, and name the U. S. delegates.

February 10: The Foreign Relations Committee recommended it to the Senate by a vote of eight to seven, after rewriting it to meet the above wishes of the State Department, and to implement it otherwise. Its number was changed from Senate Concurrent resolution 17 to Senate Joint resolution 170, and its official title became "U. S. Citizens Commission on NATO," authorized to organize and participate in a convention to explore greater Atlantic unity.

May 17: The House Foreign Affairs Committee gave a very friendly hearing to the original resolution. (Full report in June FREEDOM & UNION.)

May 24: The Senate Democratic Policy Committee, thanks to its chairman, Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, cleared S. J. Res. 170 for Floor debate with no dissenting voice.

June 15: The Senate approved S. J. Res. 170 without change 51 to 44 after a two-hour debate led by its young Floor Manager, Senator Frank Church of Idaho. Twelve other Senators spoke for it and three against it. Those voting for it—but not speaking for it—included all three Senatorial aspirants for the Democratic presidential nomination—Johnson, Kennedy and Symington—none of whom had ever previously taken position on it. Vice President Nixon authorized a statement on the Floor (see p. 41) that he was "actively" for it. The two Minnesota Democratic Senators, Humphrey and McCarthy, both of whom are vice presidential possibilities, voted for it.

June 20: The House Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously approved the resolution as written by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Twenty of the 32 Members of the House Committee were present and each voted for it by roll call—15 Democrats and five Republicans. Its sponsors believe that, had the other six Democrats and six Republican Members been present, the vote would still have been unanimous.* Eight of the absentees are known to be strong supporters of it, two more said they would vote for it, none opposed it.

June 29: The 12-man House Rules Committee by a nine-to-three voice vote granted the resolution one hour's debate on the Floor under an "Open Rule"—which means that amendments may be offered and the time allowed for debate thus extended. This was deemed "astonishing" proof of the bill's strength.

At that time it was expected that Congress would meet until July 8, if need be, to finish the mass of pending "must" bills and then adjourn for good. This meant that if the resolution failed to reach the Floor and gain approval within a week, it would die on the vine, and the long legislative process would have to be started from seed again in the Congress which will be elected in November.

On July 1 the leadership of Congress changed plans, however, and decided to recess by July 3 for the two party conventions, and return for a short session in August, the Senate on the 8th and the House on the 15th.

The resolution's Floor Managers—Chairman Morgan and Messrs. Zablocki and Judd—made every effort to secure approval before the recess. They enjoyed the powerful backing of Speaker Sam Rayburn and Majority Leader John McCormack, long a supporter of the proposal. The bill was placed on the House Program for July 1,

The last days before Congress recesses or adjourns are days of lightning changes in mood and program; items may be added, omitted or shifted with little or no notice. And so those who wished to hear the debate on S. J. Res. 170 had to listen in the gallery through weary hours of argument on other bills.

On July 1 this included sharp debate that unexpectedly rose over another

GIST OF CONVENTION BILL

Senate Joint Resolution 170 sets up a "U. S. Commission on NATO," composed of 20 representative private citizens to organize and take part in an all-NATO convention to explore stronger unification. This bill in various forms has been before Congress for 11 years. Half the U.S. delegates are to be named by the Senate President, Mr. Nixon; the other half by Speaker Rayburn. They are to hold such meetings "with similar citizens commissions in the other NATO countries" as "necessary in order to explore means by which greater cooperation and unity of purpose may be promoted by economic and political means." The Atlantic Congress in London last June urged that such a "special conference" be called this year and limited to 100 delegates. The bill does not stipulate the latter but its backers favor this. The resolution states that U. S. delegates are "not in any way to speak for or to represent the U. S. Government." (For text of S. J. Res. 170 see March *Freedom & Union*, or our free reprint).

*But not of its $300,000 appropriation, which requires separate action in both Houses—this may be left to 1960; lack of it does not invalidate the bill, once approved by the House.

**The resolution was originally co-sponsored as S. Con. Res. 17 by Senators Humphrey and Kefauver (D.) and Clifford Case and Cooper (R.); Later Frank Church (D.) joined them. The same text was introduced in the House by Chairman Morgan of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Messrs. Carnahan and Zablocki (D.) as H. Con. Res. 146, 107, 108; Later Repr. Judd (R.) joined them with H. Con. Res. 584. For text see April 1959 FREEDOM & UNION, or ask for our free reprint.

*Members who voted for the bill were, by seniority: Democrats: Morgan, Zablocki, Mrs. Kelly, Hays, Selden, Pilcher O'Hara, Fountain, Fascell, Saund, Beckworth, McDowell, Murphy, Meyer; Republicans: Merrow, Judd, Fulton, Mrs. Church, Bentley. Absentees (mostly out of town or on other business) Democrates: Carnahan, Burleson, Coffin, Diggs, Gallagher, Bowles; Republicans; Chiperfield, Mrs. Bolton, Jackson, Adair, Curtis, Wainwright.

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measure that had strong committee backing and seemed sure of passage at first. It aimed to protect certain U. S. manufacturers and their employees— rather than consumers and taxpayers in general—against their own products, sold to the Government for use abroad and then found to be unnecessary "surplus" stock, being re-imported here and sold to taxpayers at low prices.

Even Clarence Brown of Ohio, a power in the Republican party and its Floor Manager for this bill—who in the Rules Committee opposed bringing S. J. Res. 170 to the Floor—wasn't protecionist enough for the majority of members present; the House killed his bill. This ominous upset was followed by a bad-tempered debate over the artistic merits of the Theodore Roosevelt Memorial. When the tired House, recessed overnight with S. J. Res. 170 the next but one item on the program, its friends felt relieved, despite their vain vigil.

On July 2, S. J. Res. 170 stood third on the program. The two bills before it seemed fairly non-controversial. One related to land grant colleges, the other compensated property owners forced to sell land to the Government for Chantilly airport near Washington, for the expense of moving. The House began in a relaxed mood. The college aid bill sailed through. The Floor Managers of S. J. Res. 170 were confident of an easy victory within a couple of hours.

They not only had their committee solidly behind them, and the strong support of the Democratic leadership but also the backing of the Administration and the House Republican leadership. Only one Representative had asked for a few minutes of the half-hour allotted those who wished to appose the bill. He was H. R. Gross a Republican representing the third Iowa district. He has a reputation for opposing almost everything international.

The outlook could hardly have been better at 2 p.m.—but when the Chantilly bill reached the Floor it provoked a sudden squall. Then a Supplemental Appropriations bill came back from the Senate with several controversial amendments added. It took precedence, the Chantilly debate was interrupted by hot argument and time-devouring rollcall votes on these amendments, particularly a $74 million appropriation to the international Development Administration, despite heavy Administration pressure for

its passage. This sharpened many a knife-like temper not merely for anything international but for an appropriation—and S. J. Res. 170 involved some expenditure, though only $300,000.

When the Chantilly bill got back to the Floor, tempers and opposition rose even higher. There were more amendments and more rollcalls of the 437 Members. The confusion was such that the clerk (who always repeats the vote of each Member as he calls the roll) seemed to catch the spirit; he began booming out the "No" votes with a nasal intonation that sounded like the foghorn the Ship of State badly seemed to need.

By 6 p.m. the atmosphere was such that the Floor Managers of S. J. Res. 170 thought it wise not to press for action before the recess. They still believed—Chairman Morgan particularly—that they could win, but felt the majority might be reduced and handicap action thereafter. The darker outlook came from no direct evidence of opposition. Mr. Gross was still the only listed opposition speaker, but he was enough to start debate,—and what snap judgments and demagoguery might be unleashed in the House's present mood? The leadership could no longer be sure of the outcome—particularly since the Cuban Sugar bill was due back from the Senate and would take precedence.

In such conditions, the Floor Managers reasoned: Why run unnecessary risk, when defeat would be "disastrous" at home and also abroad? It was known that statesmen in allied capitals were following S. J. Res 170 closely. They might well interpret rejection of it by the House, or even another narrow victory like the Senate one, as proof that Congress was not interested in tightening NATO. And Moscow, what gamble might it not be encouraged to take? Friends of the bill in the gallery shared these anxieties; they agreed it was safer to defer the battle.

The event proved action had to be deferred anyway, for the Sugar bill kept the House in bitter debate within itself and with the Senate all night long until the two recessed about 9 a.m. July 3.

"When we return the party conventions will be over," Dr. Judd told FREEDOM & UNION, "Since all the Presidential aspirants have already endorsed our resolution, we are sure that th candidates named by both parties will be for it." He also forecast that both party platforms would include strong Atlantic unity planks. All this, and the more relaxed meed Congress is expected to be in then, made him and the other Floor Managers confident of strong House approval in mid-August.

Dr. Judd is to be the keynote speaker at the Republican Convention, and Senator Church the Democratic keynoter. The Democratic Platform Committee chairman, Representative Chester Bowles, is an ardent supporter of S. J. Res. 170.

Senate Vote Dramatic

The bill's passage through the Senate was even more dramatic than its troubles in the House, for other reasons—above all, because it reached a final rollcall vote there, and the result seemed in doubt until the final announcement. It was dramatic too because there was also doubt of how the Senate's three candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination would vote. By alphabetical order Senator Johnson led the procession. His "aye" did not surprise insiders who knew he had led in bringing the bill to the Floor. Then came Senator Kennedy. He had been absent from the Foreign Relations Committee when it recommended the resolution eight to seven; his "aye" gave its supporters understandable relief and elation. Then Senator Symington made it unanimous.

Adlai Stevenson was already known to be in favor of the proposed convention. A few days later he led still further ahead by coming out on June 23 for an "economic union of the Atlantic,"—while Governor Rockefeller on June 21 called for a "North Atlantic Confederation" to tighten all political bonds.

For one simple and unanswerable reason the close vote can not be attributed to the arguments made by opposition Senators Bourke Hickenlooper (R., Iowa), Frank Lausche (D., Ohio) and Sam J. Ervin Jr. (D., N. Car.) None of them had an audience of more than 10 Senators, and this usually sank to five or six—and nearly all the listening Senators voted for the resolution. The Senators who spoke for the resolution rarely had a bigger audience.

The discussion began late in the legislative day of June 14 with Senator Church's presentation of the resolution. The eloquence which had made him already the Democratic keynoter came out in his peroration—but the only senators left on the floor then were two strong supporters, Senators Joseph Clark (Pa.) and Russell Long(La.).

Even so, this was charged with great drama for any one old enough to remember when Senator Borah of Idaho helped kill the League of Nations Covemant, and thereafter held court as isolationist chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee . . . while Russell Long's father, Huey, single-handed, killed ratification of the World Court Protocol which Borah had agreed to, under the pleadings of Elihu Root.

Senator Church's introductory speech and his interchange with Senator Long—for many years a co-sponsor of the Atlantic Convention resolution—may be (and should be) read in the pages that follow. There we give a full report of the Senate discussion. This includes all the formal two-hour's debate, which began early in the next legislative day, June 15, and continued—with many long interruptions by other matter—until late in the afternoon.

Though there were never more than a fifth of the Senate present, the galleries were fairly well filled throughout by a shifting audience of sight-seers. At the crucial final vote, this included a delagation of 30 delegates from countries of Africa and Asia to one of Washington's innumerable conventions. Throughout it included Elmo Roper, President of the Atlantic Union Committee, to whom the Senator of his state—Prescott Bush of Connecticut—paid tribute from the Floor as the layman most responsible for the Senate vote.

The close vote seemed to be the result of inertia—and misunderstanding.

The main opposition argument was that Congress would be usurping the right of the Executive to conduct foreign relations if it named the delegates. Those making this argument were demonstrably "more royalist than the king," for the Executive itself—in its statements of Aug. 25, 1959 and Jan. 19, 1960—had made its endorsement of the convention contingent on Congress instead of it calling the meeting and naming the U.S. delegates. Moreover, all the candidates for Chief Executive were in favor of this "usurpation" of Executive rights.

The opposition vote came from a combination of Southern Conservatives and New England and Midwest Republicans. Republican Senators voted two to one against the bill; Democrats, two to one for it (*Turn page for debate.*)

Senate Debate on Atlantic Convention

There follows a condensation of the Senate debate on S. J. Res. 170 on June 14 and 15, with only repetitions, senatorial formalities and courtesies omitted.
—Editors.

MR. CHURCH. Mr. President, the only hopeful aspect of the recent Summit conference in Paris was the impressive display of unity among the Western nations emerging from it. But steadiness in a moment of crisis should only emphasize our need for more consistent, continuing cooperation among the free nations of the West. . . .

Eleven years have passed since the birth of NATO. The nature of the Communist threat, and of the problems which beset the Atlantic nations, has changed drastically. No longer is direct military aggression the overriding danger. Changes in Russian strategy, the requirements of closer association, and the rise of the underdeveloped countries have had an impact on all NATO nations.

These developments cry out for closer cooperation in broader fields of policy. In hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, witness after witness testified to this problem. General William H. Draper, Chairman of the President's Committee to Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program, testified:

As a former U.S. permanent representative to the North Atlantic Council, I can testify from personal knowledge both as to the seriousness of the problems within the Atlantic Community and as to the overwhelming need for greater unity: Military, political, economic, scientific, and cultural.

Even in the military realm, which is the heart of NATO, there is need for greater coordination. But these steps cannot be taken within the present structure of NATO, for they involve going behind the defense line to the sources of the military power.

Responsible authorities in many countries have long been aware of these deficiencies. In fact, the likelihood of such developments was anticipated in the North Atlantic Treaty, which directs that further arrangements for cooperation among its members should be considered in the future. Efforts have been made to achieve greater unity of purpose, but they have had very little success.

Senate Joint Resolution 170 is a suggested solution to this situation. It represents an idea which is relatively new in international affairs, but which has been extremely successful on domestic matters in the U.S. and in other western nations. When we want an independent survey of a national problem, we appoint a commission of leading citizens to study that problem and recommend solutions to the proper governmental authorities. The two Hoover Commissions are the most notable American uses of this technique; in Canada and England royal commissions have long had a similar function.

S. J. Res. 170 would create a U.S. citizens Commission on NATO, consisting of not more than 20 private citizens. This Commission would invite the legislatures of other NATO countries to appoint their own corresponding delegations to a convention to recommend ways of achieving greater political and economic cooperation among these nations. It is expected that the convention would not include more than 100 persons in all, and that it would meet for as long or as often as necessary.

The American commission would take the lead in arranging for the convention as well as participating in it. It would be composed of eminent private citizens, appointed jointly by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House after consultation with the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees. . . .

This proposal was first introduced as a Senate resolution more than a year ago.

Senator Frank Church from Borah's Idaho won his first victory in Senate with the Atlantic Convention bill; then was keynote speaker at Democratic Convention.

It has been entirely rewritten by the Foreign Relations Committee which produced the resolution before the Senate this afternoon. It has received strong support from numerous experts in foreign affairs as well as from authoritative gatherings concerned with strengthening the NATO alliance. It was approved unanimously by two NATO Parliamentarians' Conferences. Last year the Atlantic Congress, a meeting of 650 leading citizens from NATO countries, recommended unanimously that the convention proposed by Senate Joint Resolution 170 be held as soon as possible. The State Department is in favor of this resolution, and has testified that it would certainly welcome any constructive and practical ideas that might emerge from the proposed convention.

The failure of the Summit conference has made a stronger NATO more urgently necessary than ever. The values and interests which the Western nations share give us an opportunity to make the alliance more powerful by making the most efficient use of our resources, and agreeing on joint action to meet the various aspects of Communist penetration.

Mr. President, we have today an opportunity to plant a seed which may grow into great, constructive measures for the strengthening of the free world. To the best of my knowledge no one has denied the need for strengthening NATO. Instead, objections to Senate Joint Resolution 170 have dealt with the suitability of this method of dealing with the problem. Foremost among these is the fear that members of the Commission will in effect be conducting foreign policy in competition with the Government. The delegates to the convention would not represent the Government; they would be exchanging ideas with other delegates. They would have no power to commit this Government. The resolution specifically states that—

The U.S. Citizens Commission on NATO is not in any way to speak for, or to represent, the U.S. Government.

To make sure that this is understood, we have limited membership on the Commission to private citizens. If there were the slightest danger that this Commission would be taken as an official voice of American foreign policy, the State Department would certainly object to its formation. The State Department has no such fears, however.

Some critics . . . complain that there is already a multiplicity of organizations. The NATO Council is primarily the governing arm of NATO, and as such is preoccupied with dealing with a narrowly circumscribed set of problems—which are

largely military—in the light of existing policy. Each country's representative on the Council reflects his government's official position, and cannot deviate from it. Moreover, decisions of the Council must be unanimous; questions on which there is serious disagreement are left undecided and often are not even discussed. Many of these factors are matters of necessity for a body which essentially is the board of directors of a military alliance, but they do not encourage the imaginative searching which is required to find new solutions for difficult problems outside the scope of the Council's day-to-day operations.

The NATO Parliamentarians' Conference has been designed to serve a special and limited role and therefore is unsuited for the mission of the proposed convention. The annual conferences have operated under severe time limitations which would prevent adequate consideration of the kind of problems entailed or contemplated to be discussed.

The Atlantic Congress, which convened last summer, had a somewhat similar handicap, since it met for only a week. In addition, it had more than 650 delegates, which made it much too large a group for thoughtful discussion.

Private Convention Not Enough

It has been suggested that we might turn to meetings of strictly private groups financed by private individuals or foundations. Experience has shown, however, that citizens of the required eminence and ability have not been willing to devote sufficient time to such a task in the absence of a request from their Governments.

The convention is intended to go beyond the work of these various organizations. Avoidance of the difficulties under which they labor gives us added hope.

It is, in short, to be a small, deliberative convention that has sufficient time to consider seriously and to debate at length, the weaknesses of the present NATO alliance, and thus to formulate thoughtful recommendations, to be returned to the various NATO governments, as to the steps that the delegates think best designed to give added unity and strength to the alliance.

Finally, Mr. President, we should ask what reason there is for expecting such a convention as is contemplated by this resolution to be productive of any real good. In the course of our committee hearings, General Draper gave testimony bearing upon this point that is worthy of our serious attention. He said:

Departments of the government deal constantly with national and international problems but our own Government has from time to time felt the need for a fresh and independent look at these problems by a commission of citizens. The Committee on which I had the honor to serve as Chairman is one of the most recent ones.

For my own part, Mr. President, I would emphasize that the problem-solving procedures which this resolution would set in motion seem to me to be in the finest tradition of our own country, and of Western civilization generally. The chief glory of our society is the quality of the individuals it produces. This is what the doctrine of the state being the servant, not the master, of the people is really about. This is why we have, and seek to maintain, an open society.

If this kind of society is to survive, it seems to me that we must find more effective ways to exploit its advantages. The central purpose of this resolution is to enable eminent, free citizens, products of this open society, to consider the present situation and recommend possible lines of action that would contribute to the strengthening of the free countries to protect themselves against the Communist threat.

It is precisely because they would constitute a citizens' conclave, free to speak and act independently of the official positions which their governments may heretofore have taken, that we could expect from them ideas and recommendations which would breathe new life into the struggle of Western man to retain his freedom. Established governments tend to get bogged down in ruts, and it becomes difficult for them to lift themselves out of these ruts—to break away from habits of vested interest and fixed position.

For this reason, the greatest advances of Western civilization have most often been initiated, not by governments, but by free citizens, thinking and acting in ways made possible only by freedom; responsible, as free men are in the last analysis, only to their own consciences.

Whatever recommendations may come from the proposed convention will have no official status, no authority except what is given them by their intrinsic merit.

Mr. President, I see no basis for arguing that any harm can come from the kind of meeting which is here proposed. It seems to me, on the contrary, that it has in it the possibility of much good, that it is in the best tradition of free societies, and that it is the kind of initiative that we can properly take, and ought to take.

MR. LONG [D.] of Louisiana. First I should like to congratulate the Senator from Idaho for the fine presentation he has made this evening, and also for the very diligent effort he has made.

The North Atlantic Treaty has been regarded as one of the very foundations of the security of this Nation. . . . Most businessmen, when they see that their business is successful and showing a profit, usually like to expand it and make a greater investment in it, and broaden its activities. Yet there has been some fear expressed of what the possible consequences might be of considering new ideas such as those the resolution seeks to achieve.

I for one have been discouraged to see that there has been such a reluctance to consider or even to discuss ways in which this very successful undertaking can be enlarged upon. I very much hope that not only will the Senate pass the joint resolution, but that something will come of it.

I hope that those who will meet in this new organization will not only come forward with constructive suggestions, but will support them and help pursue them and also help muster public support for measures that will make NATO more effective.

There is no doubt that there are a number of things which could be done to strengthen the NATO alliance as far as military measures are concerned. Certainly, there must be some economic ways in which we can cooperate more fully.

I do not want the U.S. to make any concessions without gaining something by doing so. I would like to see the U.S. benefit, certainly, as much as the other members of the organization gain in a joint undertaking. I believe that as a result of this new organization, we might possibly achieve a greater matching by our partners of the effort we are making. The time has come when we have every right to demand that other nations make a greater contribution.

MR. CHURCH. The distinguished Senator from Louisiana is quite right when he says that the objective of this joint resolution is to seek out recommendations intended to give new strength and health to our NATO alliance. . . .

No alliance can remain static. It either will tend to unravel, to become weaker, and, in the end, fail, as the years go by, or it will tend to become stronger and more closely knit, and thus succeed in the accomplishment of its objectives.

There is a sense of uneasiness about the state of health of the NATO Alliance, and a realization that we must find ways to implement what was originally intended by Article II of the Alliance, which directs attention to political and economic ways by which the NATO nations should cooperate.

MR. CASE [R.] of New Jersey. I am one of four Senators who joined in submitting S. C. Res. 17 earlier in this Congress. Shortly thereafter we had a great accession to our ranks in the person of the distinguished Senator from Idaho [Mr. Church].

I should like to say, on behalf of the Senators who cosponsored Senate Concurrent Resolution 17 originally, that the committee has, I believe, produced a better resolution than the one which we originally submitted. . . .

A number of us have been working on this problem. Among them is the Vice President of the U.S.,* who, when he was in the Senate, had a great interest in this whole area, and still retains it. I am authorized by him to say that he welcomes

this initiative on the part of Members of the Senate; that he strongly believes it is extremely desirable for the countries of the Atlantic Community to engage in cooperative efforts of every sort to draw closer together, for many reasons, including, of course, the reason that if this is not done, the responsibility on those of us who are carrying the major load will become unbearable. But that is only one of the important reasons. The Vice President regards this action as a manifestation of the right kind of initiative in this area. If he were still a Member of this body and had a voice and a vote in its proceedings, he would actively subscribe to the procedure.

MR. CHURCH. I thank the Senator from New Jersey very much for his statement. I am happy that he emphasized the fact that the joint resolution has the approval and endorsement of the Vice President. Should a tie vote result tomorrow, we can thus be sure of prevailing.

The objective of this resolution has been supported for a number of years by such Members of this body as the distinguished Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Kefauver], as well as by the other sponsors of the original S. C. Res. 17. I think special credit should be given to the original sponsors.

MR. CASE of New Jersey. Mr. President, I desire to express my appreciation on behalf of myself and all cosponsors, each of whom is far more entitled to credit for this venture than I. Indeed, if it proves successful, there will be credit enough for all and great gain for the country.

MR. CLARK [D., Penn.]. First, I congratulate the Senator from Idaho on his very able presentation. I am confident that he is entitled at least to equal credit with the original sponsors, with all of whom I am happy to associate myself in this project. . . .

I have read the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations and have given some consideration to the reasons advanced by the members of the committee who oppose the resolution. It is very difficult for me to understand how those reasons can be taken very seriously. To me, they are not only not compelling, but are far from persuasive.

I am a little frightened at what the Senate is doing at this session in connection with our foreign relations. It occurs to me that we are living in a pretty rarefied atmosphere here and are not too well aware of what is taking place in the outside world.

I shall not detain the Senator further tonight other than to suggest to him that if the Senate cannot at this session pass this joint resolution, then indeed this body will have made it abundantly clear, in connection with many another action which we have either taken or failed to take, and I fear will take in the next few weeks, that we are not really very much interested in advancing, through the democratic technique of open discussion, the strength of the free world.

This attitude bothers me very much.

I hope the Senator from Idaho was speaking in jest when he talked of the possibility of a tie vote on the joint resolution being broken by the Vice President. Although I view with some chagrin the fact that the vote in the committee was 8 to 7, I hope the resolution can be passed with no dissenting votes. I see very little reason for opposing it. I hope I am not being ignorant or arrogant in saying this, but I am totally at a loss and am unable to understand the position of the opposition.

MR. CHURCH. Of course, I agree wholeheartedly that we should not have any fear of free men gathering together to debate ways and means to strengthen the unity of the Western democracies, if all they can do, as a result of their deliberations, is make recommendations to their respective governments, which in turn, will evaluate them on the basis of their intrinsic merits.

MR. CLARK. After all, what are we afraid of?

MR. CHURCH. Yes; what are we afraid of? The deliberations will result in the formulation of ideas which the governments of the Western democracies can appraise, and pass upon as they see fit.

To defeat the resolution, to take the position that there should be no convention, and no deliberation by eminent free world citizens, would be to put on the blinders, as if that were some kind of virtue, when the dire fact of our situation is that the Western World is challenged today as never before, and therefore is called upon to plumb its resources and exert itself to the utmost, to find methods to strengthen the unity of purpose and the vitality of the Western World, to meet the threat that has been thrust upon it.

Therefore, I see nothing but good to come from such a convention. I do not believe any harm could possibly emanate from it.

So, Mr. President, I hope the Senate will concur, and will pass the resolution tomorrow.

MR. LONG of Louisiana. I agree that a vote against the joint resolution could certainly be construed by many as fear on the part of this country of communication with other free peoples or fear of a good idea.

MR. CHURCH. Yes.

MR. LONG of Louisiana. Whereas the very basis of our type of democracy and that of our allies is, theoretically, the assumption that we have nothing to fear from exploring the other man's ideas, and discussing them and seeing how they can be improved upon, and that the answer to anyone's idea, if one does not agree with it, is to propose a better one.

MR. CLARK. And the cliché that is used is "to hammer out the truth on the anvil of discussion."

MR. CHURCH. Yes. No better method has yet been devised.

MR. LONG of Louisiana. That is correct.

MR. CHURCH. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate at this time, I now move, under the previous order, that the Senate adjourn until tomorrow, at noon.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 2 minutes p.m.) the Senate adjourned.

June 15: The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 170).

THE PRESIDING OFFICER.* Under the unanimous-consent agreement 2 hours have been allotted for debate on the joint resolution and 1 hour on each amendment, to be divided equally.

MR. HARTKE. [**D. Indiana**]. The collapse of the summit conference, toward which many millions in many lands had looked with hope, makes it more imperative than ever that we take effective action to strengthen and unify the Atlantic Alliance.

Mr. Khrushchev has blocked the progress in negotiation which many had expected at the summit. He has the power to halt negotiations, to vituperate, and to threaten. But Mr. Khrushchev is quite powerless to prevent us and our NATO allies from reinforcing the solidarity of the West. Indeed, since a central policy of the Communists is to bring about the disintegration of NATO, immediate action to solidify NATO will demonstrate conclusively to Mr. Khrushchev that the kind of summitry he pursued at Paris has boomeranged.

The Congress of the U.S. can take such action to strengthen and unite NATO by passing Senate Joint Resolution 170 this session.

The passage of this resolution alone would be a telling answer to Mr. Khrushchev. And this new initiative towards greater unity within NATO will encourage our allies and strengthen our ties with them as well as exert a far-reaching psychological influence throughout the free

*Mr. Nixon as Senator co-sponsored the Atlantic Union Resolution in 1952.

*Senator William Proxmire (D., Wis.).

world. Too often has it been said that our action is usually a reaction to the moves of the Kremlin. Here we have an opportunity to initiate action that is both positive and constructive.

Mr. President, a year ago I served as one of the delegates from the United States to the Atlantic Congress.

This meeting was unprecedented in the history of the Atlantic community.

I came away convinced of the great value of such meetings of NATO citizens. And I am convinced now that the smaller convention provided for in this resolution, which would meet not just for 5 days, but for as long as necessary to perform its task, has exceedingly great potentialities for good. The more extended its consideration of our problems, the sounder its recommendations will be.

Mr. President, last November I served on the U.S. delegation to the fifth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. The original recommendation for such a conference or convention of NATO citizens "directed to convene as often as necessary in order to examine exhaustively and to recommend" how greater unity may best be developed had been unanimously adopted by the third NATO Parliamentarians' Conference in 1957. The fifth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference renewed this recommendation.

This resolution has wide bipartisan support. . . . The cost is insignificant but the potentialities for good are exceedingly far-reaching.

MR. MANSFIELD [**D., Mont.**] I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Kansas.

MR. CARLSON [**R.**] Mr. President, as a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I heard much of the testimony in support of S.J. Res. 170 . . .

This would be strictly a meeting of what might be recognized as a citizens group, and in my opinion could be helpful in making suggestions that would be important if we are to protect ourselves against the Communist threat.

In these difficult and trying times, it seems to me that we should secure the services of citizens who are willing to devote some of their time in behalf of the welfare of our Nation and other nations who have similar problems. It is for that reason that I am supporting this resolution.

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Iowa.

MR. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, . . . I am definitely opposed to the pending, joint resolution. . . .

It seems to me that in the last few years there has developed a great flood of pressure groups that want to get on committees; that want to get some kind of official standing; that want to get Federal appropriations in order to have their meetings here, there, yonder, and everywhere else, but which really, in the long run, have no official standing, accomplish no particular concrete result, and spend substantial amounts of Federal money in the aggregate.

I have been familiar, as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, with this joint resolution in its various lives. It has had about nine lives. It has been altered, changed, amended, and substituted so that the resolution we are at present considering is in no real way like the original resolution which was proposed. This leads me to the opinion that all that was wanted, in the first place, was a resolution, because the contents have been changed so definitely and so substantially. . . .

We have the NATO Parliamentarians Organization, which meets every year. It has some official standing. No doubt it produces some beneficial results. Also, there are various NATO consultative groups. We have officials in our diplomatic corps, and elsewhere, who take care of the NATO situation.

But now comes a proposal for the United States Citizens Commission on NATO. The joint resolution provides that the commission cannot bind the U.S.; that is stated in the resolution. It will not, of course, bind the U.S. However, regardless of what is said, this so-called unofficial group, meeting abroad with unofficial groups of other nations, can indeed, in the eyes of many people of the world, commit the U.S. to a moral position, which is not an official position or which is not a calculated or studied position of the U.S.

The purposes of the Commission are altruistic; yes. They are to seek for peace and to seek formulas on which peace can be based. But a citizens' committee can do this without spending $300,000 or $400,000 of public funds, and without consulting under the guise of an official commission, when it is not, in fact, an official commission. A citizens' committee can now go to Europe or anywhere else it wishes to go, under its own steam, without benefit of this particular resolution.

Mr. President, I believe we are simply piling up committees, piling up groups, piling up unofficial organizations of people who, in the long run, will probably confuse the issue—because the committees are created by a resolution of this sort—rather than clarify it.

Citizens' committees can do much good if they operate truly as citizens' committees. I do not object to a group of 20 or a group of 40 private citizens doing everything they can to assist in achieving peace, or to the formation of 50, 100, or any other number of groups.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator from Iowa has expired.

MR. HICKENLOOPER. May I have 1 more minute?

MR. MANSFIELD. I yield 2 additional minutes to the Senator from Iowa.

MR. HICKENLOOPER. I think such groups may be able to bring people closer together. I think groups like International Rotary and International Lions have done much good and have assisted in creating international understanding.

What I object to is putting the stamp of official approval on an unofficial group and sending them abroad at Government expense to discuss international affairs. In the eyes of many people of the world, such a committee will commit the U.S. to a course of action which is not, indeed, an official course of action, and is not, indeed, a course of action sponsored by Congress, by the Department of State, or by the administration, but is purely the action of a private organization.

MR. CLARK. Mr. President. It ill behooves those who live in a democracy to suggest that citizens have no role to play, either in our foreign policy or in strengthening our alliance.

What are we afraid of? Are we afraid of the workings of democracy? Why are we concerned to have distinguished citizens meet with distinguished citizens of other countries in order to devise ways and means of strengthening our most precious alliance?

Are we afraid of the processes of democracy itself? Who are the pressure groups which, it is alleged, would attempt to convert to their own glory the convention called for by the joint resolution? Do my friends on the other side of the aisle not trust the Vice President, or do we on this side of the aisle not trust the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to assure that our representation at the convention will be composed of dedicated and distinguished citizens who are concerned only with the good of the country? It is difficult for me to believe that there would be such doubts.

Some seem to be afraid of the results of the meeting called for by the joint resolution. Mr. President, the sponsors of the resolution want to have a meeting of interested citizens held, and the sponsors of this measure have been ready and willing to amend the terms of the original joint resolution in order to meet any legitimate objections which might have been raised to it. Their purpose is to make possible the holding of the proposed meeting.

Mr. President, are we so sure that all wisdom resides in the parliamentary groups of NATO? Are we so sure that all wisdom resides in the State Department and in the foreign offices of our allies?

Some who oppose the joint resolution say that all such matters should be handled only through the U.N. We need more than governmental action; we also need an informed citizenry. This is the entire basis of our exchange program, by means of which the brains of the free world are exchanged and ideas are fertilized.

I suggest that the opposition to the joint resolution—impliedly, of course, not explicitly—stems from a feeling that we cannot trust the best brains of the free world to go to work on free world problems.

Mr. President, it is impossible for me to conceive how anyone can seriously contend that the representatives of the U.S. at the proposed convention would represent anyone except themselves—free, dedicated, distinguished citizens of the U.S. . .

They will donate, without charge, the most valuable thing they can possibly donate—namely, they will give to the meeting the benefit of their excellent, highly trained minds. Cannot we at least provide an adequate appropriation, in order to make sure that they will be adequately staffed, housed, and fed? In my judgment, the requested appropriation is indeed modest.

So, Mr. President, I shall conclude as I began: What are we afraid of? Do not we believe in the processes of democracy? Do we believe that the Vice President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives will let our country down? If we believe that, then this is a sad day for the U.S.

MR. CASE of New Jersey. Mr. President, I am in favor of the joint resolution, but I am in control of the time in opposition to it.

MR. ERVIN. Mr. President—

MR. CASE of New Jersey. Mr. President, I am happy to yield now to the Senator from North Carolina whatever time he may require.

MR. ERVIN [D.]. I shall need perhaps 7 minutes.

MR. CASE of New Jersey. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished Senator from North Carolina.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER.* The Senator from North Carolina is recognized for 10 minutes.

MR. ERVIN.

Mr. President, I realize that any person who opposes a joint resolution of this nature renders himself subject to the charge that he is not in favor of using all methods of promoting peace. Nevertheless, I cannot refrain from rising in opposition to the joint resolution.

Mr. President, when I became a Member of this body, I took an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the U.S. I find it impossible to reconcile this joint resolution with my oath to support and defend the Constitution of the U.S. I have reached this conclusion for two reasons. The first is based upon clause 7 of section 9 of the first article of the Constitution, which provides:

No money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law.

It has been well settled by numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of the U.S. that under this section of the Constitution Congress does not have the power to make appropriations of public moneys, save and except for public purposes.

The proponents of the joint resolution say the group of people, who would travel and act under the terms of the joint resolution, would not be public officials, but would merely be private citizens, and would not be representing the Government of the U.S. If that be true, then the joint resolution conflicts with the constitutional provision I have just now read, because the joint resolution would undertake to authorize the appropriation of tax moneys to pay the private expenses of private citizens engaged in a private mission; and I cannot reconcile this joint resolution with that constitutional provision.

Furthermore, I cannot reconcile the joint resolution itself with the interpretation placed upon it by its proponents. Notwithstanding the language of the joint resolution and the arguments of its proponents, the Congress has no authority under the Constitution to name agents to represent the private citizens of the U.S. The persons proposed to be appointed under the joint resolution would have no authority from the private citizens of the U.S. to do anything for them. They would receive all their authority from the Congress of the U.S. When we consider that interpretation of the joint resolution—and it is the only interpretation I can give to it consistent with the truth—we run into another constitutional provision. Clause 2 of section 2 of article II of the Constitution provides:

He—[That is, the President—] shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur; and he—[That is, the President—] shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls.

Under this provision of the Constitution, the sole power to conduct the foreign affairs of the U.S. belongs to the President. The Congress is so aware of that fact that it has passed what is popularly known as the Logan Act, which makes it a crime for any private citizen to attempt to carry on negotiations with any foreign country.

The pending resolution provides that private citizens—so its proponents say—deriving whatever authority they have from the Congress of the U.S., shall consult at public expense with persons of other NATO nations to see whether or not they cannot make arrangements for an international convention to the end that the U.S. may get greater unity between those countries and itself by economic and political means. . . .

The pending measure constitutes an effort to bypass the constitutional authority vested with the power to deal with the foreign affairs of the U.S. and to permit some private citizens to receive authority to do so from the Congress, which itself has no power, under the Constitution of the U.S., to deal with matters of this kind.

Mr. President, I believe we should strengthen the NATO allies by procedures which conform to the Constitution of the U.S. And the pending measure is an effort . . . on the part of the Congress of the U.S. to appoint its own Ambassadors, to deal with the foreign affairs of the U.S., insofar as they relate to the NATO countries.

And all of the sophistry and all of the talk about peace cannot wipe out the plain fact that this is an effort on the part of the Congress of the U.S. to take charge of the foreign affairs of the U.S., in violation of the plain letter and the living spirit of the Constitution. All it can do is to cause confusion and cast doubt in the minds of Europeans upon the authority of those who are now in power to represent the U.S., both diplomatically and militarily, in connection with the NATO treaty.

Although the resolution has a high-sounding name, and although its proponents have lofty motives, I cannot reconcile the resolution with the Constitution of the United States; and for that reason I shall vote against it.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut is recognized for 5 minutes.



MR. DODD [D.] Mr. President, I rise in support of the resolution. The distinguished Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Ervin] made reference to the Logan Act, which hits a very sensitive place with me, because I made some reference to it not too long ago, in relation to another individual who I thought then, and I think now, was and is in violation of the Logan Act, because of his meddling in foreign affairs. I refer, of course, to Cyrus Eaton. However, I say, with the greatest respect to my colleague and friend from North Carolina, that I think he misunderstands or misapplies the concept of the Logan Act as related to this resolution.

The Logan Act, in my judgment, prohibits anyone not authorized from carrying on negotiations or discussions of any kind with officials of foreign governments in matters having to do with the foreign policy or foreign relations of the U.S. Under the pending joint resolution, private citizens, who would make up the U.S. delegation, would be authorized by Congress and selected by the leaders of Congress to meet only with private citizens of other NATO countries, and they would not, in any sense, be unlawfully interfering in foreign affairs. I do not

*Senator Gale W. McGee (D., Wyo.) presided over the rest of the debate.

think the Logan Act applies to the present situation.

MR. ERVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

MR. DODD. Yes; I am happy to yield.

MR. ERVIN. I did not say that the Logan Act applied in this instance. I cited the Logan Act as being a recognition by the Congress that the power to deal with foreign affairs of the United States belongs to the President and to no one else, not even to the Congress itself.

MR. DODD. I thank the Senator for clarifying a misunderstanding in my mind. In any event, I think the Senator will agree with me—that the spirit of the Logan Act really is not involved in considering this resolution.

Mr. President, what we are trying to do is to take a small step toward that situation we must reach, and which I am confident we shall reach, when all of the peoples of the world, through their properly selected representatives, can meet together and decide disputes in the world, without recourse to the violence of war or aggression of any kind. That is what we are trying to do. We cannot do it all at once, for a number of reasons. The Church resolution provides a means to further this kind of process among our friends and allies of the free world.

I have no hesitancy in saying to my colleagues that I am a world federalist. World federation at the right time and on the right basis is the answer to peace or war. I do not think world federation is now attainable because of Communist deceit and treachery and because of uncompromising Communist hostility to the free world and its institutions. But I think it is ultimately the only sensible solution to the problem of peace and war in the world.

The resolution we are considering seeks to take another step forward in that direction by at least getting people together, by getting private citizens of the NATO countries to get together to talk about common problems and to find out how we can strengthen the alliances we now have, which are not worldwide but which are really regional and founded on free world principles. We can succeed here because we start out with a broad area of shared common principles. That is all we are trying to do.

This will cost a little money, $300,000 or $400,000. I know the value of the dollar, but $300,000 or $400,000 in these days of millions and billions of dollars is a drop in the bucket. If we can make any progress at all toward the ultimate goal of peace on earth, because men are able to sit down and talk out their problems rather than fight them out, then I say we ought to be willing to spend this small sum.

MR. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, regardless of what the result is with regard to passage of the joint resolution, I wish to take this occasion to commend and to congratulate the distinguished junior Senator from Idaho for the initiative he has shown and the responsibility he has undertaken.

I wish to point out that in the hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution 17, in the first instance, and later Senate Joint Resolution 170, there are statements by various Members of this body in favor of this proposal. As to whether the Department of State is in favor of the passage of the resolution, I would suggest to the Members that they should read the communications from the Assistant Secretary of State, William B. Macomber, Jr., to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The resolution also has the support of a good number of outstanding citizens, such as Gen. William Draper, W. L. Clayton, of Houston, Tex., and our former colleague in the House, Robert Hale, of Maine, as well as others too numerous to mention.

My purpose in rising at this time and in asking for this brief minute is to pay my respects to the distinguished Senator from Idaho, and to again commend and to congratulate him for the initiative he has shown and the responsibility he has undertaken.

MR. CHURCH. I thank the Senator very much for his remarks. I appreciate them more than I can say. I am very pleased to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Minnesota, who has long been associated with this proposal, and who has sponsored it in previous Congresses, as well as in the present Congress.

MR. HUMPHREY [D.]. There is no doubt that Atlantic unity, the North Atlantic Community, is vital to the security of the U.S. In fact, the NATO alliance has been properly termed our most significant alliance.

There have been many expressions of thought to the effect that NATO ought to be expanded. There could be economic cooperation and scientific cooperation, as well as greater cooperation on trade. There could be cooperation in the development of underdeveloped areas, economic assistance overseas, and a host of activities which are presently being carried on by the independent nation states.

Passage of this resolution by Congress—one forward step which Khrushchev is powerless to block—would immediately create new solidarity and hope for the future among the NATO peoples.

A fresh and independent survey of this problem is now urgently needed. While it is indeed a responsibility of the President of the U.S. and the executive branch to conduct foreign policy, there is no prohibition in or out of the Constitution against the citizenry advising and consulting on the formulation of foreign policy. In fact, the Congress has a special responsibility in this day and age, in which economic assistance trade, tariffs, scientific research, education, and information are so much a part of foreign policy.

MR. CHURCH. Mr. President, in order that the opponents of the resolution may have a full opportunity to present their arguments, and inasmuch as considerably more of the time allocated to the proponents has been consumed than is the case of the time allocated to the opponents, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

MR. LAUSCHE [D., Ohio]. Mr. President, as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I voted against S. Concurrent Resolution 17. The vote finally cast was eight in favor of the resolution and seven against it.

I directed a number of questions to the witnesses who appeared before the committee. At the very beginning, my thinking in opposing the resolution was rooted in the proposition that under the resolution there would, in effect, be created a third agency which would participate in the formulation of foreign policy. The resolution contemplates the creation of a commission made up of private citizens, who would meet, would analyze what NATO was doing, and then, if it so desired, make recommendations of courses of action to be followed by NATO other than the courses of action it was following. That statement of fact immediately threw me into a quandary concerning the situation that would exist in the event the President and the State Department felt that one course of conduct was necessary to best promote the national interest of the U.S., and the commission of private citizens declared policies and made recommendations which were in conflict with the position taken by the Government.

On page 28 of the hearings I asked Mr. Draper this question:

Now, let us assume that our U.S. Government at NATO dissents while the other 14 agree. Assume that you have this agency in existence, and they meet, and the delegates appointed by this legislative body of the U.S., take a position contrary to what our duly constituted authorities under the Constitution took in passing on a question. You believe that will be healthy?

MR. DRAPER. I do not know that that would happen, but that would be an expression of their own views. I would not think that that would be harmful if they gave their views publicly and the American people and Congress can draw their own conclusions.

SENATOR LAUSCHE. Our Constitution contemplates that the foreign relations shall be conducted by the President of the United States, through his duly appointed officials, subject to whatever restrictions the Constitution places upon that power, and vests in the Senate; is that correct?

MR. DRAPER. That is correct.

I then posed the question:

Are you not proposing now the establishment, for the first time in the history of our country, of a separate citizens' group that will begin conducting foreign

relations and which may conduct them in a manner that will be completely inconsistent with what the President contemplates the foreign relations should be?

Those questions and answers are reflective of the reasons why I believe the joint resolution should not be passed. I care not whether the appointees to the commission are of the best and most prudent in the Nation. The fact is that they are to be responsible to no one. They will owe no responsibility to the President or to Congress. When once they are appointed, they, in assembly, can make declarations of what ought to be done, and make recommendations, even though such declarations are hopelessly and indefensibly in conflict with the course which the duly constituted authorities are following.

In a democracy, nothing is more essential than to have public officials answerable to the people. The members of the proposed commission will not be answerable to the people. In accordance with the answers given, they will be responsible only to their consciences. Consciences are very elusive things. Some are good; some are bad.

I remember when I was studying the subject of equity, in the early history of the law of equity the query was made: "How does a chancellor decide issues?"

The counsellor before the court said: "He decides them on the basis of conscience."

One of the chancellors declared: "That is a peculiar law. The consciences of individuals differ just as do the size of toes. Some are large; some are small."

The primary point at issue is to make certain that whoever is attempting to declare policy and make recommendations shall be answerable to the people of the U.S. I am quite certain that none of the proponents of the joint resolution will challenge my statement that after the commission enters upon the performance of its duties, it will not be limited in any degree in what it does by a power or authority exercised over it, either by Congress or by the President. When once the members of the commission are appointed, they will continue in office. The President cannot remove them; Congress cannot remove them; nor will the people have anything to say about the matter.

At the risk of repeating, if my arguments are disregarded, there can be no indifference shown to the fact that seven members of the committee voted against the favorable recommendation of the joint resolution. While I am not certain, there is a strong possibility that one member of the committee voted in favor of the resolution solely to get it before the Senate for final disposition.

Mr. President, I believe it would be a mistake to create the commission. I can see no useful purpose it would serve. Already there is too much confusion with regard to our foreign policy. The creation of the advisory commission would merely contribute further to it.

I pose this question: The President declares one course to be the policy. The commission advises a different course. How do we stand before the world? How do we stand in the minds of the people of our own country?

I think the safe thing to do is to adhere to the traditional approach, as declared by the Constitution; namely, that the foreign policy shall be conducted by the President and by the officials of the State Department. If there is to be a change in the manner in which our foreign policy is to be conducted, it should be done, in my judgment, only through a change in the Constitution. It should not be done by the backdoor method you proposed.

I urge Senators to vote against the joint resolution.

MR. JAVITS [R., N.Y.]. Mr. President, I desire to speak in support of the joint resolution.

Perhaps I will be pardoned if I say that I have had very considerable experience with the operations of NATO, especially inasmuch as I had the honor to be a representative, designated by the Vice President, to the NATO Parliamentarians Conference. This is the 3d year I have served in that capacity. I also had the privilege last year of attending the Atlantic Congress.

I believe the world has entered a new era, following collapse of the summit conference in Paris and the exacerbation of international tempers. There is also the great concern of the entire world over the violence of the language and the approach which accompanied the blow-up at Paris.

What has caused singular unanimity of opinion in our country, regardless of party, has been a realization of the fact —which Khrushchev has proved—that today the free world must combine and unify to a far greater extent than previously had been considered as necessary.

It seems to me we are witnessing an extremely effective reaction to that situation. For example, I noticed with very great interest that in the long and detailed speech made in this Chamber yesterday by a leading Democratic Senator, the junior Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. Kennedy), who is very prominently mentioned in his party for possible nomination to be its candidate for President of the United States, he emphasized that very point—namely, that whatever may be the differences of opinion between the administration and himself in regard to what should be done, or whatever may be the differences of opinion and the differences of approach between the two political parties, certainly it is agreed by all that we must increase our cooperation with the rest of the free world.

Economic matters are also of great importance in connection with this situation, Mr. President, because it appears that the gross national product and productive power of the 15 other NATO countries amount to approximately 15 percent of the gross national product and productive power of the United States. In fact, the gross national product of those 15 NATO countries amounts to approximately one-quarter of a trillion dollars.

In addition, enormous trade responsibilities are now being considered and negotiated among the NATO countries. For instance, all of us are familiar with the problems being reconciled between the Inner Six and the Outer Seven.

I believe I can state authoritatively, as chairman of the Economic Committee of the NATO Parliamentarians, that, in the immediate future, economic cooperation of the most intensive character between ourselves and our European allies is absolutely indispensable in order to achieve real success in the cold war.

For instance, we are faced with very grave problems in connection with the kind of economic warfare the Soviet Union could wage upon the free world, especially in individual primary commodities, including such items as tin, flax, and fuel oil. We are familiar with many of those problems, especially in connection with the new underdeveloped countries of Africa. All of these problems will have to be handled in a collective manner between ourselves and the European countries which are the principal consumers of the commodities.

In addition, the Atlantic Community controls the overwhelming proportion of the world trade, and certainly must take steps to deal adequately with the problems of trade competition. We are beginning to realize in a very definite way, in all branches of our economic system, the importance and the effects of the problems presented by both imports and exports, insofar as the United States itself is concerned.

The proper handling of all these problems requires far more in the way of contacts and interrelationships with our European allies than has heretofore been

accepted as the norm; at this time we are considering membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, to replace the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which was the European organization for cooperation in regard to the Marshall plan.

Mr. President, these developments will result in greatly increased intimacy of relationships as regards trade, aid, prices, and other economic problems between ourselves and the European countries.

Finally, Mr. President, we are looking forward to partnership with the European countries in order to help aid the less developed areas of the world—areas which, despite all we have done, including the work of the International Development Association, are still insufficiently developed to meet what everyone concedes to be the legitimate desires of their peoples to improve their standards of living. All of us recognize that the extent to which we take action to meet these needs will be the gauge as to which way these underdeveloped countries will turn—either to the free world or to the Communist bloc.

Mr. President, under all these circumstances, it seems to me that a technique as beneficial as the one called for by the pending joint resolution, which employs the grassroots spirit—which is the way I define the joint resolution—will definitely help in connection with the desire to attain world peace. It is necessary in terms of the security of the U.S., the security of the entire free world, success in the cold war, and success in the post Summit period, when such great emphasis is placed upon the necessity for coordination and unification of the free world to the maximum extent possible.

It seems to me that the joint resolution offers us an ideal approach, as a first step in dealing with what must be—if we are to succeed—the greater role of the entire NATO organization in enabling the entire Atlantic Community to cooperate more closely, and yet in practicable and completely constitutional ways.

MR. CHURCH. I am happy to yield to the distinguished senior Senator from Tennessee (Mr. Kefauver), such time as he may require. He has long been associated with this cause, and he is well known for his outspoken support of the objectives of the joint resolution.

MR. KEFAUVER [D.]. Mr. President, I rise to add my voice in support of S.J.R. 170.

The events at the Summit conference have convinced me that the No. 1 goal of Khrushchev is to destroy the North Atlantic alliance. This would seem quite natural on his behalf, as this alliance stands as the most potent defense against the U.S.S.R. today.

Most of us have long been engaged in seeking out ways to strengthen our NATO alliance. Along with a number of other Senators I sponsored the resolution which made the U.S. a member of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference. I have served as chairman of one of the major committees of the Conference.

I joined in writing and working for the resolution in the NATO Parliamentarians Association which brought about the Atlantic Congress in London last year.

Both the NATO Parliamentarians and the Atlantic Congress have strongly recommended the establishment of a smaller body which can meet for longer periods of time, and which can give intensive study to the possible means of strengthening our NATO ties.

The nature of the Communist effort for world domination has shifted to a considerable extent to the economic, political, and propaganda fields. The democracies can meet this new challenge

They must also have community of action. The adoption of this resolution will be a vital step in the creation of this action.

The continued success of the NATO with success only if they have workable mechanisms for consultation.
alliance may very well depend on what we do here today.

The U.S., and particularly the Senate today, is called upon to take the lead in this step for which other NATO nations have shown their support.



MR. SPARKMAN. I am in favor of the joint resolution. This proposal is not something new. It has been around here for a long time. Certain suggestions were made by the administration. It has been worked out in its final form in a way that was acceptable to the administration, and, in fact, to me.

For several years I have felt we needed something to bring together more closely the NATO countries. I have heard our military leaders in NATO say that one thing badly needed was a greater underpinning, politically and economically, of the countries; that they are very well unified from a military standpoint, but that they could never attain their full strength until they were brought together more closely with better political and economic understanding.

There is another thing that impresses me. Over the last year or two there has developed some talk of a trade war. I do not know whether it is right to call it a trade war, but certainly it is correct to refer to trade conditions as between two different groups of European countries. Anything we can do to help prevent a trade war, which could be destructive to the well-ordered trade of the world, as well as the good understanding which prevails among the various NATO countries, we ought to do.

MR. CHURCH. Mr. President, how much time remains to the proponents?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. Twelve minutes remain to the proponents.

MR. CASE of New Jersey. Mr. President, how much time remains to the opposition?

MR. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

MR. COOPER [R., Ky.]. Mr. President, as one of the original sponsors of the resolution, I am glad to support it today in the Senate. We must recognize that it is indispensable that members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and their peoples should be more closely bound together than ever before.

But certainly the events surrounding the Summit conference make it imperative that the people of the NATO countries understand the policies of the NATO and that they support them.

In 1950 I had the unique experience of attending two meetings of the Council of NATO in company with the then Secretary of State, the Honorable Dean Acheson. I remember the debate which occurred at the second meeting of the Council, held in London, with respect to the means by which Germany might be brought into NATO. The process was commenced by making Germany a member of the OEEC.

At the third meeting, in Brussels in December 1950, the decision was made that it was necessary that American troops should be committed to the defense of Europe, and General Eisenhower was chosen as supreme commander of the NATO forces. The Brussels meeting was followed by the great debate in Congress in 1951 on the issue of committing troops to Europe. I believe that if such an organization as is contemplated by the resolution before us had been in existence at that time, and the questions to which I have referred could have been discussed by private citizens of the NATO countries, the governmental decisions could have been made more quickly and accepted and understood by the peoples of the countries which are members of NATO.

My chief reason for giving the joint resolution my support is that from the discussions and considerations of able men and women who will be delegates there will be brought to bear upon the countries that are members of NATO new

ideas and the best thoughts of their people.

Those who were delegates to our Constitutional Convention were not bound by the views of any political party. They were free to bring to bear upon the Convention their best thoughts, their ideas, and their genius. Governments by their very nature are limited. We should not be afraid of the full scope and the best ideas of the peoples of our countries.

The resolution will give opportunity to the best minds of our country and of other countries which make up NATO to advance ideas, perhaps better ideas than may be held by those who are in power at a particular time—to join our countries more powerfully — economically, militarily, and in values which affect the opinion of the world.



MR. BUSH [R., Conn.]. The subject is one I have discussed on and off over a period of the past 10 years with a very distinguished citizen of my own State, Mr. Elmo Roper, who testified in support of the joint resolution before the Foreign Relations Committee. I believe that it would be well for us to pass this joint resolution today. I believe that a good case has been made for it.

I was very much interested to note in Mr. Roper's testimony before the committee that the much-maligned Director Emeritus of the Budget Percival Brundage is quoted as saying: "I support enthusiastically S.C.R. 17, consider it very important budgetwise."

I believe that our friends on the other side of the aisle should, when the Budget Bureau is not opposed to it, give the Bureau of the Budget a little round of applause.

I was very much impressed by the fact that the Vice President of the United States has firmly and enthusiastically endorsed the resolution.

MR. CHURCH. Mr. President, I yield to summarize the arguments in favor of the adoption of the resolution.

The arguments which have been raised against the pending resolution seem to me to fall into two categories. There have been those who have said that the joint resolution somehow interferes with the constitutional power vested in the President to conduct American foreign relations. I believe that, with all due deference to those who have made this argument, the facts simply do not support it. Certainly, if there were any shred of substance to this contention, the joint resolution now before us would be opposed by the President, who is naturally jealous of the powers of his office, and there would be objection to it also by the State Department. Yet the very contrary is true. The resolution has the blessing of the administration and the approval of the State Department.

Why does the resolution constitute no interference with the power of the President to conduct American foreign relations? It seems to me that the answer is simple. It is because no power is conferred upon the delegates who will attend the proposed convention. They merely will be sent to exercise their prerogatives as free citizens of the countries which comprise the NATO alliance, to deliberate and to reach conclusions with respect to how this alliance can be strengthened and how the unity of the free nations can be enhanced. This is a fundamental right of free citizenship.

The State Department, in commenting upon the resolution, has made it clear why it feels that recommendations emanating from a convention of this kind might be very fruitful. I quote the language of the Department of State:

> The Department considers that meetings such as the one proposed in this resolution might well serve a good purpose. We in the Department of State would certainly welcome any constructive and practical ideas which might emerge * * *. We particularly welcome the thought expressed in the resolution that the delegates to the proposed convention should be free to explore the problem fully as individuals.

Therefore, I submit there is no support for the argument that the resolution in any way interferes with the constitutional prerogatives of the President to conduct our foreign affairs.

The second argument which has been advanced is that the resolution is somehow unprecedented, that it opens up new doors, and therefore we should be cautious about approving it. I submit this is not so. Citizens' commissions are precedented, and we have used them to good advantage right here in the U.S. The Hoover Commission was a citizens' commission. It made recommendations that were highly useful and productive. The Government of Great Britain has used royal commissions with excellent results.

All we do in the resolution is to lift our sights and apply the precedent that we have used so well in other fields to the common problems faced by the NATO nations in strengthening the NATO alliance.

I submit that the resolution is in the best tradition of free societies. Our individual citizen is the finest product of Western civilization. Let us use him to the best advantage. Let us remember that the most important advances which have been made in our long quest for freedom have not been the acts of duly constituted governments, but have been the actions taken by free citizens in conventions assembled. Therefore, inasmuch as the joint resolution is supported by the administration, the State Department, the Vice President, and has been endorsed by the NATO parliamentarians' conference, and unanimously endorsed by the Citizens' Atlantic Conference in London last year, and has the majority support of the Committee on Foreign Relations, it ought properly to be approved by the Senate as a whole. I hope it will be so approved in the coming vote.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution is open to amendment. If no amendment is to be offered, the question is on the engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 170) was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading, and was read the third time.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. All time for debate has expired. . . The question is on the pasasge of the joint resolution. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

MR. MANSFIELD. I announce that the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. O'Mahoney) is necessarily absent.

The Senator from Missouri (Mr. Hennings) is absent because of illness.

I further announce that the Senator from Missouri (Mr. Hennings), if present and voting, would vote "yea."

MR. KUCHEL [R., Cal.]. I announce that the Senator from Maryland (Mr. Butler) is necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Mundt) is absent on official business.

The Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Wiley) is detained on official business. If present and voting, the Senator from Maryland (Mr. Butler) and the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. Mundt) would each vote "nay."

The result was announced—yeas 51, nays 44, as follows:

YEAS—51

Bartlett	Hartke	Magnuson
Beall	Hayden	Monroney
Bush	Hill	Morse
Carlson	Humphrey	Morton
Carroll	Jackson	Moss
Case, N. J.	Javits	Murray
Church	Johson, Tex.	Muskie
Clark	Keating	Pastore
Cooper	Kefauver	Proxmire
Dodd	Kennedy	Randolph
Douglas	Kuchel	Scott
Engle	Long, Hawaii	Smathers
Fong	Long, La.	Sparkman
Fulbright	Lusk	Symington
Gore	McCarthy	Williams, N.J.
Gruening	McGee	Yarborough
Hart	McNamara	Young, Ohio

NAYS—44

Aiken	Dirksen	McClellan
Allott	Dworshak	Mansfield
Anderson	Eastland	Martin
Bennett	Ellender	Prouty
Bible	Ervin	Robertson
Bridges	Frear	Russell
Brunsdale	Goldwater	Saltonstall
Byrd, Va.	Green	Schoeppel
Byrd, W. Va.	Hickenlooper	Smith
Cannon	Holland	Stennis
Capehart	Hruska	Talmadge
Case, S. Dak.	Johnston, S. C.	Thurmond
Chavez	Jordan	Williams, Del.
Cotton	Kerr	Young, N. Dak
Curtis	Lausche	

NOT VOTING—5

Butler	O'Mahoney
Hennings	Wiley
Mundt	

So the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 170) was passed.

There is something noble and magnificent in the perspective of a great Federal Republic....closely linked in the pursuit of a common interest... tranquil and prosperous at home, respectable abroad; but there is something proportionately diminutive... and contemptible in the prospect of a number of petty states... with appearance only of union, jarring, jealous and perverse, fluctuating and unhappy.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON · in The Continentalist, July 4, 1782



I agree to this Constitution with all its faults b
I think a general Government necessary for u
think it will astonish our enemies, who are writing
confidence to hear that our councils are confounded
those of the Builders of Babel; and that our Stat
on the point of Separation, only to meet hereafter fo
purpose of cutting one another's throats. -BENJA

FRANKLIN, on signing the Federal Constitution, September 1

* * * * * * * FOR "SOMETHING NOBLE" THAT "WILL ASTONISH OUR ENEMIES" * * * * * * *

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The American compact is altogether with individuals.
The only government is that which makes minute of individuals.
The whole theory of the universe is directed unerringly to one single individual—namely to You.

—Walt Whitman,
By Blue Ontario's Shore, 1856.

The Critical U.S. Period

To some persons it may seem as if the years 1861-65 were of more cardinal importance than the years 1783-89. Our Civil War was indeed an event of prodigious magnitude . . . and . . . decisiveness. The measure of that decisiveness is to be found in the completeness of the reconciliation that has already . . . cemented the Federal Union so powerfully . . . when we consider this wonderful harmony which so soon has followed the deadly struggle, we may well believe it to be the index of such a stride toward the ultimate pacification of mankind as was never made before. But it was the work done in the years 1783-89 that created a federal nation capable of enduring the storm and stress of 1861-65.—John Fiske, *The Critical Period of American History, 1783-89,* in its Preface, written Oct. 10, 1888, Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

Sudden a Thought...

—Annemarie Bonnet

Sudden a thought came like a full-blown rose.—Keats, *The Eve of St. Agnes*

*

The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation [of the 13 States] is the principle of *legislation* for *States* or *governments,* in their *corporate* or *collective capacities,* and as contradistinguished from the *individuals* of which they consist.—Hamilton, *The Federalist, No. 15,* 1788.

*

The consequences of disunion cannot be too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves peace, every man who loves his country, every man who loves liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes.—Madison, *The Federalist, No. 41.*

*

The triumph of tyranny in Central Europe should be a warning to the nations of the free West that they too court disaster by continuing to adhere to obsolete notions of national sovereignty. And the tragic story of Central Europe also has a lesson to teach the former colonial peoples the world over who are now entering the age of nationalism.—Stephen Borsody, *The Triumph of Tyranny, Macmillan* 1960.

Why U.S. Revolution Was Unique

American independence was the beginning of a new era . . . no other Revolution ever proceeded from so slight a cause, or was ever conducted with more moderation. . . . It was democracy vigilance, less against aristocracy and in its highest perfection, armed with monarchy than against its own weakness and excess. Whilst England was admired for the safeguards with which, in the course of many centuries, it had fortified liberty against the power of the crown, American appeared still more worthy of admiration for the safeguards which, in the deliberations of a single memorable year (1787), it had set up against the power of its own sovereign people. It resembled no other democracy, for it respected freedom, authority, and law. It resembled no other constitution, for it was contained in half a dozen intelligible articles.—Lord Acton, *History of Freedom,* Macmillan, London, 1919, pp. 84-85.

*

The U.S. has more citizens and private investments in foreign lands than any other nation.—Vice President Richard Nixon, in a letter to Eugene C. Pulliam, advocating repeal of the Connally Amendment.

*

Federalism is the only possible means of reconciling states and nations.—Oscar Jaszi, in 1948.

*

The quickest way to get three Americans to travel a thousand miles is to propose an exchange of ideas.—Jacques Barzun, *The House of the Intellect.*

The Citizen & Sovereignty in the U. S. [1835]

WHENEVER THE POLITICAL LAWS of the United States are to be discussed, it is with the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people that we must begin.

The principle of the sovereignty of the people, which is always to be found, more or less, at the bottom of almost all human institutions, generally remains there concealed from view. It is obeyed without being recognized, or if for a moment it is brought to light, it is hastily cast back into the gloom of the sanctuary.

"The will of the nation" is one of those phrases that have been most largely abused by the wily and the despotic of every age. Some have seen the expression of it in the purchased suffrages of a few of the satellites of power; others, in the votes of a timid or an interested minority; and some have even discovered it in the silence of a people, on the supposition that the fact of submission established the right to command.

In America the principle of the sovereignty of the people is neither barren nor concealed, as it is with some other nations; it is recognized by the customs and proclaimed by the laws; it spreads freely, and arrives without impediment at its most remote consequences. If there is a country in the world where the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people can be fairly appreciated, where it can be studied in its application to the affairs of society, and where its dangers and its advantages may be judged, that country is assuredly America.

At the present day the principle of the sovereignty of the people has acquired in the U.S. all the practical development that the imagination can conceive. It is unencumbered by those fictions that are thrown over it in other countries, and it appears in every possible form, according to the exigency of the occasion. Sometimes the laws are made by the people in a body, as at Athens; and sometimes its representatives, chosen by universal suffrage, transact business in its name and under its immediate supervision.

The people reign in the American political world as the Deity does in the universe. They are the cause and the aim of all things; everything comes from them, and everything is absorbed in them.—Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (1835), vol. I, Chap. 4.

Atlantic Federal Union Now—

THE ONCE-IN-173 YEARS DEBATE

When the U. S. Federation was a-borning most Americans thought it "too remote" to bother about. George Washington himself doubted in 1787 that the people were "matured" for "such an important change." He feared that the "Monster . . . Sovereignty" which had "taken such fast hold of the States individually," would make "another dreadful conflict" necessary before the 13 would accept Federal Union. On the eve of the Federal Convention itself he said: "It is too probable that no plan we propose will be adopted." But all this only made Washington fight the harder for Union. Because he won that fight we rightly revere him as the Father of our Country—but we wrongly forget the apathy, skepticism and opposition he and the other Federalists faced then. Result: Many are as blind now to the all important issue of their lifetime, as the long forgotten "Non-founding Fathers" of 1787-89 were then.



A copy of any newspaper of 1788 containing one of the *Federalist* papers is now a valuable collector's item—but when those *Federalist* columns originally appeared in the press nearly all of them were discarded as trash. Any evidence that a forebear fought for American Federal Union then is now a treasured family heirloom, framed and handed down from generation to generation. Few such treasures exist. Why? Because few people then were wise enough to recognize great history when it was happening before their eyes. Most Pennsylvanians, for example, thought the elections for President of Pennsylvania more important that Franklin's efforts to federate the 13 States . . . before he achieved his 35-year task.

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

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Washington - This is taken from a report to appear in the September Freedom & Union:

HOUSE APPROVES ATLANTIC CONVENTION, 288 to 103; NEW APPROACH MADE TO NATO UNITY

The House of Representatives approved the Atlantic Convention resolution 288 to 103 August 24 after nearly three hours of debate and six moves to kill the bill. This added significance to the three to one majority in the House whose two-year term makes it traditionally more responsive to public opinion than the six-year Senate. The vote completed Congressional approval of Senate Joint resolution 170 which was approved June 15 by the Senate 51 to 44, with Senators Kennedy and Johnson voting for it and Vice President Nixon announcing he would actively support it if still a Senator. The resolution requires the President's signature but this is considered assured since the Administration has already endorsed it.

The resolution makes a new kind of approach to world problems in general and NATO unification in particular. It sets up a "U. S. Citizens Commission on NATO," composed of 20 representative private citizens appointed by Senate President Nixon and Speaker Rayburn to organize and take part in a con vention composed of similar commissions from other NATO nations. The convention's purpose is "to explore means by which greater cooperation and unity of purpose may be developed to the end that democratic freedom may be promoted by economic and political means."

Though not stipulated in the bill, supporters explained they expected the convention to be limited to 100 citizens, with the commissions from other countries roughly proportioned to population. The bill states that the U. S. delegates are "not in any way to speak for or to represent the U. S. Government." They are to serve without pay until the commission expires Jan. 31, 1962, but a $300,000 appropriation is authorized for expenses, staff and the U. S. share in the convention's cost. This requires a separate vote, but if lack of time prevents such action before the present short session ends, the appropriation can be made in 1961, and the Commission appointed meanwhile. Supporters expect it to be soon after the election, if not before.

Supporters during the debate left it to opponents to stress the newness of this whole approach in the international field; they themselves likened it to such familiar methods in the United States as the Hoover Commissions. In the House hearing it was also likened to the Federal Convention of 1787, and there too the success of the American example was emphasized. Although the resolution's approach resembles neither of these examples completely - a fact the debate did not bring out - it does resemble both in permitting convention participants to explore the problem as individual citizens.

In the debate, opponents - most of whom objected to such commissions in the national field as really efforts to promote "give away" legislation - attacked the novelty of asking citizens to explore international questions. They found this to be "unconstitutional" meddling by Congress and, worse, by "irresponsible" private citizens in foreign affairs which should be left to the Executive.

MORE

The State Department, in endorsing the resolution, had conditioned its support on Congress taking full responsibility and naming the delegates, pointing out that the resultant freedom "to explore the problem fully without being officially instructed or able to commit their governments" was "obviously in the interest of full and free exploration" which it "would welcome." The bill's opponents, however, insisted that it should, like the Hoover Commissions, include delegates named by the Executive and certainly Members of Congress.

Clement Zablocki (D., Wisc.) and Walter Judd, Minnesota keynoter at the recent Republican Convention, both of whom had sponsored similar resolutions for many years had the satisfaction of being the Floor managers for their respective parties who led the bill to its brilliant victory, with the telling support of another of its sponsors, Thomas E. Morgan (D., Pa.), chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Another committee member, Wayne Hays (D., Ohio) backed it effectively as past President of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference which has recommended this measure since 1956. Others who spoke strongly for it included Ray Madden (D., Ind.), Barratt O'Hara (D., Ill.) Porter Hardy Jr. (D., Va.) and Republicans John V. Lindsay (N. Y.), Robert R. Barry (N. Y.), Robert J. Corbett (Pa.) and James G. Fulton (Pa.)

The opposition was begun and ended by H. R. Gross (R., Iowa) whose concentration on the negative is so notorious to his colleagues as to lessen considerably his persuasive power. Others who spoke against the bill included John J. Flynt Jr. (D., Ga.), John Dowdy (D., Tex.), James Haley (D., Fla.) and Otto Passman (D., La.) and Republicans Bruce Alger (Tex.) Frank Bow (Ohio), Clarence Brown (Ohio), Clare Hoffman (Mich.), and Keith Thomson (Wyo.) Most of them feared the commission would waste taxpayer money or bring pressure on Congress to give it away to foreigners.

As in the Senate, the opposition vote was composed mainly of Southern conservatives and midwest Republicans. Two contrasts with the Senate, however, were striking. In the Senate, Republicans voted almost two to one against the bill; in the House, they voted almost two to one for it - 91 to 50 with 11 absent. In the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee approved the bill only eight to seven, with Frank Carlson the only Republican for it. In the House the Committee on Foreign Affairs unanimously recommended the same bill, with 15 Democrats and five Republicans present, and in the Floor vote only one of its 32 members, L. H. Fountain (D., N. C.) voted no, and he did not speak in opposition. Senate Minority Leader Dirksen voted against it; House Minority Leader Halleck voted for it.

Representative Flynt moved to amend the bill by making half the members of the Commission Members of Congress. Representative Hays replied that the latter could not spare the time needed for this job of exploration, and Representatives Zablocki and Judd opposed because any amendment would kill the bill since there was no time in this short session to reach agreement with the Senate. The move was defeated 59 to 33. Representative Bow then offered three amendments. The first cut from $170,000 to $50,000 the allowance for staff; it was rejected 55 to 38. Another teller vote defeated 76 to 46 the second, limiting the U. S. share in the convention expense to 20 per cent. The third, still more technical, was killed by a voice vote. Representative Gross then offered another technical amendment. A voice vote defeated it, and then his final move to kill the bill - a motion to re-commit.

Chairman Morgan brought out that P. F. Brundage, former Director of the Budget, had estimated that effective Atlantic unification would save taxpayers "more than $10 billion a year." Representative Zablocki pointed to NATO's need "to devise a strategy that would be effective in times of peace." Dr. Judd, who is a physician, likened Communism to a cancer and argued for seeking order not from the top down but "up from the bottom as was the case with out Original Thirteen States when they formed the order known as the United States of America."

(Turn page for vote in House)

Accordingly the Committee rose, and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. BASS of Tennessee, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union reported that that Committee having had under consideration the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 170) to authorize the participation in an international convention of representative citizens from the North Atlantic Treaty nations to examine how greater political and economic cooperation among their peoples may be promoted, to provide for the appointment of U.S. delegates to such convention, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 587, he reported the joint resolution back to the House.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the third reading of the Senate joint resolution.

The resolution was ordered to be read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the Senate joint resolution.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the resolution?

Mr. GROSS. I am unequivocally opposed to it, Mr. Speaker.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman qualifies. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. GROSS moves to recommit Senate Joint Resolution 170 to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs with the following amendment: On page 4, line 3, strike the period and insert a colon and add the following: "*Provided,* That no part of any appropriation contained in this resolution or of the funds available for expenditure for any individual included in this resolution, shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes designed to support or defeat legislation proposed or pending before Congress."

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit.

The motion to recommit was rejected.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the joint resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the joint of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently, no quorum is present.

The Doorkeeper will close the doors, the Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members, and the Clerk will call the roll.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 288, nays 103, not voting 40, as follows:

[Roll No. 192]

YEAS—288

Adair
Addonizio
Albert
Allen
Anderson, Mont.
Anfuso
Arends
Ashley
Aspinall
Auchincloss
Avery
Ayres
Baker
Baldwin
Barr
Barry
Bass, N.H.
Bass, Tenn.
Bates
Becker
Beckworth
Bennett, Fla.
Bennett, Mich.
Blatnik
Boggs
Boland
Bolton
Bonner
Bowles
Boykin
Brademas
Breeding
Brewster
Brooks, Tex.
Broomfield
Brown, Ga.
Brown, Mo.
Broyhill
Burke, Ky.
Burke, Mass.
Burleson
Byrne, Pa.
Cahill
Canfield
Carnahan
Chamberlain
Chelf
Chenoweth
Chiperfield
Church
Clark
Coad
Coffin
Cohelan
Collier
Conte
Cook
Cooley
Corbett
Cramer
Cunningham
Curtin
Curtis, Mass.
Daddario
Dague
Daniels
Delaney
Dent
Denton
Derounian
Diggs
Dingell
Dixon
Donohue
Dooley
Dorn, N.Y.
Doyle
Dulski
Durham
Dwyer
Edmondson
Elliott
Everett
Evins
Fallon
Farbstein
Fenton
Fino
Fisher
Flood
Flynn
Fogarty
Foley
Forand
Ford
Frazier
Frelinghuysen
Friedel
Fulton
Gallagher
Garmatz
Gathings
George
Giaimo
Gilbert
Granahan
Hagen
Halleck
Halpern
Hardy
Hargis
Hays
Hechler
Hemphill
Henderson
Hogan
Holifield
Holland
Holtzman
Horan
Huddleston
Inouye
Irwin
Jackson
Jarman
Johnson, Calif.
Johnson, Colo.
Johnson, Md.
Johnson, Wis.
Jonas
Jones, Ala.
Judd
Karsten
Karth
Kasem
Kastenmeier
Kearns
Keith
Kelly
Keough
Kilday
Kilgore
King, Calif.
King, Utah
Kluczynski
Knox
Kowalski
Lafore
Laird
Lane
Langen
Lankford
Latta
Lennon
Lesinski
Levering
Libonati
Lindsay
Lipscomb
McCormack
McCulloch
McDonough
McDowell
McFall
McGovern
McIntire
Macdonald
Machrowicz
Mack
Madden
Mailliard
Marshall
Martin
May
Meader
Merrow
Metcalf
Meyer
Michel
Miller, Clem
Miller, George P.
Miller, N.Y.
Milliken
Moeller
Monagan
Moore
Moorhead
Morgan
Natcher
Nelsen
Norblad
O'Brien, Ill.
O'Brien, N.Y.
O'Hara, Ill.
O'Hara, Mich.
O'Neill
Oliver
Osmers
Ostertag
Patman
Perkins
Philbin
Pilcher
Poage
Porter
Powell
Price
Prokop
Pucinski
Quigley
Rabaut
Rains
Randall
Ray
Rees, Kans.
Reuss
Rhodes, Pa.
Riehlman
Riley
Rivers, Alaska
Rivers, S.C.
Roberts
Robison
Rodino
Rogers, Colo.
Rooney
Roosevelt
Rostenkowski
Roush
Santangelo
Saund
Schenck
Schneebeli
Schwengel
Selden
Shelley
Sheppard
Shipley
Sisk
Slack
Smith, Iowa
Smith, Miss.
Spence
Springer
Staggers
Stratton
Stubblefield
Sullivan
Taylor, N.C.
Teague, Calif.
Teller
Thomas
Thompson, Tex.
Thornberry
Toll
Tollefson
Trimble
Udall
Ullman
Vanik
Wallhauser
Walter
Wampler
Watts
Weaver
Weis
Widnall
Willis
Wilson
Wolf
Wright
Gray
Green, Oreg.
Green, Pa.
Griffin
Griffiths
Gubser
Morris, Okla.
Moss
Moulder
Multer
Mumma
Murphy
Yates
Young
Younger
Zablocki
Zelenko

NAYS—103

Abbitt
Abernethy
Alexander
Alford
Alger
Andersen, Minn.
Andrews
Ashmore
Bailey
Baring
Belcher
Berry
Betts
Blitch
Bosch
Bow
Bray
Brock
Brooks, La.
Brown, Ohio
Budge
Byrnes, Wis.
Cannon
Casey
Cederberg
Colmer
Curtis, Mo.
Davis, Ga.
Derwinski
Devine
Dorn, S.C.
Dowdy
Downing
Feighan
Flynt
Forrester
Fountain
Gary
Gavin
Goodell
Gross
Haley
Harmon
Harrison
Herlong
Hiestand
Hoeven
Hoffman, Ill.
Hoffman, Mich.
Holt
Hosmer
Hull
Jennings
Jensen
Johansen
Jones, Mo.
Kitchin
Kyl
McGinley
McMillan
Mason
Matthews
Mills
Minshall
Montoya
Morris, N. Mex.
O'Konski
Passman
Pelly
Pfost
Pillion
Pirnie
Poff
Reece, Tenn.
Rhodes, Ariz.
Rogers, Fla.
Rogers, Tex.
Rutherford
St. George
Saylor
Scherer
Scott
Short
Sikes
Siler
Simpson
Smith, Calif.
Smith, Va.
Steed
Taber
Teague, Tex.
Thomson, Wyo.
Tuck
Utt
Van Pelt
Van Zandt
Westland
Wharton
Whitener
Whitten
Wier
Williams
Winstead

NOT VOTING—40

Barden
Barrett
Baumhart
Bentley
Bolling
Buckley
Celler
Davis, Tenn.
Dawson
Fascell
Glenn
Grant
Harris
Healey
Hébert
Hess
Ikard
Kee
Kilburn
Kirwan
Landrum
Loser
McSween
Magnuson
Mahon
Mitchell
Morrison
Murray
Nix
Norrell
Preston
Quie
Rogers, Mass.
Smith, Kans.
Taylor, N.Y.
Thompson, La.
Thompson, N.J.
Vinson
Wainwright
Withrow

So the bill was passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Hébert for, with Mr. Taylor of New York against.

Mr. Wainwright for, with Mr. Smith of Kansas against.

Mr. Bentley for, with Mr. Hess against.

Mr. Celler for, with Mr. Baumhart against.

Mr. Buckley for, with Mr. Kilburn against.

Mr. Kirwan for, with Mr. Withrow against.

Until further notice:

Mr. Morrison with Mr. Glenn.

Mr. Thompson of Louisiana with Mr. Quie.

Mr. Loser with Mrs. Rogers, Mass.

Mrs. MAY changed her vote from "nay" to "yea."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The doors were opened.

to Atlantica, and the future.

To Beat K's Hidden Hand With Cards Face Up Free Need U-nity Rather Than U-2--Streit

CLARENCE K. STREIT
Author and Editor

I SUPPORT THE ATLANTIC Convention resolution before you. This may lead to some misunderstanding because of my long identification with proposals for Atlantic Union or federation. To be fair to the many supporters of this resolution who do not—yet—agree with me in those regards, and to prevent any misunderstanding let me make two things clear at once:

My support of this Convention resolution does not mean that it involves any endorsement of Atlantic federation (as did the so-called "Atlantic Union" resolution introduced in Congress in 1949.) Nor does it mean that I no longer urge federation of the free. It means simply this: I find that the security of the United States and of freedom has gone down so much since 1949 that any measure that promises—as does this resolution—to assure early consideration, at least, of how to unite the Atlantic allies more strongly deserves support, however short it falls of what I think necessary.

In 1949 we had an atomic monopoly, immense air and naval superiority, and no one worried about Russia in the economic and scientific fields. The signing of the Atlantic alliance had led Moscow to drop the Berlin blockade. Many concluded there was no need to unite more closely with our allies, and Congress took no action on the Atlantic Union resolution.

Since 1949, communism has grown strong in China, ended our atomic monopoly, armed itself powerfully with submarines, aircraft and long range missiles, greatly increased its production and been first with sputnik, lunik—and now with space ships. Meanwhile, the relative position of the U. S. has gone down, despite all the billions Congress has appropriated, to the point where Moscow has dared renew its Berlin threat and has got the Summit meeting it demanded. That meeting opened yesterday with our country and freedom in a painfully weak position.

In those precious 11 years, it is true that NATO has grown in military power. But it is also true that practically nothing has been done to strengthen the structure of the Atlantic alliance, despite the fact that General Eisenhower, in his report as SHAPE Commander on April 2, 1952, warned: "Peacetime coalitions throughout history have been weak and notoriously inefficient. . . . Visible and within grasp we have the capability of building such military, economic and moral strength as the Communist world would never dare to challenge."

What have we done thus far even to explore how to build this strength? Nothing, structurally, except the exploration made by the NATO Committee of Three Foreign Ministers in 1956. It is perhaps comment enough on this effort's results that two of these "three wise men"—Lester B. Pearson of Canada and Gaetano Martino of Italy—came out publicly two months ago in favor of exploring the problem now by the convention proposal before you. So have such other authorities as Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, and former Premier Robert Schuman of France, a pioneer for European Union. The 1949 hopes of a united, federated Europe have turned into a Europe bitterly divided now into economic Sixes and Sevens. Meanwhile the commitment in Article 2 of the Atlantic treaty to develop Atlantic economic cooperation has remained unexplored, down to this year.

Endorsed by State Department

This delay has resulted in so great a threat that it seems to me that every patriot must encourage all he can any step in the right direction that can be taken by this Congress. This crisis cries for quick action to strengthen Atlantic unity, and this resolution offers the only practical hope for such action in the few weeks left before you adjourn. It gives this hope for many reasons: It has the sponsorship of your distinguished chairman and other Members of your Committee who rightly are highly respected for their judgment. It has the endorsement of your eminent alumnus, Secretary Herter, and is unanimously recommended by the NATO Parliamentarians Conference and the Atlantic Congress.

—*Le Canard Enchainé, Paris*

I present my dove of peace

I would like at this point to quote two paragraphs from the statement that the State Deparment made on January 19th, since no one has given this in detail yet:

The Department considers that meetings such as the one proposed in this resolution might well serve a good purpose. We would be in favor of any useful meetings in which the future of the Atlantic community can be discussed realistically by thoughtful and responsible people. We, in the Department of State, would certainly welcome any constructive and practical ideas which might emerge from the proposed Convention.

We particularly welcome the thought expressed in the resolution that the delegates to the proposed Convention should be free to explore the problem fully as individuals. It appears to us that the cause of frank and constructive discussion at the proposed Convention can be best served if it is clear that no governmental commitment is involved.

Mr. Curtis: May I ask what letter that is?

Mr. Streit: that is the Statement the State Department made before the Senate.

It has the support not only of statesmen in other Atlantic countries, some of whom I have mentioned, but of many hundreds of eminent Americans in every field and State. I feel sure that such great pioneers of Atlantic unification as the late Justice Owen J. Roberts of the Supreme Court, Robert Patterson, Secretary of War and General George C. Marshall would be happy to see the kind of Americans who now favor exploring the subject by such a convention as you are now considering. I would like to annex to the end of my testimony a

small sampling of their names, with your permission.

Apart from the hope of action soon, this proposal has other merits. Above all, it permits exploration of a most difficult problem by the method that has solved other problems men long thought insoluble. This method consists simply in officially assigning a relatively small number of the more competent private citizens in a given field to tackle the problem fully, exhaustively and in complete freedom—as individuals free from official instructions— and report back their findings. This method, in other words, seeks to unlock the present problem by the key that has led to many of freedom's greatest successes—the enterprise, resourcefulness and common sense of the competent citizen when able to act as a free individual.

This method is known as the "convention" approach because it was discovered by our Founding Fathers who produced with it—through the Philadelphia Convention of 1787—no less a success than the Constitution of the U. S. In our time we succeeded in harnessing atomic energy by this same basic method —by the American, British and Canadian Governments assigning scientists from private life to tackle the problem together, free from official instructions. On a national scale the same approach was successfully used when President Truman appointed the Hoover Commission to explore how to make our Government work better.

The Convention approach would supplement—not replace or interfere with —the work of the NATO Council and the NATO Parliamentarians Conferences. They are necessarily so absorbed by current affairs that they have no time for the underlying problem of improving the machinery for handling these affairs.

If we liken current affairs to rocks and agree that we need something better than the hammer we are now using to break them with, then the function of this Convention, as I understand it, would be, not to hammer at any rocks nor bother those hammering at them, but to confine itself strictly to devising a better implement—a rock-crusher that will break rocks with less effort and cost, and crush even those that our hammers now are unable to break.

The Convention would be concerned only with working out more effective machinery than we now have for handling our common Atlantic affairs; it would not be conducting foreign relations itself in the slightest degree. Equally important, these current "head-aches" would not interfere with its concentration on finding how to make the Atlantic body politic healthy enough to meet growing demands, dangers, opportunities.

NATO is filled with specialists on the muscular, or military, side of the Atlantic problem. Recent plans for organization of Atlantic economic cooperation show that the specialists on its digestive ills are not idle. There is obvious need for these and other specialists—but it is no less obvious that the military, economic, monetary and political parts of the Atlantic community are as intricately inter-related as are the muscles, stomach, heart and brain of each of us. Good health requires us to keep always in mind the body they together form. But we have been so concerned with the various parts of the Atlantic man that we have neglected completely to provide him with a family doctor—or even a college to educate some general practitioners to treat this body politic as a living whole.

As *The New York Times* correspondent covering the League of Nations from 1929 to 1939, I had to report all kinds of conferences that tackled its problem piecemeal— none that tackled it as a whole. This piecemeal approach gave the illusion then, as it still does, that it simplified the problem, was more "practical." In reality, these illusions gave a false sense of security, wasted the time in which realistic remedial action was still possible, led to World War II.

The 10-year course I had in this school of experience led me to appreciate what I fear is still very little understood in our country today—the superiority of the Convention method by which our Founding Fathers tackled the problem of getting their 13 nation-states to work together effectively yet democratically. Their Philadelphia Convention set up no committee of military specialists, no political committee, no economic committee. It had only *one* committee (apart from drafting committees)—a Committee of the Whole through which it wrestled from beginning to end with the problem as a whole.

Compare the common sense of their approach with the complications of the "functional" approach which is wrecking Europe now as it did the League in my time. When you look at where the Atlantic community stands today in Paris after 11 years of this piecemeal approach and think of the enduring contribution to freedom our Founding Fathers made in only three months with their Convention approach—do you wonder that I feel that any patriot should support this resolution which would at least tackle the problem now by a method that makes sense? Certainly I do not wonder that two sponsors of this wise approach are experienced family doctors, general practitioners—Dr. Morgan and Dr. Judd.

The spy plane incident has thrown

painfully glaring light on the final reason I would give for delaying no longer to explore how to unite the Atlantic community effectively. In the game with dictatorship that we must win, freedom obliges the free to play with cards face up against an opponent whose cards are face down. To govern ourselves freely we must know what our government is doing. But there is no way whereby we can keep an eye on it without everyone on earth —and the Kremlin first of all—knowing everything we learn. We can know what the Canadians, British, French and other democratic governments are doing because their people have institutions like ours for keeping tabs on their governments. But none of us can know what is happening under the Communist dictatorship any more than can its slaves.

And so the free must win in a game for keeps where the cards of Uncle Sam, John Bull, Marianne de France are face up on the table, with the searchlight of the press and opposition parties playing not only on the cards but up the sleeves of the players and under their part of the table to make sure nothing phony is going on—and trying . . . vainly . . . to reach the other end of the table where the master of the Kremlin sits with his cards hidden in his hand.

There is only one possible way to win in such a game, and that is to have so strong a hand that the dictator cannot challenge it. Clearly freedom can not hold such a hand while its cards are divided as they are now. Clearly it holds no such hand at the Summit today. Eleven years ago some of us pointed out that by uniting the Atlantic democracies in the most effective democratic way we could give freedom "all four aces— and the joker, too."

In 1952 General Eisenhower confirmed this in the NATO report I quoted: "Visible and within our grasp we have the possibility of building such military, economic and moral strength as the communist world would never dare challenge." And he added in it: "Then the Atlantic Community will have proved worthy of its history and its God-given endowments. We shall have proved our union the world's most potent influence towards peace." We trusted instead in the "notoriously inefficient" alliance method. The resulting weakness has led us inevitably to begin turning down our cards, too, little by little. For let us fool ourselves no longer—we are copying dictatorship when we seek strength by spying, secrecy, giving more power to the Executive, making the people depend blindly on the Government.

True, one must fight fire with fire at times — but one can burn oneself badly that way. Must we burn ourselves worse before we fight fire with less dangerous means?

With the Soviet space-ship orbiting above us every 91 minutes now, some may fear that the proverbial power that lies in union can no longer give freedom the unchallengable hand that was in our grasp in 1952. If so, it is still true that the more strength we gain that way the safer we shall be. For my part, I believe that we can still thus gain the unbeatable hand we need —if Congress before adjourning calls this Convention.

Certainly whenever we have sought the strength that lies in Atlantic unity, Moscow has quickly made unilateral concessions—which indicates to me that it agrees that we can decisively surpass it this way and that it must therefore make sacrifices to remove our incentive to unite still more. Our atomic monopoly in

—Samoilov, Pravda, Moscow

The American delegation, as seen by the Soviets

1948 did not keep it from blockading Berlin then. But when this led us to form the Atlantic alliance in 1949, even this "notoriously inefficient" kind of unity caused Moscow to abandon that blockade at once. When Atlantic unity was strengthened by adding West Germany to NATO in 1955, Moscow immediately withdrew from Austria.

No other moves we have made have brought such concessions. It would therefore seem to me that the best way for doubters to see whether Moscow continues to believe—as I do—that we can still give freedom an unbeatable hand by uniting the Atlantic community effectively, is for Congress to call the proposed Convention now. If this move does not make Moscow concilliatory, then we are indeed in dire need of getting quickly all the strength we can from Atlantic unity.

In conclusion, let me add that even if the communist dictatorship did not exist, Atlantic unity would be needed to meet other dangers—and to allow us and all mankind to attain the higher standards of living, moral and material, which science and invention have placed within our reach. Dictatorship's growing threat makes it only the more urgent that this Convention be sent to explore the way to the New World that can be ours through effective unification of the free. As Santangel said in persuading Isabella—at the last moment—to send Columbus on his exploratory expedition: "So little risk for so vast a gain!"

Ladies and gentlemen, may I add this: I wrote the preceding prepared statement at the last minute, as an old newspaperman. This was on Sunday. Events are moving so fast that the situation that cried for action on Sunday really implores it now—on Tuesday. It seems to me that that should be an overriding consideration for all of us in considering this.

You have the opportunity—as I understand it, if the hearings conclude today—that you could take up this bill tomorrow, and so, before the Summit disperses—which I hope it won't, but we don't know—Mr. Khrushchev could get news in Paris that this committee had approved overwhelmingly a convention to explore further Atlantic unification, that would be, it would seem to me, the finest thing you could do.

You have a tremendous opportunity, ladies and gentlemen. I feel you will devote yourselves to it.

Chairman Morgan. Thank you, Mr. Streit. We are glad to have you here and I want to say the statement might have been written on Sunday, but it is a fine statement. You have been living with this matter closer than anybody in this country. How do you compare the two resolutions, the Senate resolution and the House resolution?

Mr. Streit. Mr. Chairman, as I said a

minute ago, my considerations on this are influenced tremendously by the situation in Paris today. This resolution in the Senate could certainly be improved upon. I think it ought to be improved somewhat in the light of that situation.

I think the overriding thing should be speed. I would say, take the Senate version for basis, maybe improve it here a bit—but not at the cost of delay. A very small thing, a bullet, if it goes fast enough, has more striking power than a stone that you throw by hand.

Chairman Morgan. Mr. Chiperfield.

Mr. Chiperfield. No questions.

Mr. Zablocki. Mr. Streit, your statement really is a very forceful and effective statement. I want to join my colleagues in thanking you for coming before the committee. I want to commend you for your untiring efforts in promoting the resolution. After all, you have been the motivating force.

Mr. Streit. Mr. Zablocki, might I put in a personal word right there? As you may recall, Dr. Morgan, it was one of your colleagues, the late Tom Morgan, who brought this resolution up. Tom Morgan

Chairman Morgan. Tom Gordon?

Mr. Judd. Martin.

Mr. Streit. The late representative from Toledo.

Chairman Morgan. Tom Burke.

Mr. Streit. May that be corrected? Tom Burke, your late colleague, had this very much at heart. He was the one that brought this resolution up with great foresight in the early part of 1959. He is no longer with us. I felt, as a dear friend of his, a personal obligation to push forward what he had done. I would want him to have the credit that is really due him in this respect.

Mr. Zablocki. As one who is fully aware of the provisions contained in the Senate Joint Resolution and the House Concurrent Resolutions, in your opinion which would be the preferable resolution to report out of this committee?

Mr. Streit. I would think the resolution here would need implementing. The Senate resolution has implemented it after considerable discussion. As I said, I think there are several little points in which it might be improved, but even there, in the interest of speed, I would be willing to settle for it as it stands.

I would hope that some editing might improve it in the light of the present situation. I don't mean in any bellicose way. We need to be extremely prudent at the present time, but we need to be firm.

This resolution is not bellicose; it does not get power through any military means; it gets power through moral means. There can be no possible objection to it on that line. I would seek to save time rather than try to get the greatest improvement in its text—well, you see my position. I have dropped overboard lots of things that I like. I would appeal to you to approach this in the same way, with a view to getting action soon rather than getting perfection.

Mr. Zablocki. The Summit Conference is about to end without any accomplishments. Isn't it too late for us to act on this resolution with the hope of bringing about an atmosphere in Paris which would be helpful, following your comments and your statement?

Mr. Streit. That was my prepared statement. There seemed more hope then.

It may blow up on us before you could possibly act. But if it does, the sooner you act, the sooner the consequences of that blow-up should be met. It would be better to act sooner, it would seem to me, in that regard, than later.

Mr. Zablocki. It seems impossible to have any action by the committee today or tomorrow. Perhaps it would be helpful to merely make a statement that the proposals were heard by the committee and there was no opposition present in the hearings.

Mr. Streit. You are much more competent, ladies and gentlemen, than I am in those respects.

Mrs. Bolton. Only this, Mr. Streit: We are happy to have your presentation. It is a very moving one. I think there is no moment that I have known since I came to Congress where such immediate action is needed.

Mr. Pilcher. Mr. Streit, I enjoyed your presentation very much. In case we don't have any more hearings, in order to get one little thing in the record, I have a constituent from Possum Poke in Possum Lane, Poulan, Georgia, the home of former Governor Chase Osborn, and for ten years Mrs. Osborn has lived this North Atlantic Union night and day. I have seen her ride a bus from here to Georgia and back to attend a meeting of her committee. I think she is one of the most dedicated women to this cause that I have ever known in my life. I wanted to get Mrs. Osborn's name in the record as having fought for this thing for years.

Mr. Judd. The papers all give the indication that the conference in Paris is all broken up. I am afraid that it may not be that fortunate. Mr. Khruschev has by no means given up his designs on dividing—his plan is to divide and thereby weaken the West, hoping some of the Big Three will beg that we make more and more concessions in order to get him back. I feel it is enormously important that we act at this time to strengthen any of our colleagues or allies over there who might be inclined to weaken with this notion that if he just came back in he would be different than he was when he went out.

I feel, I agree with the others, this is a propitious time in which to act, not so much to influence him, Khruschev, as to stiffen our allies who, as we know, have been trying to go further and further just in order to get him back.

Most of the concessions we have made at San Francisco and Panmunjom were in order to get them to come along to a meeting. Then they come to a meeting and wreck it. They make mileage out of our forum. They can't make any mileage at the meeting if we stand up.

I hope when you revise, Mr. Streit, your remarks, you will modify a sentence "when President Truman appointed the Hoover Commission to explore how to make our government work better." The record ought to be clear that Mr. Truman appointed one-third of the Hoover Commission; the House appointed a third and the Senate a third, and Mr. Hoover himself was appointed by Joe Martin and not the President.

The pattern was all the more apropos. It was the executive plus the two Houses.

Mr. Streit. That is correct, and I would like to have my statement so corrected. I would like also to associate myself with what Dr. Judd says in the statement that preceded that, and to add that it seems to me that our divided power system of government gives us a wonderful possibility at the present time.

The Executive has the burden of conducting foreign affairs. The Executive has plenty of difficulties righ now, must watch every move very carefully, but the Congress has the responsibility of looking into basic policy, basic procedure. It is independent of the executive. Many Europeans criticize this as an unworkable system of government, but it gives us an opportunity here where the Congress can move ahead to look into the basic policy, the basic question, while the Executive, without being concerned with this, is free to move ahead on its level.

Some of you may know I at one time compared this to the Great Seal of our country, in urging that there should be early action on this convention.

I pointed out that the President has got to make a peaceful policy, to hold

out the olive branch, go to the Summit meeting and things like that, but that if all that was done by us was on that side, then the picture that Mr. K. would see would be the eagle's beak and the olive branch, that half of the Great Seal, without the other side — without the eagle's eye and without the united arrows that are the other side of the seal. That side is the responsibility of Congress. By applying ourselves to these two courses of action that our Constitution permits, the executive can proceed with the olive branch as far as possible, while Congress goes forward with the other side of the Great Seal.

Mr. Judd. Mr. K. is a better showman than we are. I don't think you could possibly get him to go home any more than you could when he was in Los Angeles. By terrorism he persuades us to retreat from our own position. He lives it up over there. It looks like he is calling the tune and everybody is so anxious to have him. We are in a position of beseeching him. I don't want to be in that position. It convinces the other people of the world we are dancing to his tune. He is pulling a clever act.

Mr. Zablocki. Time is of the essence and I wonder if I could suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you appoint a committee possibly of those who are sponsors of the various proposals to meet this afternoon to perfect the resolution for consideration—

Chairman Morgan. We are going to meet in executive session in the morning. I think the appropriate time would be tomorrow.

Mr. Judd. Let's meet **ad hoc** anyway.

Mr. O'Hara. I would like to comment that I was very much pleased that the witness stressed superiority of the convention approach and as an illustration mentioned the value of the family physician. Specialists do good work in their field, but the real work of healing people is done by the family physician, and the real healers of our economic and political are in our conventions, as the witness so well presented.

Mr. Murphy. I would just like to ask Mr. Streit if the convention wouldn't be a great aid in uniting the two economic groups in Europe, the Common Market and the European Free Trade Association . . . where Mr. Khruschev is trying to split the West. This would nullify his action in some part.

Mr. Streit. I am glad you brought up that question. I think it would indeed. In the statement that Mr. Will Clayton made, he emphasizes that point, I believe. Mr. Clayton is much more competent than I to speak on that. I agree with the inference to be drawn from your question, that this is a very powerful reason for calling this convention now.

Chairman Morgan. Any further questions?

(No response.)

Chairman Morgan. Thank you, Mr. Streit.

Nationwide Church Program for Peace

By JOHN A. MATHEWS

FOR MANY YEARS, various denominations of churches have separately sponsored programs of education and action in world affairs. In recent years these have been coordinated through nationwide conferences sponsored by the National Council of Churches.

At the fifth of these conferences, which was held about fifteen months ago and was addressed by the late Secretary of State, John F. Dulles, it was decided to conduct a nationwide program for peace, with all denominations of the National Council working in unison.

The United Church of Christ has expressed its endorsement of this program in the recent Call for Christian Social Action. Our Church, through its Board for Social Action, has undertaken to co-

operate by appointing a committee on International Relations. We are now seeking to expand this nucleus.

Just what is this Nationwide Program for Peace? It is a program to stimulate study, discussion and action on Christian concerns in international affairs. The initiative is to be taken by the minister and lay leaders of the various organizations within the local church.

Two basic principles have been emphasized in planning for this program:

First, it is to be an authentic educational process. It is not to propagandize particular dogmas or views in international affairs. Rather, it is to encourage the use of the most responsible, thought-provoking materials presenting differing views, so that people will develop their own convictions on which to base effective action for peace.

Second, it is to be integrated into the ongoing life of the churches. It does not seek to set up numerous additional meetings or mass rallies. Rather, it seeks to relate Christian concerns in international affairs to the continuing life and work of the churches and their councils—through publications and programs at all levels—national, state and local.

What are the issues about which we need to be better informed in order to develop wise judgments on which to base our actions? There are many, but it may suffice here to mention six:

Disarmament seems to be the most publicized current issue, and in the past few years this has been simplified to the issue of stopping nuclear bomb testing. Many people and some of our leaders believe this can be solved by a treaty. While negotiations for such a treaty have been dragging for more than a year, a fourth nation, France, has begun such testing.

The very fact that this issue is being negotiated outside the U.N. points to a more fundamental one. The adequacy of the U.N. to maintain peace and security—and to resolve the human conflicts which cause war. How many of us know that its most powerful body—the Security Council—cannot act without the unanimous consent of Nationalist China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the U.S., not even on the question of admitting a new member nation! This Council which is supposed to be continuously in session "to ensure prompt and effective action . . . for the maintenance of international peace and security" now meets only occasionally (twice in the past six months). How many of us know:

That the International Court of Justice is limited to disputes between nations?

That nations cannot be brought to court without their prior consent and that the Court has handled only 15 cases in 15 years?

How many of us know that the total budget of the U.N. and all its subsidiary organizations is only about ⅛ of 1 percent of the U.S. Federal budget?

Freedom & Union

"For the Great Republic, for the Principle it Lives by and Keeps Alive, for Man's Vast Future."—LINCOLN.

Vol. 15, No. 7-8 July-August, 1960

Dedicated to Student Debaters-- What Youth & Age Can Do

WE DEDICATE THIS ISSUE — the greatest we have yet published—to the high school debaters, 50,000 to 80,000 strong, who will be tackling the question of Atlantic Federal Union in 10,000 schools all over the U.S.A. in the scholastic year that begins in September. Thanks to the vision and generosity of a subscriber who prefers to be anonymous, a copy of it will be presented free to each of the 10,000 debate squads.

We have tried to make this issue of special value to them, as well as to our older subscribers. Nothing, I think, could help do this more than to give the extensive reports and texts we print in it of major recent news events that make it highly probable that Atlantic unification will also be debated this Winter by experienced leaders in a Convention of NATO Nations patterned on the one that wrote the Federal Constitution.

The "Academic" Myth. Of the obstacles facing Atlantic Union, perhaps the toughest is the assumption that it is too remote" to be practical politics"—or even a subject for academic debate. The High School Debate Leagues in 46 States that decide what their topic will be, brushed this objection aside last February. They had then to pick one of three topics. They repected two that none would call academic: "How may television best serve the public interest?" and "How can the U.S. best use water resources?" They chose instead: "How can the security of the free world best be maintained?" This topic, too, was, and is in the news—but not the No. proposition for debate under it—"Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization be transformed into a federal government."*

Singular Foresight. Dr. Bower Aly, Executive Secretary of the National Committee on Debate, who proposed the Atlantic Union question, and the members of the Committee who back in December voted to include it on the ballot, merit congratulation for their singular foresight. So, too, do the State Leagues who voted six months ago to make free world security the coming debate topic. Since February, events—U-2, Tokyo, Cuba—have made it the No. 1 election issue. Meanwhile the long-pending proposal that the U. S. call a convention of NATO nations to explore how they might best unite, has reached the point where, approved by Administration and Senate, it lacks only House approval—and the outlook is bright that this will be given when the House returns in August.

*There are two other propostions under this topic which debaters can choose to uphold: "Resolved: That the U. N. should be significantly strengthened" and "Resolved: That the U. S. should initiate a federal world government." Debate teams taking the negative against the above two could uphold Atlantic Union as a better alternative.

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[On Second Thought]

Politicians Lead, Press Lags. June also brought speeches from Governor Nelson Rockefeller and Adlai Stevenson that went far beyond mere endorsement of a convention to explore greater Atlantic unity. The former called for a "North Atlantic Confederation" or "Community" to "tighten all political, economic, military and cultural bonds linking Great Britain, Western Europe and North America." The latter urged "a permanent economic and social union in the Atlantic world." The press, led by *The New York Times*, omitted these creative proposals from the headlines—and thus many remain unaware that the once "academic idea" is now openly favored by leading politicians. We report this news fully on pages 6-7.

New Yorker "Letter from West." Almost simultaneously, *The New Yorker* ran June 18 a long, beautifully written "Letter from the West" by E.B. White which advanced with powerful argument "the vision of a federal union of free democratic capitalist states." Although Mr. White still cautiously called it "the distant shore," he made clear that he would welcome "political union with the United Kingdom, with France, with Scandinavia, with all the Western European nations—with any nation, in fact, that could show a long and successful record of government by consent of the governed." We deeply regret it proved impossible for us to reprint his article in full and warmly recommend it.

By November What New Disaster? Events will keep on making Atlantic Union increasingly imperative. Until November the election will absorb the U. S.—which invites communism to deal it a surprise. In our 1956 July-August issue I wrote apropos to U. S. election-year vulnerability: "The Kremlin can be counted on to exploit to the

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fullest in the coming weeks the present weakness of Washington. It will certainly consider the advantages of striking in this period of uncertainty to stop the flow of oil through Suez. Three weeks before the Canal was seized July 26, I sent this to Secretary Dulles. No heed was paid, Congress deferred the Atlantic Convention — and before November Atlantica was split . . . just when Hungary revolted. Such was the tragedy disunion brought in the last election summer. This one has begun worse.

Providential Debate. If the House approves the proposed Convention, it means that while Atlantic Union is being debated by 50,000 politically—talented boys and girls who have no memory of World War or depression, Atlantic unification will also be debated by 100 leaders from all round its ocean who *have* experienced two World Wars and the Great Depression—debated with a view to producing a plan that can save tomorrow's leaedrs from such calamities, and let them open wider"Man's vast future." It is providential indeed that so great a debate may take place simultaneously on both levels . . . among those at the threshold of leadership who have never known a non-atomic world, and those at the summit of their lives who can remember when men could not fly . . . youth's boldness and age's experience stimulating and balancing each other dynamically.

What Youth & Age United Can Create. The U. S. Federal Constitution proves how creative this interplay can be. That "miracle" (as men rightly called it hen) could never have been achieved by youth—wise though Hamilton and Madison were beyond their years—nor alone by Washington with his authority and Franklin with his wide and long experience. The problem had baffled the wisest philosophers and statesmen ever since the failure of such men as Solon, Pericles, Aristotle, to unite their city states ended Greek democracy . . . for 2,000 years. Such was the problem the Federating Fathers solved in 1787 —by the light which the sunrise and the sunset generations *together* threw upon it then.

Whether life is in its morn, at its noon, or near a glorious sunset, could one ask for more inspiring opportunity than now lies in each one's grasp?—Clarence Streit

Young Soldier Advises Student Debater

NOTE: This is an excerpt from a letter I wrote, as a former inter-scholastic and inter-collegiate debater, to my sister, Helen, on July 21, 1918. I was then 22, and serving in France as a sergeant in the American Expeditionary Force.—Clarence K. Streit

You wanted the sum of my knowledge of debating . . . I am pleased to see the interest you are taking in public speaking and debating. The latter is good training if you don't let it get the best of you and become merely an arguer. You know, in all school contests, so much emphasis is placed on winning the contest that the vote of the judges has come to assume far more importance than it should. A debate should be a search for the truth by means of placing in contrasting relief the arguments on both sides of a question. It is a strong temptation in the heat of a debate to employ arguments and facts which one knows are not true in the hope that the opponent will not know his subject well enough to detect the falsity. And especially is that temptation strong for the last speaker, for he knows the other side has no chance to answer him.

For my part, Helen, I don't think the personal or school glory of victory is worth such a price. If you don't believe in your side of the question, after you have studied it thoroughly, I wouldn't argue for it. And if I did argue its good points I would never employ arguments which could not stand up against my own reason. Sincerity is a far better ally for the debater than clever sophism. Train yourself, by debating, not to express merely *an* opinion, but *your* opinion . . . to express clearly your ideas on whatever questions may come up.

"Use Your Own Style" but "Be Simple"

As for the manner of expression, use your own style. Don't follow any stiff form too much. Study your question first—go to Poole's index, etc., search for references, read them, both sides of the question, noting down points that strike you as important and copy short quotations of opinion by men who have studied the question enough to be considered as authorities. But use these opinions sparingly, merely as re-forcements for the facts in the case. (In quoting any one, mention where and when he made the statement and why his opinion is entitled to special consideration in the question concerned. Thus the author, Sir Gilbert Parker's opinion would be perhaps of value on a literary question, but as a recommendation for a medicine, it is of no more value than that of any man who has not studied medicine or dietetics.)

When you have got the broad outlines of the subject arranged in your head, you can sketch out an outline. In it arrange your material so that it will drive home with the force of cumulated fact, logic and clearness. Arrange your material so that your argument keeps getting stronger and stronger, leading up to your trump cards for climax. Reiteration is often useful for emphasis but don't use it in a rubber-stamp way. Put some life into it. Always try to be persuasive. Don't try to cover too much. Better take two or three of the main arguments, show why they are the more important (do this in a few words) and treat them as thoroughly as possible.

And in time of refutation, don't permit your opponent to befuddle the debate with petty details. If he doesn't answer the main arguments you put out, point this out and do it strongly. Then take up his big arguments and answer them, or point out that, if true, they aren't important enough to uphold his side.

Be simple in your language and use short sentences. Remember the audience—talk to it, not the judges—does not know as much about the subject as you, and it is up to you to acquaint them in 10 or 15 minutes' talk with the results of several months of work.

HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Statement by Clarence K. Streit, Author and Editor

Hearing on H. Con. Res. 107, 108, 146, 584, on May 17, 1960

Ed. See p. 3 on spy plane

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I support the Atlantic Convention resolution before you. This may lead to some misunderstanding because of my long identification with proposals for Atlantic Union or federation. To be fair to the many supporters of this resolution who do not - yet - agree with me in those regards, and to prevent any misunderstanding let me make two things clear at once:

My support of this Convention resolution does not mean that it involves any endorsement of Atlantic federation (as did the so-called "Atlantic Union" resolution introduced in Congress in 1949.) Nor does it mean that I no longer urge federation of the free. It means simply this: I find that the security of the United States and of freedom has gone down so much since 1949 that any measure that promises - as does this resolution - to assure early consideration, at least, of how to unite the Atlantic allies more strongly deserves support, however short it falls of what I think necessary.

In 1949 we had an atomic monopoly, immense air and naval superiority, and no one worried about Russia in the economic and scientific fields. The signing of the Atlantic alliance had led Moscow to drop the Berlin blockade. Many concluded there was no need to unite more closely with our allies, and Congress took no action on the Atlantic Union resolution.

Since 1949, communism has grown strong in China, ended our atomic monopoly, armed itself powerfully with submarines, aircraft and long range missilies, greatly increased its production and been first with sputnik, lunik - and now with space ships. Meanwhile, the relative position of the United States has gone down, despite all the billions Congress has appropriated, to the point where Moscow has dared renew its Berlin threat and has got the Summit meeting it demanded. That meeting opened yesterday with our country and freedom in a painfully weak position.

In those precious 11 years, it is true that NATO has grown in military power. But it is also true that practically nothing has been done to strengthen the structure of the Atlantic alliance, despite the fact that General Eisenhower, in his report as SHAPE Commander on April 2, 1952, warned: "Peacetime coalitions throughout history have been weak and notoriously inefficient . . Visible and within grasp we have the capability of building such military, economic and moral strength as the Communist world would never dare to challenge."

What have we done thus far even to explore how to build this strength? Nothing, structurally, except the exploration made by the NATO Committee of Three Foreign Ministers in 1956. It is perhaps comment enough on this effort's results that two of these "three wise men" - Lester B. Pearson of Canada and Gaetano Martino of Italy - came out publicly two months ago in favor of exploring the problem now by the convention proposal before you. So have such other authorities as Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, and former Premier Robert Schuman of France, a pioneer for European Union. The 1949 hopes of a united, federated Europe have turned into a Europe bitterly divided now into economic Sixes and Sevens. Meanwhile the commitment in Article 2 of the Atlantic treaty to develop Atlantic economic cooperation has remained unexplored, down to this year.

This delay has resulted in so great a threat that it seems to me that every patriot must encourage all he can any step in the right direction that can be taken by this Congress. This crisis cries for quick action to strengthen Atlantic unity, and this resolution offers the only practical hope for such action in the few weeks left before you adjourn. It gives this hope for many reasons: It has the sponsorship of your distinguished chairman and other Members of your Committee who rightly are highly respected for their judgment. It has the endorsement of your eminent alumnus, Secretary Herter, and is unanimously recommended by the NATO Parliamentarians Conference and the Atlantic Congress.

It has the support not only of statesmen in other Atlantic countries, some of whom I have mentioned, but of many hundreds of eminent Americans in every field and State.I feel sure that such great pioneers of Atlantic unification as the late Justice Owen J. Roberts of the Supreme Court, Robert Patterson, Secretary of War and General George C. Marshall would be happy to see the kind of Americans who now favor exploring the subject by such a convention as you are now considering. I would like to annex to the end of my testimony a small sampling of their names, with your permission.

Apart from the hope of action soon, this proposal has other merits. Above all, it permits exploration of a most difficult problem by the method that has solved other problems men long thought insoluble. This method consists simply in officially assigning a relatively small number of the more competent private citizens in a given field to tackle the problem fully, exhaustively and in complete freedom - as individuals free from official instructions - and report back their findings. This method, in other words, seeks to unlock the present problem by the key that has led to many of freedom's greatest successes - the enterprise, resourcefulness and common sense of the competent citizen when able to act as a free individual.

This method is known as the "convention" approach because it was discovered by our Founding Fathers who produced with it - through the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 - no less a success than the Constitution of the United States. In our time we succeeded in harnessing atomic energy by this same basic method - by the American, British and Canadian Governments assigning scientists from private life to tackle the problem together, free from official instructions. On a national scale the same approach was successfully used when President Truman appointed the Hoover Commission to explore how to make our Government work better.

The Convention approach would supplement - not replace or interfere with - the work of the NATO Council and the NATO Parliamentarians Conferences. They are necessarily so absorbed by current affairs that they have no time for the underlying problem of improving the machinery for handling these affairs.

If we liken current affairs to rocks and agree that we need something better than the hammer we are now using to break them with, then the function of this Convention, as I understand it, would be, not to hammer at any rocks nor bother those hammering at them, but to confine itself strictly to devising a better implement - a rock-crusher that will break rocks with less effort and cost, and crush even those that our hammers now are unable to break.

The Convention would be concerned only with working out more effective machinery than we now have for handling our common Atlantic affairs; it would not be conducting foreign relations itself in the slightest degree. Equally important, these current "head-aches" would not interfere with its concentration on finding how to make the Atlantic body politic healthy enough to meet growing demands, dangers, opportunities.

NATO is filled with specialists on the muscular, or military, side of the Atlantic problem. Recent plans for organization of Atlantic economic cooperation show that the specialists on its digestive ills are not idle. There is obvious need for these and other specialists - but it is no less obvious that the military, economic, monetary

and political parts of the Atlantic community are as intricately inter-related as are the muscles, stomach, heart and brain of each of us. Good health requires us to keep always in mind the body they together form. But we have been so concerned with the various parts of the Atlantic man that we have neglected completely to provide him with a family doctor - or even a college to educate some general practitioners to treat this body politic as a living whole.

As The New York Times correspondent covering the League of Nations from 1929 to 1939, I had to report all kinds of conferences that tackled its problem piecemeal - none that tackled it as a whole. This piecemeal approach gave the illusion then, as it still does, that it simplified the problem, was more "practical." In reality, these illusions gave a false sense of security, wasted the time in which realistic remedial action was still possible, led to World War II.

The 10-year course I had in this school of experience led me to appreciate what I fear is still very little understood in our country today - the superiority of the Convention method by which our Founding Fathers tackled the problem of getting their 13 nation-states to work together effectively yet democratically. Their Philadelphia Convention set up no committee of military specialists, no political committee, no economic committee. It had only one committee (apart from drafting committees) - a Committee of the Whole through which it wrestled from beginning to end with the problem as a whole.

Compare the common sense of their approach with the complications of the "functional" approach which is wrecking Europe now as it did the League in my time. When you look at where the Atlantic community stands today in Paris after 11 years of this piecemeal approach, and think of the enduring contribution to freedom our Founding Fathers made in only three months with their Convention approach - do you wonder that I feel that any patriot should support this resolution which would at least tackle the problem now by a method that makes sense? Certainly I do not wonder that two sponsors of this wise approach are experienced family doctors, general practitioners - Dr. Morgan and Dr. Judd.

The spy plane incident has thrown painfully glaring light on the final reason I would give for delaying no longer to explore how to unite the Atlantic community effectively. In the game with dictatorship that we must win, freedom obliges the free to play with cards face up against an opponent whose cards are face down. To govern ourselves freely we must know what our government is doing. But there is no way whereby we can keep an eye on it without everyone on earth - and the Kremlin first of all - knowing everything we learn. We can know what the Canadians, British, French and other democratic governments are doing because their people have institutions like ours for keeping tabs on their governments. But none of us can know what is happening under the Communist dictatorship any more than can its slaves.

And so the free must win in a game for keeps where the cards of Uncle Sam, John Bull, Marianne de France are face up on the table, with the searchlight of the press and opposition parties playing not only on the cards but up the sleeves of the players and under their part of the table to make sure nothing phony is going on - and trying . . vainly . . to reach the other end of the table where the master of the Kremlin sits with his cards hidden in his hand.

There is only one possible way to win in such a game, and that is to have so strong a hand that the dictator cannot challenge it. Clearly freedom can not hold such a hand while its cards are divided as they are now. Clearly it holds no such hand at the Summit today. Eleven years ago some of us pointed out that by uniting the Atlantic democracies in the most effective democratic way we could give freedom "all four aces - and the joker, too."

In 1952 General Eisenhower confirmed this in the NATO report I quoted: "Visible and within our grasp we have the possibility of building such military, economic and moral strength as the communist world would never dare challenge. " And he added in it: "Then the Atlantic Community will have proved worthy of its history and its God-given endowments. We shall have proved our union the world's most potent influence towards peace." We trusted instead in the "notoriously inefficient" alliance method. The resulting weakness has led us inevitably to begin turning down our cards, too, little by little. For let us fool ourselves no longer - we are copying dictatorship when we seek strength by spying, secrecy, giving more power to the Executive, making the people depend blindly on the Government.

True, one must fight fire with fire at times - but one can burn oneself badly that way. Must we burn ourselves worse before we fight fire with less dangerous means?

With the Soviet space-ship orbiting above us every 91 minutes now, some may fear that the proverbial power that lies in union can no longer give freedom the unchallengable hand that was in our grasp in 1952. If so, it is still true that the more strength we gain that way the safer we shall be. For my part, I believe that we can still thus gain the unbeatable hand we need - if Congress before adjourning calls this Convention.

Certainly whenever we have sought the strength that lies in Atlantic unity, Moscow has quickly made huge unilateral concessions - which indicates to me that it agrees that we can decisively surpass it this way and that it must therefore make sacrifices to remove our incentive to unite still more. Our atomic monopoly in 1948 did not keep it from blockading Berlin then. But when this led us to form the Atlantic alliance in 1949, even this "notoriously inefficient" kind of unity caused Moscow to abandon that blockade at once. When Atlantic unity was strengthened by adding West Germany to NATO in 1955, Moscow immediately withdrew from Austria.

No other moves we have made have brought such concessions. It would therefore seem to me that the best way for doubters to see whether Moscow continues to believe - as I do - that we can still give freedom an unbeatable hand by uniting the Atlantic community effectively, is for Congress to call the proposed Convention now. If this move does not make Moscow conciliatory, then we are indeed in dire need of getting quickly all the strength we can from Atlantic unity.

In conclusion, gentlemen, let me add that even if the communist dictatorship did not exist, Atlantic unity would be needed to meet other dangers - and to allow us and all mankind to attain the higher standards of living, moral and material, which science and invention have placed within our reach. Dictatorship's growing threat makes it only the more urgent that this Convention be sent to explore the way to the New World that can be ours through effective unification of the free. As Santangel said in persuading Isabella - at the last moment - to send Columbus on his exploratory expedition: " So little risk for so vast a gain! "

* * * * * * *

STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Hearing on May 17, 1960 on the Atlantic Convention Resolutions
(H. Con. Res. 107, 108, 146, 584)

By Percival F. Brundage
Former Director, Bureau of the Budget; Senior Partner (Retired) Price, Waterhouse & Co.

Gentlemen: I appear here in support of the resolutions for an Atlantic Convention because of my strong feeling that a closer cooperation between the Free West and our own country is desirable in military, economic and fiscal policies, and also because I feel that it is the best way to counter the Soviet threat.

You may recall that each important step towards closer cooperation between the NATO countries has aroused reaction from the Soviet but, in each case, has brought concessions like dropping the Berlin blockade and withdrawal from Austria. This is because one of their foremost objectives is to divide the Western nations who believe in freedom and to see the NATO organization dissolved and the incentives for its fuller development removed.

In my work on the Federal Budget for four years, I was deeply concerned by the amount of duplication within the NATO group and the lack of uniformity in our Atlantic policies, in our equipment, in our training procedures and in our defense plans. I became convinced that a closer cooperation or coordination, even to the extent of a limited union of our NATO countries, would greatly reduce our over-all expenditures and greatly increase the effectiveness of our defense measures.

But these are not the only reasons why I support these resolutions for a convention of competent citizens to explore how to "achieve more effective and democratic unity" with our Atlantic allies. I had the privilege of being one of the delegates from the United States to the Atlantic Congress last June. This Congress, as you know, was sponsored by the NATO Parliamentarians Association and included some 650 eminent citizen delegates from all the NATO nations except Iceland, which was involved in a fishery dispute. I was tremendously impressed with the great feeling of unity among these leaders. While our policies, forms and procedures differ materially, the spirit was surprisingly similar and I found myself enthusiastically supporting recommendations of representatives from Western Germany and from France, with whom I had had many differences of opinion as to detailed procedure. That this feeling was very widespread is attested by the fact that in the Final Declaration which the Congress adopted unanimously, briefly setting forth its conclusions, it included among its "six major principles" these two:

> "A-3. No military alliance can endure unless supported by close political and economic cooperation.
>
> "A-4. The time is ripe for these nations to build an Atlantic community with responsibilities extending to military, political, economic, social and scientific fields."

The main difficulty the Atlantic Congress encountered was that it had so many delegates as to be unwieldy, and met for only five days; it lacked the time to come to grips with the problems of Atlantic unity. To keep the great advantages of its citizens approach while removing these difficulties, in carrying forward the task of building an Atlantic cummunity, the Congress delegates unanimously recommended that a special conference, practically the same as the convention proposed in the resolutions before your Committee now, be called by their governments "not later than the Spring of 1960." It stressed that the convention should be "composed of not more than a hundred leading representative citizens, directed to convene for as long as necessary in order to examine exhaustively, and to recommend as expeditiously as possible, the means by which greater cooperation and unity may best be

developed within the Atlantic community."

The resolution before you, which is endorsed by the State Department, would carry out this recommendation. Our Allies look to Congress for leadership in this proposal this very Spring, and I hope, gentlemen, that you will give it an overwhelming majority vote of approval so that it will pass the House at the earliest possible date.

The only objections that I have heard raised have been to immaterial details such as timing. Someone always objects to taking a forward step on the grounds that the time is not perfect. I feel, gentlemen, that there will never be a better time to pass this Bill, which might even have some influence on the current Summit meeting. As I mentioned before, every important step towards closer NATO unity has brought concessions from the Soviet. It is also important that we now express our confidence in the unity of purpose of the NATO countries and our willingness to explore all ways and means in which our cooperation can be increased and improved.

The military advantages of unity,to my mind, are clearly apparent. With common bases all over the world, we would be in a much stronger position to face either a total attack or small peripheral brush fires. In the economic field in which the Soviet leaders have thrown down the gauntlet, I think that the advantages of a closer cooperation are equally apparent.

In the budgetary and fiscal area, I believe that the people of this country are greatly concerned not only with our tax dollars but with the assurance that they are utilized most effectively for our common purposes. Herein, to my mind, lies the greatest saving that could be accomplished by recommendations of the proposed convention. The strength that lies in unity is proverbial - and this kind of strength does not increase our overall costs but actually saves the taxpayer money.

My own experience has indicated how difficult it is to put a dollar mark on any expected savings. I have estimated that the overall saving, if we were to accomplish a real effective coordination to the extent of unified forces, common bases, common weapons and a common master plan, could amount to more than ten billion dollars a year. I still believe that this is a very moderate estimate of the potential savings.

To explore - as the proposed convention would - how we can gain more of our strength by unity's tax-saving way has this added advantage: Communist Russia cannot compete with us in this field. The reason is that they have already carried unity to the extreme degree until it has become tyranny, whereas we have only begun with NATO to unite the Atlantic community. The strength that lies in Atlantic unity has rightly been called our vast untapped reserve of power.

Because its unharnessed possibilities are so vast, and because it costs virtually nothing to harness them, and because Moscow knows this, and knows also that it has itself practically exhausted its own "unity" resources, and because it counts on disunion among the free to deliver us to it, I believe that to undertake the proposed exploration of greater Atlantic unity would impress the Kremlin more than any other move that Congress might make at this critical juncture.

From my experience in the Atlantic Congress the differences that separate us are much less important than the spirit that unites us. With the negligible expenditure the convention involves, I believe that it might find ways to accomplish great things for the future of this country and the generations to come.

* * *

Streit, Clarence

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Feb. 11, 1959

Dear Ed:

When I saw you for a moment here recently you said you expected to be back in Washington in mid-February and would give me a signal; I do hope you will. You also asked me to let you know a few days ahead if I were coming to New York, as we might get together better there: I expect to be in New York Tuesday night the 17th for a dinner meeting, and will stay over the 18th and ring your office then in the hope of seeing you.

I am leaving by plane about Feb. 20-21 on a fortnight's trip to Paris, London and maybe Bonn. I expect to see Premier Debre, who is an old friend of mine. Between you and me, I am hopeful that his government may be very helpful in getting the long-overdue convention to explore Atlantic Union called. Some of my reasons for this hope may be found in the enclosed articles of mine on Debre and de Gaulle; believe me, Ed, there is enough basis for my hope that I am very anxious to get your advice on certain aspects of the matter. If we can't meet before I leave, I hope we may at least talk over the phone.

Our prospects are developing quite hopefully on the Hill, too - but again they are not quite ripe for publication. The Berlin crisis gives an urgent argument to us, as you may see from the attached "Brief" which I sent Premier Debre.

Moreover, as I said to you when I saw you here, on March 2nd it will be 20 years since Union Now appeared. That was the official publication date, but the first broadcast I made of the proposal was over CBS, national hook-up from Philadelphia, Feb. 9, a 13-minute sustaining talk. On March 9, 1939 Union Now was the subject of the first transatlantic radio debate - a Town Meeting of the Air debate with Wickham Steed talking from London and I in New York in favor, and George Sokolsky and Dorothy Detzer in New York against. The audience took a very lively part on our side. Sokolsky has since come round to our view. Would you be interested in a new look, 20 years later?

By the irony of history, Hitler's Berlin was the most urgent reason for Union Now in 1939; now it is democracy's Berlin - surrounded by another dictatorship.

I'm doing a book for Harpers now on the long campaign, answering the questions I get so often: How did I come to get the idea, and why the hell have I stuck to it so long? I hope it will be an interesting human story. With warmest regards, Clarence

Clarence Streit

Edward R. Murrow, CBS, New York

Freedom & Union

MAGAZINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD

EDITOR, CLARENCE STREIT

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Premier Debré
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Eisenhower in his "State of the Union Message" spoke of "U.S. Leadership"—but gave little proof of it compared to Europe's establishment of the Common Market, France's pioneering with its new Constitution and Soviet Russia's Lunik. He continued to neglect to seek the right balance between freedom and union both on the national scene and in the Atlantic Community. His "State of the Union Message" omitted even to mention political union and held that freedom alone described the U.S., though freedom without union is anarchy. He did, however, hold out some promise of working to advance the Rule of Law, and rightly demanded a balanced budget, and warned against inflation. Even so, there seems more hope for leadership toward Union of the Free from President de Gaulle.

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The new French Premier is not the narrow nationalist described in the American and British press—he is very Atlantic-minded. A brilliant, far-sighted statesman with broad knowledge of federation, which he began exploring during the war as a way to peace, he was vice president of the French *Movement for Atlantic Union* before he entered the de Gaulle Cabinet last June. He was one of the original signers of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity in 1954. Now he has a great opportunity to lead in making his Atlantic dreams come true.

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Leaders who have recently come out in favor of exploring Atlantic Union run a wide range, from Lt. Gen. Gavin to Norman Vincent Peale, and include many college presidents and prelates.

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Paul K. Martin

Two forces are rising in Africa: Desire for independence, and recognition of the need for some sort of union in order to maintain independence. Ghana and Guinea, former British and French colonies, respectively, have already taken steps to form a "union." Budding African states, still affiliated with France or Britain, are expected to follow suit. Some observers believe that by 1970 many new geographical federations will have evolved in Africa.

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Mrs. Chase S. Osborn

In this open letter to delegates to the recent Cleveland World Church Study Conference, Mrs. Osborn charges there is a "deadly virus" in its "Message to the Churches," resulting from its mysterious omission of the recommendations of the majority in favor of such regional associations as the Atlantic Community. The "Message" instead sought to advance *only* on the universal level, where progress is necessarily hampered. Thus to exclude the Christian Atlantic Community, where conditions permit a real advance in freedom under law, the author says, is to play into the hands of the Kremlin.

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West Berliners Keep on Building 12

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Henning Knudsen

Refugees from East Germany are pouring into West Berlin, in ever-increasing numbers, thanks to mounting political pressure. Persons who had held out for 13 years now find it impossible to remain in East Germany. Intellectuals, artisans, men, women, the young, the old—all kinds of people are starting anew in the West. As one refugee put it, "I have run from the sure destruction in the East to the West, where destruction is only one of several possibilities."

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A German Economic Report

Knowing from experience the importance of markets covering large areas, Americans have been quick to see the opportunities the European Common Market offers. Their efforts aim not merely at holding their present positions there; they want to extend them. American investors find the political risk smaller in Europe than elsewhere. They hope also, by developing their European business, to be more independent of the fluctuations in the U.S. business cycle.

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Frank Blumenthal

January 1 marked a new era in European cooperation, for the Common Market then came into being. Yet its future is cloudy. Britain still stays out, still insists on a larger, looser free trade zone. The Common Market, to become a going concern, must resolve its differences with the British and their bloc.

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William H. McNeill

Although schools and colleges abound in world history courses, there is little scholarly concern with the subject. Textbooks tend to be jumbles of disconnected information. The materials are now available for much better world histories, but to write them new perspective is needed. The present one is too centered on Europe and the West. Moreover, accuracy and detail have been overvalued, interpretation and synthesis underestimated. The author would have world history written from the stand point of "innovating centers."

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James A. MacLachlan

This opens a series of "5-minute" presentations of the Atlantic Union case. The present one by a Harvard law professor advocates it as a first step in extending the rule of law. He finds that Atlantic federation would be less difficult than U. S. federation in 1787.

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Freedom & Union

"For the Great Republic, for the Principle it Lives by and Keeps Alive, for Man's Vast Future."—LINCOLN.

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FREEDOM & UNION'S POLICY

To think, write and act always in terms of all the democratic world, and not of any one country in it.

To mean by "we" (except editorially) the citizens of the coming Atlantic Union or Federation of All the Free, not merely those of any existing democracy.

To speed its coming by helping its people understand better the principles of individual freedom and federal union, and their importance to peace, production, higher living standards and greater spiritual growth and happiness.

To advance it also by helping the people of this Free Atlantic Community to see that they do form a community which they need to govern democratically.

To provide a forum for all views in the vast field of freedom and federation.

To bring out the facts in this field by objective, imaginative research.



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[*On Second Thought*]

Freedom's Laggard Leadership

NINETEEN FIFTY-NINE began with three major developments in the first nine days that could and should have been topped by President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message on the 10th—but weren't. He did sound, however, one very hopeful note which promises well for the future, if promptly and properly carried out.

*

On Jan. 1 the European Common Market went into effect for France, Germany, Italy and small but yeasty Benelux. On Jan. 4 Soviet Russia achieved the breath-taking feat of sending a ton-and-a-half rocket far beyond the moon, and into orbit around the sun—the first man-made planet. On Jan. 8 the Fifth French Republic began with the inauguration of its founder, President de Gaulle, who is now in a firm position to surpass Churchill and Roosevelt by becoming the George Washington of the United States of Atlantica (see July-August 1958 FREEDOM & UNION). On Jan. 9, he named as Prime Minister Atlantic Unionist Michel Debré over nationalistic Jacques Soustelle.

*

With three far-reaching events behind it before 1959 was 10 days old, this year promises to be a most memorable one. How much more may we not see in the remaining 355 days? It depends only on us—though mainly on our leaders. There is no question but that the free Atlantic Community is ripe for heroic leadership that will raise its sights to its high destiny and unite its vast resources in men, material and spirit. It is as hungry for such leadership as France—whose anarchy was less dangerous a year ago than Atlantica's is today—immediately proved to be when a man of heroic stature appeared. The stage is set, the curtain is up, and the orchestra is playing a very stirring march of events.

Lagging U. S. Leadership. On Jan. 10, President Eisenhower told Congress and the world that the U. S. "has in recent decades reached a position of recognized leadership in the Free World." There is no doubt that it had, nor that it can do this again, but on Jan. 10 the assertion seemed ill-timed even to some patriotic Americans.

Europe Leads in Common Market. It was the leadership of such men as Jean Monnet and Paul-Henri Spaak that resulted in the great step forward which the European Common Market embodies. True, the U. S. encouraged it—but so did the danger from Moscow. True, too, before Lester B. Pearson of Canada called for its extension into an Atlantic Common Market (October FREEDOM & UNION), Adlai Stevenson did (May FREEDOM & UNION.) But the U. S. chose for spokesman not Mr. Stevenson but Mr. Eisenhower, and his Message of Jan. 10 did not break his silence on an Atlantic Common Market, even when he devoted one sentence of it—the only one devoted specifically to the West—to praising "our friends in Western Europe" for having "more closely knit" the "bonds of freedom."

Soviet Leads in Space Race. Clearly the U. S. was not leading in rocket science or missile power on Jan. 10. The substantial, if perhaps over-Madisonized, achievement its "talking" satellite represented had hardly ceased broadcasting the President's pious plea for peace before Lunik left it and the U. S. far behind from every standpoint, except talk. It was, indeed, the kind of new

"Pearl Harbor" for the U. S. which the January 1958 FREEDOM & UNION had foreseen it would suffer during that year—a guess that proved only four days off.

France Leads in Political Pioneering. Within the free world the country that showed the most leadership in 1958 in tackling the toughest and most urgent problems facing democracy was not the U. S. but France. It put its trust in a man who had proved his integrity and courage, and followed his bold, creative pioneering by adopting a new constitution. This reversed two deep-seated trends in the French democracy—both the anarchy of parties in France itself and the over-centralization of its empire, the imperialistic subjection of its overseas peoples to Paris.

*

The eternal enemies of democracy, it cannot be repeated too often, are the twin extremes—anarchy, or freedom without union, and tyranny, or union without freedom. Through all history free men have lost their freedom by falling first into the evil of too little common government from fear of tyranny, and then turning to the evil of too much government from fear of anarchy. The unending problem of democracy is to achieve and maintain through changing conditions a healthy balance between freedom and union.

State of the Union—Sans Union. Washington gave no important lead in 1958 in achieving the right balance between freedom and union in any of the various fields confronting it. Its trumpet gave forth as uncertain a sound on its domestic problem of race relations as on its overseas problem of assuring united action in the divided, multi-sovereign Atlantic Community. In both areas Washington's great weight continued to lie on the side of too little government, not to say anarchy. The Administration's lack not only of leadership but of even a healthy balance in this vital regard was reflected in the President's Message to Congress Jan. 10. President Eisenhower spoke as if freedom without union was all we needed, although this was his "State of the Union" Message—itself a reminder that the U. S. in establishing mankind's first Federal Union had led the world in recognizing freedom's need of union and in providing an effective way to balance the two.

Ike's 1 Word & Webster's 3: Where Webster's "Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable," put pithily the policy that made Washington and Lincoln great, President Eisenhower is his State of the Union Message said: "America is best described by one word, freedom." How pervasive this idea of the meaning of the United States is to him may be seen in this fact: The only time he used even the word *union* in his Message Jan. 10 was in two references to "labor union" problems—and the only time he mentioned *union* in his Message the previous year was a reference to "Soviet Union" (see "State of the Union Without Union," February 1958 FREEDOM & UNION.)

United States—Or Free States? If "America is best described by one word, freedom," perhaps the Federal Constitution should be abolished, the name of the United States changed to the Free States of America, and the annual State of the Union Message changed to one on the State of Freedom. But by whom, and to whom, could the Message then be delivered? Under that concept of America the Federal Union would be scrapped in favor of 49 disunited, independent, sovereign "Free" Nations. How long would individual or even national freedom survive in all America, or in any of the 49, if freedom without union really described the U.S.?

For "Freedom Under Law." President Eisenhower's State of the Union Message ended on a note that brings hope for a better balance of freedom and union in future, if not bold leadership in tackling the most pressing problem in this field—that of uniting effectively the free Atlantic Community. Speaking of the need of achieving "throughout the world" "freedom under law"—which is one way of saying what we mean by "freedom and union"—he said:

"As never before, the world knows the human and material costs of war and seeks to replace force with a genuine rule of law among nations.

"It is my purpose to intensify efforts during the coming two years in seeking ways to supplement the procedures of the United Nations *and other bodies with similar objectives*, to the end that the rule of law may replace the rule of force in the affairs of nations. *Measures toward this end will be proposed later*, including a re-examination of our own relation to the International Court of Justice." (Emphasis added.)

The President's phrasing is broad enough to include the proposed Convention to explore Atlantic Union among the promised measures. But since the only specific reference is to the International Court, Atlantic Unionists should restrain their optimism. It will be more than a pity, however, it will be a tragedy if the Administration makes the kind of mistake which the Cleveland Church Study Conference was led into making (see Mrs. Chase Osborn's "Open Letter," page 8)—that of seeking to advance only on the universal level, where progress must necessarily be slow and ineffective, to the exclusion of the Atlantic Community, where conditions permit a real advance in freedom under law to be made and serve as a pilot plant for all the world.

The Present Price of Liberty

Golden Bombers. The urgent need of arming freedom with the strength that comes only from union was illustrated most graphically by this startling statement in the State of the Union Message: "We are buying certain bombers that cost their weight in gold." The President also explained that "the over-all cost of introducing Atlas into our armed forces will average $35 millions per missile on the firing line." Until the rule of law unites the Atlantic Community, there is every reason to fear that at the

showdown these golden bombers and missiles will fail to deter attack because of the incertitude the best of alliances must leave as regards the use of bases. In such circumstances it would seem mad to seek to advance the international rule of law everywhere except in Atlantica—where it is most needed for Freedom's defense, and least difficult to establish, since Atlantica includes all the handful of nations that have succeeded in maintaining both freedom and law for more than 80 years.

Right on Budget. President Eisenhower cited the soaring cost of modern weapons to fortify his wise and courageous insistence on a balanced budget. He is only too right in his warnings against the inflationary dangers to freedom that result from the tremendous expenditures for defense. But, unless he turns to the economies and strength that lie in Union on an Atlantic scale, he is bound to fall between two stools. For his present policy provides adequate defense neither against Communism's arms nor against its hopes of winning through inflation.

The Industrial Race—and Trap. The crash to which inflation inevitably leads not only lowers living standards but sets back industrial production more than defense spending promotes it. Witness the fall in production resulting from the recent recession—which was only a portent of worse to come. And the real Soviet strategy—as Walter Lippmann and Adlai Stevenson have reported (see January FREEDOM & UNION, page 1)—is to win the uncommitted nations, and thereby the world, by surpassing the U. S. in per capita production. The trap in this strategy, as was pointed out in these pages last month, is to make this race which is really between Communism and Freedom, seem to be one between Communism and only one free people, the U. S. A. Despite President Eisenhower's well-grounded fears of inflation, his recent pronouncements show no recognition either of this Red strategy nor of this trap. This seems also true of the Democratic leadership in Congress.

The Lunik Trap. Moscow quickly exploited Lunik as a victory not of Russia but of Communism over the free way of life—as represented by the U.S.A. alone. Explaining why "America is lagging behind" the Soviet Union, its radio spokesman, Viktor Shragin, explained: "To know and to conquer cosmic space requires maximum unity, single-mindedness of purpose and close human cooperation. This is possible only under socialism." While Khrushchev himself presented Lunik as a "victory for Communism," the Democratic leadership fell into his trap by implying they, too, looked on the race as one between Communism and the U. S.—instead of between Communism and Freedom as a whole.

*

The press on Jan. 4 reported that Senate Majority Leader Johnson "charged that the U. S. was not going far enough fast enough," while House Majority Leader McCormack called for "a redoubling of the U. S. program to 'avert a Pearl Harbor in outer space.'" It is right that they should have demanded greater efforts in the space race, for they have the special responsibility of being each the chairman of his House's Space Committee. It is understandable that they should have urged this on the U. S. as the most practical immediate thing to do. But Freedom would have a far better hope of winning this race—and the industrial and military ones, too—if at the same time they called for the proposed Convention to explore the advantages of uniting the immense resources of the free Atlantic nations as effectively as those of the 49 States are federated now. Both men are so alert and able that one can hope that they may give Congress the honor of providing this leadership.

France's Opportunity. While the Administration and Congress continue to try almost every solution to Freedom's problems except Union of the Free, the possibility grows that France may confront them with an invitation to explore this answer which they could not refuse. Every recent month has brought new proof that Charles de Gaulle sees far and realistically, acts boldly and promptly, and does not shrink from answering today's call for greatness because of the difficulties and risks it necessarily involves. Now that he is installed in the powerful position of President of the Fifth Republic for the next seven years, leadership toward Atlantic Union is not too big a thing to expect of him. His choice of Michel Debré for Prime Minister has opened the new year most happily for Atlantica.—C.K.S.

Atlantic-Minded Premier Debré

MICHEL DEBRE seems almost as misjudged now in the American and British press as General de Gaulle was when he came to power last year. The new French Premier has been presented as the General's Man Friday, and as a narrow nationalist, if not chauvinist. Certainly he is completely loyal to his chief. And certainly as long as the U. S. and Britain play their hands according to the rules of national sovereignty, he will fight fire with fire. Having known him personally since 1946 I have some basis, however, for testifying that he is no mere yes-man nor is he at heart a nationalist.

Premier Debré is a brilliant, far-sighted statesman in his own right. He has studied world affairs long and penetratingly. His range is broad—much wider than one might think from his decisive, determined manner. He is one of those rare lawyers who, like Justice Owen J. Roberts, are more drawn to Law's basic, constitutional than operational side. To his theoretical knowledge of federation—which he began exploring during the war as the way to peace—he has recently added invaluable experience gained in working out the problems of union in the widely dispersed and varied French Community, as chief drafter of its new Constitution.

Premier Debré gained his name as a nationalist because of his intransigent opposition to European Union and the European Defense Community. But this opposition resulted from the fact that he is Atlantic-minded rather than from nationalism. Before the EDC was dreamed of, or European Union was a practical issue, he had worked out his reasons for believing that the continental basis for international organization endangers peace and that the ocean offers a far better framework—particularly the North Atlantic ocean. To him the North Atlantic has long been "the modern

Mediterranean"—the core of western civilization around which the new Rome of Liberty must be organized, and not on either continental shore alone.

Before he entered the de Gaulle Cabinet last year as Minister of Justice, Michel Debré as a Senator was vice president of the French Movement for Atlantic Union. He was one of the original signers of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity in 1954 (see October 1954 FREEDOM & UNION for text and list of signers). He is the first member of the Atlantic Union Movement to attain his high office, though others have favored its objectives. He must, of course, deal with the practical political realities he faces, and one can be sure he will follow President de Gaulle's policy loyally in regard to Atlantic Union. One must wait to see what this will be. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that in a message to FREEDOM & UNION on its fifth anniversary in 1951 he wrote:

"A new force whose material power, political determination, and social attraction no one has a right to underestimate threatens liberty. The people of the U. S., Great Britain and France and other free peoples are staking their destiny in the coming years, and while some in the New World may still hesitate, those who live in the Old World can entertain a doubt only by remaining deaf and blind. However, there is no question that if they know how to unite their thoughts and political actions in all the important fields, the Western countries may not only live on but also restore to liberal civilization the appeal it has lost. The task is urgent and every delay makes war more probable and more imminent."

All the delay since these words were written eight years ago has served to confirm their wisdom, and make the task of uniting the Atlantic Community only the more urgent. And now their author is in a key position to assure to his beloved country and chief the honor of leading in this great undertaking—and to his own creative mind a further personal satisfaction. Now he himself can be a founder of the new and far freer Rome around "the modern Mediterranean" he dreamed of through the dark years when he fought to liberate France from the Nazi nightmare.

—CLARENCE STREIT

[Atlantic Union News]

Gen. Gavin Joins Atlantic Council

—*Dept. of Army photo*

LT. GEN. JAMES M. GAVIN, former Chief of Research and Development, Dept. of the Army has recently become a member of the National Council of the Atlantic Union Committee. Others who have thus come out in favor of the proposed Convention to explore Atlantic Union include ROBERT HALE, former Member of Congress from Maine; ERNEST HENDERSON, president, Sheraton Corporation of America; PAUL C. SMITH, Vice-president and Treasurer, American Export Lines; and HARRY A. WANSKER, president, Boston Regional Conference on NATO Affairs; ANDREW G. HALEY, president, International Astronautical Federation.

Twelve church leaders have recently been added to the Council (see also p. 8). The Rt. Rev. STEPHEN F. BAYNE, JR., bishop of Olympia, Washington; DR. ANDREW R. BIRD, past president, Council of Churches of the Washington Area, D. C.; The Rt. Rev. ROGER WILSON BLANCHARD, Bishop Coadjutor of the Diocese of Southern Ohio; DR. ALBERT BUCKNER COE, former Moderator, General Council, Congregational Christian Churches, U. S.; DR. SETH C. EASTVOLD, first vice-president, Evangelical Lutheran Church.

Rev. DR. W. M. ELLIOTT, JR., past Moderator, General Assembly, Presbyterian Church, U. S.; DR. PHILIP R. GILES, General Superintendent, Universalist Church of America; BISHOP REUBEN H. MUELLER, Vice-President for Division of Christian Education, National Council of Churches; The Rt. Rev. SHIRLEY H. NICHOLS, Bishop, retired, of Kyoto District, Japan, and Salina District, Kansas; Rev. JOHN PAUL PACK, President, International Convention of Christian Churches; and DR. NORMAN VINCENT PEALE.

New Council Members also include the head of another Lutheran institution: DR. OTTO P. KRETZMANN, President of Valparaiso University in Indiana; and DR. DAVID A. LOCKMILLER, President and President-elect of two Methodist institutions, University of Chattancoga and Ohio Wesleyan University. DR. ROBERT GORDON SPROUL, President Emeritus of the University of California, has now joined President CLARK KERR of that institution on our Council. Other new educational administrators are Presidents GEORGE L. CROSS, University of Oklahoma; DR. ELDON L. JOHNSON, University of New Hampshire, and DR. J. PAUL MATHER, University of Massachusetts; DR. ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE, Director, University of Pennsylvania Foreign Policy Institute.

Blackwelder Reports on Election

A major victory in the November election was won by the Atlantic Union Committee, according to Justin Blackwelder its executive secretary. Six senators who had supported the Atlantic Exploratory Resolution were up for re-election, and five of them were re-elected. Ten Senators who had opposed the Resolution were up for re-election and nine of them were retired by the voters. Four House supporters were elected to Senate. In addition, the new Senator from Wyoming, GALE MCGEE, was Legislative Assistant to AUC's tireless supporter, Senator O'MAHONEY, and is a long-time backer of the Resolution. In the House 130 supporters were up for re-election, and 126 were re-elected. A former sponsor, JAMES M. QUIGLEY of Pennsylvania, was returned to Congress and Council member, CHESTER BOWLES, was elected from Connecticut. DAVID LAWRENCE, long-time Council member, was elected Governor of Pennsylvania.

BRIEF OF SOME URGENT REASONS FOR EXPLORING ATLANTIC UNION

1. Berlin and German problems . . their urgency . . the great risks in opening and maintaining a land corridor . . worse risk in abandoning Berlin, or seeming weak.

2. Present relative weakness of Atlantic community - in both conventional and latest arms - in will-power in Britain, which is likely to grow still weaker until coming election, and may worsen thereafter - in leadership in Washington, which lagged in bold imagination even before last election - in over-dependence on aging Adenauer in Bonn (with which Mr. K told Lippmann he felt he could eventually make another Stalin-Hitler deal) - the time needed to change such weaknesses into great strength.

3. The need to turn the tide quickly - but without increasing inflationary danger . . the fact that only realistic hope of achieving this is to supplement all present answers with a powerful new politico-moral move.

4. Calling proposed conference to explore Atlantic Union gives needed power quickly, plus immensely greater material power later, without inflationary danger . . Kremlin makes fetish of unity, fears this most in West but believes capitalistic nations incapable of real union, banks on our divisions to give it world rule, hence nothing could impress it more than decision to try to form Atlantic Union - this would also disconcert Moscow as disproving basic Marxist assumption that capitalistic nations must inevitably cut each other's throats in struggle for markets and profits

5. Atlantic community's greatest untapped resource is union's proverbial strength . . Moscow knows it cannot compete once we harness this resource for it has already extracted all the strength it can from unity, whereas we have hardly begun to, and can gain far more since the free have vaster resources in men, knowhow & materials to unite.

6. Essential to take Kremlin by surprise if we are to gain enough strength quickly to turn tide (and not merely another corner) . . surprise gives much added force . calling proposed conference would surprise everyone - world now assumes Atlantic Union is as remote as it assumed Sputnik was until it soared into orbit . . to see us begin to explore Atlantic Union this year would astonish world more than to see Moscow begin exploring space with manned rocket.

7. Only a move that astonishes the West itself as this would can surprise the Kremlin enough to turn the tide . . we not only throw them off balance but strengthen ourselves by proving we can do far more than most of us now assume we dare even to attempt.

8. Atlantic Union move, unlike others, is no mere stopgap, provides new framework for Berlin, German, other problems in which we can tackle them much more hopefully - opens for West such now unthoughtof vistas that Moscow would be forced to reconsider all its policies - could not continue tough line without thereby directly speeding Atlantic Union and thus defeating its own major end.

9. Result: Moscow would most probably switch back to conciliatory policy in hope of gaining time and removing incentive for us to unite (as when it withdrew from Austria after NATO grew stronger by uniting with Bonn) - first fruit might well be cessation of its present Berlin-Germany pressure, as it ceased Berlin blockade in 1948 once this led the West to move toward unity by alliance.

-- Clarence Streit

The Ontario, Washington 9 D.C.
Jan. 24, 1959

Streit, Clarence K.

Freedom & Union
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Washington 9, D. C.

March 7, 1958

Dear Ed:

It would greatly help us increase our circulation if we could mention that you are one of the many distinguished members of the press, TV and radio who are among our paid subscribers. I would deeply appreciate your consenting to do us this favor. Please return the enclosed note with your answer checked on it.

I do hope you'll take time to read the attached speech and give me a word on how it strikes you - for it was made in 1945.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Clarence

Clarence K. Streit

Ret'd Card

CKS/ro

Facing Another Bomb

by

Clarence K. Streit

. . . Now nothing in nature remains to protect liberty anywhere, nothing but the best in human nature . . .

NOW ONCE AGAIN the danger of war here on our own soil has come to test the mettle of Americans. The atomic age has swept us back to the life of constant peril that faced the pioneers. They had trading posts where we have cities. The weapons that meant annihilation to them seem crude today. But then as now a man had but one life to lose, and he lived in constant danger of an unseen foe.

And now as then we Americans stand at freedom's front. In World Wars I and II freedom had three walls. Back of the French stood the British, and back of the British stood the U.S.A. But in a Third World War we shall be target No. 1. We can count on having no one between us and invasion, no one

in reserve behind us, no one to save the cause of human freedom if we fail to withstand atomic assault.

Where others have only their chains, we have our liberties to lose, and those of all mankind.

This is no time to listen to panicky prophets, or trust in mediocre men who do not trust themselves and have no iron in their soul. Standing as we do today with the frontiersman who, musket in hand, built his cabin in a wilderness where death might strike savagely at any moment, we need now all those virtues that Americans then developed. We need their cool heads and capable hands, their courageous hearts and their buoyant faith in themselves, and in their liberty and Union. More than ever in our lives we need that combination of pioneering and prudence, of generous idealism and hard-headed attention to ugly facts, that made our Republic, against overwhelming odds, the citadel today of the world's free citizens.

There is no cause to despair. In the most dangerous conditions human liberty rose in America. As it rose America grew safer and more powerful. But safety tends to make men soft and heedless. Danger brings them back to essential values. We face now only the latest

in several great testing periods. But we face it in a history that records no failure ever by Americans to come through the most dangerous tests with triumphant colors.

It is only too probable that, whatever we do, the bomb at Nagasaki will not be the last to fall. We face another bomb.

But the bomb at Nagasaki was not the first one men have faced. More than 2,000 years ago the Greeks gave the name of "Bombos" to any huge stone that was hurled by a machine over a city's walls. The terror which that first bomb created as it pierced the city's defense we do not know. But we can imagine it from the fact that the word *bomb* has long been associated with terrorizing surprise. We can take some courage from the fact that we face now what men have faced ever since that day—another bomb.

We are told there is no defense against the atomic bomb. There are various defensive measures that can be taken—scientific, military, moral, political, national and international. None of them is certain, all of them can help. In so grave a matter we should make the most of every possible defense. Nor should we be overcome by the fact that all together these measures give no cer-

tainty. Since long before the atomic bomb, dangers against which no defense was sure have beset mortal man.

No matter what we do, in the end we each must die.

The atomic bomb should remind us that the surest way to achieve immortality here on earth is to live and die for some undying purpose. Those who so live and die live serenely and die without fear; their spirit lives on in the hearts of succeeding generations; it never ceases to comfort and inspire mankind. Among the immortal purposes which have made many men immortal are liberty and union.

Liberty has been tremendously endangered by the atomic bomb, and made far more precious. For the bomb is making ever clearer that the best defense against its aggressive use is civil liberty.

Rarely in history has one nation had such superior armed power as our Republic has today. Never in history did weaker nations have so secure a defense against the strongest power as they have against atomic-armed America. Their defense is not their own science or their own military power. Costa Rica is as safe from American atomic attack as is Soviet Russia. Nor is the defense of other nations *their* form of government

or *their* moral values. Spain and Argentina are as safe as Switzerland, France, or the Vatican. The best defense the other nations have against the atomic bomb lies not in them but in us. It lies in *our* form of government, in the character of *our* political institutions and our *moral* concepts, in the fact that civil liberty is supreme in the American Federal Union.

Why is civil liberty the surest guarantee against aggression? Mainly because the philosophy that gears government to liberty puts the highest value on the life, the dignity and the happiness of every person equally. It requires the most publicity in all public affairs, and the more publicity there is the more slowly the government can act and the less danger there is of its launching a surprise aggression.

The danger of aggression, atomic or other, lies not in the weapons themselves but in the will to use them. The less liberty there is, the more the national will is centered in the will of one dictator and the easier surprise attack becomes. The more liberty there is, the more the national will is divided into a myriad equal independent individual wills, that can act only by agreement. Thus the structure of a government based on civil liberty serves to guaran-

tee the citizens and the world alike against aggression by that government.

And now the rocket and atomic bomb have placed this guarantee of peace in deadly danger.

To rise at all and to survive, liberty hitherto required the protection of inanimate Nature,—the mountains of Switzerland, the lowlands of Holland, the Rhine of France, the Isles of Britain, the oceans of America. With such protection civil liberty has struggled up, but only among a fraction of our species. This fraction has been divided into a number of nations, into at least a dozen fragments, by the conditions that enabled freedom to develop in them.

Now nothing in nature remains to protect liberty anywhere, nothing but the best in human nature.

The free peoples are still free and still have a voice in world affairs because they proved stronger than their autocratic foes. To survive and keep this voice tomorrow these free peoples need to remain strong. Now as always their strength must be both material and moral.

While so much of mankind remains unfree they cannot safely renounce the armed power with which they have hitherto defended civil liberty without

delivering themselves to slavery and betraying humanity's surest hope of peace. But in this atomic age they need more power than they can possibly secure by arming nationally.

The effort each is making now to secure this power independently of the others threatens liberty in each of them, both from within and from without. It leads them to centralize power increasingly in the executive and the military. It encourages secrecy and spying. It makes them fear to help rebuild allies who may turn against them. It tempts them to seek power by clinging to the evils of imperialism.

In these and other ways this nationalistic policy undermines freedom's greatest power,—its moral power. It stains freedom with hypocrisy. It starts the free nations in a race that freedom cannot win, for it is a race with dictatorship toward dictatorship. The further the free peoples go in this direction, the more they will become divided from each other, and the more their division is bound to tempt the aggressive to attack them one by one.

These dangers threaten liberty at a time when hunger is gnawing on the minds of millions and cold is chilling their hearts. Hunger and cold threaten liberty, too. They often lead the people

to give rulers more and more power over them. They pave a trail to well-intentioned tyranny, and to chronic cold and hunger for the masses.

From Australia and America to Switzerland and Sweden, individual freedom began with nothing but deserts and wilderness, mountains and fjords. Yet invariably it has given the highest standards of living in the world to the masses who believed in it, and who put liberty above comfort or security or life itself.

Freedom has proved the best bread-winner and the top producer. So true is this that, before this war, much more than half of mankind's means of producing and transporting goods of all kinds were centered in a dozen of the world's freest nations. These means are now almost entirely centered in them. Though some of the democracies of western Europe have been crippled in the war, they have been less crippled than Germany, Italy, eastern Europe and Russia. Meanwhile there has been a great expansion in the productive machinery of the U.S.A., Canada and other democracies.

Hunger and cold and disease are more immediate enemies of liberty, and therefore peace, than is the atomic bomb. To overcome them freedom

needs all its actual and potential productive forces working at high gear. These forces cannot be mobilized effectively while the free remain divided into rival economic nations. Imagine how American production would be cut to pieces were the U.S.A. divided into a dozen rival democracies, each with its tariffs and separate currency, each protecting these with independent armaments. That will show you how appallingly the productive capacity of the world's most productive area is now cut to pieces by its division into a dozen rival nations.

Union of the free has always been the surest way to defend and to extend the blessings of individual liberty, and peace. This was never truer than in this cold and hungry dawn of the Atomic Age.

Only by Union can free men tremendously increase their defensive power with no sacrifice of their individual freedom. Only by uniting their human and material and moral resources through a Great Federal Republic can those with freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of conscience, freedom of association, freedom of election, and other rights make their persons still freer while colossally increasing their defensive and moral power.

Only by federating themselves can they remove the temptation to aggression that their division now provides. Only thus can they gain the freeborn strength that encourages the elimination of imperialism and the admission of colonial peoples to full statehood in their Union as they grow ripe for this.

Only by Union of the Free can the world's most productive area mobilize its men, its know-how, and its machines effectively enough to bring the rest of mankind through war's aftermath and rebuild shattered continents. In Europe, Russia and Asia millions of men, women and children are doomed to starve and freeze to death if the free fail to unite in one Great Union.

Only by Union can the free gain sufficient strength to meet humanity's needs today, and pursue—inside and outside the United Nations Organization—a generous, peaceful policy toward all nations, one that gives no nation any cause to attack the free, and that gives every people a growing incentive to gain greater liberty.

Once the people of the free nations break the grip of absolute national sovereignty by federating in a World Republic, what then?

The desire for liberty and peace which impelled them to this Union can

be depended on to lead them to extend its principles to the people of other nations as freedom grows among them, until at last all mankind is united in equal individual liberty. For this Universal Union to come about, the free must create the nucleus from which it can develop. Nothing can encourage the growth of liberty and union everywhere so much as this first step toward it, the formation of this nucleus with its concrete proof that Union of the Free brings to everyone advantages that are beyond calculation.

We face another bomb, but it demands no more faith and courage than the ancient Athenians showed when Themistocles led them to abandon their city to the Persian hordes and take to their ships. Plutarch tells us that the Athenians "were very unwilling" to do this, "imagining that it would signify little now to gain a victory, and not understanding how there could be deliverance any longer after they had once forsaken the temples of their gods and exposed the tombs and monuments of their ancestors to the fury of their enemies." But they followed Themistocles to Salamis, and there and then began the glory that was Greece.

Just before that battle a Spartan chided Themistocles, saying that "it did not become those who have neither city nor house to lose, to persuade others to . . . forsake their countries." And Themistocles replied: "We have indeed left our houses and our walls, base fellow, not thinking it fit to become slaves for the sake of things that have no life nor soul; and yet our city is the greatest of all Greece, consisting of two hundred galleys which are here to defend you."

Freedom is a way of life that is founded on individual courage. Courage comes from the spark of divinity in every man,—his conscience. In times like these men must have faith in something. For our part, we keep an ancient faith. For we have faith in individual freedom, and in an ever-growing Union of the Free.

When you have read this booklet send it to a friend. Additional copies are available at 5¢ each, 25 for $1.

NOTE

This address was originally given on Nov. 16, 1945, in Pittsburgh, Pa. at the fifth annual convention of Federal Union, Inc.

If, in the light of the latest Sputnik and rocket developments, you find it even sounder than it was in 1945—if you are thinking now, "Had only the President spoken in such terms then!"—if you are looking for an answer whose values and whose vision meet the acid test of time . . . please help achieve Federal Union of the Free.

The Federal Union Organization

. . . originated when public-spirited readers of Clarence Streit's *Union Now* began joining together, immediately after its publication in 1939, to achieve its purpose. It was incorporated in 1940 as a non-profit membership association, "to promote education in the basic principles of federal union as exemplified in the Constitution of the U.S., with a view to attaining world order by a Federal Union of the Democratic Peoples."

Freedom & Union Magazine

. . . is published by Federal Union for the general public. Edited by Mr. Streit, it is indispensable to anyone who would follow progress in this field.

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FEDERAL UNION, INC.
2700 ONTARIO ROAD, N. W.
WASHINGTON 9, D. C.

from

THIRD
CLASS
POSTAGE

Streit, Clarence

January 9, 1957

Dear Clarence:

Thanks for your generous and gracious words about the YEAR END SHOW. I suppose one of the useful things that people who work with voice and pictures do is to stimulate people to read what appears in print.

As ever yours,

Mr. Clarence Streit
"Freedom & Union"
2700 Ontario Road, N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

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Freedom & Union
2700 Ontario Road, N.W.
Washington 9, D. C.

Dec. 30, 1956

Dear Ed,

I listened today with much profit, as always, to your end-of-year discussion with the veritable galaxy of correspondents you have built up for CBS, and hasten to congratulate you on the program and even more on the achievement - that galaxy, I mean. I think back when I first met you . . in Geneva when I was there for the N.Y. Times in 1929 or 30 or 31 - and there was no hint of a counterpart on the air to the N. Y. Times . . and I would take off my hat to you, Sir - except that I haven't worn a hat for years.

You fellows have a great advantage over the newspaper correspondents, and a great disadvantage. The latter, of course, is that the spoken word is even more ephemeral than the one published in the daily press - and yet the test of any good newsman (Ibelieve now even more than when I was one) is his ability to give, by the space he gives to an event, or factor in events, or/and what he says about it, the verdict of posterity. The historian a century hence can easily check what the correspondents of The Times wrote in 1956 - but what of your galaxy?

I'm sorry there wasn't time for you to add your dollar's worth. I trust that in it you would have filled in what to me were (and I think to posterity would be)the big blanks in the program: namely, the fact that practically no attention was paid to the dangers to the free from an economic depression, subversion and disunion. Why forget these three things that Moscow never forgets, and concentrate on war as if the danger were still from Berlin? Also: Eric, I believe, said that no one had believed revolt against a modern police state possible. I enclose evidence that I did. If interested, I'd be glad to tell you how I learned long ago that what is important is not the weight of arms but will power.

(over)

Happy New Year! Clarence
Clarence Streit

Remembering what you told me of your interview with Nasser - how he was banking on western disunity - I don't understand why none of your correspondents dealt with this.

Freedom & Union

"For the Great Republic, for the Principle it Lives by and Keeps Alive, for Man's Vast Future."—I

Vol. 10. No. 6 June, 1955

Consider Hungary a year later—and act now

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[On Second Thought]

Who Will Win Without War—Through the R-Bomb?

IN JUNE two years ago young men in Red Berlin, with only stones in hand, rose up and battled tanks. Already in 1953 the pressure of the arms race on living conditions behind the Iron Curtain had produced this picture—an incredible picture that was, however, not a fancy but a photograph.

*

Since 1953 the pressure of the arms race on life within the Red Empire has grown, and grown. And now the West German Republic has entered NATO with 500,000 soldiers about to be armed and added to these already at the front, right where the West and East face one another.

*

Small wonder that the Kremlin is now making concessions that astound those who feared to take any step toward uniting the Atlantic Community, lest this provoke Moscow to war.

*

The wonder is that U.S. policy, as it confronts today's Jericho, still is one of reacting instead of acting—still dances to the music Moscow calls, instead of marching on with its own trumpets . . . with its own revolutionary principles. Yet they have been toppling tyrants from within ever since Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown while his band played a tune fittingly entitled, *The World Turned Upside Down.*

Revolutionary Resolution. The resolution to call a convention to explore Atlantic Union (Senate Con. Res. 12, House Con. Res. 73-80) would put America's twin trumpets—"Liberty and Union"—on the march once more. Its adoption would start a train of developments that could—and, I believe, would—end by unhorsing the Soviet dictatorship from within, without world war. This possibility deserves fresh consideration now when signs accumulate that the Red Empire is increasingly vulnerable to this revolutionary way to end the East-West tension—and seeks to turn the tables.

Red Disarmament Aim. Moscow's move to reduce and limit arms is a most important indication that its own basic strategy is to win the world by revolution rather than by war, and—still more significantly — that it fears revolution itself if it fails to gain a respite in the armaments race.

*

By its various recent conciliatory offers, the Kremlin, I believe, seeks these four goals:

1) To speed disunion in the Atlantic Community by removing the fear of Red aggression—the main bond now holding NATO together.

2) To bring on depression in the West by sharply reducing at one stroke the stimulus which the arms race gives to its economy and the unity Atlantica needs to prevent an economic setback from getting out of hand. (See *Freedom Against Itself*, chapter 19.)

3) To induce thus the conditions that make for Communist revolution in the weaker parts of the free world, and to gain at the same time the prestige of having led the world toward peace and disarmament.

4) To save itself, above all, from the danger that continuance of the arms

race will increase its present internal strain to the point where it falls victim to revolution itself.

Two-Sided Game. The free too often forget that in the great issue of our day —shall freedom or dictatorship gain the world?—either side can win by either of two major means, war or revolution.

*

In previous tests, only the free could hope to win by inducing revolt in the other camp. Hitler with his racial dogma could not possibly do anywhere outside Germany what Wilson did with his free principles not only in Germany but elsewhere. In the current test there is this new factor: The present dictatorship can compete with freedom in fostering revolt.

The R-Bomb. The Communist dictatorship has not only the A-bomb and the H-bomb but an R-bomb of its own. It has specialized, indeed, so long and so much in the technique of winning power through revolt that this should be deemed its favorite weapon.

*

Though its promises are false, Communism has proved that by subtly perverting the ideas of liberty, dignity, equality, fraternity, justice and peace, which Freedom embraces, it can echo Freedom's world-wide appeal to people of every class and country. It can do this effectively, however, only where there is acute economic misery, as in Asia, or the discontent that depression with its sudden unemployment and fall in living standards produces in the West.

Moscow's Losing Race. To understand the Kremlin's present policy one needs to see it against the backdrop of the past two years.

*

To relieve the strain within the Red Empire which the food riots of June 1953 dramatized, Malenkov felt forced to increase consumer and farm production at the expense of war goods. Only a year and a half later the failure of the food policy, combined with the growing power of the Atlantic democracies and the heavy drain on Soviet Russia to supply Red China with weapons and machinery, increased the internal strain to the point where Malenkov fell. Khrushchev rose, the effort to increase food production grew fairly frantic, and industry was shifted back to war—despite the obvious danger in thus disappointing the long-suffering consumers so soon after raising their hopes. And now the addition of West Germany's great weight to NATO's strength makes even more acute the strain within the Red Empire caused by the armaments race.

Present Imperative. Now that the U.S. has agreed to Four Power talks, it is imperative that it move forward with preparations to assemble the proposed Atlantic Convention. Otherwise it risks falling into the trap the Kremlin is now baiting with juicy concessions.

*

The main bond still holding together the Atlantic Alliance is the fear of Red military aggression—the fear that caused NATO to be made and a rearmed Germany admitted to it. Now that the Kremlin seeks by removing this fear to break this fragile bond, it becomes all the more urgent that the Atlantic democracies explore how best to unite themselves on an enduring, effective basis, one that no longer depends on the pressure of the Kremlin . . . which is notorious for abrupt reversals of its policies.

Union Decisive Factor. Whether the present situation evolves toward overstrain leading to overthrowal of dictatorship from within, behind the Iron Curtain, or toward depression and overthrowal of freedom from within the free nations, depends on whether or not the Atlantic democracies move now toward federal union. The following basic factors will help make clear why this is so:

1. The arms race depends increasingly on industrial and farm production.

2. The two major ways to augment this production are a) by uniting more effectively the nations in each camp, and b) by raising output within each nation.

3. Because the Atlantic democracies are far more advanced, industrially and agriculturally, than the Communist nations, and because they are at the same time far less united, they need merely federate to leave the Kremlin far behind in the race for power. Without increasing their expenditures for arms, but merely by gaining the economies and certitudes that organic Union brings, they can vastly augment their real strength, while at the same time raising instead of lowering their living standards. Union saves them in other ways from all danger of Communism winning by revolt.

4. Moscow could not possibly catch up with an Atlantic Union by uniting more closely the Communist nations, because Red China is too under-developed for tighter unification with Russia to add comparably to Communist power, and because the Eastern European satellites are already united to the Kremlin as completely as is practically possible. (As for the "Eastern NATO" with which the Kremlin replied to Bonn's entry into the Western alliance, insofar as it is not mere window-dressing, it indicates a weakening rather than an increasing degree of unity in the Red Empire.)

5. To raise output otherwise within the Red Empire means, in practice, to lower already low living standards.

6. In its efforts to keep up in the

FREEDOM & UNION'S POLICY

To think, write and act always in terms of all the democratic world, and not of any one country in it.

To mean by "we" (except editorially) the citizens of the coming Atlantic Union or Federation of All the Free, not merely those of any existing democracy.

To speed its coming by helping its people understand better the principles of individual freedom and federal union, and their importance to peace, production, higher living standards and greater spiritual growth and happiness.

To advance it also by helping the people of this Free Atlantic Community to see that they do form a community which they need to govern democratically.

To provide a forum for all views in the vast field of freedom and federation.

To bring out the facts in this field by objective, imaginative research.

To favor calling now a federal constitutional convention, representing the experienced civil liberty democracies, to work out and submit to their people a plan for uniting them in a Federal Union of the Free, or United States of the Atlantic, under a Constitution that would: 1) guarantee their Bill of Rights; 2) give them a free government in those fields where they agreed this would best advance individual freedom; 3) provide that this government shall be elected by, be responsible to, and operate on, the citizens and be federally balanced in its representation of them; 4) secure the right of each nation in the Union to continue to govern all its other national affairs in complete independence.

To seek to extend the Union's free federal relationship to other nations peacefully and as rapidly as this will advance liberty and peace until eventually it grows into a free federal world republic.

To assure that, pending universality, this union shall be a loyal member of the United Nations.

power race, the Kremlin has already had to lower living standards at home, while seeking to slow down the West by concessions aimed at removing its incentive both to arm and to unite.

7. If faced with the immense advance in power the Atlantic Community would gain by federal union, the Kremlin would be driven to grinding down the poor still more in its frantic efforts to keep from falling far behind.

8. This would mean harder work with less to eat and wear, in Eastern Europe particularly, because it forms the most advanced part of the Red Empire with the most juice left to be squeezed out, combined with the best productive capacity and know-how available to the Soviet squeezer.

9. For the Kremlin to seek to gain power this way is, at best, no answer, but full of peril to it. What it thus gains is trifling compared to what the free gain by Atlantic Union. Moreover, this policy makes for revolution in the area which is at once most essential to Soviet power and most likely to revolt.

Vulnerable East Europe. Moscow is most exposed to revolt in Eastern Europe for these reasons: a) Eastern Europe has been under the Red knout for only ten years—not 38 years like Russia and the Ukraine; b) its peoples have enjoyed much more freedom and better living standards than the rest of the Red Empire—and the higher one is, the more discontent a fall engenders; c) one needs but mention the Poles to remember how fierce is national patriotism in Eastern Europe, and how long schooled its peoples are in the ways of the underground; d) Eastern Europe is the area of the Red Empire that adjoins the Atlantic Community geographically—and it is far nearer to the West than to Russia in the ties formed by immigration with the U.S., by culture with France and Britain, by political thought with all three of these, by religion with Italy and by trade with Germany.

Union's Powder & Spark. Atlantic Union doubly makes for revolution in Eastern Europe, for it brings together in that key area the powder of oppression from the East and the spark of hope from the West—a most explosive combination.

*

While the great increase in material power which Union would give Atlantica would lead the Kremlin to grind down the people of Eastern Europe in a hopeless attempt to stay in the race with the West, the even greater moral power which the formation of this Union would

generate would fire the Eastern Europeans with faith in their future freedom.

*

Desperation can cause men to perform astounding feats, such as the camera immortalized in East Berlin in June 1953, but faith and hope must move men too before men can move mountains.

Alliance Moves None. Alliances rouse little enthusiasm anywhere—even less in Europe than in America, even less in Germany than in France, even less in Eastern than in Western Europe. Too many lessons have taught Europe to have no faith in alliances.

*

America was warned by the Founding Fathers against trusting in alliance even between the 13 States, warned by Washington in his Farewell Address:

"To the efficacy and permanency of your union a government for the whole is indispensable. No alliances, however strict, between the parts can be an adequate substitute. They must inevitably experience the infractions and interruptions which all alliances in all times have experienced."

*

How can alliance be expected in time of peace to rouse the oppressed to the sacrifices that revolution involves, when everyone knows that the nature of alliance leads allies to sacrifice it to save themselves, not themselves to save it?

*

What faith can we expect the Eastern European to have in the Atlantic Alliance, when we know as well as he that by its very nature no nation in it is loyal to it? Even its members are careful to remain loyal only to themselves, each one reserving the right to interpret its commitments to suit itself when its allies are in greatest danger.

Union's Moral Power. Whereas rearming on the nationalistic alliance basis of NATO has left German youth so cold as to worry the recruiters of Bonn's new army, the idea of European Union fired them with enthusiasm. Atlantic Union would have even greater moral power. It would not be so diluted by fear of German domination or French strangulation of Europe. It would present a far more eloquent picture, one not merely of the French and Germans uniting peacefully, but of the Americans and British uniting with them—great nations sacrificing the jealously guarded power of their governments to remain a law each unto itself alone. And they would be sacrificing this "Divine Right" of the Sovereign Nation so as better to preserve the life and liberty of the Sovereign Citizens through constitution of a common federal government to conduct their common affairs, and to guarantee their national independence in all truly national affairs.

*

Atlantic Union would put the American Revolution on the march again indeed. And the more boldly it presented to the suffering people behind the Iron Curtain the picture of a new and greater United States—a United States of all the Free in which there would be a place of equal dignity for them once they threw off the Communist yoke and proved their freedom—the more irresistible its revolutionary power would become.

Super-Magnet. The United States of America has long been a magnet that has drawn to it millions from every nation; countless families in Eastern Europe still testify to this. But the United States of the Atlantic would be a super-magnet. **For to the great mass of Europeans it would mean that they could look forward to enjoying there at home the freedom, dignity, peace and living standards which they previously could gain only by the painful process of emigrating to a distant land whose language they did not know. Atlantic Union would mean bringing America to their door—with all the advantages of Britain, France, Germany thrown in.**

Convention's Quick Impact. It will take time, of course, to get the Atlantic Union set up. The Convention to explore it must first be called; then a plan for Union must be worked out and agreed on there; and then this must be debated and ratified by the participating

peoples, before the Atlantic Union can begin to shower its material benefits on them. But its great psychological impact would begin with the mere calling of the proposed exploratory Convention. This would set in motion at once the twin revolution-making forces of deepening oppression and rising hope behind the Iron Curtain. As Atlantica moved on toward Union, these forces would be gaining the power needed to upset dictatorship from within, starting in Eastern Europe. Once the U.S. Congress approved the resolution calling for the Atlantic Convention it would have turned the tide, put Communism on the way out.

*

Congressional approval of the Atlantic Convention resolution would have the greater immediate moral impact because it would come with all the force of surprise, even in the United States. Though the resolution commits the country only to explore with other democracies the possibility of uniting Atlantica more effectively "federally or otherwise," yet the fact is that most Americans and Europeans assume even this is unlikely to be done this year.

President Eisenhower has repeatedly stressed the need of greater Atlantic unity, and both Secretary Dulles and Chairman George of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee publicly endorsed the Atlantic Union resolution before assuming their present offices. Yet who would doubt that if they now used their power to get this resolution adopted they would surprise the world?

Peace by Surprise. To repeat what we wrote in these pages in February 1953: "Why do we seek to win only war—never peace—by surprise attack?

*

"By its principles and practices, dictatorship is far better prepared than democracy to win by war through surprise attack at the start.

*

"Democracy's best hope is to win by surprise attack—without war."

*

"To surprise the enemy one must first surprise oneself, for one must do more than one thought one could do. But to outdo oneself—what gives more satisfaction, a greater thrill?

*

"By surprising ourselves, we electrify ourselves, and all our friends."

How can we reasonably expect to win against dictatorship without war—except by taking it psychologically by surprise? Then why not at long last try to do this with the Atlantic resolution? A more prudent yet potent surprise move could hardly be imagined than its adoption now.

Moscow Respects Unity. Nothing could more quickly make the West appear immensely stronger to the Kremlin than could a U.S. decision to call the Convention to explore Atlantic Union. Moscow not merely respects the proverbial strength that lies in union; it makes a fetish of unity, worships it to the point of carrying it to the extreme of tyranny, and permits no disunity or "deviation" even within the Communist party.

*

Time and again the Kremlin has pointed to Soviet Russia's "monolithic" unity as its chief source of strength, and has echoed Stalin's belief that the great weakness of the Atlantic democracies lay in their disunion—in a disunity so chronic and deep that Stalin assured Moscow it could count on these "capitalist nations" to cut each other's throats.

Bases Saved. Not only would Moscow be taken by surprise by the calling of a Convention to explore Atlantic Union; it could be counted on to appreciate better and sooner than anyone the swift, overwhelming increase in power that Atlantica would gain by Union. It would see at once that the West could thus grow greatly in armed strength even though it agreed to reduce to the levels Moscow proposes—and that federation would make the "foreign bases" in Western Europe the "domestic bases" of an Atlantic Union, thus ruining the Kremlin's scheme for nullifying this essential element in the NATO system.

Quick Results. Moscow did not wait for the London-Paris accords to be ratified before it began its efforts to increase its armed power by lowering living standards. It did not wait for West Germany's 12 new divisions to be organized and armed before it began to make concessions designed to prevent or delay this increase in Atlantic power. It is a safe guess it would not wait for an Atlantic Convention to agree on a plan for Union before starting its efforts to squeeze still more war production out of its poor slaves. Nor would it delay to offer surprising concessions to the West in the hope of removing all incentive for Atlantic Union. It can be depended on to do its utmost to create the conditions that would foster Atlantic disunion and depression. Only thus can it turn the tables and expose the free to the dangers of revolt with which their Union would threaten Moscow.

Dulles Saw Truly. Secretary Dulles stands out among the few statesmen who have seen the possibility of winning through Freedom's revolutionary weapon. His emphasis on liberating the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe brought him widespread criticism in the Atlantic Community — a fact that reflects its present perverted scale of values, its accent on the military, its neglect of the revolutionary. True, part of the criticism was due to a mistaken belief that he meant to liberate them by military invasion.

At Valley Forge & Valmy. The thoughtless assumption that the only way Eastern Europe can be liberated is by another World War speaks volumes on how lamentably the free now tend to forget the great expeditionary idea that served them so decisively before, when Freedom faced crowned autocrats — whether at Valley Forge in America or at Valmy in France—and had little more than its own idea power to defend it.

What Dulles Needs. Secretary Dulles was right when he pointed to the possibility of ending the Red danger from within the Red Empire, and he was right again when he saw Eastern Europe as the key to success. He was wrong only in not arming himself with an expeditionary idea strong enough to do the job. The means he has so far offered since becoming Secretary of State have fallen far short of what his objective would require.

*

It is earnestly to be hoped that Secretary Dulles will not be deterred by past criticism from pressing forward now with his sound strategy. But may he first send to rest camp the tired ideas that have been serving so long at this front. May he soon replace them with the powerful idea he has been holding in reserve—the truly revolutionary American idea of Atlantic Union, the United States of Freedom.

—CLARENCE STREIT

Freedom & Union

"For the Great Republic, for the Principle it Lives by and Keeps Alive, for Man's Vast Future."—LINCOLN.

Vol. 11, No. 7, July-August, 1956 **Tenth Anniversary Year**

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[*On Second Thought*]

Depression, Too, Can Start In the Mid East

THE situation in the Mid East grows rapidly more ominous. It bears within it not only the widely discussed danger of sparking another world war but also the widely neglected danger of setting off an economic crash. Oil is the source of both threats.

*

Oil is a major factor not only in the U.S. economy but in that of Britain, France, Germany and all Western Europe. The British Isles produce no oil, France very little, Germany not a third of its needs. All Western Europe is heavily dependent on the Mid East for its oil supply. Most of this reaches it by tanker via Suez from the oilfields of the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia.

Risk War for Oil? Suppose that Western Europe's oil supply should be suddenly cut off by Soviet machinations among the Arab States. The West would then face this dilemma: Either it would have to risk war to keep its oil supply, or it would have to suffer disruption of its economy.

*

If Moscow succeeds in cutting off Mid East oil, it will probably do so only when the situation is such that Britain and the U.S. could not hold these oilfields by force except by risking an atomic world war with Russia.

Even if it were found to be bluffing, Moscow might well gain a propaganda victory. Certainly it would do its best to present to the world a picture of the U.S. and Britain ready to risk plunging the world into atomic war for "oil imperialism," and of Soviet Russia as the power that preserved the peace.

No Oil, No Jobs. Suppose that the dangers inherent in holding the Mid East oilfields by war led the West to let them be cut off from it. All the transporting, manufacturing and servicing industries in Europe that depend on oil—aviation, automobiles, buses, diesel trains, etc.—would then be crippled or halted. This would result in unemployment and social troubles that the Reds could easily exploit.

If Western Europe were deprived of the oil from the Mid East, the danger of losing key countries of Western Europe from within would bring heavy pressure on the U.S. to divert part of its own oil supply to its allies. Yet the U.S. with its booming economy and millions of automobiles is already oil thirsty. It could not divert enough of its supply to hold Europe without running short itself — without engaging in wartime controls, rationing, etc. What would happen to automobiles and farm machinery sales—already lagging —in such conditions? With the outlook for sales thus darkened, lay-offs would rise. Unemployment could spread rapidly by chain reaction from such a blow.

Egypt—and Reds—Celebrate. Only one great power—Soviet Russia—sent its Foreign Minister to participate when Egypt celebrated for three days—June 18-20—its having gained from the British complete control of the Suez Canal. The Kremlin sent its new Foreign Minister, Dmitri Shepilov, who won that post as the expert on Mid Eastern affairs who had engineered last summer's post-Geneva surprise deal by which Egypt got arms from the Reds.

To mark the withdrawal of the last British troops, Premier Nasser paraded his new armed power. Will it encourage him to close the Suez Canal to tankers bringing the oil of the East to drive the motors of Western Europe

. . . should this fit into the strategy of his Arab alliance?

What Price, Egypt? Moscow chose Egypt's Suez celebration to underbid substantially the Anglo-American offer to finance the Aswan High Dam project. Shepilov offered to loan Egypt $1.12 billion for 20 years at only 2 per cent interest to pay for this dam, on a basis that would bind Egypt's economy to the Soviets for at least that period.

Uncertainty in U.S. While Moscow was showing increasing evidence that it was giving No. 1 rating to Egypt and the Arabs and was prepared to gamble heavily in the Mid East, uncertainty was rising in Washington because of President Eisenhower's second illness.

Will Moscow Strike Now? The Kremlin can be counted on to exploit to the fullest, in the coming weeks and months, the present weakness in Washington. It will certainly consider the advantages of striking in this period of uncertainty to stop the flow of oil through Suez to the industries of West Europe.

August, when the Republican Convention names its candidates, is the lazy, vacation-minded month in the West which ushered in not only two World Wars but the 1929 economic crash.

One Moral. Failure of the U.S. Congress to call, before adjournment, the proposed Convention to explore Atlantic Union means that this move will have to be made later in worse conditions. Now it would be a sign of strength that would give the Kremlin pause. Made next year, conditions then may make the world regard it as a sign of weakness, and may help Moscow to picture it as motivated only by "oil imperialism." Death is the wages of sin . . . including the sin of omission.—C.K.S.

Forewarned of Suez . . and of Worse to Come

An advance proof of the preceding editorial was sent to Secretary Dulles, Sherman Adams, Assistant to President Eisenhower, and Senator Walter F. George, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on July 3 — more than three weeks before Egypt seized the Suez Canal on July 26. An excerpt from the letter to Secretary Dulles — similar to the covering notes sent the others—follows; unlike the editorial it is not reprinted but published now for the first time.—C.K.S.

July 3, 1956

DEAR SECRETARY DULLES:

. . . You know the dangers in the Mid East far better than I. Experience, however, shows that the best informed sometimes overlook the blow that was really in preparation, and are caught by surprise, as at Pearl Harbor. And so I venture to attach a galley proof of my editorial in our forthcoming July magazine, entitled, "Depression, Too, Can Start in the Mid East"—by a Shepilov-shaped move to cut off Western Europe's oil supply.

For several years now I have warned that 1) the Soviet strategy aims to win by fostering depression, 2) the danger period starts in 1956, and 3) if the proposed Atlantic Convention is not called before a crash, it may be too late, for whereas military aggression in Europe tends to unite the democracies, an economic crash divides them worse than ever and stimulates nationalism to a degree suicidal for freedom.

This was true of Weimar Germany which fell to National Socialism through the last depression. I venture to say that it probably will be true of not only Germany but France, Italy, India, Japan and others if we wait for the economy of Atlantica to crash before we call the proposed Convention. In such an emergency it alone could recommend with the necessary speed and prestige the far-reaching measures of Atlantic unification which every responsible statesman must know in his heart are now quite overdue.

I hope I am wrong in fearing that an economic crash can come out of the Mid East, or anywhere else. However, my guesses of the kind of disaster that Atlantic disunion would produce at a given time have been right often enough since 1939 (see pp. 196-99, and Annex 6, *Freedom Against Itself**) for me to feel that I should express these fears to your now, before the adjournment of Congress delays the needed action until 1957.

You may be right in believing that the Kremlin is really losing control over foreign Communist parties. But if so, this picture of weakening Communism can: . . .

> Encourage the Kremlin to divert attention and restore its authority, not necessarily by the classical method of a foreign war, but by the bold stroke (more in keeping with marxist thinking) to which my attached editorial points . . . that of confronting us suddenly with the dilemma of either appearing before the world as ready to back Eden in risking H-bomb world war for "oil imperialism," as many uncommitted countries would see it, or risking an economic crash.

Where then would be the Republican campaign strategy of booming prosperity but not booming guns? And where would be some other important things?

If Congress approves the Convention this month, the world will regard it as a move from strength; it will cause consternation in the Kremlin, rouse new hope in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and all through Eastern as well as Western Europe; it can turn Communism's present weakness into a rout. If we wait until next year to call this Convention, we risk losing its moral power. . . .

Sincerely,

CLARENCE K. STREIT

*The non-profit paper-covered edition of this book (Harpers) can be had from FREEDOM & UNION for $1.50 postpaid.—Editors.

It Pays to Read *Freedom & Union* every month — and Costs but $4.00 a Year, $10.00 for 3 Years.
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It was on the basis of this assumption: that I made my Suez guess: Seems to me to be a good basis & continue guessing on

Streit, Clarence

Freedom & Union

MAGAZINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD

Editor, CLARENCE K. STREIT Associate Editor, HERBERT AGAR

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2700 ONTARIO ROAD NW WASHINGTON 9 DC ADAMS 4-2211

Oct. 17, 1956

Dear Ed:

Just heard you on radio tonight which reminded me that I hadn't yet carried out my intention of congratulating you on the Suez TV report which I saw Sunday a week ago and found a superb piece of reporting - you do ask the most searching questions - though I confess I regretted that you did not bring out the part played by the villain in the piece (the disunity among the democracies you stressed to me as the thing on which Nasser was banking.)

Only this disunity - as I recall you - allows this poverty-stricken country to challenge successfully the West. And Nasser had told you how he was counting on it to bring the western nations round. No doubt what he said on that subject couldn't be used as a direct quote on TV. But since you saw its significance, why not make it clear somehow to the public who think the villain is Britain, of France, or the U.S. (depending on the accident of where they were born) - not the dismal fact that they have no means of agreeing in good time on any common policy?

Enough - too much - of that.

To turn to your broadcast tonight: Is the important thing whether the President thinks he is strong enough to get out and campaign more than was expected - or whether he has fallen victim to a very common delusion, and is thereby likely to overstrain himself, with results that can be disastrous - after the election?

You know what it is to be wrapped up in a job and go charging on, thinking you have more nervous energy than you really have. I know it, too. I've done a little campaigning , too, in the past 17 years. Nothing to compare with what Kefauver does, but still, I know what it is to speak several times a day, with a view to persuading people to do something definite, and repeat this, day after day, from town to town. I was never really tired until I finished the long tour - and then, my God, I was tireder than I thought a man could ever be. I was luckily endowed with an iron constitution and lots of resilience - but I've noticed that as the years go on, they're not what they used to be. One cannot generalize for others, but, all things considered, my guess is that Ike won't survive a 2nd term, and will pay heavily for the present proofs of health. If so, the real issue is: Nixon or Stevenson. When it is so evident that the whole Republican campaign could be sunk any day - even Nov. 5 - by Ike having even a semi-major illness (to say nothing of another heart attack), I am astounded, and somewhat depressed, to see that apparently little weight is given to this consideration.

Incidentally, everyone thought Ike the picture of health just before he came down, September a year ago. I've yet to see any pictorial agency which showed comparative pictures of him then - before the attack - and now. Maybe they would prove the case he wants proved. I don't know. But the ;ictures should exist. Why doesn't anyone trot them out?

Best regards,

Clarence

Clarence Streit

Streit, Clarence

Freedom & Union

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October 2, 1956

Dear Ed,

Here is our Tenth Anniversary issue, which we discussed when I had the pleasure of seeing you last week. I hope you found time to read the editorials on Suez and on the election in the page proofs I left with you. In case you didn't, I have marked some ~~pages~~ passages in them, and also some other things in the enclosed magazine that I thought would interest you.

I look forward to hearing your talk on the general subject which I think you said you would make on TV Sunday. I would appreciate your having your secretary give me the correct day and the time if my memory is wrong and also send me a written copy of your talk on that occasion, if it is available. I still understand through the eye better than the ear.

If you can find a peg in our Tenth Anniversary on which to hang some comment sometime, drawing attention to our work, I would greatly appreciate it - and so would the many good souls who make this work possible. If you cannot find such a peg but have any suggestions to offer me as regards any other CBS service, I would appreciate that too.

I was delighted to hear you say that you would be in Washington within a fortnight or so and would try to find time for a good talk at lunch or dinner. We would be very happy to have you at dinner or lunch when you are here. Please let me know when that will be so that we can reserve the date. I realize that your tight and changeable schedule may make any arrangement impossible to fulfill in the end, but we would be quite willing to take our chances.

I, too, always feel better after seeing you, and so I do hope I may see you soon again.

With warmest regards, I remain

Sincerely,

Clarence

Clarence K. Streit

CKS/mje

P.S. For your further information on our work - I enclose our 1955 Annual Report.

Edward R. Murrow
CBS
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Freedom & Union

MAGAZINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD

EDITOR, CLARENCE STREIT

ATLANTIC UNITY

ATLANTIC CONVENTION RESOLUTION

All 4 candidates hit this target, especially those for Vice President. Nixon, as Senator, co-sponsored Kefauver's Atlantic resolution. See "Which Victory Helps Atlantica Most?" Page 1

Dutch Mayor Pays "$18 a Year"—Gladly —for *Freedom & Union*

Baron Michiels van Kessenich, Burgomeester of Maastricht, city of 80,000 in Limburg Province, Holland, wrote Mrs. Chase Osborn of Michigan, who had introduced FREEDOM & UNION to him, the following in a recent letter in his own English:

"Already much too long I have your letters, tokens of kind remembrance, unanswered. Receiving *Freedom & Union* regularly, I must confess that, although reading is quite a selective thing for me as I always have too much, I never forget to put this periodical somewhere in a safe corner, where I can read it attentively. On the 17th of July I made my subscription with $5,* and with this small amount —which is for Dutch purchasing value something like $18—I want to show my very keen interest in the great enterprise of this movement. As I see the difficulty of any kind of union, it is a basic difficulty to sacrifice a little own advantages for the betterment of a great thing of all."

Baron Michiels van Kessenich
Burgomeester of Maastricht

His "$18" Annual Subscription

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[*On Second Thought*]

Which Party's Victory Will Help Atlantic Union Most?

ATLANTIC UNIONISTS, face the happiest choice in this U. S. election they have ever faced. In October, 1952, we wrote here: "Whoever wins, they can't lose, since both Eisenhower and Stevenson are in favor of closer Atlantic unity, and both Nixon and Sparkman are sponsors of the Atlantic Union resolution." That applies now, only more.

*

The one change in the two tickets since 1952 is that the chief sponsor of the Atlantic resolution, Senator Kefauver, has replaced his unfailing co-sponsor, Senator Sparkman, as the Democratic nominee for Vice President. And meanwhile the office of Vice President has gained in importance. Meanwhile, too, all four candidates have moved our way.

Non-partisans Must Vote. The Atlantic Convention resolution has always enjoyed bipartisan support in both Houses of Congress. FREEDOM & UNION is, as it has always been, non-partisan. But every Atlantic Unionist — except rigid party regulars (the movement includes these on both sides)—will ponder carefully: How can I do best with my vote to speed the Atlantic Convention? For some this question will be all important; for others, it will be one of several considerations determining their choice between the tickets or between candidates for Congress. It may lead two equally ardent and intelligent Atlantic Unionists to opposite decisions.

—Burck, Chicago Sun-Times

"I Like 'em Both"

One Atlantican's Views. Some of the election pondering of one federalist—for whom the interests of Atlantic Union have long been all important—may help inform and clarify the thinking of others. In this spirit I give now my own personal views, written before the campaign has really begun.

Eisenhower Record. Eisenhower's war and NATO experience and the statements in favor of some form of union in the Atlantic which he made not only privately but in his public report to NATO in April, 1952, and other considerations led me to believe in 1952 that his victory would best serve the interests of Atlantic Union. He began, however, by sharply disappointing this hope.

*

During his first two years President Eisenhower badly neglected the Atlantic community — much more than Washington ever had since NATO began. This was due to no indifference, but rather to a strategy which aimed at speeding German rearmament by trying to force the European Defense Community on the French by making them believe there was "no alternative" to it, such as Atlantic Union. When this failed com-

pletely, and the EDC was replaced by the Paris accords in early 1955, the Administration began to move toward the Atlantic Convention. By June it had advanced far in that direction.

*

In July 1955 came Moscow's shrewd and successful diversionary move against Atlantic unity—the Summit conference at Geneva. This killed the hope of Congressional action on the Atlantic resolution before adjournment. Even so, it is to the Administration's credit that Secretary Dulles dropped all the many objections to the Atlantic convention which the State Department had voiced under Secretary Acheson, and expressly stated he was not opposed to it. He held, however, that Congress should take all responsibility for it. He also wanted certain things in the resolution changed; its sponsors were willing to do this. The Administration, however, did not, even privately, push for action.

Heart Attack Intervenes. Once Congress adjourned in 1955, the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal and the October Geneva conference showed how much the July excursion to the Summit had been in the clouds. But meanwhile President Eisenhower had suffered his heart attack. This made the movement toward Atlantic unity mark time for the next seven months. After the President returned to work, the Administration soon resumed its march toward closer unity—more strongly than ever.

Ike Accelerates. The Dulles speech last April in favor of exploring new ways to "advance NATO from its initial phase into the totality of its meaning" was the first positive public leadership the Administration had given in this direction. President Eisenhower followed May 9 by naming Senator George his representative for the development of closer Atlantic unity, and declaring, "I regard the contribution which the U.S. can make to this project as of the utmost importance." This was even stronger than the statement he had made four years previously in his report to NATO as SHAPE Commander:

"Within the Atlantic community, and in Europe, we have the opportunity to build a bulwark of peace—a central position of unity and strength for the free world. This, then, must be a first and fundamental consideration."

It was happily clear that President Eisenhower at long last had returned to the track he had so disappointingly left on entering the White House.

*

After the NATO Council appointed, on U.S. motion, its Committee of Three to explore strengthening NATO, I was personally though privately assured in the highest Administration quarters that it would be helpful if Congress supplemented this scouting party on the Executive level with the proposed Convention on the citizen level. Once more there was hope of action—which the Administration could easily have secured in Congress. But a month went by, in which it made no move, even in private.

Again Illness Intervenes. Suddenly in June the President was stricken again. Caution replaced courage in the State Department. Congress was rushing toward adjournment by the time the President recovered. In these circumstances, the Administration decided that it would create "confusion" if it favored exploring Atlantic unity simultaneously by the

How Election Result In Congress Would Effect Atlantic Resolution

The Senate. The election situation as regards the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—the decisive one for the Atlantic Convention resolution—is as follows: Of its eight Democratic members, six support this measure. Only three of these, Senators Fulbright, Long and Morse, face re-election now, and the first two are already assured of this. The other two Democrats are Chairman George, who twice co-sponsored the resolution before becoming chairman, and Senator Green who is non-committal but inclined to follow the State Department. Since George is retiring, Green, who will be 89 this October and is very alert for his years, will become chairman if the Democrats keep control of the Senate. The next in line for chairman on the Democratic side will be Fulbright, a supporter of the Atlantic resolution. If the Democrats lose the White House, Senator Kefauver would most probably get the vacant seat on the Foreign Relations Committee.

None of the seven Republicans in the Foreign Relations Committee has sponsored the current Atlantic resolution, though one of them, Senator Aiken, sponsored it in 1951. Three of the seven face re-election; they include two opponents of the measure, Senators Hickenlooper of Iowa and Capehart of Indiana. The other, Senator Wiley of Wisconsin, is friendly, and if re-elected would be chairman, should the Republicans win the Senate. Next in line is Senator H. Alexander Smith who has been benevolently negative, but would probably follow a Republican Adminstration line. If both Wiley and Hickenlooper lose, Senator Langer of North Dakota, who has the purest isolationist record in the Senate, would be the Committee's second ranking Republican. The other Republican member is Senator Knowland, who would become majority leader if the Republicans win the Senate. His attitude toward the Atlantic resolution has been negative, but passive. He has opposed Administration foreign policy more than once in the Senate.

The House. In the House Foreign Affairs Committee, eight of the 17 Democrats and only one of the 12 Republicans are announced supporters of the present Atlantic resolution, though four other Republicans were thus listed before their party won the White House. All the members of this Committee, of course, face re-election. The chairman, James Richards, is retiring from Congress. By seniority, the next chairman, in the event of re-election and Democratic control, will be Thomas Gordon of Illinois, a long-time supporter of the Atlantic resolution. Next in rank will be another supporter, Thomas Morgan of Pennsylvania.

If the Republicans win the House, Robert Chiperfield of Illinois would be chairman and John Vorys of Ohio second in rank. Neither has ever supported the Atlantic resolution and Vorys is benevolently opposed to it. John McCormack of Massachusetts, who would remain majority leader of the House if the Democrats keep control, is very sympathetic to the resolution. Charles Halleck of Indiana who will have this post if the Republicans win the House is non-committal, as are also Speaker Rayburn and Joe Martin, who would be the Republican Speaker.

Convention and the Committee of Three. And so again the resolution was stalled. The President did, however, take the trouble to write me his encouraging letter of July 26 (published in September FREEDOM & UNION), explaining that "this by no means forecloses future consideration of the alternative you support," and reaffirming his own deep interest in Atlantic unity.

*

Thanks to the active leadership of such Stevensonian Democrats as Senators Humphrey and Sparkman, the Foreign Relations Committee before adjourning gave the Administration one further opportunity to act this year. It watered down the resolution to where it called only for a Commission, which the Administration could name and finance without further action by Congress, and referred this to Secretary Dulles. But, as will be seen on page 7, the Administration has decided against this.

To Sum Up on Ike. At heart he is, I believe, for Atlantic Union. His strategy of pushing first for the EDC was defensible; though I always contended it was unsound, most Americans and Europeans agreed with it. But the event is the test—and the school—of statesmen; it proved this Eisenhower policy was a bad mistake. It cost the West two precious years, and leaves it now with the chief thing the President sought to gain — German rearmament on the NATO side — increasingly in doubt as Adenauer's star lessens. Meanwhile NATO has been undermined in many ways. No important strengthening of it can yet be credited to the Administration, but it has now begun a very serious effort to unite the Atlantic Community. I feel sure this will bear good fruit when the NATO Council meets in December.

*

The President, if he wins the election, will aim, I believe, to lead vigorously toward Atlantic unity in 1957, particularly if Dulles remains Secretary of State. His chief difficulty lies in his own party. How far and fast he goes will depend on several factors; most of all on his health.

What of Nixon? Vice President Nixon as a Senator was one of the co-sponsors of the Atlantic Union resolution when Senator Kefauver introduced it in January 1951. After he was nominated for Vice President in 1952, the Chicago *Tribune* questioned him about this. He stood firm, though the isolationistic wing of the Republican party was then stronger than now. He has never since then repudiated the resolution. Nor has he actively supported it.

*

As Vice President, Nixon has followed the President's lead, and I believe he shares his views on the Atlantic Community. True, the go-it-alone Republicans have done their best to identify him with them. I do not, however, share the fears that he is one of them, or would go their way in the Atlantic, if he became President. But I do fear that this would delay Atlantic Union for other reasons.

*

At best, I would expect a struggle for the Republican succession to start soon after the election, since the 22nd Amendment prevents President Eisenhower from having a third term. This fact should increasingly weaken his hold on his party during his second term. The leadership would of course fall to Nixon if he had to take the President's place. This would not make him more popular with such rivals as Senator Knowland, who are powerfully placed in the Senate.

*

Instead of having the cooperation that Eisenhower has enjoyed from the Democrats, Nixon as President would suffer from their distrust. He would probably be driven to appeasing the go-it-aloners in his party in the hope of preventing a bad split. This would make for rash caution in the Atlantic rather than prudent boldness—the thing that is needed.

Giving Blood—or Bleeding to Death?

Stevenson & Atlantica. There is no question in my mind that Adlai Stevenson is at least as strongly in favor of closer Atlantic unity as President Eisenhower. Since 1952, he too has publicly advanced in this direction.

*

Stevenson was a signer of the Declaration of Atlantic Unity in 1955. Its five-point program called for (1) "the development of NATO as a central agency to coordinate the political, trade and defense policies of" members, (2) a mutual lowering of trade barriers within NATO, (3) creation of NATO committees in the legislature of each NATO nation, (4) establishment of an advisory Atlantic Assembly, representative of NATO member legislatures, and (5) creation of an Economic Council representing employers and employees in NATO countries. This goes somewhat further than the Administration has yet gone publicly, though it gave the Declaration a very friendly reception. In endorsing the whole program, Stevenson wrote that NATO must advance "into the political and economic spheres."

*

As for the proposed Atlantic Convention, Stevenson, like President Eisenhower, has never endorsed it publicly. I have good reason to believe, however, that he is even more favorable to it than I think the President is, privately.

No Doubt About Kefauver. In Senator Kefauver Atlantic Unionists have long had their strongest, most active and dependable leader in the Senatorial and Presidential fields. He was the first candidate for the Senate to endorse our program, and the first in whose election it played a decisive part. That was in 1948 when he defeated the legendary Crump machine thanks—as he himself wrote me at the time — to a Citizens Committee of Seven. It was formed to support him because he promised to sponsor a resolution for a Convention to explore Atlantic Union if elected. Five of this Committee's seven, including its key man, Edmund Orgill, now mayor of Memphis, were active Federal Unionists.

*

Senator Kefauver promptly carried out his pledge; he was chief sponsor in 1949 of the first Atlantic Convention resolution. He was personally responsible for getting it more co-sponsors than anyone had dreamed it would get at the

start. He was again the chief sponsor when it was reintroduced in the 82nd Congress in 1951 and in the 84th Congress in 1955. For eight years he has urged it in many speeches.

*

Since 1948 I have been on close terms with Kefauver. I must testify that he has never wavered on this issue and has proved time and again that he put the interests of the Atlantic Union Convention proposal above what others thought were his own political or personal interests. He stood his ground when attacked because of it in both his campaigns for the presidential nomination.

*

When Senator Kefauver faced reelection in 1954, his opponent, Congressman Sutton, appealed not only to race prejudice but chauvinism, and made Atlantic Union a major issue. Charles A. Caldwell, who covered the primary campaign for the Memphis *Press-Scimitar* wrote of it in the September 1954 FREEDOM & UNION:

"It was the courage of Senator Estes Kefauver—exemplified in his refusal to back down on his support of Atlantic Union — that turned a vicious demagogue's attack on him into victory at the polls this summer in Tennessee. . . . As Sutton's attacks grew more vicious, Kefauver's tone grew firmer and firmer. When Kefauver ended his campaign the night before the primary election—with a State-wide radio broadcast . . . his last words to the people of his State were: 'I am for Atlantic Union.' "

Kefauver's Stature. I have been in an unusually good position during the past eight years to form a sound judgment about Kefauver. He impressed me favorably from the start, and he has grown and grown in my esteem, particularly in qualities which I rate high in a President. These include moral courage, integrity, stick-to-itiveness, good political judgment, sangfroid, far-reaching vision combined with a down-to-earth sense of the practical and a genuine, warm-hearted interest and respect for people, individually and collectively. Practically all the articles about him that I have read in the mass magazines and big newspapers have shown only superficial knowledge and perception, and have badly under-estimated him.

*

Kefauver does not have the exceptional gift of expression that characterize both Governor Stevenson and Vice President Nixon; he suffers in this respect much the same difficulties President Eisenhower does. Nor has he had the training for the Presidency and gained the intimate knowledge of current world problems that Nixon has enjoyed from working so closely with President Eisenhower and the National Security Council. But the Senator has some assets which I would consider still more important; they include a greater capacity to see the forest from the trees, and act accordingly, than the Administration has shown thus far.

*

Recent experience has taught that the Founding Fathers were wise in seeking to assure that the Vice President should be of presidential stature. However much one may admire and trust a candidate for President, his hopes may be wrecked by illness or death—and failure to provide adequately for the succession. The responsible voter must consider which ticket gives the best double guarantee of a good President. Even if Kefauver did not have the Atlantic Union record he has, I still would favor him for President.

If Estes Became President. If the Democrats win and Vice President Kefauver should have to replace President Stevenson, I have no doubt whatever that—assuming the Atlantic Convention had not already been called—one of his first acts would be to urge it strongly on Congress. He would be in a much stronger position to get action on it in a Democratic Congress than Nixon would be if similarly advanced to the White House with a Republican Congress, if only because the go-it-aloners are much stronger in the G. O. P.

Other Pro & Con. The Atlantic Convention's bipartisan support has always been more Democratic than Republican in both Houses. Curiously enough, it had more Republican supporters in both Houses during the Truman Administration than since President Eisenhower took over. A number of Republicans who had previously co-sponsored it then begged off for various reasons, while remaining favorable. The real explanation, I believe, was that they were all strong Eisenhower supporters, and his troubles with the nationalistic wing made them the more inclined to follow him.

The Administration's attitude toward the Atlantic Convention was so negative in 1953-54, when the Republicans controlled Congress and the Administration was bent on "no alternative" to EDC, that no serious Republican sponsor could be found for the resolution, and it was not introduced that session. After the Democrats regained control of Congress, it was introduced early in 1955 when the State Department's attitude was still negative. Even so it did gain some Republican sponsors then.

State Department's Role. The State Department under Dean Acheson was always much more opposed to the Atlantic Convention than it ever was under Secretary Dulles. Acheson was never friendly and constructive in his attitude as Dulles became in mid-1955.

*

One reason why I favored Eisenhower in 1952 was the danger that Stevenson, who then owed his nomination to Truman, might retain his friend, Acheson, as Secretary of State, whereas it was known that Eisenhower would replace him with Dulles, who had publicly endorsed the Atlantic Union resolution. Since State Department career men are habituated to thinking in terms of diplomacy, their attitude toward the Atlantic Convention and Union tends to be negative or hostile. To offset the heavy weight of this bureaucracy it is highly important that the Secretary of State himself should have the deep personal interest in this measure that Dulles has. Perhaps the worst hazard for the Atlantic Convention in a Democratic victory now is that Acheson should become Secretary of State again, but there seems no danger of this since Truman opposed Stevenson's renomination.

*

Secretary Acheson's hostility caused President Truman to withdraw the green light he once tentatively gave the Atlantic resolution. But this never kept even Administration Democrats in Congress from sponsoring it, as the lack of Administration approval deterred Republicans in Congress after 1953.

Congressional Paradox. In sum, experience indicates strongly that (1) because of the division in the Republican party there is practically no hope of getting Congress to call the Atlantic Convention without active Administration

—*Stampone, Army Times*

support if the Republicans control it, (2) there is much more hope for action in Congress without Administration leadership when the Democrats control Congress and/or the Administration, and (3) paradoxically, the best way to assure the strongest Republican support of this resolution is to have the Democrats in full control, as in 1949.

Bipartisan Voting. Many factors will, of course, govern most voters. One may, for example, conclude that a Democratic victory would be best for the Atlantic Convention, and yet, if a Kentuckian, vote to send to the Senate so needed a Republican champion of it as former Ambassador John Sherman Cooper. Or an Atlantic Unionist in Iowa, Indiana or Idaho may conclude in favor of Eisenhower, and yet vote against such Republicans as Senators Hickenlooper, Capehart and Welker. Other things than the direct effect of one's vote on Atlantic Union will also enter into the decisions of most Atlantic Unionists.

Two Sweet & Sour Parties. Personally, I find in general that Republican policy is more to my liking on the domestic side, and Democratic policy in foreign affairs. I prefer Benson's farm policy to Kefauver's, and hard money and balanced budgets to inflationary solutions. I sympathize with Republican fears of centralization, even those of Senator Bricker. I find the Democrats too inclined to turn to the Federal Government instead of the States or the citizens for the key to all problems. But to me the present threat to liberty from centralization lies in depression and war, not in Democratic domestic policy.

*

The dangers of depression and war originate in the field of foreign affairs. These disasters are certain to strike us, no matter how Republican our domestic policy may be, if we do not hasten to federate the Atlantic democracies. The Brickerites not only oppose this but worsen the danger from anarchy in Atlantica by their methods of curbing centralization in Washington. Their cure is more dangerous than the disease is now.

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Once depression and war strike, they inevitably result in giving immensely greater power to the government. And so my way of preventing centralization and statism is to prevent the pressure of emergency that leads to these, to concentrate not on the effects but the cause —the disunion in the Atlantic.

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Once the source of the danger of war and depression is removed by Atlantic Federal Union, I am confident that the so-called New Dealers will get nowhere in the U.S.A., and the Marxists will retreat in Europe.

If Reason Ruled. If logic ruled, and the Democrats were really bent on deliberately building up the Moloch State (as Republican orators say, but I don't believe), they would couple their domestic policies with Bricker-Jenner-Knowland foreign policies. And if the Republicans were really intelligently seeking to advance free enterprise and curb centralization, they would combine the domestic policies of the Bensons and Humphreys with the foreign policies of the Kefauvers. Such combined policies would add up, make sense.

*

The voter, alas, is not confronted with an easy choice between two logical and coherent policies. Instead, each party is more or less divided against its own policy—and against the freedom they both seek. The Democrats tend toward centralization on the domestic side, but offer on the foreign side the best hope of removing the forces that make for statism and marxism. And the Republicans who are most loudly alive to the danger of statism from within, are doing the most to produce it by their foreign policies. The voter must strike the balance, and take his risks.

Ideal Party. When President Eisenhower in the frustrations of his first years in the White House dreamed of founding a third party, I have no doubt he aimed at the logical ideal—a party that would unite Republican domestic policy with Democratic foreign policy. He has failed thus far to remake the Republican party along these lines, and I doubt that he will be able to succeed in a second term—on his way out—or that Nixon can do better in this regard.

*

If Stevenson wins, he will face a similar problem, but he has a better chance of working it out. Fortunately for him, he faces in his own party far less opposition to Atlantic unification than Eisenhower does in his, and much stronger incentive to move in this direction. The more rapidly he does advance toward Atlantic Union, the less pressure there will be from war and depression to give government more power over the citizen, and the easier it will be for him to develop moderation at home, and remake his party on lines where both its foreign and domestic policies protect freedom from the two fatal extremes—anarchy and tyranny—that have brought so many democracies to ruin.

Which Way, November? To sum up, as I size up the pro and con, the outlook for the Atlantic Convention resolution in 1957 will be good if the Republicans win, and it will be still brighter if the Democrats do. I may be wrong—in fact, I was wrong in believing the reverse of this in October four years ago, and so I write with diffidence now. But this is the present picture as I personally see it. What is your own view?

—CLARENCE STREIT

Suez, Oil, & 7 Neglected Facts

TO A DISTURBING DEGREE news and public comment in the Atlantic Community continue to neglect the main danger to it in the Mideast, to which we called attention here in July, three weeks before the seizure of the Suez Canal. That danger is not world war but a major economic crash caused by Western Europe being cut from its Mideast oil supply.

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Even when general agreement rose that war was unlikely to occur now, the spotlight did not shift to the other possibility, that the Kremlin's Mideast maneuvring aims instead at fostering an economic crash in the West. Though the importance of Mideast oil to Europe has been widely stressed, there has been little attempt to spell out the major peril that would result from the loss of this oil. The Atlantican public has been kept blissfully unaware that this loss might well lead by chain reaction to western economic crash.

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Even those most inclined to see Reds under every bed and to ascribe the worst to Kremlin plotting do not seem worried by the possibility that Soviet scheming in the Mideast aims at producing an army of the unemployed in Atlantica. Yet this would be the obvious way for Moscow to recruit a really formidable fifth column in the West.

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The reasoning that led us to point in July not only to the immediate danger at Suez but to the resultant eventual threat of economic disaster has not been answered, or denied. It has not been agreed to or acted on. It has simply been generally ignored—the not uncommon fate of truths that people do not want to face. Meanwhile the economic danger has grown graver.

Test Case at Suez. The Kremlin and the Arab nationalists could hardly have picked a better test case than the Suez one to open a campaign to shift control in the Mideast from the West to the Arabs and, through them, to Moscow.

The maximum resistance to a program of national socialization could be expected at Suez. The Canal is an international waterway in which many nations are directly interested. It gives the West the best moral case for strong action that it has in the Mideast, and the most widespread incentive to act.

When Premier Nasser seized Suez on July 26, Britain and France threatened to restore their rights by force. The U.S. made clear it would not back them up that far. Moscow thereafter indicated it would support Egypt with arms. Result: another international conference. The British counted ten, the war spirit cooled, and though Britain and France sent armed forces to Cyprus, few took the threat seriously.

Before the Suez crisis broke, the economic situation in both Britain and France gave much cause for alarm. Their tough talk and costly preparations for war since then have thus far

Volga Boatman Gets Around

served mainly to weaken further their economies, both morally and materially, by lessening confidence in them and increasing inflationary forces. By going to war they can escape the loss of prestige which empty threats entail, but only by jumping from a frying pan into the fire of inflation.

Next, the Oil Fields. It seems reasonable for the Arabs and the Kremlin to conclude from the Suez test that it is safe for other Arab governments to go ahead and nationalize—the fashionable euphemism for socialize or communize—the oilfields and pipelines in their territory. They may be tempted particularly to move as Nasser did—while a presidential election dominates American considerations.

If Washington should use force to restore communized Mideastern oilfields and pipelines to their American owners, this would undoubtedly be considered "naked imperialism" throughout the uncommitted countries. It would fit into communist propaganda much more than would American use of force to keep international a waterway in which Americans have practically no financial interest. Neither would fit into Republican election strategy.

Communization of Mideastern oilfields and pipelines would put the Arabs—and the Kremlin on whom they would then depend decisively—in position to cut at the source the oil that is essential not only to Western Europe's economy but to the NATO airbases which the U. S. strategy of "massive retaliation" requires. This threat can not be met, as the Suez one might be, in time, by building super-tankers to go round Africa.

Doubtful Hope. Many count on self-interest to keep the Arab rulers from cutting off Western Europe's oil. They stress that the Arab states last year received "one billion in oil royalties on a 50-50 profit-sharing basis with the oil companies," and depend on this income for their normal and development budgets. No doubt this will give them pause. But emotional factors, such as nationalism, often cancel out self-interest. The West should know this.

If self-interest ruled, it should have led us to enjoy the economies and other advantages of Atlantic Union; instead, our democracies have sacrificed hundreds of billions of dollars and millions of their citizens rather than "sacrifice their national sovereignty" enough to federate. Why expect the Arabs to be governed less by blind emotion, more by common sense? Especially when Russia is playing an active hand in the game, and has more to gain from ruin than from reason?

Cheaper Than War. In both Arabia and Atlantica nationalism is playing hob with self-interest, but in Russia nationalism and self-interest are working hand-in-hand. Both the elements composing Russian nationalism today—czarist imperialism and communist

ideology—urge it to seek control of the Mideast, not only for its intrinsic value to an empire lacking ice-free ports but as an instrument for wrecking Atlantica's economy.

It cost Russia hundreds of billions of dollars to overthrow Nazi Germany by war. Since then it has spent many billions every year in preparations to destroy the West by war. If the Arabs, from fear of losing present revenues, should hesitate to communize their oilfields and pipelines and cut off Western Europe's oil long enough to bring it to its knees, self-interest would seem to advise Moscow to give them a billion, if need be, to do this.

4 Red Advantages. Nationalization of Mideast oilfields and pipelines has these four advantages for Moscow:

1. It could result in mechanical and technical breakdown, because of lack of experienced management. This would stop the flow of oil westward in a way that would gain the sympathy of uncommitted countries and not incur the risks that willful stoppage would.

2. It could easily lead the Arabs to replace western oil technicians with Soviet ones, thus strengthening Moscow's position.

3. The more power it gives the Kremlin in the Mideast, the better position Moscow is in to gain its ends by mere threat of cutting off the oil, rather than by running the risks of actually stopping it.

4. In any event it advances marxism, since nationalization really means communization or socialization. (To understand why nationalism, far from being the foe of marxism, as some leaders of the Veterans of Foreign Wars mistakenly believe, is bound by its nature to serve communism rather than freedom, send for a free reprint of our May 1950 editorial, "Nationalism Means Nationalization.")

Once Again. The free are paying in the Mideast for the divisions among the Americans, British, French and other democracies which did so much to bring on and prolong the 1929 depression and World War II, and the heavy losses suffered since then in China, Korea, Indo-China. Once again, and not for the last time, they are paying heavily to maintain the undemocratic dogma of unlimited national sovereignty, that each democracy should remain, in last analysis, a law unto itself, —retain the right to do itself precisely what it blames Egypt for doing at Suez. And once again attention in each major democracy is centered on the merits of its own policy and the faults of its fellow-democracies.

7 Facts the Free Dodge. When, for once, will the Atlantic democracies center their attention on the basic fault they all share? That fault is their blindness to these seven facts:

1. Differences of opinion—which are the strength of democracy where there is a common government to assure that the majority can act for the whole community in good time—are transformed into paralyzing divisions by national sovereignty in the Atlantic Community, because it lacks a common government.

2. National sovereignty will inevitably continue to produce these fatal divisions; the leagues and alliances based on it have never prevented them.

3. The one sure way to transform these paralyzing divisions into the healthy divisions of democracy is Federal Union.

4. Communism, unlike the Nazis, Japanese and Kaiser, can win by economic crash instead of war, and this is the key to its strategy in the Mideast.

5. Atlantica is much more vulnerable to paralyzing divisions on the economic than the military side; it has nothing in the former field to compare even with NATO and SHAPE.

6. There are exceptions to the "law that all change must be gradual" which democratic leaders so often cite to justify their snailishness. Crashes are not gradual.

7. Time is running out.—C. K. S.

Dulles Defers Atlantic Commission Idea

THE EISENHOWER Administration has let pass its last chance to begin this year to explore closer Atlantic unity not merely on the alliance level of diplomacy but also on the broader level that opens when citizens meet—as in the 1787 Convention that drafted the Federal Constitution—unhampered by official instructions. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee referred to it a proposal that the President follow this example by naming a citizens' Commission to explore the problem. (See September FREEDOM & UNION for text and comment.)

The Administration has answered by reaffirming its position on the previous, stronger version of the Atlantic Convention resolution. Secretary Dulles explained in a letter to us Sept. 7 it sought to avoid "the creation of confusion by seeming simultaneously to support two different approaches"—NATO's Committee of Three and the Commission idea. He added:

"Since the report of the Committee of Three Ministers has not yet been made, the Administration continues to be reluctant to support this other approach to the development of Atlantic unity. This by no means forecloses future consideration of it."

No Nip—Just a Canal. Clearly, all that Suez has shown already has not yet convinced the Administration that the Founding Fathers were right when they warned against the dangerous confusion inherent in diplomacy's alliances. It strains at a nip, and swallows a canal.

"Confusion" Won A-Bomb. Had this kind of thinking prevailed during the war, the free nations would never have won the race to make that atomic bomb. For it was won when citizen scientists, unhampered by official instructions, decided to take not one, or merely two but *four* different approaches to the problem simultaneously—run the risk of confusion, but not the risk of trusting all the eggs to one basket.

We hoped for better from the President who, when speaking in London July 3, 1951, of the smaller but similar problem of European unity, said:

"Any soldier contemplating this problem would be moved to express an opinion that it cannot be attacked successfully by slow infiltration, but only by direct and decisive assault, with all available means. The project faces the deadly danger of procrastination, timid measures, slow steps and cautious stages."

Arabs, Asians Rise in First U.N. Decade

By THOMAS J. HAMILTON
U.N. Correspondent, N.Y. Times

ALTHOUGH THE U.N. CELEBRATED its 10th birthday in San Francisco in June, the real dividing line will be the 1956 session of the General Assembly, which opens November 12. The three new members, Tunisia, Morocco, and the Sudan, will be admitted in the first day or two, thus confirming the revolutionary action of the Assembly and the Security Council last December, which approved the package deal for the election of 16 members. Thus the U.N., whose membership has remained at 60 ever since 1950 when the 60th member was elected, will reach an unprecedented 79.

This is a far cry from the first concept of the organization, under which the coalition which fought in W.W. II was to constitute a new League of Nations for the enforcement of peace. We are a long way from the days when the only way to get a ticket for admission to the San Francisco Conference was to break off diplomatic relations with the Axis powers.

Neither Germany nor Japan is yet a member, but Italy was part of the deal on the 16, and all the minor Axis satellites are now members. The U.N. is well on the road toward universal membership. Japan is still excluded under the theory that unless an enemy country has signed a peace treaty with all members of the U.N. group it doesn't deserve membership. The Soviet Union has not agreed to a treaty with Japan. Japan's ambition to become a member of polite society again is one of the reasons why most people think it will have to accept the Russian terms before the Assembly meets.

Also barred under the terms of the membership deal are rival governments claiming jurisdiction over divided countries—Germany, Korea, and Viet Nam. With the exception of these six, the phantom state of Outer Mongolia, and Switzerland (which refused to join the U.N.), all the sovereign states of the world are members.

Others who have been promised independence, or are likely to get it soon, such as Nigeria, Malaya, the Gold Coast, and Algeria, seem to be guaranteed election as soon as they cast off their colonial bonds.

(Of course, it can be said that 500 million or 600 million Chinese are not represented, since Chiang Kai-shek's writ is confined to Formosa. The Chinese Communist Government is not a member of the U.N. or its specialized agencies. This situation seems likely to continue unchanged until next year; certainly there will be no change before the American presidential election. The opening of the Assembly, which normally takes place in mid-September, was postponed two months to avoid such a development.

Within a couple of years it is likely that the membership will rise to 85. Even the present 76 members have created a problem for the space experts at U.N. Headquarters. The General Assembly Hall can handle them, and it has only been necessary to do away with the gold disks behind the rostrum; there was only room for 72.

The rooms for Assembly committees are the real headache, since each committee has in it a representative of every U.N. member. Even with 79 members the committee rooms will be crowded; if the total ever reaches 85 the problem will be much more difficult.

—*Scott Long, Minneapolis Tribune*

"You'll Have to Wait for the Next Show"

The change in the nature of the U.N. will be even more significant. The League of Nations was largely a European show, in which Britain and France played the dominant roles. The Soviet Union, Germany, and Italy might have disputed their preeminence but for the fact that the Russians did not join until 1934, while Hitler and Mussolini pulled out. The U.N. so far has been controlled by the U.S., which has relied on Western Europe, the British Commonwealth, and particularly the 20 votes of the Latin American countries. Since the Assembly resolutions on subjects of any importance require a two-thirds majority, the U.S., through its influence on the Latin Americans, had a veto in the Assembly that was almost as reliable as its veto in the Security Council.

All this has been changed. The Latin Americans have been reduced to little more than one-fourth of the voting strength, and their influence, and that of the U.S., has declined. The Asian-African bloc, including the countries to be admitted in November, will total 26. Together with the enlarged Soviet bloc of nine, Yugoslavia(which more and more is back on the old stand on U.N. issues), plus a few discontented western proteges, such as Greece, are now a majority.

Three immediate conclusions are clear.

1. Since both the Arab-Asian and Soviet blocs are anti-colonial, the U.N. is in the process of becoming an organization for the liquidation of the white man's political and economic influence. This tendency was noticeable from the first days of the U.N.; it is now unmistakable. The Suez Canal, Cyprus, and Algerian issues are likely to hold the stage at the coming sessions.

2. The intended functions of the U.N. as an agency for the enforcement of peace are virtually over. The anti-colonial countries are, with few exceptions, neutralists. It is impossible to conceive of the U.N., 1956 model, repeating the action it took on Korea six years ago.

3. The influence of the U.S. in the U.N. has greatly declined.

—*United Airlines*

Why is Atlantic air travel less than 1/50th of domestic volume? Airliner view on left shows it's not lack of good sleeping quarters, and other view proves language differences don't lessen the lure of the other side of the ocean. What's the answer, then?

[*Research Report*]

What Keeps Myriads from Flying Across the Atlantic

By DAVID MILLER

Planes have broken the ocean and the sound barriers—but not the barrier of national sovereignty. It keeps traffic down with red tape and high fares that could be halved, at least, by Atlantic Union; this would add greatly to travel.

AIR TRANSPORT, already one of the strongest material links connecting the nations of the Atlantic Community, promises to be of even greater importance in the future. Research shows that even now it could bring them closer together and serve their people in other ways much more than it does, were it not checked by a political barrier—national sovereignty. This keeps the Atlantic Community divided into more than a dozen nations.

The ocean barrier to air transport went down in the 1920's and 30's, the sound barrier was broken in the 40's, but the political barrier remains.

What this means may be seen by contrasting air transport in the politically divided Atlantic Community with its functioning in an area that is only less vast—the American Community where the people of 48 home-ruled States have entered the air age politically united in a Federal Union which governs such common affairs as interstate commerce and communications.

Three examples may show the high price paid by the people of the Atlantic community—Americans included—for maintaining in air transport the sovereign rights of their individual nation, instead of federating as the 48 States have dine in America. Consider:

A. When goods are shipped by air from New York to Los Angeles—across a dozen States or more—no export declarations are required. But goods shipped abroad by air from the U. S. now require annually the filling out of 8,340,000 of these export forms. This is but one instance of the mountains of needless red tape that national sovereignty creates in Atlantica.

B. The minimum air coach from New York to Los Angeles (about 2,500 miles) is $80. The comparable fare from New York to Paris (about 3,600 miles) is $310. The latter distance is about 40 per cent longer—but the fare is almost 400 per cent greater where national sovereignty enters.

C. In 1952, the number of passengers carried in flights within the 48 States was 25,009,815. In that same year, the number of passengers carried in North Atlantic flights (an area vastly larger and more populous than the U. S.) was 448,072. The two comparable figures for 1955 are 37-392,000 and 692,404. Again, national sovereignty's blighting influence.

It is true that the people of the federated American community have more money to spend on air travel (partly because of the many economic and other advantages of federal union) than do the people of the European half of the divided Atlantic Community. But national sovereignty manages in various ways to discourage even many Americans from flying abroad. The U. S. Department of Commerce and European tourist bureaus say the number of air travellers to Europe from the U. S. alone has not greatly increased in recent years, if one remembers the increased income and leisure Americans have gained.

In short, national sovereignty acts to impede Atlantic air communications and make it more costly by:

1. creating red tape,
2. keeping fares high, and thus,
3. depressing substantially the volume of Atlantic air traffic.

Information based on a survey by a task force of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) provides a few graphic ideas of how the paper work piles up at national borders. The task force was concerned with regulation of air traffic between the United States and other nations. Excerpts follow:

"It was estimated by the Task Force that the compilation of the [Passenger] Manifest costs the airlines over $330,000 per annum for operations into the U. S. No estimate was made of the cost to the Government which, as a result, handles

yearly 2,382,625 pieces of paper . . .

"In the U. S. the required number of copies of the Passenger Manifest is five . . .One extra copy of the Manifest per flight would mean another one-half million sheets of paper each year . . .

"The Task Force estimated that the presentation of [the list of stores] form for flights arriving in the U. S. costs the airlines $14,000 a year. Many countries require only an oral declaration of stores.

"Carriers at present must prepare a form of authority for consignees to clear consignments through customs . . . It was suggested that these forms should be rubber stamped with the release order. This simple change would eliminate 1,000,000 forms and save the airlines over $200,000 a year.

"An outstanding example of a form being required unnecessarily is the shipper's export declaration. In the U. S., a copy of the declaration is given to three government departments, each department receiving in one year 8,340,000 forms . . . The Task Force, however, found that one of the departments concerned did not require the form for shipments under $100 value. This represents 2,500,000 unnecessary forms. If the other departments were to accept the same minimum valuation, over 7,000,000 forms a year would be saved . . .

"The Bureau of Customs undertook to introduce simplified procedures for in-bond shipments . . . The airlines estimate that those changes will save $150,000 a year to the industry.

Federation Cuts Red Tape

Virtually none of these forms are required for traffic between states of the United States, nor would they be required if the Atlantic Nations formed a federal union. While it would be wrong to say that Atlantic Union would eliminate all red tape, it seems certain it would do away with a basic condition which is responsible for much present "paperfluousness."

Other problems caused by national borders, as reported by the IATA, center around Air Traffic Control Centers. These are created to conform with national boundaries and with little regard for the needs of aircraft operation. The result is that the control areas are often excessively small and unrelated to route patterns and require excessive transfer of information among the centers. This is expected to get worse as aircraft speeds increase.

Another problem caused by creating control areas along national boundaries is seen in Ireland. There, through planes not intending to land must circumnavigate the country, wasting time and fuel. Finally, the IATA points out, national customs regulations prevent or hamper the pooling of spare parts among airlines, and this raises costs.

None of these problems occurs in the entire U. S. where there is a single federal control. Nor would they exist in a federated Atlantica.

So much for the red tape that hampers Atlantic air communications. What about fares?

Offers $145 Transatlantic Fare

In recent months Trans-American Airlines (formerly North American) has sought to establish regular services from the U. S. east coast to Luxembourg, with one-way fares of $145 to $158. These are far below the $310 New York-Paris fare cited earlier in this article, and they have served to call attention to what seems to be an inflated fare structure. Trans American is the non-scheduled U. S. airline which led the way in creating domestic low-cost air travel by offering a coast-to-coast fare of $80, a rate later accepted by the scheduled airlines. In discussing the proposed rates, Trans American's J. B. Lewin said:

"Allowing for certain higher costs involved in international operations [presumably including the red tape described above], Trans American is confident that aircoach service can be made available at a fare of four cents per mile. While this is about 30 per cent higher than domestic fares, it would constitute a reduction of 43 to 53 per cent in existing transatlantic aircoach fares."

(IATA is a non-governmental organization to which almost all scheduled airlines belong. Its rates are usually accepted by the U. S. and other governments of member lines and it has thus become a quasi-official rate-making body in the international field. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) regulates U. S. domestic rates.)

Concerning Pan American's request to IATA that rates be lowered, President Juan Trippe said:

"The number of Americans traveling by air would increase 50 per cent soon after the low air fare service became available. Tourist expenditures abroad are now the most important factor in American foreign trade; in fact, tourist expenditures abroad last year permitted friendly governments to earn a billion and a half dollars with which to purchase American-manufactured goods and farm products. **Low fare air service and a great expansion of tourist travel abroad would become, in the critical years ahead, the most important single contribution to the growing economic strength and mutual understanding of the free world."**

Agreeing with this in principle, CAB said in May, 1955:

"We have concluded that the public interest requires a liberalization of our policy in this area. This liberalization will make it possible for groups of people who would not otherwise be in a position to do so, to obtain the advantages of foreign travel so helpful to the development of better international understanding."

Air fares and traffic volumes are closely linked. What is the volume of North Atlantic air traffic now and what might it become if fares were to be substantially reduced?

Figures supplied by the IATA indicate that in 1955, North Atlantic scheduled lines carried 692,404 passengers. The comparable figure in 1952 was 448,072. That amounts to an increase for the three-year period of a little more than 30 per cent, or about 10 per cent a year.

There is a feeling, at least in the U. S., that rates could be cut to a level which would remain profitable while increasing U. S. transatlantic volume by 50 or even by 100 per cent. The two estimates are those Pan American and Trans American respectively quoted in support of their proposed rates.

Trans American says that if the U. S. air passenger volume abroad were to be doubled, dollar exports to Europe in the form of tourist expenditures would increase from the 1955 level of $600,000,000 to $1,200,000,000 annually.

Some effort has been made to reduce fares. While the IATA refused to accept the rates proposed by Pan American, it did make rate revision recommendations in June. The IATA says that proposed rates (to take effect Oct. 1 if members' governments agree) amount to a 20 per cent reduction.

However, in analyzing the proposals, Paul J. C. Friedlander said in *The New York Times* on July 1:

"A study of the proposed new tariffs shows that there will be some marked increases in first-class fares, and that the present off-season (Nov. 1 to March 30) reduced rate fares will be abandoned this Fall. And, paradoxically, two adults can go to Europe under the present tourist-class family plan more cheaply than they will be able to under the new and supposedly sharply reduced 15-day excursion rate."

Meanwhile, Trans American—which as a non-member of IATA does not need its permission to offer sharply reduced rates—has been unable to gain approval from the CAB to try them out on an experimental basis and without the government subsidy received by the scheduled airlines.

If there is a mass air market to be reached, why are IATA's member airlines not adjusting rates to reach it? An important part of the answer was given in testimony before a House Committee investigating airline practices. The following dialogue took place between Sir Percival Hildreth, IATA's director general, and Representative James M. Quigley (D. Penn.) a member of the Committee. After the latter inquired about the great discrepancy between the fare of $80 from New York to Los Angeles and the $310 fare from New York to Paris:

HILDRETH: The answer is that the terrific dvelopments here, the expert skill, has produced a wonderful thing. I hope we can match it, but give us a chance.

QUIGLEY: Do they suddenly lose their expertness when they get out over the Atlantic?

HILDRETH: No sir. I think that is not quite a fair question, you see. **In the States, one country, no currency problems, one control and an enlightened one at that—the nation with its high standard of living demands this great development. On the Atlantic, you are not dealing just with the Americans. It is conceivable that if the whole Atlantic traffic were in the hands of four or five Americans, you might—God forgive me for saying this, but I am trying to be honest—you might get a more efficient thing, because after all, if you get a little airline flying because their government wants the prestige of a flag line, and you get a lot of them, little ones, you do not get quite the same degree of efficiency."**

—*British Overseas Airways Corporation*

Air passengers in 1955 within the 48 United States (160,000,000 population) totalled 37,392,000 while transatlantic traffic came to only 602,404, though 400,000,000 live in 15 Allied States of NATO. The two pictures illustrate this huge difference in volume. Many factors cause it; a major one is that Federal Union raises standard of living in U.S. while reducing air fares and red tape. Airline executives estimate Atlantic fares could profitably be cut 53 per cent and that this alone would double number of U.S. transatlantic passengers. But national sovereignty prevents this action.

Meanwhile *Aviation Daily* reported that the head of the French civil aviation administration, René Lemaire, told the IATA meeting last May that European governments could not permit rate competition on international flights. M. Lemaire was reported as saying that Europeans believe rate cuts should be delayed until jet transports are in service, indicating the jets would be cheaper to operate in reduced-fare service. He added that fleets of many of the European airlines are too small to give them the flexibility to compete on a three-class basis.

National sovereignty, it is evident, is a barrier to air communication in Atlantica which must be sealed with miles of red tape. It keeps inefficient airlines alive for reasons of national prestige. Its red tape and high fares combine to prevent air traffic in the Atlantic Community from reaching its potential volume. Airlines and governments pay in increased overhead and less business. Travellers pay in higher fares and slower travel, or by being unable to finance the trips of their dreams. Nations pay in reduced trade. Who gains?

Some Non-Federal Ways to Strengthen NATO

By BARBARA WARD

AT THIS STAGE of the discussion of a possible Atlantic Community, to argue the overwhelming necessity of it is the most vital task. . . . Yet even at this stage, it is not enough simply to state the arguments for closer association. The concrete steps needed in the advance towards union need also to be discussed, for it is difficult to raise enthusiasm or focus conviction about a disembodied ideal.

Yet here at the outset there is, it must be admitted, a sharp difference of approach. There are those who believe that nothing less will serve than an explicit federal constitution, dividing powers between the constituent states and the new federal authority, setting up central organs of government and enlarging elective processes to cover them.

Others, however, are equally convinced that what is sometimes called the "confederal" and functional approach to co-operation is the only possible line of advance. They envisage separate governments meeting together to agree on joint policies to cover specific problems or setting up inter-governmental agencies to carry on the joint policies upon which agreement has been reached. In fact, there are grave difficulties in the way of both methods.

The full federal approach has a rigidity and a finality that might scare away the timid and actually lessen the degree of rather fluid unity at present existing in the free world. Such indefinable yet valuable links as those which bind Britain to the new Asian dominions might be snapped and with them would go one of the main channels of communication between East and West.

One can conceive of new African dominions finding a place in the informal family of the Commonwealth. It is less easy to envisage them formally seeking admission to a White Man's Federation. Moreover, there is no doubt that government becomes more unpalatable as it grows farther and farther away from the reach of the individual citizen. In the United States there is widespread reaction against the encroachment of federal government because it is felt to be increasingly remote. How much greater would the risk be with a free-world authority, and with what care would the subjects it was competent to consider need to be delimited. A fixed and fully drafted federal constitution might add unbearably to the weight of government and to its inaccessibility to the ordinary citizen.

—*British Information Services*

Miss Ward, wife of Sir Ronald Jackson, was assistant editor of the London Economist. Her books include "The West at Bay" and "Faith and Freedom."

On the other hand, inter-governmental arrangements do not strictly transcend sovereignty and must remain at the mercy of shifting national sentiment. They are not incorporated in lasting institutions and although the Commonwealth is a magnificent example of how much genuine co-operation can be secured in the almost total absence of machinery and in the strictest recognition of national sovereignty, nevertheless the Commonwealth has evolved from an earlier period of close attachment and of subordination to a single centre and it is not likely that so indefinable a relationship of goodwill and forebearance could be built up between nations some of which had fought each other repeatedly.

It is perhaps the institutional argument that is decisive. There is no doubt that once an order of ideas has received embodiment in institutions to which authority is attached, the ideas have a lasting power, and a power of imposing themselves which no shifting arrangements can equal. If there is no formal instrument of sovereignty higher than the nation, then, in a real sense, our world will remain an anarchy of nation states. For this reason it is the view of the present writer that, in spite of all the difficulties and drawbacks, the federal approach to free world union is the one most likely to produce the final result.

There may, however, be a halfway house between the federal and the confederal approach which goes further than simple inter-government co-operation and can act as a practical preparation and education for federal association. The nations may also find, in practising it, that a full federal constitution is too rigid an instrument for a community as wide as the world and that a looser system of states is practical.

This intermediate method may be called the Treaty System. Two functioning experiments are already in being and it should not be impossible to devise more. In the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the Schuman Pool for Coal and Steel in Western Europe, the contracting governments agree to abrogate their exclusive sovereignty in certain specific fields, and to transfer the administration of policy from a national to an international secretariat. These treaties are binding over a number of years and the areas they cover are, to a great extent, removed from the purview of governments.

Day-to-day administration is in the hands of an international body—the

permanent Council of NATO under its Secretary-General and the High Authority of the Schuman Pool. In addition, NATO is reinforced by a Military Standing Group in Washington on which Britain, the United States, and France are represented. Many supporters of NATO would like to see such a group set up to combine a common strategy in the field of foreign relations.

The subjects covered by NATO are in a sense more important than those with which the Schuman Pool is concerned. Security is at the very root of sovereignty. Yet in the case of NATO, the transfer of sovereignty is hardly complete. The Schuman Pool covers a narrower field, but in that field, the common market for coal and steel in Western Europe, its authority is absolute and purely international. It may well be that these two institutions, in the immediate future, hold the key to further advance.

In the field of security, for instance, it might be possible to apply to the Atlantic forces the principles proposed for the European Defence Community —that of a single Defence Minister, a common military budget, standardized equipment, and a complete transcending of nationality in the higher ranks and in the larger units of the army.

Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty empowers the signatories to explore means of creating more effective economic and cultural links between each other, and there can be no difficulty today, after the discussions of the last five or six years, in picking out those economic problems which can only be solved by international agreement and co-operation.

Admittedly, such co-operation calls for the greatest sacrifice from the U.S., for only in America is there any basis for the illusion that a government, acting singly, can determine its own economic future. The other Atlantic members know their dependence only too well, and know that the choice is between being violently affected by U. S. policies over which they have no control or of attempting to set up instruments of agreement. Yet even the U.S. must realize to some extent that although international co-operation may mean some loss of control, it is at least rational and methodical, whereas complete national sovereignty means not unity, but an irrational and unpredictable loss of control—to plunging markets, to soaring prices, to cycles of boom and bust.

Provided this realization is strong enough to offset the deep distaste Congress—and not Congress alone—must feel for this sharing of responsibility, it is possible to envisage perhaps three Atlantic treaties covering trade and currency, investment and development, and commodities. These are the substance of all recent negotiations between the Atlantic Powers.

The contracting parties would agree to move towards the elimination of tariff barriers—possibly with an agreed time-table. They would accept measures for balancing their trade exchanges at the highest level—and not, as under the rules of non-discrimination—at the lowest. These measures would undoubtedly entail some assurances about the maintenance of high levels of employment—but clearly the whole economic stability of the Atlantic area depends on avoiding depression.

The contracting parties might also undertake to examine the plight of any area falling constantly into credit or debit in its international trade, and would undertake such measures in the field of investment and migration as would be necessary to reintroduce balance. This trade policy would automatically lead to the convertibility of currencies and eventually, perhaps, to a single monetary system.



Send for our Research Report No. 1, "How Atlantic Union Would Affect U.S. Economy," (16 pages) and No. 5, "Atlantic Union and World Trade" (32 pages) both by Louis Domeratzky—retired U. S. Department of Commerce expert. Single copies 25c, if ordered together, 35c for both.

The question of investment might be the subject of a separate Investment and Development Treaty. It would lay down the guarantees required by private international investment and would fix—possibly again as a proportion of national income—the amount of Governmental investment that might be made available for basic social investment—in transport, housing or utilities, for instance—which would hardly be forthcoming from private sources.

It is worth noticing that the principle of a contribution in direct grants from the wealthier to the poorer members of the free world community would be completely in keeping with the aim of reproducing in international relations the stability of domestic society. It can be argued that progressive taxation has done more than anything else to defeat Marx's forecasts of the collapse of Western society. It is the essential instrument of the Welfare State. Its extension to the international scene is almost certainly an absolute pre-condition of establishing the rule of law and the protection of law courts and police in the lawless world of sovereign States.

Further treaties—to cover the production, price stability and in some cases the allocation of basic world commodities—would no doubt be necessary.

The treaty system leaves open the question of political organs of association. The NATO approach—and indeed that of the Commonwealth—is that of regular conferences between heads of States and between Foreign and Finance Ministers. Reinforced by the treaty system, they might come to operate as an embryo federal cabinet. At least they would be doing the work that would fall to one. Whether or not more formal and elective political organizations should be established would depend upon the growth and strength of federal sentiment in the Atlantic Community at large. One advantage of a slowly evolving treaty system is that it would not entail sudden breaches with existing forms of international associations. The signatories would continue their work in the U. N. but would do so the more effectively in sharing a

common approach to the great issues of the day. They would be, in a sense, the first sketch of a political party in the parliament of man.

The special relationships of Britain with the Commonwealth and of the U. S. A. with Latin America need not be unduly disturbed. The Sterling Area is far more likely to be disrupted by the failure of sterling to become convertible and of trade to expand than by measures of consolidation which link sterling securely with the Dollar Area. And although many of the new Dominions may not be parties to the proposed treaties, the organs of consultation between them and London will remain intact and they, too, will not be unduly disturbed by a strengthening of the economic position of the West.

In military affairs, they will continue, no doubt, to practise their preferred policy of neutrality, but their security wil not be endangered if Western defence is more effective than it is at present. Nor will their tendency to fear impulsive American action be increased if a measure of international control is extended over all Atlantic forces. In this way, the erection of closer and more explicit links within the Atlantic Community need not disrupt the informal ties holding the free world in some sort of unity.

Yet whatever the elaboration of possible ways and means of selling Atlantic co-operation, it remains true that no precise formulation, this way or that, of institutions, will call an Atlantic Community into being. Atlantic unity can come only from a political will strong enough to overcome the free world's instinctive bias towards the anarchy of complete national sovereignty. With almost the single exception of the Thirteen American Colonies—and they with their common speech and tradition are a special case—the cause of unity by agreement has been lost, and when unity comes at last, it comes in the guise of a unifying conqueror—the Romans who enforced in Greece a unity the Greeks could not agree to among themselves, the Spaniards, who brought the unity of oppression to Italy. The chances of history are against the establishment of an Atlantic Community, and those who preach distrust, dislike, division, and national self-sufficiency can console themselves that they have all the weight of tradition and inertia on their side.

And yet there is, in Western history, an unquenchable spirit of innovation. The mightiest discoveries about man and nature have been made in the West and the boldest experiments in living and governing and working. Even if the forces behind our status quo of anarchy are strong, Western man has shown a unique capacity for breaking out of the crust of custom and seeing his world and his institutions with new eyes.

After the mindless upheavals of two great world wars—the second underlining the futility of the first by its almost exact repetition of it—it does not take much imagination to feel that the world is spinning in a vicious spiral of sovereignty from which only the transcendence of sovereignty can set it free.

Those who support Atlantic Union can at least feel that they belong with the pioneers of the West and that their vision, if it succeeds, will not only release mankind from the prison of exclusive nationhood, but add a new dimension to human society and even perhaps achieve the first practical realisation of the unity of man.

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[Atlantic Editorials of the Month]

Toward Atlantic Unity

St. Louis Post-Dispatch:

REMEMBER THE BOOK *Union Now?* The struggle for Atlantic Union or at least for more Atlantic unity, proceeds year after year under the leadership of author Clarence K. Streit. And this year the issue was stretched from a Senate committee to the White House itself.

Senate Resolution 12, sponsored by Senator Humphrey of Minnesota, urged the President to name a committee of private citizens to meet with citizens from other NATO countries to explore ways of achieving better unity in the Atlantic community.

In the last days of the Congressional session, Mr. Streit appealed to President Eisenhower to call for speedy and bipartisan consideration of this proposal. The President promptly replied that since his Administration was co-operating with an official committee named by the North Atlantic Council, he did not wish to seem to support at one time two different projects which had the same intent.

Mr. Streit's main appeal went somewhat neglected. For he had argued the advisibility of a study by *private* citizens who, since they could not commit anyone, would also be able to explore Atlantic unity the more freely.

Nevertheless, his efforts had one reward. While the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not act on the Senate resolution, it took the unprecedented step of bringing the proposal to the attention of the Secretary of State. The Administration could on its own initiative do what the resolution suggests. This is a long way from "union now," but the continuing and joint effort to bring the Atlantic democracies closer together can proceed along many lines.

Walla Walla Union Bulletin

THE ATLANTIC EXPLORATORY Resolution was not acted upon by Congress at its recent session. However, the failure is not to be interpreted as being caused by any lack of interest among congressional and administration leaders.

President Eisenhower's position on the matter of Atlantic Union is that he desires to avoid "creating confusion" by "seeming simultaneously to support two different concepts of Atlantic unity." However, the President, in a letter to Clarence Streit, of the Atlantic Union Committee, said: "This by no means forecloses future consideration of the alternative you support."

Actually, the only issue between the two approaches has to do with the method of representation. Plans for NATO studies of the question would be confined largely to the official, diplomatic level. The latest revision of the Atlantic Exploratory Convention resolution calls for appointment of a commission of private individuals from this country to meet with similar groups from other NATO countries, so that citizen delegates with no official instructions can explore freely all the possibilities of co-operation without committing anyone to anything. In a world no closer than ever to a lasting peace, such common action would appear to be the only possible hope for mankind.

[Letter from London]

U.K. Feels Let Down on Suez

By KENNETH HARRIS
An Editor of the London Observer

IT HAS BEEN A LONG TIME since people in this country have been so conscious that the say-so about a vital British problem has somehow passed largely out of their hands. Britons have a feeling that somehow Britain isn't going to be allowed to deal with the Suez problem on its own.

In the first ten days after Premier Nasser's coup, the main topic of conversation in Britain was whether or not there would be war. A month later people felt that war was at least a considerable way off.

All that people here seem sure of now is that there is going to be a lot of talk and little real action. The more thoughtful Briton seems to think that some kind of settlement will emerge rather unsteadily under pressure from both sides, a settlement which will not preserve much of the status quo and will go a good way toward giving Egypt at least the substance of what it wants. Nobody seems to have more than a hazy idea of what the settlement might be. And one senses a certain relief in the tones in which people—even powerful people—express their vagueness.

My personal feeling is that two things have happened which have had some effect and may have more. Most people I talked to after the first ten days seemed to think that the British government may have been a bit too tough in what it initially said and did, and that several of our newspapers, including the influential and usually statesmanlike *Times*, may have started beating the drum a bit too soon. Some say, however, that the Government's apparent bellicosity, and the gunboatism of some of our newspapers had a most salutatory effect: Public opinion, which might have boiled up in anti-Nasser jingoism, reacted strongly against the pace set by the Government and the press, and remained comparatively calm and discriminating.

The other thing I am conscious of is a marked decrease in the public ill-feeling inspired by Nasser personally. Some newspaper stories at first represented him as another Hitler. Others told of concentration camps and torture chambers in the Sahara and roused a great deal of anti-Egyptian feeling. The temperate tone of the statements put out by the Egyptian Embassy, and Nasser's behavior on some television programs screened here, helped allay this. Most people in this country have little use for the Egyptians right now; but I think they are not as angry about what they have done as some of our newspapers suggest. I don't believe many people now put Nasser personally in the same class with Hitler.

"Anything in Sight Yet?"

With Egypt and Suez so much in the news here, practically every other country failed to get a look in. The one exception was the U. S. This was probably because of the tremendous interest here in the role (much praised on the whole) which Secretary of State Dulles took in the conference. But the main American news came from the party conventions.

The Republican Convention surprised nobody, I suppose, though it did not altogether please many. Everybody here is for Ike, of course, well or ill, but Vice-President Nixon has few admirers. Britons seem to be largely anti-Nixon. The great number of people I have heard discuss him feel that his face reminds them of some of the men around Hitler, and that his personality seems to go with the face. It seems to me a pity that appearance and manner should so disqualify a man in a foreign country which has no opportunity to get to know his true qualities.

President Eisenhower's personal prestige and popularity here are as constant as ever. People who saw tele-recordings of him speaking at the convention, however, were shocked. To them it seemed that his health had deteriorated sadly since his illness; he appeared to have aged ten years.

In spite of the efforts of our correspondents, few people I talked to in London could regard the Democratic nomination for President but a foregone conclusion. Everybody is delighted that Adlai Stevenson won; if he hadn't, America's reputation for sense and sensibility would have sustained a grave blow in Britain.

Senator Kefauver's elevation to the ticket was also very popular here. Few Britons know enough about what he says and how he says it to be more than emotionally in his favor. All that most of us know is that he married a girl whose folks live in Glasgow, fought a sensational campaign against corruption, has a big, friendly smile under big, horn-rimmed spectacles, is a sticker, and an internationalist. He could do pretty well over here on that record.

We thought that 1952 had proved that the American people were crazy about politics on TV. Some of us Britons thought that perhaps General Motors or another big company would try to sponsor a couple of conventions every month. Now, according to reports here, Americans don't care for political conventions on TV. This rather fits in with *our* own experience with televised politics. The top rating for the programs televised during the general election of 1955 was only 14 per cent of the possible viewing public. Right now it seems as if the two peoples look at politics on TV rather more similarly than had been supposed.

Freedom & Union is 10 -



October 1946

July 1947 (above) June 1948 (below)



TEN YEARS AGO FREEDOM & UNION was born. Let us look anew at our field, our philosophy, our primary practical purpose for the present, and our progress.

*

We have taken for field the vast one implicit in our name, FREEDOM & UNION.

*

What do we, what do you, mean by freedom? by union by freedom-and-union?

*

When you think of freedom, whose freedom do you think of? That of the God-made individual person, or that of the man-made individual "person"—the nation or tribe—which individuals form when they unite politically in a John Bull or Uncle Sam?

*

Would you say that when you think of freedom you put first individual liberty? That would be a natural thought for any person. But, alas, people—even the most "freedom-loving" and enlightened people—are far more willing to sacrifice to maintain the freedom, the "sovereignty" of their nation, than their own individual freedom and sovereignty. Of course, they confuse the two. They think they are putting individual liberty first by putting national sovereignty first. Else they would not sacrifice so much of the former to the latter in taxes, jobs, markets, even life itself . . when all this could be saved by union —union of the free for even greater freedom.

* * *

This magaizne was born to explore, develop, teach and apply practically the way of life embodied in its name.

*

The individual and society—what is their true relation? How are they to be fiitted better together? Practically? Theoretically? This is man's eternal basic problem, all through his rise from the cave to the cosmos. He faces it in the two sexes, in the family they form, in the tribe, nation, and in the coming union of the free.

*

Union without freedom is tyranny, has always been tyranny, from the cave family to communism now. But freedom without union—whether in a community of persons, tribes, or nations—is anarchy, and will always bring the evils of anarchy.

*

Human freedom and human union when worshipped separately—as they are too often—are Molochs, each of whom devours its worshippers.



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

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

) - Its Purpose and Progress



February 1956

Freedom *and* union together—that is the ideal. How best to unite them is the immortal issue facing man.

*

To see freedom and union not as two irreconcilables, but as a couple, as two great truths to be married lovingly, fruitfully—this is the way of life that leads to man's vast future. It is the mother lode of greater golden ages. It is the philosophy that *Freedom & UNION* was named for, and seeks to make ever clearer.

* * *

Atlantic Union is to us the most urgent practical application of our philosophy. In the past 10 years what progress has been made toward it!

*

When we started, even the freest men deemed it more important that nations should be "peace-loving" than that they should love, and practice freedom. Even the Atlanticans did not recognize any community of spirit among them—any "Atlantic community."

We already have an Atlantic Pact, an Atlantic Council, an Atlantic Command, an Atlantic Parliamentary Conference, and Atlantic Union Committees. Repeatedly in recent months the Administration has talked of the "Atlantic Community" and the President has called the U.S. contribution to its development "of the utmost importance." A committee of Three of NATO's ablest, most union-minded members is exploring now how to unite more closely. The NATO Council is to act on this recommendation in December. On the day I write this—Sept. 17, anniversary of the signing of the Federal Constitution—the Committee is hearing in Paris the views of the U.S. government on this problem.

The proposed Convention to explore Atlantic Union which we have urged from our first issue has made immense progress, especially in recent years. Its leading champion in Congress, Senator Kefauver, is now Democratic nominee for Vice President. We still race with catastrophe—but are gaining ground.

* * *

With gratitude and pride we present in the following pages some birthday greetings. Spurred by them we shall continue to carry on the spirit of the American, English, French Revolutions.

The progress achieved in the past 10 years by our principles and practical policies makes one feel confident that in the next 10 years the Atlantic democracies will cross the Rubicon that separates alliance and federation, war and peace.—CLARENCE STREIT.



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

July 1953 (below) July 1954 (above)

October 1951

November 1952

Our Aim as Stated in Vol. I No. I

Volume I, No. 1 of Freedom & Union began with a policy statement which we reprint now somewhat condensed.

"I ENTERTAIN A high idea of the utility of periodical Publications . . . I consider such easy vehicles of knowledge more happily calculated than any other to preserve the liberty, stimulate the industry and ameliorate the morals of an enlightened and free people." George Washington wrote these words to Mathew C. Carey on June 25, 1788. On that day Virginia ratified the Federal Constitution 89 to 79, despite Patrick Henry.

Better than anyone, Washington knew that Virginia's vote would be decisive in his 13-year fight for freedom through union of the free. In 1775 he had stood out against the majority of colonists who preferred to appease the king, who sought peace through union of liberty and tyranny at the sacrifice of freedom. He had led the war for liberty. When it was won and disunion with tyranny was achieved, the majority of his fellow victors sought liberty and peace in more disunion even of the free—or nothing tighter than confederation to hold the 13 states together. Washington had led the campaign then against that folly, had fathered the world's first attempt to unite the people of free states through federal union. But there could be no Union if the most powerful of the 13 democracies, his own Virginia, rejected the Federal Constitution. None knew better than Washington how near to ruin his whole life's work was on June 25, 1788 . . . the day when he took time to stress the importance of periodicals.

In the same letter he wrote that he "could heartily desire" that "Magazines . . . might be spread through every city, town and village in America." That wish has been realized. Men far less burdened than Washington complain now that there are too many magazines.

No Magazine in Our Field

And yet, how many magazines today take for their special field the one that made George Washington desire them spread throughout the land of the free . . . the problem, the conflict, the cause of liberty & union? . . . In all the multiplicity of magazines, how many do you find devoted principally to information, opinion or discussion of the principles of freedom & union? Is there one such periodical among all those that go to every village in America? If there were one that reached them all, it would not be spread wide enough today.

Since 1788 the principles of liberty & union have spread far beyond the strip of western Atlantic coast they then held. They now rule democracies all around the North Atlantic . . . Scandinavia, the far-flung British Commonwealth, Eire, Holland, Belgium, France, Switzerland. They have made that central waterway what the Mediterranean was in the time of Rome, the civilizing sea. Here lies the Atlantis that is not lost, that has not yet found itself, that is a community already but not yet a state. . . . The land of the free is divided in a dozen Atlantic countries, but no magazine today concentrates on serving liberty & union through this area, seeks to speed the step from community to country . . . reaches one in 10,000 of the small fraction of mankind that has known freedom. . . . even 30 years.

If Washington was right about the need of periodicals for liberty & union, is it then so surprising that the free today are in a state of such confusion, frustration, discouragement and division? Even Churchill felt the need of tools.

And so, we add FREEDOM & UNION to the multitude of magazines . . .

To See Time as a Whole

We find the press and radio today much too fascinated with only one element in Time—the Present. This concentration on Time's most fleeting, ephemeral and tensest tense—on the day, the week, the month—gives the mind no depth, the heart no direction, the judgment no foundation or standard of values, the senses no perspective, and life no stability, poise or purpose. It deludes men into believing that flotsam and jetsam are freighted ocean liners. It makes men easy victims of mass hysteria. Yet it gives them no real sense of urgency, no wise awareness of the deadlines and the tides there are in the affairs of men.

The Present is important, exciting, rich in interest, but so are the Past and Future. FREEDOM & UNION will try to keep them all in mind, see Time as a whole. The world we live in is not only wider than the widest nation, it is deeper than the day or month or year, it draws its food both from the ground and air, its leaves go higher, higher as its roots go further down . . . and in it there are times to plant and times to harvest. That is the world we hope to keep before you.

How shall mankind avoid the looming war . . . grow in soul as in science . . . save liberty from chaos & dictatorship? These questions together form man's world problem now.

FREEDOM & UNION will do more than inform you concisely of important facts and trends in this vital field. We shall 1) report diverging or conflicting views 2) give our own views, 3) try to bring the "world" nearer to you personally, make it more entertaining, more human and humane. . . .

FREEDOM & UNION itself will champion the principle of individual liberty, equality and fraternity through an ever peacefully expanding federal union of the free, beginning with the new Atlantis. We shall tackle the emotional as well as the structural and practical problems of such federalism today. We shall teach the federal union philosophy that seeks freedom, peace and prosperity and . . . *yes* . . . heaven on earth . . . through faith in individual man, and also through the dynamic balancing of opposite forces: Individual liberty and union, local and central government, private and public enterprise, the practical and the ideal. . . . This may indicate how vast is the philosophy of federal union. We aim, also, to develop an ever deeper sense of community loyalty among the people of all nationalities who practice individual liberty, a "Bill of Rights" patriotism.

We shall seek to show why individual liberty is the surest guarantee of peace . . . how civil liberty makes for high production and high standards . . . why federal union of the freest peoples is the best safeguard for liberty, and therefore of peace and prosperity . . . how such union can be worked out structurally and practically . . . how it would solve or affect current world political, economic, financial, labor and other problems. We shall expose the dangers to peace and freedom wherever we find them, not only in totalitarianism but in imperialism, nationalism, racism and other discriminatory dogmas based on birth, in security-ism and in materialism.

We believe the spiritual has been neglected far too much in our field. Indeed, in every field people seem today as tongue-tied about their soul as they were about their sex when we were a child. We shall do our part in breaking down this new taboo. Every month under the heading, "The Human Venture," we shall consider the things of the spirit.

Faith and work can do more than move mountains. Creative faith, we affirm, can at long last create the kind of world that is the ideal of man, whether black, brown, red, white or yellow, and has been ever since the soul began changing a brute into a brother.

Faith . . . with work. And so to work.

—C.K.S.

John, Jean & Johann Q. Visit SHAPE in Droves

Group visits to SHAPE in a typical summer month included: Rotary Club of Paris (70 persons) Sherwood Eddy Seminar (74); French consultants at U. S. air bases (30); American Federation of Teachers (20); Branting Institute (46); French Reserve officers (27); Federation of Insurance Companies (20); British Atlantic Committee; Canadian students, Trinity College, Ontario (62); U. S. teachers group; Congressional Medal of Honor holders.

Atlantic Leaders Greet Freedom & Union on 10th Birthday

John Foster Dulles, SECRETARY OF STATE:

I note that *Freedom & Union* is celebrating its tenth anniversary this autumn. Throughout this decade I have been a reader of this publication and have found it stimulating and constructive. I strongly believe in the need for growing cooperation as between members of the Atlantic community.

Senator Estes Kefauver, DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE FOR VICE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES:

I am happy to extend best wishes to *Freedom & Union* on the tenth year of its publication. *Freedom & Union* has done much to inform and enlighten its readers on Atlantic Union, and I wish for it continuing success.

Henri Bonnet, FORMER FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES:

If the democratic nations want to prevent other nations, which are still free today, from despairing and giving up liberty, they must eradicate the doubts that the totalitarian countries try to cast on their future. There is no better way to attain that goal than to foster, within the Atlantic community, an ever-growing solidarity between the U. S. and a United Western Europe.

Senator Karl E. Mundt, REPUBLICAN, SOUTH DAKOTA:

Freedom & Union is entitled to generous congratulations on the part of all peace loving Americans on the occasion of its tenth anniversary. The emphasis placed on the plans and programs for peace in every monthly issue provides inspiration for many Americans and contributes both to the determination and ability of this country to continue to lead the world forward on the paths of peace. Somehow or other the world must learn to live together without war and the candle of hope which *Freedom & Union* continues to hold aloft is among the beacon lights which help to spark the hopes and stimulate the plans of those who believe that peace can be permanently preserved.

CLARE BOOTHE LUCE, U. S. AMBASSADOR TO ITALY:

Congratulations to *Freedom & Union* on its Tenth Birthday!

Freedom & Union is a publication inspired by a creative and powerful idea, the serious discussion of which is most pertinent to our times. In the world in which we live, survival itself depends on



greater and more effective unity of Western policies and actions. The best, perhaps the only, certainty we have of avoiding the piecemeal destruction of the free world lies in our ability to concert with the greatest extent possible our goals and methods.

Under your long and dedicated leadership the great ideas of freedom and union now inspiring the magazine have increasingly become ideas upon which all men of good will must seriously, indeed prayerfully, meditate.

Lord Ismay, SECRETARY GENERAL, NATO:

For ten vital years *Freedom & Union* has championed the cause of Atlantic unity with vigor, foresight, and courage. Never was this unity more essential than it is today. I am therefore delighted to have the opportunity of sending my warmest congratulations to my good friend, Clarence Streit, and his colleagues on this, the tenth anniversary of their magazine, and to offer them my best wishes for their continued success.

Sir Roger Makins, FORMER BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES:

The survival of the free world in the last two decades has depended upon the ever growing unity and understanding between the free nations. Every effort to foster their cooperation it to be applauded. In explaining what is being done and in exploring new possibilities, *Freedom & Union* has been working manfully for the strengthening of the Atlantic community.

George W. Perkins, U. S. AMBASSADOR AND REPRESENTATIVE ON NATO COUNCIL:

I have found your magazine to be most interesting and look forward to reading it in the future. I trust that the unity among the nations of the Atlantic Community which we so fervently desire will continue to be strengthened so that it may become an even firmer bulwark of freedom and may continue to be a source of peace and understanding among nations.

Ernest K. Lindley, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON BUREAU, NEWSWEEK:

I congratulate *Freedom & Union* on its tenth birthday. The role of the explorer and trail blazer is not easy. It requires imagination, courage, and tenacity. Over the decade, you have demonstrated all of these qualities.



General of the Army George C. Marshall, FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE:

I am glad to salute *Freedom & Union* on its tenth anniversary and am hopeful that it will enjoy many more years of success. Its accomplishments so far have been warmly recognized by many of our world leaders and I am sure that it will grow in stature as its principles become known.

Arthur Krock, WASHINGTON COLUMNIST FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES:

On your tenth anniversary, what I said in 1951 on the fifth anniversary of *Freedom & Union* is even more emphatically the truth as I see it.

"Whatever progress humanity has made toward enduring world order is due to the unselfish efforts of men like Clarence Streit. When he writes, 'danger and difficulty have always been the bread and butter of the soul,' he unconsciously pens his own epitaph—one to engender pride in disciples and hope in the oppressed and endangered."

Erland Waldenstrom, MANAGING DIRECTOR, SWEDISH IRON ORE EXPORT COMPANY:

Clarence Streit's long, patient, and keen struggle for a federal union of the Western world has my fullest admiration. I wish him every success in his continued attempt to get more and more people to understand the nature and the necessity of a political union, and I think we should all be grateful to him for his self-sacrificing work. The difficulties may still be enormous but the idea of bringing about a federal union will in the end be victorious.

Walter Hallstein, PERMANENT GENERAL SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC:

On the occasion of its tenth anniversary I wish to express my cordial congratulations to the editors and staff of *Freedom & Union.* May that outstanding publication and your own personal efforts continue to be successful in ensuring the ever-tightening unity of the Atlantic community.

Closer cooperation between the free peoples is now a dictate of self-preservation. The new political methods of the Soviets require a far-reaching harmonizing of all our policies—and not in the area of defense alone. Above all, the foreign policies of the free world must be coordinated more closely than has been the case in the past. The free nations will succeed in meeting the dangers of world communism and in preserving the peace if they are united in a genuine and firm solidarity not only in the military but also in the political, economic and cultural fields.

The United States have preceded us Europeans in setting the best of examples. Under their leadership the Atlantic alliance has progressively tightened to the point where today it has become the firm base of the relations between the peoples of the European and the American continents. For this achievement our sincere gratitude is due to the people and the government of the United States.

The Atlantic Community has made since its start a decisive contribution to the preservation of peace and freedom in the world. I am convinced that it will continue to be successful in achieving this objective as long as we stand together with courage and determination and jointly strive to remove the real causes of world tensions, which include the grievous partition of our country. In the great cause of preserving the peace, the German people and Federal Government feel as one with the United States and all free peoples of the world.

Representative Kenneth B. Keating, REPUBLICAN, NEW YORK:

A tenth anniversary is always a momentous occasion, but especially so when the event marks unparalleled achievement of a pioneer such as *Freedom & Union.* Your courageous trailblazing in a previously unexplored field has won the admiration and respect of all thinking men, whether they agree with you or not. By informing the pub-

Lester B. Pearson, CANADIAN SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS; MEMBER, NATO COMMITTEE OF THREE:

On the tenth anniversary of the publication of *Freedom & Union,* I am very happy to join in sending a message of goodwill and congratulation to you and to your colleagues.

Although wise and honest men may differ on the methods and on the appropriate timing of measures most likely to increase the sense of community and partnership among the North Atlantic nations, there can be no doubt that there has been a steadily increasing realization of the urgent necessity to create a closer and more comprehensive unity among these nations than that of the military alliances of the past.

To this new understanding and to the increasing awareness on this continent and elsewhere of our new responsibilities, and to our recognition of the clear fact that we of the Atlantic Community of Nations are all members one of another and that each of us best serves his interests by working together with his neighbors in close partnership, *Freedom & Union* has made a distinguished and important contribution.

lic concerning Federal Union you are doing much to advance that cause.

Needless to say, the success of this magazine is due in large measure to your realistic and able guidance . I am confident you will continue to adhere to the high ideals which prompted the founding of *Freedom & Union,* in order that the aims and principles of the cause for which you labor may gain wider recognition and understanding.

Halvard Lange, NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, MEMBER, NATO COMMITTEE OF THREE:

Since 1945 cooperation among the Atlantic nations has grown apace. Through a web of bilateral and multilateral agreements in various fields, the foundations for an Atlantic community have been laid. The OEEC and NATO, occupying a central spot in this picture, are examples, each in their own way, of the new and efficient type of intergovernmental cooperation on which the western democratic world can base its future. We need no longer fear that governments of the Atlantic nations arrive at important economic and political decisions without informing their allies.

Though great strides have been made in the post-war era in developing economic and military cooperation, the members of NATO agree on the necessity for a further intensification of the organization's work in the non-military field. It has been encouraging to note the powerful support for the Council's decision to this effect in all members.

I, for one, feel that as more attention and energy is devoted to such cooperation new perspectives for the Atlantic community will open and solidarity among our peoples will be further strengthened. If this world is to succeed, political leaders must have the backing of an intelligent, interested public opinion, as is expressed, for instance, in *Freedom & Union.*

We are not at a stage in the development towards an Atlantic community when it is necessary to consolidate the positions we have won and to prepare ourselves for a rapid expansion in new fields. Unless we have the people on our side, any structure we build will come tumbling down in the first storm.

I thank you, Mr. Streit, for your incessant contribution to a closer understanding between the Atlantic peoples, and I wish you continued success.

General Pierre Billotte, FORMER FRENCH MINISTER OF DEFENSE:

When they signed the North Atlantic Pact on April 4, 1949, the nations of the free world brought the danger of a third World War to a halt, perhaps permanently. But by having limited their contractual co-operation thus far only to a general war and to the limited dimensions of the Atlantic area, they have left the field wide open—everywhere else in the world—to aggression.

And so, either simultaneously or successively, we have witnessed in Korea, in Southeast Asia and in North Africa aggressions which took different forms but had the same origin and the same objective. Each of them shook the very foundations of the Atlantic structure. Now the political significance of the Suez crisis completely overshadows its technical aspects; this time an unsatisfactory settlement would undoubtedly deal a mortal blow to the Atlantic Treaty.

For ten years, with unfailing perspicacity, *Freedom & Union* has been constantly preaching the vital necessity of complete solidarity between the Atlantic nations in their common affairs everywhere in the world, and their need for not merely a military but also a political and economic organization in keeping with this concept of solidarity.

Thus, *Freedom & Union* points the way to the best, if not the only road to salvation for that part of the world which remains free, the only one good enough to meet the perils we face. Readers of *Freedom & Union* understand this. May the governments of Atlantic nations, in turn, understand it soon.

General Alfred M. Gruenther, SHAPE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:

It is a pleasure to congratulate *Freedom & Union* on its tenth anniversary. I want you to know how much we at SHAPE deeply appreciate the splendid effort the magazine has always afforded our effort within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to insure peace by building such strength that no military aggression, or coercion and intimidation backed by military power, could destroy our freedoms. Keep up the good work.

Stephen Chadwick, PAST NATIONAL COMMANDER, AMERICAN LEGION:

Like all movements for lasting peace which appeal to the sound intelligence and reason of men, progress toward freedom and union seems to its missionaries to be terrifying slow. Yet that dramatic progress is being made through continued education and the evangelism of your magazine none can deny.

Ten years is but a moment in the history of mankind. May your next ten years be even more fruitful.

Whitelaw Reid, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE:

President Eisenhower recently used Ibsen's words, "I hold that man is in the right who is most clearly in league with the future." It seems to me that it could be applied to no man or organization more aptly than to you and *Freedom & Union.* Clearly your whole work has been narrowed immeasurably between what the future holds and what the present requires for the North Atlantic Community. Heartfelt congratulations on the advances you have made in a cause so important to mankind.

We received more messages than space permits us to give in this issue. We shall publish the others in our November issue.—The Editors.

FREEDOM'S CRISIS

(Reprinted from the first issue of Freedom & Union, October 1946)

HOW SHALL we secure our freedom —your freedom, mine? We of the brood of Washington, Lafayette and Paine? Now in mid-twentieth century, when dictatorship rules more armed men in one country than it ever did in history? When all the massive machinery of production can be quickly geared to butchering the species that devised it . . . and talk of war is drowning talk of peace?

When men have learned how to burn alive myriads of babies, some in a flash and others slowly and invisibly from within? When men can learn this dread atomic secret much more readily than how to govern themselves in union, with freedom, equality, fraternity?

How shall we now preserve our freedom, we of the gasoline generation, now in the early electric era, at the dawn of the jet atomic age of the air? We of the brood of Franklin, Watt, Ampère . . . Faraday, Curie, Bell . . . Pasteur, Darwin and the Wrights? Now when distance is no more a thing of miles but of minutes, when the Old World and the New are closer than New York and Virginia were to George Washington?

Freedom has worse foes than foreigners. There is the enemy within the gates. Free constitutions and laws are more concerned with safeguarding freedom from domestic danger than from foreign invasion. And rightly so. Against autocracy from within, protective tariffs, vast air armadas, mighty fleets and armies are of no avail. Nor is the atomic weapon. Indeed, the greater the armed power at the government's command, the graver is the potential danger to our freedom from the insidious enemies who went to school and church with us . . . from the little Hitlers, Chamberlains, or Kerenskys that live on in each of us.

How shall we preserve our freedom when the devoted efforts of a Roosevelt to free the forgotten man end by saddling him the more with burdens they were meant to lift? When they load him with heavier taxes than rich men paid before? Vex him with a bewildering bureaucracy? Habituate him even in time of peace to ever greater governmental interference in his life, to ever greater concentration of power in the executive, and ever greater dependence of the citizen on the state? When victory, in a war for freedom from want and freedom from fear, leaves all the world a-shiver?

When every week seems to bring the government in some country some new power over the citizen? When nearly every measure—political, military, economic, financial, monetary, or social—that the free man is persuaded to adopt to make him independent of the foreigner ends by making him more dependent on his own government? When the lessons of Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Communist Russia are there to teach us that every powerful people that lost what rights of man it had, lost them to no foreign foe but invariably to a citizen who pandered to the passions of the people, and preached adoration of himself and hatred of the foreign and the few.

* * *

How shall we now "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity" that our constitutions were created to secure? We of the brood of Rousseau, Locke and Jefferson . . . Mill, Hamilton, de Tocqueville . . . Shelley, Hugo, Whitman . . . we of the brood of Abraham Lincoln? Now, when their names are invoked to inoculate the ignorant with the very evils they sought to free men from? Or when we are told that the principles they upheld are wrong, that individualism is decadent or is done for, what counts is the mass and not the man? When our young take liberty for granted instead of for a treasure that they must guard alertly and develop? When they hunger for a purpose and fail to find in freedom a cause worthy of their lives?

Freedom has other foes than men. It is beset by poverty, ignorance, disease, vicissitude, premature death.

How shall we now secure our liberty —political, economic, financial, material, social, intellectual, spiritual—against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and nature, too?

That is the question that troubles men these days wherever they have long practiced freedom—whether they call themselves Americans, British or French, Dutch, Belgians, Scandinavians or Swiss, Irish, Canadians, Australians, or New Zealanders.

That the free are increasingly concerned for their freedom is a cheering thing that offsets a horde of dangers. We must know what is dearest to us, before we can secure it. Confusion over what we really want is the thing that perhaps most frequently defeats us. For such confusion puts all our conscious power to seeking some counterfeit of our true desire. It divides us against ourselves, sets hand and mind against the heart, and thus brings us to nought. We have nothing to fear but confusion, and lack of faith in freedom and ourselves.

Some of the dangers that beset our freedom now are new, but most of them are old as man—and not so bad as those that men have overcome before. None but a coward, fool, or thoughtless man would say man's conquest of atomic energy faces human freedom with worse dangers than those man long ago confronted in the cave. Among the people who whine about the perils that plague modern man, who would prefer the sinister unknown that beset each man when his hand could not yet write and stones and clubs were his only weapons?

Like all that's good, freedom's crisis is eternal. But never did it offer greater opportunity than now. And men who lie yet in the womb of time shall think themselves ill-starred they were not here—until they learn we did what we shall do so they might do much more.

Here in FREEDOM & UNION, we shall tackle the problem of how to secure human liberty today, tackle it with anxiety, and yet without dismay. We thank God that these, too, are times that try men's souls. The soul that is never tried never knows its power, nor grows, nor even lives. Danger and difficulty have always been the bread and butter of the soul.

—COMMON SENSE, JR.

Our Family Album: 1946–56

Some pictures we published in our first 10 years, marking milestones on the road to Atlantic Union

Freedom & Union October 1946 —*Press Association*

Freedom & Union rst appeared Sept. 28, 1946—the 170th anniversary of the world's first constiutional guaranty of free speech, given in the Constitution Pennsylvania adopted Sept. 28, 1776. To mark this anniversary, and Freedom & Union's birth, Justice Owen J. Roberts, one of its editors, presented on its behalf that day an illuminated scroll to Lt. Gov. John C. Bell of Pennsylvania (left) in Independence Hall, home of both the Declaration that men make the State for their own Freedom and the Constitution of the first Federal Union of the Free in history.



F & U August 1947

Estes Kefauver—then a Congressman—as he looked when we first printed his picture (1947). Occasion was review of his "A Twentieth Century Congress"; book showed rare concern for improving Democratic governmental machinery which led him naturally to Atlantic Union.

In January, 1948, Federal Union held a conference in Louisville, Ky.; many urged political action, and Tennessean Lucius Burch boomed Kefauver for Senate. First senatorial candidate to endorse Atlantic Union aim, Kefauver attributed his 1948 victory over Crump machine to Memphis Citizens Committee of Seven—five of whom were active Federal Unionists, including leader, Edmund Orgill, (below, left) who was elected mayor of Memphis last year.

Brice Toole, Asst. U. S. Atty. General, Treasurer of Federal Union, died 1949, after writing, speaking 10 years for it.

Freedom & Union, March, 1948 —*Louisville Courrier-Journal*

Federal Union met in Louisville, Ky., 1948. Chm. and co-founder John Howard Ford (extr. rt.) died 1949. Others, l. to r.: Edmund Orgill, Lawrence Duncan, C. K. Streit



Freedom & Union September 1949 —*Acme*

Some founders of Atlantic Union Committee in 1949, all members of its first Board, tackle early problems that summer in New York. L. to r.: Arnaud Marts, George Shea, Jr., Hugh Moore, Edm. Orgill, Justice Owen J. Roberts, C. K. Streit, John Young, Walden Moore.

F & U Jan. 1950 —*International News Photo*

Dr. Harold C. Urey, the Nobel Prize atomic scientist, is a Federal Unionist since 1939; has been on AUC Board since its foundation.

Sen. Kefauver's election in 1948 led directly to Justice Roberts issuing invitation to the meeting which founded Atlantic Union Committee, Jan. 23, 1949, to push for Convention to explore Atlantic Federation, which Federal Union, publisher of Freedom & Union, has urged since Union Now readers founded it in 1939.

F & U Feb. 1951 —*F & U Photo*

Sen. Kefauver (r) & two co-sponsors who led in introducing Atlantic Union resolution in 1949 & 1951; left—Hale Boggs (D., La.) & Sen. Robt. Hendrickson (R., N.J.)



F & U May 1950 —*Wide World Photo*

Will Clayton, former Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and chairman of Anderson, Clayton & Co., has been vice-president of Atlantic Union Commitee since foundation, a tower of strength. He alone remains of its great original triumvirate—Justice Roberts, founder & President until he died, 1955, and Robt. Patterson (l.), former Secretary of War, its vice president until his death, 1952.



Late James Wadsworth, chief Republican Atlantic bill sponsor in House in 1949.



Freedom & Union July 1951 —F & U Photo

Two ex-Under-Secretaries of State, Grew (speaking) & Clayton with Goodyear Co. Chm. Litchfield (r) at 1st Atlantic Union Council Conference, Washington, 1951

Hearings on Atlantic Union resolution were held in 1950 by House Committee & Thomas sub-committee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee; with State Department negative they deferred decision. Meanwhile AUC grew with Robt. Bishop & then Richard Harless as director. More than fourth of both Houses, including Foster Dulles when Senator, endorsed resolution; 500 national leaders joined AUC Council, movement spread in U.S. & abroad.

Freedom & Union July 1951 —F & U Photo

Justice Roberts beams as ex-Under-Secretary of State Wm. Phillips gives Mrs. Chase Osborn "Councilwoman of Year" citation for "outstanding devotion" to Atlantic Union, 1951. At 1952 Ottawa AU session (below, l. to r.) Sen. Gouin (Can.), Rep. Leroy Johnson (U.S.) MPs Alastair Stewart & J. A. Burdette (Canada), Sen. Gilette and Justice Roberts (U.S.)

Freedom & Union June 1952 —Newton, Canada



F & U May 1956 —Harcourt

Firmin Roz—attired as Membre de l'Institut—wrote introduction to French edition of "Union Now," 1939, founded French Comite pour l'Union Atlantique, 1951, retired as its President in 1956 when 90. Gen. Billotte, former Defense Minister, has since then led French "Mouvement."



Freedom & Union, December 1951 —F & U Photo

Gov. Browning, Justice Roberts, former Memphis Congressman Chandler open giant "Union Now" as 160 delegates hold the first AUC Congress, Memphis, Nov. 2-4, 1951.



F & U Dec. 1954 —*Wide World Photo*

Speaker Robertson of Canadian Senate receiving 1954 AUC Atlantic Award from Justice Roberts, got Ottawa Senate to adopt Atlantic Union resolution, 1950. He fathered Nato Inter-Parliamentary Body, 1956.



—Green, Providence Journal

P. F. Brundage (L) co-incorporated Federal Union, 1940, helped found Freedom & Union, 1946; resigned as chairman, 1954, to be Eisenhower's Deputy Director of Budget. In April he became Director of U. S. Budget.

F & U Sept. 1952 —*British Information Service*

Sir Hartley Shawcross, ex-Attorney General, has headed British Friends of Atlantic Union since foundation, 1952, with Lord Tweedsmuir as Deputy Chairman. Herbert Agar did much to start this group.



F & U Jan. 1956 —*Painting by Oswald Birley*

Lionel Curtis, "prophet" of federalism, worked for it in British Empire since 1909, began urging it internationally in 1937 in his "World Order," backed "Union Now" at once, strove on till death, 1955.

Estes Kefauver, three years after he began pioneering in Senate for Convention to explore Atlantic Union, was runner-up for Democratic nomination for President. Violently attacked as "sacrificing sovereignty" through Atlantic Union, he easily won re-election to Senate, 1954. He led in 1955 in re-introducing Atlantic Convention resolution, which reached new heights. Now as V.P. nominee he is again proving "God's chillun got wings."

Meanwhile, AUC gained great men, as Gen. Marshall—but in 1955 mourned loss of Justice Roberts at 80. New AUC President, opinion poller Elmo Roper (below) was early Federal Unionist, co-founded AUC & contributed to our first issue. And so album ends all smiles as the next decade's pictures begin next month.

F & U Jan. 1956 —*Blackstone Studio*



Freedom & Union January 1953 —*F & U Photo*

At 1953 Buffalo Congress: (l to r) AUC Secretary ex-Ambassador Lithgow Osborne, Norwegian Minister Lange; Chm. AUC Executive Gerald Henry and Justice Roberts



THIS BOOK IN BRIEF

Chapter 1 of FREEDOM AGAINST ITSELF entitled, "What This Book is About"

THE UNDERLYING TENSION of our time lies within freedom itself, within us. This tension is preparing new disaster now. By prompt, right action we can still avoid danger—or keep it under control—and turn it to great good.

Today's lament is that political progress lags far behind scientific discovery and technical invention. What we overlook is this:

It is freedom that is causing this rapid advance of discovery and invention. And it is also freedom, or rather our faulty grasp of it, that at the same time is halting man's political and moral progress. We the free, we are the ones who have long been thus dividing freedom against itself, and bringing depression, dictatorship and war down upon us, and all mankind, again and again.

Let us look at our primary problem afresh. And let us begin by taking, and keeping the standpoint that men too seldom clearly take and carefully keep, the standpoint of their own individual freedom.

From this standpoint, the world is growing greater for each of us. Not smaller, as we often say.

We have discovered much that our forefathers did not know, but still we find our world increasingly hard to understand. We each want it governed peacefully, democratically, in the interests of the individual's life, liberty, happiness. But the more prodigious our inventions grow, the greater difficulty we find in harnessing their power to these, our major purposes. Our machines free us more and more from the host of things with which nature, as Hobbes found three hundred years ago, made "the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Yet we complain today as he did then that we live in "continual fear and danger of violent death."

The fault is not in our star, or world, but in ourselves. For generations now our freedom has been working simultaneously to pull men together and to pull them apart. While it unites them through the machines its inventiveness produces, it divides them by the political policies it favors. With its right hand it creates an Atlantic community; with its left it keeps this community ungoverned, a prey to anarchy. Worse—our machines that have helped form this community also serve, unavoidably, to arm dictatorship to destroy freedom and fill the vacuum caused by our refusal to constitute the needed international government.

The tension that results from this conflict of freedom against itself has long been tightening from both sides, more and more. It is bringing us nearer and nearer to catastrophe . . . when freedom—were its house united—could be bringing everyone an ever higher, safer, freer life.

It is this cleavage within freedom, this schizophrenia, that makes our world seem now so mad. Since freedom has no flesh or blood or personality save

TO SEE A BOOK AT A GLANCE

We call you here on an . . . adventure, on a voyage of discovery into space as yet uncharted.—ALLBUTT, *Introductory Address at St. George's Hospital, 1889.*

THIS BOOK GIVES ITS FINDINGS at the start instead of at the end. It would be wrong to infer, however, that I began with these conclusions and wrote the book to prove them. The fact is that the first chapter you read is the last one I wrote.

I have placed it first partly for your convenience, and partly because of long experience as an American newspaper correspondent. It teaches the advantage of giving in the leading paragraphs the main things the reporter has found, and then the supporting facts.

This method, which I followed in *Union Now*, has a special advantage in a book of this kind: It permits the reader to begin by seeing the work as a whole. We see at once all of a painting, statue, bridge, monument, however great it may be. We do not start as we do in most books, where we see one detail, and then another, and another, before gradually we grasp the book as a whole.

When we enter the Sainte Chapelle in Paris we cannot, of course, see all the beauty in it at first glance, even though we do see it at once as a whole. We see still more of it in the next few moments as the eye sweeps over its walls of stained-glass windows, with the sun bringing out the jewel they together form. But to see all the beauty stored in the Sainte Chapelle takes much more time—though not the time its creation took the thirteenth-century artists who, aware that God would see their work even in the darkest places, made it a mosaic of minor masterpieces. You need much more than one visit to see all this beauty. The Sainte Chapelle continues to reward you no matter how much time you give it.

It seems to me that an author should at least try his best to make his book reward the reader as quickly, completely and enduringly.

—From the Foreword of *Freedom Against Itself.*

that of the individual persons who are free, the cleavage is really in our own minds and hearts. We can cure this madness, but it is high time that we begin.

This volume offers no little evidence to support these conclusions.

This book is composed of five parts. We examine, first, what freedom is doing to unite men; second, the field where it now needs to unite them; third, what it is doing there instead to divide them and to arm dictatorship to unite them by force. Then we consider, fourth, how great, growing and imminent is the resulting danger to freedom; and fifth, how we can turn this danger into opportunity. Before examining these five topics in detail, let us look at them briefly, to see still better Freedom's House as a whole.

I

We find in Part I that the major inventions and discoveries have had, more and more rapidly, this characteristic effect: They bring people together in a community greater than concerned them before, and in many ways liberate and unite them. This process has been going on now with accelerating speed for two hundred years.

What yeast has so expanded man's once static world? We find this yeast was freedom or, more precisely, a relatively high degree of individual liberty enjoyed by a relatively large number of persons united through a relatively free government—a combination I shorten into the term, *freedom-and-union.*

MERCATOR FRANKLIN ELI WHITNEY MACADAM STEPHENSON

Study of 1,012 major inventions and discoveries listed in FREEDOM AGAINST ITSELF shows 95 per cent came from Atlantic community—thanks to its freedom.

We reach this conclusion by first ascertaining from what area and nations these world-widening machines came. Study of a list of 1,012 major inventions, discoveries and innovations since 1750—the most comprehensive one I know of —brings out these facts:

1. Practically all of them—95 per cent—came from the people living in the nations around the North Atlantic ocean. (I call this region "Atlantica" for short and include in it all fourteen members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,[1] plus Germany,[2] Sweden, Switzerland and Ireland.)

2. Nearly all these inventions and discoveries came from the freest of these peoples—the democracies whose federation was proposed in *Union Now*. The three great democracies, the United States, the United Kingdom and France, have led in producing them; together their citizens have contributed nearly three-fourths.

3. The peoples who have long suffered despotism have shown little creativeness. Those who spent this two hundred-year period first under the Czars and then under the Communist dictatorship have contributed only a handful of the inventions and discoveries that have made our modern world.

Study of the nationality of all the Nobel Prize winners since 1901 confirms this.

Why has this astonishing creative power of the free Atlanticans passed so unnoticed? Though their machines have knitted Atlantica into the closest, most interdependent international community on earth, it remains the forgotten country, because it has no common government.

Next we find that the creativeness of the Atlanticans followed on the heels of freedom's advance among them. The great political inventions of the Atlanticans *preceded* their other inventions. Creativeness followed freedom through no accident; by its nature liberty fosters invention and discovery, whereas dictatorship by its nature blights them. Necessity, and the economic, geographic and racial factors have not played the decisive role liberty-and-union has.

Yet we the free ourselves have paid little attention to the fact that freedom-and-union is the yeast that has caused invention and discovery to expand so wonderfully. We have neglected badly this mother lode of power and progress. Merely by clearly seeing and showing others where the key to our creativeness lies, we make surer that the techniques the awakening Asians are now learning will not again be turned against us (as they were at Pearl Harbor), but will help harness to greater liberty-and-union the world's richest and most wasted natural resource—man himself. Yet the science of free government which to Franklin came first is today the Cinderella science.

II

For two hundred years freedom with its machines has been bringing together its far-flung followers, forming them into a highly interdependent Atlantic Community. Once such a community exists, it cannot remain without an ef-

[1]Members of NATO are the U. S., Canada, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Turkey.

[2]The German Federal Republic became a member of NATO after *Freedom Against Itself* was published.—Editor.

BACON'S REQUEST TO HIS READERS

I have one request to make, the one that a great English scientist, Francis Bacon, expressed so well in the Preface to his *Novum Organum:*

"I have on my own part made it my care and study that the things which I shall propound shall not only be true, but should also be presented to men's minds, how strangely soever preoccupied and obstructed, in a manner not harsh or unpleasant. It is but reasonable however (especially in so great a restoration of learning and knowledge) that I should claim of men one favor in return; which is this: If any one would form an opinion or judgment . . . concerning these speculations of mine, let him not hope that he can do it in passage or by the by; but let him examine the thing thoroughly; let him make some little trial for himself of the way which I describe and lay out; let him formalize his thoughts with that subtlety of nature to which experience bears witness; let him correct by reasonable patience and due delay the . . . deep-rooted habits of his mind; and when all this is done and he has begun to be his own master, let him (if he will) use his own judgment."

—From the Foreword of *Freedom Against Itself.*

fective government. Whether it is on an Athenian or an Atlantic scale, a community without a government is in a state of anarchy. Anarchy's evils always result in government being established by force or by agreement.

III

Instead of meeting this need for union with the exploring, inventive spirit they have shown in all other fields, the free have been splintering their world. Through confusion they have replaced the divine right of sovereign kings with the divine right of sovereign nations. They have been walling men apart increasingly with new nations, new armies, new taxes, new censorships, new currencies, new man-made barriers to travel, trade, production, employment, and other sacrifices of individual life, liberty and happiness on the altar of Absolute National Sovereignty.

The tendency of the free to associate individual freedom with disunion goes very deep. It has splintered the Church, and political parties. It early began splintering empires. The freest among them was characteristically the first to split; that came when the thirteen Colonies broke away in 1776. Since then the British Empire has produced ten more sovereign States, always in the name of freedom. In its name the American Colonies began their independent existence as thirteen sovereign States, separated by thirteen currencies, tariffs and defense forces, and united only by alliance.

The resulting anarchy led them, however, to do a most exceptional thing in the history of freedom: They formed by agreement in 1787-89 an organic union, a federal interstate democracy, something then quite new in the world. But the proneness of the free to confuse liberty with absolute state sovereignty almost destroyed the United States later by Civil War.

The same confusion led freedom's two greatest powers, Great Britain and the United States, to follow foreign policies that Balkanized the Western world. And so the 800,000,000 people living west of Soviet Russia now enter the Jet Atomic Age splintered into fifty-seven sovereign nations. East of them 1,450,000,000 people enter it divided into only fifteen sovereign States, five of whom govern almost half the human race.

FARADAY BRAILLE WESTINGHOUSE BUNSEN BELL

While freedom unites Atlantica by the machines it invents, it keeps it splintered by its chronic tendency to confuse individual liberty with national sovereignty.

Instead of providing by free international government the degree of unity that liberty requires, the free have formed, instead, associations of governments designed to maintain unlimited national sovereignty—leagues of nations and alliances, from the Wilsonian Covenant through the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Where freedom fails to unite, force succeeds. History records few nations that were created by free agreement. Whereas freedom by its nature is divisive, dictatorship's nature leads it to expand. While the free are breaking up their empires into independent nations, Russia continues its imperialistic course.

Two characteristics of freedom's inventions inevitably arm dictatorship industrially and militarily to fill the need for international government which the free keep on creating and keep on refusing to meet themselves: (a) these machines and weapons permit the unskilled to do what only the highly skilled, or no one at all, could do before, and (b) once they are invented, slaves can soon learn to make and use them.

Dictatorship can speed their use by forcing its slaves to make sacrifices that free people make only when in desperate danger. Nor is it checked by the vested business, labor and farm interests that often defer the development of inventions where people are free. Dictatorshop's ability to exploit freedom's machines has its limits, but even so it partly offsets despotism's blight on creativeness. There is greater danger of dictatorship arming itself through this channel—which no security measures can block—than through spies stealing any secrets we retain. What the Japanese and Russians have already done with our machines, the Chinese who start 450,000,000 strong may do on a greater scale.

Freedom has another characteristic that makes its machines arm dictatorship more rapidly than democracy: The most complex machine is simpler than man. We quickly teach men anywhere to fly planes, but we still find it hard to govern ourselves. The paradox that men learn to govern the most awesome machines more readily than they learn to govern themselves is understandable. Free government puts man to a much severer test. It requires the citizen to govern one of the most unpredictable and potentially powerful of units, a human being—himself. At the same time, he must also help govern and be governed by millions of these complex beings, on a basis of equal individual freedom.

Liberty is a heady liquor. Those unused to it tend to drink it to excess. Self-government all too often results in no-government, which nearly always ends in mono-government, dictatorship.

Hamilton and Gruenther

As States are a collection of individual men . . . which ought we to respect most, the rights of the people composing them, or the artificial beings resulting from the composition? Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter. . . . This [is] the critical moment for forming . . . a Government. . . . Henceforward the motives will become feebler, and the difficulties greater.—*Alexander Hamilton*, in the American Federal Convention, June 29, 1789.

Never was there greater need among the NATO nations for unity, for wisdom, and for perseverance. Never was there a greater need to see clearly that our lives are bound inextricably together. — *General Alfred M. Gruenther*, Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Forces, August 31, 1953.

—*Don Hesse, St. Louis Globe-Democrat*

"The 800,000,000 people living west of Soviet Russia now enter the Jet Atomic Age splintered into 57 sovereign nations. East of them 1,450,000,000 people enter it divided into only 15 sovereign states." —Freedom Against Itself.

Of the seventy-seven sovereign nations on earth, only four—the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the Netherlands—have had even 150 years of unbroken experience in relatively free self-government. In all four a protecting natural shelter—ocean, Channel, mountains, delta—gave freedom the time it needed to achieve this degree of maturity. But its machines have made such shelters of no avail today, when so many sprouting democracies seek to achieve this, too. Freedom must henceforth count for protection on human wisdom only.

Freedom's survival depends now on the people of Atlantica learning to spread the know-how of liberty-and-union through humanity as rapidly as their other know-how spreads. They may do this by learning first to govern freely but effectively their own Atlantic community. By forming an Atlantic federation they can, moreover, supply through it the shelter from dictatorship which mountains and oceans no longer give to infant democracies.

IV

My studies in 1942-43 not only brought out the basic tension the free have themselves created but made me conclude that the danger in it was great indeed. Since then all four of the major forces causing this tension have tremendously increased it, and the resulting danger. In that brief decade (1) freedom's inventiveness has produced the supersonic plane, the atomic and hydrogen bombs while (2) its political divisiveness has produced fifteen new sovereign nations and prevented the creation of any international government. At the same time (3) the area united under dictatorship has expanded more than in any decade in centuries and (4) dictatorship has armed itself far more formidably in Soviet Russia than it was in Germany, Japan and Italy, and has quickly learned to make our most advanced weapons.

At this rate how much greater will the tension be ten years hence . . . if it does not meanwhile produce catastrophe? Consider this ABC of one element in this tension, the growing economic strain on Atlantica:

A. We are still adding to the huge load of debt we acquired in the two World Wars and the Depression. The biggest factor in it, the cost of armament, is soaring fantastically. Bombers already cost eight times more than in 1945. This curve seems certain to continue, and to burden us much more than it does the Kremlin.

B. The practice of seeking to solve economic problems by artificially increasing costs has become chronic throughout Atlantica. In the past forty years the free have reversed their 19th Century policies that cut away man-made obstacles to the free movement of men, money and goods while their machines were removing natural barriers to this trinity of economic freedom.

At the very time when mass production and the automobile, airplane and atom came, requiring for their growth an even wider market than the steam age did, we Atlanticans turned back to the thinking of 1750. We have sought prosperity through building all kinds of man-made barriers to business, until Atlantica in this year of the reign of Absolute National Sovereignty is as cluttered up with them as was France under the reign of Absolute Royal Sovereignty two hundred years ago.

On top of this, organized business, labor and farm interests, which freedom has brought to great power in every Atlantic nation, use their influence to limit in costly ways the market their fathers freed. In so doing they inevitably give greater power to the governments their fathers sought to limit. They have their disputes, but they tend to settle them usually by agreements that raise prices and wages—increase still further the cost of living, producing, marketing.

Were it not that our machines are continuing to cut costs, freedom's economy would have collapsed already. But the economies they effect are being devoured by the rise in man-made costs. These could be drastically cut by Atlantic federation extending the free movement of men, goods and money on an oceanic scale at the dawn of the Jet Atomic Age, as the American Federal Union extended it on a continental scale at the dawn of the Steam Age.

Once invented, slaves can soon learn to use and make freedom's inventions. They inevitably arm dictatorship industrially



—*Ford Motor Company*

and militarily to fill by force the need for international government which the free create but refuse to meet themselves.

Until this is done the economic strain is bound to grow worse.

The Soviet dictatorship has its own difficulties, but it does not suffer these pressures that afflict all Atlantica. There are fifteen States in the Soviet Union —but not fifteen currencies, fifteen barriers against the movement of goods and men, fifteen defense forces devouring taxes. Nor is Moscow hindered by the kind of cost-raising pressures that business, farm and labor bring so freely

on Washington, London, Paris, Ottawa.

C. Then there is the witch's brew of fear and suspicion in Atlantica . . . the growing mistrust among Americans, Britons and French . . . the fever of investigations that divert attention from essentials and destroy the mutual faith which freedom needs to live. All this so distorts our sense of values that to gain illusory security against a future Fuchs we sacrifice all we could gain from having a team of Fermis, Bohrs, Meitners, Einsteins, Curies and Rutherfurds continuing to work freely together.

Our most powerful weapon, as this study shows, is the great inventive power that lies in union of the free. This weapon remains the monopoly of the free. We need no security measures to keep dictatorship from stealing it. We cannot persuade Moscow to copy it. Yet this is the weapon that we are sabotaging now—in the name of security.

The Kremlin aims to steal whole countries now—with hungry depression as its skeleton key. And our "security" zealots are busy now helping produce the key.

The imminent danger now lies in political disunion and economic depression rather than World War—though the war danger remains so great (particularly as regards new "Koreas") that it would be folly to weaken our defenses. We have probably closed the domestic door through which depression came in 1929. But we have left open the door which Atlantic disunion provides. The people of Atlantica still lack even the most elemental means of dealing with a common economic crisis; they have no common government.

It would seem common sense to hasten to tighten Atlantic unity from within as Moscow removes the pressure of fear that now holds NATO together. If the NATO nations need to have the means prepared beforehand for joint military defense, they need international machinery on the economic side, too. An attack by general depression on one of them can also imperil them all.

Atlantic disunion and depression form a vicious circle. The worse disunity becomes, the greater is the difficulty of nipping depression in the bud. On the other hand, depression makes for worse disunion. Military danger often leads the free to unite, but economic danger nearly always divides them more than ever.

The Kremlin is busy undoing its folly which produced NATO. But Atlantica's statesmen and politicians are not yet seeking to replace NATO's made-in-Moscow bond before it vanishes. Instead of hastening to replace it with the internal cement of organic Atlantic Union, they urge the Kremlin to remove more rapidly the pressure that brought them together.

The need of uniting the free is so urgent "we should tackle it simultaneously by every reasonable method—by federalist-constitutional procedures that made U.S. as well as by diplomacy and "gradualist' methods that made Britain," author says.

They make the people think that the way to peace lies in concessions that depend on others, on Moscow or on Paris—on a united Korea, a united Austria, united Germany, a united Western Europe—not on a United States of the Atlantic. At Yalta, they paid the Kremlin to come where it wanted to go . . . into position to win China. Now they beg it to prove its "sincerity" by concessions that would speed the descending spiral of disunion and depression, which it already sees is the best way to destroy freedom.

How near is the danger?

When two opposing winches put a chain under increasing tension, it is impossible to say at which link and at which moment it will break, but it is easy to see that it is bound to break somewhere, sooner or later, if the strain continues.

So it is with this basic tension of our time. Since the break would be a major catastrophe, and since it takes so much time to arouse to salutary action those with most at stake, it is safer to err in fearing that we are at the eleventh hour than in assuming that we have plenty of time.

V

I believe catastrophe can still be averted—and this danger turned to great good. To work this transformation we need to keep in mind that the primary source of the danger lies in us, the free, rather than in dictatorship. Only the free can end this tension while preserving freedom. They cannot do it by ending their inventiveness; they cannot help but continue to be creative while they continue to be free. They cannot alter totalitarianism's inherent trend to expand until it is truly total. Nor can they keep their machines from being so simple that dictatorship can make and run them with its slaves, and use them to impose its government. *There is only one way the free can peacefully end the world's most dangerous tension.* They *can* end their own divisiveness; they can constitute an effective free government for their common concerns.

Despite the Machiavellis of Moscow and the depression, I for one believe this will be done. Among my reasons why are these two:

1. By great good fortune the key country on which Atlantica now depends for leadership, the United States, provides in its history the proof that economic danger can persuade free States to federate. It is the exception to the rule that war unites but depression divides. Where war led the people of the thirteen original States to form merely an anarchic alliance, hard times thereafter produced their present Union.

2. The first step to Atlantic Union is relatively easy: All we need do now is to call another Federal Convention, much like the one of 1787, where delegates from the people of Atlantica would explore the possibility of uniting in a federation. This commits no people to any Union; the time for commitment would come only when the Convention presented them with a Constitution to debate and ratify.

Merely by calling this Convention we tackle the long overdue task of learning better the principles of free government, so that we can spread this know-how more rapidly through a world that learns so quickly to turn our weapons and machines against freedom. Both by its debates and by the example it set, this Convention would give our principles a power among the young democracies and behind the Iron Curtain that nothing else could do.

To explore this solution would not hurt, but help, the United Nations, NATO and the unification of Europe. The need of strengthening international organization is so great that we should tackle it simultaneously all along the line and by every reasonable method —on the Atlantic as well as on the universal and the European level, and by the federalist-constitutional procedures that made the United States, as well as by diplomacy and the "gradualist" methods that made Great Britain and the Commonwealth, which we are confining ourselves to at present.

The essential is that, before Moscow removes more of the pressure that now keeps the free from falling apart, we should thus redouble our efforts to weld them together. Once we have freedom's ablest statesmen assembled, and authorized to submit to us a plan for governing our common affairs adequately, we can have faith that even a depression would not deliver the free to dictatorship and war, but would lead the Atlanticans, as it did the Americans in 1787, to the higher standards of life and liberty that Federal Union brings.

If we astonish the many skeptics among us by actually achieving Atlantic Union, we can be sure that we shall also take the Kremlin by surprise. This surprise will be the more devastating to the Communists since they are banking so deeply on Stalin's assurance—plus all we are doing now to confirm it—that the peoples of Atlantica have not "been taught sufficiently by the experience of two World Wars" to unite.

The convulsions that have wracked our generation—two World Wars and a Great Depression—need not be convulsions of madness and death for individual liberty. They can mean, instead, merely the end of the present worship of Absolute National Sovereignty, and the birth of far greater freedom for us and our children.

None of us can hope to save freedom without some personal sacrifice. No matter what it is we most believe in, it requires some sacrifice. The god of Absolute National Sovereignty demands that we sacrifice our sons to it, our jobs, our individual freedom. For these sacrifices it brings us only greater grief, as our generation knows from experience. Liberty-and-union requires us to sacrifice some of our prejudices, some of the power we have given our politicians, some of the special privileges that some of us have. To those who have made these sacrifices in the past, it has brought greater liberty, richer, safer life.

On a memorable occasion in 1789 the beneficiaries of Absolute Royal Sovereignty in France offered to sacrifice to liberty-and-union some of their privileges and prejudices. But they sacrificed too long to the wrong god, too late to the true one. They sacrificed only when they saw this was their only hope to save themselves, and they soon lost all they sought to retain, and their lives, too.

Abraham saved his son Isaac by unhesitatingly offering to sacrifice even him when he thought his God required this proof of faith.

Whose example shall we follow? And how soon? It is for each to decide what he or she holds supreme, the sovereignty of the State, or the sovereignty of its Citizens. You know my answer. It is for you now to say which you will put your faith in—Freedom's Divided House or the Union of the Free.

Life in Atlantica

Kremlin Jets to Jets

"The numerical strength of the Soviet Air Forces in recent years has been about 20,000 aircraft," the NATO Letter reports, "but the rapid increase in the Soviet air potential is illustrated by the rate of change-over to jet aircraft. Today, all Soviet first-line fighters and bombers are jet powered. A similar development has occurred with respect to their light bombers. In early 1951, jet light bombers had not been introduced into operational units. Today, all of their light bomber forces are jets."

Nato Youth Meet

The second conference of delegates from youth organizations of NATO nations was held at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris last summer. Mr. S. Stray, of Norway was elected chairman. The conference formed four committees, each dealing with one of these topics:

1. Program for exchange of military personnel on leave, students, teachers.
2. Organization of seminars, holiday camps, rallies, sport meetings.
3. Forms which cooperation between young people of the NATO countries might take, and institutions which might be designed with this in view. Relations between the youth of NATO countries and other countries of the Free World. Desirability of setting up "Atlantic Community" associations open particularly to young people.
4. Contribution which youth organizations can make in disseminating information on NATO aims and methods.

Atlantic Cultural Exchange

The first conference of Cultural Experts sponsored by NATO met at the Palais de Chaillot in Paris last summer. It was presided over by Dr. H. J. Reininck, Director General for the Arts and Foreign Cultural Relations of the Netherlands Ministry of Education, Arts & Sciences. The meeting was attended by senior officers primarily concerned with government-sponsored cultural activities in the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance. The Conference adopted specific recommendations for intensifying cultural exchange among their countries.

Soviet Satellites Arm

The number of Soviet satellite divisions has almost doubled since 1947 bringing their total to about 80 divisions, according to the official NATO Letter. It adds that in 1951 the aircraft of the satellite Air Forces were obsolete. By the end of 1952, their strength had been doubled to over 2,500 aircraft, about half jet fighters.

The Little Dog Laughed

Here are a few of the cartoons printed in FREEDOM & UNION *in the past 10 years that I enjoyed most. So many made me laugh that I can't resist continuing to celebrate our birthday by showing you next month some more of my favorites.*

—THE LITTLE DOG

F&U June '51 —*Herblock, Washington Post*

"We've been using a roundish one."

F&U Sept. '50 —*Stanley for Pathfinder*

"I don't know how the Russians do it. When I drink vodka I say 'yes' to anything."

Should Auld Agreements Be Forgot?

Should auld agreement be forgot
  And never brought to mind?
Should auld agreement go for naught,
  As though it ne'er were signed?

Then here's a pen, my trusty friend,
  And gie us a pen o' thine,
We'll sign a coupla treaties yet
  And keep 'em, well, in brine.

We diplomats have high silk hats,
  Great power is our wine,
But when we break a treaty—hic!
  We hear no bullets whine.

Then here's a pen, my trusty friend,
  And gie us a pen o' thine,
And when we break our treaties—well,
  We'll have some more to sign.

—*By Burns Meeyup.*



F&U October '46

F&U April '51 —*H. Monier in Le Canard Enchainé, Paris*

" 'Men of the world,' 'women of the world,'—that, of course is all right. But to talk of 'citizens of the world!' What is the world coming to, my friend?"

WHEN DID YOU LAST READ A BOOK?

TRY A CHAPTER A DAY—NOW

There is No Substitute for Reading This Book

"Nature made the acorn a marvelous digest of the oak. Yet the acorn's strength is not the strength of the oak; one cannot build one's house with acorns. Nor can one quickly grasp the depth and stature or some truths, their rooted solidity, their branching out, their twigs hung with seed. But there is widespread resistance nowadays to the truths that, to be fully understood, require one to read a book." — From FREEDOM AGAINST ITSELF.

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"Deserves wide reading."—N. Y. Times.

"I find myself exhilarated and engrossed"—W. W. Waymack, former U.S. Atomic Energy Commissioner.



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Streit, Clarence

June 28, 1956

Dear Clarence:

Many, many thanks for your thoughtful letter of June 25th. You are, of course, right; but the trouble is we fight a clock in this business, and I felt it advisable to confine myself to what had actually happened rather than attempt to detail a set of conditions which might have prevented it.

Your idea about a "Letter to the Editor" has merit. The only trouble is there wouldn't be many as thoughtful as yours.

I am taking a little time off starting tomorrow. Let us talk about it when I get back in the autumn.

As ever yours,

Mr. Clarence K. Streit
"Freedom & Union"
2700 Ontario Road, N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

rh

Freedom & Union

MAGAZINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD

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June 25, 1956

Dear Ed,

I've just listened to your commentary on the vote in Iceland and learned, as usual, a few things, for which I thank you.

But I think you made one mistake yourself, by way of omission, and in view of your quotations from the Chinese on the human virtue of correcting errors, I believe you'll want to correct it some time.

Your broadcast implied throughout that the fault lay in the way our Government had handled the situation in Iceland - not in the system, in the basis on which we conduct our relations with Iceland, that of alliance.

Granted that we made the mistakes you pointed out, and that they were avoidable, and that we should learn from them to do better in future. Granted that under any system men make avoidable mistakes.

Still, is it not a profound mistake to choose and cling to the system under which the errors in question are not only most likely to occur but to have far more dangerous consequences?

The Government can, and does, make the same kind of mistakes in dealing with the people of this or that State in our own Federal Union that it has made in Iceland, and in other States of NATO. But however bad they may be, the result is not the loss of a most important air base.

Another thing: If our 48 States were united merely by alliance, as are the 15 States of NATO, Moscow might step in and "solve" the farm problem in the sovereign nation of Iowa as you report it "solved" the fish problem in sovereign Iceland. Conversely, if the States of the Atlantic Community were federated as are our 48, the Kremlin could not hope to buy off any of them.

Too many Americans forget, or never learned, that originally the 13 States were united merely by an alliance - the Articles of Confederation. Under that system, as Madison pointed out in the Federal Convention on June 29, 1787, the smallest State could defy the alliance as Iceland can defy NATO now - "Delaware during the late war opposed and defeated an embargo, to which twelve States had agreed, and continued to supply the enemy with provisions in time of war."

It was this sort of thing that led the 13 States then to tackle the basic mistake

they had made in organizing their relations as an alliance. They tackled it by calling into being, not a Committee of Three diplomats, as NATO has done recently, but that Federal Convention of delegates where Madison spoke, and voted, as did all the delegates, as an individual citizen, free from instructions from his home government. That Convention produced our Federal Constitution, the most enduring success any conference of sovereign States ever had.

If the alliance system couldn't work even among the 13 States, if it failed so miserably among allies all of whom spoke the same language and had so much in common, how can we realistically expect it to work better among the nations of the Atlantic Community today? Unless we can count on angels for diplomats, legislators and voters, is this system not bound to produce more and more dangers such as the present one in Iceland? If little Iceland can defy NATO, or the U. S., what ally can't? Making another Cyprus of Iceland is, I submit, no solution. Would not federation solve these problems?

"Peacetime coalitions throughout history have been weak and notoriously inefficient," General Eisenhower warned on April 2, 1952 in his report to NATO. Yet since he became President his Administration has done nothing yet even to explore by the Convention method that produced our own Constitution how to unite the Atlantic democracies effectively.

A resolution to call such a convention for this purpose is now before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which recently decided to hold a final day of hearings on it, probably next week.

I suggest, Ed, Iceland provides a good peg on which to hang broadcast on this subject. And if you want some juicy quotations on the mistake any democracy makes in trusting to alliance, I would be glad to supply them hot from Hamilton and Washington.

With best regards,

Clarence

Clarence Streit

P. S. Why not have a "Letter to the Editor - I mean, Commentator" in your broadcast from time to time? I nominate a piece of the above as a starter!

Edward R. Murrow
CBS New York City

GENERAL GRUENTHER FAVORS ATLANTIC CONVENTION RESOLUTION

Testifying on the Mutual Security Act of 1956 at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in executive session on May 31, General Gruenther was questioned by Senators George, Fulbright and Humphrey regarding Atlantic Union and the Atlantic Exploratory Convention resolution [S.C.R. 12, H.C.R. 72-80] . The questions and answers below are reproduced from the Report of the Hearings on this Act, released June 17.

The CHAIRMAN. If, injected into this present picture, there should arise a belief in the NATO members in Western Europe that there would be a probability that the United States and Canada would become parties in a federated union, would that be a divisive influence right now?

General GRUENTHER. I would say that if the United States were willing to make that kind of offer it would definitely have a favorable influence on the NATO members.

The CHAIRMAN. I would not want to say that the United States would be willing to do that because I presume that the men around this table would know better.

General GRUENTHER. I was taking your question as posing a hypothetical situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, a hypothetical question. I just wanted to get your view on that point, looking at it from the standpoint of the Western European states.

General GRUENTHER. I would say this, Senator. Anything that can be done to create in the minds of our NATO allies the belief that there is a mutuality of interests between the United States and Western Europe, is all to the good. Any indications in that direction would be helpful. We must always bear in mind that United States participation in European affairs is something very new. Many of our Western European friends entertain the haunting fear that sooner or later we may pull back and leave them alone. All too often some of the public utterances of some of our prominent citizens give this impression.

* * *

ATLANTIC UNION

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you see any alternative to continued military preparation?

General GRUENTHER. With conditions as we know them now, I can see no acceptable alternative.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What do you think of Atlantic Union as an alternative? Do you support such an idea?

General GRUENTHER. I think any feasible action which would improve unity within NATO is all to the good.

* * *

Senator HUMPHREY. Just this final question. You are familiar with the proposal for a NATO convention, that is, for representatives of NATO countries to get together and talk over the possibility of strengthening NATO.

General GRUENTHER. Yes.

Senator HUMPHREY. There has been a resolution introduced here in the Senate—Senate Concurrent Resolution 12—and there have been some recent revisions of it. The last revision was merely to suggest that—

> The President is requested to transmit to other democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty Organization the proposal of Congress that they name delegates to meet in a convention with delegates from the United States and from other democracies, to explore and report to what extent their people might, within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the basic principles of the Constitution of the United States, achieve more effective unity in advancing their common economic and political affairs and their joint defense.

How do you feel about such an exploratory convention?

General GRUENTHER. I feel that the bringing together of representatives of the NATO nations is desirable.

Senator HUMPHREY. Do you think it would be helpful in terms of political unity of our NATO pact countries?

General GRUENTHER. Yes; I think any decision that would improve mutual understanding of the problems of the NATO nations would be helpful.

GRUENTHER PUSHES ATLANTIC FEDERAL UNION

Testifying behind closed doors, General Gruenther gave Atlantic Union a powerful push at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Foreign Aid May 31. The Committee has only now given out his answers to questions including this significant passage:

> Chairman George: If . . there should arise a belief in the NATO members in Western Europe that there would be a probability that the U.S. and Canada would become parties in a federated union, would that be a divisive influence right now?
>
> General Gruenther: I would say that if the U.S. were willing to make that kind of offer it would definitely have a favorable influence on the NATO members.

The July Freedom & Union will include a full page of General Gruenther's answers to questions on the Atlantic Convention resolution put to him at that hearing by Senators George, Fulbright and Humphrey. Don't miss it, nor the other reports of progress in our field that crowd our July issue.

Following General Gruenther's favorable testimony, - which we are told was even stronger in the oral than the printed version - the Committee decided to have one final day of hearings on the Atlantic resolution as soon as it finishes with the Foreign Aid bill - in late June or early July. This is to enable the DAR et al to testify against the resolution and to let its supporters meet the objections that Secretary Dulles raised to certain provisions in the original text. The result will be to clear the stage for possible action before Congress adjourns.

(over, please)

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Clarence K. Streit

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with our thanks as a progress
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new supporter.

Freedom & Union

MAGAZINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD

EDITOR, CLARENCE STREIT

Atlantica . . . in the Stars (p. 2–3)

I agree with Sen. Kefauver (Atlantic Convention Sponsor.)
—Italy's MARTINO

Our ultimate destiny may require some form of federalism.
—Canada's PEARSON

Closer Union between the free countries of the Atlantic . . . is the chief task of our generation. —Norway's LANGE

I regard the contribution which the U.S. can make to this project as of the utmost importance.—Eisenhower naming GEORGE as his personal Atlantic unity explorer.

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

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[On Second Thought]

Ike Moves to Unite Atlantica —and Moscow to Divide It

AT LONG LAST, the U. S. Government has committed itself to explore stronger unification of the North Atlantic Community. It did this by four important moves in quick succession, though none—at this writing—went to the point of calling for action on the resolution for an Atlantic Exploratory Convention, pending in Congress. Meanwhile there have been a series of important moves on the other side of the Atlantic table. Their effect is to advance the Kremlin's strategy of weakening Atlantic unity and winning the world through another depression. On balance, it seems to me that the Eisenhower Administration awoke none too soon, and is still moving much too slowly. It deserves a slap on the back for what it has already done—and another, lower down, to speed it on.

One Two Three. The Administration's turn toward Atlantic unification began April 23 with the speech Secretary Dulles made at the Associated Press lunch in New York announcing that if this "be the common desire of the NATO member nations, the U. S. will join eagerly in exploring" it. (See the May FREEDOM & UNION for excerpts from this major speech.)

Next came the NATO Council session in Paris on May 5-6 and its decision to name a Committee of Three to explore the matter. (On page 15 we give the text of the Council's communique, and on page 12 the public report on the meeting Secretary Dulles made on his return.)

The third move: President Eisenhower on May 9 wrote Senator Walter F. George, that "I regard the contribution which the U.S. can make to this as of the utmost importance" and asked him to "crown" his career by acting "as my personal representative and special ambassador in the development of this new evolutionary step within the North Atlantic Community." (See page 3 for text of this letter, and the Senator's acceptance.)

"There Be Three . . . Yea Four." This Old Testament way of emphasizing a point applies not only in the way our cover suggests but also to the moves the U. S. has made toward Atlantic unity. For along with the three steps which all the world could see marked a turning point in U.S. policy, there came a fourth whose relation to Atlantic unification passed unnoticed, yet was of far-reaching importance. President Eisenhower on May 4 threw his weight behind an air-power policy which makes U. S. security depend on foreign bases while Russia gains the lead in long-

range bombers. This policy leads to Atlantic Union as surely as President Truman's guarantee of Turkey and Greece led to NATO.

Ike vs. the America Aloners. A basic choice faced President Eisenhower when General Curtis LeMay, head of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, roused wide concern in Congress and the press by testifying that the Kremlin is now surpassing U.S. production of long-range bombers and, if this continued, would lead in this kind of striking power by 1958 or 1960. An air strategy that relies primarily on intercontinental bombers implies a political policy that is primarily one of "America alone" nationalism, though General LeMay and many of his supporters may have missed this implication.

*

Questioned on this issue at his press conference May 4, President Eisenhower, according to *The New York Times*, "reiterated the Administration policy of basing military strength on national requirements rather than matching the Soviet Union plane for plane." He went on to stress that medium bombers were "more efficient," and that the U. S. could and would rely heavily on them because it had "the most powerful Navy in the world," which "featured air power." Moreover, he added, the U. S. has "bases around the world established for the particular purpose of using the medium bomber, and not being forced to make all our bases in the U.S. and, therefore depend on intercontinental machines."

Air Base Advantage. Soviet Russia can build a navy, but it is far harder, if not practically impossible, for it to gain the equivalent in bases for medium bombers of those the U.S. has. By far the most important of these are in the North Atlantic community.

*

If the Kremlin could take over all the foreign air bases the U. S. has, it still would be little closer to the U. S.—except through those in the Atlantic area. Iceland would bring it closest, but would not give it the striking power against the U. S. which this base gives the U. S. against Russia. A bomber which could reach Washington from Iceland could strike only Northeastern America, whereas it could bomb all European Russia, and all the European satellites.

*

Suppose the Kremlin could gain a base in northern South America. It would still be farther from Washington than a U.S. plane based on France is from Moscow, and Stalingrad. Even if the Kremlin had a base on the Rio Grande in Mexico, it would be farther from Washington than a West German base is from Moscow.

Basic Fact on Bases. The U. S. is the citadel of the Atlantic community, its centers of power are scattered across the continent, and by the Eisenhower rating of bomber efficiency it is far better protected than is the citadel of Communist power — European Russia and east Europe—from bombers based on the European side of Atlantica. This basic fact makes it easier to understand why the central aim of Kremlin strategy is to neutralize, at least, Germany, France and Iceland, and destroy what unity Atlantica has gained in NATO. But this same basic fact makes it harder to understand why Congress and the U. S. press should be so concerned lest the U. S. fail to match Russia in the highly expensive and relatively inefficient bombers that circumstances require Moscow to rely on—and so little concerned at the alarming headway Moscow is making in lessening the vast advantage which the combination of Europe's bases with U. S. power gives the West. Happily, the President has shown better judgment.

Congress Backs Ike. Commenting on the President's preference for bases rather than long-range B-52s, John G. Norris wrote in the *Washington Post and Times-Herald*, May 5: "It will come as a shock to many in the country that the nation is prepared to give up its lead in global bombers — long considered one of the nation's most potent weapons." On May 11 Mr. Norris reported that the House, before unanimously passing a $36 billion defense bill, had decisively rejected an amendment to add another billion dollars for more intercontinental bombers. It did so after the manager of the bill

HALVARD LANGE, FOREIGN MINISTER OF NORWAY, said, at the Congress of the Atlantic Union Committee, Nov. 21, 1952:

"You have foregathered here in Buffalo to discuss how best to further a closer union between the free counties of the Atlantic Community. The establishment of such a closer union is the chief task of our generation. Its establishment is a main condition if we are to prevent the present cold war with all its stresses and tensions from turning into the world cataclysm of an Atlantic war."

GAETANO MARTINO, FOREIGN MINISTER OF ITALY, in a statement made for the July 1955 FREEDOM & UNION, said:

"I am glad that so many eminent members of the American Parliament have seen fit to introduce the Atlantic Union Exploratory Convention Resolution into the American Congress. I agree with your Senator Kefauver that the peace of the world cannot be assured by methods of formal diplomacy alone; and I feel that any efforts on the part of leading citizens in different democratic countries to explore and carefully discuss the probable advantages, obstacles and problems connected with some possible form of eventual democratic federation are very desirable."

LESTER B. PEARSON, CANADIAN SECRETARY FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, stated on April 30, 1956, in London—just before the NATO council met in Paris:

"We have not fully recognized the changes . . . which render obsolete many of our old concepts of national sovereignty, and which . . . make essential the growth . . . of supranational association: changes that require that we give priority to interdependence over independence.

"This does not mean, however, that we should move at once into world government, or some form of Atlantic union or broad political federation . . .

"Those who advocate such schemes of federation do so from the highest motives. They perform . . . a good and useful service in preparing public opinion for the political changes which will undoubtedly be called for in the future. . .

"Our ultimate destiny—to safeguard our very existence—may require some form of federalism on a regional or even a wider basis. But meanwhile we have to work with the institutions which exist today."

WHAT NATO'S THREE SAY OF ATLANTIC UNION

opposed it on the ground that more bases were "desperately needed," not more B-52s.

Bases Depend on Union. President Truman could not make good his guarantee to Turkey and Greece without assuring the line of communication to them, and this meant guaranteeing Western Europe—as he proceeded to do in the Atlantic alliance. Still less can President Eisenhower guarantee American defense by air bases without being sure of the right to use them. Only organic union can assure this—and the President is proceeding now to explore Atlantic unification. None too soon. On May 18 the press reported that new U. S. air base construction in Iceland had been suspended in view of the uncertainty resulting from the Iceland Parliament's request in March that the U. S. withdraw all its troops.

*

If national sovereignty permits little Iceland to force the U. S. to leave the key base it has built there, then clearly the NATO alliance gives even less assurance that the U. S. can use its bases in Britain or France at the showdown.

*

If the U. S. keeps its troops in Iceland despite Icelandic opinion, it risks having all the trouble on that island that the British are having in Cyprus. If Atlantica were a federation instead of an alliance, the Union would be as certain of being able to use without difficulty its base in its State of Iceland as the U. S. is now of a base in any of the 48 States in its Union.

Singapore Threatened. In Iceland the Communist party is influential, and in another important base, that of Britain at Singapore, the Chinese who form most of the city's population look with favor on Red China. London's negotiations with the Singapore government broke down in May, and Britain's hold on this key area is increasingly threatened. This adds to the danger it faces of losing the rubber and tin in the Malayan peninsula which are so important to its faltering economy, especially its dollar position. Loss of Singapore and Malaya would make it all the more imperative that the West compensate for this by gaining the military and economic strength Atlantic Union gives.

Kremlin Advances. While the West was retreating in Iceland and Singapore — and also in Ceylon, the Near East and North Africa,—the Kremlin was also advancing in other quarters and other ways. It was drastically integrating the economy of its European satellites, and gaining still more production—and wide applause by reducing arms it no longer needed.

Ike Names George Ambassador to Atlantica

On May 9 President Eisenhower wrote to Senator George:

I know that your present term in the Senate expires this year. In view of that fact I should like to say two things to you:

It has been my great hope that you would continue on in the Senate where you have been able to make so great a contribution to peace through helping to develop and sustain a non-partisan foreign policy. Your contribution in that respect has been incalculable and I believe it was the overwhelming desire of the American people that you would have found yourself able to continue in the Senate.

I can, however, realize that you may desire to concentrate more exclusively on the great problems of war and peace which confront our Nation, free of the other responsibilities which inevitably go with the Senatorship. If that is your preference I earnestly hope that you will be willing to act for this Nation with reference to the development of the North Atlantic Community so that it will, in greater unity and greater effectiveness, serve the cause of international peace and the preservation of those ideals of human liberty and freedom which are so deeply rooted in the community.

As you know, at the latest meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Council, it was decided to *explore* ways and means by which the North Atlantic Community, through the NATO Council *or otherwise* might more fully realize its potential for peace and human welfare. I regard the contribution which the United States can make to this project as of the *utmost importance* and feel that it may indeed play a decisive role in the achievement of a just and durable peace and the preservation of the great values inherent in our Western civilization.

It would be a great service to the Nation and, indeed in a broader sense, to the whole world if you would be willing, for as long as I may hold my present office, *to act as my personal representative and special ambassador in the development of this new evolutionary step within the North Atlantic community*. In case you do feel impelled to lay down the responsibilities of your present office, I can think of no way where you could better serve our Nation and more fittingly crown your great career as a statesman.

The White House announced Senator George's acceptance thus, May 14:

"Senator George stated that he would be glad to accept this responsibility and . . . would be available after the adjournment of the present session to perform any duties, consistent with his Senatorial responsibilities, that might be required by the President. In the meantime the Senator, in cooperation with the Secretary of State, will study the problem of developing the NATO concept and consult with the foreign ministers of Canada, Italy and Norway, who were designated by the NATO council to study the problem with the governments involved.

"Following his retirement from the Senate, Senator George would plan to devote himself actively to advising the President and the Secretary of State with reference to this matter as well as regards the general development and implementation of a bipartisan foreign policy."

Note: We have added the italics to the text.—THE EDITORS

Satellite Economies United. On May 5—the day that Mr. Dulles launched in the NATO Council his proposal to explore greater Atlantic political and economic unity, — the Warsaw Pact launched a plan for dividing and coordinating industrial production among the eight members of this Red equivalent for NATO. Each nation is to restrict its economic development to its most suitable industries, and rely on imports from allies for other needs.

*

By the Red plan, East Germany will concentrate on brown coal, coke, chemical derivatives, steel and fertilizers. Poland and Czechoslovakia will expand their hard-coal output, Hungary its aluminum production, Romania oil and natural gas, and so on. This amounts to the economic unification and specialization which federal union has produced among the 48 United States without any Marxist planning or dictatorship.

*

While NATO timidly sends out three explorers, and the U. S. Congress hesitates to call a convention to explore Atlantic Union, the Kremlin is already integrating the economy of its satellites. It is bringing them into a far closer economic union than most Americans yet dream of even considering doing themselves with their allies, even though their alarm mounts at rising Red production.

Soviet Arms Cut. Moscow sought to get all the propaganda value it could from its announcement, May 14, that it would reduce its army by 1,200,000 men. This put "tremendous pressure on the West to make new cuts," as *The New York Times* recognized, adding, "it taps the sentiment—current in this country, rampant in Europe — against conscription and taxes."

*

The strategy behind the Soviet cut in armed manpower, it seems to me, is still the one I outlined in these pages just a year ago, under the title, "Who Will Win Without War?" The Kremlin feels the need of lessening the burdens on its long-suffering slaves and increasing their supply of food and consumer goods. Its disarmament move serves all these defensive purposes. On the offensive side, it does much more than let the Kremlin shift more men to atomic bomb and long-range bomber production, while gaining credit in Asia, Africa and elsewhere for setting a peaceful example.

Depression the Aim. By its arms cut, Moscow replies to the Dulles move to explore stronger Atlantic unity; its reply is to lessen still more the fear of aggression which caused NATO to be formed, and whose diminution led to the Dulles move. The arms cut not only weakens still more the cement that now holds NATO together, but tends to check German rearmament and reduce throughout Atlantica the stimulus that defense and foreign military aid have given the economy. The Kremlin believes this is the way to speed both disunion and depression in Atlantica.

*

Moscow timed its "disarmament example" to come when sales of automobiles and farm eqiupment were falling in the U. S., lay-offs in these industries were "alarming" labor leaders, consumer debt and farm prices and surpluses were causing anxiety, and a Conservative British Government was resorting to a lottery to balance its budget. When Wall Street read the Moscow move, the market fell—which did not discourage Moscow.

U. S. in a Race. The Eisenhower Administration has made a good if slow start toward Atlantic unification, but it needs to remember that it is in a race, and that there are other races than arms races. Fortunately, there are indications it is aware of this, and some reason to hope it will do what is necessary to supplement the three NATO explorers of unity via diplomacy with Congressional action before adjournment to provide for exploration of deeper union by the proposed semi-official convention.

Three Good Men. The three foreign ministers — Lester Pearson of Canada, Halvard Lange of Norway, and Gaetano Martino of Italy — whom the NATO Council named as its Committee of explorers into Atlantic unity could not have been better chosen. Their previous statements on this subject (see page 2) make them especially welcome to Atlantic Unionists. Two of them—Pearson and Lange—served with Foreign Minister de Gasperi of Italy and the Dutch and Belgian foreign ministers on the Committee of Five which the NATO Council named in September, 1951, to do a similar task. If their work then came to little—the committee was disbanded at the Lisbon Council session five months later after it had made one meagre report* — it was through no fault of theirs. Now the climate is better, and they can profit from experience. Even so, neither will have any illusion about the difficulty of achieving effective, enduring Atlantic unity within the limits of diplomacy.

Hopeful Signs. Several things make one think the U. S. Government aims at doing more than strengthening the present NATO set-up. The Administration's utterances on the subject are less concerned with NATO than with the "North Atlantic community"—a vague term which might be composed other than NATO is. Moreover, the President, in writing Senator George, spoke of exploring how "the North Atlantic community, through the NATO Council *or otherwise* [my emphasis], might more fully realize its potential." And he named the Senator by a very curious formula as his "special ambassador in the development of this new evolutionary step within the North Atlantic community"—not as his envoy to NATO or its Committee of Three, as the press headlined it, but rather as his ambassador to Atlantica . . . an "envoy extraordinary" indeed.

Ambassador to a Country Yet To Be. An ambassador is normally named to a country, and the naming of Senator George to one yet to be created is a particularly welcome sign that Atlantica is on its way. Before becoming chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he twice sponsored the resolution for a convention to explore this unknown country. If any one can assure action on it before Congress adjourns this Summer, Senator George can—and this would indeed crown his 34 years in the Senate. Was this the reason why the President named him to the new post before he left the Senate? Certainly the added prestige Senator George now enjoys as the President's spokesman on this whole subject should facilitate such action.

—CLARENCE STREIT

*For a summary, see FREEDOM & UNION, January 1952, p. 18.

Atlantic Editorial of the Month

Next Step--An Atlantic Convention

W. K. Kelsey in the Detroit News

AT LONG LAST Secretary Dulles has adopted an idea which in various forms has been discussed ever since it became evident to thoughtful people that the powers of the United Nations were inadequate to preserve order in the world. That idea involved a political organization . . . with specific powers delegated to it by its members, who would retain all other powers.

U.S. Sets Pattern

The organization would thus be patterned on that of the United States under the Constitution, and would be established for the same reasons that caused the 13 states to seek a tighter, or, as they expressed it, a "more perfect" union than a loose confederation. Experience and necessity dictated that certain sovereign powers, jealously maintained by the separate states, be surrendered to a central, national, representative government.

For years resolutions have been introduced at each session of Congress asking the President to invite the Atlantic democracies to join with the United States in an exploratory convention to consider whether a "more perfect" union might be possible. . . .

Secretary Dulles has not gone so far as to endorse, in a public speech, this particular way of getting the Atlantic democracies together. But in his address to the Associated Press (on April 23) he referred to NATO as an organization which "contains the possibilities of great development" and which, though conceived primarily as a military alliance, "can and should do more."

He added that Canada "has notably espoused this point," and that at last December's meeting of the Council "both the French and Italian delegations introduced resolutions along this line."

Secretary Dulles might have added that on March 2, Chancellor Adenauer of West Germany spoke for the expansion of NATO into a political organization which would present a united front in the "cold war" with the Soviet Union.

For some reason not yet explained, Dr. Adenauer's statement was not published in this country. Mrs. Chase S. Osborn, a member of the national council of Atlantic Union, learned of it through a letter to her from the secretary of the Bundesrat at Bonn. She interested Senator Neuberger, who asked the State Department for the text of the statement. State claimed ignorance of it, but investigated and turned it up. Mrs. Osborn sent it to President Eisenhower.

Be it noted that the question is not yet the nature of a NATO political organization, but whether it would not be a good thing to decide on one. And if the principal powers agree that a political organization ought to be established, why would it not be advisable for President Eisenhower to invite the rest to a conference, or convention, which would explore the possible means?

Mr. Dulles has committed himself to nothing more than to join with the other members of NATO in "exploring those possibilities which now beckon us forward." He is still on safe political ground. No Democratic leader seems likely to take issue with him at this stage, —certainly not Senator Kefauver, who introduced the resolution in the Senate, and certainly not Senator George, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who favors it.

Of course, no resolution is really necessary. The President could summon the exploratory conference on his own hook, if he were sure that Britain would join Canada, France, Italy and West Germany in participating.

"Next to the Originator..."

JOHN BARTLETT
Born in U.S.A., June 14, 1820

JUST 101 YEARS AGO there appeared the first edition of Bartlett's *Familiar Quotations*. The 1855 edition had only 295 pages. Nine editions were edited by Bartlett himself, who prefaced the ninth edition in 1891 with the statement that the book "now culminates" its career and "closes its tentative life." Since then it has continued to grow steadily; the latest edition—the twelfth—was published in 1948 and totals 1,831 pages.

Although it is easy to measure thus the growth of this classic, it is impossible to estimate all it did in the past century to free authors from having their nuggets buried amid all their words, or their wisest, pithiest sentences misquoted. It freed other writers and speakers from having to dig for literary allusions that were perched elusively on the tips of their tongues, or for ideas and inspiration when they had neither. To everyone who has used this treasury of wisdom, wit and beauty, it has opened unexpected doors.

Little has been written of Bartlett himself. He was born in Plymouth, Mass., of a family that came there in 1620. It is said that he read from the Bible to his mother at three, and at nine had read all the Scriptures. He entered the bookstore business in Cambridge at 16, became a publisher, brought out himself the first three editions of his famous book, and became a partner of Little, Brown & Co. in 1865, which has published it since. His classic grew out of the practice of collecting quotations and their sources which he had developed for his own benefit. One wonders if he may not have been stimulated by his contemporary, Emerson, whose "Next to the originator of a good sentence is the first quoter of it," Bartlett helped to make familiar. Certainly this should be his epitaph.

Bold, Dynamic General Billotte Heads Paris Atlantic Movement

GENERAL PIERRE BILLOTTE, the newly elected President of the French *Mouvement pour l'Union Atlantique,* brings to this work the experience of an extraordinarily brilliant and colorful career: Soldier, prisoner of war, diplomat, administrator, author, deputy and Cabinet Minister.

When World War II broke out, Pierre Billotte, son of a general, was attached to Army Headquarters; he asked to join a fighting unit. During the tragic days of May, 1940, while in command of a unit of heavy tanks he met, head on, 20 German tanks, destroyed 12 and scattered the rest.

Wounded, he was transported to a hospital in Germany and then joined his comrades in a prison camp. There he organized a "University" and a committee for study of the arts. He used the first to lecture on the inevitable defeat of Germany, and the latter to stage a play where all the actors had to be in civilian garb. How much easier it was to escape in that costume! They did. Pierre Billotte eventually reached Soviet Russia and was interned again. He went from prison to prison, from camp to camp, including Katyn of sinister memory. Soon Russia entered the war: General Billotte represented General de Gaulle in Moscow and then returned to London by the long, circuitous way of the Spitzberg, and brought 186 Frenchmen out with him.

In London, de Gaulle made him chief of staff. For two years he helped prepare the liberation of France. Roosevelt rewarded him with a citation.

Now the war was on again on the Continent, and the General wanted to fight. He was nominated as national delegate to the French Resistance, but General Eisenhower expressed his opposition: the risk was too great because General Billotte had participated in planning the invasion. He wanted to rush in with an army of parachutists and land in the middle of the fight, in the Massif Central. Again the Allies held him back. Finally he was given command of a Leclerc brigade and fought in Normandy. He went on to Paris. He got there first, an hour and a half before the forces of General Leclerc—thus winning a bet he had made with him three years earlier. Then he went on to Lorraine, conquered the Vosges mountains, and fought at Colmar.

At the war's end he was in command of the Second Army Corps and Governor of Rhenania and Hesse-Nassau. Now his exceptional talents as an administrator found an immense field of action: Three million men to be fed, sheltered—in a word, kept alive—in the midst of rubble, where there was no bread, no coal, no roads. Everything had to be recreated or rebuilt.

In his "spare" time, he conceived a plan of collective security and disarmament which he took to de Gaulle. Though only 38, he was immediately entrusted with the highest functions in the Army.

Later he turned to politics: France was threatened with having a communist government formed through the collaboration of the socialists. He and his friends had much to do with removing that threat.

General Billotte was among the first to understand that the atomic hegemony of the United States made possible the defense of Europe, in spite of Soviet superiority in armaments. In 1946 he came to the United States to urge an Atlantic Pact, as a first step toward American union with Western Europe. He ran head on into a wall of objections: the fear of the military that at the first sign of help from the United States, Russia would be on the march; the certitude of the diplomats that the United States, faithful to the Monroe Doctrine, would never set foot out of its hemisphere in peace time. But the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact proved him right.

Note: Billotte is pronounced "bee-yott."

Farmers Union for Atlantic Resolution

Excerpt from a letter to Sen. Walter P. George from James A. Baker, Assistant to President James Patton, April 26th:

"We are taking this means of expressing our views concerning S. Con. Res. 12. This resolution proposed a conference of representatives of industrialized democratic nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with a view to broadening the basis of supranational cooperation to include economic and social policies in addition to security.

"Over a long period National Farmers Union has supported all efforts of the Congress to promote, encourage, facilitate and assist the economic growth and development of the free and democratic nations. The basic premise underlying all our testimony before the various Congressional committees on legislation, the objective of which is to strengthen the democratic world, is the deep-seated desire for peace which is grounded in farm areas of the nation.

"We have long urged the establishment of a Democratic World Economic Union, composed of nations that subscribe to the kind of democratic rights and privileges set forth in the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights. Such an economic union of democratic nations, we feel, would add materially in the rapid development and growth of free world economies and even more importantly bring us toward peace.

"We shall not attempt to elaborate further in this communication concerning the operation of such a union of democratic nations, primarily because the records of hearings before your committee already contain our views. We do want to support S. Con. Res. 12 because we feel a conference of representatives of the more highly developed democracies that are members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be a step in the right direction."

In Asia, however, General Billotte failed in similar efforts for the creation of a Pacific Pact. Six years of work ended in the collapse at Dien Bien Phu.

In 1950 General Billotte resigned from the Army and entered the political arena. He was elected to the National Assembly on the Gaullist ticket. Later he was one of the "dissident Gaullists" who broke away from that party.

General Billotte became a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; he was *rapporteur* for the Atlantic Pact and the Paris Accords bringing Germany into NATO. The gravity of the situation in North Africa induced him to accept the post of Minister of Defense in the Faure government in 1955. He voted for the dissolution of Parliament in the hope that France would give itself a strong government.

An ardent sportsman, General Billotte has taken part in rugby, swimming and boxing matches. He still skis and plays tennis. He also has an airplane pilot's license: Union Now and his own wartime experience made General Billotte a convinced believer in Atlantic Federal Union. He made a strong case for it in his book, *Le Temps du Choix,* which appeared in Paris in 1950 and shows a remarkable grasp of basic federal principles, and of economic and political as well as military affairs.

General Billotte for many years has been an active apostle of Atlantic Union in France. He helped found the French Atlantic Union Committee in 1951. He has visited the U. S. a number of times, speaks English well, and addressed the Congress of the Atlantic Union Committee in Memphis, Tennessee, in 1951.

On being elected recently to succeed Firmin Roz, the historian who retired at 90 as President of the French Atlantic Union Committee (see the May FREEDOM & UNION), General Billotte at once proposed that it be enlarged from a select committee of leading personalities into a popular movement. The Board a little later agreed to this, changed the organization's name to the *Mouvement pour l'Union Atlantique,* and adopted other Billotte plans for a press campaign and wide membership.

A man of vast vigor and great resources, to whom difficulties are only a chalienge, General Billotte takes the leadership for Atlantic Union in France at a most opportune time. He can be counted on to advance it rapidly and far.

—JEANNE DEFRANCE

Our Mission is Man, Billotte Book Says

General Billotte's book, *Le Temps de Choix* (The Time to Choose), published by Robert Laffont, Paris, 1950, is a thorough-going, deep delving and vigorously put analysis of the world situation. It concludes with a chapter urging Atlantic Union as the only solution. In early issues of FREEDOM & UNION we plan to publish this chapter, and another explaining why neither the U. S. alone or a United States of Europe is big enough for the needs of the time. The following excerpt from this book concerns the moral side of the problem.

WHEN WESTERN civilization had added to its spiritual motivation the material strength, which it then alone possessed, the Western world imagined that its reign was established by the unchanging Law of Nature. It ceased to be concerned with safeguarding the elements that made its strength.

Consider its unity. Born of the upheavals of the 16th century, both the nationalisms of the 19th century and the wars of the 20th have divided and exhausted the Western world to such an extent that the Soviet bloc has been able to infiltrate the diverse independent nations. . . .

Consider the West's material superiority. This was a temporary advantage that it soon had to share with others. The error of our time is to believe that the life of a civilization can be built enduringly on industrial and scientific progress. . . .

Consider the mission of the West. Its belief in Individual Man has changed. This belief embodied the spiritual principles of the Western world. It could have brought together the various religions and rallied the peoples of other races. But it suffered the worst of perversions from Hitlerian crimes and Fascist madness; colored races then partly turned their backs. China, an ancient nation where evolution moved slowly through the centuries, adopted in less than four years a regime where Man is merely the slave of the state. Southeast Asia, the Mid-East, Africa itself have been gradually infiltrated by the "inhuman" principles of Muscovite Marxism.

Although cleansed of Nazism and Fascism, the West has not regained integrally its conception of individual man. It has allowed the combined effects of the old errors and of the Stalinian poison to penetrate it. For the concept of the predominance of individual man there has been substituted a pernicious notion of "categories." Categories such as "classes," whose struggle is being gradually erected into a political and social system. Categories such as "parties," which dominate both individuals and states. Categories such as exacerbated nationalisms. Individual man —in the noblest meaning of the term— is being ground to dust between these "categories" which now dominate the Western world.

Western civilization is no longer the harmonious setting the individual needs in order to blossom and grow both personally and collectively. On the contrary, the contradiction in this dual human evolution raises problems which the worship of categories and the struggles that result make impossible to solve. Western civilization has too often become a battlefield where the sordid, clamorous clashes of the various categories are fought, over the body of individual man. . . .

Since the end of World War II these weaknesses have made it impossible for the West to create a wide political concept and have forced it instead into temporary expedients.



Billotte was recently Defense Minister

Here is important European news in the making—which author finds American newspapers, periodicals report competently, but . . .

Swiss Appraises U. S. Press in Europe

"I have just read Kenneth Counsell's article on foreign correspondents in Washington,"* writes E. J. B. Rose, director of the International Press Institute, of Zurich, Switzerland. "I wonder," he says, "if you have ever tackled the complementary subject of American newspaper coverage of, say, Asia, or even of Europe. I draw your attention to a study, published earlier this year, by Theodore Kruglak [*The Foreign Correspondents: A Study of the Men and Women Reporting for the American Information Media in Western Europe,* Librairie E. Droz, Geneva]."

The following article is a digest of Mr. Kruglak's study of "the people who are interpreting Europe to Americans"—reprinted from the *I.P.I. Report,* bulletin of the International Press Institute, with permission.—Editor

As befits a doctoral thesis, Professor Kruglak's work contains not a glimmer of the daredevil in the trenchcoat depicted on film and in novels. Instead he has amassed facts about real people which should prove fascinating to all American editors who consider foreign news an important part of their newspaper.

This is the first study anyone has made of the people who are interpreting Europe to Americans. The author found that in Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the German Federal Republic, Holland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trieste, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia) the correspondent corps population came to 396 persons. They report for 16 newspapers or syndicates, nine magazines, three major news agencies and three supplemental agencies, and three radio networks. Of the 286 full-time correspondents in the group, 169 work for the agencies. Specialized magazines and papers were not included in the study, nor were those people who cannot truly be said to give a significant portion of their time to gathering news.

By anonymous biographical questionnaire and personal interview, Professor Kruglak sought to determine the personal background, education, professional experience, salary, and attitude toward world problems of the correspondents. Not all the correspondents answered his questionnaires, and it would have been a physical impossibility to interview the entire group. However, nearly three-fourths of the questionnaires were returned, and almost 100 interviews conducted.

From the mass of material thus assembled, one thing is particularly noticeable: the differences between agency correspondents and the correspondents for the other media. The agency men are younger and given responsible positions at an earlier age. A higher percentage of them enter the correspondents corps with no previous journalistic experience (13 per cent as compared with less than five per cent for newspaper correspondents), or with less than five years experience (the American Newspaper Guild's level of maximum qualification). The agencies have the highest proportion (38.8 per cent) of correspondents who have been in their present posts for less than a year. The agency men, by their own evaluation, have the least proficiency in the foreign language of the country where they are stationed. They are the lowest paid group among United States personnel (as distinct from foreign nationals working for U.S. media). Approximately 30 per cent receive less than the Guild minimum for experienced reporters.

Criticizes Agency Reporters

Adding this all up, Professor Kruglak says that "it is possible to say that the news agency correspondents have lower professional qualifications for the job of reporting and interpreting the Western European scene than the correspondents in other media. Not that this is a judgment on the entire news agency corps. It merely indicates that there are more correspondents without a well-rounded background in the agency ranks than in other media." The bureau managers, or what the author calls the "elite" group, are an exception to most of these remarks, but here, again, they sometimes fall short of the "elite" of other media (correspondents responsible directly to editors in the U.S.) because they have been shifted too rapidly around Europe to become truly familiar with the scene, or have just arrived in Europe. Then too, their salaries are generally lower than the elite of other media; as a consequence they are frequently hired away from the agencies, which are considered "good training ground" by other media.

*"Curious Case of the Missing Correspondents," by Kenneth Counsell, FREEDOM & UNION, April, 1956

Added to all this is the fact that in the smaller countries, where the agencies provide virtually all the coverage, agency correspondents are frequently expected not only to collect news for home consumption but also to supply and sell news to the agency clients in that country. . . . It is important to keep in mind that the agencies are the primary, and in some places the only, source of news for American papers.

Another interesting aspect of the correspondents corps is the status of the non-American working for American media. Here a few figures are pertinent. Of the 176 American citizens who are full-time correspondents in Western Europe, approximately 92 per cent are stationed in the U.K., France, Germany and Italy. The other eight per cent are scattered throughout the other countries, and these are chiefly news agency men. Of the 44 news agency correspondents in these other countries, about 82 per cent are non-American citizens.

Who are they? A look at their professional qualifications is helpful. A greater proportion of them come from non-journalism backgrounds than is the case with the American correspondents. Their ranks include former lawyers, teachers, economists, engineers, chemists and students. However, in length of experience in journalism they compare favorably with the Americans, and their time spent within the country where they are stationed is usually a good bit longer. With the exception of the newspaper elite, twice as many of them have had pre-war experience in Europe as their American colleagues. The language problem, so far as the country where they are stationed is concerned, is presumably non-existent. However there is the question of their ability to speak and write English. One failing, according to American correspondents, is their unfamiliarity with the American idiom and with American history and political affairs.

What about political pressures on these nationals? The author says that they are relatively free of it. "Only in Spain, Portugal, or possibly Yugoslavia might a non-American correspondent risk bodily danger or arrest or expulsion by reporting news detrimental to or critical of his country's policies." There is fear elsewhere, however, and the author cites an Austrian correspondent who pointed out that whereas Oatis was finally released, the Czechs who worked for the Associated Press in Prague are "either dead or in jail." This has not contributed to the calm of non-U.S. personnel in several other countries where a change in government could result in a spy trial, according to the author.

Most American correspondents interviewed by Professor Kruglak felt that important stories should be written by Americans, not merely because of possible bias, but more importantly, because the non-Americans lacked knowledge of what a story must contain for American understanding of its significance.

Full-Time U.S. Correspondents In Western Europe

*6 News Agencies**	
U.S. Citizens	84
Non-U.S. Citizens	85
Total	169
16 Newspapers or Syndicates	
U.S. Citizens	52
Non-U.S. Citizens	17
Total	69
9 Magazines	
U.S. Citizens	27
Non-U.S. Citizens	7
Total	34
3 Radio Networks	
U.S. Citizens	13
Non-U.S. Citizens	1
Total	14
Total full-time correspondents	286

*Includes 3 supplemental agencies

The non-American correspondent has distinction of a sort, or, as Professor Kruglak puts it, "it is interesting to compare the non-American news agency and newspaper correspondents' salaries with the American Newspaper Guild minimum rates. Eighty-six per cent of the non-American news agency personnel and 76.9 per cent of the newspaper correspondents earn less than Guild minimum." He adds that none of the non-American magazine correspondents are below the Guild level. If one takes the British National Union of Journalists' minimum salary of $2,100 as a criterion for a non-American's salary, instead of the Guild minimum of $6,760 for foreign correspondents (or $5,720 for an American agency reporter with five years' experience or $6,240 for newspaper reporters) the non-American salaries show up better. Sixty per cent of the non-American news agency correspondents and almost 70 per cent of the newspaper correspondents are well above the NUJ minimum scale, and only one full-time correspondent reported getting less.

Non-Americans Predominate

Professor Kruglak says, "When a low salary can be combined with the ability to act in a dual role, the non-American is more likely to be employed. With wage levels in the U.S. constantly rising, it is apparent that the news agencies . . . will find the wage differential between American and non-American correspondents abroad even greater than it is today. The tendency inevitably must be toward hiring more non-American correspondents abroad."

Among American correspondents there appears to be a great waste stemming from the high turnover within the corps. Some leave for better-paying jobs; some are transferred to jobs in the U.S. as executives or Washington correspondents; some cannot adjust to European living conditions, and a few are fired for incompetence. . . . A common reason for a correspondent's returning to the U.S., often after a tour of duty of two or three years, is that the glamour of Europe cannot compete with the conveniences at home so far as his wife and children are concerned. Thus the correspondent leaves just as he acquires value insofar as knowledge of the country he is reporting is concerned.

Basic to the whole problem of foreign correspondence is the fact that there are not enough correspondents to cover the field. Although the agencies have the most manpower, it is barely adequate for their primary task of covering "spot news"—anytime and anywhere. The newspapers, magazines and radio concentrate their correspondents in the four countries mentioned above, leaving the rest of Western Europe to roving reporters or part-time correspondents. The author says, "The manpower shortage is further aggravated by the relatively few magazines, newspapers and radio stations that employ correspondents abroad. . . Nor do these

media have equal personnel. Many of the newspapers are trying to cover Europe with one correspondent, while only one newspaper, one radio network and one news magazine have correspondents outside the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany." He goes on to say that the contribution of the part-time correspondent to this strength is debatable. It is obviously easier and quicker for him to copy the local newspaper's crime story than to dig for the interpretive article, and, at least so far as newspapers are concerned, he will seldom receive more than $25 for either story.

Turnover Too Great?

What can be done to improve the correspondents corps? Professor Kruglak starts with the agencies. He suggests that the gathering of news and the sale and transmission of news are two distinct operations, and should be kept separate. The news agencies should improve their methods of hiring. Inexperienced personnel — "fresh blood" — should not be eliminated, but there should be a better balance between inexperienced and experienced correspondents. Salaries should be on a graduated scale in keeping with experience and ability. A correspondent starting his second tour of duty should receive greater financial incentive to remain in Europe and with the agency.

The news agency elite should have greater inducements — financial and otherwise—to stay in Europe and with the agency; otherwise the draining off of the cream of the agency force in Europe will continue.

In the newspaper field, the author points to some 85 American newspapers with over 100,000 circulation which are prestige papers "in the sense that they exercise national or regional influence in social or political affairs." More than half of them are monopolies in the local field; nearly half of them own an important radio station and a third also own a television station in the same city. He suggests that the executives of such organizations owe it to their positions in their areas to be leaders in the presentation of foreign news. One way to achieve this would be the organization of newspaper pools. Professor Kruglak feels that for interpretive reporting on an adequate scale, eight correspondents, to be stationed in London, Paris, Frankfurt, Rome, Geneva, Vienna, Stockholm and Madrid, would be necessary. For this, an American newspaper participating in a four-newspaper pool would contribute the services of two correspondents. (It is estimated that a newspaper in the 100,000 circulation class must add approximately one per cent to its editorial budget to establish a *four*-man foreign correspondents staff.) These two would file their stories to their own paper, which in turn would teletype the stories to the three other member papers.

Pooling arrangements can also cut across media lines. Professor Kruglak remarks that "The publisher (who also owns radio and television outlets) who divides the services of correspondents among his own media probably obtains the maximum value from the correspondent's service. The iteration of the correspondent's by-line in the newspaper, his voice over the radio and, when possible, his face on television, create a continuing impression of authority.

Experienced correspondents must be hired for such a job, and luring the top-flight news agency correspondents with more money will not increase the overall corps unless this competition results in a higher wage scale which would keep other foreign correspondents abroad. The author feels a better source would be "the hard core of experienced newspaper, magazine, or radio correspondents who are working as free-lance journalists in Europe." Their earning level is equal to that of the average agency correspondent but not equal to the pay of other media correspondents. They are experienced and know the country in which they live, and its language.

Professor Kruglak's parting shot indicates whence the initial impulse for any improvement of foreign coverage must come:

"Providing the data upon which an informed public opinion is based is not the sole responsibility of the foreign correspondent. It devolves upon the owners of the American information media as well.

"To achieve this goal, some improvement in the training and selection of foreign correspondents is necessary, but above all there must be a sincere desire upon the part of the owners of the press and radio to give their readers and listeners more European information than the media now offer and believe the American public want, and to present it within a framework of understanding and perspective."

"Life" Editorial Honors George Lehleitner

GEORGE LEHLEITNER, *whose article, "Hawaiian Statehood Would Win Friends for the U. S. in Asia," appeared in our May issue, has received a quite unusual tribute from LIFE magazine. In an editorial it devoted on May 7 to Mr. Lehleitner's "Tennessee Plan" for Alaskan statehood, which was published in the April* FREEDOM & UNION, *LIFE said:*

"Hats off to Mr. George Lehleitner, a refrigerator dealer of New Orleans. His private hobby looks as if it would yield a big benefit to Alaska, to Hawaii and therefore to the U. S. When he was in Hawaii as a troopship commander during the war, Mr. Lehleitner was outraged to discover that American citizens were being governed like pre-Revolutionary colonists; so from pure disinterested conviction he began working for Hawaiian statehood as soon as he got out of the Navy. Later he visited Alaska and took on that cause as well. He is a scholarly as well as an energetic man, a walking encyclopedia of U. S. constitutional history.

"With some help from the Library of Congress he turned up an almost forgotten method by which seven earlier states got into the union. Calling it the Tennessee plan, after the first state to use it, he sold it last winter to leading Alaskans, and the people of Alaska have just voted to adopt it by nearly two to one.

"It consists of acting like a state before becoming one: electing two Senators and a representative and sending them to the Capitol to lobby until they are seated . . .

"We hope they get results, and that Mr. George Lehleitner proves as good a political prophet as he is a constitutional scholar. It is always a pleasure to see peopeople claim their right to self-government . . . The case for Hawaii has long been overwhelming; now the Alaskans have added a lot of punch to theirs—punch soundly based on historical precedent and the traditions of the American frontier."

[United Nations Review]

Middle East Taxes U.N. Diplomacy

By THOMAS J. HAMILTON
U.N. Correspondent for the N.Y. Times

United Nations, N. Y.

IT IS A PITY, from the standpoint of both the United Nations and the prestige of the Secretary General, that the world expected so much from his mission to the Middle East.

The Palestine problem, even before the emergence of the Soviet Union as a Middle Eastern power, was one that did not yield to dramatic efforts. Ever since 1949, when the armistice agreements were signed, it has become more and more complex as a result of the decline of Western power in the area and the resulting increase in Arab demands.

Now, with the Soviet Union arranging with Czechoslovakia to supply jet planes and other equipment to Egypt, the best that can be hoped for is a partial solution. And since the U.S., Britain and France have agreed to seek a solution in the U.N., the Soviet veto in the Security Council—and what amounts to an Arab veto in the General Assembly—inevitably limit the possibilities of action.

—Burck, Chicago Sun-Times
"—And he rent him . . ."

Limited Objectives

In such a situation, Mr. Hammarskjold was inevitably limited to two basic objectives: to stop the fighting (which flared up again between the time the Security Council asked him to undertake the mission and his arrival on the scene); and to patch up the machinery for detecting and (one may hope) preventing incidents along the armistice lines.

These two aims he has accomplished, but the broader issues—the Palestine Arab refugees and the development of the Jordan river, the acceptance by the Arab States of either the present or revised boundaries of Israel, indeed the acceptance of Israel as a fact—remain.

Mr. Hammarskjold felt that under his overall powers as Secretary General, which are set forth in Article 99 of the Charter, he had the right to take up these larger issues even though they were not included in his mandate from the Security Council.

However, he returned impressed with the enormity of the task, which certainly is enough to strain all the resources of the United Nations. Even apart from the Soviet veto, the admission of the 16 new members last December, and the fact that they are predominantly neutralist or Communist, has effected a basic change in the nature of the U.N.

The organization is no longer in a position to use force, and henceforth it must confine itself mainly to an attempt to settle great political issues, including Israel-Arab relations, by conciliation and compromise.

Mr. Hammarskjold, both by temperament and by the training he had as a Swedish civil servant, is well suited for this task. But there are limits to what the ablest diplomat can accomplish unless he has sufficient backing in military and economic power as a last resort.

These resources, of course, would have to be supplied by the U.S., Britain—and France if the French Government can find sufficient energy to deal with anything besides Algeria. But the Western Powers had no common policy when Mr. Hammarskjold left, and indeed it is clear that the mission was proposed in the hope that within a month they would be able to produce one.

The discussions between the Big Three foreign ministers during the NATO meeting in Paris, which coincided with the end of Mr. Hammarskjold's mission, again failed to solve the fundamental dilemma—should the Western Powers provide Israel with planes to ward off the threat of the Czechoslovak planes Egypt is now learning to use, or should they continue, as Mr. Dulles says, to try to cultivate friendly relations with both sides?

Since this is an election year, the Palestine issue presents domestic as well as foreign policy issues for the Eisenhower Administration, and its situation is not one to be envied.

In any event, it was obviously useless to rush into a Security Council meeting to examine Mr. Hammarskjold's report unless and until a Western policy could be developed.

Despite the fact that Mr. Hammarskjold had been given a deadline for submitting his report, so that it would assist the Council in deciding what further action would be required, an awkward period of waiting developed after his return.

Indeed the Secretary General himself counseled delay, and if he had had any earlier plans for a second trip to the Middle East under his overall powers, he gave them up.

Soviet Consent Needed

The situation in which the U.N. now finds itself is assuredly difficult, and the best that can now be hoped is that fighting will not be resumed. If this is achieved, the Security Council will have time to try partial solutions of individual problems.

This will require the consent of the Soviet Union if anything is to be accomplished, and it remains to be seen whether the Russians want to continue to keep the situation off balance, or have now decided that it is dangerous to continue to encourage the Arabs. But the first necessity, of course, is the formulation of a Western policy.

The Secretary of State told of the "turning point" NATO Council session in Paris May 6-7 in this talk which he gave in Washington May 8.

Dulles Reports on NATO Decision

ALL WHO KNOW and share Western civilization can take great pride in its accomplishments. It was based upon the Judeo-Christian conception of the spiritual nature of man. Out of this faith came individual resourcefulness and a sense of mission which brought much of good to much of the world.

But when we think with pride of what Western civilization has accomplished, we must also think with regret of the fact that it has never yet found the way to live within itself at peace. If today the West is seriously challenged by believers in an atheistic creed, it is largely because two world wars, coming in quick succession, drained off the life blood of our finest and bravest youth and gravely impaired the economic strength of the West. Also the West has lost in moral authority because, while professing a religion of peace, it has not found a sure way to make peace a permanent reality within its own membership.

Great Strides Taken

Since the end of World War II, great strides have been taken to create unity at various levels within the Atlantic Community. . . .

The broadest effort at unity is represented by the North Atlantic Treaty itself, now embracing 15 nations, including two from this hemisphere—Canada and the United States. Under this Treaty great progress has been made, particularly in military terms. There is an integration of military forces on the Continent of Europe, including contributions from Great Britain, Canada, and the U.S., the like of which has never been seen before. The newly developing forces of the Federal Republic of Germany will share that integration.

The military unity under NATO is supplemented by the new (1954) treaty for Western European Union which unites France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the three Benelux countries under a system for limitation of armament and of armament supervision and control. . . .

In addition to these efforts on the military front, there is the Coal and Steel Community whereby France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries deal with the production of coal and steel. . . .

There is the Council of Europe, where Ministers and Parliamentarians of European countries regularly meet for discussion of matters other than defense. There is the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and the European Payments Union..

But at Paris last week we had to ask ourselves whether what has been done is good enough. There has been a marked development of the consultative process. But it still remains the fact that matters of vital importance to the Atlantic Community are not being given timely consideration on a community basis . . . .

The problem of the Middle East . . . had never been seriously discussed by the North Atlantic Treaty Council even though the future of Western Europe is deeply engaged by developments there.

We have seen, in North Africa, where serious disturbances within a part of the North Atlantic Treaty area have brought about a shifting of forces from continental Europe which alters the capability of defense as against a possible aggression from Eastern Europe.

There is the problem of Cyprus which deeply concerns three parties to the North Atlantic Treaty—the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey.

I do not suggest that any of these problems should today be made a matter of common consideration around the NATO Council table. At the point to which these particular problems have now developed, there can reasonably be questions as to whether consultation is or is not desirable. Neither do I imply any criticism of the past, for there has never been agreement or understanding that problems of this type should be discussed. But surely the Atlantic Community is not adequately organized if matters of this nature, which could shake the Community to its foundation, develop over the years without any effort at broad consultation between the members.

Then there is the problem of the reunification of Germany. That subject was discussed by the NATO foreign ministers at special meetings which were held just prior to the Geneva "Summit" Conference with the Soviet rulers and before the Four Power Foreign Ministers Conference which followed. But, as we know, the Geneva Agreement by Messrs. Bulganin and Khrushchev on "the reunification of Germany by means of free elections" has been ignored by them and they now unashamedly continue the division of Germany as though

Model of new home for NATO made by French architect Jacques Carlu. This six-story "magnet" is to rise in Paris where the Avenue Foch ends in the Bois de Boulogne.

—Photo by NATO Information Service



on to Explore Unity

they had never agreed to the principle of reunification. . . .

Then we have the problem of the relation of the Atlantic Community to the newly independent nations of the world. They now represent upwards of 650 million people, composing 18 independent nations, and more non-self-governing peoples are at the threshold of independence or knocking at the door. What has happened is an amazing tribute to the basic beliefs of the West in the rights of man and in government by consent. Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to conclude that, because these newly independent peoples have peacefully won their independence from the Western powers, relations are in all respects good. In many cases there remain unresolved problems between the newly independent countries and the colonial powers. Above all, there remain barriers in terms of sensitiveness to racial arrogance which has at times been practiced by some persons of the West.

One-third of the world's population is ruled by Communist despots. Another third are new nations which are today the special target of the predatory tactics of international communism, which seeks to stimulate the prejudices and to appeal to the aspirations of these peoples.

The members of the Atlantic Community have so much to offer in the way of genuine brotherhood—they can do so much to strengthen the political and economic institutions of the newly independent peoples—that it is tragic that the outcome is anywhere in doubt. Certainly, as was often said at our Paris meeting last week, NATO, until now primarily military in its nature, is no proper organ for implementing political and economic policies between the Atlantic Community and the newly independent countries.

But the Community does contain, within its own membership, nations which themselves have been through the experience of being colonies and winning their independence. Also it contains colonial powers which have demonstrated and are illustrating great statesmanship in promoting evolution from colonialism to independence. Surely the members of such a community could generate greater dynamism to help, in acceptable ways, to sustain political and economic independence elsewhere. Also we should be able to help to find relationships expressive of true brotherhood and recognition of the fact that other civilizations than our own have immense values. We perhaps have material and technical things to give.

Balance Not One-Sided

They also have things to give. And if we are wise enough to perceive and to take what other civilizations have to offer, the balance struck between us will not be one-sided by any true measure of values, and will be consistent with the equal dignity of all the parties.

It may be said that the North Atlantic Treaty members already have a permanent Council where problems can be discussed which vitally affect the welfare and integrity of the Atlantic Community. There is a Council composed of permanent representatives who are men of stature and great ability. In theory, they could discuss any problems of common concern. The fact is that, as they are now established, their discussions often have been merely reports of actions already taken or decisions already made.

That is because the governments concerned have never taken the basic decision to have a council to which problems affecting the Atlantic Community would normally and regularly be brought. If that decision were taken, it would greatly alter the entire character of the Community relationship. It would not require different personalities at the Council table, but a different approach and far greater "depth" in terms of political advisers than is now the case. But above all is the basic decision to take seriously the unity of the Atlantic Community and seek to promote it, not by super-government, but by common counsel.



Dulles Finds Many Ties Unite Atlantica

REFERRING TO THE THINGS the democracies of the Atlantic Community have in common, Secretary Dulles said in his major speech on April 23rd:

"Our nations basically have so much in common that we should be able to do more in common. . . . All of our peoples embrace a religious faith which makes atheistic materialism seem abhorrent to them. We have a common sense of moral values. Our political institutions predominantly reflect democratic conceptions which had their origin in Greece, and legal institutions which had their origins in Rome.

"Our economies are similar. We believe in and encourage the private ownership of property, and there is a large and flourishing trade between our countries. Our educational systems are much the same and provide a broad basis for the free exchange of views and the gaining of common understanding. And not only do we have this firm foundation, but also we hold in common many guiding principles of action which should enable us to develop practically our fellowship."

Such a decision has not yet been taken, except in military terms.

This was the problem which was most actively discussed at Paris during the past week. In that connection we discussed the Soviet threat—the acts of violence which had marked Soviet foreign policy until recently and the latest changes in that policy. We recorded the fact that it was our joint military efforts which had successfully deterred Soviet aggression in Europe and contributed to the adoption by the Soviet Government of the so-called "policy of coexistence."

Our joint communiqué said that, to the extent that this Soviet policy involves a certain easing of tension and the admission by the Government of the Soviet Union that war is not inevitable, it is welcomed by the Atlantic Powers. But also we recorded our joint conclusion that the reasons which gave rise to the Atlantic military alliance have not disappeared and that the Western Powers cannot relax their vigilance while many outstanding problems have not been solved and when there is no effective disarmament plan. . . .

Then we went on to record what may prove to be a historic decision. The communiqué said that "the Atlantic Council considered it timely and useful for the members of the Atlantic Community to examine actively further measures which might be taken at this time to advance more effectively their common interests." And the Foreign Ministers went on to designate three of their members to advise **"on ways and means to improve and extend cooperation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic Community."** The three Ministers were asked to submit their report as soon as possible.

It is significant of the importance attached to this matter that the task of exploration was given to, and assumed by, three foreign ministers themselves—the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Italy and Norway. They are each men of wide experience, each of whom personally believes in the development of the Atlantic Community both on a broad base and, within the framework of that broad base, as between groups of members which can in certain respects work together with greater intimacy than can the whole. These three Ministers will be conferring with each of the 15 Governments during the coming weeks and, in the light of what they learn, will submit a report, perhaps early next fall, which the Governments then can further consider from the standpoint of further action.

It would, I think, be prudent to note that there is as yet no clear definition of the concept of closer Atlantic unity. And we could hardly expect acceptance in advance.

The U.S. perhaps can visualize that

Federal Union's "Million-Dollar Answer"

FEDERAL UNION, INC., publisher of FREEDOM & UNION, states in its report for 1955 its total income and expenditure since its incorporation in 1940 as a membership association has now passed the $1,000,000 mark. Its 1955 income was $83,834. The report, entitled "The Million Dollar Answer," says:

"An answer to a major problem that wins a million dollars in voluntary support from the public may be called a 'million-dollar answer,' at a time when television has drawn such attention to $64,000 questions.

"In the 15 years and seven months from its incorporation as a non-profit, educational membership association to the end of 1955 Federal Union received $1,048,393 to advance the purpose for which it was incorporated: 'education in the basic principles of federal union as exemplified in the Constitution of the United States, with a view to attaining world order by a Federal Union of Democratic Peoples.' . . . It spent on educational work in those years a grand total of $1,030,435, including $81,815 in 1955. . . .

"We mounted to the Million-Dollar-Answer level step by step through more than 15 years of struggling to survive, often from month to month, even from week to week. Federal Union grew from only an idea, an Answer, largely through myriad dues, contributions, and subscription fees $1 to $10. Many of these have been repeated for 5, 10, 15 or more years by devoted men and women who would not take *No* for the answer. Less than 20 per cent came in contributions of more than $1,000. . . . Federal Union has never received a grant from a major foundation. In a world where the majority of new corporations formed each year, profit or non-profit, perish within five years, Federal Union has existed for fifteen."

Federal Union's annual income, the report says, has ranged from a low of $26,098 in 1943 to a high of $101,256 in 1941, and its expenditures from $22,346 in 1943 to $101,709 in 1949. Measured by 5-year periods, its income has steadily risen; 1955's was above the highest 5-year average. Most of the 12-page report reviews the "new heights" the organization's work attained in 1955. It includes a concise statement of the Federal Union "Answer."

concept more readily because of its membership in the Organization of American States. That Organization traces its origin back 66 years to the foundation of the Pan American Union. It is not only the oldest but by far the most effective regional organization which has been created. It deals effectively with problems as between its members, and has conspicuously done so within the last year or two in relation to the broad threat of international communism, and in relation to particular situations such as those that arose in Guatemala, in Costa Rica and as between Ecuador and Peru. It seeks to develop hemispheric international law.

It is obvious that the Organization of American States, which has developed in a particular environment to deal with problems typical of this hemisphere, cannot usefully be duplicated in detail as regards the Atlantic Community. Each community is distinctive. But the experience which the U. S. has had, in cooperation with the other American Republics, enables us perhaps to see more clearly the possibilities inherent in the Atlantic Community.

Speaking on April 23 prior to this last meeting of the NATO Council, I said, "The North Atlantic Treaty already serves as an indispensable and vital instrument of the Atlantic Community, but the time has come, I believe, to consider whether its organization does not need to be further developed if it is adequately to serve the needs of this and coming generations. If that be the common desire of the NATO member nations, the U.S. will join eagerly in exploring the possibilities which now beckon us forward."

It is gratifying to report that it is the common desire of the NATO member nations at least to explore these new possibilities. That decision was taken, not lightly, but after a discussion which prolonged our meeting of Friday and Saturday into the early hours of Sunday morning. It was recognized by all as being a decision which could be of historic importance, since it could contribute mightily toward erasing what has been the great weakness of the West—namely, its disunity. To erase that disunity, which has given birth to so many tragic consequences, is one of the greatest tasks of postwar statesmanship.

NATO Council Session Communique

The following final communique was issued in Paris, May 6, after the NATO *Council of Ministers meeting there:*

1. The Atlantic powers, seven years ago, entered into the North Atlantic treaty in face of the Communist threat to their common ideals and civilization. For they had seen imperiled all the human rights which their peoples regard as essential for their life and freedom, particularly representative government, freedom of the individual, the rule of law and liberty of the press. . . .

2. The collective defense efforts of the Atlantic powers have not been in vain. They have successfully deterred Soviet aggression in Europe and have contributed to the adoption by the Soviet government of the so-called policy of co-existence.

To the extent that this policy involves a certain easing of tension and the admission by the government of the U.S.S.R. that war is not inevitable, it is welcomed by the Atlantic powers, who have always supported this idea. It is now possible to hope that those principles of the United Nations Charter which have regulated the relations between the peoples of the Atlantic community may eventually also regulate the relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers.

3. The reasons which gave rise to the Atlantic alliance have not, however, disappeared. No progress has been made towards solving certain vital European problems including the reunification of Germany in freedom, which have to be solved on a basis which would satisfy the legitimate security needs of all. The Western powers cannot relax their vigilance until these problems have been solved and until a disarmament plan providing the necessary guarantees to all and an effective control system has been put into effect.

Soviet military power continues to increase. Security remains therefore a basic problem, and the Atlantic powers must continue to give priority to the maintenance of their unity and strength. However, present prospects seem to leave scope for further peaceful initiatives on the part of the Atlantic powers. They are determined to pursue these initiatives with the same energy that they displayed in building up their defense organization and with which this will be maintained.

They solemnly affirm that this policy will be pursued in common and based on the unity, solidarity and co-operation of peoples sharing common ideals and standing together in the cause of freedom.

4. The Atlantic Council consider it timely and useful for the members of the Atlantic community to examine actively further measures which might be taken at this time to advance more effectively their common interests. The Atlantic powers already are a forum for consultation regarding policies of general interest. In order to enable the council better to perform these tasks, the ministers agreed to appoint a committee of three ministers to advise the council on ways and means to improve and extend NATO co-operation in non-military fields and to develop greater unity within the Atlantic community. The committee of three was requested to submit its report as soon as possible.

5. In the meantime, the Council agreed:

(A) To undertake periodic examinations of the political aspects of economic problems.

(B) To strengthen economic co-operation between member countries, to seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies, and to promote conditions of stability and well-being.

(C) To instruct the permanent representatives of the Council to examine economic problems in the light of the ideas set out above and of the plan put forward by M. Pineau, Foreign Minister of France, calling upon the services of a committee of technical advisers working under their authority.

6. Members of NATO are by their treaty dedicated to "safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." Their first seven years of working together have resulted in marked success and have strengthened the bonds between them. The members of NATO are determined to remain united and steadfast to their ideals. They face the future with confidence.

Kefauver in Campaign Urges Atlantic Convention

Senator Kefauver gave the following address to the faculty and student body of Vassar College at Poughkeepsie, N. Y. on April 26:

I WAS GLAD to note that here in New York Mr. Dulles this week turned the debate into a phase of our foreign relations which has given me considerable concern. This is our relations with our fellow Western democracies of the North Atlantic.

Not long ago I was rereading some of the files that I have accumulated through the years in the Senate, and ran across a report which I felt was quite incisive. It was dated April 2, 1952, and outlined some of the developments within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization during its first year of existence. It included this statement which I shall read in full:

"As we look back over these developments, it seems almost as if the nations of the West have been, for decades, blindly enacting parts in a drama that could have been written by Lenin, prophet of militant communistic expansion. This pattern of events, which points so surely to ultimate disaster, can be changed if only the peoples of the West have the wisdom to make a complete break with many things of the past and show a willingness to do something new and challenging. NATO itself is a significant step to meet both the present danger of aggression and the tragic struggles and dissensions that have divided our peoples in the past. But NATO's development is not automatic: action is the test."

Agreement Needed

The report went on to say that if "the free nations are to remain secure, our peoples must march together, agreed on common goals, and win that cooperative unity possible only in a free society."

Now personally I found myself in agreement with the sentiments expressed in that report at the time I originally read it in April of 1952. I find myself in agreement with them now. The report was signed by Dwight D. Eisenhower, then Supreme Commander of NATO.

This week I was interested in reading in Mr. Dulles' remarks this statement:

"The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is another organization which, in its own distinctive way, contains the possibilities of great development. It was, to be sure, conceived primarily as a military alliance, and that aspect of the organization remains vitally important. But the organization can and should be more."

Mr. Dulles continued:

"The historic weakness of the West has been its disunity. Out of this disunity came wars which have taken the lifeblood of its finest youth and weakened its economies. A major task of postwar statesmanship was to find the ways whereby the West can maintain its solidarity . . ."

I find myself also in agreement with these remarks of the Secretary of State concerning NATO. But I am wondering what has happened in between April 2, 1952, when Eisenhower spoke from his post of Supreme Commander, and April 23, 1956, when Dulles spoke as Secretary of State in an Eisenhower Cabinet.

Just a little over a year after his report, General Eisenhower became President Eisenhower. He then had the office and the authority to seek to bring about the conditions that he believed beneficial. But where is the action that he spoke about as the test?

There has been none.

In 1952 General Eisenhower wrote that "the enormity of the present threat will never be met by half-hearted measures." And he continued: "Required is the full awakening of the free world and the pursuit of energetic, far-reaching measures to insure our form of life —even our survival."

But what has President Eisenhower done since he entered the White House to awaken the free world to the enormity of the threat to which he called attention so ringingly in April 1952? I leave it to you and to him to decide.

Do I need to prove to any of you that the threat remains enormous still? Would you say that the free world needs to be awakened to it any less now than in April 1952. The one thing that President Eisenhower has done which gained the most attention in the world was to go to the Summit Conference in Geneva. But no one would say that its purpose or result was to awaken the free world to the enormity of the threat it faces.

Sees West Weaker

Where are the "energetic, far-reaching measures"? I search my memory and can recall the Marshall Plan, NATO, Point 4—all adopted under the administration of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman. But what has the Eisenhower administration proposed?

During the past 4 years, rather than improving, our relations have deteriorated badly. The fact is that the Atlantic Community's continued disunion has left the West far weaker in April 1956 than it was in April 1952. With the Mediterranean — the whole southern flank of the Atlantic alliance—seething from one end to the other, I am sure that I need not convince you that there is serious need for improvement in the alliance. We are today weaker in important areas of Africa and Asia. Need I do more than mention Indochina, India, the Middle East, Cyprus, Tunis, Algeria, Morocco?

Our relationships will continue to deteriorate, in my judgment, unless we take some of the bold and imaginative steps that President Eisenhower called for but then failed to carry out. I note in Secretary Dulles' present speech the glimmer of hope that something may now be done. He says that the Canadian Government "has notably espoused this point (that NATO can be more than a military alliance)."

What has the Canadian Government done? It has done only what I have long proposed that our own Government do, and which only our Government can do successfully, because only it has the geographic location, prestige, and strength to provide the necessary leadership.

On February 9, 1955, I introduced

in the Senate a resolution which I have had pending from time to time for a much longer period. This resolution, simply provides that the President call a convention of the other sponsors of the NATO agreements to meet and determine what steps they might take to forge unity in their military, economic, and political policies. It is known as the Atlantic Union Resolution.

I have no partisan interest in this resolution. The Marshall Plan, NATO, Point 4, all were adopted with Republican support. Some of us remember that the proposal for a League of Nations was put forth first by a Republican, former President William Howard Taft whom Woodrow Wilson defeated in the 1912 election. But in May 1916, Wilson announced his support of a League of Nations, at a dinner presided over by former President Taft.

Many people have forgotten that Wilson took over the proposal of the league from Taft. Once he adopted the idea, it was his. And so it can be with Eisenhower. If I sought personal political advantage, I would wait until after Congress adjourns to make this speech, but now there is time for Eisenhower to provide the leadership within his party necessary to fulfill the desires that both he and his Secretary of State have expressed.

The convention, let me emphasize, would be one at which free peoples would meet together to discuss the desire and hopes and dreams of the entire free world searching for a common policy, the purpose of which would be to make freedom itself more secure.

Whatever proposals they in their wisdom adopted would have to be ratified by the respective nations according to their own constitutional prerogatives. To fear such a meeting is to fear democracy itself.

And democracy cannot be strong, nor can it be democracy, if it is afraid.

What we seek is unity of purpose.

Only good can come from intensifying that search.

* * *

There follows a radio and television address given by Senator Kefauver in Pensacola, Fla., on April 30.

I want to talk about a significant new development, which is now in the process of formation in the foreign policy of our Nation.

It is important that we consider it, because foreign policy—the question of peace or war—is by far the over-riding question with which you and I are faced today or any day.

Our economic structure, our jobs, our farm income, the highways and roads that we build, the schools that we construct, our social-security system—all of these are of necessity tailored to the question of whether we are in the shadow of war or on the brink of peace.

The peace and security of your family and mine is based as much upon decisions that may be made 3,000 miles from here as they are on the decisions that we ourselves made at our breakfast table this morning.

Tomorrow the Secretary of State will leave Washington for Paris to attend a session of the North Atlantic Council. He has said that he has some thoughts to exchange on the question of transforming the North Atlantic Alliance into a broader association of free nations. He has said that without cutting back western military strength, the foreign-policy accent of the United States should be shifted to the economic and political fields.

My reaction is, it's about time.

This is the emphasis that I have been seeking to achieve in our policy toward the Western nations every since I became a Member of the Senate.

It is most certainly the emphasis that I would pursue should I be chosen as the next President of the United States.

Therefore, I can wholeheartedly give my support and encouragement to the Secretary in his present mission—and say that this is at least one trip on his part which I consider is necessary.

In adopting this new attitude, it is my feeling that the Secretary of State is at long last expressing the kind of sentiments which find their birth within the mainstream of American thinking and culture. A brief review of the development of our North Atlantic relationships will, I believe, bear that out.

Five years have passed since a President of the United States who has been much abused and much criticized, but who will go down in history as a man who made the right decisions on the big issues, signed the NATO agreements. I am speaking, of course, of President Truman. This NATO agreement was a dramatic—and a highly successful—step in the effort to control and contain militant communism.

From its very inception, it seems to me, these Western demorcaries which entered into the NATO agreements were taking a step which inevitably would grow and develop into a new concept of relationships among nations.

In the North Atlantic Treaty itself they declared themselves "determined to safeguard the freedom, common heri-

Whether it's Uni-ty or Uni-on, it's whale of a good idea

tage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."

They agreed, in article 2 of the treaty, to "contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions." They agreed to "seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies." They agreed to "encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."

Now why was it that they could do that? The reason was simply that we are so much alike—we residents of the United States and Canada and England, and the free nations of Europe. We may have differences in accents and languages, but we are alike in our love of freedom, in our respect for the dignity of every man, in our fierce belief in democratic institutions, in our pursuit of liberty.

Basically, however, despite these larger concepts, the NATO agreements were and have remained treaties of military agreement.

For a long time I have thought they should be more. You see, wars do not just occur. More often than not we stumble into them. Like all disputes, an action here, a word there, a misunderstanding, an underestimation—these are the things of which wars are made. I therefore felt that since we were binding ourselves, one to the other, to fight one for all, we ought to have some kind of channel—some kind of arrangement—by which we could also forge common policies for peace. . . .

We did, nevertheless, maintain excellent relationships with our Western friends for the succeeding few years. Then our entire Atlantic policy went into eclipse. Why was this?

In the first place, with the advent of the Eisenhower administration, those of us who believed in an enlightened foreign policy, including the President himself, found it necessary to spend a great part of our time in a type of guerrilla warfare against powerful go-it-alone and isolationist elements within the GOP itself. . . .

Another great obstacle in the path of real Atlantic cooperation during those first years of the Eisenhower administration was the single-minded obsession of United States policy with the European Defense Community. It was rather obstinate on our part to try to force upon the European nations a union which many of them did not want, and which we and Great Britain would not join.

Well, the French refused to ratify EDC. We had no alternative to propose, but the British did. Through the London-Paris agreements, far superior to what was proposed in EDC, Western Germany became an equal partner in NATO. NATO was strenghtened in many respects and for the first time a sort of international control over armaments was established among a group of sovereign States.

I then felt that the time had again come when we should push forward toward these economic and political goals and when the present Congress convened, I introduced again my proposal for a convention of the NATO sponsors.

World is Ready for this Move.

A former great Secretary of State and military commander, Gen. George Marshall, endorsed my proposal. He wrote: "There is no blinking the fact that this country now stands at a turning point in its relations to its traditional friends among the nations of the Old World."

Another great statesman, Robert Schuman, former Premier of France and the author of the Schuman plan joined the author of the Marshall plan, in endorsing my proposal. He said:

"If the American Congress accepts the Atlantic proposal of Senator Kefauver, all the democratic European nations should be happy to accept the invitation to send delegates to such a Study Commission. Should there result from the work of this conference and from later proposals the outline of an acceptable plan of union . . . we would then certainly have made a great step toward world peace and general propserity."

Paul-Henri Spaak, foreign minister of Belgium; Paul Van Zeeland former prime minister of Belgium; Gaetano Martino, foreign minister of Italy—all sent words of encouragement and endorsement.

Said Mr. Spaak:

"I personally hope that such discussions will take place between the citizens of the Atlantic nations very soon."

Said Mr. Van Zeeland:

"To sum up, it would be a major step toward peace and prosperity throughout the world."

Said Mr. Martino:

"I agree with Senator Kefauver that the peace of the world cannot be assured by methods of formal diplomacy alone."

Last year a step in the direction in which the Secretary is now going was taken. A resolution which I sponsored resulted in the United States participation in an association of NATO legislators, then being formed, which held its first successful meeting in Paris last summer, and which formed itself into a continuing body.

Therefore, I would say to the Secretary as he leaves tomorrow that he will find the ground already well-plowed for his mission. Four years ago Dwight Eisenhower, called for "bold and imaginative" steps to further develop NATO. President Eisenhower was then General Eisenhower, commanding the NATO forces. Since he has been President there have been none of these bold and imaginative steps and indeed I believe this is the first major speech on NATO. But this, it seems to me, is the President's and the Secretary's great opportunity. They can leave on the pages of history a chapter comparable to the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, NATO itself.

I would commend to them the method of exploration which my resolution proposes—a convention to be attended by representatives of the people of the nations involved. I fear that cautious discussions between cautious diplomats will result in nothing if they occur in a vacuum—but coupled with simultaneous exploration on the part of the people in convention—then we might take that step toward world peace and general prosperity which we all seek.

IF IT WERE ONLY FICTION

From William L. Laurence's report in *The New York Times* of the hydrogen bomb test, May 21:

This lays to rest some fantastic speculations that the hydrogen bomb was not actually a fusion bomb, but rather a so-called fission-fusion ¾ fissing [sic] device, in which some 80 per cent of the explosive force is derived not from fusion but rather from the fission of the otherwise non-fissionable and most abundant form of uranium, namely, Uranium 238. . . .

The so-called fission-fusion-fission bomb therefore, must henceforth be known as "the fission-fusion-fission-fiction bomb."

NATO Blossoms in Press

By JOHN T. KANE

WHATEVER the ultimate outcome of Secretary Dulles' recent efforts to revitalize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Administration has certainly succeeded in putting "NATO" back in the news and editorial columns of American newspapers. Newspaper interest blossomed like the spring foliage.

The St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* struck an oft-sounded chord in newspaper editorial comment with its statement that ". . . there is no question that the strengthening of the Atlantic community's political and economic ties needs thoughtful examination."

"A military alliance of mutual defense is necessarily negative," it added. "But it cannot be made positive merely by extending into political and economic fields the psychology of military containment."

Marquis Childs, the columnist, complained of a "withering away" of the military front of NATO, and then went on to write:

"The alliance has failed to take the steps for unity and cohesion that would have made Western Europe a strong force politically and economically. The fundamental fact was that the old haunting problems of poverty and surplus population could not be solved within national boundaries by nation states going it alone.

Finds Step Overdue

"Now the formal step has been taken —it should have come at least two years ago and, better still, four or five years ago—to try to develop the political potentiality of NATO."

The *Christian Science Monitor* devoted a sizeable number of feature articles and editorials to NATO developments since the Dulles speech of April 23d. After the Paris meeting it commented that the challenge which confronted the ministers "has rested at the heart of NATO since its founding." The same editorial pointed out that this challenge has been to ". . . preserve NATO as a military alliance by making it much more than a military alliance. The aim is to keep it a ready alignment of military power back of the developing idea of defensible Western European unity, insuring American security and logically made practicable by American support."

The *Baltimore Sun* included a comment on NATO in a rather lengthy editorial on the Saar. The writer asserted: "If the Continent remains a group of states which co-operate only under the compulsion of fear, as they co-operated in entering NATO, the Saar will still be a bone of bitter contention."

The ultra-nationalist *Chicago Tribune* interpreted Mr. Dulles' statement that the time had come to "advance NATO from its initial phase into the totality of its meaning" as indicating that the Secretary was thinking of transforming NATO into a sort of super-government. The *Tribune's* editorial suggested that Mr. Dulles ". . . could hardly hope to transform NATO into an effective organ for unified political action without qualifying the sovereignty of the United States. As it is, his larger hope in this direction has been placed in the hands of three men, none of whom is an American."

After a prediction that America is bound to be short changed no matter what the three foreign ministers decide, the *Tribune* thus concluded:

"The only thing we can say of the Paris meeting is that it could have had far worse results for the United States. This was not because of any lack of willingness on the part of Mr. Dulles to invite them."

In *Human Events*, the weekly nationalistic newsletter, Editor Frank Hanighen, wrote:

". . . If plans of the White House Palace Guard mature, an 'expanded NATO' would turn out to be 'Atlantic Union,' Clarence Streit's proposed international organization, as a preliminary to global government.

"Members of Congress who are in a position to know say that Dr. Milton Eisenhower, whose 'one world' proclivities are well known, is strongly backing these blueprints for American surrender to international organization." [Emphasis in original.]

Columnist Walter Lippmann, after describing the foundations of NATO, commented that it was not these that were disintegrating but rather a superstructure that is obsolescent. Now that people have lost the fear that ". . . World War III could take the form of an attempt to invade Western Europe," he viewed NATO's first need to be ". . . reappraisal of its strategical concepts."

Press comment seemed to be practically unanimous in praising the appointment of Senator George as the President's personal representative for the development of the North Atlantic Community. Typical was the New York *Herald Tribune* view that President Eisenhower's choice was ". . . both admirable and logical." It concluded that "The projected expansion and evolution of the North Atlantic alliance along new political and conceivably economic lines is of the greatest importance in the attainment of a durable peace. Certainly, Senator George can be counted on to make a vigorous impress. He is just the man for the job."

At Long Last!

The Reporter magazine began a signed editorial with unaccustomed exuberance, Max Ascoli writing:

"At long last it is happening. A little over nine months after the Summit meeting, the post-Geneva America foreign policy is a-borning. We are in no mood to recount the time wasted and the lost opportunities. We are in a mood to rejoice." He added:

"We take these recent foreign-policy pronouncements unreservedly at face value, and consider as utterly irrelevant the accidents that may have prompted them. This is the way some decisions which turned out to be the most momentous in recent American foreign policy were made—like the Marshall Plan or Point Four."

Cautioning that "we must be ready to pay the price for the strengthening of political and economic ties with our allies," Ascoli concluded that "our nation for several years has been dangling on the brink, not of war, but of the Bricker amendment."

David Lawrence, usually at the other end of the political spectrum from *The Reporter*, likewise had high praise for the new U.S. NATO objectives, which

he described as the Dulles Plan to stop the disintegration of political unity on our side in Europe.

In a signed editorial in *U. S. News & World Report*, he commented:

"The idea now is to make the NATO Council of 15 nations a living organism of diplomacy. This means that mediation and conciliation can be quietly employed to work out solutions for the complicated problems of Europe as well as of the Middle East and Asia where European powers have historic involvments." He concluded:

"By coordinating the energies of the free governments which are ready to make great sacrifices for ultimate peace, this bold and brilliant plan initiated by Secretary Dulles can take root. It could give the world at last what it has long been praying for—a constructive program which, by its challenge, must attract the attention of peoples on both sides of the Iron Curtain."

British Press Cautions

"What is now needed," *The Times* in London wrote on the eve of the Council session, is—"preferably without the creation of any new organization"—to give NATO "some continuous political life."

"If this is to be done," it continued, something more than window-dressing is needed. It will be tempting in Paris to play down the still vitally important military aspects of NATO, and to talk in generalities about the merits of article 2 on the treaty. But, in fact, such talk will be meaningless, and quite possibly harmful, if it is not accepted that article 2 implies a genuine political and economic community. This faces Britain and America, in particular, with considerations affecting their sovereignty at least as far-reaching as those implicit in the Coal and Steel Pool or Euratom. The assessment of how the 400 million people now embraced by NATO can be brought closer together politically and economically will be enormously difficult, but it must be tackled."

"No projects for dovetailing economic plans will achieve anything if the member States of NATO drift further apart politically," *The Times* warned. "To a certain extent the political issues which divide them are due to faulty liaison, but to an even greater extent they stem from the hard facts of the situation. It is clear that a good deal of the friction which has been seen recently over such questions as Cyprus, Algeria, and the whole Middle Eastern situation could have been avoided if the machinery of consultation had been better.

"The fact is that NATO has never been made a clearing-house for political policy. It has been the body where Communist intentions were regularly assessed and the means needed to combat them estimated. It has been a forum where points of dispute between individual members could be quietly debated. But in this limited sense NATO only functions spasmodically."

"From the economic point of view," *The Times* held, "the most important consideration is how aid can be coordinated both to countries which are members of NATO and to those which are outside it. Communist aid to the outside world, though still richer in promises and suggestions than in deeds, is closely integrated. The web which ties Russia and the satellites together makes it easy for the industries of Czechoslovakia and East Germany to support Russia's political plans, whether or not they can really afford to do so."

The *Manchester Guardian* stressed the continued importance of the miltary side of NATO—a point *The Times* also noted—and added:

"The Atlantic alliance is 'robust and virile,' in the words yesterday of the Foreign Secretary. There is no reason to doubt his judgment, and it is good that this should be the impression which he has brought back from Paris. Even if the military forces in Europe are degenerating, the alliance need not lack vitality. . . .

"If now it is to be encouraged to range over a wider area of diplomatic and economic co-ordination . . . it may prove highly valuable. But co-ordination, if effective, can hurt. If, for example, it is seriously intended that the Council should try to eliminate conflict in international economic policies, it may have to give unwelcome advice on points of trade and financial policy which Congress in Washington, Parliament in London, and other legislative bodies regard as their own prerogative.

"If, as another example, it is intended that the Council should try to remove points of political friction, it may have to tell the British Government that every other member of NATO thinks we are in the wrong over Cyprus, much as they may sympathise with our difficulties. This is the kind of matter from which the North Atlantic Council hitherto has been discreetly steered away . . ."

House Approves NATO Solons Meeting

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES passed, on May 7, by an overwhelming voice vote, H.J.R. 501, providing for annual participation by a delegation of nine Senators and nine Congressmen in the NATO Parliamentary Conference. This resolution had been introduced on January 31 by Hon. Wayne L. Hays (D., Ohio), Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the first NATO Parliamentary Conference of last July and U.S. Member of the Conference's Standing Committee. It had been reported unanimously by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 23 and is now before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

To say that the debate in the House was one-sided is to surpass the British in understatement, since opposition came from only one member. One minor amendment, however, was proposed by a member supporting the resolution, and accepted by Mr. Hays. It provided that the delegation should be appointed to meet "when Congress is not in session." This was the result of experience at the first Conference, held in the closing days of the 1955 session, when no Senators were able to attend and a delegation from the House could be selected only at the last minute.

The resolution constitutes permanent legislation authorizing 18 members from Congress to participate annually in the Conferences. It provides that half shall be appointed by the President of the Senate and half by the Speaker of the House, not more than five of either group being from the same party. It also authorizes up to $30,000 annually for the expenses of the delegation, and up to $6,000 as the annual U.S. contribution to the expense of the Conference and its Secretariat.

The 1956 Conference is scheduled for November 19 at the NATO headquarters in Paris. It is expected to contribute effectively to the non-military development of NATO.—L.H.

[Letter from London]

U.S. More O.K. in U.K. After B.K.

By KENNETH HARRIS
An Editor of the London Observer

WHEN, two months or so ago, it became known that Bulganin and Khrushchev were definitely going to pay a visit to Britain, disciples of Anglo-American unity, and of the wider Atlantic association of which Anglo-American unity is a major pre-condition, were deeply disturbed. The memory of the visit B. and K.—as they are now known here—made to India was still vivid. They had used the cities and plains of India as platforms from which to denounce Britain as a war-mongering country. Would they not use Britain as a platform from which to hurl abuse at the United States? And did not the very fact that Britain was, in spite of the lessons of the Indian visit, willing to invite B. and K. to London, suggest that Britain was somewhat careless about the susceptibilities of American public opinion? As the date of the visit approached, the shadow over Atlantica lengthened.

Now that B. and K. have come and gone, all is, comparatively speaking, sunny. Having watched what happened to them here, and having seen the direct and indirect consequences of their visit, I feel that they have made a substantial contribution towards the unity of the West.

In the first place, the fact that B. and K. decided to accept Prime Minister Eden's invitation to visit Britain once more centered public attention on the nature of the Anglo-American relationship. For several days the British press thoroughly ventilated the question of whether B. and K. should be allowed to come, in view of the risk of their using Claridge's Hotel, London, as a platform from which to condemn the policies originating in Foggy Bottom.

The British and the American man in the street heard, for some days, a keen and sometimes vehement debate in which one of the main issues was whether it was decent and neighborly towards the U.S. for Britain to allow B. and K. on British soil. The underlying

—Burck, Chicago Sun-Times

"I say, have they finally gone?"

unity and identity of interest of the two countries is too much taken for granted at times, too much ignored at others. For a number of reasons, mainly connected with the critical situation in the Middle East, the differences of outlook and interest, rather than the similarities, had been holding the stage. The public debate as to whether, out of deference to Anglo-American relations, the visit of B. and K. should be permitted, restored perspective.

It had been made clear to the Soviet Union well in advance that the visit would be allowed to interfere as little as humanly possible with Anglo-American relations. The preliminary arrangements made it evident that it was regarded here as considerably below the level of a state occasion. Everything that was arranged seemed to indicate official coolness. B. and K. were not to attend any popular receptions; they were not to drive slowly through a Pall Mall bedecked with flowers and flags and thronged with cheering crowds.

Whatever the Government may have anticipated, there was no mistaking the curious but uncordial attitude of the public. Crowds were very small—40 people in the street outside Claridge's to watch the Prime Minister go in to dine with B. and K. the night of their arrival; about 400 outside the hotel on the peak occasion a week later. No American observer in Britain that week could have felt for one moment that the behavior of the man in the street towards B. and K. was putting a strain on Anglo-American relations.

The famous dinner which the Labor Party gave for B. and K. made, indeed, a remarkable, positive contribution to Anglo-American relations. The British Labor Party, being Socialist, has many times, over the last ten years, been a source of embarrassment—however unintentional—to Anglo-American well-wishers on both sides of the Atlantic. To the unsophisticated, at any rate, the Labor Party is inclined to appear somewhat anti-American and pro-Russian, if only because it is anti-private-enterprise and pro-Socialist. It fell to the British Labor Party, however, to give Comrade Khrushchev the most embarrassing and critical session which he has ever experienced, or is likely to experience, abroad. As a result of the uncompromising and indeed undiplomatic demand which the Laborites made for the release of the imprisoned Social Democrats, observers in countries outside Britain should disabuse themselves, for good and all, of the notion that the British Labor Party wants to be solft towards the Russians. Comrade Khrushchev certainly does not share that notion, even if he did not actually say to Ambassador Malik, as he left the reception in dudgeon, "If I lived in Britain I would vote Conservative!"

West Responds in Kind

In one other respect, it seems to me on reflection, the visit of B. and K. has contributed to the strength of the Anglo-American association. The latest major move of the Russians—to pay visits abroad, win friends and influence people, and generally turn the spotlight on Western emphasis on military programs—has now, apparently, stimulated the West to try to respond in kind.

While B. and K. were still here, John Foster Dulles made the speech which foreshadowed the steps the recent NATO Council meeting took to explore the development of NATO's political and economic unity. A few days earlier President Eisenhower spoke of the need to plan programs of a non-military kind

which would win the respect of the "non-committed nations." George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African affairs, followed with a speech on the problems to be solved as a result of increased stress on economic aid to countries not associated militarily with the United States. These changes in American thinking on foreign policy made a considerable impact here. And to the extent that they were precipitated by the peace initiatives launched by the Russians, the Russians are to be thanked for them.

In short, one way and another, the B. and K. visit—climax in a series of moves in the Russian peace offensive—has stimulated thinking, on both sides of the Atlantic, about what the West must do to regain the initiative in world affairs. It has put once more into focus that basic identity of interest and purpose, here and in the U.S., which is considered here the keystone of the Atlantic association.

U. S. Documents on Microfilm

THE UNIVERSITY of North Carolina, in 25 feet of cubic space, has assembled a mass of hitherto scattered public documents that contain many of the primary sources of the early history of the United States.

Henceforth researchers and authors can inspect these documents on a roll of microfilm that is equivalent to 8,333 books with a total of two and a half million pages, and all in one small room. Professor William Sumner Jenkins of the University, director of the establishment, spent 20 years, in the 48 States and in Great Britain, photographing these documents, which were found in 300 different archives and libraries. The microfilm product, said Professor Jenkins, "is the first great encyclopedia of the nation's sources, a virtual blood-bank of the vital life-blood of research."

The result is bound to be the first thorough presentation of the documentary materials from which the continuing story of the Republic is derived.

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Little Steps . . . or Shotgun Wedding?

Under the caption, "The 'Totality' of NATO" *LIFE magazine on May 7 said in its lead editorial:*

"THE NATO MINISTERS are meeting in Paris at a critical point in its career. The Soviets have long sought to destroy NATO, and the closer it comes to being the means of actual German rearmament, the more they hate it. The new Soviet look, which has all but banished the fear of war from Europe, is doing more to undermine the NATO military alliance than Stalinism eved did. . . . To stem the decline . . . Secretary Dulles advanced some fresh thoughts about NATO itself. He hopes it will now grow into "the totality of its meaning."

"What is this 'totality'? Though a military alliance, NATO's charter also contains in Article II an invitation to closer political and economic ties among its 15 member nations. . . . Mr. Dulles listed some of the things the NATO nations have in common: religion and morals, democracy and law, freedom of thought, private property and trade. But the question of how to turn these abstract ties into concrete links is something else again.

"At one extreme are Clarence Streit and his fellow advocates of a full federal Atlantic 'union of the free.' . . . The Streit resolution (sponsored by Senator Kefauver) asks for a transatlantic convention to explore the problems of union, a cautious approach which has won it some politically responsible support. But worthy as it may be of theoretical discussion, Atlantic Union is unlikely to get further than that at a time when Western civilization does not feel its back to the wall. Certainly those who fear such a union need not let it haunt their opinions of Article II.

"At the other extreme are a lot of little ways to implement Article II, mostly technical and economic, and mostly explored already by NATO's own council and secretariat with meager results. But this need not foreclose the further exploration that Dulles seeks. Since economic strength underlies military, there is an argument for making NATO a funnel for economic development. North Africa, for instance, needs more public and private capital than France alone can afford; and North Africa is vital to NATO's strategic boundaries.

Suggests "Life" Under-estimates Americans

Mr. Streit wrote the following comment to LIFE:

"I wish to thank you for the compliment your editorial paid me in calling the resolution for an Atlantic Exploratory Convention the 'Streit resolution,' but I must point out that this honor should go to others—notably the bipartisan group of 13 Senators and 13 Representatives that introduced this measure in Congress. If any one man deserves it, he should be Senator Kefauver, the chief sponsor. I did not draft this resolution. Had I done so, its basic provisions, it is true, would have been much the same, but it would have been worded more strongly.

"Your editorial implies that Atlantic Union is 'worthy' of discussion, but adds that it 'is unlikely to get further than that at a time when Western civilization does not feel its back to the wall'—and so meanwhile the best hope lies in 'a lot of little ways' to improve NATO. Is this not a dimmer view of a great civilization than you meant to give? May I ask your readers to say whether they agree that the character of the American people is such that they would accept only half-hearted measures until it is too late to prevent disaster by adequate action, and would reject an Atlantic Union even if a convention of leading statesmen, after exploring the situation, recommended it as the surest way to prevent another world war and another depression?"

These include early court calendars, the files of state mental institutions, governors' letters, municipal treasurers' reports, manuscripts of the original 13 Colonies, specimens being the famous *Massachusetts Body of Liberties* of 1648 and William Penn's *Abstract or Abridgment of the Law* of 1701. Most of these have been out of the reach of students, and some will be entirely new to the leading authorities.

It is even possible—though this is a venturesome supposition—that the microfilm collection will improve the teaching of American history in the schools and turn out new generations of Americans adequately informed about the beginning and evolution of our governing system. If so, the Library of Congress and the University at Chapel Hill, which sponsored the project, and the Rockefeller Foundation, which financed it with $125,000, will share the credit.

Not only have these source materials been assembled on microfilm; they have been so edited and arranged that a specific item may be obtained in a few minutes instead of requiring much time and travel to locate. On the basis of his experience Professor Jenkins believes that "within the span of a lifetime the official records of the universe could be facsimiled and arranged on a thin 35-mm. waistband of microfilm stretching only once around the earth's surface."

De Tocqueville Notwithstanding

De Tocqueville, when he wrote his famous *Democracy in America* (1835-1840), looked with extraordinary prescience into the American future. Many of his prophecies have been borne out by events. But the task just completed at Chapel Hill has proved him wrong in at least one prediction. "I am convinced," he wrote, "that in 50 years it will be more difficult to collect authentic documents concerning the social condition of the Americans at the present day than it is to find remains of the administration of France during the Middle Ages; and, if the United States were ever invaded by barbarians, it would be necessary to have recourse to the history of other nations to learn anything of the people which now inhabits them."

De Tocqueville went on to say that "no one cares for what occurred before his time [a trait unfortunately still highly prevalent]; no methodical system is pursued; no archives are formed; and no documents are brought together when it would be easy to do so. Where they exist little store is set upon them."

But, as the Library of Congress and the University of North Carolina have demonstrated, much of this data was miraculously preserved in some form. Miraculous it is, considering that the proposal by an early American scholar, Francis Lieber, that the Government establish a collection agency for historical documents was disregarded by Congress for more than a hundred years.

—ARTHUR KROCK

[Books]

European Unity

BRITAIN IN WESTERN EUROPE: WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE. A REPORT BY A CHATHAM HOUSE STUDY GROUP. *Royal Institute of International Affairs, London; N. Y.*, 121 p., $1.50.

The stated main purpose of this compact and up-to-date booklet is to assess the significance of Western European Union (WEU), the latest of the international organizations in Europe which came into being as a result of the London and Paris Agreements of 1954. In making this assessment, the authors have brought together in one booklet so complete an historical account of the highlights of the European unity movement that anyone who has tried to maintain a file of newspaper clippings on this subject can safely throw away most of them.

The Study Group which prepared this booklet (actually written by a rapporteur) comprised politicians, journalists, businessmen, university teachers, and a service representative, all British. In a special preface Donald McLachlan, author of two previous Study Group reports issued in 1950 and 1952, states his personal opinion that WEU was "primarily an expedient to rescue something from the wreckage of the EDC" and that "it is still at the stage of tender infancy" —in fact, "it bears the appearance of an unwanted child." These apt observations perhaps explain why so little has been heard of WEU since its birth 18 months ago.

Most of the booklet is devoted to a description of the efforts to unite Europe, from 1947 down to the defeat of the "Europeanization" statute in the Saar in October 1955.

The authors point out that, for the present, WEU is unlikely to be concerned with anything but two immediate tasks —the rearmament of Germany within a system of safeguards, and the solution of the Franco-German dispute over the Saar. The latter is supposed to be exclusively a WEU function, although recent reports from Europe indicate that the question is still being discussed by high level French and German officialdom. The authors conclude that it is difficult to foresee the future role and development of WEU, and this for three reasons. First, WEU may not wish to try to resolve any major conflict or policy between members until the Saar question is settled. Second, it still has to achieve (along with NATO) the task of controlling German rearmament, and the extent of German cooperation is uncertain. And finally, Russia's opposition to NATO and German participation therein further delay WEU's task.

Nevertheless, the study group points out, WEU was in itself a considerable achievement, particularly in that it brought Great Britain into close association with the Continent. However, this observation is qualified by the statement that since U.S. support of Western Europe is essential in military matters, "in so far as the United States is prepared to consult, decide and act with these nations within and outside NATO, the Western European Union is relatively unimportant." Conversely, if the U.S. reduces its commitments or interests, WEU's role might well change. But if it has been allowed to hibernate, it probably could not suddenly be revived to handle a crisis.

Presumably the group selected WEU for the focal point of its study because of Britain's membership therein. It is to be hoped that its next study will take up a more active and influential organization, such as perhaps the European Coal and Steel Community, with which Britain does maintain an association. The Chatham House group has an admirable passion for detail and has obviously engaged in considerable painstaking research.

—FRANK H. BLUMENTHAL

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Second Thoughts at 96

You have caused me, too, to take a "second thought" and to renew once more my small contribution [$10] to your great undertaking. I gave up when the infirmities of age forced me to take refuge in a small rest home, and to narrow my obligations, both financial and mental. I am now 96 years old.

May we all see how God will work in His own way "His wonders to perform." Please accept my humble thanks for your effort in my behalf. May God preserve and strengthen you for your great work.

HELEN M. JUDD

Woburn, Mass.

Contradiction Seen

I read with interest your editorial on the dangers to Eisenhower in the April issue of FREEDOM & UNION. Kindly forgive me for pointing out that if Khrushchev is counting on disunity of the West for his decision that war is not any longer inevitable, your whole argument falls flat.

If Atlantic Union were realized during Ike's second term, this would change Mr. Khrushchev's conclusion back again to Marx's—that war is inevitable—and it will make the danger of war increase, and will therefore not decrease the strain on Eisenhower. I am not arguing against Atlantic Union, but the argument you propose for it this time contradicts itself.

Based on the argument you propose I can have only one conclusion, and that is that investors in the stock market had better be more careful in 1957 unless something is done about Atlantic Union.

H. C. COLEMAN, JR.

Norristown, Pa.

* * *

The contradiction is more apparent than real. The editorial pointed out, a couple of paragraphs before the one cited, that once the Atlantic resolution is passed the Kremlin's "best hope of preventing the Convention from succeeding is to refrain from troubling the peace—and to make substantial concessions in order to remove Western incentive to federate." The reasons for this have been developed in previous editorials, and in chapters 19 and 22 of *Freedom Against Itself*.

It will take time to get an Atlantic Union made but once it is made the Kremlin—whatever view it takes then of the Marxist theory of inevitable war—will, I believe, fear to attack so strong a Union, the more so since aggression would serve only to strengthen the bonds of Union. Meanwhile the creation of the Union will be keeping the Kremlin preoccupied with dangers of revolt in Eastern Europe—for reasons given in "Who Will Win Without War—Through the R-Bomb?" This editorial, in the June 1955 FREEDOM & UNION, goes into this question fully.—C. K. S.

Off To Australia

I have just had the pleasure of reading the April issue of FREEDOM & UNION from cover to cover. It is an unusually fine issue, even for FREEDOM & UNION. I am sending it to a newspaper friend of mine in Australia. If he likes it, I shall send him a subscription.

SAM WARNER

Guilford, Conn.

Isolationists Too Concerned

The isolationists continue to be gravely conerned about the sovereignty of the United States. That should be the concern of absolutists—not of people who pretend to be such great defenders of the Constitution. Note that it is the object of our Constitution, *inter alia*, to "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity"; it is not the object of that great document to preserve national sovereignty.

Those opposed to Atlantic Union should note that the same arguments that they use today were used violently—and equally irrationally—in 1787 and '88 to oppose adoption of the Constitution. In answering the objections to the Constitution which put too much emphasis on (then) State—now National—sovereignty, Madison said*:

"Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that the government of the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape—that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form?"

The Atlantic Union Committee, and Federal Union, Inc., are doing a lot more for the preservation of constitutional government than those who attack those organizations.

JOHN F. SCHMIDT

Peoria, Ill.

*The Federalist, No. 45

Protest April Cover

I should like to register my protest at the cover on the April magazine. It seems to me that it is destructive in its influence. If I read the times aright, neither side, from now on, is going to be able to impose a solution of the present differences by force. It looks as though we are going to have to live with Soviet communism, whether we like it or not.

This being the case, I feel the creation of such emotions in the general public as our April cover would engender tends to make a reasonable solution of differences impossible. If one is dealing with a voracious vulture, there is no solution but to kill him, I suppose. But we cannot kill him without killing ourselves too, in this nuclear age.

Therefore, I believe we have to shift our hopes from faith in superior force to faith that there is indeed some dignity and decency in all men which can be roused if we ourselves exhibit these qualities toward them. My interest in Federal Union is that it provides the way for an expanding democratic government which could, eventually, become world-wide. If we are going to put up emotional barriers against one half of the world we are only adding to the powder-keg.

JANICE HOLLAND

Washington, D. C.

• • •

The cover of the April issue strikes me as being a little out of taste. FREEDOM & UNION is truly a rather conservative magazine, even though some people feel that its policy isn't necessarily conservative.

Covers such as the April one would maybe give the wrong impression to some new person not familiar with the editorial policy of the magazine. They might give him the idea that the magazine is radical or biased.

This is just one comment and I have made no attempt to analyze any series of covers, but thought I would pass my first impression along for what little it is worth.

F. GILBERT LAMB

Weston, Oregon

The Little Dog Laughed

DAR Dictionary

It is sometimes asked how the members of the DAR manage to be wrong on nearly every important question. The following example may provide a clue to the answer.

The DAR, through its National Defense Committee, has recently issued a statement concerning Senate Concurrent Resolution 12 which provides for delegates from Atlantic countries to meet in a convention to explore and to report to what extent their peoples might further unite for their mutual welfare.

The DAR National Defense Committee opposes this resolution partly on the ground that a convention is a treaty. It quotes sound authority to the effect that a convention is "an agreement between soverign states . . . Broadly speaking it is a treaty."

It is true, of course, that the dictionary does not include this meaning of the word "convention." But note that the DAR has carefully by-passed nine other definitions, including the most commonly accepted one, in order to seize upon a meaning which serves its purpose, happily oblivious to the obvious fact that the definition it has chosen is absurd.

How do these ladies expect delegates to meet in a treaty? It seems extraordinary that any member of the DAR, which meets annually in Constitution Hall, should forget that the founders of our country met in a Convention to create the Constitution.—*Mrs. C. S. Osborn, Sault Ste. Marie, Mich.*

Little Pitchers Have Big Errors

A Massachusetts Firm, reports the *Washington Post & Times Herald*, recently ordered 750 pitchers from Italy, identifying the design by the inscription a certain macaroni manufacturer had added for advertising purposes. Charles Barbo, head of the New England company, cabled instructions.

In due course 16 crates of pitchers, valued at a total of $200, arrived. On the side of each pitcher was this inscription: "Leave out the words 'Enjoy your wine with Prince Macaroni.' "

Select News Service

This extract is from a broadcast by Fulton Lewis, Jr.

Secretary of State Dulles arrived in Paris today, for discussions that are reported by the press as looking toward the expansion of the Nato organization into a sort of new Marshall Plan, with emphasis on foreign economic aid, and improved cultural relations.

It is interesting to note that this is exactly the proposal which was set forth in a joint declaration on December 11, 1954—a year and a half ago—in some public recommendations to the North Atlantic Treaty nations, just prior to a conference they were about to hold in Paris, and you will be interested, perhaps, in the list of individuals who signed that joint declaration—which Mr. Dulles now is supposed to be following:

Harry S. Truman, Adlai Stevenson, General George Marshall, Norman Cousins, President of the United World Federalists; Owen J. Roberts, President, and Will L. Clayton, Vice President, of the Atlantic Union Committee; Clarence K. Streit; Chester Bowles; Senator Hubert Humphrey; Senator Estes Kefauver; Senator Herbert N. Lehman, William V. Griffin, President of the English-Speaking Union; and Edward R. Murrow and Elmer Davis, commentators.

For your information, whether the interpretation of Mr. Dulles' purposes is by design or by ignorance, I am informed by the most reliable sources that the interpretation is completely unture, and the plan he has in mind, in connection with Nato is not any revival of the Marshall Plan, or anything of the sort.

* * *

Mr. Lewis selected with care the 14 names he chose to give to the isolationist Republicans he cultivates. There were 79 American signers to the Declaration to which he refers. Among those whom he carefully omitted are these 14: Vannevar Bush, Governor James F. Byrnes, General William Donovan, Benjamin Fairless, Henry Ford II, Governor Christian Herter, Paul G. Hoffman, Paul W. Litchfield, John J. McCloy, Governor Theodore McKeldin, Philip D. Reed, Charles P. Taft, Thomas J. Watson and William Zeckendorf.

Mr. Lewis was no less selective in his report of the Declaration's purpose; it aimed at trade rather than aid, or a "new Marshall Plan," and this was only one of several proposals it made in non-economic fields.—*The Little Dog.*

—*Lichty, Grin & Bear It*

"In line with our resolution to make this a better world, do we start at the national level, the state level, the municipal level or the husband level, girls? . . ."



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NEW 3-T NYLON TUBELESS TIRE by GOODYEAR

Stopped this car 38 feet quicker at 50 m.p.h. on an oil-slicked road!

Safer on the outside! In this spine-tingling test we slicked a section of road with oil—then had two cars hit this slippery stretch at 50 miles an hour and brake at the same instant.

The far car, riding on new tubeless tires with ordinary-type treads, slipped and fish-tailed dangerously. The near car, on new Nylon Custom Tubeless Super-Cushions with Twin-Grip tread, came to a safe, straightline stop 38 feet quicker! You get a margin of safety that can save a life.

This safety-built 3-T Nylon tire costs only a few dollars more than a standard tubeless tire, and your near-by Goodyear dealer will buy all the unused mileage in your present tires.

The new Twin-Grip tread design is also available in a tube-type 3-T Nylon Custom Super-Cushion. Goodyear, Akron 16, Ohio.



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There's a Goodyear dealer near you. See him for better tire values . . . better tire care . . . convenient credit terms.

Super-Cushion, T. M., The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Akron, Ohio

Streit, Clarence

EDWARD R. MURROW

May 9, 1956

Dear Clarence:

Thanks for yours of May 3rd. Your point is well taken, but I think the matter of subscriptions for our correspondents ought to be considered and decided by the CBS News organization. As you know, I just work here; so, I am sending your letter along to John Day, our News Director.

As ever yours,

Mr. Clarence Streit
Editor
"Freedom & Union"
2700 Ontario Road, N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

rh
cc: Mr. Day
plus correspondence

FEDERAL UNION

INCORPORATED IN 1940

Publishers of the Illustrated Monthly FREEDOM & UNION

Researchers into Problems of Atlantic Federation

Manager, Helen B. Thompson

Assistant Treasurer Melvin Ryder

President, CLARENCE K. STREIT — *Chairman,* LESTER B. VERNON

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ROBERT W. WILLIAMS, *Pennsylvania*

ADAMS 4-2211 — 2700 ONTARIO ROAD, N. W., WASHINGTON 9, D. C.

December 21, 1955

Dear Ed:

After the July hearings on the attached Atlantic Convention resolution, Senator George told me that this measure would be on his Committee's first order of business in January. Since this Convention is patterned on our 1787 Convention, I thought you might wish to refresh your knowledge of the latter now.

To help rescue the records of this convention from the shocking neglect into which they have fallen, our Board recently passed the other resolution I enclose. It pointed out that the collection of these records, including Madison's Journal, which Congress published in 1927, entitled FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, was about to go out of print, and urged it be kept available at a lower price. Since then this volume, which was the only such collection extant, has also gone out of print.

Before it did, the generosity of Robert Whitaker, a member of our Board, and his wife, of Kenosha, Wisconsin, enabled us to buy a number of copies for presentation to key men and women, so as to assure that some of the remaining volumes would go to those who could make best use of them.

We take pleasure in sending you separately with our compliments an inscribed copy of FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES. We would deeply appreciate any comment on this basic document that you could give us that would help rouse public interest in this widely forgotten part of the American heritage.

I attach part of a letter I wrote President Eisenhower, in presenting a copy to him. It tells why I believe even the busiest statesman should find time to study now these records of 1787. I also attach the other enclosures I sent him. I have marked your book as I did his, and added the same illustration to the inside front cover.

I know of no better means for dispelling the current confusion over sovereignty and the principles of free federal government than study of this great book provides. May it serve through you to advance anew the grand line of United States history - and to advance it as memorably now as when Madison, Hamilton, Franklin, Washington and their co-authors wrote FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES.

Surely our supersonic atomic age calls for exploration, at least, of this time-tested U.S. way to unite the free enduringly, and calls for action on it without waiting for another World War. And surely the Geneva failure makes exploration of the possible formation of a Union of the Atlantic Democracies particularly timely now.

Sincerely,

Clarence

Clarence K. Streit

CKS/mje

A Nonprofit Educational Membership Association To Advance Individual Freedom by Federating Democracies

(Contributions to Federal Union, Inc. are Deductible from Taxable Income)

Some Reasons for Reading FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES

(From a letter to President Eisenhower from Clarence Streit, Nov. 2, 1955)

FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES is, I believe, even more relevant to the problems we face in uniting the free effectively than is THE FEDERALIST. The latter puts masterfully the case for adopting a concrete plan for a federal union - the United States Constitution. The Atlantic community, however, has not yet reached the stage the 13 States had reached when THE FEDERALIST appeared. Despite their atomic energy and supersonic planes, the Free States of the North Atlantic are still where the 13 were at the dawn of the steam-electric era, when FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES begins - united only by alliance, and facing a proposal to call a Convention to explore the possibility of uniting effectively.

In this book one finds how every subsequent step was taken, - including the official credentials of the delegates (who were appointed in all the States except one by the Legislative branch.) The pro and con of alternative proposals - set forth by such statesmen as Franklin, Hamilton, Madison, and Mason, - involve many basic problems in inter-state organization similar to those confronting us today. I have found this book a mine of wisdom on these questions - as it is also, of course, on all the domestic problems which face you, Mr. President, with constitutional issues.

The proposed Atlantic Convention would mark the first attempt by the United States to explore the possibility of uniting with other democracies to some degree by the fundamental federal principles whose birth this book records. It would also mark our first attempt to tackle any international problem by the 1787 convention type of conference, as distinguished from the diplomatic type. The big difference between these two types of conferences is brought out in the marked paragraphs of the enclosed reprint.

The Convention procedure produced the greatest success of any conference of sovereign states in history - our Federal Constitution. Diplomatic procedure has resulted in war after war. Surely the United States should try the procedure by which it was itself constituted. And surely anyone who studies the work of the Philadelphia Convention in FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES must agree that the procedure of diplomacy would never have produced our Constitution.

In speaking through the country, I have been appalled at the widespread ignorance of the origin, principles and history of our Constitution. Even leaders of the D.A.R., V.F.W. and other organizations that pride themselves on patriotism, have fallen into dangerous confusion. They seek to uphold, in the name of Americanism the concept of sovereignty which the Founding Fathers rejected when they adopted the Constitution. (See quotations from them in my enclosed "King Nation or King Citizen?")

I have nourished my own patriotism on long study of the constitutional history of the United States. I am so confident that the proposed Atlantic Convention is in the true line of our Republic's unique history that I do all I can to get foes, skeptics and supporters of this proposal to see this for themselves by studying the official record which FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES provides.

I have marked some passages in it which may particularly interest you, in view of the coming discussion in Congress of the Atlantic Convention resolution. . . . .

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ADAMS 4-2211 2700 ONTARIO ROAD, N. W., WASHINGTON 9, D. C.

THE BOARD OF FEDERAL UNION, INC.:

BELIEVING "a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles," as Pennsylvania's Constitution said in 1776, is "absolutely necessary to preserve the blessings of liberty;"

IMPRESSED by the light thrown on these principles by the Federal Convention debates in 1787, as reported by Madison and other delegates whose notes are given in full in FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, a collection of documents on the origin of the United States Constitution published by the Government Printing Office in 1927 as House Document 398, - the only one-volume edition of this treasury of wisdom in print;

APPALLED to find that in the 28 years since 1927, in which our population rose from 120,000,000 to 160,000,000, only 11,555 copies of this book have been ordered, and orders fell from 258 in the last half of 1954 to only 30 in the first half of 1955;

ALARMED to learn that this fundamental source book may soon go out of print, since the Government Printing Office has less than 100 copies left (hardly one copy for every 2,000,000 citizens); and that there are no plans for reprinting it, and a new edition may involve long delay and be priced much higher than the present $6.50;

NOTING that FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES is of exceptional interest now in view of the resolution before Congress to call a Convention like the one of 1787, this time to explore the possible formation of a Union of the Atlantic Democracies;

RECALLING that Federal Union, Inc. was incorporated in 1940 as a non-profit membership organization "to promote education in the basic principles of federal union as exemplified in the Constitution of the United States with a view to attaining world order by a Federal Union of Democratic Peoples;"

RESOLVES that: 1. The present deplorable neglect of the documents of the Convention that drafted the United States Constitution should be ended without delay, and adequate steps taken by the proper authorities to popularize them.

2. The collection of them called FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES should be reprinted at once at a low price and never permitted to go out of print.

3. A shorter paperbound book including at least Madison's Journal of the Convention should be published soon at a still lower price to encourage wider reading.

4. A copy of this resolution shall be sent the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker, the Secretary of State, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Printing, the Librarian of Congress and the public printer for consideration and action.

October 14, 1955

The New Resolution to Explore Atlantic Union

Exploration Stressed. The new resolution is entitled "Resolution for an Atlantic Exploratory Convention," which is a more accurate name than the old one, "Atlantic Union Resolution." That title led some to fear it committed them to an Atlantic federation, though the resolution's text limited action to calling a Convention to explore the possibility of such a Union. The new name, emphasizing as it does exploration and convention, should eliminate all such misunderstanding, at least among the reasonable and fair-minded.

New Motive Added. A most useful provision has been added to the new Atlantic resolution preamble declaring that "the Nine Power agreement to extend the North Atlantic Treaty and defense system to include the German Federal Republic makes such exploration still more timely." This agreement gives little assurance that Germany, once rearmed on a national sovereignty basis, will not end by turning its arms against freedom.

*

Another welcome addition to the preamble of the revised Atlantic resolution is its final clause, which states that "it is desirable that this problem be considered by delegates who would act in accordance with their individual convictions and make a public report of their joint findings and recommendations." All this was implicit in the previous resolution, but to spell it out has several advantages. It reassures the fearful by underlining further the exploratory character of the proposed Convention. It also makes clearer that the Convention will not be another diplomatic conference, with each delegation—like those at the meetings of the United Nations and NATO—rigidly held to continuous instructions from its government. Instead, it will be like the Federal Convention of 1787, where each delegate was officially named by his State government, but none was under any instructions, and each voted on every issue without a caucus, entirely as his own conscience and wisdom advised him.

*

The procedure followed in the 1787 Convention resulted in the U.S. Constitution—the most astonishing and enduring success ever achieved in human history at a conference of sovereign States. No one who has read, or skimmed, Madison's *Journal* of that Convention—and all too few have done so—will believe that this result could have been achieved had the delegates been instructed by their governments. And yet the resolution for an Atlantic Convention is the first proposal yet made, in this war-cursed century, that we tackle our basic problem of inter-democracy organization by the method that alone has succeeded in this field—the non-diplomatic procedure of the 1787 Convention. It will be hard for our children to under-

stand why we have refused so long to try the method that worked. Can you give them any explanation of this fact that will make our generation seem moderately intelligent?

Exploration Unlimited. The enacting clause is, of course, the most important part of any resolution. It is here that the new Atlantic resolution most closely resembles the old one. The only important changes in it neatly balance, to make it at once more general and more precise—certainly a remarkable example of the art of compromise.

On the one hand, the new resolution further stresses the exploratory character of the Convention by stipulating—instead of merely implying—that its function is "to report" rather than to act. Then, where the old resolution limited it to exploring "how far" the participating democracies could "apply among them, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union," the new text removes this limit. It permits the Convention to consider any method, federal or non-federal, of further uniting the Atlantic democracies. On the other hand, the new resolution then spells out much more concretely than the old one did the scope or character of the union to be explored.

All this is summed up in the final words of the resolution which authorize the delegates "to explore and report to what extent their peoples might further unite within the framework of the United Nations, and agree to form, federally or otherwise, a defense, economic and political union."

Dilemma. As it now stands, the text of the Atlantic Exploratory Convention Resolution puts opponents in a dilemma. They cannot oppose it without being in the position of refusing even to explore *any* method of uniting the free more economically, effectively and democratically against the obvious dangers that confront them. Nor can they oppose the Convention's mandate to explore the federal method without taking the position that Americans should join in exploring every means of uniting democratic States except one—the U.S. federal system. To take that position in the name of patriotism will require reasoning too cock-eyed to be cogent.

—Clarence Streit

—*Memphis Commercial Appeal*

"Let's Have a Deep See."

Reprinted from the February 1955 issue of Freedom & Union, 700 9th St. NW, Washington 1, D. C.

Streit, Clarence

March 7, 1956

Dear Clarence:

I must indeed appear to be a churlish individual. The "Formation of the Union of the American States" is at the farm in Pawling and I confess to you I have not had a chance to read it. I hope to get at it soon.

As ever yours,

Mr. Clarence Streit
Federal Union
2700 Ontario Road, NW
Washington 9, D.C.

rh

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ADAMS 4-2211 2700 ONTARIO ROAD, N. W., WASHINGTON 9, D. C.

February 21, 1956

Dear Ed,

Before "Formation of the Union of the American States," went out of print last Fall, the generosity of Mr. and Mrs. Robert Whitaker of Kennosha, Wisconsin, enabled us to send a number of copies of it to leaders whom we thought could make best use of this great and shockingly neglected book, - the only book then still extant which gave Madison's Journal of the Federal Convention of 1787.

Its rare value is reflected in the exceptional response I have had from many of those who received the book, - as you may see from the few samples I enclose.

This book's special importance in world affairs today is brought out in the attached excerpt from a letter I wrote President Eisenhower, with particular reference to the Atlantic Convention resolution.

I sent you an inscribed copy of this book on December 21. The same passages were marked in it as in the copy I sent to President Eisenhower and the others whose answers I enclose. Not having heard from you, I fear the book may have gone astray, though I hope it merely got buried in all the mail pressing for your attention. I am not sure whether it was sent to your office address or to your home in Pawling, but I think it was the latter. I would appreciate your help in trying to trace it if you failed to receive it. Believe me, Ed, you won't want to miss this book; you'll be fascinated by it once you dip in.

Sincerely,

Clarence

Clarence K. Streit

CKS/mje

P.S. I am happy to add that Federal Union, Inc. has made some headway in its efforts to get this basic book back in print, which I explained in my covering letter to you at the time. The Public Printer has informed us that he is bringing out a new printing of 2,000 copies, which should soon be available. Unfortunately, however, he has had to raise the price from $6.50 to $9.50 - because of government regulations, he explained, - instead of lowering it, as we urged, so that it would be available to more citizens. We shall continue to press for a popular edition of this forgotten classic, and to this end have other plans under way which we hope will soon bear fruit. I'd like to get your advice on them when convenient.

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(Contributions to Federal Union, Inc. are Deductible from Taxable Income)

FORMATION OF THE UNION Private

Here are a few of the many letters I have received from the 175 key leaders to whom I gave the last copies of Formation of the Union before this great book went out of print last Fall. - Clarence Streit

Dear Mr. Streit: In acknowledging your recent letter to the President, I want to thank you for your thoughtfulness in sending him the volume of documents, Formation of the Union. Your interest in making it readily available is indeed appreciated. With respect to a possible reprinting of the volume, your remarks are being brought to the attention of the Chairman of the National Historical Publications Commission - an organization which has been interested in the publication and dissemination of documents relating to the formation and growth of the United States.

SHERMAN ADAMS.

Dear Clarence: Thank you for the wonderful book, Formation of the Union. I have enjoyed greatly going through it and reading passages, particularly those that you have thoughtfully marked. It does not take much exercise of the imagination to transplant yourself from this modern day to the days when this record was being written. I think that this is the most pleasant and productive way to study history. - THOMAS H. BURKE, Legislative Representative (UAW-CIO).

Dear Clarence: Thank you for sending me Formation of the Union. It must be an answer to a prayer because before I got your letter, I learned of the book and resolved to get it if I could. I have of course gone over Madison's Journals before, and also Farrand's edition of the proceedings, but this seems to be much to the point. Thank you again. SENATOR PAUL H. DOUGLAS.

Dear Clarence: It was kind of you to send me a copy of Formation of the Union of the American States. I know the book, and there is no question that it is, as you say, a fountain of wisdom about the beginnings of our government. - JOHN FOSTER DULLES.

Dear Clarence: I am deeply grateful for the inscribed copy of Formation of the Union of the American States. It will be a valuable and cherished addition to my library. I am taking the liberty of lending the book to my colleagues for advice on how we can best further your idea to prevent the book from going out of print. It is too important a part of our history to be treated lightly. - PHILIP L. GRAHAM, Publisher, Washington Post-Times-Herald.

Dear Clarence: It was very, very kind of you to send me a copy of Formation of the Union. It will be a valuable reference book, and I hope I shall have time to read it soon. May 1956 be a most successful one for you. I trust I'll have the pleasure of seeing you again during that year - several times. All my best. -

GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

✓ Dear Clarence: I have read the greater part of the extremely stimulating volume which you sent to me and found that there was a great deal in our history which I did not know and that I was very much interested to learn. At the present time I am not taking active part in affairs outside the Commonwealth since I have found that trying to do my job here consumes the better part of my time. However, your comments stimulated many thoughts and perhaps the day will come when I can put those thoughts to good use. When I say this, I am not implying that I am a candidate for any job but merely that I will have more leisure time-CHRISTIAN A. HERTER,Governor,(Mass.).

My dear Clarence: I deeply appreciate your kindness and generosity in sending me Formation of the Union of the American States. More than ever during this atomic age is it important for us to refresh our knowledge of our American heritage and the principles upon which our democracy was founded. Again, many, many thanks for thinking of me. - SENATOR LISTER HILL.

Dear Mr. Streit: I am deeply indebted to you for sending me a copy of the impressive book containing the documents dealing with the formation of the Union. It is a most useful book of reference and perhaps I will find time before too long to read it from cover to cover. - PAUL G. HOFFMAN.

My dear Mr. Streit: The volume of documents which you have sent to me is greatly appreciated. Thank you very much. - HERBERT HOOVER.

Dear Clarence: I am very grateful indeed for the volume called Formation of the Union of the American States, which I have wanted to possess ever since you first told me about it. I shall value it not only for the reasons you have sent it, but another accidental one. While this volume was sitting in my office over the holidays, the greater part of my library at home was destroyed by fire. You have given me an excellent foundation volume on which to start a new one. - JOHN K. JESSUP.
Chief Editorial Writer, LIFE.

Dear Mr. Streit: This is to thank you for Formation of the Union. I will read it with much interest. - SENATOR LYNDON B. JOHNSON.

Dear Clarence: You are so thoughtful to send me the marked copy of Formation of the Union. I also appreciate the beautiful inscription. This is a wonderful book to have in my library and I intend to spend some time reading it before the New Year. - SENATOR ESTES KEFAUVER.

Dear Mr. Streit: I wish to thank you for sending me Formation of the Union which I am in the process of re-reading. - SENATOR WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND.

Dear Streit: You have most certainly enriched my library and met one of my daily necessities by sending me that book of priceless documents. Thank you very much. It reminded me again how much I regret that I have been unable within my formula to circulate my deep admiration for you, and for the gallantry with which you pursue your noble objective. - ARTHUR KROCK, New York Times Columnist.

Dear Clarence: The book which you so kindly sent me is an old favorite of mine and I have used it more than you would perhaps suppose. I am particularly glad to have a copy with your generous inscription. - WALTER LIPPMANN, Columnist.

Dear Mr. Streit: Thank you so much for sending me a copy of Formation of the Union. I shall read it with deepest interest and with keen appreciation of your thoughtfulness in making it available. - GENERAL DOUGLAS MacARTHUR.

Dear Mr. Streit: Many thanks indeed for the book of documents on the formation of the Union and for the inscription. I am delighted to have this book and consider it a very vital element in my library. I greatly appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending it to me. - JOHN J. McCLOY.

Dear Clarence: When I returned from a short trip yesterday, I found the very nicely autographed copy of the bound documents recording the formation of the United States. It was mighty nice of you to include me among those to whom this very attractive and useful collection has been sent. I have already found one opportunity to use the contents of this document for a quick reference and I assure you that I shall cherish this volume in my library, especially because of your very gracious autograph. - SENATOR KARL MUNDT.

Dear Clarence: The book, "Formation of the Union," which you were good enough to send me looks a bit formidable, but none the less I am going to read it. Thanks for sending it to me. - DREW PEARSON, Columnist, Commentator.

Dear Clarence: I want to thank you most sincerely for sending me a copy of Formation of the Union of the American States. This is a most interesting and informative volume and one that should be carefully studied by all persons who have a sincere desire to get a more complete grasp of the various philosophies of those who founded this Union. - J. PERCY PRIEST, Chairman, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives.

Dear Streit: The other evening at home I found that amazing volume constituting the documents on the formation of the Union, and I am grateful for it, as it will form a very fine addition to my library. - CLARENCE B. RANDALL, Chairman, Inland Steel Company.

Dear Clarence: You have done a tremendous thing in sending me a copy of Formation of the Union. I was most interested and worried on learning from you that this great document was nearly extinct and I certainly never hoped to have one of the few copies available. It was therefore very exciting to open your package and learn the contents, and I can't tell you how grateful I am. It is all in such beautiful print too that I can't imagine a nicer kind of textbook on this earth-shaking event. I do hope, even as do you, that there can be another such event, for it's hard to see how the West can sufficiently galvanize itself to meet the Communist threat without more cohesion. - WHITELAW REID, Editor, New York Herald Tribune.

Dear Clarence: I was very touched by your thoughtfulness in sending around the documents on the formation of the Union. I have put them on my desk and intend now to read them with more care than I have in the past. - JAMES RESTON, Chief Washington Correspondent, The New York Times.

My dear Mr. Streit: I was delighted to find among my Christmas gifts one of enduring usefulness, and I have you to thank for it. It's a splendid book, and I have not seen it before. And I am likewise profoundly touched by your inscription and the citations which you have so thoughtfully marked. - ADLAI E. STEVENSON.

Dear Mr. Streit: The book from the Public Printer is a most interesting document. I have one packed away somewhere with the rest of my books, but inasmuch as this copy has your notations in it, I am very glad to have it. I wish it were necessary for every high school boy to read this book from cover to cover. A great many of the things to which I refer in my memoirs are based on information contained in it.
HARRY S. TRUMAN.

* * * *

Some Reasons for Reading FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES

(From a letter to President Eisenhower from Clarence Streit, Nov. 2, 1955)

FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES is, I believe, even more relevant to the problems we face in uniting the free effectively than is THE FEDERALIST. The latter puts masterfully the case for adopting a concrete plan for a federal union - the United States Constitution. The Atlantic community, however, has not yet reached the stage the 13 States had reached when THE FEDERALIST appeared. Despite their atomic energy and supersonic planes, the Free States of the North Atlantic are still where the 13 were at the dawn of the steam-electric era, when FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES begins - united only by alliance, and facing a proposal to call a Convention to explore the possibility of uniting effectively.

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The Convention procedure produced the greatest success of any conference of sovereign states in history - our Federal Constitution. Diplomatic procedure has resulted in war after war. Surely the United States should try the procedure by which it was itself constituted. And surely anyone who studies the work of the Philadelphia Convention in FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES must agree that the procedure of diplomacy would never have produced our Constitution.

In speaking through the country, I have been appalled at the widespread ignorance of the origin, principles and history of our Constitution. Even leaders of the D.A.R., V.F.W. and other organizations that pride themselves on patriotism, have fallen into dangerous confusion. They seek to uphold, in the name of Americanism the concept of sovereignty which the Founding Fathers rejected when they adopted the Constitution. (See quotations from them in my enclosed "King Nation or King Citizen?")

I have nourished my own patriotism on long study of the constitutional history of the United States. I am so confident that the proposed Atlantic Convention is in the true line of our Republic's unique history that I do all I can to get foes, skeptics and supporters of this proposal to see this for themselves by studying the official record which FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES provides.

I have marked some passages in it which may particularly interest you, in view of the coming discussion in Congress of the Atlantic Convention resolution. . . . .

THE MILLION DOLLAR ANSWER

Annual Report of the President—1955



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

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

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MELVIN RYDER

If You Don't Know Our Answer . . .

How to keep both peace and freedom—to keep them securely and be done with this lifelong nightmare . . . and enjoy a life of greater individual liberty and higher standards, spiritual as well as material?

That is the Question. The Answer is to do now between democracies on an oceanic scale what our Fathers did on a continental scale when they established the United States Constitution—form a Federal Union of the Free. We should start by uniting the democracies of the North Atlantic in a great Federal Republic built of, by and for the thing they all hold dearest and have most in common—the principle of government for the sake of individual life and liberty. This Union of the Free would be designed (a) to provide the free with effective common government in those fields where they agree that such government will clearly serve freedom and peace better than separate governments, and (b) to guarantee the continuance of their independent national governments in all the other fields where such separate governments will serve freedom and peace better than a common government.

An exploratory Convention of Delegates, representing the participating peoples (rather than their governments) would work out a Constitution embodying this division of fields of power, the Union's Executive, Legislative and Judicial Departments, its Bill of Rights, etc. This would then be submitted to the people of each country concerned for full discussion and decision.

The proposed convention would be modelled on the Federal Convention of 1787. Its unique procedure enabled it to reach mankind's first successful answer to this age-old issue—the U. S. Constitution, the original Federal Union of the Free. Although this has proved to be the most astonishing and enduring answer to the problem in all history, the American people have never yet sought to explore its possibilities in this jet-atomic age, nor tried to tackle any international question by the 1787 Convention method which produced the greatest success ever achieved at a conference of sovereign States.

The Federal Union of the Free we advocate is—like the United States itself—an interstate government so constituted as to keep *you,* the citizen, free and sovereign. It puts the accent on the sovereignty of the citizen, rather than on national sovereignty; it keeps the latter the servant of the former, and aims to save the citizen from having his life and liberty sacrificed merely to serve the sovereignty of his nation. It holds that supreme sovereignty in the United States—and in any true democracy—is vested equally in its citizens, rather than in the national government, that so-called national sovereignty is really merely a means to serve the citizen, not something more sacred than the people who made it.

In a Federal Union of the Free, as in your nation or state, you elect the lawmakers, and their laws are enforced on you individually. Power is divided between the Union and your national government. A Federal Union's major powers normally are limited to the right to conduct foreign relations, maintain armed forces, issue currency, regulate interstate commerce and communications between member nations, and grant Union citizenship.

Far from "abolishing the nation," Federal Union would guarantee the right of each nation to govern as independently as it does now all its purely national affairs—namely, every field except the few which it agreed itself were common Atlantic affairs. Each nation would remain free to practice democracy at home in its own language, according to its own customs and in its own way, so long as it did not infringe the Union's Bill of Rights for the citizens.

The proposed Union would be designed to grow gradually by federating with other nations as this became practicable, much as the United States grew from 13 to 48 States. Pending its growth into an eventual government of, by and for all mankind, which is far distant, it would be a member of the United Nations.

Because the Federal Union Answer would begin federation with the more experienced and like-minded democracies, and because nearly all of these are situated in the North Atlantic Community—the United States, Canada, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, etc.—and are already allies in NATO, our Answer is often called Atlantic Union. And because of the title of the book that first gave this Answer, and the stress we lay on action in time to prevent another world war or depression, Federal Union is often known as Union Now.

We cordially invite all those to whom it makes sense to join in giving this Answer as a member of **Federal Union, Inc.**

THE MILLION DOLLAR ANSWER

An answer to a major problem that wins a million dollars in voluntary support from the public may be called a "million-dollar answer," at a time when television has drawn such attention to $64,000 questions. In 1955 **Federal Union, Inc.**, climbed into this "million-dollar" class with its answer to the problem of how to secure world peace with individual freedom—an answer variously summed up as Federal Union of the Free, or Atlantic Union, or Union Now.

Not that its answer won $1,000,000 in support in that one year. The amount received was, instead, $83,934, but this sufficed to bring the support given to **Federal Union** since its incorporation in 1940 up to a grand total a bit above the million-dollar mark.

How Federal Union Got $1,048,393 in 15 Years

In the 15 years and seven months from its incorporation as a non-profit, educational membership association to the end of 1955 **Federal Union** received $1,048,393* to advance the purpose for which it was incorporated: "education in the basic principles of federal union as exemplified in the Constitution of the United States, with a view to attaining world order by a Federal Union of Democratic Peoples." To make known the why and how of its answer, and do further research in the problem, it spent on educational work in those years a grand total of $1,030,435,* including $81,815 in 1955.

Had **Federal Union** gained its million dollars in one gift or in a few grants from big foundations, this would have been widely headlined news. Perhaps even more impressive is the way by which it actually reached this figure. We mounted to the Million-Dollar-Answer level step by step through more than 15 years of struggling to survive, often from month to month, even from week to week. **Federal Union** grew from only an idea, an Answer, largely through myriad dues, contributions, and subscription fees of $1 to $10. Many of these have been repeated for 5, 10, 15 or more years by devoted men and women who would not take *No* for the answer. Less than 20 per cent came in contributions of more than $1,000. By far the largest single contribution in one year was $25,000 given by a woman in 1940 after the fall of France. **Federal Union** has never received a grant from a major foundation. In a world where the majority of new corporations formed each year, profit or non-profit, perish within five years, **Federal Union** has existed for fifteen.

Annual income and outgo have fluctuated sharply. High and low points were as follows:

Income	Expenditure
$101,256 (1941)	$101,709 (1949)
$ 26,098 (1943)	$ 22,346 (1943)

However, when viewed in five-year periods, the financial curve is one of steady growth:

Period	Average Annual Income	Average Annual Expenditure
1939-40*	$34,320	$35,832
1940-45	48,093	46,324
1946-50	73,059	69,945
1951-55	82,555	84,212
1955 (alone)	83,935	81,815

*Pre-incorporation 14-month period.

It will be seen that expenditures last year were slightly below the highest five-year average, while income was slightly higher than the highest such average.

Union of the Free Makes Record Advance

Funds for **Federal Union** are but means to advance its educational work. In 1955 our work, too, attained new heights. Rarely have we gained so much ground within one year. Consider these highlights:

Atlantic Convention Resolution

In February, after a two-year lapse, the resolution for a convention of delegates to explore the possibility of Atlantic Union was re-introduced in both Houses of Congress by an impressive bipartisan group of 13 Senators and 13 Representatives, led by Senator Estes Kefauver. This was a revised version of the previous resolutions; the major changes brought out more clearly the purely exploratory character of the convention and its resemblance to the 1787 Philadelphia Constitutional Convention. During the year those who made public their support of the resolution rose to 94 Members of Congress—17 Senators and 77 Representatives.

Endorsements by Marshall and Others

In May, General George C. Marshall, former Secretary of State and of Defense, gave FREEDOM & UNION a statement endorsing this "prudent" resolution. He said, in part:

> *The subject today is vitally important and the period fateful. All probably agree to the importance of Atlantic unity but few act. . . . Thinking back on the development of our own Federal Union—on the doubts and difficulties which preceded the final union of the colonies, on the remarkable advance in freedom, invention, production and living standards which followed on the solution of the early difficulties, and on the high degree to which the States have continued to maintain their individual personality and institutions—Americans should have a sympathetic understanding of this effort to overcome the limitations of national barriers in the approach to a solution for common problems.*

*The grand totals reach $1,088,435 received and $1,072,241 spent, if one adds the amounts raised ($40,042) and expended ($41,806) in the 14-month period between organization of the first committee on March 28, 1939, and incorporation on May 23, 1940.

Acting in Paris quite independently but almost simultaneously, Robert Schuman, Minister of Justice and father of the Schuman Plan, joined the father of the Marshall Plan; he, too, came out for the Atlantic resolution. In a statement given to Dr. Ralph Epstein, roving correspondent of FREEDOM & UNION, the former French Premier attributed the breakdown of his efforts to unite Western Europe more closely to American failure to explore Atlantic Union.

Our magazine also received other strong endorsements of the Atlantic Convention proposal from Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, former Belgian Premier Van Zeeland, Canadian Foreign Secretary Pearson, Dutch Foreign Minister Beyen, and Italian Foreign Minister Martino. Never before had any former Secretary of State or the Foreign Minister of any democracy come out publicly for a Convention to explore Atlantic Union.

Hearings by Senate Committee

In late July, despite the heavy competition for time in the closing days of Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the Atlantic Convention resolutions on two days, July 25 and 29. These important gains were made as compared to the 1950 hearings:

1. The hearings in 1955 were held on the Atlantic resolution only, not on a half dozen resolutions in the field of international organization, as in 1950.
2. The hearings in 1955 were conducted by the full Senate Foreign Relations Committee, not by a sub-committee as in 1950.
3. In 1955 Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy came to the hearings and read a letter from Secretary Dulles giving the Department's views of the matter. In 1950 no State Department representative higher than Assistant Secretary testified at the hearings, and Secretary Acheson remained aloof.
4. In 1955 the State Department's view was constructive and by implication favorable to the resolution. In 1950 the State Department cited a number of reasons against the resolution, none of which it put forward in 1955.

The Secretary's statement at the 1955 hearing was sufficiently ambiguous, however, for the press to interpret it as being opposed to the Convention proposal. On August 22 in a letter replying to one sent by Senator Kefauver (who had written him that supporters of the resolution were willing to make the changes the Secretary had suggested), Mr. Dulles explained his opposition was merely to the "actual text of the resolution," particularly because it made the Convention an initiative by the President instead of by Congress. Secretary Dulles added:

> *However, I did not intend thereby to express opposition to any exploration, pursuant to Congressional initiative, of the possibilities of increased unity between some or all the members of the Atlantic Community.*

Unfortunately by that time Congress had recessed until January 4, 1956. Later I was told by a well-informed member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he was astonished by the ambiguity of the Secretary's statement at the hearing; all signs had led him to believe the statement would be clearly favorable. Had it been, the resolution might have gone through the Senate before it adjourned; certainly this was under consideration in high quarters. Undoubtedly the "Summit" conference in Geneva the same month, and the illusory hope it left served to defer action on the Atlantic Convention. Had the subsequent disillusioning October meeting in Geneva occurred in July, the Atlantic Convention resolution might well have sailed through Congress then.

As it was, Chairman George promised to bring it up in the Foreign Relations Committee soon after Congress reconvened in January. This he did in executive sesssion. After two Administration Senators sought delay, and gained some support from the Democratic side, it was agreed to postpone action until later. There the resolution rests at this writing. Pending a decision in the Senate, the supporters of the Atlantic Convention have not sought action in the House.

On the organizational side, chief credit for the resolution's advance in Congress goes to the **Atlantic Union Committee,** which was set up independently in 1949 to concentrate on having a Convention called to explore the possibilities of Atlantic unification. (See page 12 for more about this affiliate.)

NATO Parliamentary Body Organized

In July, the Big Four conference at the "Summit" in Geneva over-clouded, in the press at least, another conference which met the same week in Paris and which history may longer remember. It was the first meeting ever held by delegations from the parliaments of all 15 members of NATO. It decided to form a continuing body and to meet every year. Edward J. Meeman, editor of the Memphis (Tenn.) *Press-Scimitar,* likened the session in importance to "the first meeting of the Continental Congress," in his eye-witness report in the September issue of FREEDOM & UNION.

The leading role of Senator Wishart Robertson, Speaker of the Canadian Senate, in bringing about the conference was recognized when he was elected chairman. Much credit for this conference also goes to Lester B. Pearson, Canadian Secretary for External Affairs; Halvard Lange, Norwegian Foreign Minister; and Finn Moe, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Norwegian Parliament. Senator Kefauver was the prime mover in assuring the participation of the U.S. Congress; its delegation was led by two other supporters of the Atlantic Convention resolution, Representatives Wayne L. Hays, (D. Ohio) and Leroy Johnson (R. California).

Thus life came at last to an idea to which our magazine has devoted more attention than any other periodical, notably in articles by Patrick Nicholson, our Canadian correspondent, and by Livingston Hartley. Mr. Hart-

ley's first contribution to this subject appeared in FREEDOM & UNION, November, 1951. In 1953 we published his "A North Atlantic Assembly—Its Purpose, Function and Structure" as our Research Report No. 4.

Although the present body is neither a "NATO Parliament" nor a consultative assembly, it does assure permanent regular contact on the parliamentary level, contact hitherto confined in NATO to the generals, admirals, diplomats, cabinet members and chiefs of governments. It is certain to grow in influence from year to year and to serve increasingly to knit together the Atlantic Community.

Major organizational credit for this conference goes to the group—Will Clayton, William H. Draper, Jr., Hugh Moore, Lithgow Osborne and Philip D. Reed—which fathered the "Declaration of Atlantic Unity" in 1954, and to its very active Executive Secretary, Walden Moore. This group published a handsome booklet in 1955 giving the text of this important Declaration, along with the names of 244 NATO leaders in nine countries who were signers, and statements concerning it by the more prominent of them. The pamphlet also lists names, address, purposes and officers of the 11 organizations in the Atlantic unification field that now exist in seven nations: three in the U.S.; two each in France and United Kingdom; and one each in Belgium, Canada, Denmark and The Netherlands. This pamphlet is available from Walden Moore, 114 East 54th Street, New York, N. Y.

Other 1955 developments which should be mentioned are: the ratification of the Paris Accords on the rearming of the German Federal Republic and its entry into NATO; the resignation of Jean Monnet as head of the European Coal and Steel Community and his replacement by Rene Mayer; and Mr. Monnet's subsequent campaign for European unification in the atomic field (often called Euratom).

In the organization field, the **German Committee for Atlantic Union** was most active abroad. It proposed the creation of an Atlantic-wide organization for Atlantic Union. Mrs. Chase Osborn of the **Atlantic Union Committee** played a particularly important role in rousing German interest in our cause.

Deaths of Justice Roberts and Lionel Curtis

Amid all our cause for rejoicing we suffered irreparable loss in 1955 through the death of two of our best-known and best-beloved leaders. On May 16 we lost Owen J. Roberts, aged 80; on November 24 Lionel Curtis died at 83.

Owen Roberts first came out for Federal Union in 1941 while an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1946 he helped found FREEDOM & UNION, of which he was a contributing editor until his death. In 1949, Justice Roberts led in founding the **Atlantic Union Committee.** in addition to his well-known efforts for our cause,* Justice Roberts gave $8,000 in the past 10 years to **Federal Union, Inc.** As General Marshall said so discerningly in his statement in our June magazine:

> *Justice Roberts' service to defense as well as to the judiciary were manifold, but perhaps the finest thing he did was the sacrifice he made in resigning from the Supreme Court to devote himself to the cause of Atlantic Union.*

Lionel Curtis was the grand old man of federalism not only in the British Commonwealth but in the world, in years of service as well as age, although his role is much less known to Americans than that of Justice Roberts. Lionel Curtis helped found the Union of South Africa in 1909 after being converted to federalism by reading *The Federalist.* In his monumental book, *World Order,* published in London in 1934-37 he proposed Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom unite federally on a basis designed to become gradually universal. In 1939 he read *Union Now,* which I had written without knowledge of his work. We met in New York City and he immediately threw his vast influence behind its proposal for an Atlantic Union; the swift rise of *Union Now* in public consideration through the world owes much more to him than I can say. Lionel Curtis** continued the struggle steadfastly to his death; he lived to see all the evidence 1955 brought to justify the advice he gave our little handful in 1939, quoting Arthur Hugh Clough:

> *Say not the struggle naught availeth,*
> *The labor and the wounds are vain,*
> *The enemy faints not, nor faileth*
> *And as things have been they remain.*

EDUCATIONAL WORK IN 1955

A. Freedom & Union

Our illustrated monthly magazine, founded in 1946, was nominated at the completion of its ninth year for the 1955 Award for Public Service in Magazine Journalism, given by Sigma Delta Chi, the national professional journalistic fraternity. Its sponsor for this signal honor was Vic Reinemer, executive secretary to Senator James E. Murray of Montana.

The award is given each year to a magazine of general circulation for rendering "exceptionally noteworthy public service . . . in the face of anti-social, political and other hampering forces." Selections from the case Mr. Reinemer made for his nomination will suffice as a report on FREEDOM & UNION in 1955. They follow:

1. FREEDOM & UNION, a magazine of general circulation, deserves the Sigma Delta Chi Award because:
   Through the year it kept before the public of the Atlantic Community the basic ideas of freedom and union that formed the United States itself;

*See my tribute to Justice Roberts in FREEDOM AND UNION, June, 1955; and the article, "Owen J. Roberts and Atlantic Union," which I contributed to the eight articles on him which the University of Pennsylvania Law Review published "in memoriam" in its December, 1955 issue. (Now available as a reprint.)

**See "Lionel Curtis—Prophet of Federal Union," in FREEDOM & UNION, January, 1956, pp. 10-11.

it encouraged study of American federal constitutional principles and history; it promoted better understanding and more effective organization of the Atlantic Community; and it crusaded for the calling of [an Atlantic] Convention. . . .

It consistently carried on to an exceptional degree the best traditions of the press as regards not only crusading for important political reforms but maintaining high standards of accuracy and fairness, and keeping controversy on a high plane.

The leadership and service it gave through the year justified . . . tributes [from] Carroll Binder, editor, editorial page *Minneapolis Tribune* . . . Erwin D. Canham, editor, *Christian Science Monitor* . . . Ernest Lindley, Washington correspondent, *Newsweek* . . . Forrest W. Seymour, editor, Worcester (Mass.) *Telegram-Gazette* . . . W. W. Waymack, former editor, *Des Moines* (Iowa) *Register;* . . . [and] Arthur Krock, columnist, *The New York Times.*

[Mr. Reinemer cites these comments. Perhaps typical is Mr. Binder's: "FREEDOM & UNION is performing an invaluable service for all who care about freedom. It makes available information and opinions about developments in that direction which are not to be found in any other periodical."]

2. FREEDOM & UNION has rendered this service and given this leadership . . . despite the indifference, discouragement or skepticism of much of the public and press, and in the face of two powerful deterring forces:

a. The belief that there is no profit to be made in this kind of journalism, a belief that is confirmed by the fact that no other U.S. periodical cultivates this field **and**

b. The fear that if a periodical crusades too much—or even at all—it will be deemed fanatical and/or will lose influence and income.

3. Evidence of the good that FREEDOM & UNION accomplished in 1955: [Here Mr. Reinemer cites FREEDOM & UNION's ideas as advancing through the Atlantic Convention resolution, the endorsements of it by leading statesmen, the hearings on it, the meeting of NATO Parliamentarians, etc., already mentioned on page 12 of this report.]

4. Evidence of "enterprise" . . . : [Here Mr. Reinemer points to our full coverage of the Atlantic Convention hearings and NATO Parliamentarian Conference (September issue), and our exclusive publication of the Dulles-Kefauver exchange of letters on the Atlantic Convention (October issue).]

5. Evidence of "initiative":

a. Called attention to forgotten fact that the United States, as a Federal Republic, was born on March 4, 1789, when the Constitution went into effect, and proposed this be celebrated.

Atlantic Union . . . "Not a Problem—The Answer"

The following excerpt from a letter which a new member, Richard R. Quay, secretary and general counsel of the Chase Brass & Copper Co., Waterbury, Conn. wrote to a U.S. Senator fits into this Report as if it had been especially written for it:

I've been all over the pros and cons of Atlantic Union and until recently was inclined to dismiss the idea as impracticable in the present climate of world opinion. It seemed to me little more than a goal for the long term future, incapable of realization until such time as popular obsession with absolute national sovereignty might, perhaps, have subsided under the impact of successive disasters.

I was finally disabused of that notion about two weeks ago in a conversation with Roy F. Steward, the senior partner of our patent law firm in New Haven. He has been active in the Atlantic Union movement since it began [he was Vice-President of **Federal Union, Inc.**, *in 1955]. My respect for his opinions is by no means confined to his expert field, and it wasn't difficult, therefore, for him to persuade me of the essentially wrong, negative and defeatist character of my attitude.*

Viewed in proper perspective, I now clearly recognize it as representative of the same type thinking that, had it infected St. Paul and a handful of other inspired men, would have consigned Christianity to oblivion. It surely would have made the development and adoption of our own Constitution impossible. It contributed largely, I think, to both World Wars. To sum it all up, I can think of nothing better than a comment of Canon Streeter's of the Queens College, Oxford:

> **I had a great deal of trouble with the problem of Christianity until I suddenly realized that Christianity is not a problem but simply the answer to the problem of life.**

Now why doesn't the same principle apply perfectly to this whole Atlantic Union proposal? Analyzed as a problem, its practical and technical difficulties appear both innumerable and insuperable. Recogonized as the answer to the problem of war and totalitarianism in the atomic age, its forest emerges from the trees, the pieces fall into place, and like Archimedes, having at last found some solid ground on which to stand, one can, at least, begin to believe that it may be possible after all to develop enough leverage to move the cosmos.

b. Played up fact that the Atlantic ocean is now—in time [required] to cross it—221 times smaller than in 1492.

In other points Mr. Reinemer documented his belief in FREEDOM & UNION's initiative, effectiveness of presentation, variety of approaches and breadth of coverage. These points he illustrated by mentioning specific articles, including:

"A Thought On Thinking," by Norman Cousins (October); "Interdependence and Religion," by Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson (November); "The Ultra-Conservative and Internationalism," by Father Ralph Gorman (December); "Fallacies of the Tariff" (January); "Atlantica's Economic Future—With and Without Union" (May); and "Facts of Economic Life," by Ambassador Winthrop Aldrich (December). Sigma Delta Chi will announce its annual awards for 1955 later this year. Past awards have gone without exception to mass circulation magazines.

FREEDOM & UNION is celebrating its tenth year of publication throughout 1956; its first issue appeared in October, 1946.

Staff Changes

Staff changes in 1955 were unusually great. To our deep regret Helen Hamer resigned in July. She had been managing editor of FREEDOM & UNION from its founding. She is now executive secretary of the Commission for a National Civic Auditorium and Cultural Center, a body recently established by Congress. She left many enduring marks of devoted service in nine years and earned many compliments by her consistently high-quality work. She will remain on our masthead as a Contributing Editor.

Pierre Streit, my son, and our former European correspondent, was temporarily in the U.S. when the managing editorship became vacant. He filled in as managing editor and brought out the September, October and November issues before returning to Afghanistan for a new television film assigment. C. R. Lyle II, former editorial writer for the Keene (N.H.) Sentinel, then took over as managing editor. Through this period of change Nancy Hamilton, promoted to Assistant Editor in 1955, carried the burden of assuring continuity in the magazine, a responsibility she splendidly fulfilled.

B. "Formation of the Union" and Other Work

Federal Union's greatest single educational achievement in 1955 concerned the world's basic book on federal government and the United States Constitution, *Formation of the Union of the American States.* This collection of major documents was published by Congress in 1927. We were instrumental in calling attention to the shocking neglect into which it had fallen and in getting it reprinted. We also distributed copies to leading statesmen, generals, and other key leaders, many of whom had never heard of it.

1. Reprinting of "Formation of the Union"

Testimony of opposition witnesses at the Senate hearings on the Atlantic Convention resolution forcefully brought home to me once more the dangerously deep and widespread ignorance of Americans concerning the origin, history, and fundamental principles of our Federal Republic. Leaders of various organizations priding themselves on their patriotism have become so confused that they seek to uphold, in the name of Americanism, the concept of sovereignty which the Founding Fathers deliberately rejected when they adopted the Constitution. After the Senate hearings I sent marked copies of *Formation of the Union* to President Eisenhower, former President Truman and eight other top leaders who were in a position to help clarify this confusion. In doing this it was discovered that the volume was in short supply at the Government Printing Office and that it had no plans to reprint a work "so costly" and "so little in demand."

This situation was reported at the meeting of the **Federal Union** Board October 14, upon which the Board adopted a resolution, proposed by Melvin Ryder, stressing the importance of *Formation of the Union,* expressing alarm at its short supply and the lack of plans for reprinting it, and pointing out that the Atlantic Convention resolution now added to its importance. The Board's resolution went on to call for action to stop neglect of the publication, to popularize it, and to reprint a low-price edition at once which should never be permitted to go out of print. The resolution also called for a shorter, paperbound edition at a still lower price to encourage wider reading.

A copy of the resolution was sent to the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker, the Secretary of State, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Committee on Printing, the Librarian of Congress and the Public Printer. (For text of this resolution, see December FREEDOM & UNION.)

Subsequently it was learned that *Formation of the Union* was not only the "only one-volume edition" of these documents but the sole edition of any kind extant.

On November 17 Carper W. Buckley, Superintendent of Documents, wrote us that plans to reprint this book were being made.* It was out of print by mid-November, however, and was not again available until mid-February. Thus for three months no one who sought to

*Replying for President Eisenhower, Sherman Adams wrote: "Your interest in making it readily available is indeed appreciated. With respect to a possible reprinting of the volume, your remarks are being brought to the attention of the Chairman of the National Historical Publications Commission—an organization which has been interested in the publication and dissemination of documents relating to the formation and growth of the United States."

The Librarian of Congress, L. Quincy Mumford, in answer to the resolution wrote: "I share the desire of your Board to further the distribution, knowledge, and use of the compilation entitled *Formation of the Union of the American States.* I shall be glad to do anything which I might appropriately do to further these ends." He added some helpful suggestions, and has been most cooperative.

learn how the American people had achieved the federal union which made them the freest, strongest, richest people on earth could buy any book that gave the official record of the formation of the United States. **Federal Union, Inc.** not only led in keeping this lapse from continuing indefinitely; it was the only organization to our knowledge that took action to keep these fundamental Constitutional documents available. Our Board's resolution gained editorial support from several newspapers. It has not yet succeeded, however, in getting a cheaper edition of the book. Instead, official regulations forced the Government Printing Office to raise the price from $6.50 to $9.50. **Federal Union, Inc.**, will not rest, however, until the objectives of its resolution are fully realized.

2. Distribution of "Formation of the Union"

When I told our Board on October 14 of the 10 copies of this book which I had given to key statesmen, and the importance of our presenting it to more of them during the Congressional recess, one member, Robert Whitaker, spontaneously offered $1,000 on behalf of himself and his wife to finance this. **Federal Union** was thus able to purchase 165 more copies before the book went out of print.

Before the year ended all these books were presented to key leaders in government, the press and business. I inscribed each one to the recipient personally, and to my covering letter attached a copy of our Board's resolution and a page excerpt from the letter I wrote President Eisenhower in presenting the volume to him. My covering letter also explained that we had marked the recipient's volume in the same way as the one sent to the President—with the cover of the July FREEDOM & UNION —and had indicated the same passages (more than 50) that were emphasized for the President. These included a number showing that the concept of national sovereignty we urge on the Atlantic democracies today is the one that the Founding Fathers urged on the 13 States in 1787. Apart from making such points, our purpose in marking the books was to encourage busy readers to begin to browse in the massive volume. The work of marking each volume was done largely by Mrs. Justin Blackwelder as a labor of love.

The results already achieved have amply justified all this care. We have never enjoyed so good a response to any such project as this one received. Among those who answered with personal notes of thanks—many of them very encouraging—were former Presidents Hoover and Truman; Secretary of State Dulles; Adlai Stevenson; Generals Gruenther, MacArthur and Ridgway; Senators Paul Douglas, Herbert Lehman, Lister Hill, Lyndon Johnson, Estes Kefauver, William Knowland, Karl Mundt, and H. Alexander Smith; Governor Christian Herter; Paul Hoffman; Henry R. Luce; Clarence Randall; Philip Graham; Arthur Krock; Walter Lippmann; Edward R. Murrow; Drew Pearson; Whitelaw Reid; James Reston; and scores of others. There were so many key leaders in various fields to whom we wished to present the book, and so few copies available that there inevitably resulted many very regrettable omissions.

3. Publications

We published three pamphlets and twelve reprints from FREEDOM & UNION in 1955.* Nearly all of them were distributed.

During the year we sold more than 1,000 copies of *Freedom Against Itself,* published in 1954. Our Vice-President, Mrs. Patricia Luce, succeeded single-handedly in getting 24 outstanding leaders to sign a joint statement describing this book as presenting a "bold course of action that deserves the studious consideration of every thoughtful American" and urging the public to buy it. Under the title, "We The Undersigned Urge Every Thoughtful American to Read This Book," this rare endorsement was published as a full-page advertisement in The New York Times Book Review signed by:

Frank Aydelotte
Director Emeritus
Institute for Advance Study
Margaret Culking Banning
Author

*Pamphlets	QUANTITY	DISTRIBUTED
Reactor Experiment	8,000	6,500
How Far Do We Agree? (Score Card)	5,000	4,400
Federal Union 1954 Report	7,500	7,350
Reprints		
Plymouth Rock Inscription	15,000	11,000
Against the D-Bomb—What "Massive Retaliation?"	12,000	7,770
New Atlantic Convention—Resolution and Comment	11,000	9,500
Open Letter to President Eisenhower	10,000	7,100
King Nation or King Citizen?—The Confusion Over Sovereignty	10,000	9,300
Mayflower Compact	11,000	10,000
General Marshall Comes Out for Atlantic Union	5,000	4,950
Epstein's Report on Asia	1,000	1,000
Epstein's Report on Europe	1,000	1,000
Problems of NATO—Parliamentary Organization	1,000	1,000
Forgotten Birthday	1,000	600
"Union, How? Great 4 or....?" (July cover, FREEDOM & UNION)	200	200
TOTAL PAMPHLETS AND REPRINTS	98,700	81,670

Harry Bullis
Chairman, General Mills
Will Clayton
former Undersecretary of State
Arthur H. Compton
Atomic scientist, Nobel Prize Winner
Gordon Dean
Banker; former chairman, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Howard Dietz
Librettist
Dorothy Canfield Fisher
Author
Estes Kefauver
U.S. Senator from Tennessee
Tex McCrary
Commentator
Hugh Moore
Chairman, Dixie Cup Co.
Peter H. Odegard
former Chairman, American Political Science Association
Edgar E. Rand
President, International Shoe Co.
Theodore Repplier
President, Advertising Council
Owen J. Roberts
former Justice, U. S. Supreme Court
Will Rogers, Jr.
Actor; former Member of Congress
Elmo Roper
Public Opinion Surveyor
Harry Scherman
Chairman of the Board,
Book-of-the-Month Club, Inc.
John R. Steelman
former Chairman, National Security Resources Board
William E. Stevenson
President, Oberlin College
Herbert Bayard Swope
former Editor, *New York World*
Edward Teller
Physicist
Harold Urey
Atomic scientist, Nobel Prize Winner
W. W. Waymack
former member, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission

Designed by Harry Scherman, chairman of the Book-of-the-Month Club, as a contribution to the cause, this advertisement was also published in dailies in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere.

4. General Mailings

We sent out a total of some 72,000 letters and other mailings in 1955, an increase of 11,000 compared to 1954.

ADMINISTRATION

A. Organization

1. Board

In 1955 our Board met three times—February 4, April 29 and October 14; twice in Washington and once (April) in New York. The annual mail ballot of the membership in January re-elected the following six members for 3-year terms: F. Joseph Donohue, F. Gilbert Lamb, Mrs. Patricia Luce, Richard W. Norton, Jr., Mrs. Clarence K. Streit, and Robert W. Williams; and Sam Warner for a 2-year term. The following two new members were also elected: Dr. Arthur H. Compton, Nobel Prize atomic scientist, St. Louis, Mo.; and Robert Whitaker, realtor, Kenosha, Wisc.

At the April meeting Mrs. Robert W. (Flora Molloy) Adams was elected by the Board as a member for the part of 1955 remaining after her resignation as our Manager.

The Board elected the following officers for 1955 on February 4: Chairman, Lester B. Vernon; Vice Presidents, Mrs. Patricia Luce and Roy F. Steward; Secretary, Janice Holland; Treasurer, F. Joseph Donohue; Assistant Treasurer, Melvin Ryder. It also named as Executive Committee: the President,* Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, Assistant Treasurer, and Board members A. Powell Davies and Leo McCormick.

2. Staff

Changes in our administrative staff in 1955 were as great as the ones in the editorial department. Following her re-marriage, Mrs. Adams resigned in May as Manager of Federal Union and Business Manager of FREEDOM & UNION, so that she might devote all her time to her children. Starting with **Federal Union** nine years ago, she showed great ability, industry and character and rose to Manager in a few years. Her loyalty and conscientiousness have stood us in good stead. As a member of the Board now, residing near Washington, her unique knowledge of our affairs remains at our service.

Mrs. Helen Berry Thompson was promoted to Manager of **Federal Union** and acting Business Manager of the magazine. As my personal secretary for more than a year she had proved herself capable of heavier responsibilities and deserving of wider opportunities for her enterprise. I was fortunate in being able to replace her with Miss Marilyn Ellis as my secretary. There were two other good additions to our small team of eight: Donald Manganello was placed in charge of stock room, mimeo and mailing activities, and Miss Jacquelyn Burkholder became general utility girl. Mrs. Peggy Mullen continued in capable charge of membership and circulation records.

3. New Headquarters

After remaining for 11 years at 700 Ninth St., N.W., **Federal Union** headquarters were moved in August to much more satisfactory offices filling the third floor at 2700 Ontario Road, N.W. We had hardly settled there when the second floor, with much-needed extra space at little rent increase, became available. There we are now, in six rooms, much better and more conveniently installed than we have ever been in Washington. Mrs. Thompson deserves full credit for finding these new quarters, for most effectively carrying out the two moves, and for getting us settled in more suitable offices at comparatively little cost. We cordially invite all members, sub-

*The President of **Federal Union** is elected by the membership of the organization—not by the Board—for a 3-year term.

scribers and friends to pay us a visit when in Washington.

B. Finances

The annual financial statement for 1955, as reported by our auditors, Rouart & Rouart, shows the following results, given here to the nearest dollar:

Table 1—Federal Union, Inc., 1955 Revenue and Expenditure

	Budget Estimate	Actual
Revenue	$80,600	$83,935
Expenditure	80,400	81,815
Surplus	$ 200	$ 2,120

This represents an improvement of some $16,000 compared to 1954 and about $4,000 compared to 1953. The relevant figures for those years were:

Table 2—Revenue and Expenditure for 1954 and 1953

	1954	1953
Revenue	$67,311	$79,813
Expenditure	67,856	74,355
	minus $ 545	plus $ 5,458

The following table shows that we did better in 1955 than the average for the past five years, or for any previous five-year average; it also brings out the details of **Federal Union's** steady growth which we referred to earlier:

Table 3—Federal Union, Inc. Revenue & Expenditure Since 1939

5-year Period	Total Income	Annual Average Income	Total Expenditure	Annual Average Expenditure
1951-55	$412,776	$82,555	$421,082	$84,212
1946-50	365,295	73,059	349,728	69,945
1940-45*	269,322	48,093	259,415	46,324
1930-40**	(40,042)	(34,320)	(41,806)	(35,382)

*From incorporation, June, 1940, five years and seven months.
**Pre-incorporation period, April 1, 1939 to June 1, 1940, 14 months.

Compared to 1954, contributions in 1955 rose by $13,287, membership dues and advertising both rose slightly while subscriptions fell by $685 and sales of publications (excluding the magazine) fell by $4,871. The latter item was unusually high in 1954 due to the publication in that year of *Freedom Against Itself*. Sales of that book continued to provide most of the revenue in this category in 1955. Chief expenditures are summarized in the table below:

Table 4—Federal Union, Inc. Expenditures in 1955 Compared to 1954

	1955	1954
General education & Research	$21,577	$16,752
Freedom & Union	33,466	31,440
Administrative	26,772	19,664
	$81,815	$67,856

Moving costs and higher rent for the new offices account for much of the increase in administrative costs.

Full-time staff varied between seven and nine persons during the year. The highest salary paid is $7,500 a year which I receive as editor. Total payroll figures for the last six years are given in the table below:

Federal Union, Inc. Payroll Totals by Years, 1950-1955

Year	Total Payroll
1950	$36,561
1951	42,816
1952	47,346
1953	33,681
1954	29,075
1955	33,822

We ended 1955 with a net worth of $8,527, calculated on the most conservative basis and omitting our $10,000 subscription fulfillment reserve. This figure compares to a net worth of $6,407 at the end of 1954. **Federal Union's** only debts are current bills. In short, **Federal Union** continues to be financially healthy, but needs to grow much stronger. Compared to our Goliath we remain a David . . . with too small a pebble. What has already been accomplished with that pebble is an indication of what **Federal Union** could do with more adequate arms.

C. Fund Raising

In 1955 we spent $4,384 on fund-raising, or five per cent of total revenue. This is a modest amount as compared to other organizations and is under our own seven per cent rate in 1954. Contributions from members of our Board reached a new high in 1955 for a total of $15,936, compared to $14,403 in 1954 and $7,610 in 1953. Death deprived us during the year of several substantial benefactors. We received no grant from the larger foundations but did get some aid from smaller, private ones. No bequests or legacies were received; so far as can be recalled **Federal Union** has never received any.

Business friends contributed two very welcome gifts: an electric typewriter and a mimeograph machine. These have substantially aided operations.

To give me an opportunity to present our answer to world problems in hopes of widening our support in New York City, Jack Chrysler and Nicholas Kelley gave a cocktail party for their friends in the Cloud Club atop the Chrysler Building. Harry Davega gave a lunch in his White Turkey restaurant, Nicholas Doman gave a dinner at the Princeton Club and Mrs. Patricia Luce held a cocktail party in her home. I welcome this opportunity to thank them again, and to express my appreciation of the valuable fund-raising help given by Mr. and Mrs. Pierre Streit, and by Mrs. Adams, Mrs. Thompson and Miss Ellis of our staff.

The Board especially commended Richard W. Norton, Jr., member from Shreveport, La., for devising and carrying out at his own expense a plan for educating in our principles all the Louisiana delegation in Congress, all the members of the Louisiana Legislature, its Governor and other State officials. To this end he sent them each a copy of *Freedom Against Itself* and a gift subscription to FREEDOM & UNION, along with a

personal letter. He also worked actively to interest Louisiana newspapers and organizations of veterans, farmers and women in his State.

LAST WORD

Toward the end of 1955 we got the following letter from James de Fremery of Oakland, California, who began supporting **Federal Union** in 1939. The letter tells its own story of the progress **Federal Union** made in 1955:

> Enclosed is my check for $100. I told you some time ago that I could not go along with you any longer for, although I was in favor of Atlantic Union, I thought the idea impractical and I had other interests to which I was giving all I could spare. However, recently Atlantic Union has made such rapid progress that it really begins to look as though the dream might be realized in the not-too-distant future. So I'd like to climb aboard the bandwagon once more. Good luck to you. I greatly admire your devotion and persistence.

To rest on our laurels now is to lose the momentous race we are in. Our greatest weakness lies in the proneness of many members to let their chain-reaction powers lie idle. Discouraged by past failures to enroll friends as supporters or subscribers, they cease their efforts to make our Answer known and widen our sphere of influence. They let their support sink into passivity. They deprive themselves—and their friends—of some of life's lasting satisfactions.

For is it not satisfying to serve a momentous truth? . . . to open the eyes of friends to the answer they grope for? . . . to persuade them to sacrifice their time and money now so as not to have to sacrifice their children later? . . . to get them to invest their talents and spare funds in an enterprise that has proved its soundness, pays priceless dividends and is destined to rise higher and higher on the Great Board of Human History?

Is it not a satisfaction to overcome difficulties by persevering until at long last the supporter you seek is added to our rolls? . . . Is it not a satisfaction to enlist an important community leader in the Federal Union cause? . . . get people to part with antique ideas that are more deadly than ancient ideas of medicine ever were? . . . Is this not a better satisfaction than is found in hunting big-game or bargain-rate antiques?

Now is the time—as Mr. de Fremery indicates—for all of us to renew our efforts, to refresh our thinking, to rearm ourselves with new materials and ideas, to talk and write to friends, to the press, to key leaders—to tell the world about our Million Dollar Answer, and get others to join and multiply the chain reaction.

One St. Louis member last year multiplied hers by 12, for she enrolled a dozen new members—and showed what any of us can do with a little effort. The effort can be reduced to a quota of one new supporter a month . . . but the result will be great at the end of 1956.

The more of us who follow this Member-a-Month lead the greater will be the progress our next annual report can point to in every field, for success breeds success. And the more you yourself help produce it, the more you will personally "feel like a million dollars."

Federal Union, Inc.
Clarence K. Streit
President

April 23, 1956

Federal Union, Inc. and the Atlantic Union Committee

Federal Union, Inc. orginated when readers of *Union Now* spontaneously banded themselves together in cities from coast to coast and overseas to back the plan it proposed for preventing the then-looming World War II. The plan was summed up in the book's sub-title: "A Proposal for A Federal Union of the Democracies of the North Atlantic."

Union Now was published by Harper and Bros. on March 2, 1939 and the first of the local committees formed to support this answer was organized in New York City on the 28th of that month. On that day there also appeared the first periodical of the movement, the monthly *Union Now Bulletin,* published by a group in Washington, D.C., headed by Melvin Ryder (who was elected vice-president of **Federal Union, Inc.**, on February 4, 1956 after serving many years as a member of its Board.) Delegates sent by local committees from Boston to Oakland, California, set up on July 16, 1939 the first national organization. It was called **Inter-Democracy Federal Unionists,** later changed to **Federal Union.**

The **Atlantic Union Committee** is the major organization that grew out of **Federal Union, Inc.** Though completely independent, the two are closely affiliated. The **Atlantic Union Committee** was founded in 1949 largely by long-time supporters of **Federal Union, Inc.**, notably Owen J. Roberts, former Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court who was President of this Committee until his death in 1955. He was succeeded as president by another old **Federal Union** supporter, Elmo Roper.

It was thought best to provide the movement with these two cooperating arms—**Federal Union** concentrating on its basic federal answer to the problem, and on publications, research, etc., while the **Atlantic Union Committee** concentrated on getting Congress to take the first step by inviting other democracies to meet with American delegates in a Convention to explore the possibility of their uniting.

There is this other difference between the two organizations: Whereas members of **Federal Union** naturally also favor the calling of a convention to explore the Federalist answer, members of the **Atlantic Union Committee,** who favor such exploration, are not necessarily committed to the **Federal Union** answer, though many of them personally are.

Contributions to Federal Union, Inc. are deductible from taxable income

FEDERAL UNION INC.,

2700 Ontario Road, N.W.

Washington 9, D. C.

Streit, Clarence

Freedom & Union

MAGAZINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD

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700 NINTH STREET NW WASHINGTON 1 DC DISTRICT 7-4171

March 21, 1955

Dear Ed,

Such interest was shown in my letter to President Eisenhower, - which I sent for private background to some press, radio and TV friends on whose discretion I can rely, - that I am enclosing now for the same purpose a copy of a letter I recently sent Senator George.

I am particularly anxious that what I say in it about the Senator's own concern over the economic danger should not be used in any form, except as background information in judging the matter as a whole. All the rest of my letter can be quoted, but as written by me to "a Senator," without George being named in any way.

I also attach a reprint from our magazine giving two articles on the depression danger (the "D-Bomb") which I sent Senator George, - "Against the D-Bomb, What 'Massive Retaliation?'" and (on page 6) "Atlantica's Economic Future - With and Without Union." I develop this subject much more in Part IV of my recent book, Freedom Against Itself. *

I would greatly appreciate any comment you can make on any of this material. If you do deal with the subject, please send me a tear sheet.

We are running as a new feature the "Atlantic Editorial- [or Column-] of-the-Month." Please send us a copy of any you do that aim at more unity among the Atlantic nations or deal with the problems of the Atlantic Community, which we might reprint in full.

With best regards, I remain,

Sincerely,

Clarence
Clarence Streit

I expect to be in New York Friday, also Thursday p.m. and will give you a ring -

* Incidentally, if your paper was among the many which, I'm glad to say, have already reviewed or commented on this book, our clipping service missed it. I would greatly appreciate a copy, if or when done.

A LETTER TO SENATOR GEORGE from Clarence Streit - March 5, 1955 PRIVATE

March 5, 1955

Dear Senator George:

In my attached editorial commentary on the new resolution for an Atlantic Exploratory Convention, the passage on page 2, stressing the importance of the proposed Convention approach - in contradistinction to the usual diplomatic conference - is most important.

It seems to me that it will be impossible to defend, at the bar of future History where every statesman must stand his supreme trial, the continued failure of the United States even to try once to tackle its Atlantic inter-democracy problems by the Federal Convention procedure of 1787 which produced the United States Constitution, the most enduring success that ever resulted from any meeting of sovereign states.

I can understand why the lower State Department officers - who influence so much policy - should be prejudiced in favor of the diplomatic approach, the only one they know. But it does baffle me why the President and Secretary of State and Members of Congress whom History will hold responsible, should continue to let this approach be the only one tried, despite the mounting dangers it has already led to, and despite the attention that Justice Roberts, Will Clayton and others have called to the success which the Convention method achieved.

* * *

Recalling that in our last talk you shared my concern over the danger of another depression, I earnestly hope that you will also read my 2-page article in our enclosed February magazine on "Atlantica's Economic Future - With and Without Union."

You may remember that in my book, "Freedom Against Itself," I stressed these significant differences between the military and the economic roads to Red victory:

1) whereas we recognize that military attack on any of the Atlantic democracies may endanger us, we do not recognize that the economic danger can also spread from them to us by chain reaction;

2) whereas we have set up the NATO machinery, inadequate as it is, to meet the military danger, we have nothing comparable to assure concerted Atlantic action to prevent or deal with an economic break-through - and have not yet begun to explore how best to provide this machinery;

3) whereas experience shows that a military aggression tends to unite the democracies when it occurs in Europe, the record shows that economic depression anywhere on a major world scale tends to divide them worse than ever;

4) whereas the Kaiser and Hitler could win only by war, the Communists can hope to win through depression, too, and seem to be counting mainly on the latter, which involves no risk for them and against which our billion dollar means of massive retaliation are of no avail, but, on the contrary, contribute to the economic danger.

I have yet to see anyone deny any of those four propositions.

But I see no one, either, in the White House, the Cabinet or the leadership in either House of Congress who is yet doing anything at all to meet this danger, or

even to call public attention to it, - except, of course, the Congressional sponsors of the resolution to explore an Atlantic Union.

Otherwise, it is being ignored now as completely, - so far as I can see, - as the situation that produced the Wall Street crash in 1929 was ignored, before that explosion came, by official Washington.

Yet I read in The New York Times today an ominous Geneva dispatch which I hope you will not miss. It is from my successor there, Michael L. Hoffman, who is a most trustworthy, well-informed and far-sighted correspondent, particularly in the economic field. He reports that "the danger of an irreparable breakdown in cooperation among the free nations to maintain order in international trade is acute." Stalin's 1952 forecast of inevitable and mutual destructive commercial warfare returning among the capitalist nations may, Mr. Hoffman fears, prove true in the next four to six months. The economic experts whose views he reports find that "the raw material for an explosion of nationalistic economic rivalry lies ready to hand in every nation."

Recent votes in the House on trade and tax policies make me the more concerned about the economic danger, and the continued delay - nox six years long - of Administration and Congress to begin exploring how to unite the free effectively.

* * *

As I said when we talked, I can understand why the Administration now delays this from fear that support of the Atlantic Convention resolution would interfere with the ratification of the German rearmament accords in Europe, even though I believe the opposite would be true.

There are, however, much worse dangers than delay in ratifying the Paris accords. One of them is delay in tackling the problem of uniting the Atlantic Community effectively.

A strategy that delays the latter from fear of delaying the former not only risks failure in that objective; even if it succeeds in getting the rearmament accords ratified it faces this disaster - German arms being turned again against freedom and the United States as the result of another depression suddenly exploding before effective Atlantic machinery for dealing with it has been set up.

We can not count on improvising the needed unity after depression explodes as we can when aggression strikes the Atlantic nations. We must, instead, fear that it will have the opposite effect, divide them even more . . and thus deliver them one by one to Communism.

It is not as if the present choice were between Atlantic Union and German rearmament. Even if the advance of the Atlantic Convention resolution in Congress failed to advance German rearmament through the Paris accords, as I say it would, even if it resulted in failure to implement these accords, the success of Atlantic Union would simply mean that the Germans would be rearmed on a much more trustworthy and effective basis - as part of the Atlantic instead of merely the European community. It would mean linking them more closely with ourselves, the Canadians and the British than we now hope to link them with the French and Italians.

Surely this would give far greater guaranty of keeping German rearmament on the side of freedom than the Paris accords do, and would therefore at the same time speed and strengthen Germany's contribution to Atlantic defense by reassuring German democrats and youth against the danger of a recurrence of German militarism which now deters them so much.

And, while solving the German problem far better than the present accords can possibly do, Atlantic Union would be providing the means of preventing Communism from winning through economic warfare and depression in the West.

In these circumstances, I feel sure that you will understand, Senator George, why I call your attention again to the economic danger and hope that you will use your great influence to advance the Atlantic Convention answer to it.

With highest regards, I remain,

Sincerely,

/s/ Clarence Streit

Senator Walter George
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Freedom & Union

"For the Great Republic, for the Principle it Lives by and Keeps Alive, for Man's Vast Future."—LINCOLN.

Vol. 10, No. 1 January, 1955

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[*On Second Thought*]

Against the D-Bomb What "Massive Retaliation"?

THE NEW YEAR is traditionally a time for resolutions and forecasts.

My Forecasts: An Atlantic Union resolution, proposing that the United States call a Convention to explore the possibility of federating the free, will be reintroduced in Congress early in the new session. Except for a shorter preamble it will be substantially the same as the one Senator Kefauver originally introduced in 1949, which attained the support of more than one-fourth of both Houses.

If the Atlantic Union resolution is not adopted this year, then (for reasons given in my book *Freedom Against Itself*) it may well be too late to prevent World Depression II from afflicting the free in 1956 or 1957, or to keep it from advancing Communism immensely.

If Congress does adopt the Atlantic Union resolution this year, then my guess is that a serious economic collapse can not only be avoided but that the combined gross national product of the Atlantic democracies — Atlantica, for short—will vastly exceed by 1965 the rosiest present forecasts of it. And Communism will not only be in retreat through the world, without war, but will be suffering internal difficulties.

Beware the D-Bomb. Depression II would be so helpful to the Kremlin that it might well be called Communism's D-bomb. As it is also a delayed and diabolical bomb, D-bomb describes it trebly. Quadruply, for it is made of democratic disunion.

Bombs are associated with surprise attack, consternation, terror, sudden widespread ruin . . . such as the Wall Street crash in 1929 caused. Certainly the current optimism would help make another depression strike with the panic-spreading effects of a super-bomb.

No Massive Reprisal Possible. The fear of "massive retaliation" is a powerful deterrent to attack with A-bombs or H-bombs. Indeed, Secretary Dulles on Jan. 12, 1954, proclaimed that the basic defensive strategy of the U.S. against such attack is "to depend principally upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing." But this is no defense against a world depression. No retaliation, massive, instant or otherwise, can work against Communism's best weapon, the D-bomb—let alone deter it.

After the Wall Street crash in 1929, the U.S. sought to give employment and to protect itself against worse depression

—Don Hesse, St. Louis Globe-Democrat
Awake—before surprise economic collapse.

by raising some of its tariff rates a minimum of 31 per cent, and others all the way up to 49 per cent. This Smoot-Hawley Tariff in June, 1931, was a massive blow to many nations, but it did not bother Stalin. His world trade was almost nil anyway.

Three months after the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, the British, partly to defend their own hard-hit trade, suddenly went off gold. This was not merely a massive but an instantaneous measure. At one stroke it served to check all imports into Britain while helping British exports scale all foreign tariff walls . . . except, of course, in Soviet Russia where the government controlled all trade by having a monopoly of all exports and imports, and production, too. But France and other countries promptly retaliated by inventing new barriers to trade, such as quotas, to keep from being flooded with the cheapened British goods.

*

By 1933—less than two years after each of the great democracies had shown its "great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing" against depression via foreigners—world trade had fallen, unemployment had risen, the governments of the U.S., Britain and France had far greater power than before over their people, and dictatorship had destroyed the German democracy.

The One-Way D-Bomb. Both sides can use the A-bomb or the H-bomb against the other, but the D-bomb serves only dictatorship. Depression does not make for freer government; it does make government more centralized, powerful, tyrannical. Nor is this the only diabolical oddity of the D-bomb.

Loaded for Communism. Depression can make for various kinds of dictatorship. It made Fascists in Italy and Nazis in Germany. But the only type of dictatorship that can now hope to advance in any and every country by depression is the Communist dictatorship. Dictatorships based on race cannot spread beyond their nation except by war. Communism can spread anywhere. No other dictatorship is so designed to profit from depression. Nor does this end the diabolical peculiarities of the D-bomb.

Cost: Not a Red Cent. It cost the U.S. $2 billion to make the first A-bomb. How much the H-bomb has cost the Kremlin no one but the Kremlin knows. But the D-bomb does not cost the Kremlin a penny. Instead, it saves Moscow money.

*

Moscow's most effective contribution to the making of the D-bomb is to cease threatening aggression, reduce the West's fear of attack, lull it with talk of peaceful co-existence. By cutting instead of increasing its war budget it can best advance this stratgey. By so doing Moscow can hope not merely to lessen the stimulus that rearmament, war and cold war have given the economy of the West ever since the last depression, but to weaken and destroy the unity which the threat of Soviet aggression developed in the West.

FREEDOM & UNION'S POLICY

To think, write and act always in terms of all the democratic world, and not of any one country in it.

To mean by "we" (except editorially) the citizens of the coming Atlantic Union or Federation of All the Free, not merely those of any existing democracy.

To speed its coming by helping its people understand better the principles of individual freedom and federal union, and their importance to peace, production, higher living standards and greater spiritual growth and happiness.

To advance it also by helping the people of this Free Atlantic Community to see that they do form a community which they need to govern democratically.

To provide a forum for all views in the vast field of freedom and federation.

To bring out the facts in this field by objective, imaginative research.

To favor calling now a federal constitutional convention, representing the experienced civil liberty democracies, to work out and submit to their people a plan for uniting them in a Federal Union of the Free, or United States of the Atlantic, under a Constitution that would: 1) guarantee their Bill of Rights; 2) give them a free government in those fields where they agreed this would best advance individual freedom; 3) provide that this government shall be elected by, be responsible to, and operate on, the citizens and be federally balanced in its representation of them; 4) secure the right of each nation in the Union to continue to govern all its other national affairs in complete independence.

To seek to extend the Union's free federal relationship to other nations peacefully and as rapidly as this will advance liberty and peace until eventually it grows into a free federal world republic.

To assure that, pending universality, this union shall be a loyal member of the United Nations.

In our time, and nearly always in past history, only imminent military danger has served to bring the democracies even temporarily together. Depression, with rare exceptions, has made instead for worse disunion among them.

Moscow's military menace at its worst united the democracies only in the NATO alliance, in which the Council can merely recommend action, provided it is unanimous, and each ally reserves the right to interpret its commitments to suit itself.

H-Bomb Democracy. To give some assurance of instant massive NATO retaliation as a deterrent against an A-bomb or H-bomb attack, the U.S., it is reported, sought vainly at the December NATO Council session to arrange so that the NATO military chiefs could take the fatal decision themselves. This would preserve democracy by throwing out the basic principle that the military should be subordinate to civilian government—rather than proceed to create the kind of democratic Atlantic government that could act swiftly. Such efforts serve to point up the desperate need of making possible swift joint Atlantic action against the H-bomb threat. . . . But for joint Atlantic action against the D-bomb there does not yet exist even the machinery that NATO provides now against military danger.

Vicious Circular Chain Reaction. Disunion comes dear. The more disunion there is among the Atlantic democracies, the more it makes for depression. And the worse the danger of depression grows, the worse disunion it tends to create.

Only We Can Make D-Bomb. No one would ascribe the 1929-33 depression to Soviet Russia. All would agree that the Atlantic democracies brought that D-bomb on themselves—and that their lack of any political machinery for effective joint action on their common economic problem made that danger much worse for all of them. There is this difference now: Soviet Russia, a negligible factor in 1929, can help speed depression now by fostering disunion among the democracies. But it remains true that any D-bomb that hits them will have been made by themselves.

D-Bomb Secret Safe. Senator McCarthy need not worry lest the Krem-

lin, while he is out of his chairmanship, steal our D-bomb secret. The Communists are only too confident that the "capitalist" democracies will make the D-bomb for them, and with it deliver the free—with all their property intact —to Communism.

*

So strong and certain is the depression-breeding disunion among the "capitalist" countries, as seen in Moscow, that Stalin foresaw it even degenerating into another war among them. In his final advice on Communist strategy—his statement of October, 1952—Stalin reasoned that "the struggle for markets" and the desire to "secure for themselves an independent situation" can be counted on to cause not only the Germans and Japanese but the British and French to "break away" from the U.S. and sink from economic conflict into war with each other. "These comrades are mistaken," he said, who believe "that the progressive people of capitalism have been taught sufficiently by the experience of two World Wars . . . not to permit themselves again to drag the capitalist countries into a war among themselves."

What of D-Bomb Defense? The Kremlin is confident not only that the democracies will inflict depression on themselves, but do this fairly soon. It must rejoice at the widespread evidence that, in the field of international action, the Atlantic democracies remain as unprepared for the D-bomb as Hiroshima was for the A-bomb.

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True, many Americans are convinced that legislation passed after the last depression makes the U.S. well prepared now to prevent another crash like the 1929 one in Wall Street. One may grant this, yet doubt that the U.S. is prepared to prevent or cope with other kinds of economic crashes. Many a city was prepared to meet block-buster bombs in 1945; none was prepared for another type of bomb, the one that actually hit Hiroshima.

Fatal Fallacy. In the 1930s U.S. political policy was based on the assumption that the U.S. was in so strong a position that by purely national action—the Neutrality Act, "Cash and Carry" —it could keep from being involved in a world war. The U.S. now recognizes that a military attack on any of 14 countries, some as small and distant as Greece and Turkey, can involve it by chain reaction in war. Recognizing this danger the U.S. has helped set up NATO for joint action to prevent it. But the great majority of Americans do not yet recognize the need for even this inadequate type of machinery against a world depression. In the D-bomb field they still nourish the fallacy of the '30s.

—*Low, London Evening Standard*

"Here is where the enemy said he would get in!" This 1949 cartoon still applies.

Microbes and Men. Nearly all American forecasting, as regards the possibility of prosperity, recession or depression, is based entirely on purely domestic factors. The implicit assumption is that in the economic field the U.S. is still so strong that the only danger of depression that need concern it is one starting in the U.S. itself.

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To reason that disease in a small country's economy cannot be fatal to a large country is to reason that microbes are too small to kill a man.

*

Since the H-bomb itself starts in a very small unit—the atom—and develops its power by chain reaction, it would seem prudent to guard against the danger that the D-bomb may start within a small democracy, yet explode the greatest power.

Ten Forgotten Truths. It cannot be too often repeated that:

1. Marxism powerfully inclines the Kremlin to seek triumph through the "inevitable" economic collapse of the capitalist system rather than through direct Soviet military attack.

2. Manifestly the D-bomb has great advantages for Moscow over the H-bomb.

3. Depression can move by chain reaction from country to country.

4. World depression, being by definition international in scope, cannot be prevented or controlled by national action alone.

5. World depression requires prompt joint international action to prevent or deal effectively with it.

6. This is particularly true in the North Atlantic Community, where the principal economic powers are situated, with their economies closely inter-related.

7. No effective joint machinery now exists for Atlantic action against another depression.

8. To wait until depression comes to begin providing this Atlantic machinery is to forego the possibility of thus preventing depression—and probably the possibility of setting up the machinery, since economic danger tends to divide the free still more, not unite them as does military danger.

9. Federal union provides the most, if not the only, effective machinery for inter-State action against depression.

10. To explore the possibilities of Atlantic Union now involves no risk comparable to that of failing to explore this way to prevent depression and war.

Few when confronted with these ten truths will deny them. Yet nearly all then talk as if they had already forgotten them. Certainly these are not the views that are being shouted from the housetops today.

No Alsop Alarm. Even the Alsops, the columnists most inclined to view with alarm, are not alarmed on the economic side. The A-bomb and the H-bomb leave them no space for the D-bomb. This is not too surprising. Most of us rate least important what we know the least about, and the rich newspaper experience of the Alsops has included much more of war and diplomacy than of economics. Their courageous services to freedom have not yet been in this last field. They were in prep school or college when the last depression broke. The older men who share their valuations have no such out.

David Lawrence's Fear. When the last D-bomb exploded, David Lawrence had already won a name for himself in American journalism. It has since grown much greater, thanks to the outstanding work his *U. S. News & World Report* has long been doing. But his chief fear for the Republic now seems to be that it will not have enough McCarthy security in the A- and H-bomb field—certainly not that it lacks effective international machinery for coping with a world depression.

Niemeyer's 1964 Forecast. The December 10 *U. S. News & World Report* features a long and detailed forecast of developments during the next ten years, entitled "1964—After Ten Years of 'Coexistence.'" It is by Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer, Professor of International Relations at Yale. He was born and educated in Germany, came to the U.S. in 1933, and is now a U.S. citizen.

His year-by-year 5,000-word forecast through 1964 includes no hint whatever of any depression or recession possibly occurring anywhere in the world. It devotes hardly a dozen words to economic conditions.

Depression had brought dictatorship to power when Dr. Niemeyer left Germany. The Kremlin has time and again made clear the hopes it builds of victory through another depression. Yet Dr. Niemeyer's forecast is based on the assumption that the dictatorship we face now is still the German-type which can win only by military and diplomatic arms.

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Dr. Niemeyer, David Lawrence, and the Alsops are, of course, not alone in their views. In insisting that the more imminent danger lies in the D-bomb, rather than the H-bomb, it is rather I who am in a small minority.

Niemeyer's Merit. The great merit in Dr. Niemeyer's article, I would add, is its chief purpose—to show how the U.S. could become isolated in face of a hostile world in ten years without any war having occurred. Since he overlooks the possibility of depression speeding this result, and explicitly assumes that the U.S. will lower its tariffs, what he really does is show how in the most favorable conditions the present U.S. policy, based on alliances, can completely fail. He sees it failing through the allies gradually being drawn, one by one, away from the Atlantic and into the Soviet diplomatic orbit, as the Kremlin's H-bomb power grows and it becomes more evident that the U.S. will not risk war against it.

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Nowhere does Dr. Niemeyer directly trace the disaster he foresees to its true source—the assumed failure of the U.S. to replace the Atlantic alliance, which makes this disaster more than possible, with an Atlantic federation. Yet only a Union which would transfer foreign policy from each nation in it to an Atlantic federal government can be relied on to prevent effectively the diplomatic debacle Dr. Niemeyer pictures. To those who read between his lines, his article is a powerful argument for at least exploring Atlantic federation now, before it is too late.

Fairless Forecast. Benjamin F. Fairless, Chairman of the U. S. Steel Corporation, declared in a speech on November 17:

"Even the most conservative forecaster would be bound to conclude that the years immediately before us are rich in their promise of a sound, steady, and healthy growth, not only in the steel industry but throughout the economy generally. My personal opinion is that the year 1955 should be one of moderate gains all along the line; and that business, as a whole, will gather its strength and regroup its forces for a still more rapid expansion in the latter part of the 1950s. And, if we look still farther ahead, the prospects appear so bright that it is sometimes hard to see how we shall manage to measure up to all the demands which will be made upon us."

"We stand today," Mr. Fairless added, "at the gateway of what promises to be a greater change in our mode of living than the so-called industrial revolution has wrought in the past century or so. Most of us cannot even imagine the wonderful new devices and appliances that will become commonplace necessities of our daily life in the next few decades."

*

In his speech Mr. Fairless foresaw some "radical changes" resulting from this scientific revolution—but none that are international in scope or character.

When Unemployment Rises. Should there be "any sudden and widespread increase in unemployment which must unavoidably occur in the course of this scientific revolution that we face," according to the Fairless forecast, "it is entirely likely that control of our National Government could shift back and forth between the forces which seek to uphold our enterprise system and those which favor a collectivist society. We would thus find ourselves in a constant state of transition from inflation to deflation, from control to decontrol, and from repeated frenzies of false prosperity to the inevitable agonies of the economic 'morning after.'"

*

It did not seem to occur to Mr. Fairless that in these conditions of flux within the U.S., Western Europe might also be affected, and might not swing back and forth, but settle on the Communist side as permanently as Russia has. Nor did it seem to occur to him that such a continued advance of Communism might have dangerous repercussions on American freedom and enterprise. Among the things needed "to cope with this scientific revolution," there was no hint that he felt it necessary to create any common government of the Atlantic democracies to deal jointly with this immense common problem.

Not Without Resolution. The fact remains that without Atlantic Union we remain dangerously vulnerable to the D-bomb. But this fact need only be hammered resolutely home now to provide the incentive for timely convoca-

tion of a convention to explore the possibility of safeguarding against Depression II by Atlantic Federation.

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In the face of the prevailing optimism, implicit and explicit, on the economic side, one must, indeed, "venture" to differ. Yet without venture, without courage, without determination, the dangers we face cannot be met.

Significant "s." The New Year might better be a time for more resolution rather than resolutions.

What a change one letter *s* can make. . . . Consider the difference between *resolution* and *resolutions*. . . . Or ponder the opening words of two Preambles:

"We the People of the United States," as the U.S. Federal Constitution starts, and "We the Peoples of the United Nations," as the U.N. Charter says. The former takes the citizen as sovereign and forms a people, a government, a Federal Union: where States are United enough to deal effectively with any common threat, be it H-bomb or D-bomb. The latter takes the nation as sovereign and forms not a government but a league of governments, nations associated but not united: a "grand" Alliance like NATO . . . irresolute, unreliable, only too liable to fail to prevent either depression or war. All this immense difference wrapped in one often unseen letter *s*.

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When even one *s* can make a decisive difference, why should any "little man" think that he is too little to matter in great world issues?

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One forecast is easy: The Atlantic Union Resolution will be adopted this year — *if* its supporters have enough resolution. —CLARENCE STREIT

From - and to - The Four Corners

ONE PAGE, drawn at random, from only one of many reports that are being turned out all the time by all the U.S. agencies now sending Americans abroad, will stir the imagination where it needs stirring. This page gives short biographies of half a dozen Americans assigned recently to give technical assistance in as many countries. It indicates how Americans these days are being constantly drawn from the four corners of the country and scattered to the four corners of the world. Here are excerpts:

"Clinton S. Smith of Memphis, Tennessee, to Egypt as Assistant Malacologist Advisor. . . .

"Leonard H. Starbird of Portland, Maine, to Ecuador as Railroad Maintenance of Way Advisor. . . .

"Henry Milton Stokes of Annapolis, Maryland, to Iran as Assistant Automotive Operations and Maintenance Advisor. . . . Mrs. Stokes, the former Carmen Trinidad Perez of Manila, served during World War II with a guerilla intelligence unit. She will accompany her husband to Iran.

"Clarence Charles Strong of Missoula, Montana, to Afghanistan as a Forester. . . . He is married to the former Marie Tonseth of Anaconda, Montana. Their daughter, Mrs. Merilyn Winship, is a missionary in the Philippines. Their son, Richard Allen, 25, holds the distinguished service award for his service in Korea. Mrs. Strong will accompany him to Afghanistan.

"William Allen Underwood of Woodstock, Vermont, to Jordan as Contracts Administration Advisor. . . . A veteran of World War II, he is married to the former Marie-Ange Hanki of Cairo, Egypt, who became an American citizen in 1950. During the war, she parachuted into enemy-occupied France to help in the French Resistance movement. She will accompany her husband to Jordan.

"Ferdinand Milton Vorbach of Flushing, L.I., New York, to Iran as Procurement and Supply Officer. . . . His wife, the former Jean Marion Reid of Brooklyn, N. Y. will accompany him."

*

What a ferment is this that is going on *crescendo* before our unseeing eyes! Is there left a single village anywhere in the U.S. that does not have today its own human bonds with the distant world . . . at least one hometown boy who is serving, or has returned from serving, or is about to serve in one of the U.S. civilian or armed services in some country his fellow townsmen had never even heard of 20 years ago? How many towns can there be left outside the Iron Curtain where these "envoys extraordinary" have not yet penetrated? What a two-way street is this—and with what traffic in the intangible, the incalculable, the invaluable is it crowded!

There was never anything before in any nation's history of both this nature and scope. There is no likelihood of its ceasing to grow apace. And yet there are still those who talk as if a return to isolationism were still possible —if not just round the corner.—C.K.S.

Salute to Louisiana's Farmers

As an excellent example of alert thinking and forceful action on big issues we give you these two paragraphs from the resolutions adopted by the Louisiana Farm Bureau Federation at its 1954 State Convention:

"*European Union Unwise.* We would warn against the policy of fostering a United States of Europe or other close European unification. Germany tried twice to achieve this end by arms, as did Napoleon before her. A solidary European continent, perhaps under Franco-German or German domination, with the Anglo-Saxon powers excluded, could become as great a menace to our security as the Central Powers were in 1917 and 1940.

"That Continent, already an industrial giant by grace of our Marshall Plan Aid, much exceeds us in manpower and for some purposes in the strength deriving from central strategic position.

"*Atlantic Union Better Strategy.* Any such unification must include ourselves, together with the British nations, as integral—and in the interests of our safety, preferably dominating—participants. Such Atlantic Union regularized in a formal political constitution may not be now within the realm of practical politics, but it is sounder in strategic conception than Pan-Europe alone."

The more farmers who talk in these terms, the sooner we shall have Atlantic Union to solve the farm problem with a far better market.

ATLANTICA'S ECONOMIC FUTURE — WITH AND WITHOUT UNION

THE MAJOR ECONOMIC FORECASTS for 1955 have now been made on both sides of the Atlantic. The optimism for the future is almost unanimous everywhere; it reminds one of the glowing days of 1928 and 1929—early 1929, that is.

The current optimism is easy to understand in vew of past performance, particularly on a long-term basis. The rise in the gross national product of the United States in the past 20 years is spectacular indeed.

Producing $1 Billion a Day. "From not much more than $1 billion a week in 1933," the December *Monthly Letter* of the National City Bank of New York says of the U.S., "the national product in 1953 reached $1 billion a day. If that rate of growth, averaging 9.8 per cent per annum, is projected ahead, we could cross the trillion-dollar mark only ten years hence, in 1964."

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The *Monthly Letter* is careful to add that the dollar shrank in purchasing power by 4 per cent per annum over the 20 years between 1933-53. It concludes that to continue on this road would be a "dubious" achievement, since it involves dangerous inflation. Even when allowance is made for the inflation in the past, however, the increase in the U.S. national product was impressive — from less than $3 billion a week in 1933 to $7 billion a week in 1953.

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"The most extravagant estimates of what the future may hold," the *Monthly Letter* continues, "have been prepared by the newly formed 'Conference on Economic Progress,' under the leadership of Leon H. Keyserling who was chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers in the Truman Administration." This Conference estimates that the U.S. gross national product may approach $600 billion a year in 1960—or more than $11 billion a week.

Ike's $10 Billion Guess. President Eisenhower in a speech on Oct. 25, 1954, made this guess of the national product by 1964: "Drawing on the richly varied abilities of our entire citizenry, we can foresee that in less than a decade the national output will increase from today's $356 billion to $500 billion. This would equal an average increase of more than $3,000 for every American family of today. And these can be real dollars—dollars of stable buying power, not simply more dollars of cheapened value." It would also amount to a gross national product of $10 billion a week.

Both the President and Leon Keyserling made their guesses on the apparent assumption that national sovereignty would continue to rule the North Atlantic Community throughout the decade as it does now. If that assumption proves true, the conclusion certainly won't.

My Guess. My own guess is that the U.S. share in the increase in the national product—and therefore in the rise in the standard of living—will be far greater in "real dollars" by 1965 than even Mr. Keyserling dreams—but *only provided* that the proposed Atlantic Convention is called in 1955 to work out a plan for "drawing on the richly varied abilities" of the "entire citizenry" of the free Atlantic Community as only a full federal union can. Those who consider this too easy and empty a prophecy should examine the past record where the change from alliance to federation was made.

"Fortune's" Appraisal. *Fortune* Magazine, when it first appraised the idea of Atlantic Federation in reviewing *Union Now* editorially in April, 1939, called it "the greatest political and economic opportunity in history," and explained:

"Gigantic opportunities would be opened up. A rise in the standard of living of millions of consumers would result from the expansion of markets and the consequent lowering of prices for mass-produced goods. Even a relatively slight expansion in their known market would enable U.S. automobile manufacturers (to take only one example) to cut prices, and cars would thus become available to more persons, not only in the other States of the Union but also in what we call 'home.'

"The economic history of the U.S. demonstrates that this process is cumulative and that it would almost certainly result in lower automobile prices than even Mr. Ford has dreamed of. There would be an inevitable revival in shipping and in railroads, and hence in the capital-goods industries behind them. Industrial unemployment might, therefore, almost disappear.

"A genuine union of the democracies, then, opens up a vista of industrial growth to which the only enlightening parallel is the growth of the U.S. itself. At the time the American Union was formed the 18th Century libertarian economists were preaching free trade. And the abolition of tariffs within the borders of the U.S. provided for this doctrine the most spectacular practical demonstration that any economic theory has ever had."

What Union Did in the U.S. Depression and the danger of dictatorship it brought were the sharpest spurs that drove the 13 States to federate in 1789. And these poverty-stricken States actually quadrupled their foreign trade in the first ten years of federal union, with its common currency, common market, common defense force, common foreign policy, common federal government and common citizenry.

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There are always those who rise to say that there is no analogy between the 13 democracies of America in 1789 and those of Atlantica today. Clearly there are differences between them, but it is by no means certain that the differences, when the balance is struck, do not argue more in favor of union now than then.

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Many attribute the gigantic economic growth of the American people after they federated to "cheap" or "free" land, the predominating agricultural nature of their economy, rich natural resources, and so on. They forget that all the favorable conditions on which they lay such stress obtained also under the previous League of Friendship. That "grand alliance" possessed precisely the same potentially rich wilderness from the Alleghenies to the Mississippi. It had

the same leaders and practically the same people in it in 1789 as in 1799 . . . and yet it could hardly borrow a penny at home or abroad.

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How can any reasonable man account for the astonishing economic improvement in the U.S. between 1789 and 1799—except by attributing it primarily to the only basic change that had occurred . . . the change from an alliance of sovereign States to a union of sovereign citizens, with free movement of goods, money and men throughout the federation?

If Atlantic Federal Union is achieved within the next few years, *Fortune*, I forecast, will point with increasing pride to the late Russell Davenport's April 1939 editorial in that magazine declaring that, compared to an Atlantic Union, "the opening of the North American continent was a modest beginning." But what if Atlantic Union is deferred?

European Recovery. Summing up the year-end optimism in Europe about Europe, a Geneva dispatch from Michael L. Hoffman in *The New York Times* of January 16, tells of the good British outlook and adds:

"From Belgium, Italy, Western Germany, Austria, Sweden and even France, long a laggard in economic growth, the reports repeat almost monotonously that production is up and expected to continue rising, agricultural productivity is up and expected to improve, unemployment is down and expected to fall further, prices have been stable and are expected to remain so, real wages are rising and are expected to continue doing so, the balance of trade is better and expected to get better, and so on."

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These signs of recovery are not so convincing, however, to canny Michael Hoffman as they are to the European experts, and even more to many Members of Congress who see no further need for U.S. aid. He gives more space to the doubts expressed by a minority who "believe some re-thinking has to be done about the validity of the signs and symbols of economic activity upon which, for the past ten years, observers have depended for their evaluation of Western European economic trends.

"It may be that things look so good, they suggest, only because everybody is looking at the wrong things, and judging by the wrong standards. . . . There may be other crises ahead, unseen because they do not send advance warnings in the kind of terms economists have been accustomed to recently."

This makes sense to me, at least, remembering as I do how prone economic experts are to get in ruts, like nearly everyone else, and to what great errors this has led them in the past.

If Union Waits. Should Congress fail to approve this year the Kefauver resolution for a Convention to explore Atlantic Union, I hope economic disaster may still be prevented by calling it by 1956 or 1957. But I, for one, will not be surprised if History then finds that in 1955 we let the last moment go in which depression could have been averted or kept in hand by Atlantic Union.

*

If we have not achieved Atlantic Union by 1960—to say nothing of 1965—my guess is that President Eisenhower's estimate of a U.S. national product of $500 billions then in "dollars of stable buying power, not simply more dollars of cheapened buying power," will remain to mock him as some of President Hoover's views did in 1932.

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My guess is that without Atlantic Union the U.S. national output in 1965 in non-military goods will be—in 1955 dollars—less than it is now, not more. And not merely the American standard of life but of liberty will have woefully fallen. Previous forecasts make me fear that this will be only too true. For I find my tendency is always, despite my efforts to correct it, to under-estimate the cost of failure to federate the free.

The high cost of survival

1948 Guess. In FREEDOM & UNION of February 1948 I noted a report by John G. Norris in the *Washington Post* that the annual arms budget might reach $25 billions in the 1950s but that "defense chiefs concede that such outlays are unlikely . . . and that a 'reasonable degree of security' can be maintained for . . . $14 to $16 billions . . . half again more than today." And I added my own forecast:

"It is hard to see why the defense chiefs concede it is unlikely they will reach the $25 billion figure in the early 1950s—unless they are counting on the U.S. federating meanwhile with the British and Western European democracies. Otherwise the chances are only too great that the U.S. will be spending much more than $25 billion on defense within five years."

Mr. Norris continued: "Totalling these astronomical estimates, Administration and Congressional leaders want to know whether there is any other way out. Can we have security without a 50 per cent boost in cost?" I added: "The answer is: We cannot have security with a 50 or 500 per cent increase in defense spending on a national or U.N. basis. We can have security with a 50 per cent decrease in cost by Federal Union of the Free—and only by such Union now."

Since 1948. Four years after 1948 the U.S. was spending 400 per cent more on defense—not the "astronomical" 50 per cent increase that Mr. Norris discussed. Last year expenditures for major national security totalled $40,644 million. This year's budget calls for $40,458 million.

This is but one of many examples showing how the highest official experts grossly err in over-estimating the possibilities of national sovereignty, and how badly I err in under-estimating its costs and dangers. Other examples of the latter may be found on pages 196-8 of *Freedom Against Itself*.

*

Against this background one must assess my own pessimism and the current optimism of both the Republicans and New Dealers, and both the Americans and Europeans, as regards the economic future we face in 1956 or 1957 without Atlantic Union.—C.K.S.

WE THE UNDERSIGNED URGE EVERY THOUGHTFUL AMERICAN TO READ THIS BOOK

"The underlying tension of our time lies within freedom itself—within us"

CLARENCE STREIT in *Freedom Against Itself*



IN 1945, Americans dared hope that with the destruction of one tyranny, democracy and decency would prevail for long years.

Instead, we have seen free nations, one after another, disappear behind the dread Communist curtain.

While we have been half-awake and irresolute, Communism has been alert and implacable. Now, as Will Clayton has reminded us: "United *they* stand. Divided *we* fall."

Steadily, the free world has shrunk while the Communist world has expanded. The free peoples invent new machines to develop their world, but political disunity threatens to shake apart its very structure.

Clarence K. Streit's brilliant new book, *Freedom Against Itself*, dissects the forces tending to divide the free world. It presents a bold course of action that deserves the studious consideration of every thoughtful American. "No mere restatement of the author's *Union Now*," to quote the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch*, it is "a fresh approach to the whole question."

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MAGAZINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD

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March 9, 1955

Dear Ed:

Your references in yesterday's broadcast to the fall in the stock market and Professor Galbraith make me think you would be particularly interested in the attached copy of a letter I have written Senator George.

As you will see, he shares my own concern about the economic danger. Few seem to do so, but as he is the former chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, he has weight enough for quite a number.

I gather that Galbraith thought conditions now were more comparable to 1928 than to 1929, which seems to fit in with the view expressed in my book, Freedom Against Itself, that the danger of another depression breaking lies in 1955 or '56. But, as I stress in that book, and in my letter to George, the time to take preventive action is now - particularly in the international field where we are badly exposed to disaster.

Judging from what you said in the same broadcast about the way people worry mainly over their personal affairs, one would think that their interest could be roused more easily in this economic danger to them than in the war danger, the diplomatic game, etc. Yet, I have found that the press, radio and TV continue to concentrate on the latter, and are as chronically bullish on the economic side as they are bearish with regard to war. This unhealthy evaluation adds to my fear that we are headed for the economic explosion on which the Communists are counting.

I hope you can do something about it. I enclose the article on the economic situation I sent Senator George and another one I had sent him earlier on "D-Bomb" (depression danger).

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Clarence

Clarence Streit

CKS:ht
Enclosures

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
483 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Freedom & Union

"For the Great Republic, for the Principle it Lives by and Keeps Alive, for Man's Vast Future."—LINCOLN.

Vol. 10, No. 1 January, 1955

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[On Second Thought]

Against the D-Bomb What "Massive Retaliation"?

THE NEW YEAR is traditionally a time for resolutions and forecasts.

My Forecasts: An Atlantic Union resolution, proposing that the United States call a Convention to explore the possibility of federating the free, will be reintroduced in Congress early in the new session. Except for a shorter preamble it will be substantially the same as the one Senator Kefauver originally introduced in 1949, which attained the support of more than one-fourth of both Houses.

If the Atlantic Union resolution is not adopted this year, then (for reasons given in my book *Freedom Against Itself*) it may well be too late to prevent World Depression II from afflicting the free in 1956 or 1957, or to keep it from advancing Communism immensely.

If Congress does adopt the Atlantic Union resolution this year, then my guess is that a serious economic collapse can not only be avoided but that the combined gross national product of the Atlantic democracies — Atlantica, for short—will vastly exceed by 1965 the rosiest present forecasts of it. And Communism will not only be in retreat through the world, without war, but will be suffering internal difficulties.

Beware the D-Bomb. Depression II would be so helpful to the Kremlin that it might well be called Communism's D-bomb. As it is also a delayed and diabolical bomb, D-bomb describes it trebly. Quadruply, for it is made of democratic disunion.

Bombs are associated with surprise attack, consternation, terror, sudden widespread ruin . . . such as the Wall Street crash in 1929 caused. Certainly the current optimism would help make another depression strike with the panic-spreading effects of a super-bomb.

No Massive Reprisal Possible. The fear of "massive retaliation" is a powerful deterrent to attack with A-bombs or H-bombs. Indeed, Secretary Dulles on Jan. 12, 1954, proclaimed that the basic defensive strategy of the U.S. against such attack is "to depend principally upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing." But this is no defense against a world depression. No retaliation, massive, instant or otherwise, can work against Communism's best weapon, the D-bomb—let alone deter it.

After the Wall Street crash in 1929, the U.S. sought to give employment and to protect itself against worse depression

—Don Hesse, St. Louis Globe-Democrat
Awake—before surprise economic collapse.

by raising some of its tariff rates a minimum of 31 per cent, and others all the way up to 49 per cent. This Smoot-Hawley Tariff in June, 1931, was a massive blow to many nations, but it did not bother Stalin. His world trade was almost nil anyway.

Three months after the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, the British, partly to defend their own hard-hit trade, suddenly went off gold. This was not merely a massive but an instantaneous measure. At one stroke it served to check all imports into Britain while helping British exports scale all foreign tariff walls . . . except, of course, in Soviet Russia where the government controlled all trade by having a monopoly of all exports and imports, and production, too. But France and other countries promptly retaliated by inventing new barriers to trade, such as quotas, to keep from being flooded with the cheapened British goods.

*

By 1933—less than two years after each of the great democracies had shown its "great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing" against depression via foreigners—world trade had fallen, unemployment had risen, the governments of the U.S., Britain and France had far greater power than before over their people, and dictatorship had destroyed the German democracy.

The One-Way D-Bomb. Both sides can use the A-bomb or the H-bomb against the other, but the D-bomb serves only dictatorship. Depression does not make for freer government; it does make government more centralized, powerful, tyrannical. Nor is this the only diabolical oddity of the D-bomb.

Loaded for Communism. Depression can make for various kinds of dictatorship. It made Fascists in Italy and Nazis in Germany. But the only type of dictatorship that can now hope to advance in any and every country by depression is the Communist dictatorship. Dictatorships based on race cannot spread beyond their nation except by war. Communism can spread anywhere. No other dictatorship is so designed to profit from depression. Nor does this end the diabolical peculiarities of the D-bomb.

Cost: Not a Red Cent. It cost the U.S. $2 billion to make the first A-bomb. How much the H-bomb has cost the Kremlin no one but the Kremlin knows. But the D-bomb does not cost the Kremlin a penny. Instead, it saves Moscow money.

*

Moscow's most effective contribution to the making of the D-bomb is to cease threatening aggression, reduce the West's fear of attack, lull it with talk of peaceful co-existence. By cutting instead of increasing its war budget it can best advance this stratgey. By so doing Moscow can hope not merely to lessen the stimulus that rearmament, war and cold war have given the economy of the West ever since the last depression, but to weaken and destroy the unity which the threat of Soviet aggression developed in the West.

FREEDOM & UNION'S POLICY

To think, write and act always in terms of all the democratic world, and not of any one country in it.

To mean by "we" (except editorially) the citizens of the coming Atlantic Union or Federation of All the Free, not merely those of any existing democracy.

To speed its coming by helping its people understand better the principles of individual freedom and federal union, and their importance to peace, production, higher living standards and greater spiritual growth and happiness.

To advance it also by helping the people of this Free Atlantic Community to see that they do form a community which they need to govern democratically.

To provide a forum for all views in the vast field of freedom and federation.

To bring out the facts in this field by objective, imaginative research.

To favor calling now a federal constitutional convention, representing the experienced civil liberty democracies, to work out and submit to their people a plan for uniting them in a Federal Union of the Free, or United States of the Atlantic, under a Constitution that would: 1) guarantee their Bill of Rights; 2) give them a free government in those fields where they agreed this would best advance individual freedom; 3) provide that this government shall be elected by, be responsible to, and operate on, the citizens and be federally balanced in its representation of them; 4) secure the right of each nation in the Union to continue to govern all its other national affairs in complete independence.

To seek to extend the Union's free federal relationship to other nations peacefully and as rapidly as this will advance liberty and peace until eventually it grows into a free federal world republic.

To assure that, pending universality, this union shall be a loyal member of the United Nations.

In our time, and nearly always in past history, only imminent military danger has served to bring the democracies even temporarily together. Depression, with rare exceptions, has made instead for worse disunion among them.

Moscow's military menace at its worst united the democracies only in the NATO alliance, in which the Council can merely recommend action, provided it is unanimous, and each ally reserves the right to interpret its commitments to suit itself.

H-Bomb Democracy. To give some assurance of instant massive NATO retaliation as a deterrent against an A-bomb or H-bomb attack, the U.S., it is reported, sought vainly at the December NATO Council session to arrange so that the NATO military chiefs could take the fatal decision themselves. This would preserve democracy by throwing out the basic principle that the military should be subordinate to civilian government—rather than proceed to create the kind of democratic Atlantic government that could act swiftly. Such efforts serve to point up the desperate need of making possible swift joint Atlantic action against the H-bomb threat. . . . But for joint Atlantic action against the D-bomb there does not yet exist even the machinery that NATO provides now against military danger.

Vicious Circular Chain Reaction. Disunion comes dear. The more disunion there is among the Atlantic democracies, the more it makes for depression. And the worse the danger of depression grows, the worse disunion it tends to create.

Only We Can Make D-Bomb. No one would ascribe the 1929-33 depression to Soviet Russia. All would agree that the Atlantic democracies brought that D-bomb on themselves—and that their lack of any political machinery for effective joint action on their common economic problem made that danger much worse for all of them. There is this difference now: Soviet Russia, a negligible factor in 1929, can help speed depression now by fostering disunion among the democracies. But it remains true that any D-bomb that hits them will have been made by themselves.

D-Bomb Secret Safe. Senator McCarthy need not worry lest the Krem-

lin, while he is out of his chairmanship, steal our D-bomb secret. The Communists are only too confident that the "capitalist" democracies will make the D-bomb for them, and with it deliver the free—with all their property intact —to Communism.

*

So strong and certain is the depression-breeding disunion among the "capitalist" countries, as seen in Moscow, that Stalin foresaw it even degenerating into another war among them. In his final advice on Communist strategy—his statement of October, 1952—Stalin reasoned that "the struggle for markets" and the desire to "secure for themselves an independent situation" can be counted on to cause not only the Germans and Japanese but the British and French to "break away" from the U.S. and sink from economic conflict into war with each other. "These comrades are mistaken," he said, who believe "that the progressive people of capitalism have been taught sufficiently by the experience of two World Wars . . . not to permit themselves again to drag the capitalist countries into a war among themselves."

What of D-Bomb Defense? The Kremlin is confident not only that the democracies will inflict depression on themselves, but do this fairly soon. It must rejoice at the widespread evidence that, in the field of international action, the Atlantic democracies remain as unprepared for the D-bomb as Hiroshima was for the A-bomb.

*

True, many Americans are convinced that legislation passed after the last depression makes the U.S. well prepared now to prevent another crash like the 1929 one in Wall Street. One may grant this, yet doubt that the U.S. is prepared to prevent or cope with other kinds of economic crashes. Many a city was prepared to meet block-buster bombs in 1945; none was prepared for another type of bomb, the one that actually hit Hiroshima.

Fatal Fallacy. In the 1930s U.S. political policy was based on the assumption that the U.S. was in so strong a position that by purely national action—the Neutrality Act, "Cash and Carry" —it could keep from being involved in a world war. The U.S. now recognizes that a military attack on any of 14 countries, some as small and distant as Greece and Turkey, can involve it by chain reaction in war. Recognizing this danger the U.S. has helped set up NATO for joint action to prevent it. But the great majority of Americans do not yet recognize the need for even this inadequate type of machinery against a world depression. In the D-bomb field they still nourish the fallacy of the '30s.

—*Low, London Evening Standard*

"Here is where the enemy said he would get in!" This 1949 cartoon still applies.

Microbes and Men. Nearly all American forecasting, as regards the possibility of prosperity, recession or depression, is based entirely on purely domestic factors. The implicit assumption is that in the economic field the U.S. is still so strong that the only danger of depression that need concern it is one starting in the U.S. itself.

*

To reason that disease in a small country's economy cannot be fatal to a large country is to reason that microbes are too small to kill a man.

*

Since the H-bomb itself starts in a very small unit—the atom—and develops its power by chain reaction, it would seem prudent to guard against the danger that the D-bomb may start within a small democracy, yet explode the greatest power.

Ten Forgotten Truths. It cannot be too often repeated that:

1. Marxism powerfully inclines the Kremlin to seek triumph through the "inevitable" economic collapse of the capitalist system rather than through direct Soviet military attack.

2. Manifestly the D-bomb has great advantages for Moscow over the H-bomb.

3. Depression can move by chain reaction from country to country.

4. World depression, being by definition international in scope, cannot be prevented or controlled by national action alone.

5. World depression requires prompt joint international action to prevent or deal effectively with it.

6. This is particularly true in the North Atlantic Community, where the principal economic powers are situated, with their economies closely inter-related.

7. No effective joint machinery now exists for Atlantic action against another depression.

8. To wait until depression comes to begin providing this Atlantic machinery is to forego the possibility of thus preventing depression—and probably the possibility of setting up the machinery, since economic danger tends to divide the free still more, not unite them as does military danger.

9. Federal union provides the most, if not the only, effective machinery for inter-State action against depression.

10. To explore the possibilities of Atlantic Union now involves no risk comparable to that of failing to explore this way to prevent depression and war.

Few when confronted with these ten truths will deny them. Yet nearly all then talk as if they had already forgotten them. Certainly these are not the views that are being shouted from the housetops today.

No Alsop Alarm. Even the Alsops, the columnists most inclined to view with alarm, are not alarmed on the economic side. The A-bomb and the H-bomb leave them no space for the D-bomb. This is not too surprising. Most of us rate least important what we know the least about, and the rich newspaper experience of the Alsops has included much more of war and diplomacy than of economics. Their courageous services to freedom have not yet been in this last field. They were in prep school or college when the last depression broke. The older men who share their valuations have no such out.

David Lawrence's Fear. When the last D-bomb exploded, David Lawrence had already won a name for himself in American journalism. It has since grown much greater, thanks to the outstanding work his *U. S. News & World Report* has long been doing. But his chief fear for the Republic now seems to be that it will not have enough McCarthy security in the A- and H-bomb field—certainly not that it lacks effective international machinery for coping with a world depression.

Niemeyer's 1964 Forecast. The December 10 *U. S. News & World Report* features a long and detailed forecast of developments during the next ten years, entitled "1964—After Ten Years of 'Coexistence.'" It is by Dr. Gerhart Niemeyer, Professor of International Relations at Yale. He was born and educated in Germany, came to the U.S. in 1933, and is now a U.S. citizen.

His year-by-year 5,000-word forecast through 1964 includes no hint whatever of any depression or recession possibly occurring anywhere in the world. It devotes hardly a dozen words to economic conditions.

Depression had brought dictatorship to power when Dr. Niemeyer left Germany. The Kremlin has time and again made clear the hopes it builds of victory through another depression. Yet Dr. Niemeyer's forecast is based on the assumption that the dictatorship we face now is still the German-type which can win only by military and diplomatic arms.

*

Dr. Niemeyer, David Lawrence, and the Alsops are, of course, not alone in their views. In insisting that the more imminent danger lies in the D-bomb, rather than the H-bomb, it is rather I who am in a small minority.

Niemeyer's Merit. The great merit in Dr. Niemeyer's article, I would add, is its chief purpose—to show how the U.S. could become isolated in face of a hostile world in ten years without any war having occurred. Since he overlooks the possibility of depression speeding this result, and explicitly assumes that the U.S. will lower its tariffs, what he really does is show how in the most favorable conditions the present U.S. policy, based on alliances, can completely fail. He sees it failing through the allies gradually being drawn, one by one, away from the Atlantic and into the Soviet diplomatic orbit, as the Kremlin's H-bomb power grows and it becomes more evident that the U.S. will not risk war against it.

*

Nowhere does Dr. Niemeyer directly trace the disaster he foresees to its true source—the assumed failure of the U.S. to replace the Atlantic alliance, which makes this disaster more than possible, with an Atlantic federation. Yet only a Union which would transfer foreign policy from each nation in it to an Atlantic federal government can be relied on to prevent effectively the diplomatic debacle Dr. Niemeyer pictures. To those who read between his lines, his article is a powerful argument for at least exploring Atlantic federation now, before it is too late.

Fairless Forecast. Benjamin F. Fairless, Chairman of the U. S. Steel Corporation, declared in a speech on November 17:

"Even the most conservative forecaster would be bound to conclude that the years immediately before us are rich in their promise of a sound, steady, and healthy growth, not only in the steel industry but throughout the economy generally. My personal opinion is that the year 1955 should be one of moderate gains all along the line; and that business, as a whole, will gather its strength and regroup its forces for a still more rapid expansion in the latter part of the 1950s. And, if we look still farther ahead, the prospects appear so bright that it is sometimes hard to see how we shall manage to measure up to all the demands which will be made upon us."

"We stand today," Mr. Fairless added, "at the gateway of what promises to be a greater change in our mode of living than the so-called industrial revolution has wrought in the past century or so. Most of us cannot even imagine the wonderful new devices and appliances that will become commonplace necessities of our daily life in the next few decades."

*

In his speech Mr. Fairless foresaw some "radical changes" resulting from this scientific revolution—but none that are international in scope or character.

When Unemployment Rises. Should there be "any sudden and widespread increase in unemployment which must unavoidably occur in the course of this scientific revolution that we face," according to the Fairless forecast, "it is entirely likely that control of our National Government could shift back and forth between the forces which seek to uphold our enterprise system and those which favor a collectivist society. We would thus find ourselves in a constant state of transition from inflation to deflation, from control to decontrol, and from repeated frenzies of false prosperity to the inevitable agonies of the economic 'morning after.'"

*

It did not seem to occur to Mr. Fairless that in these conditions of flux within the U.S., Western Europe might also be affected, and might not swing back and forth, but settle on the Communist side as permanently as Russia has. Nor did it seem to occur to him that such a continued advance of Communism might have dangerous repercussions on American freedom and enterprise. Among the things needed "to cope with this scientific revolution," there was no hint that he felt it necessary to create any common government of the Atlantic democracies to deal jointly with this immense common problem.

Not Without Resolution. The fact remains that without Atlantic Union we remain dangerously vulnerable to the D-bomb. But this fact need only be hammered resolutely home now to provide the incentive for timely convoca-

tion of a convention to explore the possibility of safeguarding against Depression II by Atlantic Federation.

*

In the face of the prevailing optimism, implicit and explicit, on the economic side, one must, indeed, "venture" to differ. Yet without venture, without courage, without determination, the dangers we face cannot be met.

Significant "s." The New Year might better be a time for more resolution rather than resolutions.

What a change one letter *s* can make. . . . Consider the difference between *resolution* and *resolutions*. . . . Or ponder the opening words of two Preambles:

"We the People of the United States," as the U.S. Federal Constitution starts, and "We the Peoples of the United Nations," as the U.N. Charter says. The former takes the citizen as sovereign and forms a people, a government, a Federal Union: where States are United enough to deal effectively with any common threat, be it H-bomb or D-bomb. The latter takes the nation as sovereign and forms not a government but a league of governments, nations associated but not united: a "grand" Alliance like NATO . . . irresolute, unreliable, only too liable to fail to prevent either depression or war. All this immense difference wrapped in one often unseen letter *s*.

*

When even one *s* can make a decisive difference, why should any "little man" think that he is too little to matter in great world issues?

*

One forecast is easy: The Atlantic Union Resolution will be adopted this year — *if* its supporters have enough resolution. —CLARENCE STREIT

From - and to - The Four Corners

ONE PAGE, drawn at random, from only one of many reports that are being turned out all the time by all the U.S. agencies now sending Americans abroad, will stir the imagination where it needs stirring. This page gives short biographies of half a dozen Americans assigned recently to give technical assistance in as many countries. It indicates how Americans these days are being constantly drawn from the four corners of the country and scattered to the four corners of the world. Here are excerpts:

"Clinton S. Smith of Memphis, Tennessee, to Egypt as Assistant Malacologist Advisor. . . .

"Leonard H. Starbird of Portland, Maine, to Ecuador as Railroad Maintenance of Way Advisor. . . .

"Henry Milton Stokes of Annapolis, Maryland, to Iran as Assistant Automotive Operations and Maintenance Advisor. . . . Mrs. Stokes, the former Carmen Trinidad Perez of Manila, served during World War II with a guerilla intelligence unit. She will accompany her husband to Iran.

"Clarence Charles Strong of Missoula, Montana, to Afghanistan as a Forester. . . . He is married to the former Marie Tonseth of Anaconda, Montana. Their daughter, Mrs. Merilyn Winship, is a missionary in the Philippines. Their son, Richard Allen, 25, holds the distinguished service award for his service in Korea. Mrs. Strong will accompany him to Afghanistan.

"William Allen Underwood of Woodstock, Vermont, to Jordan as Contracts Administration Advisor. . . . A veteran of World War II, he is married to the former Marie-Ange Hanki of Cairo, Egypt, who became an American citizen in 1950. During the war, she parachuted into enemy-occupied France to help in the French Resistance movement. She will accompany her husband to Jordan.

"Ferdinand Milton Vorbach of Flushing, L.I., New York, to Iran as Procurement and Supply Officer. . . . His wife, the former Jean Marion Reid of Brooklyn, N. Y. will accompany him."

*

What a ferment is this that is going on *crescendo* before our unseeing eyes! Is there left a single village anywhere in the U.S. that does not have today its own human bonds with the distant world . . . at least one hometown boy who is serving, or has returned from serving, or is about to serve in one of the U.S. civilian or armed services in some country his fellow townsmen had never even heard of 20 years ago? How many towns can there be left outside the Iron Curtain where these "envoys extraordinary" have not yet penetrated? What a two-way street is this—and with what traffic in the intangible, the incalculable, the invaluable is it crowded!

There was never anything before in any nation's history of both this nature and scope. There is no likelihood of its ceasing to grow apace. And yet there are still those who talk as if a return to isolationism were still possible —if not just round the corner.—C.K.S.

Salute to Louisiana's Farmers

As an excellent example of alert thinking and forceful action on big issues we give you these two paragraphs from the resolutions adopted by the Louisiana Farm Bureau Federation at its 1954 State Convention:

"*European Union Unwise.* We would warn against the policy of fostering a United States of Europe or other close European unification. Germany tried twice to achieve this end by arms, as did Napoleon before her. A solidary European continent, perhaps under Franco-German or German domination, with the Anglo-Saxon powers excluded, could become as great a menace to our security as the Central Powers were in 1917 and 1940.

"That Continent, already an industrial giant by grace of our Marshall Plan Aid, much exceeds us in manpower and for some purposes in the strength deriving from central strategic position.

"*Atlantic Union Better Strategy.* Any such unification must include ourselves, together with the British nations, as integral—and in the interests of our safety, preferably dominating—participants. Such Atlantic Union regularized in a formal political constitution may not be now within the realm of practical politics, but it is sounder in strategic conception than Pan-Europe alone."

The more farmers who talk in these terms, the sooner we shall have Atlantic Union to solve the farm problem with a far better market.

ATLANTICA'S ECONOMIC FUTURE — WITH AND WITHOUT UNION

THE MAJOR ECONOMIC FORECASTS for 1955 have now been made on both sides of the Atlantic. The optimism for the future is almost unanimous everywhere; it reminds one of the glowing days of 1928 and 1929—early 1929, that is.

The current optimism is easy to understand in vew of past performance, particularly on a long-term basis. The rise in the gross national product of the United States in the past 20 years is spectacular indeed.

Producing $1 Billion a Day. "From not much more than $1 billion a week in 1933," the December *Monthly Letter* of the National City Bank of New York says of the U.S., "the national product in 1953 reached $1 billion a day. If that rate of growth, averaging 9.8 per cent per annum, is projected ahead, we could cross the trillion-dollar mark only ten years hence, in 1964."

*

The *Monthly Letter* is careful to add that the dollar shrank in purchasing power by 4 per cent per annum over the 20 years between 1933-53. It concludes that to continue on this road would be a "dubious" achievement, since it involves dangerous inflation. Even when allowance is made for the inflation in the past, however, the increase in the U.S. national product was impressive — from less than $3 billion a week in 1933 to $7 billion a week in 1953.

*

"The most extravagant estimates of what the future may hold," the *Monthly Letter* continues, "have been prepared by the newly formed 'Conference on Economic Progress,' under the leadership of Leon H. Keyserling who was chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers in the Truman Administration." This Conference estimates that the U.S. gross national product may approach $600 billion a year in 1960—or more than $11 billion a week.

Ike's $10 Billion Guess. President Eisenhower in a speech on Oct. 25, 1954, made this guess of the national product by 1964: "Drawing on the richly varied abilities of our entire citizenry, we can foresee that in less than a decade the national output will increase from today's $356 billion to $500 billion. This would equal an average increase of more than $3,000 for every American family of today. And these can be real dollars—dollars of stable buying power, not simply more dollars of cheapened value." It would also amount to a gross national product of $10 billion a week.

Both the President and Leon Keyserling made their guesses on the apparent assumption that national sovereignty would continue to rule the North Atlantic Community throughout the decade as it does now. If that assumption proves true, the conclusion certainly won't.

My Guess. My own guess is that the U.S. share in the increase in the national product—and therefore in the rise in the standard of living—will be far greater in "real dollars" by 1965 than even Mr. Keyserling dreams—but *only provided* that the proposed Atlantic Convention is called in 1955 to work out a plan for "drawing on the richly varied abilities" of the "entire citizenry" of the free Atlantic Community as only a full federal union can. Those who consider this too easy and empty a prophecy should examine the past record where the change from alliance to federation was made.

"Fortune's" Appraisal. *Fortune* Magazine, when it first appraised the idea of Atlantic Federation in reviewing *Union Now* editorially in April, 1939, called it "the greatest political and economic opportunity in history," and explained:

"Gigantic opportunities would be opened up. A rise in the standard of living of millions of consumers would result from the expansion of markets and the consequent lowering of prices for mass-produced goods. Even a relatively slight expansion in their known market would enable U.S. automobile manufacturers (to take only one example) to cut prices, and cars would thus become available to more persons, not only in the other States of the Union but also in what we call 'home.'

"The economic history of the U.S. demonstrates that this process is cumulative and that it would almost certainly result in lower automobile prices than even Mr. Ford has dreamed of. There would be an inevitable revival in shipping and in railroads, and hence in the capital-goods industries behind them. Industrial unemployment might, therefore, almost disappear.

"A genuine union of the democracies, then, opens up a vista of industrial growth to which the only enlightening parallel is the growth of the U.S. itself. At the time the American Union was formed the 18th Century libertarian economists were preaching free trade. And the abolition of tariffs within the borders of the U.S. provided for this doctrine the most spectacular practical demonstration that any economic theory has ever had."

What Union Did in the U.S. Depression and the danger of dictatorship it brought were the sharpest spurs that drove the 13 States to federate in 1789. And these poverty-stricken States actually quadrupled their foreign trade in the first ten years of federal union, with its common currency, common market, common defense force, common foreign policy, common federal government and common citizenry.

*

There are always those who rise to say that there is no analogy between the 13 democracies of America in 1789 and those of Atlantica today. Clearly there are differences between them, but it is by no means certain that the differences, when the balance is struck, do not argue more in favor of union now than then.

*

Many attribute the gigantic economic growth of the American people after they federated to "cheap" or "free" land, the predominating agricultural nature of their economy, rich natural resources, and so on. They forget that all the favorable conditions on which they lay such stress obtained also under the previous League of Friendship. That "grand alliance" possessed precisely the same potentially rich wilderness from the Alleghenies to the Mississippi. It had

the same leaders and practically the same people in it in 1789 as in 1799 . . . and yet it could hardly borrow a penny at home or abroad.

*

How can any reasonable man account for the astonishing economic improvement in the U.S. between 1789 and 1799—except by attributing it primarily to the only basic change that had occurred . . . the change from an alliance of sovereign States to a union of sovereign citizens, with free movement of goods, money and men throughout the federation?

If Atlantic Federal Union is achieved within the next few years, *Fortune*, I forecast, will point with increasing pride to the late Russell Davenport's April 1939 editorial in that magazine declaring that, compared to an Atlantic Union, "the opening of the North American continent was a modest beginning." But what if Atlantic Union is deferred?

European Recovery. Summing up the year-end optimism in Europe about Europe, a Geneva dispatch from Michael L. Hoffman in *The New York Times* of January 16, tells of the good British outlook and adds:

"From Belgium, Italy, Western Germany, Austria, Sweden and even France, long a laggard in economic growth, the reports repeat almost monotonously that production is up and expected to continue rising, agricultural productivity is up and expected to improve, unemployment is down and expected to fall further, prices have been stable and are expected to remain so, real wages are rising and are expected to continue doing so, the balance of trade is better and expected to get better, and so on."

*

These signs of recovery are not so convincing, however, to canny Michael Hoffman as they are to the European experts, and even more to many Members of Congress who see no further need for U.S. aid. He gives more space to the doubts expressed by a minority who "believe some re-thinking has to be done about the validity of the signs and symbols of economic activity upon which, for the past ten years, observers have depended for their evaluation of Western European economic trends.

"It may be that things look so good, they suggest, only because everybody is looking at the wrong things, and judging by the wrong standards. . . . There may be other crises ahead, unseen because they do not send advance warnings in the kind of terms economists have been accustomed to recently."

This makes sense to me, at least, remembering as I do how prone economic experts are to get in ruts, like nearly everyone else, and to what great errors this has led them in the past.

If Union Waits. Should Congress fail to approve this year the Kefauver resolution for a Convention to explore Atlantic Union, I hope economic disaster may still be prevented by calling it by 1956 or 1957. But I, for one, will not be surprised if History then finds that in 1955 we let the last moment go in which depression could have been averted or kept in hand by Atlantic Union.

*

If we have not achieved Atlantic Union by 1960—to say nothing of 1965—my guess is that President Eisenhower's estimate of a U.S. national product of $500 billions then in "dollars of stable buying power, not simply more dollars of cheapened buying power," will remain to mock him as some of President Hoover's views did in 1932.

*

My guess is that without Atlantic Union the U.S. national output in 1965 in non-military goods will be—in 1955 dollars—less than it is now, not more. And not merely the American standard of life but of liberty will have woefully fallen. Previous forecasts make me fear that this will be only too true. For I find my tendency is always, despite my efforts to correct it, to under-estimate the cost of failure to federate the free.

The high cost of survival

1948 Guess. In FREEDOM & UNION of February 1948 I noted a report by John G. Norris in the *Washington Post* that the annual arms budget might reach $25 billions in the 1950s but that "defense chiefs concede that such outlays are unlikely . . . and that a 'reasonable degree of security' can be maintained for . . . $14 to $16 billions . . . half again more than today." And I added my own forecast:

"It is hard to see why the defense chiefs concede it is unlikely they will reach the $25 billion figure in the early 1950s—unless they are counting on the U.S. federating meanwhile with the British and Western European democracies. Otherwise the chances are only too great that the U.S. will be spending much more than $25 billion on defense within five years."

Mr. Norris continued: "Totalling these astronomical estimates, Administration and Congressional leaders want to know whether there is any other way out. Can we have security without a 50 per cent boost in cost?" I added: "The answer is: We cannot have security with a 50 or 500 per cent increase in defense spending on a national or U.N. basis. We can have security with a 50 per cent decrease in cost by Federal Union of the Free—and only by such Union now."

Since 1948. Four years after 1948 the U.S. was spending 400 per cent more on defense—not the "astronomical" 50 per cent increase that Mr. Norris discussed. Last year expenditures for major national security totalled $40,644 million. This year's budget calls for $40,458 million.

This is but one of many examples showing how the highest official experts grossly err in over-estimating the possibilities of national sovereignty, and how badly I err in under-estimating its costs and dangers. Other examples of the latter may be found on pages 196-8 of *Freedom Against Itself*.

*

Against this background one must assess my own pessimism and the current optimism of both the Republicans and New Dealers, and both the Americans and Europeans, as regards the economic future we face in 1956 or 1957 without Atlantic Union.—C.K.S.

WE THE UNDERSIGNED URGE EVERY THOUGHTFUL AMERICAN TO READ THIS BOOK

"The underlying tension of our time lies within freedom itself—within us"

CLARENCE STREIT in *Freedom Against Itself*



IN 1945, Americans dared hope that with the destruction of one tyranny, democracy and decency would prevail for long years.

Instead, we have seen free nations, one after another, disappear behind the dread Communist curtain.

While we have been half-awake and irresolute, Communism has been alert and implacable. Now, as Will Clayton has reminded us: "United *they* stand. Divided *we* fall."

Steadily, the free world has shrunk while the Communist world has expanded. The free peoples invent new machines to develop their world, but political disunity threatens to shake apart its very structure.

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Streit, Clarence

March 8, 1955

Dear Clarence:

Thank you for sending me the material.

Sorry we missed meeting the last time you were in New York, hope we have better luck the next time.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Clarence K. Streit
Editor
Freedom & Union
700 Ninth Street, N.W.
Washington 1, D.C.

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Freedom & Union

MAGAZINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD

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Swing

March 2, 1955

Edward R. Murrow
CBS Commentator
481 Madison
New York City

Dear Ed,

The harm done by the confusion over national sovereignty, I'm sure you'll agree, is incalculable. There is urgent need to clarify this subject.

The recent attacks on Judge Harlan give a good peg for this. On the theory that an Atlantic Union means surrendering U. S. sovereignty, abolishing the Constitution, and so on, he has been attacked for being a member of the Council of the Atlantic Union Committee. All this will no doubt be given an even greater airing soon, when his nomination comes up on the Floor of the Senate.

Thus both the national sovereignty issue and Atlantic Union are in the news. Moreover, a resolution to call a Convention to explore Atlantic Union was introduced Feb. 9 in both Houses by a bipartisan group of Senators and Representatives led by Senator Kefauver.

I enclose a letter I have written the NewYork Times on the Harlan affair, since its report brought "Union Now" into the picture. I also enclose an editorial on the sovereignty issue I wrote during the last Presidential primary campaign, when Senators Russell and Kerr raised it.

I also attach some pages I have torn from my newbook, "Freedom Against Itself," which bear on this great subject. Among them I would stress page 211, which brings out how deeply this issue has run through all our history. If you haven't time to read anything else, please read this one page. It is the subject of ~~the~~ a book on which I have been working for 20 years and hope to bring out in a year or so.

I think these enclosures will show you that I have a good deal to say on this subject that is fresh, clear, enlightening, thought-stimulating - and that needs to be aired just now. I would deeply appreciate anything you can do, Ed, to help get our side of this case before the public.

Couldn't we at least talk it over by phone soon?

When we last had lunch together, you said you said you wanted your TV associates to meet with me when they got back from Florida. That was quite a while ago. I hope it won't be much longer.

With warmest personal regards, I remain

Sincerely,

Clarence

Clarence Streit

February 28, 1955

To the Editor of The New York Times:

Your report of the Feb. 26th hearing on the appointment of Judge Harlan to the U. S. Supreme Court began:

"Judge John Marshall Harlan assured the Senate Judiciary Committee today that he regarded the Constitution as supreme. He said he would not surrender the sovereignty of the United States to any world government . . .

"Judge Harlan . . . stated that he was not an internationalist, or a one-worlder, or a 'unionist-now.'"

Hasty readers may have drawn from this - and even more from less careful press reports - the inference that "Union Now" and the movement for an Atlantic Federal Union would "surrender the sovereignty of the United States" to a world government. As the author of "Union Now," and the president of Federal Union, Inc., the educational membership association formed by readers of the book in 1939, I would like to correct this quite erroneous impression which Judge Harlan's opponents, and ours, seek to propagate.

Far from surrendering the sovereignty of the United States to anyone, "Union Now" would have us apply further the principle of sovereignty embodied in the Federal Constitution which created the United States. This principle of sovereignty is that the people, in the citizens equally, and forms the true basis not merely for a democratic State but for inter-democracy government.

"Union Now" proposed that we try to extend this distinctive United States concept of sovereignty to govern our common affairs with other North Atlantic democracies where we and they agreed that this would better preserve our lives and liberties - each citizen's share, in other words, of the sovereignty all democracies lodge in the people. More concretely, the book proposed that the people of the United States, Canada, Britain, France and a few other democratic nations seek to federate now by precisely the same principle of sovereignty which the people of our 13 States established in adopting the United States Constitution.

The only sovereignty the latter surrendered thereby was the Old World concept of it which subordinates the people to the State and sacrifices their lives and liberties to keep the government sovereign.

The people of the 13 States fought a truly revolutionary war to abolish this principle of sovereignty. Through confusion, however, they abolished at first only half of it. As regards their domestic affairs the people of each State made its government subordinate to them. But as regards the foreign affairs they had in common with the other 12 States each clung to the ancient concept of sovereignty. Taking the State instead of the citizen as the sovereign, - much as we have done in forming the present Atlantic alliance, - they formed the alliance of the Articles of Confederation.

Fortunately, the Americans of that generation came to their senses before this confusion in basic principle had led to anything like the danger it is facing us with now. They called the Federal Convention of 1787, and established the sovereignty

of the people of the United States as a whole.

To get this done, George Washington had to denounce the "thirst for power, and the hantling, I had liked to have said monster, for sovereignty, which have taken such fast hold of the States individually." Madison, the "Father of the Constitution," made the revolutionary nature of the change still clearer when he scornfully answered those who told the people they would be surrendering their sovereignty if they formed the proposed Federal Union:

"Was, then, the American Revolution effected . . was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty and safety, but that the government of the individual States . . might . . be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another shape, - that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to . . political institutions of a different form?" (The Federalist, No. 45.)

It would seem evident that those who oppose the formation of an Atlantic Federal Union now on the ground that it means surrendering national sovereignty have themselves surrendered the principle of sovereignty which the Federal Constitution established in the United States, and seek to preserve instead the Old World doctrine of sovereignty which Washington and Madison denounced.

Your report also said that Judge Harlan had been attacked for being a member of the Council of the Atlantic Union Committee. As a member of that Committee's national Board, may I point out that this is even more preposterous? Whereas Federal Union, Inc. and "Union Now" aim to bring about a Federation of the Free, the Atlantic Union Committee was founded to work for the calling of another Convention like the one in 1787, this time representing the people of the United States, Canada, Britain, France and a few other democracies, to explore the possibility of their uniting to some degree under the principle of sovereignty that produced the United States Constitution.

The Atlantic Union Committee, headed by Owen J. Roberts, former Justice of the United States Supreme Court, is currently supporting the resolution for an Atlantic Exploratory Convention which Senator Kefauver and a bipartisan group of 30 Senators and Representatives introduced in both Houses of Congress on Feb. 9. It asks the President to call a Convention composed of delegates from the seven nations that sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty "to explore and to report to what extent their peoples might further unite within the framework of the United Nations, and agree to form, federally or otherwise, a defense, economic and political union."

The broad term, "federally or otherwise," deserves note. It would seem to leave opponents in the position of opposing the slightest effort to unite these nations more effectively by any concept of sovereignty whatsoever.

Sincerely,

Clarence K. Streit
President, Federal Union, Inc.

attributed to them in Annex 1. When one views the past 200 years as a whole, and recalls the great contributions to liberty such Germans as Kant and Goethe have made, it would seem fair to rank Germany fourth, among the larger nations, as regards actual individual freedom.

The three major democratic powers, Britain, France and the United States who have produced more than 70 per cent of the world's major inventions and discoveries in the past 200 years, formed together only 6 per cent of the world's population in 1750—about 38,000,000 of its 660,000,000 people then. In 1950 they totalled only 10 per cent of mankind, or 243,000,000 out of 2,400,000,000. When we add to them the other NATO democracies, and also Sweden, Switzerland and Germany, we find that Atlantica, with only 18 per cent of mankind in 1950 produced about 95 per cent of the inventions, discoveries and innovations that since 1750 have transformed the world.

This creative power, in short, has been neither concentrated in any one nation nor spread through many. It has been scattered neither over the planet, nor over all the non-Communist part of it which so many politicians loosely call the "free world." For 200 years this yeast that has raised the world for all the human race has been concentrated in a small fraction of it living in one region—the Atlantic area where there has been the most individual liberty for the longest time.

It would seem evident that the more individual liberty people enjoy, the more they then contribute to free human life in every way, from ignorance and drudgery, from disease and war and poverty, and from the worst of poverties—poverty of heart and mind and spirit.

Atlantica—the Country Without a Patriot

Why does this immense power of the people of Atlantica still pass so unnoticed in the world? Why have the Atlanticans themselves remained so blind to it?

Because they still do not see that they *are* a people, a country—that all their "lands of the free" form together *the* Land of the Free. Though now, at long last, some of them have begun to talk of their "Atlantic Community," they still think too much in terms that are either too small or too big for freedom's reality. When they do not, as usual, think of their nation alone, they speak of the "West," the "free nations," the "free world," and use these words so vaguely as to embrace any non-Communist nation, even though under some dictatorship, or offering little guaranty of individual freedom.

The freest people ignore that not simply their own nation but every free people of Atlantica gave their national government what sov-

ereignty it has *only* to advance individual liberty—their own sovereignty as citizens. When concerned with government within their nation, the people in every country of Atlantica think in terms of themselves and their individual rights. But when they turn to governing their relations with the other free people of Atlantica they abandon these flesh-and-blood realities for fleshless, bloodless, mystic words—symbols that lack the soul every person has.

They put their pride only in the fraction of free Atlantica where they happened to be born, and think it greater than the whole. They center themselves on their own nation and make their dignity depend on its government's freedom from other free people, not on their own freedom as individual men and women. They do this from confusion and habit, much as their forebears once assumed that the sun centered on the earth, when all the time the earth was turning round the sun.

*

Soon after the first Federal Union of the free was peacefully constituted, Benjamin Franklin, the man who had worked longest to achieve it, sent this prayer across the Atlantic on December 4, 1789: "God grant, that not only the Love of Liberty, but a thorough Knowledge of the Rights of Man, may pervade all the Nations of the Earth, so that a Philosopher may set his Foot anywhere on its Surface, and say, 'This is my Country.' "

Since then liberty has grown all around the North Atlantic which Franklin crossed so often in its service, but still the Americans, Britons, Frenchmen and other free people of Atlantica are aliens to each other. When they set foot on the soil of the other nations that know and love the Rights of Man, they still do not say as the dying Franklin prayed they would, "This is my Country!" If we alter Sir Walter Scott's famous question to read today—

> Grieves there a land, with men so dead,
> That to themselves they've never said,
> This is my own, my native land?
> Whose hearts have ne'er within them burn'd,
> As here their footsteps they have turn'd,
> From wandering far from Freedom's strand?

—the answer is, "Yes, there *is* one such land . . . Atlantica."

And so it is that the free have remained blind to "the significant facts of today's existence" which have been brought out here—and to others no less important that we shall bring out.

pioneers who blazed that trail—the American people, who have experienced the blessings of Federal Union for the longest time and on the greatest scale.

The history of no other people centers as does ours in the present issue: Does individual freedom lie in Union of the Free or in their division? Is the sovereign State the master, or is it the servant of the sovereign Citizen?

Three times this issue has moved the American people to the depths and heights, as no other issue ever has. The first time we fought this issue out began with Franklin's proposal of Union in 1754 and continued to the inauguration of the Federal Republic which he lived to see in 1789. Those thirty-five years included eight years of war on our own soil. The second time lasted through the long period that ended in the four years of the Civil War. The third time began with World War I, and still continues; it has already brought us nine years of war.

Twice already the American people, when their leaders and their friends almost despaired because of their confusion, ended with an astonishing new birth of freedom-and-union. More than any other people they honor as their greatest heroes those who did the most to save them when they confused the sovereignty of the State with the sovereignty of the Citizen. And the Americans whom all the world also most esteems—Franklin, Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, Lincoln—every one of them is honored for his clarity on this issue and his contribution to its solution through Union of the Free.

The American people are very young and inexperienced in the ways of diplomacy, alliances and power politics in which so many Europeans urge them now to lead. But when it comes to the politics of individual freedom, to the problem of uniting people over a large area by free agreement under a common government and keeping them free, they are the oldest and most experienced of nations.

For more than three hundred years their history throws, on Atlantica's present problem, the light of wise discussion and wide experiment. No other people's history can do so much to clear away the confusion into which we Americans and all the free have fallen now. This history badly needs to be seen afresh, in the framework of the present crisis. But that is another book—one on which I have long been working, and which I hope to finish soon. Meanwhile, the study I have made of this history immensely encourages me to believe that once again, as twice before, the American people will confound the skeptics by sailing on, to greater Union of the Free.

the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."

*

In any free federal union, the people guarantee not only their own individual rights, and the rights of their Union, but also the independent rights of their respective States or nations.

*

It is true that the U.S. Federal Government has been growing in power and the States have been losing rights. This, however, has been part of the general trend throughout the world toward greater centralization in this electric, air, machine age. No non-federal type of government has resisted it so well as have the federal unions. No one State among the 48 has suffered more than the others. And while Americans are impressed by the decline of State Governments, visiting Europeans are astonished by the amount of State rights that remain.

*

One major reason why the U.S. Government has gained such power in relation to the States is that the country has been suffering a series of emergencies—World War I, the great depression, World War II. Emergencies lead inevitably to centralizing power. The way to prevent further loss of States rights is to prevent another world war, another great depression. They were not prevented by nationalism, isolationism, mere alliance, a league of nations. They can be prevented by Atlantic Federal Union. Nothing less can save the basic American concept of sovereignty.

***

The Forgotten Revolution. With all respect to Senators Kerr and Russell, the notion of national sovereignty they are so fearful we Americans will sacrifice by entering an Atlantic Union is the old European notion of sovereignty. That notion grew up when they had sovereigns over there who asserted they had a divine right to rule as they pleased, autocrats who held that they had a right to sacrifice the people through needless wars and ruinous taxation; that man was made for the State.

Surely Senators Kerr and Russell have not forgotten that we fought a war, a revolution, to rid ourselves of all that notion of national sovereignty, and to replace it with the opposite idea: The idea that the State is made for man, and

Kefauver: official power not a fetish to him

that all its so-called sovereignty is really vested not in the government but in the people, equally in every citizen. That is the great American pioneering idea of citizen sovereignty.

*

The Founding Fathers sacrificed none of the revolutionary U.S. concept of national sovereignty, none of their own sovereignty as citizens, when they established the Federal Government. But the present governing generation has been sacrificing this sovereignty tragically, and is sacrificing more of it all the time.

***

Sacrificing U.S. Sovereigns. If you agree that U.S. national sovereignty is not vested in the President or the Senate of the Government but equally in all the citizens, then every citizen who is burdened with excessive taxation is sacrificing that much of his share of the national sovereignty. Every citizen who is drafted into the armed services is sacrificing another big portion of his share of the national sovereignty. And every citizen who is slain in war is sacrificing all the rest of his share of U.S. national sovereignty.

*

Look at the way we Americans are now sacrificing the citizen's sovereignty.

In 1938 the bill for U.S. defense amounted to only $16 a citizen. Now it is $273 for every man, woman and child—17 times as much as it was before the worst war in history. In 1938 no American citizen was subject to draft. Now millions are drafted and subject to draft. In World War I, the U.S. called into the services 4,609,190 men, of whom 53,403 were killed in battle. In World War II, 15,513,657 U.S. citizens were called into the armed services and 293,105 sacrificed in battle their entire share of the nations sovereignty. All this adds up to an appalling sacrifice of U.S. sovereignty.

*

How much more of U.S. sovereignty will be sacrificed by the cost of a third World War, with taxation and inflation already so high?

*

How much more of the citizen's sovereignty will be sacrificed in military service by World War III, with so many drafted now?

*

How many, many more Americans will sacrifice all their share of the national sovereignty in the third World War toward which we are steadily moving, despite all this taxing and drafting —a war in which hundreds of thousands can be killed by a single atomic bomb?

*

We Atlantic Federal Unionists are anxious to prevent needless and more fearful flesh-and-blood sacrifice of national sovereignty than our nation has already suffered. We want to save the real sovereigns of this republic, and of every democratic nation. We are not pacifists; we realize that some sacrifice of liberty and even of life is necessary to preserve freedom. We want to save the citizens from *unnecessary* sacrifice, make them all more powerful sovereigns. We believe this can be done by extending U.S. federal principles around the North Atlantic.

***

Washington Warned. To keep from sacrificing needlessly the sovereign citizens, Americans, in particular, should be ready to sacrifice the power of those who now govern them: The Founding Fathers set the example. They sacrificed the sovereignty of King George III when they set up their independent State Governments. Then they sacrificed some of the sovereign powers of those State governments when they set up the Federal Constitution. George Washington foresaw that this second move would be opposed by those who lost power by it, just as the revolution before it angered the British sovereign. Referring to the proposal to federate the

13 States, George Washington wrote in a letter to Henry Knox dated Feb. 3, 1787:

> "I believe that the political machine will yet be much tumbled and tossed, and possibly be wrecked altogether, before such a system as you have defined will be adopted. The darling Sovereignties of the States individually, the Governors . . . the Legislators . . . whose political consequence will be lessened, if not annihilated, would give their weight of opposition to such a revolution."

Some of the Governors and legislators of the 13 States tried hard to make the people believe that their loss of power was a loss to the citizens. But the people were not fooled. They saw that the Federal Constitution simply transferred some powers which they themselves had given their State officers, to Federal officers whom they retained the same right to elect. They didn't mind lessening the "political consequence" of their State representatives so long as they, the people, gained in the process.

*

The establishment of an Atlantic Federal Union, it must be admitted, would lessen the political importance of the President of the U.S. and of U.S. Senators and Congressmen. Certain powers they now have over the citizens would be transferred to the Executive and Senators of the Atlantic Union Government. But the citizens would remain the sovereigns who elected all these officers.

It is natural that Senators, and particularly those running for President, should not want to lose any power the citizens have given these officers. It is understandable that they should think that sacrificing them means sacrificing all the citizens, that they should be more concerned with the government's sovereignty than with that of the citizen.

***

Coonskin Pioneer. Senator Kefauver represents the pioneer American spirit with more than his coonskin cap. He is willing to sacrifice some of his power as U.S. Senator, and some of the power he would have if elected President, if his fellow citizens find this will help secure their own life and liberty, prevent further sacrifice of their own sovereignty as citizens, give them each more power individually.

He asks you to explore carefully whether you might not reduce your tax burden, lessen military service, and save your family and freedom from extinction by sacrificing instead some of his official power and giving it to some other representative you elect to an Atlantic Federal Union. It is evident from what George Washington wrote to Knox in 1787 that, were the Father of this Country alive today, he would warmly applaud this self-sacrificing stand of Senator Kefauver, but not the view of sovereignty taken so thoughtlessly by Senators Russell and Kerr.

***

To Gain Sovereignty. You would not only sacrifice none of your sovereignty as a citizen but would gain sovereignty through an Atlantic Union. Let Americans consider this: When the sovereign citizens of your State approved the Federal Constitution, they remained not merely the sovereigns of their State but gained citizen sovereignty in another State, a much greater State—the United States—where before they had no vote, no sovereign rights.

Similarly, when you help constitute an Atlantic Federal Union, you retain your sovereign right to govern your State affairs as you please, and your national U.S. affairs as you please, without the interference of anyone in England, France or any other member of the Atlantic Union. But you gain another, greater sovereignty: You become one of the equal sovereigns of the United States of the Atlantic. You gain as much direct voice in handling all Atlantic world affairs, as you gained in American national affairs through the U.S. Federal Constitution, and in your State affairs through the establishment of your democratic State Constitution.

*

Far from surrendering any of your sovereignty as a citizen by constituting this Greater Atlantic Union, you gain sovereignty, power, rights; you gain a vote where you personally have none whatever now—and you gain this citizen sovereignty in the very fields where you need it most, the fields on which peace and war depend.

***

What Powers? What are the fields you would begin to help govern through your representatives in the new Union Government? Its creation would involve no change whatever in the structure or powers of any State Government. Nor would it involve any change in the basic structure of the U.S. Government. It would involve only the transfer of certain powers from the U.S. Government to the Atlantic Union Government. Which powers? At most, only those powers which the people of the 13 Original States transferred from their State Governments to their Federal representatives when they replaced the Confederation with the Constitution.

By this transfer of power they created not only a common citizenship, but a common defense force, a common foreign policy, a common currency and the great common free market which has been the making of American prosperity.

***

How Citizens Win by Union. The citizens of all the 13 States gained in sovereignty not only by becoming sovereign citizens of the U.S., too, but also by all the other transfers of their delegated power from the State to the Union.

*

Consider how much the people have gained in all the 48 States by having a common U.S. defense force to defend their individual liberties and their State rights. What if each State had to uphold the liberty and State rights of its citizens all by itself, be prepared to fight not only Old World dictators but neighboring States? Before the 13 federated, the troops of New York and of Massachusetts were massing on their frontier, threatening war over Vermont. What taxes, military service and war we Americans would suffer now if each of our 48 States had to defend its rights alone!

*

Consider the gain to all the citizens of all the 48 States from having a common foreign policy. Let any American ask himself: What if my State could have a tough policy toward Soviet Russia, while neighboring States could appease Moscow? Before the 13 federated, when Massachusetts closed its ports to British ships, Connecticut welcomed them in its harbors, made the most of this chance to get business—pretty much as the British recognized Red China when the U.S. refused to

. . . while Stalin chuckled scornfully, and attacked the divided democracies in Korea.

*

Consider the gain to all the citizens of the 13 States when federation freed them from the vexation and cost of doing business with 13 currencies. Think of the enormous advantages we Americans now have from having one currency throughout the 48 States!

*

Consider how much American citizens everywhere gained when federation removed the tariffs between their States, and allowed every American to sell whatever he had to sell in the highest market in the whole U.S. and buy whatever he needed to buy in its cheapest market—all without any State Government interfering with his trade. How our American standard of living and mass production would be cut down and down, if our States regained the "sovereign right" to vex the citizens with trade barriers as do the sovereign States of Europe!

***

By every one of the U.S. transfers of power from the State to the Federal Government, the citizens in every State gained immensely, became much stronger, freer sovereigns.

***

How Far Now? How far should we follow now the U.S. example in constituting a great Atlantic Union with the other democracies? In my personal view, we should transfer to it the same powers that the 13 States originally transferred to the Federal Government. We know from experience that this combination creates prodigious power and freedom. We had better take no chances these days in having too little of either power or freedom if we wish to risk the lives of no more of our sons, sacrifice no more of our sovereign rights, and lives. That is my personal conviction. Others believe a Union as regards only defense and foreign policy would suffice for the present.

*

How far we should, and can, go depends of course not only on agreement among Americans but on agreement with the other democracies. The best way to reach agreement on this, and on other obvious problems that Atlantic Union involves, is to send delegates to a convention to thresh these things out with delegates from the other democracies, and have them report whatever agreement they reach back to the people for action by them. That is the way the U.S. Constitution was created through the Federal Convention that met in Philadelphia in 1787. And that is how the Atlantic Union resolution now before Congress proposes to tackle the problem.

***

Anti-Columbus? Whatever one thinks of Atlantic Union itself, one need only read the text of the Kefauver resolution to see that its adoption could not possibly sacrifice any national sovereignty —even of the George III variety which Senators Kerr and Russell are so strangely fearful of losing. Here is its enacting clause:

> Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring) That the President is requested to invite the democracies which sponsored* the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates, representing their principal political parties, to meet this year with delegates of the United States in a Federal Convention to explore how far their peoples, and the peoples of such other democracies as the Convention may invite to send delegates, can apply among them, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union.

It is clear that this resolution is expressly limited to calling a meeting to "explore" the possibility of Atlantic Union, and involves no commitment whatever to federation itself, or to the slightest transfer of sovereignty. All the proposed convention could possibly do would be to recommend that the citizens re-delegate to their Atlantic representatives certain powers they have given their national representatives. It would remain for the sovereign citizens to decide whether this should be done. What can they lose by exploring whether they might gain in liberty, peace, prosperity, by extending the U.S. idea of sovereignty across the ocean in the jet-atomic age?

*

*The other sponsors of the Atlantic Pact which the Resolution would have us meet in Convention are Canada, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. These seven drafted the Atlantic alliance, and then they extended it to some others.

Exploring is a New World tradition considerably older than the coonskin cap. Senators Kerr and Russell have got off on the wrong foot, but surely after second thought they will not campaign on an anti-Columbus platform.

Republican Witness. The Atlantic Union issue did not enter into the Republican primaries. But one witness from that party has testified with great weight to the importance of union in the Atlantic. In his report April 2 on his first year as Atlantic Commander-in-chief, General Eisenhower declared:

"The enormity of the present threat will never be met by half-hearted measures . . . This pattern of events, which points so surely to disaster, can be changed if only the peoples of the West have the wisdom to make a complete break with many things of the past. * * *

"Peaceime coalitions throughout history have been weak and notoriously inefficient. Sovereign nations have always found it difficult to discover common ground on which they could stand together for any length of time. Nevertheless, we were expecting NATO members . . . to work and sacrifice together, over an indefinite period. * * *

"There is power in our union . . . Visible and within grasp we have the capability of building such military, economic and moral strength as the Communist world would never dare to challenge.

*** * * * * Then the Atlantic Community will have proved worthy of its history and its God-given endowments. We shall have proved our union the world's most potent influence toward peace."**

***

Union is the Word. It must be noted that although Gen. Eisenhower in his NATO report spoke of "union" in connection with the Atlantic, nowhere has he urged the case for federation there as he has called for it in Western Europe. "In the political field, these [national] barriers compound inefficiency with distrust and suspicion," he has written,—but he has said this only as regards six continental European nations. He knows, of course, that national sovereignty has the same bad effect between the U. S.

and Britain, and between both of them and the democracies of the Continent. But he always leaves it to the readers to put his twos and twos together, when it comes to the over-riding problem of the political organization of the Atlantic.

*

Gen. Eisenhower, perhaps, does not mean the same thing by union in the Atlantic that Atlantic Unionists do. And, as a neophyte in politics, he may consider discretion the better part of valor there. Two facts remain: 1) He *has* pointed out that such coalitions as NATO have always been "weak." And 2) he has said that the way to power and peace lay in *"union"* of the Atlantic Community.

*

The good old American word, "union," which Gen. Eisenhower has repeatedly used, is one which U.S. diplomats have always carefully avoided, in speaking of the Atlantic. They realize what "union" means in U. S. political history, as must every West Pointer, too, since the Civil War. The State Department uses, instead, such terms as "Atlantic integration," "collaboration," and that hardy survivor of the red-blooded diplomacy of the thirties—"cooperation."

***

Red-blooded. The myriads of sovereign citizens who were sacrificed in World War II proved how red with other men's blood are the results of the diplomacy and politics that fear even to use the word "union," and talk instead only of "unity" and "cooperation." But the citizens who survived have an opportunity now to say whether they want more of this—or more of union in the North Atlantic.—CLARENCE STREIT

Reprinted from June, 1952, *Freedom & Union,* published by Federal Union, Inc. Copies available at 10c each or in quantities: 10 to 99, 8c each; 100 up, 6c each. These notes were used as an address by Clarence Streit, 36-minute tape recordings of which are available at $7.50 each.

THE 13-YEAR ADVANCE OF FEDERAL UNION, INC.

"Union Now"—The Beginning

1939, a memorable year. Nationalism is on the loose. Germany, Italy, Japan terrorize the world. The League of Nations capitulates. Democracy, peace and liberty are in full retreat. Isolationism rules the U.S.; in Europe defeatism is rife. The free world hovers disunited and leaderless on the brink of history's greatest war.

In this setting UNION NOW is published, and some of its readers organize the membership association now known as Federal Union, Inc., to achieve its promise for the future.

The Promise

UNION NOW called upon the Atlantic democracies to practice among themselves the democracy they practice at home. Leagues, pacts, alliances, it said, rest on a worn and alien creed that glorifies diplomats above elected representatives. It dooms the free to hopeless division and will deliver their cities and their sons to destruction. UNION NOW challenged Americans to lead the way to federal union of the democracies. It endowed freedom's creed that the citizen is the Sovereign of the Nation with international scope and a bright new future.

The Progress

1952, thirteen years have passed. Nationalism is on the defensive. Isolationism and defeatism are waning. The U.S. has undertaken building a strong, united Atlantic community. The Atlantic Federal Union proposal is before the U.S. Congress, backed by a fourth of each House, and is figuring in the Presidential campaign. It is endorsed by the Canadian Senate. It is influencing the Councils of NATO. It is gaining popular support all around the Atlantic.

But the free now face a most formidable foe, and the challenge to Union is now the race against war.

As Others See Us

World War II, trial-and-error, various other painful and costly events have contributed incalculably to UNION NOW's momentous advance. So have many organizations and many, many good people. Of Federal Union's contribution this has been said:

"When free men everywhere are united through federal union, in large measure the credit for this achievement will be due to your efforts." SENATOR GUY M. GILLETTE.

"Peace with genuine individual responsibility must continue to be our goal. I know of no organization or association that can compare with yours to bring this about in our time." GEORGE DENNY, FORMER MODERATOR, TOWN MEETING OF THE AIR.

"May God give to our humanity in peril many men as determined, as upright and as faithful as you and your associates in preparing the future that must come." GEORGES BIDAULT, FORMER PREMIER OF FRANCE.

An Invitation To Make History

Looking back and ahead, we of Federal Union believe that the free will have Atlantic Union soon. We believe, moreover, that the free can have it in time to avert war. The Union will be the crowning achievement of our lives and the pride of our children and their children's children.

We invite all those who understand the overriding importance of the Union to peace and freedom to join and support Federal Union, Inc., so that the work so auspiciously begun shall be speedily and successfully accomplished. To join, or to ask for more information, write to:

FEDERAL UNION INC.
700 Ninth St., N. W., Washington 1, D. C.

Clarence K. Streit
The Ontario
Washington 9, D. C.

Feb. 11 - 54

Dear Ed -

I've been in Europe since early September - finishing a book which is now completed & will be published in April by Harpers. Here is the Table of Contents & a digest of the first chapter of it. The publisher seems very pleased, and I think you will find it of interest. Heaven knows it deals with a great subject - Freedom Against Itself - and gave me another college education in the writing of it. I'm going to be in NYC Feb. 17, 18, 19 and want very much to discuss it and Europe with you. I fear we're heading toward disaster on the economic side, though we can still avert it. Will ask my daughter - a U.N. interpreter - to

(over)

give your office a ring to see if you have any free time.

Best

Clarence

Her home phone. Jeannette Sheit - is Sacramento 2-6594.

U.N. - PL 4-1234 ext. 560.

Streit, Clarence

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FREEDOM AGAINST ITSELF

By Clarence K. Streit

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Last Word

#

FREEDOM AGAINST ITSELF

By Clarence K. Streit

Chapter 1 - This Book As A Whole

As States are a collection of individual men . . which ought we to respect most, the rights of the people composing them, or the artificial beings resulting from the composition? Nothing could be more preposterous or absurd than to sacrifice the former to the latter . . . This (is) the critical moment for forming . . a Government. . . Henceforward the motives will become feebler, and the difficulties greater. -- Alexander Hamilton, in the American Federal Convention, June 29, 1789.

Never was there greater need among the NATO nations for unity, for wisdom, and for perseverance. Never was there a greater need to see clearly that our lives are bound inextricably together. -- General Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Forces, August 31, 1953.

The underlying tension of our time lies within Freedom itself, within us, ourselves, - nowhere else. It is preparing new disaster now. By prompt, right action we can still prevent it, - or keep it under control - and turn it into great good. Today's lament is that political progress lags far behind scientific discovery and technical invention. What we overlook is this:

It is Freedom that is causing this rapid advance of discovery and invention. And it is also Freedom, or rather our faulty grasp of it, that at the same time is halting Man's political and moral progress. We the Free, we are the ones who have long been thus dividing freedom against itself, and bringing depression, dictatorship and war down upon us, and all mankind, again and again.

Let us look at our primary problem afresh. And let us begin by taking, and keeping, the standpoint that men too seldom clearly take and carefully keep, the standpoint of their own individual freedom.

It would seem that either the world is growing mad, or we are. The fault is not in our star, or world, but in ourselves. For generations now our freedom has been working simultaneously to pull men together and to pull them apart. While it unites them through the machines its inventiveness produces, it divides them by the political policies it favors. With its right hand it creates an Atlantic community; with its left it keeps this community a prey to anarchy. Worse, - the machines with which we have formed this community unavoidably serve also to arm dictatorship to destroy freedom and provide the government we refuse to constitute by agreement.

The tension that results from this conflict of freedom against itself has long been tightening from both sides, more and more. It is bringing us nearer and nearer to catastrophe ..... when freedom, - were its house united, - could be bringing everyone an ever higher, freer life.

It is this schizophrenia, this cleavage within freedom, that makes our world now seem so mad. And since freedom has no flesh or blood or personality save that of the individual persons who are free, the cleavage is really in our minds and hearts. We

can cure this madness, but it is high time that we began. It is already in the violent stage.

This book offers no little evidence to support these conclusions, and of the more concrete ones that follow.

Part I. Here Freedom Unites

We find in Part I that the major inventions and discoveries have had, more and more rapidly, this characteristic effect: They give the individual more power, bring people together in a community greater than concerned them before, and in many ways liberate and unite them. This process has been going on now with accelerating speed for 200 years.

What is the yeast that has so expanded man's once static world? We find this yeast has been freedom or, more precisely, a relatively high degree of individual liberty enjoyed by a relatively large number of persons united through a relatively free government, - a combination I shorten into the term, freedom-and-union.

We reach this conclusion by first ascertaining from what area and nations these world-widening machines and innovations came. Study of a list of about 1,000 major inventions, discoveries and innovations since 1750 - the most comprehensive one I know of* - brings out these facts: Practically all of them - 96 per cent - came from the people living in the nations around the North Atlantic ocean. (I call this region "Atlantica" for short, and include in it all 14 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, plus Germany, Sweden, Switzerland and Eire.) Nearly all these inventions and discoveries came from the freest of these peoples - the democracies whose federation was proposed in Union Now.

Next we find the creativeness of the Atlanticans followed on the heels of freedom's advance among them - and because of it. Why has this astonishing creative power of the free Atlanticans passed so unnoticed? Why have the free themselves paid so little attention to the fact that freedom-and-union is the yeast that has caused invention and discovery to expand so wonderfully? Why have we so neglected this mother-lode of power and progress?

Part II. Where Freedom Now Requires Union

For 200 years freedom with its machines has been bringing together its far-flung followers, forming them into a highly inter-dependent Atlantic Community. Once such a community exists, it cannot remain without an effective government. Anarchy's evils always result in government being established either by force or by free agreement.

Part III. Here Freedom Divides Men and Arms Dictatorship

Instead of meeting this political need with the exploring, inventive spirit they have shown in all other fields, the free have been splintering the world into more and more sovereign nations. They have been walling men apart increasingly with new armies, new taxes, new censorships, new currencies, new barriers to travel, trade, production, employment, and other man-made bars to individual life, liberty and happiness. The 800,000,000 people living West of the Soviet Union enter the Jet Atomic Age splintered now into 57 sovereign nations. East of them 1,450,000,000 people enter it divided into only 15 sovereign states.

Where freedom fails to unite, force succeeds. History records few nations that were created by free agreement. Whereas freedom by its nature is divisive, dictator-

ship's nature leads it to expand. Two characteristics of freedom's inventions inevitably arm dictatorship industrially and militarily to fill the need for international government which the free keep on creating and keep on refusing to meet themselves: a) these machines and weapons permit the unskilled to do what only the highly skilled, or no one, could do before, and b) once invented, slaves can soon learn to make and use them.

Freedom's machines have another characteristic that makes them arm dictatorship more rapidly than democracy: The most complex machine is simpler than Man. We can teach people everywhere to pinpoint bombs, but we still find it hard to govern ourselves. Of the 77 sovereign nations on earth, only four - the U. S., the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the Netherlands, - have had even 150 years of unbroken experience in relatively free government. In all four a protecting natural shelter, - mountains, delta, Channel, ocean, - gave freedom the time it needed. But its machines have made such shelters of no avail today.

Freedom's survival depends now on the people of Atlantica learning to spread the knowhow of liberty-and-union through humanity as rapidly as their other knowhow spreads. They may do this by learning first to govern freely but effectively their own Atlantic community. By forming an Atlantic federation they can, moreover, supply through it the shelter from dictatorship which mountains and oceans no longer give.

Part IV. Great, Growing, Imminent Danger

My studies in 1942-43 not only brought out the basic tension the free have themselves created but made me conclude that the danger in it was great indeed. Since then all four of the major forces causing this tension have tremendously increased it, and the resulting danger. In that brief decade 1) freedom's inventiveness has produced the supersonic plane, the atomic and hydrogen bombs while 2) its political divisiveness has produced 14 new sovereign nations and prevented the creation of any international government. At the same time 3) the area united under dictatorship has expanded more than in any decade in centuries and 4) dictatorship has armed itself far more formidably in Soviet Russia than it was in Germany, Japan and Italy, and has quickly learned to make our most advanced weapons.

At this rate how much greater will the tension be in 10 years . . . if it does not meanwhile produce catastrophe? Consider this ABC of one element in this tension, the growing economic strain on Atlantica:

A) We are still adding to the huge load of debt we acquired in two World Wars and the Depression. The biggest factor in it, the cost of armament is soaring fantastically.

B) The practice of seeking to solve economic problmes by artificially increasing costs has become chronic throughout Atlantica. In the past 40 years the free have reversed their previous 19th century policies that cut away man-made obstacles to the free movement of men, money and goods while their machines were removing natural barriers to this trinity of economic freedom. At the very time when mass production and the automobile, airplane and atom came, requiring for their growth an even wider market than the steam age did, we Atlanticans turned back to the thinking of 1750. Organized Business, Labor and Farm interests, which freedom has brought to great power in every Atlantic nation, use their influence to limit the market their fathers freed and raise costs artificially.

The Soviet dictatorship has its own difficulties but it does not suffer these

pressures that afflict all Atlantica. There are 15 States in the Soviet Union - but not 15 currencies, 15 barriers against the movement of goods and men, 15 defense forces devouring taxes. Nor is Moscow hindered by the cost-raising pressures that Business, Farm and Labor bring so freely on Washington, London, Paris, Ottawa.

C) Then there is the witch's brew of fear and suspicion in Atlantica . . the growing mistrust of each other among Americans, Britons and French . . the fever of investigations that divert attention from essentials and destroy the mutual trust which freedom needs to live. Our most powerful weapon, as this study shows, is the great inventive power that lies in union of the free. This weapon is still the monopoly of the free. We need no security measures to keep dictatorship from stealing it. We cannot contrive to get Moscow to copy it. Yet this is the weapon that we ourselves are sabotaging now, - in the name of security.

The costliest thing about our present loyalty-security complex is that it leads to another depression. The spirit of fear and mistrust it spreads can leap from the loyalty and military fields to the economic and monetary ones. The Kremlin aims to steal whole countries now, - with Hungry Depression as its skeleton key. And it has our "security" zealots busy now helping produce this key for it.

The imminent danger now lies in political disunion and economic depression rather than world war, - though the latter danger remains so great that it would be folly to weaken our defenses. We have probably closed the door to depression we left open in 1929. But we have left open the door which Atlantic disunion provides. The people of Atlantica still lack even the most elemental means of dealing with a common economic crisis; they still have no common government.

It would seem common sense to hasten to tighten Atlantic unity from within as Moscow removes the pressure of fear that now holds NATO together. Washington, instead, has threatened - from annoyance with France - to do precisely what the Kremlin most desires - take the heart out of NATO. If the free need to have the means prepared beforehand to meet military attack on any of them, they need to do this on the economic side, too. An attack by General Depression on one of them can also imperil all of them.

Atlantic disunion and depression form a vicious circle. The worse disunity becomes, the greater is the difficulty of nipping depression in the bud. On the other hand, depression makes for worse disunion. History shows that military danger often leads the free to unite, but economic danger nearly always divides them more than ever.

Yet, while the Kremlin is busy undoing its folly which produced NATO, Atlantica's statesmen and politicians continue compounding their own folly. Instead of trying to replace NATO's made-in-Moscow bond, with the internal cement of organic Atlantic Union which they alone can provide, they urge the Kremlin to remove its pressure more rapidly. They make the people think that the way to peace lies in concessions that depend on others, on Moscow or on Paris, - on a united Korea, a united Austria, a united Germany, a united Western Europe, - not on a United States of the Atlantic. At Yalta, Atlantica's statesmen bribed the Kremlin to come where it dearly wished to go . . into position to win China to communism. Now they beg it to prove its "sincerity" by concessions that would speed the descending spiral of disunion and depression, which it already sees is the best way to destroy freedom.

How near is the danger?

When two opposing capstans put a chain under increasing tension, it is impossible

to say at which link and at which moment it will break, but it is easy to see that it is bound to break somewhere, sooner or later, if the strain continues. When, as at present, the break would be a major catastrophe, and it takes so much time to arouse to salutary action those with most at stake, it is safer to err in fearing that one is at the eleventh hour than in assuming that there is still plenty of time.

Part V. To Turn Danger Into Opportunity

I believe catastrophe can still be averted - and this danger turned to great good. To work this transformation we need to keep in mind that the primary source of the danger lies in us, the free, rather than in dictatorship.

Only the free can peacefully end this tension while preserving freedom. They cannot do it by ending their inventiveness; they cannot help but be creative while they continue to be free. They cannot alter totalitarianism's inherent trend to expand until it is truly total. Nor can they keep their machines from being so simple that dictatorship can make and run them with slaves, and use them to impose its government. There is only one thing the free can peacefully do to end the basic tension of our time: They can end their own dangerous divisiveness by constituting an effective free government for their common concerns.

Despite the Machiavellis of Moscow and the divisiveness of depression, I for one believe this will be done. Among my reasons are these two:

1) By great good fortune the key country on which Atlantica now depends for leadership, the U.S., provides in its history the proof that economic danger can persuade free states to federate. It is the exception to the rule that war unites but depression divides. Where war led the people of the 13 Original States to form merely a grand alliance, hard times thereafter produced their present Union.

2) The first step to Atlantic Union is relative easy: All we need do now is to call a Federal Convention where delegates from the peoples of Atlantica would explore the possibility of uniting in a federation. This commits no people to any Union; the time for commitment would come only when the Convention presented them with a Constitution to debate and ratify.

Merely by calling this Convention we tackle the long overdue problem of learning better the principles of free government, so that we can spread this knowhow more rapidly through a world that learns so quickly to turn our weapons and machines against freedom. Both by its debates and the example it would set, this Convention would give our principles a power among the young democracies and behind the Iron Curtain that nothing else could do.

To explore this solution would not hurt, but help, the United Nations, NATO and the unification of Europe. The need of strengthening international organization is so great that we should tackle it simultaneously all along the line and by every reasonable method - on the Atlantic as well as on the universal and the European level, and by the procedures that made the U.S., as well as by those that made Great Britain and the Commonwealth, which now alone are being tried.

The essential is that, before Moscow has entirely removed the pressure that now keeps Atlantica from falling apart, we should thus redouble our efforts to weld the free together from within.

The convulsions that have wracked our generation - two World Wars and a Great

Depression - need not be convulsions of madness and death for individual liberty. They can mean, instead, merely the end of the present worship of Absolute National Sovereignty, and the birth of far greater freedom for us and our children.

None of us can hope to save freedom without some personal sacrifice. No matter what it is we most believe in, it requires some sacrifice. The god of Absolute National Sovereignty demands that we sacrifice our sons to it, our jobs, our individual freedom. For these sacrifices it brings us only greater grief, as our generation knows from experience. Liberty-and-union requires us to sacrifice some of our prejudices, some of the power we have given our politicians, some of the special privileges that some of us have, some of our money, leisure, energy. To those who have made these sacrifices in the past, it has brought greater liberty, richer life.

On Aug. 4, 1789, the beneficiaries of Absolute Royal Sovereignty in France offered to sacrifice to liberty-and-union their privileges and prejudices. But they sacrificed too long to the wrong god, too late to the true one. They sacrificed only when this was their only hope to save themselves, and they lost all they sought to retain. In a few years their heads were rolling from the guillotine.

Abraham saved his son Isaac by unhesitatingly offering to sacrifice even him when he thought God required this proof of faith.

Whose example shall we follow? And how soon? It is for each to decide what he or she holds supreme, the Sovereignty of the States, or the Sovereignty of its Citizens. You know my answer. It is for you now to say which you will put your faith in,- Freedom's Divided House or the Union of the Free.

#

From: Federal Union, Inc.
700 Ninth Street, N.W.
Washington 1, D.C.

* The book includes this list (referred to on page 2), giving the year and the name and the nationality of the author of each item in it. To compile this list was a major research task in which some 70 sources in 10 countries assisted. This list is in itself a reference tool of high and general value.

(not included in Griffin Index) 3-C-44 Streit, Clarence

Freedom & Union

MAGAZINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD

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700 NINTH STREET NW WASHINGTON 1 DC DISTRICT 4171

Jan. 28, 1953

No.

Dear Ed,

For more than 13 years now we've been trying to call attention to a time-tested cure - which doesn't needs half a million to Harvard - for something alongside of which your two billion dollar cost of the common cold is a . . . minnow.

Why not, some day - or week, month, year, generation or century, (you see how long I hope you live) - give a little time somehow to it?

I've been listening, you see, to your talk tonight. Also listened to your round-up confab with your European and Asiatic correspondents at the turn of the year. I meant to write you, and them, at that time about a blind spot I there detected all round.

Something like the blind spot a lot of members of the French Acadaemy of Sciences had - if my memory serves me right - when Pasteur came trying to persuade them that something - considerably smaller than the famous cloud which Elijah's boy saw - was responsible for a number of diseases.

I never got round to doing it, just as I haven't got round to giving you a buzz about the subject we were considering the last time we lunched. My loss and I like to think (though I should regret to) - possibly yours.

Lunched yesterday with a friend whose son is in Korea and who was lyrical about your TV from there.

He mentioned that you found the boys didn't know what it was all about.

I gave him the enclosed pamphlet, including a letter from - the exception who no doubt proves the rule.

But Ford, Columbus, Socrates, were exceptions once. (To mention too few.)

They proved more than rules.

Are your TV associates still - or again - in Florida?

Why don't we get together again, with or without them?

I plan to be in NYC Feb. 3,4,5, and will ask my secretary there to give yours a ring to see what the situation is.

Meanwhile, I attach our current issue with some thoughts of mine on Dulles that do not seem to have occurred to others, and some reasons why I fear you may have new Koreas to report if the No. 1 task of the time does not get more attention. Our next issue will facts about Bidault you should read, for your broadcast when he replaced Schuman did him, and you, less than justice. You should subscribe!

Best ever,

Clarence

Clarence Streit

Edward R. Murrow, CBS, NYC

ice K. Streit
. Ontario
Washington 9, D. C.

December 2, 1952

Dear Ed:

I made the attached private appraisal of the election for some of our leaders. It includes some confidential reasons why the results pleased me, even before the Dulles appointment (see top of p. 4).

The publishable parts will appear in the December Freedom & Union, which you should receive in a week or so. It also contains an unpublished letter I wrote Eisenhower five years ago that I believe you will find of interest now.

With best regards,

Clarence

CKS.ea

Later correc

Washington, D.C.
November 6, 1952

Private
Not for Publication

WHAT THE EISENHOWER VICTORY MEANS TO ATLANTIC UNION

By Clarence Streit

Conclusion. The election results are, in my judgment, extremely favorable to the Atlantic Union movement and resolution. If President Eisenhower wants Congress to adopt the Atlantic Union resolution, or something like it, he can get this done with relatively little trouble, I believe, particularly if he acts early in 1953 when the prestige of his landslide victory is highest. If he wants to defer it, action on it will be deferred. All depends on which policy he adopts. Weighing the factors, pro and con, I am convinced that there is a very strong hope of his leading boldly in 1953 toward the proposed exploratory Atlantic Federal Convention, especially if all those who desire this push hard for it from now on. Here are some of my reasons:

I. U.S. Political Situation.

1. Danger of Opposition from Taft & Co. is Small. For reasons given in my October Freedom & Union editorial, I did not share the fear that Eisenhower would be the "captive" of Taft and the more isolationist members of Congress. This widely held fear would seem to me completely removed now by such facts as these: a) the landslide character of Eisenhower's victory; b) the fact he ran far ahead of Taftist Senators in their own States; c) the strong confirmation of this supplied by Senator Kem's defeat; d) the election of Atlanticist Senator Cooper (R.) in Kentucky, one of the few States Eisenhower lost; e) the fact that Taft did little campaigning for Eisenhower, especially compared to what Truman did for Stevenson.

The great bulk of the Republicans in Congress would seem certain to follow where Eisenhower leads, at least in the next year or so, because of a) his vast vote-getting power; b) the fact that he led them back to power after 20 hungry years; c) the fact he did this despite their widespread fear he couldn't; d) their party's narrow majority in each House,- contrasting with his powerful hold on the White House; and e) all the jobs the President has to give in his first year.

These circumstances make it equally unlikely that many Republican Senators would follow Taft if he broke with Eisenhower, or that he would be so foolish as to be responsible for any move that could be interpreted as hurtful to his party's chances to remain in power. As the defeated rival for the nomination, Taft is very vulnerable to criticism in his own party if he makes any move savoring of poor sportsmanship. All this offsets his technically strong position as Senate Republican policy chairman.

To focus this now on the Atlantic Union resolution: While seeking the nomination, Taft took a position, at least twice, favorable to an exploratory conference of the NATO democracies, though unfavorable to an Atlantic federation. He wrote this on January 7 in a letter to John Apperson of Memphis. All things considered, I would not be surprised to see Taft join in supporting Eisenhower with his vote if - early in 1953 - the President wanted Congress to approve calling the proposed Atlantic Convention. I would be more surprised if Taft should strongly oppose him on this, and still more surprised if he got even the following 13 Republican Senators all to vote with him against it: Bricker, Hugh Butler, John Butler, Capehart, Dirksen, Dworshak, Jenner, McCarthy, Malone, Millikin, Watkins, Welker, Langer. On

the Democratic side, he could get Byrd and McCarran, but not many more. Eisenhower - as Taft would know - could replace all the Republican defections with the 20 Democratic sponsors of the Atlantic Union resolution who remain in the Senate next year. I know of at least nine others who, I feel sure, would join them in such circumstances; this would make a majority of two-thirds, though only a simple majority is needed for such a resolution.

At the showdowns, Taft will be obliged to go along with the Eisenhower program - particularly in the Atlantic field - or be reduced to leader of a faction. He is now Eisenhower's captive. This situation will change if Eisenhower makes bad mistakes, but in early 1953 Taft will be weak and Eisenhower very strong.

2. Vice President Nixon a Sponsor of Atlantic Union Resolution. This is especially helpful since he should have an influential role as President of a closely-divided Senate. Though never an active supporter of the resolution, he stood his guns when during the campaign the Chicago Tribune tried with loaded questions to get him to recant.

3. Senate Backers of Resolution Increase to 29. Most of the 28 Senatorial sponsors of the Atlantic Union resolution were not up for reelection this year. Only four of the others were defeated, none on this issue. Two of these, Republicans Cain of Washington and Ecton of Montana, were replaced by Democrats Jackson and Mansfield, who backed the resolution as Members of the House. The other two, Moody of Michigan and O'Mahoney of Wyoming, were defeated by Republicans Potter and Barrett, whose views are not known. These losses, however, are offset by the election of three new Senators who are known to favor the resolution: Republicans Bush (Conn.) and Cooper (Ky.), and Democrat Gore (Tenn.). There is thus a net gain of one.

Senator Cooper's election is especially helpful. I have worked closely with him; at one time he told me, "It is high time some Senator got impassioned about Atlantic Union" and "carried on a running fight on the Senate floor for it." A former delegate to the Atlantic Council, highly respected in both the Senate and State Department, well grounded in Atlantic Union and strongly believing in it, he is just the kind of leader the cause has badly needed on the Republican side of the Senate.

Senator Carlson (Kans.), another sponsor, is one of Eisenhower's closest advisers.

4. Senator Kefauver should be greatly strengthened now in the Democratic party and in the Senate. The resolution's chief sponsor already had a strong national following in his party; his many friends will not let it be forgotten that he was the proved vote-getter in the primaries, and a nationally-known figure whom the Truman machine and city bosses blocked at the convention in favor of a relatively unknown candidate who, with all his great qualities, failed as a vote-getter and led the party out of power. The more the defeat is interpreted as a revulsion against corruption, the city bosses and "Trumanism," the more Kefauver will stand out as the Democratic leader most opposed to, and by, all these forces. He is the natural leader of all those Democrats who interpret their defeat as proof that it's time for a change in the Democratic machine, too.

Kefauver's party position is further strengthened by the fact that he did not sulk when defeated, or ask a price, but campaigned ardently for Stevenson, doing far more for him than Taft for Eisenhower. In contrast, his chief rival, Senator Russell, did little for Stevenson and did that little late, and with qualifications

regarding civil rights that will help him only in the South.

Stevenson deservedly won many friends in the campaign and remains the titular head of the party, but he is weakened now by two things: 1) he was not only defeated but led his party out of long-held power, and 2) in 1953 he will hold no political office from which to exercise his leadership. Moreover, he has to cope with a possible rival, Harry Truman, who shares with him the former responsibility and the latter handicap. Senator Kefauver has the great advantage that he is in the Senate, where he will remain continuously in the national spotlight and can make his weight felt in many ways. In international affairs, Eisenhower will need the support of Kefauver and his friends; in domestic affairs, both Stevenson and Truman will need him to uphold Democratic party policies against the combination of Republicans and Southern conservatives. Kefauver has a formidable start toward the 1956 Democratic nomination for President; and as the world moves toward Atlantic Union, the fact that he was the Senator who pioneered for it will heighten his stature.

5. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Situation Improves. The change in the powerful position of chairman of this key committee is a distinct gain for the Atlantic Union movement. Senator Connally, who has retired, was an obstacle to it. His Republican successor, Senator Wiley, is much more friendly, though he is not a sponsor. He showed his sympathy frequently during the 1950 hearings on it held by a sub-committee of which he was a member. Last April he courageously made clear in a public speech that, as ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, he intended to be as internationalist and bipartisan as Senator Vandenberg ended by being. When Congress meets in January there will be three Republican vacancies on this committee, and one Democratic. Senator Kefauver is high in line for the latter. If he gets it, at least five of the 13 members of this committee will be sponsors of the Atlantic Union resolution. None of the present Republican members is a sponsor, but none of them is hostile and three are quite friendly.

6. In the House: All but 25 of 116 Backers of A.U. Resolution were Reelected. The 25 include Gore, Jackson and Mansfield, who were elected to the Senate; Herter, elected Governor of Massachusetts; several who vainly sought Senate seats; and several who retired or died. The 91 remaining divide: 30 Republicans, 61 Democrats. None of those defeated lost, so far as known, because of supporting the A.U. resolution. Leroy Johnson (R. Calif.), the only Representative known to have been attacked sharply by rivals because of his federalist views, was overwhelmingly reelected - on both party tickets. The views of the many new Republican members are not known as regards A.U. The House, however, usually follows, more than the Senate, the lead of the President who belongs to the majority party. If President Eisenhower led for an Atlantic exploratory convention, any Republican defections in the House would be more than offset by the Democrats who favor this course.

7. The New Speaker Not Opposed. Joe Martin, who no doubt will be Speaker now, told Justice Roberts some time ago in private that he would not oppose the A.U. resolution.

8. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Its chairman-to-be, Robert Chiperfield, has not been as favorably inclined to the A.U. resolution as his Democratic predecessor, James Richards, who remains as ranking minority member, but he is not hostile. I have known him for 12 years; he would follow Eisenhower's lead, I feel sure. Among the reelected backers of the resolution, four Republicans and six Democrats are on this 27-member committee. It will have five Republican and no Democratic vacancies to fill.

9. Great Gain in State Department. Not only does the election assure the departure of the chief single obstacle to the resolution - Secretary Acheson - but the advent, in all probability, of a friendly successor. The best from an A.U. standpoint would be the likeliest candidate, John Foster Dulles. I have known him well since about 1939; he has been deeply interested since then, and has a thorough grasp of the whole Atlantic Federal Union idea. Both his mind and heart favor it; he came out publicly for the A.U. resolution when running for the Senate in 1949, but has not pushed it publicly from fear, I believe, lest this keep him from becoming Secretary of State and thus being, as he would say, "in position to do more for it." I would expect him privately to encourage any Eisenhower leanings toward Atlantic Union, and if the President wanted the proposed convention called, Dulles - I believe - would surprise even his admirers by the power with which he would uphold this policy. In any event, judging from the past, I would have good access to him and he would give my views a very good hearing. He realizes as few others do the importance history will attach to the creation of this Union.

If Dewey is made Secretary of State, Dulles would be his Gray Eminence. Dulles, however, would be the better choice for Secretary of State, if only because he is experienced in diplomacy and is much more acceptable to both the Taft Republicans and Democrats than is Dewey. John J. McCloy, also mentioned for Secretary of State, told me privately, when I saw him in Frankfort in 1951, that he favored the A.U. resolution. Later he publicly endorsed the idea. Paul Hoffman would also be a great improvement on Acheson, from an Atlantic Union standpoint, though not as much as Dulles.

II. Major Obstacles to Early Action.

If Eisenhower decides not to press in 1953 for an Atlantic exploratory convention, I believe it will be mainly from fear that a) this would interfere with the program he himself pushed as NATO Commander for a European Defense Community and a western European federation; and b) the U.S. public is not ripe for this step.

The former fear would seem the more important. Not only is Eisenhower strongly committed to the EDC and European Union, but work on these projects is now at a critical stage. EDC ratification is pending, and facing strong opposition in Paris and Bonn; it may well be deferred until March, when the constituent assembly of the Schuman-EDC countries is scheduled to deliver its draft of a political constitution for them.

There are powerful elements in these countries that are determined to put this program through and that will use their influence to defer U.S. action on an Atlantic convention until afterward, some because they believe this is the soundest way to Atlantic Union, and others because their chief aim is to make Europe independent of the U.S., not to make an Atlantic Union. There will also be strong voices in the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and Congress who will support their view.

III. Major Hopes for Early Action.

A. Atlantic Union and European Union.

1. Not "either-or" but "together with." There are good reasons why the exploration of union should go on simultaneously on both a western European and Atlantic scale. There are enough good men available for conventions to work in both fields. The two could help each other. Much of the non-communist opposition in France and

Germany to both the EDC and European Union projects would disappear if the Atlantic convention were called, for this would be the best assurance against its fear that Britain and the U.S. would be left out of the picture, or that the U.S. was aiming to withdraw from Europe. It would also lessen British fear of European Union. All eggs would not be in one basket; if European Union proved too difficult, there would remain the possibility of Atlantic Union - without the risk and loss of precious time entailed by deferring exploration of it until Europe failed. To tackle the problem thus simultaneously would be in accordance with the prudent method by which the scientists achieved the atomic bomb by approaching the problem in four ways at once.

2. Eisenhower's Character. To tackle the problem simultaneously on an Atlantic as well as a European scale fits in with Eisenhower's character and habits of mind, as revealed in his London speech, July 3, 1951: "Any soldier contemplating this problem would be moved to express an opinion that it cannot be attacked successfully by slow infiltration, but only by direct and decisive assault, with all available means. The project (federation) faces the deadly danger of procrastination, timid measures, slow steps and cautious stages. Granted that the bars of tradition and habit are numerous and stout, the greatest bars to this as to any human enterprise lie in the minds of men themselves." Though he was speaking of European federation, his words apply also, not only to Atlantic Union, but to any big problem. They show that he is inclined to tackle such problems as a soldier rather than as a diplomat or politician habitually does.

3. Eisenhower Already Shifting from E.U. to A.U.? When I saw him in Paris in April, 1951, he seemed very favorable to Atlantic Union. High European sources have told me they got the same impression in that period. In July, 1951, he came out strongly for a European federation. I have good reason to believe he did this primarily from the belief this would hasten achievement of his strong desire to bring Germany into the western defense picture, and secondarily to hasten solution of the economic difficulties confronting NATO. I believe he was also led to this policy by the fact that it required no action by Congress and that as a General - not President, he could not lead for an Atlantic Union, as he could for one in Europe.

From July, 1951, to March 1952, Eisenhower pushed hard for the EDC and E.U.; but since April he has pushed less and less in this direction, and increasingly in the Atlantic field. It looks as if he had become aware of the dangers in seeking to achieve European Union first, without at least parallel effort toward A.U.; certainly these dangers have been brought to his attention.

At any rate, it is significant that in his NATO report April 2, Eisenhower put E.U. into an Atlantic framework. He not only gave his accent to the latter, but openly talked of "union" in the Atlantic as the key to peace, and of the "notoriously inefficient" character of "coalitions" such as NATO. During the campaign he said little if anything about E.U. In his Philadelphia foreign policy speech he omitted E.U. from his ten points for peace, though its inclusion would not have cost him votes.

Although he did not talk of A.U. either, he did risk votes by his strong demand for lower U.S. trade and immigration barriers in his New York City speech October 16. In the same speech he stressed Stalin's hopes of winning the world through division among the democracies, and emphasized the need of unity with our allies.

Again in New York on October 21 he said he would "call on the best minds of

our nation to sit down with political and economic leaders" of "our closest allies" to "take a new look" and "help build a new economic alliance" with "a long-term, consistent program" instead of "emergency relief and isolated, piecemeal action," in order to meet the dangerous line of attack indicated in Stalin's message to the October Communist Congress. The move he suggested could lead into an Atlantic Federal Convention as readily as the commercial conference in Annapolis in 1786 led to the Philadelphia Convention in 1787.

4. European Support for A.U. There are many powerful supporters of Atlantic Union both on the Continent and in Britain, and both in and out of the movement to federate western Europe. There is also strong opposition to forming the latter before A.U. is more advanced. All this may come out in the debates this Fall on ratification of the EDC and in the European constituent assembly. If the French and/or German Parliaments should provide strong evidence at this juncture that they would welcome an invitation from the U.S. to explore Atlantic Union, too, and/or that this would help speed EDC and E.U., their action might well have decisive influence with Eisenhower. This would be the more probable if Britain and Canada nudged at the same time toward A.U., and the Scandinavians indicated that Little Europe is no answer for them, and the Swiss made more evident their fears of E.U.

5. European Union Cannot Solve Major Problems, A.U. Could. At best, European Union alone cannot: a) end the dangers in the dollar gap; b) solve the problem of Britain; c) remove the peril in conflicting American, British and French policies in the troubled zone from Morocco to Indo-China (to which even the Atlantic Pact does not apply); d) put enough sure power behind the West to discourage the Kremlin; e) reduce the cost of western military power enough to remove the dangers of inflation, high taxation, economic crash; f) provide the economies needed to develop Point 4 aid enough to prevent Communism fattening on misery in vital areas; g) solve the problems of such countries as Canada and Norway; h) seriously lessen the atomic danger; i) give the psychological lift needed to induce a revolutionary democratic movement within the satellite states. E.U. would help in some of these respects, but not decisively, and it might make matters worse in other respects. A.U. would be much more helpful all along the line.

6. European Union Cannot Thwart Stalin's Present Strategy, which Eisenhower in his October 16th speech showed he considered so dangerous. This strategy, as Eisenhower there stressed, seeks to win by exploiting the divisions within the free world. The proposed E.U. would unite six nations effectively, but leave their Union and Britain and the U.S. as divided as the six nations are now. Since each of the three would then be a more dangerous competitor to the others, this result should encourage Stalin's belief that a struggle for markets will lead the West into war within itself again, with Communism again the gainer. Atlantic Union by ending these divisions in the West would have the devastating effect on the Kremlin of a blow upsetting all its basic calculations and proving Stalin wrong.

7. A.U. Would Help Eisenhower in Korea, both by distributing the burden more equitably and by removing the inter-democracy divisions (as between U.S. and British policy toward Red China) which encouraged both the original attack, and the later intervention of the Chinese Reds. A.U. would also lessen the danger of new Koreas. European Union alone would do neither.

8. Eisenhower Needs A.U. to Fulfill his Economy Pledge. He cannot achieve without it the substantial economies he has promised the U.S., except by dangerously cutting U.S. and Atlantic security, which it is inconceivable he would do. There is reason to believe he knows this, and looks to A.U. to effect these economies.

Confidential: he told me in April 1951, "I believe if we got effective political union in the Atlantic, we would cut our defense costs in half," and when I told that to Harriman - the Democrat in best position to know - he said, after some thought, "Yes, I suppose we could cut our costs by half if we formed a real United States of the Atlantic."

9. Eisenhower is Well Aware of the Advantages of Federalism, as his arguments for European Union prove. He must also know that these arguments apply even more to Atlantic Union.

10. For Eisenhower to Defer A.U. for E.U. Does Not Make Sense. It means he is deferring - and probably worsening - his major headaches in order to cure relatively minor ones, when he can tackle them together.

11. Other Advantages. By getting Congress to approve early in 1953, when his prestige is highest, the calling of an exploratory Atlantic convention, Eisenhower gains these other advantages: a) he acts when action is easiest and has the most psychological effect; b) he avoids the risks of waiting until his honeymoon with Congress is over and the foreign situation becomes more difficult; c) he reaps all the immediate psychological benefits in western and eastern Europe, but he can still defer the Atlantic Convention until European Union is more advanced, if he wishes. (The European constitution is scheduled to be drafted by March, and if the A.U. resolution were through Congress by that time, the Atlantic Convention still couldn't be ready to meet for several months, at least. In short, early Congressional action nails the convention down at the most propitious time, here and abroad, but does not require the convention to meet prematurely.)

B. Ripeness of U.S. Public for A.U. Resolution.

1. Important Distinction. Those who say the public is not ripe for this action usually mean they think it isn't ripe for Atlantic Union itself. But the only issue now is whether it is ripe for a convention to explore the possibility of forming such a Union.

2. There are Many Signs the People are Ripe to Explore A.U. Senators and Congressmen are good judges of such questions. The fact that so many in both parties have publicly backed the A.U. resolution, despite the negative attitude of the Administration, speaks volumes. So does the fact that none asked for removal of his name from the list of supporters, despite opposition attacks. It is noteworthy, too, that few were attacked by rivals on this issue, and none defeated on it.

Another straw: Freedom & Union - which goes to all the important dailies in the U.S. - prominently announced on its September cover that both Nixon and Sparkman were supporters of the A.U. resolution. Only the Chicago Tribune chain - to my knowledge - attacked them for this. In three editorials and two interviews it vigorously sounded the alarm over this situation and the fact, it added, that both Eisenhower and Stevenson were sympathetic. It failed completely to alarm either public or candidates. If Eisenhower moves early toward Atlantic Union it can't be said that the public wasn't forewarned by the Chicago Tribune press.

3. A.U. is a Good Bipartisan Opening for Eisenhower. Since both Nixon and Sparkman are co-sponsors of the A.U. resolution, and since it now has many more known Democratic backers than Republicans in both Houses, there is no danger of its becoming a partisan issue or the football of politics. Instead, it provides a

ready-made basis for Eisenhower to begin his foreign policy in a bipartisan way.

4. Good Press Assured. If Eisenhower comes out for the proposed Atlantic Federal Convention, I am confident - from long and widespread acquaintance with the more important papers all over the U.S. - that he would have strong press support. About the only opposition would come from the Chicago Tribune, Hearst and Knight chains. The idea also has many friends in the radio, TV and magazine fields. How strongly the press can help ripen public opinion for this move is perhaps best illustrated in the very timely article in current LOOK in which Arnold Toynbee gives powerful arguments for Atlantic Union as "the next step in history."

5. Riper for A.U. Exploration than for Lend-Lease in 1941. The Atlantic Union idea has been before the public since 1939, continuously. It has received very wide publicity through allmediums. It has hundreds of eminent supporters in all walks of life. It has had hearings in both Senate and House Foreign Affairs Committees recently enough for most members of both to be familiar with it. No doubt much more could be done, but already the public is better prepared for it than it was for much important legislation, or Executive moves. And the calling of a convention to explore Atlantic Union involves no commitment, whereas Lend-Lease, the Truman Doctrine in Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Alliance, involved huge commitments, taken with little trouble despite a less ripened public.

6. To Speed Further Ripening for A.U. The best way is early adoption of the resolution to call the exploratory convention. If advantage is taken now of the honeymoon period of the Eisenhower Administration to get this approved by Congress, then enough time as is judged necessary can be taken to prepare for the convention before it meets. The fact that the exploration has been approved by Congress will immensely facilitate and speed preparations for the Convention. Much more education and ripening is needed for public acceptance of an Atlantic federation itself, but the passage of the resolution to explore the subject, the preparations for the convention, and above all the debates of the convention itself, which will be widely publicized, will educate and ripen the public as nothing else could possibly do. And events, the pressure of necessity, will continue to offer the powerful helping hand they have given in past years. As Eisenhower himself has so wisely said:

> "The project faces the deadly danger of procrastination, timid measures, slow steps and cautious stages. . . But difficulties are often of such slight substance that they fade into nothingness at the first sign of success. If obstacles are of greater consequence they can always be overcome when they must be overcome."

One cannot hope for an easier, safer time than the early honeymoon period of the Eisenhower Administration to get Congress to approve exploration of Atlantic Union. Only disaster can make it easier - but it cannot make it safer, too.

* * *

Street, Clarence

September 9, 1952

Dear Clarence:

Just a quick note to say my best thanks for yours of the 2nd.

I'm glad you liked our September 1st piece and appreciate your writing to say so. Enclosed is a copy which you are by all means welcome to use in Freedom & Union.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Clarence Streit
Freedom & Union
700 Ninth Street, N.W.
Washington 1, D.C.

nic

Freedom & Union

MAGAZINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD

Editor, CLARENCE K. STREIT Associate Editor, HERBERT AGAR

Managing Editor, HELEN B. HAMER European Editor, JEANNE DEFRANCE
Circulation Manager, PIERRE STREIT Office Manager, F. E. MOLLOY
Advertising Manager, CLINTON C. GARDNER

CONTRIBUTING EDITORS
EDGAR BISSANTZ HON. OWEN J. ROBERTS RUSSELL W. DAVENPORT

700 NINTH STREET NW WASHINGTON 1, DC DISTRICT 4171

NC - thanks & send script this aig

Sept. 2, 1952

Edward Murrow
CBS Commentator
481 Madison, Avenue
New York City

Dear Ed,

I listened to the latter part of your Labor Day broadcast w ith much more than interest, - with inward applause and heartfelt gratitude that such a high standard for reporting (whether radio or press) should be followed, and broadcast.

In the words of Washington, you have "raised a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair."

You have put in words much better than I could the code I sought to follow when a New York Times correspondent.

Could you send me a copy of it? And could we publish it in our magazine, so its beneficent influence may be a little more widespread, and our readers abroad may see what high news standards free men can set themselves?

I attach our July-August issue, which includes some thoughts of mine on the presidential campaign you probably missed, and that I'd like for you to see. Also, remembering your way of ending your broadcasts, I would invite your attention to the treasury of rare quotations we run in Poor Adam's Almanack (p. 16). This monthly feature has the added advantage for yo u that it ties down each quotation not only to the author and month, but usually to the day and year, also. I'll send you separately a calendar of 12 of these features we once got out; it may help you when you are fishing for a word for the day.

My chief purpose in this feature is to remind our readers that the past, too, is rich and alive, and that every day in the month was a day, also, to our many benefactors who lived before us. As you will see from our enclosed policy statement in Vol. I, No. 1, I seek to give our readers more time perspective.

With best regards.

Clarence

Clarence Streit

Streit, Clarence

March 19-2021

March 10, 1952

Dear Mr. Streit:

Mr. Murrow left last night for California and has asked me to tell you in his absence that he will be delighted to see you when you are in New York next week. At the moment however, there is a possibility that he will be in Texas and his plans will not be definite until he returns from the Coast on Friday of this week.

He asked if you would call him when you arrive and if he is here we shall arrange a meeting.

Sincerely yours,

Dorothy McDonough
Secretary to Mr. Murrow

Mr. Clarence Streit
Federal Union
700 Ninth Street N.W.
Washington 1, D.C.

FEDERAL UNION
INCORPORATED IN 1940

Publishers of the Illustrated Monthly FREEDOM & UNION

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700 NINTH STREET N. W. WASHINGTON 1, D. C. DISTRICT 4171

February 29, 1952

Mr. Edward Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting Station
481 Madison Ave., New York

Dear Ed:

Recalling gratefully that CBS was the first to put me on the air in 1939 - as early as February, when I made my first Union Now lecture at Swarthmore before the book was published officially in March, I think you will be pleased by the attached draft of a "13-Year Report to Readers of Union Now," telling of the immense progress we have made in that period.

We have tentatively set March 17 as the release date, but may make it later in the month.

I hope this report will inspire you to think of some good way to give it radio and television publicity. I would be glad to adapt it and give it as a talk over the air. I still have a recording of that 1939 CBS broadcast if you want to draw on it.

I would, of course, warmly welcome your personal reaction to the report, and any suggestions for its improvement. It is a long time since we have had a talk; I hope I may see you when I am next in New York - March 19, 20, 21.

A booklet of recent messages about our magazine and work is also attached.

With warmest regards, I remain

Sincerely,

Clarence

Clarence Streit

March-29/10

CKS.ea

P.S. Miss Marjorie Bennett, director of our Speakers Bureau at 537 Fifth Avenue, New York, MU 2-3492, will be glad to cooperate whenever you need good speakers on international federation, freedom, or Atlantic Community affairs.

Yes ordered

FROM THE EDITOR

February 22, 1952.

Dear Ed:

As an old newspaperman, I'm very proud of the enclosure - and of the fact that nearly all those cited are paid 3-year subscribers, though they could get press copies free. I'll be still prouder if you join them.

Financing Freedom & Union is so hard that we do need more paid subscribers . . . and especially welcome 3-year ones. They most help this non-profit enterprise to produce a magazine ever more useful to those who need to be behind the news . . . and ahead of it.

Consider how far the free have gone our way since 1948 - when there wasn't even an Atlantic Pact. Isn't the possibility of achieving Atlantic Union by 1955 big enough to merit the regular watching that only 3-year subscriptions assure? Please use the enclosed slip while it's at hand, to encourage us with a three, two, or one-year lift.

Sincerely,

Clarence

Clarence Streit

Freedom & Union

MAGAZINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD

Editor, CLARENCE K. STREIT Associate Editor, HERBERT AGAR

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HON. OWEN J. ROBERTS
RUSSELL W. DAVENPORT

700 NINTH STREET NW WASHINGTON 1 DC DISTRICT 4171

Leading Editors, Publishers, Correspondents

Speak of FREEDOM & UNION

W. W. WAYMACK, former editor, Des Moines Register, former U.S. Atomic Energy Commissioner: I consider Freedom & Union, now five years old, an excellent, important and even indispensable contribution to thinking on what is obviously the central task of our time.

SEVELLON BROWN, editor, Providence Journal: I recall well our discussion of the project before you launched Freedom & Union and I warned you what a costly and difficult undertaking it was, for I was once a magazine publisher. But you have turned the trick,and Freedom & Union has made an outstanding contribution to the democratic world.

ERWIN CANHAM, editor, Christian Science Monitor: Many of us are overwhelmed by the present. We must look ahead. And there is no organ more realistically and effectively looking ahead than Freedom & Union.

ARTHUR KROCK, chief Washington correspondent, N.Y. Times: Whatever progress humanity has made toward enduring world order is due to the unselfish efforts of men like Clarence Streit. When he writes, "Danger and difficulty have always been the bread and butter of the soul," he unconsciously pens his own epitaph - one to engender pride in disciples and hope in the oppressed and endangered.

CARROLL BINDER, editor of editorial page, Minneapolis Tribune: Freedom & Union is performing an invaluable service for all who care about freedom with security and justice. It makes available information and opinions about developments in that direction which are not to be found within the covers of any other periodical. More power to it.

EDWARD J. MEEMAN, editor, Memphis Press-Scimitar: Every year of the existence of Freedom & Union has made more clear the need of it. It lifts the torch by which we can find our path.

WHITELAW REID, editor, N.Y. Herald Tribune: I have found much of its material provocative and useful in thinking.

FORREST W. SEYMOUR, editor of editorial pages, Des Moines Register and Tribune: It must be clear to any reasonable and practical man that a larger measure of political unity within the democratic world is the real hope - indeed, the only immediate hope. Freedom & Union is making this hope articulate and keeping it aflame. Tens of thousands of us are relying upon you to carry on.

"For the great Republic, for the principle it lives by and keeps alive, for man's vast future" – Lincoln

HAROLD HINTON, Washington correspondent, N.Y. Times: Its high literary quality, coupled with its intellectual prodding to us all, is what I would have expected of Clarence Streit and his distinguished collaborators.

HERBERT ELLISTON, editor, Washington Post: I turn to Freedom & Union with great interest every month.

MARSHALL FIELD, JR., editor and publisher, Chicago Sun-Times: Many congratulations on the fine job you are doing.

MANCHESTER BODDY, publisher, Los Angeles Daily News: Founding a new magazine is one of the most difficult undertakings in the whole realm of communications. To bring one to robust, effective maturity as you have done with Freedom & Union in the short space of five years is little short of miraculous.

ERNEST LINDLEY, Washington correspondent, Newsweek: You have been a trail-blazer for a good many years now.

FRANK AHLGREN, editor, Memphis Commercial Appeal: I can hardly believe Freedom & Union is only five years old. Its dynamic force seems to have been a part of the publishing picture for a longer period than that.

JOHN H. CRIDER, editor, Boston Herald: No great idea, however remote of fulfilment, has ever captured the minds of men or, indeed, even survived without the bold and courageous championing by a true believer. I have watched Clarence Streit fight this battle from the time he returned from Geneva not too cynical from the failure of one of man's great hopes to embrace another, even bolder dream. Freedom & Union has reflected the great zeal with which its editor pursues his goal.

LANSING WARREN, Paris correspondent, N.Y. Times: Freedom & Union is becoming indispensable to one who is directly occupied with international affairs.

THOMAS L. ROBINSON, publisher, Charlotte (N.C.) News: I believe the best testimonial to the success of your far-sighted policy is the progress toward a federal union of the free since that first edition of the magazine appeared. Atlantic Union has become a household word, thanks largely to the efforts of your magazine.

FRED C. CHRISTOPHERSON, editor, Sioux Falls (S.D.) Argus-Leader: Congratulations to Freedom & Union for distinguished leadership in the promotion of humanity's finest ideals.

DAVID ROBERTS, travel editor, Cincinnati Enquirer: An excellent job throughout. In my opinion it has done more than any other single enterprise to join together and concentrate support for the idea of a democracy of free nations.

PAUL C. SMITH, editor, San Francisco Chronicle: May this challenging magazine continue to get its message across to an ever-widening circle of citizens.

* * *

Freedom & Union

"For the Great Republic, for the Principle it Lives by and Keeps Alive, for Man's Vast Future."—LINCOLN.

Vol. 6, No. 9 OCTOBER, 1951

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COVER: CANADIAN NAT'L FILM BOARD

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Indexed in "Public Affairs Information Service"

[*On Second Thought*]

Five Years Back and Ahead

FIVE YEARS AGO FREEDOM & UNION began. Let us now look back, and ahead.

*

This magazine was born to explore, develop, apply practically, teach and disseminate the way of life embodied in its name.

*

The individual and society—what is their true relation? How are they to be fitted best together; practically, theoretically? This is man's eternal basic problem, all the way from the cave to the cosmos. He faces it in the two sexes and the family they form, in the tribe, the nation, and the eventual world republic.

*

Union without freedom is tyranny, and has always been tyranny, from the cave family through to totalitarian communism. But to seek to save freedom without union is to betray it to its other enemy, anarchy.

*

Freedom *and* union together—that is the thing.

*

Taken separately, human freedom and human union are two gods doomed to devour the men who worship each alone.

*

To see freedom and union not as two irreconcilables, but as a couple, as two great truths to be married freely and fruitfully—this is the way of life that leads to man's vast future. It is the mother lode of more and more golden ages. It is the philosophy that FREEDOM & UNION was named for, and means to make ever clearer and more practical in the years to come.

In the period since we began championing Atlantic Union as the great practical application of its philosophy today, what strides have been made toward this goal! We already have an Atlantic Pact, an Atlantic Council, and an Atlantic Command headed by the man most sought in both parties for the U.S. Presidency.

*

And now, on the eve of our fifth anniversary, comes the Ottawa declaration of intention to develop Atlantic unity in the non-military fields, the basic importance of which we have always stressed—and talk of federation.

*

When we started, even the Atlantic area deemed it much more important to peace that a nation should profess to be "peace-loving" than that it should love freedom, and practice it.

*

Many in 1946 considered the world community so advanced that the Acheson-Baruch Plan for a U.N. atomic authority still held the stage as the practical thing to push, despite Soviet hostility. There seemed little evidence that people then recognized even the existence of any community of spirit or of special interest among the democracies of the North Atlantic.

* * *

On this page in October 1946, we cited George Washington's "high idea of the utility of periodical publications," and added:

"Men far less burdened than Washington complain now that there are too many magazines. . . . And yet, how many magazines today take for their special field the one that made George Washington desire them spread throughout the land of the free . . . the prob-

lem, the conflict, the cause of liberty and union?

"There is no end of periodicals that aim to stimulate industry, engineering, science. Not a few seek to improve morals or to inform the mind with facts and figures. . . . But in all the multiplicity of magazines, how many do you find devoted principally to information, opinion or discussion of the principles of freedom and union? . . .

"Since 1788 the principles of liberty and union have spread far beyond the strip of western Atlantic coast they then held. They now rule democracies all around the North Atlantic . . . Scandinavia, the far-flung British Commonwealth, Eire, Holland, Belgium, France, Switzerland. They have made that central waterway what the Mediterranean was in the time of Rome, the civilizing sea. The creative energy that liberty releases has led the men of this new Atlantis to invent many marvels. From their sea of civilization steamships, railways, motorcars, airplanes and electrical instruments have spread around the globe, and made, they say, the whole world one.

"In many ways the world, of course, is now only on its way to being one. Not only to each other are the Abyssinians, Afghans, and Albanians still remote. For some time to come they and many others will be neighbors by virtue of the alphabet rather than the airplane.

"If there is any area where a group of nations already forms one world, enough to give some solid hope that they might possibly succeed in forming freely an effective common government, the nucleus of the future world republic, that area is that one that rims the Atlantic. Here lies the Atlantis that is not lost, that has not yet found itself, that is a community already but not yet a state. . . .

"The land of the free is divided in a dozen Atlantic countries, but no magazine today concentrates on serving liberty and union even through this area, seeks to speed the step from community to country even here . . . reaches one in 10,000 of the small fraction of mankind that has known freedom for a generation, even 30 years."

*

To meet this urgent need was another reason why F&U was born five years ago . . . on the 170th anniversary of constitutional free speech.

*

Like William Lloyd Garrison, we came "determined to be heard," but no less resolved to seek to remain as broad-minded, fair, and good-humored as Lincoln in our "firmness in the right."

*

Financially, we began "on a shoestring," to scale mountainous obstacles. But politically, morally, spiritually, we began among "them thar hills" where there is much more gold than mining, or prospecting.

*

Some of our many friends in the publishing world to whom we turned for expert advice before launching F&U, shook their heads at our "temerity" in starting a new magazine under any circumstances . . . but advised us very helpfully.

*

We have never ceased to benefit from labors of love—and not only from contributors like Count Sforza, the Italian Cabinet Minister, who, when we asked him for the article that appears on page 28, wrote it "as my contribution of labor and love to your magazine. I do not expect anything else but your lasting friendship."

*

We have profited too from labors of love by subscribers who got and gave other subscriptions (and still do)—thus rescuing us from the magazine-killing cost of building up circulation—by staff members who helped in many ways to make both ends meet for F&U, and by many others.

*

In friends, too, we began not with a shoestring but with a string of pearls, an endless string of pearls.

*

We wish we could express our gratitude to each of our friends. Without them, this non-profit enterprise would have gone to join all the other magazines born in the past five years—some with resources we envied—which are no more.

*

When it suddenly dawned on us that F&U would be five years old, it was too late to ask all our readers and friends to help us mark this anniversary with their comment. And so we invited a representative group of them to do so.

*

A number of Cabinet members, high military officers, party leaders, business and organization executives, and others whose names we would like to mention replied with private messages. To quote one world-known figure: "You may be certain that I shall continue to read your magazine with interest. I prefer, however, that my name should not be associated with any private publication, in view of my position as ———."

*

With gratitude and pride we present in the following pages some of the comment sent us for publication.

*

Spurred by this evidence that F&U has been of some influence on events and men in its infant years, we shall continue in the momentous years ahead to carry on the spirit of the American, English, and French Revolutions. That spirit put man above the state, linked law with liberty, equality, fraternity, created the Bill of Rights, produced representative democratic government, constituted the federal union answer to the interstate problem, challenged the Divine Right of absolute sovereignty with the concept of citizen sovereignty, and has already raised the standards of human life far beyond the level that once made kings majestic.

*

That spirit has been overthrowing autocrats for generations. We mean to do our bit to help it overthrow the totalitarian tyrants of today, without another world war.

*

On the basis of the solid progress achieved in the past five years by our principles and practical policies, and of something still more solid—our faith in the philosophy of freedom *and* union—we are confident that in the next five years the Atlantic democracies will cross the Rubicon separating alliance and federation, war and peace. In 1956 may we be living in the Union of the Free, the nucleus of the eventual Republic of Man.—CLARENCE STREIT.

Reprinted from October, 1951, Freedom & Union. Subscription rates: $4 a year, $7 for two years, $10 for three years.

Streit Clarence
(not included in Griffin Index)

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
485 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

September 24, 1947

Dear Clarence:

Forgive me for the delay in answering yours of August 31st; I have been on vacation.

I wish that I might write the comment you request, but the fact of the matter is that I am starting next Monday two broadcasts a day—one at 7:45 p.m. and the other at 12:45 a.m.—and I simply have no choice but to devote such energy and reading as I can possibly achieve to that series of broadcasts. I am sure you understand and I hope that you will give me a chance to see you when you come to New York again.

Like always,

Mr. Clarence Streit
Freedom & Union
700 Ninth Street NW
Washington 1, D.C.

Freedom & Union

JOURNAL OF THE WORLD REPUBLIC

Editor, CLARENCE K. STREIT • *Associate Editor,* HERBERT AGAR

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HARRIS WOFFORD, JR.

700 NINTH STREET NW • WASHINGTON 1, DC DISTRICT 4171

August 31, 1947

Dear Ed,

I would greatly appreciate this favor:

We are planning to publish in pamphlet form the series we have just concluded, "Free Enterprise Makes for Peace." To our knowledge, no other work shows, as this does, that the Marxist line that capitalism inevitably means war and marxism means peace is the reverse of the truth.

We wish to include in the pamphlet some comment that will help get it read more widely by men of your influence. If you have been reading this series as it appeared in Freedom & Union, and if you believe your friends should read it, please say why in a sentence or two that we can quote.

We enclose a couple of papers from the series to refresh your mind. If you haven't read the series and wish to see the whole thing, we shall be glad to send you the other papers.

An early reply will be extremely helpful.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Clarence

Clarence Streit

Mr. Edward Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
481 Madison Ave.
New York, N.Y.

[Freedom's Crisis]

Free Enterprise Makes For Peace

FREE ENTERPRISE has one powerful argument in its favor that few of its advocates seem to see: It is much more conducive to peace than is the alternative, communism, or even democratic socialism.

In this respect especially the free need to learn that individual liberty is essential to the achievement of their ideal of peace. They can be counted on to cling to their other liberties as being good in themselves.. But they tend increasingly to regard individual liberty in the economic field both as an evil in itself and as a positive danger to peace.

Yet the more one studies free enterprise & marxism in relation to world peace, the more essential the former seems—at least at the present stage of world development—and the more dangerous appears the trend toward the latter. One of the greatest forces behind this trend is hunger for peace. Broadly & deeply humanitarian in their make-up, the idealists who have always dominated the leadership of western socialism are sincerely convinced that capitalism inevitably means war, and socialism peace.

Perhaps they have come to believe it so unquestioningly because their adversaries have questioned it so little themselves. They have preferred to attack socialism as inefficient and defend the profit system as more productive. They have talked initiative, incentive, opportunity. These things, as James Parton remarks in a stimulating article in *Export Trade and Shipper,* "mean little to Europe's masses," have none of the glamor of the marxist catchwords, "full employment," "security," "peace." Yet the greatest of these is peace, and—whatever may be true of the other two—free enterprise has the best of this argument.

Why does socialism, despite the pacific ideals of its supporters, make for war more than free enterprise? One key to the answer may be found in that favorite socialistic term, *nationalization.*

Marxists do not talk of the internationalization or worldization of coal mines, steel mills, or anything. They cannot aim at such objectives first, because there is no world or even international government. They cannot possibly start the socialist experiment with world ownership of the means of production, or even international ownership of any one industry. The prerequisite to British ownership of railways was the existence of the United Kingdom government. Were Scotland & England still two kingdoms, there could only be today Scottish ownership & English ownership of railways.

The marxists insist that the economic determines everything. They overlook the fact that the possibility of establishing any marxist economy is itself determined by a purely political factor—the existence & confines of government. Socialism being possible only within the limits of a sovereign state, and the world being divided now into a quantity of national states, the socialists in each of them are inexorably driven to nationalize.

Whatever nationalization may mean in jobs, efficiency, production or distribution of wealth, it is bound to mean arming the national government with new powers. The aim, of course, is to use these powers to benefit all the people of the nation. But it is very hard to do this without using them *against* others.

EVEN WHERE it is not merely the intention to bring the economy of a nation under the direct control of its citizens by nationalizing it, but where the strongest practical guarantees exist, as in Britain, that the citizens will remain free to exercise this control, the danger of the state using its powers nationalistically against others remains.

One instance may show why. Suppose that the British nationalize their automobile industry, which cannot compete with American automobiles except with the help of tariffs & subsidies. What British party would then dare seek office by opposing these? What candidate would lay himself open to the charge of ruining an industry, however artificial, when all the voters—and not merely a few greedy "profiteers"—owned it? Who will oppose measures directed against foreigners that are "needed" to preserve "full employment," when the voters are not only workers in but owners of the industry threatened?

All the arguments in favor of raising barriers to imports and subsidizing or dumping exports become far stronger when the industry passes from private to national ownership. They increase in power with every industry nationalized.

Not all nationalization, of course, affects foreign relations. Nationalization of the British railways, for example, doesn't. It is only where an industry has strong outside competitors, or depends for survival on its exports, or on imports of raw materials, that its nationalization involves dangers to peace. Far from eliminating the competition for markets and for control of sources of supply which occurs under private ownership and—the marxists say—leads to war, nationalization of such industries merely makes this competition more certain & more dangerous. It wraps it thereafter directly in the national flag, changes it from a dubious to a very legitimate matter of governmental concern, charges it highly with emotion, feeds it with all the prejudice & passion of previous wars, and keeps it constantly armed not only militarily, but with all the nation's economic, monetary, financial & political power.

THE COMPETITION of free enterprise can also, of course, lead to war—but only by an industry getting the government to fight for its interests. While this can happen under free enterprise, it is bound to result under socialism. Far from removing the real danger in international economic competition, socialism makes it certain & constant.

However democratic socialism might be once a world government exists, to attempt to make socialism precede world government is to destroy both the freedom & the peace that its advocates seek to gain. So long as the world is divided into sovereign nations, the establishment of socialism must make for war, rather than for freedom, peace & international government. For it divides the world into nations more abysmally than ever, gives each nation more direct cause for conflict with others, and arms it with more means of fighting them. By comparison, free enterprise with all its faults is much to be preferred by those who seek to develop internationalization.

This brief article, of course, merely scratches the surface of a fearfully neglected field. But the importance of free enterprise to peace will become only clearer as we go deeper.

—COMMON SENSE, JR.

(*To be continued*)

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Subscription: $4 a Year

[Freedom's Crisis]

Free Enterprise Makes for Peace

V — A SUBSTITUTE FOR WAR

ONE OF THE many unremarked ways in which free enterprise makes for peace is the relatively safe outlet that it gives to power-hungry men. The love of power leads to war more than does the love of profit.

It has often been noted that business competition under free enterprise, particularly under extreme *laissez faire,* is much like war. Those who deplore this are usually the kind who also lament the lack of a peaceful outlet for man's pugnacious spirit. They overlook the fact that free enterprise is itself a substitute for war.

So long as men hunger for personal power, society must provide them with some safe form of satisfaction. Regulated free enterprise provides not only the safest but the most productive answer. With all its faults, it does allow an infinite number of outlets for ambitious, domineering, dictatorial-minded men. This type is as certain to exist in any country, America or Russia, and in any society, Christian or Moslem, *laissez faire* or Marxist, as is the kindly, tolerant saint.

Despite the excesses of the lords of *laissez faire,* the English prospered more when the ambitious worked off their energies in business competition than when feudal lords fought the Wars of the Roses. What would have happened to the American experiment in Federal Union had political power been the only outlet for the "ruthless business barons?" Thanks to the opportunities given them by free enterprise, they left us railroads, steel mills, pipelines—not cities ruined by war.

The freer a government keeps economic enterprise—and that means checking monopoly power—the more the ambitious will be drawn to this field. Here they cancel each other out and spend their energies vying to get more profit by making cheaper, better, goods.

What happens when the major economic outlets for ambition are removed and all power is centered in the state, as the Marxists urge? Inevitably, the attention of the most dangerously ambitious men is glued on the one big prize available—control and increase of the state's monopoly of power. Men who might have contented themselves with trying to monopolize steel and then coal, seek to dictate to the nation, and its neighbors. Conspiracy to restrain trade gives way to conspiracy to overthrow the dictator, and foreign governments. Result: civil and foreign war.

So it was in the centuries before Turgot, when each feudal state governed absolutely the economy of its serfs. So it is now, in the all-out Marxist state. The first victim in Stalin's purges in the '30s was the Marxist theory that Marxism is the way to peace. Multiply the Stalin-Trotsky struggle sixty-fold, envenom it with nationalistic prejudices, raise the prize to world power for a world Stalin. Then you begin to see what it would mean to peace if every nation scrapped that substitute for war—free enterprise.

—COMMON SENSE JR.

(To be continued)

"Laissez. . .faire"

ANNE ROBERT TURGOT

Born France May 10, 1727

M. DE GOURNAY, FORGOTTEN author of the celebrated maxim, *laissez faire, laissez passer* (let goods be made freely, let them pass freely through frontiers), was born in May 1712, and died in 1759. Many of his principles were put in practice by his great disciple, Turgot, though even he failed in his efforts to establish free trade between the French provinces.

Now it is the fashion to misinterpret *laissez faire,* turn from the extreme of business bossing government back to that of government bossing business, and restore on a huger scale the evils that kept mankind poor before Turgot began to free private enterprise. Here are the conditions in France and Europe that led to the cry, "Laissez faire!"—as pictured by Turgot in his eulogy of de Gournay:

"M. de Gournay had not imagined . . . that, in a kingdom where the succession to the crown itself had been established only by custom and where the death sentence was still left to the judge's discretion, the government would deign to regulate by specific law the length, width and number of threads in each piece of cloth.

"Nor had he imagined it would fill four volumes in quarto with such important details—plus any number of statutes dictated by a spirit of monopoly whose sole object was to discourage industry and concentrate trade in a few hands by multiplying its formalities and expense, requiring 10-year apprenticeships in trades that could be learned in 10 days, excluding from them those . . . born outside certain limits, forbidding the employment of women in the making of cloth, etc.

"He had not imagined that all the cities in a kingdom ruled by one prince would look on each other as enemies, forbid employment within their walls to certain Frenchmen whom they called *foreigners,* prevent the sale and free passage of goods from a neighboring province—fight for trivial interests against the general welfare of the State. He was no less astonished to see the government busy itself with regulating the price of each commodity. . . .

"These principles [of his] which are called a 'new system' seemed to him merely maxims of the simplest common sense. All his so-called *system* was based on this maxim, that in general every man knows his own interest better than does another man to whom this interest means nothing at all. From this, M. de Gournay concluded that when the interest of individuals is precisely the same as the general interest the best thing to do is to leave each man free to make what he wishes (*laissez* chaque homme libre de *faire* ce qu'il veut). . . .

"M. de Gournay concluded that the only objective of the Administration should be . . . to give all branches of commerce the precious freedom they had lost through the prejudices of centuries of ignorance, the tendency of government to favor particular interests, and a misguided desire for perfection."

[Forum of Freedom]

How Can We Prevent World War III?

THE FOUR LEADING VETERANS GROUPS GIVE THEIR ANSWERS

As the month of May brings back Memorial Day . . . who has a better right than veterans to be heard on how to prevent another war? And so Freedom & Union put this question to the American Legion, American Veterans Committee, American Veterans World War II, and Veterans of Foreign Wars. We believe this is the first time their programs for peace have been presented in a forum.

Paul H. Griffith

National Commander, American Legion

THE AMERICAN Legion's formula for the prevention of World War III lies in an American "Peace Through Strength" program.

It means strength in fighting power; strength in firmness of foreign policy, and strength in Americanism in the national dedication to the American ideals of freedom, justice and opportunity for all.

The backbone of the "Peace Through Strength" program must be the nation's preparedness to cope with any eventuality. In an atomic age, such preparedness must include universal military training for national security. This nation must at all times be possessed of youth trained in the scientific, technical and specialist know-how of modern warfare because future national defense must be geared to repel potential lightning-like attacks. There never again will be time to prepare to fight if sudden attack comes. The new weapons of warfare have given offense a tremendous head start. Defense must be brought up to date. It cannot be done overnight. The nation that is not ready to fight in the next war never will have a chance to fight.

Universal military training is designed to give the nation's young men the rudiments of scientific defense which they never would have time to learn if another war should catch them unprepared. This training, therefore, is not only the best insurance for the nation's security but also the best insurance for its young men to survive modern combat.

With such universal training as the basis of future national security, and with the maintenance of an adequate armed force, America also can bring its most effective contribution toward making the United Nations an organization that eventually could close the door forever on future wars. The U.N. can not succeed unless it is backed in its cradle days by an America strong enough to make effective her desire for peace.

It is idle to talk of a firm foreign policy, a waste of breath to condemn appeasement, unless the nation's policy is backed by strength. We never will be able to say what we mean at international conference tables unless we can mean what we say. We can give meaning to our words only by having a military punch behind them.

We also should continue to maintain all-out support of the U.N., with this nation subscribing to a foreign policy which is neither hostile nor subservient to any power on earth—and which scorns appeasement.

—Chase-Statler Photo

Comdr. Griffith: Peace by strength

Once the U.N. is firmly entrenched, once the family of nations is in accord on handling international disputes, once peace is guaranteed, then we can turn toward relaxing our military guard. Until that day arrives, it would be pure folly to rely on diplomatic phraseology to preserve the peace, or to forestall another world war.

Finally, we must have a rebirth of fundamental Americanism in this country. We must as a nation and as individuals go back to the [illegible] of our founding fathers in freedom, justice and equality of opportunity for all. On this foundation our nation has grown to be the greatest and most prosperous in all history. We need to build up the bulwarks of our way of life to repel the tide of foreign philosophies assailing our shores. By ridding ourselves of such un-American elements as Communism, Nazism, Fascism, Nipponism and every other foreign "ism," we can present a solid American front against war and for enduring peace with justice and liberty for all.

Charles G. Bolte

Chairman, American Veterans Committee

THE AMERICAN Veterans Committee (AVC) as an organization of veterans of the second World War is vitally concerned with the problem of preventing a third World War. AVC's fundamental views on the foreign policy of our country were set forth by the delegates to its first national convention last June. They adopted by a virtually unanimous vote an international affairs platform which provided: "As veterans we know that without world peace and understanding we cannot reach our other goals. We support a strong United Nations as the basis for world understanding. We recognize that the unity of the Big Three is essential to a strong U.N. We believe in the development of world government through the U.N. . . ."

Today, nine months after these words were written, it is apparent that the U.N.

Streit, Clarence

Freedom & Union

700 NINTH STREET, NW WASHINGTON 1, DC TELEPHONE: DISTRICT 4171

May 4, 1948

Dear Ed,

You helped create Freedom & Union with your Charter subscription more than a year ago, and I trust you have been pleased with it, and with all the progress it has made toward one of its goals - an Atlantic Union of the Free. As this idea becomes practical politics and enters increasingly into the news in coming months, Freedom & Union will have an increasingly valuable service to perform. No other magazine has its background in this field.

We don't like to lose a Charter subscriber, least of all yourself, just when we can give more value for your money - and will need your subscription as much as ever. (I'm sure I don't need to convince you that it takes more than one year to get a new magazine on its feet.) I like to think that this will bring us your renewal. Certainly, I would greatly appreciate your continued encouragement.

Sincerely,

Clarence

Clarence Streit

mac - photo renew
CBS. change

P.S. A number of friends are renewing for three years at our special $10 rate, which saves a lot of bother - and is most helpful to us. If we advance as much in that period as we have since 1945, what satisfaction they and we shall have in 1951! May I share it with you, too?

You will be interested to know that Chairman Eaton has just invited me to testify May 12 at the hearings on the structure of the U.N. and U.S. relations to it that the House Committee on Foreign Affairs is holding.

Ed Sullivan

July 8, 1960

Mr. Ed Sullivan
502 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Sullivan:

As Mr. Murrow will be away for the whole of this month at the political conventions, I am answering your letter to him concerning the Boys' Club Pro-Celebrity Day in his stead.

Mr. Murrow has unfortunately strained a tendon in his hand and has been told to give it a long rest. In the circumstances, I regret that he will be unable to join you on August 8.

Yours sincerely,

Sheila Hogg
Secretary to Mr. Murrow

ED SULLIVAN
502 PARK AVE.
NEW YORK CITY

July 7, 1960

Dear Edward:

I hope no news is good news! Haven't heard from you relative to your playing in the Boys' Club Pro-Celebrity Day, August 8th at The Huntington Crescent Club, Huntington, L.I., N.Y., benefit Boys' Club of Queens.

Not much hope for a successful event if you are unavailable. 50 top pros of the P.G.A. will be on hand; tee off from one tee only with ten minute intervals between foursomes. Please try and make it. Let me know!

Sincerely,

Ed

ED SULLIVAN
502 PARK AVE.
NEW YORK CITY

June 30, 1960

Dear Edward:

This year, our Boys' Club Pro-Celebrity-Day will be held on Monday, August 8th, at The Huntington Crescent Club, Huntington, L.I., N.Y.

I sincerely hope your schedule will permit you to play. Your pro will be one of the top 50 money-winners of the P.G.A. tour.

All proceeds are going to The Boys' Club of Queens.

Please try to come. The prestige of your appearance will do much to make the tournament an overwhelming success.

Sincerely,

Ed

Personal
Sullivan, Ed

May 11, 1959

Dear Ed:

I try never to remember Christmas. It is a crass, commercial, depressing holiday. I have no memories of any Christmas worth recounting and, if I did try to do it, they would be of such a nature that no publisher would print them. Sorry.

As ever yours,

ERM:skh

Mr. Ed Sullivan
502 Park Avenue
New York City.

ED SULLIVAN
502 PARK AVE.
NEW YORK CITY

May 7, 1959

Dear Ed,

Could you do me a tremendous favor, in a hurry?

That's a fine way to start a letter, but ---

I'm doing a Christmas book for McGraw-Hill and I'd like to have you rush me a particular Christmas holiday recollection of your own - either when you were a youngster or, perhaps, a Christmas experience in your broadcasting career. It would be credited, of course, to you.

This means a great deal to me and I would appreciate it deeply.

Sincerely,

Ed

ES/db

Sullivan, Ed

CBS TELEVISION

A Division of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

485 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 22, NEW YORK · PLAZA 1-2345

Office of
MARLO LEWIS
Executive Producer

March 16th

Dear Ed:

A personal word of thanks for attending the Friars testimonial to our Ed.

Best as always,

Marlo

Mr. Ed Murrow
CBS
485 Madison Av.
New York City

Special Program
(Ed Sullivan)

CBS TELEVISION

A Division of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

485 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK 22, NEW YORK · PLAZA 1-2345

Office of
MARLO LEWIS
Executive Producer

October 17th

1

Dear Ed:

I presume that you've heard from many quarters how well last night's interview went with our Ed and I just wanted to add my own enthusiastic praise to the list.

Best regards,

Marlo

P.S. You, too, savor words like W.C. -- And how wonderful it is to hear them!

Mr. Ed Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

Sullivan Ed

CBS NEWS

Office Communication

to: Ed Sullivan

from: Edward R. Murrow

August 20, 1958

Dear Ed,

I have a strong feeling that God is indifferent to television, but I will do it if you want me to. What do we talk about? Why don't you come over to Quaker Hill one day next week to play our little nine-hole golf course and we will think up profound thoughts. The telephone number is Pawling, Ulysses 5-6202.

CBS NEWS

Office Communication

to: Edward R. Murrow

from: Ed Sullivan

August 18, 1958

Dear Ed,

The network has proposed that on Sunday, September 21, our show be used as a springboard or representation of the exciting fall schedule on the CBS TV Network.

While the network and I are well aware that you hardly need any advance publicity, Edward, naturally I'd love to have you on our September 21 show, for my own selfish purposes. I'd like to do the interview type of thing that was done so successfully by you before. So please, Edward, remembering our old foxhunting days together, say yes. Otherwise you have put me in a hell of a situation and God will not forget it.

Your loving uncle

ED

(Dictated to Sheila Hogg)

Date September 16, 1958

Mr. Ed Sullivan
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

I hereby agree to render my artistic and professional services on "THE ED SULLIVAN SHOW", a television show advertising Lincoln-Mercury & Eastman Kodak products and/or services, to be broadcast over such television facilities as you may elect, on the following terms and conditions:

Date(s) and Time(s) of Performance: 9/21/58 8:00 - 9:00 PM

Rehearsal: To be advised

Dress or Costume: OWN

Compensation: TWO HUNDRED AND TEN DOLLARS AND NO CENTS. ($210.00) Payable to: EDWARD R. MURROW

In full payment for my services and the rights and privileges granted you hereunder, you shall pay me the compensation specified on the face hereof not later than 10 days after the work week during which my services will have been rendered, subject to the deduction of such taxes and withholdings as are authorized or required by law. There shall be no obligation on your part to produce or broadcast the program or to use my services or materials, if any.

Additional terms: I will render my best services in this engagement and at rehearsals and will abide by all reasonable rules and regulations of the sponsor, its advertising agencies, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., and the producer of the program. You, the sponsors and their advertising agencies may open and answer mail addressed to me relating to the program, provided that all such mail relating to me and intended for me, or copies thereof, shall be turned over to me within a reasonable length of time.

I agree that from three weeks prior to my contracted date of appearance on THE ED SULLIVAN SHOW, I shall not appear, perform, or render any services in connection with any other television program; nor shall I render any services of permit the use of my name or likeness during this period, in connection with any radio program, or any other activity which advertises or promotes any products or services competitive to the products or services of the sponsor above-named. I agree that for a period of seven (7) days following my engagement hereunder, I will notappear, perform, or render any services in connection with any other television program, provided however, that if my compensation for this engagement shall be less than $500.00, the provisions of this paragraph shall be applicable only during the actual rehearsal and broadcast period.

The program hereunder may be originally broadcast either live or by recording over the facilities arranged by and for you. The term "recording" as used here in shall mean and include any recording or recordings made, whether before or during a broadcast transmission, by electrical transcription, tape recording, wire recording, film, motion picture film, or any other similiar or dissimiliar method of recording television programs, or parts thereof, whether now known or hereafter developed. Your right to make such recordings shall be without any obligation on your part to pay me any additional compensation. All recordings, as between you and me, shall be and remain your sole property with full right in you and your assigns to broadcast, license to be broadcast and/or exhibit in

any media and recordings and excerpts therefrom at any time and from time to time for purpose of file, reference, audition, sales, promotion and publicity, and for delayed, repeat and supplemental broadcast purposes, provided, however, that the broadcast and/or exhibition of said recordings for delayed, repeat and supplemental purposes shall be subject to the restrictions contained in the AFTRA Code in effect at the time such recording is made, except as AFTRA may otherwise permit in writing. I will, if required by you, for any reason whatever, re-enact the performance, in whole or in part, in connection with any recording of all or any portion of the program (which you may deem desirable) , provided that such reenactment of my performance shall take place within seven days after the original breaccast of the program at a time which does not conflict with any other bonafide commitments, and provided, further, that you shall pay for my services in connection with such reenactment such additional compensation as may be required by the said AFTRA Code.

You, CBS, the sponsors and their advertising agencies shall have the right, and may grant to others the right, to disseminate, reproduce, print and publish my name, likeness and biographical material concerning me for publicity and promotion and for advertising and purposes of trade, but not for the endorsement of any product or service.

I shall indemnify Producer, CBS, the sponsors and their advertising agencies, and all stations broadcasting the program, or any recording against any and all claims, damages, liabilities, costs and expenses (including reasonable attorney's fees) arising out of the use of any materials, ideas, creations, and properties (herein called "material") whether or not required of me, furnished by me in connection with this engagement, and any ad libs spoken or unauthorized acts done by me in connection therewith. You shall similarly indemnify me in respect to materials furnished by you, and acts done or words spoken by me at your request. Each of us will give the other prompt notice of any such claims and/or legal proceedings (and shall send a copy of such notice to AFTRA) and shall cooperate with each other on all matters covered by this paragraph.

If this agreement requires, as an express additional provision, that I furnish materials (herein called "required materials") in connection with my performance hereunder, I shall submit such required materials to you at such time prior to performance thereof as may be reasonably designated by you, and such required materials shall, as between you and me, unless otherwise expressly provided in this agreement be and remain the property of you.

If the broadcast of any program hereunder is prevented by governmental regulation or order, or by a strike, or by failure of broadcasting facilities because of war or other calamity such as fire, earthquake, hurricane, or similar acts of God, or because of the breakdown of such broadcasting facilities due to causes beyond your reasonable control (such as the collapse of the transmitter due to structural defects), you shall be relieved of any responsibility for the payment of compensation for the program so prevented; provided that in such case Producer shall reimburse me for all out-of-pocket costs necessarily incurred in connection with such program. In addition I shall be paid the full applicable rehearsal rate for all hours rehearsed prior to notice of cancellation. The same consequences shall ensue if the program time is preempted by a Presidental broadcast and notice of cancellation for such purpose is given Performer promptly upon such notice having been received by Producer. Where the program time is preempted to broadcast an event of public importance (other than a Presidential broadcast) or where the program is cancelled or prevented for any reason other than those stated above, or where insufficient advance notice has been given under the preceding sentence, Producer shall pay Performer his full contract price for the program so cancelled or prevented.

I agree that the time and date of performance(s) and/or rehearsal(s) as scheduled above may be changed provided such change does not conflict with any of my existing contractual commitments.

Notwithstanding any provision in this agreement to the contrary, it is specifically understood and agreed by all parties hereto:
(a)That they are bound by all the terms and provisions of the applicable AFTRA CODE OF FAIR PRACTICE FOR TELEVISION BROADCASTING. Should there be any inconsistency between this agreement and the said Code of Fair Practice, the said Code shall prevail; but nothing in this provision shall affect terms, compensation, or conditions provided for in this agreement which are more favorable to members of AFTRA than the terms, compensation or conditions provided for in said Code of Fair Practice.
(b) That the artist is covered by the provisions of Paragraph 102 of said Code entitled "AFTRA Pension and Welfare Funds."
(c) That Performer is or will become a member of AFTRA in good standing, subject to and in accordance with the Union Shop provision of said Code of Fair Practice.
(d) All disputes and controversies of every kind and nature arising out of or in accordance with this agreement shall be determined by arbitration in accordance with the procedure and provisions of the said AFTRA Code of Fair Practice.

This agreement, when executed by Performer and Producer, shall constitute the entire understanding between them and shall be construed according to the laws of the State of New York applicable to contracts fully to be performed therein.

Very truly yours,

Artist

*SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 111-09-1781

ADDRESS 580 Park Avenue

New York

TEL. NO. TE 8-0508

ACCEPTED:
ED SULLIVAN

By

Personal.
Sullivan, Ed

July 2, 1958

Mr. Ed Sullivan
502 Park Avenue
New York City.

Dear Mr. Sullivan:

Thank you very much for your letter to Mr. Murrow of July 1, and the enclosed check for $199.07. I am acknowledging them in his absence, as he is on vacation and will be away until September.

Very truly yours,

Secretary to Mr. Murrow

skh

ersonal ?

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM

Office Communication

to: Mr. Seward

from: Sheila Hogg

July 2, 1958

I am enclosing for your attention a check for $199.07 received today from Ed Sullivan in connection with his anniversary show.

skh

Sullivan, Ed

ED SULLIVAN
502 PARK AVE.
NEW YORK CITY

June 13, 1958

Dear Nephew Ed,

I'm so deeply pleased with your permission to use a scene from that interview on our stage as part of our 10th Anniversary show on June 22. The thought occurred, as I went through the "kines" that apparently you are ageless. So help me, you look just the same today and, in fact, I think you are even smoking the same cigarettes - a nice bit of thrift if ever I saw one.

Give our love home.

As ever,

Ed

ES/db

ED SULLIVAN
502 PARK AVE.
NEW YORK CITY

attach to previous correspondence

June 9, 1958

THE ED SULLIVAN SHOW

Dear Ed,

With reference to our telephone conversation/telegram, as part of a 10th Anniversary celebration program to be broadcast on Sunday, June 22, 1958, we are planning to use an excerpt of a kinescope (television) recording of a performance given by you on the above program of Oct. 16, 1955.

1:00 Minute Interview -Edward R. Murrow-Ed Sullivan

We should like very much to include this excerpt of your performance on the Anniversary program, and we would appreciate it if you would indicate your consent to its use by signing and returning to us the attached carbon copy of this letter.

To give this 10th Anniversary program the importance it deserves, we also need your consent to the use of your name and likeness in publicising this broadcast.

Thank you very much for your cooperation and permission.

Sincerely,

Ed Sullivan

Ed Sullivan

I consent to the foregoing:

E R Murrow

F. 51-7/57

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.

Sullivan
Ed.

Private Wire

PLEASE READ INSTRUCTIONS BELOW BEFORE SENDING YOUR MESSAGE.

Before sending this message please be sure a letter by **REGULAR OR AIR MAIL** would not suffice. Then be brief and indicate the account number to which the message is to be charged. A letter via **REGULAR MAIL** addressed to points in Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York; the New England states, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, Washington, D. C., Montreal and Toronto, and via **AIR MAIL** to points in other states, will normally reach the addressee within a minimum of 12 hours and a maximum of 48 hours after it has been mailed from New York City.

Messages for **WBBM** and **KNX** are normally sent within an hour after receipt in the Communications Room on Mondays through Fridays; messages to other stations are normally transmitted so as to reach the addressee not later than **NOON LOCAL TIME** on the first business day following their receipt in the Communications Room, providing the teletype equipment at the receiving point is attended. Mark your message "Today" **ONLY** if faster service to these other stations is vital.

DATE MAY 27, 1958

CHARGE TO ACCOUNT NO.

Div.	Dept.	
202	550	6

TO: EDWARD R. MURROW
485/17

DEAR ED:

BECAUSE YOU HAVE CONTRIBUTED SO MUCH TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR SHOW, I'D LIKE VERY MUCH TO USE AN EXCERPT OF 1:35 IN KINESCOPE WHERE I'M INTERVIEWING YOU ABOUT YOUR FATHER ON OUR TENTH ANNIVERSARY SHOW OF JUNE 22. MAY I HAVE YOUR PERMISSION?

SINCERELY,
ED SULLIVAN

Called.

Sullivan, Ed

ED SULLIVAN
502 PARK AVE.
NEW YORK CITY

July 2, 1957

Dear Ed,

Thank you so much for permitting Mr. Nielsen to give our show that pat on the back.

Best,

Ed.

ED SULLIVAN

"TOAST OF THE TOWN"
C B S. TV, SUNDAY NIGHT

HOTEL DELMONICO
NEW YORK CITY

June 12, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
CBS
485 Madison Ave.
New York City

Dear Mr. Murrow,

On Sunday night, June 24th, Ed Sullivan celebrates his eighth anniversary on television. On your "Person-to-Person" show of June 22, would it be at all possible to say: "we want to extend congratulations to Ed Sullivan on his eighth anniversary on television, Sunday night, June 24."

Anything you can do would be deeply appreciated.

Please drop me a note at 502 Park Ave., letting me know if you could help Ed celebrate a happier TV anniversary.

Thank you very much for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Carmine

Carmine Santullo
Assistant to Ed Sullivan

Eng Part
Sullivan, Ed.

Friars TESTIMONIAL DINNER

in honor of **ED SULLIVAN**

WALDORF - ASTORIA **THURSDAY EVENING, MARCH 15th**

JOE E. LEWIS - JACK BENNY
Co-Chairmen

EDWARD ELKORT
Executive Chairman

CARL TIMIN
Co-Ordinator

Honorary Committee

GOODMAN ACE
STANLEY ADAMS
HARRY ADLER
DANIEL G. ARNSTEIN
SENATOR ALBEN W. BARKLEY
MILTON BERLE
RABBI BERNARD BIRSTEIN
JOEY BISHOP
MILTON BLACKSTONE
RAY BLOCH
JERRY BRADY
JACK J. BREGMAN
THOMAS D'ARCY BROPHY
DR. RALPH J. BUNCHE
GEORGE BURNS
SENATOR PRESCOTT BUSH
RED BUTTONS
IRVING CAESAR
JAMES CAGNEY
ADMIRAL ROBERT B. CARNEY
PHIL CHARIG
RICHARD CLARKE
MYRON COHEN
JOHN H. COLEMAN
WICK CRIDER
BING CROSBY
BENNY DAVIS
MEYER DAVIS
HARRY DELF
JACK DEMPSEY
WALT DISNEY
VINCENT DRADDY
BERNARD C. DUFFY
NAT DUNN
JOSEPH L. ECKHOUSE
JAMES A. FARLEY
BENNY FIELDS
EDDIE FISHER
FRANK M. FOLSOM
BENSON FORD
EMIL FRIEDLANDER
BERT FROHMAN
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SAMUEL GOLDWYN

January 5, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
C. B. S.
485 Madison Ave
New York City

Dear Mr. Murrow:

The Friars are honoring Ed Sullivan with a Testimonial Dinner at the Waldorf Astoria, Thursday evening, March 15th at 7 P. M.

I know you must be aware of the Testimonial Dinners that the Friars Club, over a period of 50 years have given. I perhaps, need not remind you, that they have included such men, from George M. Cohan, to Will Rogers and Caruso, et al, all the way down to our last few years, one to Jack Benny, Bob Hope, George Jessel and Martin & Lewis.

As you know these dinners have not only been delightful affairs with the attendant wide publicity and television coverage, but also serve the purpose of helping the Friars do much of their charity and welfare work.

We would deem it a great honor to have your presence on the dais, to make this occasion the most memorable and thrilling evening in the annals of Friar history.

Please write us of your acceptance.

With kind regards and best wishes, I am,

Respectfully yours,

Black tie
yes
Talk to him
Mon.

Jack Benny Joe E.

JACK BENNY - JOE E. LEWIS
Co-Chairmen

Please Make Checks payable to the FRIARS CLUB—123 West 56th Street, New York 19, N. Y.

d.

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W. R. WILKERSON
EARL WILSON
HENNY YOUNGMAN

Eng. Pace

September 12, 1955

Dear Jack:

This is merely a note to let you know that it would pleasure me greatly to be on the Honorary Committee for Ed Sullivan's Testimonial Dinner.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Jack Benny
Co-Chairman
Ed Sullivan Testimonial
Friars Club
123 West 56 Street
New York 19, New York

rh

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September 3, 1955

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
CBS, 485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

We are honoring Ed Sullivan with a spectacular Testimonial Dinner at the Waldorf Astoria, March 15, 1956.

We have assembled the outstanding names in Show Business, Industry and Arts for our Honorary Committee, and we will deem it a privilege and honor to have your name also on this Honorary Committee.

Please inform us as soon as possible as to your disposition.

The proceeds of this affair will go to the Friars Relief Fund for indigent members of the theatrical profession, as well as to Ed Sullivan's favorite charity.

With kindest personal regards, I remain

Sincerely yours,

Jack Benny

JACK BENNY
Co-Chairman

JB/wg

OK

SEE FOLDER

"SEE IT NOW"
and
CBS NEWS SPECIAL

FROM PRECINCT TO PRESIDENT

Harry S. Truman

February 2, 1958

December 26, 1972

CBS NEWS
A Division of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
524 West 57 Street
New York, New York 10019
(212) 765-4321

Dear Mrs. Horan:

In answer to your request, we are pleased to send you a transcript of our CBS NEWS SPECIAL broadcast in which you are interested. This transcript is being sent to you for your reference and review use only.

Thank you for your interest in our broadcast.

Sincerely yours,

May M. Dowell

May M. Dowell
Director of Special Projects

Mrs. Eleanor Horan
Edward R. Murrow Center
of Public Diplomacy
Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy
Tufts University
Medford, Massachusetts 02155

January 17, 1973

MMD/jh

4-B-21

TRANSCRIPT

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CBS NEWS SPECIAL

"Harry S. Truman, 1884 - 1972"

as broadcast over the

CBS TELEVISION NETWORK

Tuesday, December 26, 1972

7:30 - 8:30 PM, EST

PRODUCED BY CBS NEWS

REPORTER: Walter Cronkite

EXECUTIVE PRODUCER: Burton Benjamin

THIS IS RECYCLED PAPER

WALTER CRONKITE: Harry S. Truman, 33rd President of the United States, is dead. He entered the White House ill-prepared, humble and afraid. "If you fellows ever pray," he told reporters, "please pray for me." Years later, he reminisced with CBS News Correspondent Edward R. Murrow.

MURROW [1957]: Well, Mr. President, in a period of three months, you became President; the war in Europe ended; Japan surrendered; the nuclear age began; the United Nations was created. No man in history ever rode such a tiger in such a short time. How did you manage it? How did you keep your equilibrium?

TRUMAN: All my life, whenever it comes time to make a decision, I make it and forget about it and go to work on something else. And when these things came before me as President of the United States, I made the decision on them and went into the next thing. You never have time to stop. You've got to keep going, because there's always a decision just ahead of you that you've got to make.

CRONKITE: This hour might be called Harry S. Truman on Harry S. Truman. Much of it is in Mr. Truman's own words, based on a conversation he had in 1957 with Edward R. Murrow. Some of the conversation was broadcast in 1958, some is being broadcast tonight for the first time, in this hour on the 33rd President of the United States.

ANNOUNCER: This is a CBS NEWS SPECIAL: "Harry S. Truman, 1884-1972".

CRONKITE: Harry Truman was born in this house in Lamar, Missouri. When he was six, the family moved to Independence, where Harry grew up; worked at odd jobs; became a history buff; married his childhood sweetheart, Bess Wallace; lived in this house; and entered politics, a candidate of the Pendergast machine.

When FDR, worn down by war, died in office, his hand-picked Vice President of little experience inherited the Presidency - and the world's problems.

Peace in devastated Europe. No President had so much to do in so short a time. In his first term alone, the decisions he made altered the world. He signed the United Nations charter: first proposed at Dumbarton Oaks, later amended at Yalta to include the veto, and finally hammered out at San Francisco.

With Secretary of State James Byrnes he sailed for Europe and his first meeting with the Allied war leaders at Potsdam, Germany. Behind him, the war's topmost secret was about to be revealed. In the New Mexico desert, the first atomic bomb was soon to be exploded. At this conference to plan the peace, fateful decisions - and, in retrospect, errors - were made. Truman felt he must keep the Yalta agreements; he believe Stalin would also. Here was laid the groundwork for the Iron Curtain, a divided Germany, a divided Korea. Here Truman learned that the Alamogordo test had been successful. From here the unconditional-surrender ultimatum was issued to Japan.

When Japan ignored it, Truman decided to use the atomic bomb. Truman announced it from the cruiser Augusta on his way home from Potsdam.

TRUMAN [1945]: A short time ago, an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima and destroyed its usefulness to the enemy. We are now prepared to destroy more rapidly and completely every productive enterprise the Japanese have in any city. We shall destroy their docks, their factories and their communications. Let there be no mistake: we shall completely destroy Japan's power to make war.

CRONKITE: Three days later: a second bomb, and the war with Japan ended. Peace was signed aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. For the first time in 14 years, there was no fighting in Asia. General Douglas MacArthur was chosen by Truman to head the Japanese Occupation.

Next, in the face of open opposition by the military, Truman unified the Army, Navy and Air Force into one Department of Defense.

When Britain had to withdraw its aid from the Government of civil-war-torn Greece, Truman acted promptly. He asked Congress for - and got - $14-million to help Greece fight its Communist-led rebels, thus setting a precedent for U.S. intervention around the world to halt Communist imperialism.

Called "the greatest innovation of the 20th century," the Marshall Plan gave temporary economic aid based on each country's individual needs. It was offered to all Europe, but only the Western countries accepted. Later, Truman introduced Point Four: technical aid to underdeveloped areas.

Truman promptly recognized the newly independent state of Israel - making as many enemies among Arab partisans as friends among supporters of a Jewish state.

A new Soviet threat: all roads to Berlin, deep in the Russian Zone, were blockaded. Truman immediately ordered an airlift to supply and provision the city. The blockade and airlift lasted 11 months.

At home: political troubles. The Democratic party thought Truman could not win. But there was no other candidate.

HOUSE SPEAKER SAM RAYBURN [1948]: Harry S. Truman having received the majority of all the votes cast, I therefore declare him the Democratic nominee for President of the United States.

CRONKITE: "Give 'em hell, Harry," shouted from the crowd, set the campaign's tone.

TRUMAN: I accept the nomination. Senator Barkley and I will win this election and make these Republicans like it, don't you forget that. If you give the Republicans complete control of this government, you might just as well turn it over to the special interests and we'll start on a boom-and-bust cycle and try to go through just what we did

in the twenties and end up with a crash, which in the long run will do nobody any good but the Communists.

CRONKITE: Truman - almost alone - had no doubts. In a whistle-stop campaign, he confounded pollsters, politicians, commentators and newspapers - especially one. Mr. Truman had his moment of triumph.

TRUMAN: And along about 12:00 o'clock I happened to wake up for some reason, and the radio was turned on on the National Broadcasting Company and Mr. Kaltenborn [laughter] and Mr. Harkness were reporting the situation as it then developed. And Mr. Kaltenborn was saying, "Well, the President is a million votes ahead in the popular vote. We have yet to hear from . . ." [Laughter]

CRONKITE: In his second term, Truman signed the North Atlantic Treaty. Like Hamlet, his troubles came in battalions: Communist North Koreans invaded South Korea. Truman sent U.S. troops to the rescue as a "police action" to defend "the principles of the United Nations." Despite the beginnings of friction with General MacArthur over purpose in Korea, he flew to Wake Island that fall to discuss policy and award the General a medal for the Inchon landing maneuver which had turned the tide in Korea. But friction worsened. The question of ultimate authority was raised. Truman relieved MacArthur of duty.

For Truman, two terms were enough. By then he had made enemies among industrialists, taxpayers, Congressmen, the press, the military and the mothers of soldiers. He campaigned vigorously for Adlai Stevenson but was not surprised when Eisenhower won. He played his part in inauguration and then, with his wife and daughter Margaret, went home happily to Independence.

TRUMAN [1953]: I can't adequately express to you my appreciation for what you are doing. This is the first time I ever had the experience of being sent home in a blaze of glory.

CRONKITE: Mr. Truman was interviewed by Edward R. Murrow for the CBS News series "See It Now". It was photographed at Amorada [sic - should be Islamorada] Florida in 1957, broadcast in 1958.

MURROW: Mr. Truman, would you think that the phrase "Give 'em hell, Harry" helped you considerably in 1948?

TRUMAN: I don't know whether it did or not. I don't know who originated that, but I always told them when they would say that to me in a crowd that I never did give anybody hell. I just told the truth on them and they thought it was hell.

MURROW: Mr. President, you have talked frequently about the necessity for professionals in public life and in politics. What are the essential qualifications of a successful politician?

TRUMAN: It's just as necessary for a man who understands politics to be in a position of operating the government, which is founded on

politics. A free government is a government by politicians, and a politician is a public relations man who knows how to get along with people. I think the most honorable title that can be given to a man is to say that he is a politician, and I've always said that the great statesmen you read about were all politicians or they would never have been statesmen. They become statesmen after they're in their graves.

MURROW: Let's go back to your early childhood. What was the first job you had?

TRUMAN: I imagine I must have been about twelve or thirteen. I got a job washing windows and mopping floors and wiping off bottles for a drug store at home. An old fellow by the name of Jim Clinton ran the drug store and I used to go up and open up the store and mop the floor and straighten everything out, and we had a great many people in our home town who would not go into a saloon. There were a dozen saloons around the Square at Independence, and they'd come in for their early morning eye-opener behind the counter and would put a dime on the prescription case and pour their own, and then go on out. And, of course, I wasn't supposed to have anything to do with that, but I saw it, and I found out that there were a great many of our leading citizens who were great uplifters publicly, but they liked to do just like the old men who went in the saloons openly. And I got quite a kick out of that at twelve or thirteen years old. And I'll never forget the first three silver dollars I got in payment for that first week's work. That's the most important money I ever earned.

MURROW: Where did your military service begin?

TRUMAN: I had joined the National Guard in the organization of Battery B on June the 14th, 1905. I was a charter member of the Battery and a private, and they gave me a nice, beautiful blue uniform with a red cord around the shoulders and red stripes down the breeches legs, and I took it out and showed it to my old grandmother whose house had been burned by the Federals in the Civil War, and she looked at it, and said, "Well, Harry, that's a very beautiful uniform, but that's the first time a blue uniform's been in this house since the Civil War. Don't bring it back here." And I didn't.

MURROW: Well, speaking of uniforms, I am told that at one point just before we got into World War II, you went to see General Marshall and asked to go back in the Service. Is that right?

TRUMAN: Yes, that's correct. I was a Senator at that time and had been a Colonel of Field Artillery since 1927. This was in 1940 or '41, and I went down to see the General and told him that I'd spent my time since I'd been in the Reserve Corps training these young men in field artillery and teaching them how to shoot, and that I'd like very much to go back into the Service in command of an artillery group, and I felt like I owed it to the country. The

General pulled his spectacles down on his nose like that, and he said, "Mr. Pres-- Senator, how old are you?" And I said, "I'm 56." He says, "Senator, you're too damned old. You go on back and stay in the Senate." I says, "I'm four years younger than you are." He said, "Yes, but I'm already in." So, I went back and stayed in the Senate.

MURROW: What did you do immediately after your discharge in 1919?

TRUMAN: I went back to the farm and stayed there for most of the next three or four years except that Eddie Jacobson and I decided to open a-- a men's furnishing store on West 12th Street, and did. And I furnished the money and Eddie furnished the brains, and we had a wonderful business the first year and a half, and then Mr. Mellon began his wringing out process by making high money just as we're going through now, and I went busted as one of the little businessmen. I never forgot it.

While that process was going on, I was elected judge of the county court for the Eastern District of Jackson County with four other fine men in the county in the race in the primary. One of them was already a county judge. One of them was a leading banker. One of them was a leading contractor, and I was a busted merchant. But I made a campaign on the basis of seeing as many people as possible in the county, and I defeated all four of them and became the county judge for the Eastern District. Then I got into a political fight and was defeated in 1924 by a nice old man who was a harness maker in Independence and had made a set of harness for my brother and myself when we were kids for a pair of little red goats we drove to a wagon. And then in 1926, I was elected Presiding Judge of the County Court of Jackson County by 16,000 votes; and then four years afterwards I was elected by 55,000, and when I ran for Senate, I carried the county by a hundred and thirty-two thousand, so they didn't feel badly about the manner in which I'd carried out of the business of the county.

MURROW: Mr. President, I must be a bad reporter because I have neglected to ask you when you learned to play the piano.

TRUMAN: Well, when I was about, oh, I guess I must have been eight or nine years old, we succeeded in raising enough money to buy a piano and then I began to take a few piano-- piano lessons from Mrs. E. C. White, who was a pupil of Leschetizky. I got a viewpoint on good music which was a wonderful asset to me as-- in an educational way, but when I was about fifteen or sixteen years old, I decided that it was a sissy thing to be a piano player, and I quit.

MURROW: How was it that the "Missouri Waltz" became rather your unofficial theme song, Mr. President?

TRUMAN: I hate to go into the details on that, but the "Missouri Waltz" was composed by a man from Iowa in 1914, and is called "Hushaby My Baby". It's a ragtime song, and if you let me say what I think, I don't give a damn about it, but I can't say it out loud because it's the song of Missouri. It's as bad as the "Star Spangled Banner" so far as music is concerned.

MURROW: Well, sir, I assume it would be true to say that you achieved national prominence through the Truman Committee. What would you say its major accomplishments were?

TRUMAN: Well, that committee was organized for the purpose of helping the United States Government to win the war - to be an asset to the Commander-in-Chief, the President of the United States, and to General Marshall, who was the organizer of the Armed Forces of the United States, and it was handled in just that way.

We made investigations of construction programs, and when things were in a tangled condition and action could not be had on the construction of, we'll say, training planes and engines for training planes and for fighter planes and for tanks, we'd look into the matter without the idea of headlines or publicity, and try to correct the situation.

MURROW: Do you have the feeling, Mr. President, that occasionally the Congressional power of investigation is abused or stretched too far?

TRUMAN: Yes, I've-- I've always thought that there are times when the investigative power of the Congress of the United States, both in the House and the Senate, has been abused. It's a power that's absolutely essential, however, to get intelligent legislation, and the objective of the investigation is for the purpose of legislation. Legislation came about as a result of our own investigations in this special committee, legislation that was of great benefit to the country.

MURROW: Isn't it true that the first time you heard of the atom bomb was when Secretary of War Stimson asked you to call off an investigation of Oak Ridge?

TRUMAN: I had started an investigation at Oak Ridge and at Pasco, Washington, and the Secretary of War called me up and said that he wanted to talk to me about that, and I told him I'd come down and see him. He said, "No, I'm coming down and see you," and he came down and sat down in my office and said, "I want to say to you, Senator, that this is one of the most important things that's ever been done in the history of the world. We can't afford to have a public investigation of it, and I'd appreciate it very much if you would call off your dogs and not have the investigation." I said, "Mr. Secretary, if you tell me that, I know it's true, and I'll call them off." And I did.

MURROW: You were prepared to nominate Jimmy Byrnes for Vice President, weren't you?

TRUMAN: Yes. Jimmy called me from Washington and said the President had decided that he'd like to have him for Vice President, and asked me if I would nominate him, and I told him that if the President wanted him I'd do the best I could. I didn't know I'd be any asset to him as a-- as a nominator, but then if that's what he wanted, I'd try to do it. And I found out afterwards that there had been a meeting in the White House a week before that in which it had been decided that the Senator from Missouri was the favorite of the President, but I didn't know about that and never found it out. And a short time after Byrnes had called me, just before I left for Chicago, Senator Barkley called me and asked me if I'd nominate him, and I told him I couldn't nominate two of them, that I'd told Byrnes I'd nominate him.

MURROW: Had you prepared a speech in nomination of Mr. Byrnes?

TRUMAN: Yes, I had a good speech ready. I think it would have nominated him.

MURROW: You never heard directly from Mr. Roosevelt, himself, that you were his choice?

TRUMAN: Not until Thursday afternoon when the Vice President was to be nominated the next day. They had a meeting of all the Democratic party leaders in the Blackstone Hotel, and asked me to come over, and Bob Hannegan had placed a call for the President, and the President's question - as soon as it was connected - the phone was between twin beds, and you know the President really didn't need a phone; all he needed to do was to raise the window. I could hear every word he said. He said, "Bob, have you got that fellow lined up yet?" Bob said, "No, Mr. President, he's the contrariest man I ever had anything to do with." "You-- Bob, you tell him that if he wants to take a chance on losing the election and perhaps losing this war, that's his responsibility," and he hung up. Well, I was sunk. I didn't know what to do hardly. I walked around the room, and finally told him I'd do it, and I'd told all my friends that under no circumstances would I be a candidate, but when the President made a statement like that, I had to do something about it, and I couldn't find anybody to nominate me. I finally found my colleague, Bennett Clark, who was the Senior Senator from Missouri, and he agreed to nominate me.

MURROW: Would-- Would it be fair to say that some of your subsequent disagreements with Mr. Byrnes may have stemmed from the fact that he had the feeling that he might, or rather that he should, have been the Vice Presidential Nominee?

TRUMAN: Well, I don't know. There might be something in that, but-- I never really thought that was the case. I think that Jimmy had a superiority complex in reference to the Junior Senator from Missouri, and that he felt maybe I was not capable and did not know exactly what ought to be done, and that it was his duty to take it over and do it like it ought to be done. But when a fellow becomes President, he really knows where he's going, and I had to tell Mr. Byrnes that I was the President and he'd have to act as Secretary of State at my direction. And I think that's the principle thing that caused the disagreement.

MURROW: You have been quoted as saying that you never liked yes-men around you.

TRUMAN: I don't. I don't want men around me that won't tell me the truth, and as they see it, because you can't operate if you have a bunch of men who put you up on a pedestal and say everything you do is right, because that can't be possible.

MURROW: Exactly-- Exactly what did you feel when you were told that you were President?

TRUMAN: Well, I was shocked, of course, because I had hoped to serve out my term as Vice President and go back to the Senate. I had the most pleasant time in my political life in the Senate of the United States. And of course I was shocked when I found out that I had become President of the United States in the midst of the war which was not over yet - the war with Germany and with Japan was still going on - and it was overwhelming almost for-- to step right in and take charge of a situation with which I was not completely and entirely familiar, although I tried the best I could to inform myself on the subject, and my special committee gave me a lot of information behind the lines that I otherwise wouldn't have had. But I was not familiar with foreign affairs because I was not on the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate.

MURROW: Mr. President, when World War II ended, we then proceeded to dismantle the greatest military machine that had ever been constructed. I know that you were concerned about it. General Marshall was concerned about it. Was there anything that you could have done that you didn't do to prevent it?

TRUMAN: Nothing whatever, for the simple reason that every mama and every papa and every kid's grandmother in the country wanted him home at once, and every kid wanted to go home at once, and we did the best we could. We tried to have a discharge program on a merit basis. That is by points, and the thing began to break down, and we just had to face it and let it happen, but it was a disastrous thing to do.

MURROW: You moved immediately to recognize Israel after it was created, didn't you?

TRUMAN: That's correct.

MURROW: Do you have any regrets about that?

TRUMAN: Not the slightest. I just carried out the agreements that had already been made on the subject, and I've never been sorry for it because I think it's necessary that there be a State of Israel. Israel can be made into an industrial state which will supply the industry for all these food-producing countries, and there can't be anything then but peace. And when you get modern machinery and know-how to work those pieces of land that are still as rich as they ever were, with their tremendous oil reserves, there isn't any reason in the world why that shouldn't be a center of the civilization of the world again as it was in the beginning.

MURROW: Of course, one precondition of that would be that the Arabs would have to recognize that Israel is there to stay.

TRUMAN: Of course, and it's going to stay there no matter what they think or what they do, because the Israelites will take care of themselves as they always did in historic times. But the thing is that they ought to be peaceable, loving neighbors. They're first cousins anyhow, and there's no use in shooting each other over that.

MURROW: At what point in that '48 campaign did you feel that you had it won?

TRUMAN: Well, I thought I could win that campaign after the acceptance speeches of Senator Barkley and myself in Philadelphia at that convention - the night the convention adjourned. The reception which we received at that convention showed me that the people could be convinced, and I left that convention fully of the opinion that if I could see enough people I'd win that election. And that's what happened. And I wasn't being egotistical about it, because I had been through half a dozen campaigns before that on the same basis, where I didn't have a Chinaman's chance to win the election.

MURROW: You also said, I think in 1948, that you didn't have a very high opinion of pollsters.

TRUMAN: I still don't.

MURROW: You still don't? Why not?

TRUMAN: Well, I'll tell you why. I can take you down the street here and we'll promiscously stop a half a dozen people and ask them a question and without thinking they'll answer you. They'll go home and think about that, probably, and in all probability they'll change their minds, so that, when a man goes into the polls on Election Day - or a woman, particularly - you never know what she's going to do, and I don't think any pollster can find out. I think the best poll there is is the count after election.

MURROW: Do you have the feeling that newspapers influence votes very much?

TRUMAN: Not now. I think in the past they did.

MURROW: Do you feel that during your political career there has been very much distortion in the reporting of political news?

TRUMAN: I don't think there's been an intentional distortion, but the-- a fellow can't help but express his opinion when he's discussing things political, and of course, the vast majority of the sources of the news were slanted in the other direction, and editorially I didn't expect anything else. But the men who report the news - the working press, I call them - make an honest effort to report the thing as it happens. I think if there's any distortion, and there is a great deal, the distortion happens with the blue pencil and the news editors in the office. I don't know enough about the radio and television business to make a comment on that. I'm talking about newspapers now. I never had any complaint because it didn't make any difference what they said about me-- if I could keep the people from believing it, it didn't make any difference.

MURROW: Well, Mr. President, what is your feeling about so-called Madison Avenue influence, the tendency to have campaigns taken over by advertising agencies?

TRUMAN: Well, it's just like selling soap, and it's not right. It doesn't work. You can't sell human beings. Slavery's gone out of fashion. People usually understand what those people are talking about,and they don't fool anybody but themselves. All my experiences as candidate for office, I never did have money enough to run. In the campaign of 1948, the train got stopped in the station on several occasions because we didn't have the money to pay the fare. When I campaigned for the Senate, both times, we never did have money enough to meet the necessary expenses. We had no chance at all in those campaigns to talk over the radio or anything of the kind, and we won just the same. I'm not so sure that people have the respect for the big money that everybody thinks they have, because they like to vote for a poor man sometimes.

MURROW: In the 1948 campaign you were apparently quite prepared to risk your future political career on the matter of Civil Rights.

TRUMAN: That's correct, and I did.

MURROW: Do you think it helped you?

TRUMAN: I don't know whether it helped win the election or not, but it was right and we won the election. You'll have to draw your own conclusions on that.

MURROW: Mr. President, in your opinion, how long will it take to implement the Supreme Court's decision on segregation?

TRUMAN: I think it will take some time. It's a matter to some extent of education and understanding our position in the world. I think there are just as many wise men south of the Mason and Dixon line as there are north of it in proportion to the population, and eventually those wise men will prevail. We can't have one face at home and another one abroad.

MURROW: What did you fail to do as President that you would like to have done most, Mr. President?

TRUMAN: Well, there are a great many things that I would have very much liked to have accomplished while I was President of the United States. I think the two most important that I was not able to accomplish were a health program and an educational program for the people of the United States. The ordinary man with a family and a middle bracket income is not able to have the hospitalization and the medical care that the fellow who has a great income can afford. And on the educational proposition, it's my opinion that equal education means, in the end, equal opportunity for everybody no matter what his race, color or creed may be. And if he has the educational background to understand the history of the human race, and what happens when certain things are not done, he'll be more likely to join in with an effort to create a situation where we'll have equality of opportunity for every citizen in this great republic of ours. And we must do that for the simple reason that we can't be the leaders of the free world and draw a color line on opportunity; and that was the two things that I did not get finished.

MURROW: Which act of yours do you think will be regarded by historians as the most important in your Administration?

TRUMAN: Well, the-- the action that was taken with the Berlin Airlift, and the Greece and Turkish thing, and the Korean affair. I think you'll find that that established beyond a doubt that the President has the power to meet an emergency when it comes up, and he should take the bull by the horns and meet it when it's necessary.

MURROW: But in terms strictly of the Constitution, Mr. President?

TRUMAN: That's Constitutional. That's in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, as set out in the Constitution of the United States.

MURROW: I was rather expecting that you might have suggested it would have been the dismissal of General MacArthur in terms of re-establishing or rather establishing again the control of the civilian over the military.

TRUMAN: That was only following a precedent. If you remember, James K. Polk had the same sort of trouble with some of his generals in the Mexican War; and Abraham Lincoln had to fire General after General. McClellen, particularly, stands out as an example in comparison with the MacArthur thing. And the Constitution provides that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, and he-- when he acts as Commander-in-Chief, he's got the right to hire and fire Generals any place he pleases, and there was nothing new about that at all. That was only the establishment of a precedent. When the Commanding General of the Far East was insubordinate, he got relieved the same as any other General would under the same circumstances.

MURROW: How did you decide to remove General MacArthur, and whom did you consult, Mr. President?

TRUMAN: Well, General MacArthur had been becoming rather insubordinate as the Pro Consul in Asia, which he considered himself, and when he disobeyed orders directly, it became necessary to find out the best thing to do about it. MacArthur had been making statements on policy in the government, which he had no right to do. The policy is made at headquarters in Washington by the President and his Cabinet. That is, the foreign policy of the United States is made entirely by the President with the assistance of the Secretary of State. General MacArthur sent an article to Dave Lawrence's magazine, and didn't send a copy to the White House or to the President. I happened to find it in the press room of the White House, and I suppressed it because it was not in line with the policy of the United States Government. And I sent him word that he couldn't do a thing of that kind, and then he was willing to have the matter withdrawn. And a short time after that, he did the same thing over again, completely contrary to orders, and he had acted that way in several instances not only with me but with President Roosevelt. And I stood it as long as I could, and I made up my mind the best thing to do with him was to give him the McClellan treatment - that was, to retire him. General Marshall said he hoped I'd postpone the situation until he had had a chance to read the-- the messages over the last two years, and he also

made the statement that he had matters pending before the Congress which might be affected by it. General Bradley said he ought to be fired. He's a good military man. Averell Harriman, the Ambassador, said if he were in my place, he'd have fired him long ago. I had my mind already made up, but I didn't tell them. And then I told them to come back in two days, or the next morning, I forget which it was. And they came back, and General Marshall had read all the messages by that time, and he made the statement to me. He said, "Mr. President, you ought to have fired him two years ago, or at least six months ago," he said. And I then discussed the matter with the other people. Dean Acheson still thought it was poor politics and bad business to fire him. And then I issued the order, had General Marshall write the order out, himself, in longhand, which was to be forwarded to Frank Pace, who was Secretary for the Army, and who was then in Korea. We couldn't reach Frank Pace at all, and General Bradley came over to see me early Monday morning. This all happened on Friday - Thursday, Friday and Saturday. General-- General Bradley came to see me and said that some Tribune reporter had obtained a leak in the Pentagon and he thought the whole thing would be released. "Well," I said, "send a direct message to the General and tell him he's relieved. But inform him also that if we'd have been able to get hold of Frank Pace, we'd have had it delivered in person." And that's how the whole thing came about. I never had anything personal against the General. He's a great military man, and it's a terrible thing when you have to do that to a man who's been in the military service for 51 years, but he brought it on himself, and it had to be done.

MURROW: Some of your critics claim that some of your controversial decisions were prompted by petulance.

TRUMAN: Oh, I never acted when I was out of sorts, because a man does some things that he ordinarily wouldn't do. I think about the only time that I ever acted when I was really out of sorts was when I told a music critic where to get off when he said some mean things about my daughter. If I had thought about it a while, I probably wouldn't have done it.

MURROW: Much of the criticism, perhaps the major criticism, of you has been aimed at your continuing loyalty to friends even when they were in trouble. And particularly, I remember your attending Mr. Pendergast's funeral.

TRUMAN: I imagine that was the truth, but I've always felt that a man's career is based on his friendships and his loyalty to those friends. I always believed in loyalty to friends unless they did something radically wrong, which required prosecution or something like that. I never fronted for any of them when they got into trouble with the law, but I always felt that when a fellow was in trouble was the time that he needed his friends most, and then's when they should stick with him.

MURROW: In 1952, the Republican slogan was "Korea, Corruption and Communism." What about communism in the government?

TRUMAN: I don't think there was ever enough communism in the government to create that comment for the simple reason that there are-- there is complete loyalty with the vast majority of the more than two million employees of the United States government. And in all their hunting around, and in all the charges that were made, there was never a single one of the demagogue, -gogic charges proved, that they never found a single Communist in the place where the demagogue said it was. That demagogue's McCarthy, if you want to know who I'm referring to.

MURROW: Speaking of demagogues, what's the best way to deal with them?

TRUMAN: With ridicule. Ridicule is the best thing in the world for a demagogue because he is a monumental egotist or he wouldn't be one, and when you can stick pins in him and let the wind out and get people to laughing at him, he's through.

MURROW: Do you believe the government has any right to inquire into the political affiliations of government employees who are in non-sensitive jobs?

TRUMAN: I think the government employees ought to have exactly the same liberties that the first ten amendments of the Constitution guarantee, and I have said time and again that I thought the Un-American Activities Committee in the House of Representatives is about the most un-American thing in America.

MURROW: Did you refer to Alger Hiss case as a red herring?

TRUMAN: No. The situation was such that I was trying to arrange some very important matters with the Congress, and in order to prevent the consideration of those things, these charges were made that the government was lined with Communists. And somebody asked me if that wasn't a red herring to keep from putting my program over, and that's where the conversation came from. I didn't initiate the thing at all. Some questioner in the audience- and he was only there once - asked that question, but he asked a question that fitted the bill exactly, in my opinion.

MURROW: I wonder if you would like to give your impressions of some of the people you've had to deal with.

TRUMAN: Fire away.

MURROW: First, Churchill.

TRUMAN: Churchill was one of the most agreeable men I ever met. He's a hard bargainer. He likes to argue about everything, but when it comes right down to brass tacks, he's always on the right side. It would take a little more time to do business with him than it did with the others, but when he got through you knew very well that the British would keep their agreements, which they always do.

MURROW: What-- What about General DeGaulle?

TRUMAN: General DeGaulle was hard-- a hard person to talk to. He had a very hard time making up his mind, and I never was right sure that he'd intended to keep the agreement after he made it up, because I had to force him to get out of Italy with the French troops, if you remember.

MURROW: What about Molotov?

TRUMAN: The Russians are a peculiar people with whom to negotiate unless you're personally faced with them, unless they're sitting in front of you. You never could tell what Molotov wanted or what he believed. He is one of the pigheadedest men that ever I've come in contact with, and whenever I wanted him to perform, I called Stalin up and told him what I'd like to have done, and then Molotov would do it. Otherwise, he wouldn't act at all. Stalin, at Potsdam, that's the only place I ever saw him, made a very agreeable impression upon me. He was easy enough to get along with, and he was-- it was easy enough to make an agreement with him. Of course, I didn't know at that time he had no intention of keeping them.

MURROW: Mr. President, I remember that you told Stalin at Potsdam that we had the atomic bomb.

TRUMAN: Yes.

MURROW: Did he seem to be impressed at that time?

TRUMAN: No. I don't think he quite understood what I was talking about. I told him that we had discovered a tremendously powerful explosive which had come to a final conclusion by an explosion in New Mexico, and that we proposed to use it to end the war with Japan, and he smiled and said he was very happy to hear it. And then the conversation ended, and I went my way and he went his. This was after the-- one of the conferences at Potsdam.

MURROW: Well, when the bomb was dropped, the war was near to ending anyway. Was this the result of a miscalculation of the Japanese potential? Was our intelligence faulty in this area?

TRUMAN: It was done on the theory that the-- our troops were expecting to invade Japan in a very short time through the Tokyo plain, and on the southwest side of Japan also, and it was estimated that if would take about a million-and-a-half men to make that invasion - and in all probability there'd be a half a million of them casualties and 250,000 of them killed. And when we had this powerful new weapon, I had no qualms about using it, because a weapon of war is a destructive weapon. That's the reason none of us want war and all of us are against war. But when you have the weapon that will win the war, you'd be foolish if you didn't use it.

MURROW: What about the decision to go ahead with the hydrogen bomb?

TRUMAN: If it were possible to make a more powerful explosion than the one of the first atomic bomb, it seemed to me that with all the background and material, and all the money that had been spent, it was our duty to go ahead and carry the thing to its logical conclusion. And that was the reason it was done.

MURROW: There has never been in history a new weapon no matter how terrible that was not used.

TRUMAN: That's correct. I hope it will never have to be used because I hope we'll keep the peace in the world and it won't be necessary. If the world ever gets into a turmoil, however, it will be used. You can be sure of that.

MURROW: What was the most difficult decision you had to make as President?

TRUMAN: The most difficult decision I had to make while I was in office was Korea.

MURROW: Any regrets?

TRUMAN: Not the slightest. Not the slightest in the world. The reason that I was able to make the Korean decision, I remember Munich and the League of Nations, and we had just established the United Nations. The United States passed a resolution which had recognized the Republic of Korea, and had-- it had been established, and when the Republic of Korea was about to be overcome by aggressions started by the Communists, backed by Russia, and-- and what later became Communist China, it seemed to me that the proper thing was to establish the United Nations as a going concern, and that's what I tried to do. And that-- but that was the most difficult decision I had to make during my whole Administration of eight years.

MURROW: Were you surprised when Red China entered the Korean War?

TRUMAN: Yes, I was. Yes, I was, because I had been assured in October by the Commanding General of the Far East of the United States Forces that they would not do it.

MURROW: What about the decision not to bomb north of the Yalu, Mr. President?

TRUMAN: That was one of the decisions that was made in-- in the hope that that would prevent the bringing on of a Third World War.

MURROW: Is it true that you offered General Eisenhower the Presidency at Potsdam?

TRUMAN: No, no I didn't offer him the Presidency. I told him that a great many people who had been in his position had been willing to run for the Presidency, but it was my opinion that a man at the top with a military reputation could only have that reputation smeared if he went into politics, because being the Commanding General of the Armed Forces of a nation is entirely different from being the head of the State in a political job.

MURROW: So it would be fair to characterize it as being almost an offer, and a warning simultaneously. Was that it?

TRUMAN: It could be taken as that. I gave him wise counsel, and he wrote me the best letter on why a military man shouldn't be President of the United States that's ever been stated, and it's still in existence.

MURROW: And--

TRUMAN: He didn't write the letter to me. He wrote it to a newspaperman in New Hampshire. But he gave me a copy of it, and I've still got it, and I never used it on him at all.

MURROW: Is it your feeling as an historian that military men enter the White House under a basic handicap?

TRUMAN: Yes. They've been educated along one line, and a man to be President of the United States has to understand the whole picture. And the only way he can get the whole picture is by varied experience, and he doesn't get that in the military. You can take the historical members of the profession who've been Presidents of the United States. There was Zachary Taylor and General Grant and the present occupant of the White House are good men. They're honorable men. They want to do the right thing, but they've been educated in a manner that's like a horse with blinders on: he only sees one direction right down the road.

MURROW: Why don't more people of real ability enter politics?

TRUMAN: Thin-skinned. They're afraid somebody'll throw a brick at them and they won't be able to catch it and it'll hit them.

MURROW: Do you think that's the primary reason?

TRUMAN: That's the primary reason. They don't like to be in a rough and tumble verbal fight. They are afraid that something will come out that may cause them injury or hurt their business or something of the kind. But there are an immense number of people who are not afraid and who do take a hand in politics and who are willing to take it on the chin when the going gets rough.

MURROW: What about toughness under criticism?

TRUMAN: Oh, well, if he's got a thin skin, he's got no business being in the Presidency. He must understand his own ideas of what's right and wrong, act on those ideas, and if the newspapers and the means of communication don't like what he does, let them say what they want to say, and then if he's in the same disposition I am, he'll get up and tell them where they're wrong, and never let them browbeat him. You never want to let an outfit of any kind - any kind of special provilege outfit or any kind of an outfit whether special privilege or not, tell you what you ought to do. You've got to make the decisions and always hope that they're right.

MURROW: And this is as true in the field of foreign policy as anywhere else?

TRUMAN: The President makes the foreign policy. He has more power in the foreign policy than in any other part of the government because nobody can direct and make the foreign policy but the President himself. He has the Secretary of State and a wonderful coterie of experts in that line. He has the Central Intelligence Agency. He has the National Defense Department and the Commerce Department, all of whom have foreign relations outside the country. But their-- those things must be coordinated, and the President has to make the final decision on what will be done no matter what it is, or how small it may be.

MURROW: It is true, isn't it, Mr. President, that historically greater progress has been made when we have had what is called a strong President in the White House, a man who is prepared to do battle with the Congress?

TRUMAN: That's correct, that's correct. A President who doesn't have a fight or two with Congress is not considered a very strong man. It's necessary, and it's all right. There's nothing wrong with it. It's not a personal matter. It's a matter of-- of the Congress always trying to infringe the Presidential rights, and a good strong President-- the Congress will accuse him of trying

to infringe the Congressional rights, and in each case there's always some good accomplished, because the final result will be in the interests of the people, and the fact that we have those division-- that division of powers makes it much more safe for the people than it would otherwise. The only efficient government is a dictator's government, and a free government can't be as efficient as one where one decision meets the whole situation, and it's not good. I think our government is the best one that's ever been organized in the history of the world, and I know something about the governments of the world.

MURROW: What essentially is the relationship or should be the relationship between the President and the people?

TRUMAN: I've made the statement many a time that there are about fifteen million people in the country that can afford to have a representative in Washington to look after their interests in addition to the Congressmen and Senators that they have there, and they're called lobbyists. There's nothing wrong with them. They have a perfect right to do that, but there are a hundred and fifty million people that can't afford that. They have but one man in the government to look after their interests, and that's the President of the United States. He is the lobbyist for a hundred and fifty million people, and when he ceases to be that, those people are in a pretty bad way so far as the government of the United States is concerned.

MURROW: Mr. President, in your view what are the qualifications for a successful President?

TRUMAN: Well, the first and most important requisite is that he must be a fundamentally honest man - intellectually and every other way, and an intellectually honest man will usually succeed in any-- any line of business he takes up. If he understands people and has a policy - he has to have a policy, and he has to have a policy that's based on high principles for the welfare and benefit of the whole country - and now for the welfare and benefit of the whole world, since we're the leaders of the free world. It's quite a-- a number of assets that he has to have, and I don't mean to imply that I had all those assets, but I wished I had had them. I think I did have intellectual honesty, otherwise, I don't know about it. We'll have to wait and see what history says about the rest of them.

CRONKITE: History's view of Harry Truman would be incomplete without recalling him as the Man from Independence. Like this small Missouri city where he grew up, he seemed to symbolize an older, simpler America - confident, solid and secure. Independence welcomed him home to this Victorian house on North Delaware Street in 1953. And Independence helped him build the Truman Library, a massive tribute to his Presidential years. It seemed fitting that

on the most American of holidays - the Fourth of July - Harry Truman and Independence celebrated there together.

TRUMAN: I didn't make a regular prepared speech for this occasion....

CRONKITE: Here he was - 82 years old - in 1966.

TRUMAN: Celebrating the Fourth of July is not a new thing to Independence. We've been doing it for a long time. I'm going to read you a paragraph or two from every speech I made. Now, if you don't like it, you can just close your ears up.

CRONKITE: Mixed with the familiar Trumanese, there was a hint of sadness when he spoke about leaving the White House.

TRUMAN: When I got out of that place, I didn't have any place to go or anything to do, so I told two or three of my good friends I wanted to stay right here in this part of the world and that I was expecting to put a library here with all the information regarding all the Presidents so that they'd be available for people who wanted to find out what the facts were. Well, this building was the result. I raised the money for the building; the people of Independence gave me the site to put it on. I appreciate very much what you've done here. This is a wonderful turnout and I'm highly complimented and very much pleased that you did it. And you'll now hear some people who can make you a good speech.

CRONKITE: The years took away some of the Truman jauntiness and softened his vinegar temper. But they never completely mellowed him. "They're trying to make an elder statesman of me," he once said, "but they'll never succeed. A politician isn't a statesman until after he's dead."

Even after he faded from the front ranks of political power, he enjoyed giving advice to old Democratic friends. President Lyndon Johnson admired his toughness, once said of Truman, "That little fellow was pretty much always on the right track." It was partly this appreciation of Truman that led Johnson to Independence for signing of the Medicare Bill in 1965. It was also recognition that Truman was the first President to propose such a law. Twenty years earlier he had pleaded its cause before an uncooperative Congress. Medicare, a milestone for Johnson, was the realization of one of Truman's fondest ambitions.

There were other salutary moments. At a United Nations luncheon in Kansas City in 1966, two old gentlemen exchanged forgiving smiles, blurring memories of past personal bitterness.

And in March, 1969 another old enemy came to make peace. President Nixon, quick to mend fences, visited Independence. It was easy to forget he had once infuriated Truman with disloyalty charges against his Administration. Now - for the Truman library - he

brought a peace offering: Truman's old White House piano - and a familiar tune.

TRUMAN: Thank you very, very much.

WOMAN: Aren't you going to play something?

NIXON: I'll play something for the President. I play everything by ear.

[Piano playing: "Missouri Waltz"]

CRONKITE: Mr. Nixon probably had forgotten that Truman said he never liked the "Missouri Waltz" in the first place. History will not record what Truman thought of this Republican rendition of it.

In 1968, when he was almost 84, Truman gave one of his last news conferences. This was at Key West, Florida where, during his presidency, he so often flaunted his famous sportshirts. He was asked about today's young people, and he had this to say:

TRUMAN [1968]: I think they're the greatest thing that we've got and always have been.

REPORTER: There seems to be a great deal of criticism, though, that they've changed - that they're-- now they're more radical than they used to be.

TRUMAN: You'll find it's just not true. I still think they've got good sense. Most of them have. And they'll vote right.

REPORTER: Mr. Truman, tell us a little bit about your day. What do you do during the day? Do you read?

TRUMAN: Well, this is the most important thing I've done since I've been down here. I read, walk and enjoy myself. And I knew damn well that if I didn't get you out of the way you'd intercept me some day. I've had plenty of experience with you.

REPORTER: Thank you, Mr. President. That was very kind.

TRUMAN: I want to say that I appreciate the fact that you wanted a press conference with me. It was a grand thing for you to do and I'm very thankful for it.

CRONKITE: And in the warm Florida sunshine at the Key West Naval Station, the elderly former President once more went on parade, just as he had done so often as Commander-in-Chief during some of the most difficult years of our history. The scene somehow served to remind us that there was something in Harry Truman - Mr. Citizen from Independence - which made average citizens feel that, indeed, they could be more than average.

ERIC SEVAREID: Harry Truman looked, dressed and sounded like the most ordinary, conventional person in the world. You could throw a stone into any big crowd of middle class Americans and hit a man just like him.

And a lot of people felt their hearts sink when he was sworn in as President, following Franklin Roosevelt with all the grandeur and sweep, that aristocratic voice and face, that Harvard background.

But what Truman became (by any accounting) - one of the more impressive Presidents we have had - is a matter of rejoicing for those who still believe in some old American propositions: that general freedom and relative classlessness will bring to light the human gold that lies in all the common clay; that there is something special in the most ordinary man; and that America is the place where the special is most likely to turn up.

The Truman story is a reaffirmation of what this country was supposed to be, of the kind of men who made it; and it confronts one with the fact that by the sheer law of probabilities there must be tens of thousands of men in this land who could live up to the Presidency.

He was not brilliant and he was not eloquent. Those are the preeminent qualities for other settings, like a university. But he had something else: the prime necessity for men who would lead and govern other men. The Romans, who invented political administration, called it "gravitas" - patience, solidity, breadth of shoulders and weight of judgment.

The last time I talked privately with Harry Truman his mind was not on Korea or the U.N. or the Atlantic Alliance or the Marshall Plan. It was on several hundred elderly people in Missouri long ago, who had been railroaded by their relatives into mental institutions under a defective law. Judge Truman got them out. I think he was prouder of that than of anything he ever did.

In Harry's sight, as (so we are taught) in the sight of God, the most obscure have as much divinity in them as the most famous. His own world fame never changed that conviction and never changed him in the slightest.

ANNOUNCER: This has been a CBS NEWS SPECIAL: "Harry S. Truman, 1884 - 1972".

Don Hewitt

CBS NEWS

Office Communication

to: DON HEWITT

from: Ed Murrow

January 16, 1961

Talked to Truman re: Inauguration. He agrees.

E.R.M.

gw

Truman

January 12, 1961

Copy to Roosevelt

Mr. Philip C. Brooks
Director, Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

Dear Mr. Brooks:

At the direction of Mr. Murrow and Mr. Friendly, we are shipping two prints (16mm) of all of the film shot during President Truman's interview with Mr. Murrow at Islamorada, Florida from February 8 - 15, 1957.

The film was shot by two cameramen, Charles Mack and Martin Barnett, in 35mm original negative. There was a total of 42,000 feet shot during this interview of which some 5,000 feet was extracted and used on the SEE IT NOW program of February 2, 1958. Prints of this show were furnished to the Truman Library shortly after the broadcast. Thus, the footage we are sending you represents all of the remaining material unexpurgated and unabridged.

The individual reels shot by Charles Mack were originally odd-numbered 1 - 43; those by Barnett, 2 - 40. Since we are able to get four of the original 35mm reels on a single 16mm reel, the prints are marked Mack, Reel 1 (contains original reels 1,3,5,and 7); Barnett Reel 1 (contains original reels 2,4,6, and 8). The original reels 1 - 41 contain the actual interview while reel 43 is exterior scenery and scenes of President Truman and Mr. Murrow sitting on the dock.

When you run the material through you will find that you can follow the original transcript from reel to reel and any material missing will be contained in the original SEE IT NOW program. I am sorry to have made this appear more complicated than it perhaps really is but, if upon receipt of the prints you have any further questions, I would be most happy to answer them.

Sincerely,

Palmer Williams
Associate Producer
CBS REPORTS

PW:sl

Sam Rosenman
Truman

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MURRAY HILL 8-7800
CABLE ADDRESS
"GOCOKAY NEWYORK"

December 19, 1960

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

I have heard from President Truman today that he would like the film sent to the Library without any editing, to be used as a historical document.

Thanking you for your courtesy,

Very sincerely yours,

Samuel I. Rosenman

SIR:AHS

Sam Rosenman

December 9, 1960

Dear Sam:

Further regarding yours of September 23rd, we are now ready to ship two complete prints unexpurgated and unabridged of the Truman interview. To whom at the Library should we send them? We shall also dispatch a note explaining how the film was assembled.

Sincerely yours,

Judge Samuel I. Rosenman
Rosenman Goldmark Colin & Kaye
575 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

KRM:gw
cc:Palmer Williams

CBS NEWS

Office Communication

to: Mr. Murrow

from: Palmer Williams November 30, 1960

Re: Prints for President Truman

We are now ready to ship two complete prints of all the material unexpurgated and unabridged. Will you or shall I find out who the material should be addressed to at the Truman Library in Independence? I will send a covering note with the film to explain how it has been assembled.

sl:
att.

P.W.

September 28, 1960

Dear Sam:

I have your letter of September 23rd. We shall take steps to fulfill the terms of the agreement as soon as possible. You will appreciate that a certain delay is inevitable, but it will be done.

So far as I know no additional income has been received, but I will make a check.

I have the feeling that in last night's "debate" the winner was the stop watch.

Sincerely yours,

Judge Samuel I. Rosenman
Rosenman Goldmark Colin & Kaye
575 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

ERM:gw
cc: Fred Friendly

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE
575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
GODFREY GOLDMARK
RALPH F. COLIN
SYDNEY M. KAYE
WALTER J. PETSCHEK
MAX FREUND
AMBROSE DOSKOW
SEYMOUR D. LEWIS
LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN
ANDREW J. SCHOEN
JEROME L. SINDLER
ASA D. SOKOLOW

MURRAY HILL 8-7800
CABLE ADDRESS
"GOCOKAY NEWYORK"

September 23, 1960

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

When President Truman was in town last, he spoke to me about the following, and I told him that I would be in touch with you and ask you to take care of it.

Paragraph 17 of the agreement of January 22, 1957 between CBS and President Truman provides that CBS should furnish him without charge two prints of all of the film taken of the interview, complete with sound track, other than the specific portions thereof disapproved by him. The contract provides that title should remain in CBS, but that he and/or the Library should have the right to retain permanent possession -- for its own use and not to permit any broadcast or commercial use thereof.

He would like to obtain these prints.

Could you follow this up for him and see that they are sent out there as soon as convenient?

I assume that there has been no additional income derived from these interviews which would entitle President Truman to any further proceeds. Is that correct?

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely yours,

Samuel I. Rosenman

SIR:AHS

HAPPY "75" MR. PRESIDENT!





Tune: "MISSOURI WALTZ"

Down in old Missouri on a certain bright May morn
There a little darlin' Truman baby boy was born.

His mammy and pappy, oh my, they were happy,
For somehow they just knew,
What this baby would do!

For his mammy dear would hold him close, and fondly say,
"You'll grow up to be our president, I know, someday."

His mother's words guided,
And her faith provided
The light to show the way!

Now, in old Missouri there's a library so fine,
Filled with gifts and treasures that will grow richer with time.

A tribute to Truman; the world's greatest human,
And all who come to see; oh how thrilled they will be.

For our nation's history passes by their very gaze,
And they learn the meaning of those wartime troubled days.

His story forever,
In glory forever,
Inscribed in this one place.

Tune: "C A DOUBLE R-I-GAN SPELLS CARRIGAN"

H-A-double R-Y,
He's the guy we toast today.

We wish him the greatest birthday ever;
Does he ever age at all? No, never!

H-A-double R-Y,
Young in heart and mind:
He's the kind you'll always find
Ahead of all the rest;
Oh, Harry is, the best!

Tune: "WE'RE JUST WILD ABOUT HARRY"

We're just wild about Harry,
'Cause we know Harry is great;
We're quite sincere when we all cheer,
This favorite son of our state!

Our Harry's gone down in history,
As one who changed the world's fate;

And so we shout about Harry,
A leader of all men,
Has a gifted pen,
No one's smarter than
Harry!

Tune: "YELLOW ROSE OF TEXAS"

There's a guy from old Missouri,
That good old "show-me" state.
Became our president and
Acquired the title "great!"

With his brilliant mind and know-how
Of what makes people tick,
He guided us through wartime
And turned the "atom trick."

And when Harry left the White House,
All the people missed him, why?
There's no one to fill his shoes,
Tho others may try.

All of us are proud to know him
And give this mighty toast:
A happy, happy birthday to
The guy who is "the most!"

75th BIRTHDAY MEMENTOS

STATUETTE IN GOLD BY RENE SHAPSHAK

75th BIRTHDAY MEDALLION IN BRONZE

SPECIALLY DESIGNED
JEWELED DESK SET IN GOLD

MENU

MELON BALLS SUPREME

ROAST CORNISH GAME HEN
with Wild Rice

SWEET POTATOES FLORIDIENNE

ASPARAGUS HOLLANDAISE

ASSORTED ROLLS AND SALT STICKS

HEARTS OF LETTUCE AND TOMATO RING SALAD
Thousand Island Dressing

FRESH STRAWBERRIES
A La Mode

INDIVIDUAL BIRTHDAY CAKES
Served with Dessert

SPECIALLY AGED IMPORTED SWISS CHEESE

HADAR WINE

COFFEE

Muehlebach Hotel

Kansas City, Mo.

May 12th, 1959

Luncheon


LIBRARY CARD
MILLER

F

Dear Mr. Murrow—

I am sorry to be so long in thanking you for the gorgeous red roses you sent me while I was ill, but there were some notes I insisted upon writing personally and I am just able to start them. Your lovely flowers

gave me many hours of pleasure and I deeply appreciate your thought of me.

Please remember me to Mrs. Munson. I often think of the happy time we had with both you and in Colorado.

Most sincerely

Bess W. Truman

Truman, Ha

MAY 7, 1958

THE HONORABLE HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

SORRY I CAN'T JOIN YOU AND YOUR FRIENDS AT YOUR BIRTHDAY PARTY TOMORROW BECAUSE I MUST BE OFF TO LONDON TO DO AN INTERVIEW WITH PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN STOP WISH I COULD HOPE FOR AS GOOD AN INTERVIEW AS THE ONE WITH YOU STOP PLEASE CONVEY MY REGARDS TO MRS. TRUMAN. REGARDS.

E.R. MURROW

514-43
fe

RECEIVED
1958 MAY -6 PM 2:51
C.B.S. TELETYPE ROOM N.Y.

RECEIVED
1958 MAY -6 PM 2:51
C.B.S. TELETYPE ROOM N.Y.

RECEIVED
1958 MAY -6 PM 2:51
C.B.S. TELETYPE ROOM N.Y.

WU020 PD

FAX BU KANSAS CITY MO MAY 6 1222PMC

EDWARD R MURROW NEWS DEPT CBS

THOUGHT YOU WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WE ARE HAVING BIRTHDAY LUNCHEON FOR FORMER PRESIDENT TRUMAN AT NOON THURSDAY MAY 8TH HOTEL MUEHLEBACH TRIANON ROOM. HOPE YOU CAN BE WITH US, IF NOT YOU MIGHT WANT A CAMERA MAN OR REPORTER PRESENT

N J STARK FOR THE FRIENDS AND NEIGHBORS OF MR TRUMAN

138P..

Truman

JANUARY 23 1958

HARRY TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

EITHER FRED OR I WILL ARRIVE WITH THE FILM AT 1:45 PM WEDNESDAY JANUARY 29TH STOP SUGGEST WE PLAN TO LOOK AT IT ABOUT 3:00 STOP WILL YOU PLEASE GIVE US THE NAME OF THE CONTACT AT THE MUSEUM SO THAT PROJECTION PLANS CAN BE COORDINATED.

EDWARD R. MURROW

fc
202-182-33

Truman, H

February 19, 1957

Dear President Truman:

Enclosed herewith is "The Decline and Fall of Practically Everybody" which Mr. Murrow, before he left for London on Saturday, asked me to send to you.

Sincerely yours,

Rebecca Holder
Secretary to Mr. Murrow

The Hon. Harry S. Truman
c/o Clara May Downey's Olney Inn
Islamorada
Monroe County, Florida

Truman

March 12, 1957

Dear Sam:

This is in further reference to our conversation at lunch today about a television program for President Truman. These are my own ideas, but I think it a type of program that might interest the President, and which the officials of CBS would be inclined to give careful and, I hope, favorable consideration.

The working title might well be, "Pivots of History."

Mr. Truman would select initially twenty six events in the history of this country upon which history has in fact pivoted. He would open the program live (which could be done from Kansas City) for about five to eight minutes he would recount the state of the nation, the issues agitating the public mind, the relations between this and foreign countries as the "pivot" approached. Let us take for example, the Monroe Doctrine which he might well choose as a "pivot." He should briefly outline the American posture at that time in regard to Europe and Latin America. He should tell, as only he can do, something of the personalities and foibles of the principal characters, with perhaps a little-known anecdote or two about Monroe in order to make him a human, believable, almost living character.

After this prologue, we would proceed directly to an authentic dramatization based upon impeccable historical research with everything from costumes to text checked by reputable historians.

At the end of the dramatization, President Truman would return for about five minutes to delineate the extent to which our history has pivoted on that decision, and perhaps to draw a parallel between that and subsequent decisions; for example, the Truman Doctrine for Greece and Turkey, or current Administration policy in regard to the Middle East.

The objective would be to give the viewer not only detailed and authentic information about a major incident which shaped the course of American history, but also a sense of the continuity of our development in relation to the rest of the world. The viewer would be made aware, without preachment, of the origins of basic American policy and practice and of the consequences

that have followed upon these decisions.

There is bound to be high drama coupled with very considerable humor in almost any "pivot" the President selects. It is a fact, of recent history at least, that in time of crisis and uncertainty all peoples dig deep into their history, folklore, and past accomplishments in an effort to gain a sense of purpose and accomplishment; even the Russians did it in the late war.

I am convinced that there is a market for this type of program, the climate of opinion is right for it, and I venture to think that it is something the President would enjoy doing.

As I have said, this is purely a personal suggestion, but if the President should be disposed to pursue the matter, I would be glad to discuss it with him when he is here on April 1st. If the idea has merit we could then move towards some formal and financial consideration of it, both by Mr. Truman and by CBS.

As ever yours,

Judge Samuel Rosenman
Rosenman, Goldmark, Colin & Kaye
575 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

rh
bc: Mr. Robinson

CBS TELEVISION

Office Communication

to: MR. MURROW

from: Hubbell Robinson

May 6, 1957

The only honest answer I can give you on the Truman project, as I can see it at this moment, is a discouraging one as far as getting it launched this coming fall is concerned.

I don't really see any practical place to put it other than Sunday afternoon for reasons as familiar to you as to me. I don't think it is a nighttime operation. On the other hand, it seems to me too important to bury in a Saturday time.

As you know, we have football on Sunday afternoon on most of the network up until 5 o'clock until approximately January 1. From 5-6, we have THE SEVEN LIVELY ARTS and SEE IT NOW once a month. From 6 on, we have the regular schedule.

Prior to 5:00, we have certain other Public Service programming which I think we undoubtedly will have to keep on a regular basis.

As you know, I have great enthusiasm and I think it would be a proud and important thing for CBS to do; but in view of the above complications, I just don't see how to do it this season.

HR

HR:bjg

Att:

Truman Corr.

January 10, 1958

Dear Mr. President:

We have finally made a start on our most difficult editing task. It is our plan to present the first hour from 5:00 to 6:00 PM Eastern Standard Time on February 2.

The title will be "From Precinct to President" and the subtitle will be "Some Reflections by Harry S. Truman." We will make it clear in our advance notices and on the air that this is in no sense an interview or commentary on current events.

At present it rather looks as though the material will break down into three sections dealing with your early recollections, your days in the Senate, and your remarks regarding the Presidency with particular reference to the relationship between the executive and legislative branches.

Both Fred Friendly and I have re-read the transcript several times and it is full of rich and rewarding material. We still haven't a clear idea of how much we will be able to compress into this first hour, but we shall do the editing with such skill as we possess and with real affection.

Sincerely,

The Honorable Harry S. Truman
Federal Reserve Bank Building
Kansas City 6, Missouri

fc

cc: Judge Rosenman
Fred Friendly

TRUMAN BIRTHDAY MESSAGE. Recorded 4/27/59.

Mr. President:

As you know, reporters are not historians - they merely make scratches on paper, or utter words into a microphone while ~~on the~~ at a dead run. They are not always right, but they would like to be. I have known at least one President and one Prime Minister who were disposed upon occasion to question the legitimacy of certain reporters.

Having recently returned from a quick trip to England, France and Germany, I must report to you that you are rapidly being "discovered!" A very considerable number of people - not all of them historians - said with overtones of pride of discovery in their voice: "Your President Truman will loom large in the history of the free world." Being a reporter and not an historian, I refrained from reminding them that I had ~~said~~ told them that first years ago.

You may recall, Sir, that once when we were "striking a blow for liberty" this reporter contended - perhaps at undue length - that most of the people he had met whose names made headlines - were blessed with wives who were better men than they were. From this doctrine you did not dissent. Therefore I trust you will not find me lacking in discretion, discernment,

~~XXXX~~ respect or affection if, upon the occasion of your seventy-fifth birthday, I anticipate somewhat the verdict of future historians, and bow deeply in the direction of Mrs. Harry S. Truman. For those who give you credit are also greatly in her ~~XXXX~~ debt.

Truman, Harry S.

Sent script to Mr Robbins. 8/11. M.C.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

August 8, 1958

T

Dear Ed:

Mr. Jhan Robbins of This Week magazine is writing an article based on a few talks with me and certain statements I have made in the past.

He believes it would be of help to him to read a written transcript of your recent interview with me on television and will call at your office in the next few days to see if such a transcript is available.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

May 21, 1958

Dear Ed:

Thank you very much for your thoughtfulness in sending me that editorial from the Manchester Guardian.

Clippings of editorials from several Canadian papers, this one from England and the various comments I have heard expressed in this country, indicate that appreciation of our joint efforts approaches the universal.

It's an old story for you but new and unique for me.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

CBS TELEVISION

Office Communication

to: Mr. E. R. Murrow

from: Paul A. Rosen

May 20, 1958

With respect to the request for granting newspaper syndication rights in Europe of your conversations with Mr. Truman, I am attaching a letter from Mr. Truman indicating that he does not presently approve of such a proposal. Accordingly, I have held up this deal until a later date.

P. A.R.

PAR:jr
Att.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

May 13, 1958

Dear Mr. Rosen:

I appreciated your letter of the 2nd, and I wish I could oblige you.

Because of certain conditions, which prove themselves restrictive at the present time, I am not in a position to approve the European release you have proposed.

I regret it very much, but perhaps we can reach, at a later date, a satisfactory agreement concerning the possibility of a more universal distribution of the material.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Paul A. Rosen
Business Manager
CBS Television Enterprises
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Truman, Harry
Corr.

May 16, 1958

Dear Mr. President:

As I mentioned on the phone yesterday, I am just back from London and must report that our television interview with you is regarded over there as the yardstick against which all other interviews will be measured.

I cannot resist sending you the attached editorial from the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN. This is one of the truly rare occasions where the GUARDIAN has done an editorial on a television program.

As ever yours,

The Honorable Harry S. Truman
Independence, Missouri

fc

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

May 13, 1958

Dear Ed:

Thank you very much for your telegram of the 7th.

You were kind and thoughtful to remember my birthday, and I am sorry that you could not join us for the celebration.

I know that you got a fine interview with Prime Minister MacMillan, and I will look forward to seeing and hearing it.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

I'm still hearing from ours. The only thing wrong is that everyone of the communications is for office & I'm not accustomed to that!

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Rosenman
Truman

bc: Mr. E. R. Murrow

March 17, 1958

Dear Judge Rosenman:

At Mr. Murrow's suggestion, I transmit to you herewith a check payable to the Honorable Harry S. Truman, in the amount of $1,000.00.

This represents payment to Mr. Truman with respect to the broadcast on the CBS Radio Network of the soundtrack of the SEE IT NOW program entitled "From Precinct to President".

Sincerely,

Paul A. Rosen

Honorable Samuel Rosenman
Rosenman, Goldmark, Colin
& Kaye
575 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

PAR:jr
Att.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

Col. Frank I. Hogan
Suite 204 Lyric Professional Building
Cor. Florence Ave. & Pacific Blvd.
Huntington Park, California

Feb 20 58

You have no idea how I appreciated your letter about my interview with Mr. Ed Murrow. The question and answer period carried on by Mr. Murrow and myself was intended to clear up misunderstandings of events as they happened. The statements made by me in answer to Mr. Murrows questions were the facts as I saw them. I am glad you were pleased.

Sincerely

Harry Truman

Truman, Harry S

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

January 7, 1958

Dear Ed:

I wish you would tell Eric Sevareid, Winston Burdett, Peter Kalischer, Alexander Kendrick, Ernest Leiser, David Schoenbrun and Daniel Schorr that I more than appreciated the privilege of listening to their reports from at home and abroad. I only wish it had been possible for me to talk personally to everyone of them.

That was a wonderful luncheon at the Overseas Press Club; too much Truman was its sole fault.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

CBS RADIO

Office Communication

to: Mr. Murrow cc: Mr. DeOrsey
Mr. Friendly

from: Mr. Seward

September 23, 1957

This is in reply to your memorandum of September 13 regarding a Truman film.

Since the Truman film will be a SEE IT NOW program originally broadcast on CBS Television the rights about which you inquired are governed by an agreement between CBS Television and Jefferson Productions, Inc. Under this agreement, Jefferson has the right to proceed with preparation of the movie. The income derived from the movie would be split 75% to CBS and 25% to Jefferson until CBS has recouped its cost of producing the program less:

(a) $85,000 plus

(b) any program payment by a sponsor in excess of $85,000.

Thereafter the income would be divided 75% to Jefferson and 25% to CBS.

It would be necessary, of course, to obtain a formal agreement with Mr. Truman and appropriate agreements covering music or any other elements used as well as agreements covering the outside footage.

In the light of the fact that CBS would in any case participate in the proceeds as well as the volume of negotiation and legal work which would be involved, I would recommend that we ask Spence Harrison to designate some member of his setup to work on the matter (perhaps Merritt Coleman). I believe that the distributor would be the most likely source for the additional financing.

Jim
J.M.S.

Truman

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM

Office Communication

to: Mr. Seward cc: Mr. DeOrsey
Mr. Friendly

from: Mr. Murrow September 13, 1957

Fred and I are inclined to think that the subject of the Truman film is an outstanding hour of film which we are tentatively planning to do in January, February or March. But there is in addition to this, the basis for a full length movie if it were to be beefed up with existing footage that could be purchased on the outside.

My questions are (1) Can we proceed contractually with preparation of the movie and (2) What arrangements can or should be made for financing purchase of outside footage.

I don't know what this would amount to, but something in the order of one hundred thousand bucks. Fred and I are prepared to participate in the financing of this film if a proper deal can be worked out.

fc E.R.M.

Conf. I

May 10, 1957

Dear Sam:

Hubbell Robinson, our VP in charge of television programming, has today apprised me that he sees no real possibility of launching the "Truman project" this autumn. The only available time appears to be on Saturday, and Robinson expresses the view, with which I concur, the project is too important to bury in Saturday time.

Robinson says, "As you know, I have great enthusiasm and I think it would be a proud and important thing for CBS to do, but I just don't see how we could do it this season."

I am sorry and disappointed, but there appears to be nothing further that I can do. Hope the delay in discovering this decision has not interfered with possible alternatives. My own enthusiasm for the project is unabated and if I can personally help in making alternate plans you have but to command me.

Sincerely yours,

Judge Samuel Rosenman
Rosenman, Goldmark, Colin & Kaye
575 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

fc

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE
575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
GODFREY GOLDMARK
RALPH F. COLIN
SYDNEY M. KAYE
WALTER J. PETSCHEK
MAX FREUND
AMBROSE DOSKOW
SEYMOUR D. LEWIS
LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

April 22, 1957

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

Thanks for your letter of April 16th. I have sent a copy of it to the President. He is coming here on May 2nd, and it would be nice if we could have some definite word for him at that time.

Very sincerely yours,

Sam

SIR:AHS

Samuel I. Rosenman

Truman

April 16, 1957

Dear Sam:

Hubbell Robinson advises me that he still has great enthusiasm for the project we have been discussing with Mr. Truman.

He says the first problem to be settled is consideration of where we might find the time to put it. He hopes that some decision could be reached on this in two weeks and then effort will be made to proceed.

As ever yours,

Judge Samuel Rosenman
Rosenman, Goldmark, Colin & Kaye
575 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

rh

CBS TELEVISION

Office Communication

to: Mr. Murrow cc Mr. Fred Friendly

from: Hubbell Robinson

April 9th, 1957

As I am sure you know, I have great enthusiasm for the project you have been discussing with Mr. Truman.

I think the first problem to be settled now is consideration of where we might find the time to put it. I am hoping this entire picture will shake down within the next two weeks and then I would like to pick this up and see how we could move forward with a view to making it an actuality.

HR

50

Truman

CBS TELEVISION

Office Communication

to: Mr. Robinson cc: Mr. Friendly

from: Mr. Murrow

April 1, 1957

Spent a couple of hours with Mr. Truman this morning. Explained that it was purely exploratory conversation and I was in no position to speak for the Company. We talked at length about the possibility of his doing about six shows a year of the type outlined in my letter of March 12th, copy attached. He was eager and willing, prepared to devote much time to the project, etc. but did not wish it to be shopped around various advertising agencies, if that can be avoided.

He is vigorous, alert, and rarin' to go! I told him I would inquire whether or no the Company wished to make him a proposal. How do you wish the matter handled from here out?

E.R.M.

rh

565

Conf. T.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK BUILDING
KANSAS CITY 6, MISSOURI

March 6, 1957

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I certainly did appreciate the letter you wrote me on the 1st. I am more than happy to receive the check which you sent me and as soon as I can get the expense account together Sam Rosenman tells me that I should send it to you.

I received a note from Erwin G. Harwood sending me some of the lens cleaner which we used down in Florida.

I was also very happy to receive "The Decline and Fall of Practically Everybody" which I read with more interest than you can possibly understand.

I was more than happy to receive the broadcast which you enclosed in your letter.

Whenever you are ready to finish the program I'll be more than happy to cooperate in any way I can.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Corb. T.

March 1, 1957

Dear Mr. President:

Since returning from London I have had an opportunity to view enough of the film we made to report to you that both picture and sound are excellent, and I am thoroughly delighted with the outcome. Such shortcomings as there are must be credited entirely to me; for example, I noticed when you mentioned the name of Charlie Ross I failed to ask you what you regarded as the essential qualifications for a White House News Secretary. Also, I think, at some subsequent date we may want to go into a little more detail about the relationship between the president and congress, but these are minor matters which we can film sometime at your convenience either here in New York or when our cameras come out for the ceremonies on May 8th. I do feel very strongly that we have the essentials of what we set out to do, namely, a visual document for history which will help to illuminate and inform your grandchildren and mine.

The trip to London was hectic but interesting, and I venture to enclose a brief broadcast I did from there in an effort to summarize my impressions. The one thing that is not included therein is the fact that British officials do not make the distinction so frequently made here between Mr. Dulles and the President, they are disposed to place the blame squarely at Mr. Eisenhower's door.

We are still developing some of the still pictures taken in Florida and will send a set of them out for you and Mrs. Truman and also send some to Margaret. They will serve to remind me of a most memorable experience which was enjoyable from beginning to end.

Our check for the agreed amount is enclosed. Sam Rosenman tells me he will forward to me your travel and other incidental expenses.

Sincerely yours,

The Hon. Harry S. Truman
Federal Reserve Bank Building
Kansas City, Missouri

rh

Conf. T.

CBS TELEVISION

Office Communication

to: Mr. Hadley cc: Mr. Murrow

from: Paul A. Rosen February 27, 1957

Pursuant to our agreement with him, a copy of which you have in your files, will you please issue a check payable to the Honorable Harry S. Truman in the amount of $25,000.00.

This check, when prepared, should be forwarded to Mr. Murrow so that Mr. Murrow may forward it on with a personal letter. Will you please see that this check is delivered to Mr. Murrow's office tomorrow.

Thank you.

P. A. R.

PAR:jr

565

Conf. T.

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE
575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
GODFREY GOLDMARK
RALPH F. COLIN
SYDNEY M. KAYE
WALTER J. PETSCHEK
MAX FREUND
AMBROSE DOSKOW
SEYMOUR D. LEWIS
LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

February 21, 1957

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

Will you please send the attached bill for additional expenses laid out by me during the Florida trip from February 9th to and including February 14th to the proper accounting office for reimbursement.

In view of the fact that these expenses are to be recovered by CBS before any future division, I suppose it ought to go to someone who is handling the account of "See It Now".

When you get back from Europe and have a chance to talk with me, please let me know.

Very sincerely yours,

Sam

Samuel I. Rosenman

SIR:AHS
Enc.

Sent by Friendly

Corr. T.

CBS TELEVISION

Office Communication

to: Mr. Edward R. Murrow

from: Paul A. Rosen

February 7, 1957

It will be appreciated if you will advise me following the completion of your interviews with Mr. Truman. Upon advice to this effect from you, I shall instruct that the requisite payment to Mr. Truman be drawn.

Would you like to forward the check to Mr. Truman with a letter, or shall I send it directly?

P. A. R.

PAR:jr

HARRY S. TRUMAN
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK BUILDING
KANSAS CITY 6, MISSOURI

January 30, 1957

Dear Sam:

I think that everything has worked out in good shape. Tom Evans and his wife will not be able to come to Florida, and I haven't heard definitely from Dave. The date makes no difference, for I had no intention of allowing any interference with Ed Murrow's program. You may tell him that.

I think I've already told you that the Frisco Railroad has given us one of their business cars which will take us directly to Miami, and the Chrysler people are furnishing a car in which we will drive from Miami to Mrs. Downey's place.

We certainly are looking forward to a very pleasant visit with you and Mrs. Rosenman, and I know we will have quite a time.

Sincerely yours,

Honorable Samuel I. Rosenman
Rosenman Goldmark Colin & Kaye
575 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK BUILDING
KANSAS CITY 6, MISSOURI

January 24, 1957

Dear Sam:

I was certainly happy to have your letter of the 21st, and you can be sure that Mrs. Truman wants to go fishing whenever she has the opportunity. We will probably have to carry her on the boat but I'll bet she will catch more fish than anybody on it.

I am glad you liked the statement on the President's Message but it has to be read as a whole to appreciate just exactly what I was trying to do.

Acheson was disturbed over the statement because he thought there was a chance for some disagreement between us but there isn't, of course.

I think that Florida trip is going to be a grand one. The Frisco Railroad President is turning over his business car to us so we won't have to change trains and the Chrysler people called and said they have a car waiting down there for me to use so everything is all right.

If you have an opportunity to get in touch with Mrs. Downey again tell her to reserve a couple of rooms for proposed visitors. I think Bill Hillman and Dave Noyes want to come down - then there is a chance that Tom Evans may take a notion to come down and I know the Doctor is going to come down and take the cast off Mrs. Truman's foot.

I am looking forward to a grand time on this trip.

Sincerely yours,

Honorable Samuel I. Rosenman
Rosenman, Goldmark, Colin & Kaye
575 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
GODFREY GOLDMARK
RALPH F. COLIN
SYDNEY M. KAYE
WALTER J. PETSCHEK
MAX FREUND
AMBROSE DOSKOW
SEYMOUR D. LEWIS
LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

January 28, 1957

Honorable Harry S. Truman
1107 Federal Reserve Bank Building
Kansas City 6, Missouri

Dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of January 24th, and we are all looking forward to the trip.

I just spoke with Ed Murrow, and he thinks that it would spoil the project if we got a lot of people down during the filming. I would suggest that they come after Friday, February 15th, because Murrow has to complete his work by then since he has a "Person to Person" show to do in New York that night.

I assume that you will want Bill and Dave to go over the editing, and of course they can do that at their leisure when the film is developed. If you will let me know when after the 15th Bill and Dave and Tom want to come down, I will try to arrange it with Mrs. Downey.

In the meantime, we are arranging for Mrs. Truman to do some fishing -- cast on her foot or not.

Very sincerely yours,

SIR:AHS

Samuel I. Rosenman

Cong. T.

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
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AMBROSE DOSKOW
SEYMOUR D. LEWIS
LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

January 21, 1957

BY HAND

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

I am sending you a copy of a letter from the Olney Inn in Florida together with my reply.

Please let me know when the cameramen expect to get there because apparently they can accommodate them at the Inn. I might add that the rates seem microcosmic in view of what I have heard about Florida hostelries.

With respect to fishing, I would like to go bone-fishing with you for a half a day either on the 12th or 14th. The 13th being my birthday, I think I should spend it at home. I think it would be nice also if the six of us, or at least the four of us, spent one day deep-sea fishing.

Do you think this is possible? Please let me know as soon as you can.

Very sincerely yours,

Sam

Samuel I. Rosenman

SIR:AHS
Encs.

P.S. Please send me a memo of the reservations. I have sent it

CLARA MAY DOWNEY'S

O L N E Y I N N

On the Ocean

P.O. Box 187, Islamorada
Monroe County, FLORIDA

Telephone: Matecumbe 3511

January 19, 1957

The Honorable Samuel I. Rosenman
575 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Judge Rosenman:

In a telephone conversation with Mrs. Downey yesterday, she requested that we advise you regarding the rates for your party of six. She feels that a special rate of $15.00 per couple per day would be satisfactory to all concerned and deems it a great privilege to have you.

With regard to the six cameramen who will be accompanying you, we will be able to accommodate them here at the Inn at the rate of $30.00 per day, i.e. $5.00 per person per day.

Our dining room prices run approximately as follows:

Breakfast	$1.25 (average)
Luncheon:	
Sandwiches	.85 to $1.50
Regular luncheons	1.50 " 2.50
Dinner	3.25 " 6.00

You mentioned to Mrs. Downey that there is a possibility you all would like to do some bone, reef and deep-sea fishing. We have contacted Captain Dick Williams who, in our opinion, is the finest bone-fishing guide on the Keys and an exceptionally nice young man who was written up quite extensively recently in Sports Illustrated, and find he will be free on February 11 and possibly for a half day on February 12, 13 and 14. Bone-fishing is done from a skiff which accommodates two persons plus the guide. All tackle and bait are furnished by the guide. The charge is $40.00 per day.

Reef and deep-sea fishing are done from a large boat, usually accommodating six persons. The charge for this is $65.00 per day. These guides also furnish all tackle and bait.

All fishing guides are in great demand during February and March; therefore if you could give us a definite commitment as to which of the above dates you would like to do some fishing, whether bone or otherwise, we shall be happy to make a definite reservation for you. However, if a definite reservation is made, you will be responsible for payment whether you fish or not, provided the weather is favorable. If not, it is automatically cancelled by the guide. If your plans for fishing are too flexible at this time, of course we shall do everything we can to obtain guides for you when you arrive but we shall have no assurance that they will be first-rate.

We hope the above information will be helpful to you but if there are any questions to which we have not given you the answers, please let us know.

We look forward with a great deal of pleasure to having you and your party with us and shall do everything in our power to make your visit an enjoyable one.

Sincerely yours,

OLNEY INN

By (Mrs. E.) Margaret Christensen
Reservations

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
GODFREY GOLDMARK
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SEYMOUR D. LEWIS
LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

January 21, 1957

Mrs. E. Christensen
Olney Inn
P.O. Box 187, Islamorada
Monroe County, Florida

Dear Mrs. Christensen:

Thank you very much for your letter of January 19th.

The rates are perfectly satisfactory.

I will let you know in a day or so about the fishing.

I suppose Mrs. Downey told you that President and Mrs. Truman will arrive on the 10th of February in the morning. Mr. and Mrs. Murrow and Mrs. Rosenman and I will arrive on the 9th in the evening. I do not know when the cameramen are arriving, but I will find out and let you know.

We are all looking forward to being with you.

Very sincerely yours,

SIR:AHS

Samuel I. Rosenman

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

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LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

December 13, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

I am sending you herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter dated December 11th which I received from the President today, together with a copy of my reply.

Very sincerely yours,

Sam

Samuel I. Rosenman

SIR:AHS
Encs.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK BUILDING
KANSAS CITY 6, MISSOURI

December 11, 1956

Dear Sam:

I sent you a telegram in reply to yours, copy of which I am enclosing.

I hope Ed Murrow had a chance for his interview with Chou-En-Lai.

To tell the honest truth the week of February 11th suits us much better than the January date.

Mrs. Truman tells me that the lady who ran Olney Inn has some wonderful cottages about half way between Miami and Key West and she ought to have them open by that time. Mrs. Truman is trying to get in touch with her now. If that is the case that ought to be an ideal place. We would ship our car down on the train on which we come down and unload it at Miami and then drive down to this place that belongs to the Olney Inn lady. Of course, that is all in contemplation and I don't know exactly how the thing will work out.

If you have any further information on the situation as it is developing I hope you will let me know about it as soon as you can.

Sincerely yours,

Honorable Samuel I. Rosenman
575 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

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MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

December 13, 1956

Honorable Harry S. Truman
1107 Federal Reserve Bank Bldg.
Kansas City 6, Missouri

Dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of December 11th, and I think the place you mention would be very good.

I would suggest, however, that it would be much cheaper to hire a drive-yourself car at Miami than to pay for shipping your car down, unless you expect to drive home.

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely yours,

SIR:AHS

Samuel I. Rosenman

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

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MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

December 11, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

President Truman would prefer the second week in February, starting February 11th. I have sent him a copy of your letter, asking him whether the "basis of the announcement" is satisfactory to him.

As soon as he tells me where he would like to do the filming, I will be in touch with your office.

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely yours,

Sam

Samuel I. Rosenman

SIR:AHS

December 7, 1956

Dear Sam:

I suggest that we might do the prolonged interview with Mr. Truman during the second week of January, starting filming January 7th or alternatively, the second week in February, starting filming February 11th.

I suggest that the announcement be made and the signing be done in Kansas City just before we start shooting, and that the basis of the announcement should be that we are attempting for the first time to prepare a "visual document of history" which will present Mr. Truman in his own words discussing not only his own political career but his philosophy of politics and foreign affairs.

We will do the filming, as we discussed, at a place convenient to Mr. Truman.

As ever yours,

Judge Samuel Rosenman
Rosenman, Goldmark, Colin & Kaye
575 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

rh
bc: Mr. Friendly

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE
575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
GODFREY GOLDMARK
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LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

December 6, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

This is a copy of the letter I sent the President.

I hope these dates are accurate. Pursuant to our conversation, I took the second Monday in each month. I hope they are satisfactory.

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely yours,

Sam

Samuel I. Rosenman

SIR:AHS
Enc.

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
GODFREY GOLDMARK
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LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

December 6, 1956

Honorable Harry S. Truman
1107 Federal Reserve Bank Bldg.
Kansas City 6, Mo.

Dear Mr. President:

I shall be sending you in a day or so a memo with respect to the various comments you made on the Murrow contract. In the meantime, I want you to know that I spoke with Murrow today. He is just as enthusiastic as ever. He is leaving tomorrow for Rangoon where, confidentially, he expects to make arrangements to have an interview with Chou-En-Lai.

Murrow suggests that we definitely set our project for the second week in January, which would be the week of January 14th, or the second week in February, which would be the week of February 11th. He is willing to go wherever you and Mrs. Truman wish. He suggests that he pick you up in Kansas City, at which point the contract would be signed with appropriate publicity, and then proceed to the place you select.

I hope that these periods will be satisfactory to you.

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely yours,

SIR:AHS

Samuel I. Rosenman

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
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LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

November 21, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

As soon as you get your bearings, will you please let me know (1) whether you wish to have a public signing of the Truman contract out in Kansas City, and (2) when you would like to set aside a week for doing the work.

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely yours,

Sam

SIR:AHS

Samuel I. Rosenman

Phoned 11/26
that Mr M
will phone
next wk.
RH

Truman

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
GODFREY GOLDMARK
RALPH F. COLIN
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LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

August 10, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Murrow:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of August 8th addressed to Judge Rosenman.

I have forwarded a copy to the Judge, who left for Chicago last Sunday.

Yours sincerely,

Anne Schwabas

Anne Schwabas
Secretary

Truman

August 8, 1956

Dear Judge:

I certainly agree with you that the NBC proposal conflicts with our plans in regard to the President's television activities.

I look forward to seeing you in Chicago.

As ever yours,

Judge Samuel I. Rosenman
Rosenman, Goldmark, Colin & Kaye
575 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

rh

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
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MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

July 30, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

I have received a letter from NBC of which the attached is a copy. I am also sending you a copy of my reply.

On the face of it, it looks as though this conflicts with what you are going to do. Don't you think so?

Very sincerely yours,

Samuel I. Rosenman

SIR:AHS
Encs.

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
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LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

July 30, 1956

Mr. Robert D. Graff
National Broadcasting Company, Inc.
RCA Building
Radio City
New York 20, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Graff:

Thank you for your letter of July 26th.

I should be glad to take this matter up with the President. It might be that one of his prior commitments would preclude this.

When I return from the Democratic Convention in Chicago, for which I am leaving next Sunday and where I will see President Truman, I shall be in touch with you.

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely yours,

SIR:AHS

Samuel I. Rosenman

NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC

A SERVICE OF RADIO CORPORATION OF AMERICA

RCA Building, Radio City, New York 20, N.Y.

CIRCLE 7-8300

July 26, 1956

Judge Samuel I. Rosenman
Rosenman, Goldmark, Colin & Kaye
575 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Judge Rosenman:

The National Broadcasting Company would like to film a "Conversation with Harry Truman" sometime after the election this year for inclusion in our series entitled "Conversations with Distinguished Persons". The film would be a philosophical and historical conversation between Mr. Truman and some younger person of his choice.

As you may be aware, we have already broadcast about eighteen of these "Elder Wise Men" programs over the past three years including conversations with Herbert Hoover, Jawaharlal Nehru, Eamon De Valera, Pablo Casals, Paul Tillich and Sean O'Casey. We are attempting, as best we can to make a permanent record of those persons who have by word or deed truly formed our times.

If you have a few moments to spare next week, I would very much like to come to see you and get your advice on this matter. For the last several years I have been the producer responsible for this series. You may reach me at Circle 7-8300.

Cordially yours,

Robert D. Graff

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM

Office Communication

to: MR. MURROW cc: Mr. Van Volkenburg, Mr. Mickelson
Mr. Cowan, Mr. Harrison

from:

May 15, 1956

Judge Rosenman has agreed that Mr. Truman will go before the motion picture cameras with you at a price of $25,000 instead of the $40,000 which was the basis of our earlier negotiations. It is understood that Mr. Truman will be available for a filming sometime after the Presidential election in November. I understand that our Legal Department is working on the contracts and they can be authorized now to change the figure from $40,000 to $25,000.

I am not clear about the point covering Mr. Truman's expenses. I hope the Rosenman office will consider the $25,000 to include any expenses incurred by Mr. Truman in connection with the filming, but, on the other hand, it may be too firmly established already that we were to absorb these costs. I think we should feel Rosenman out on this.

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
GODFREY GOLDMARK
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MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

April 30, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

President Truman will be in New York May 8th, 9th and 10th. He is sailing on the 11th for Europe.

Do you think we ought to talk with him about the project?

With kindest regards,

Call Homer -

Very sincerely yours,

Sam

Samuel I. Rosenman

SIR:AHS

CBS TELEVISION

Office Communication

to: Mr. Murrow cc: Mr. Brauner

from: Mr. Woodard March 29, 1956

At Mr. Brauner's request I have reviewed the draft of the proposed agreement between CBS and President Truman, submitted to you by Judge Rosenman. It is a good contract, but the Judge's draftsman, like all lawyers, including myself, was apparently thinking primarily of his own client (President Truman, in this case) when he wrote it. As a result, the contract appears to be somewhat more favorable to Mr. Truman than was probably intended, and, in addition, a good deal of re-writing is indicated.

My comments in this memo are directed only to substantive points which I believe should be raised for your consideration. I would suggest that "language" problems be left for the lawyers to resolve after the substantive points have been settled.

Following are my comments, numbered to correspond with the paragraph numbers in the contract:

1. If you have any personal scheduling problems, the "on or about" 11/19/56 may give you some trouble.

What the parties intend time-wise is not clear. I suspect that what you mean is that each interview will continue for such period of time as you think necessary, but "not more than four hours" etc. If you think such language will look too harsh, you may wish to employ language such as: "It is contemplated that the interviews shall be held for approximately four hours per day, or such shorter period as Mr. Murrow may elect, but in any event for not more than four hours on any one day and not more than two hours at any single session".

Do you intend to tape these interviews as well as film them?

2. I take it he means a written transcript.

I would suggest that some schedule be arranged for the screenings - e.g. within two weeks after we notify him that the film is available for screening.

203

I take it you have agreed to the absolute right of approval.

On the basis of the language of this paragraph as now written, in my opinion Mr. Truman could disapprove film months after approving it, and we would be obligated to destroy it. I believe that the way to resolve this problem without bringing it up is to provide that notice of disapproval will be given by not later than ____ days after screening.

3. (a) This is pretty rough. I imagine that we will have to go along with something of this sort, but suggest that

(i) Mr. Truman be required to act reasonably; and

(ii) We spell out in the contract some of the uses which are satisfactory; e.g. broadcast on programs such as "See It Now" or "Omnibus", broadcast as a series or single program, direct projection exhibition by educational or charitable organizations, etc.

(b) Are there to be any restrictions or qualifications on his disapproval rights? Any exceptions such as direct projection exhibition by educational institutions or publication in certain types of publications?

(c) I suggest that Mr. Truman's approval "not be unreasonably withheld".

4. Our obligation to exploit should be limited to radio and television, and perhaps phonograph records and publications. We are not equipped to use much, if any, efforts in the other fields mentioned.

I have some problems with the "profitable exploitation". I rather imagine that you will want to use this material initially on the network. Chances are fair that such use would be sustaining. If so, we wouldn't be using our "best efforts...to bring about profitable exploitation of the material", since putting it directly into syndication would mean we could get profits immediately, with more return than we would get after network sustaining broadcasts.

5. Does he get a right of approval as to the 90 minute program too? If so, we should again provide that he will notify us of his disapproval, specifying what it is that he disapproves, within ____ days after screening.

Approval should not unreasonably be withheld.

Are we obligated to broadcast the program? If we are, I suggest that the six month period be suspended for any period during which network broadcasting is restricted, suspended, etc., and that such obligation be cancelled if we find it necessary to discontinue network broadcasting.

7. If, as a result of the exercise by Mr. Truman of his disapproval rights, we are in a position where in our opinion we do not have sufficient material for programs satisfactory to us having a running time of at least ____ minutes, our obligation to pay $40,000 should be reduced to ____.

9. I take it that we have the right to deduct all costs. If so, the language used should be expanded. In addition, however, there are several costs, which can aggregate to a large amount, which this language would expressly exclude. I refer to items such as print costs, shipping and insurance costs, advertising costs, film laboratory costs, taxes and similar costs. These are all continuing costs - particularly in syndication.

10. (a) (ii) I consider it highly advisable to agree upon a sustaining price now, particularly if we intend to assume an obligation to broadcast in six months. I would assume that the price for each run would be less than the price for the preceding run.

This paragraph again raises, by implication, the question of our right to broadcast sustaining at all. I rather imagine that it is quite likely that we would want to make more than one network broadcast of the program and/or the material, and that subsequent broadcasts may be sustaining.

(iii) As you know, we may "syndicate" locally, regionally or nationally, and the distribution fee varies accordingly. If they will agree to our standard fees (35%, 25% and 10%, respectively), this is merely a matter of language.

(iv) We customarily get a 35% distribution fee for foreign syndication.

11. (a) The language is not clear - are we entitled to deduct all costs of producing the programs, including e.g. talent costs, or just the cost of including the material?

I take it that you agreed to the limitation on the source of cost recoupment.

(b) What is other program material? Your services as narrator? Interviews with persons replying to Mr. Truman? Background material for Mr. Truman's remarks?

(c) Right to deduct costs?

10, 11, 12 and 13 - I see no reason why at least the original production costs of the "material" (including payment to Mr. Truman) should not be applied against proceeds derived from the exploitation thereof in any media.

14. We usually get "net loss carryover" rights, and I consider it particularly appropriate where the payment period is so short. In this connection, it would be to our pecuniary advantage to pay annually.

17. I suggest that Mr. Truman's approval "not be unreasonably withheld".

The last sentence raises one problem. In selling the material for sponsored broadcast, the sponsor will undoubtedly want the right to promote the broadcast, and, in connection therewith, to at least mention and probably advertize his products. Is this permitted? If it is, it should be expressly so stated in the contract, as the language presently appearing in this paragraph is extremely unsatisfactory in this respect from our viewpoint.

18. There will be union problems here if any of the material is used on programs under AFTRA jurisdiction, or live programs under AFM jurisdiction.

20. This raises the question of an indemnity. Customarily in this situation, we have full indemnity from each person involved. Although I am an admirer of Mr. Truman's (or perhaps because I am one) in my opinion it would be a very good thing if we could get an indemnity from him. I suspect from the presence of this paragraph in their draft that we would encounter considerable resistance to any suggestion of an indemnity.

I consider it quite likely that we would be unable to get standard broadcaster's liability insurance covering Mr. Truman in this situation. Although we carry such insurance covering all of our programs, I am not sure that it would cover Mr. Truman, especially in this situation where, if he made a statement giving rise to liability, he would, presumably, quite likely know it when he made it - or at least be deemed to have known it.

This suggests two points:

(i) if we can't get the insurance on terms satisfactory to us, it should be no breach on our part and all of our rights should remain unaffected;

Mr. Murrow March 29, 1956

(ii) if in our opinion an unreasonable risk of legal liability would arise from the use of the material or a substantial portion of it, so that we do not have satisfactory programming with an aggregate running time of at least ____ minutes, our obligation to pay the $40,000 should be reduced to ____.

I realize that relationship-wise it might be preferable not to suggest point (ii) to Mr. Truman.

I am returning to you herewith Judge Rosemman's draft of the agreement.

I shall be pleased to discuss any of these points with you at your convenience.

C.C.W.

CCW:bm
Enc.

AD:ESL(6)
3/13/56

, 1956

Honorable Harry S. Truman
Federal Reserve Bank Building
Kansas City, Missouri

Dear Mr. Truman:

The following shall constitute our agreement:

1. You agree to participate in a series of interviews to be conducted by Edward R. Murrow, and to permit us to record such interviews and to take motion pictures thereof. Such interviews shall be held at _____ _____, or at such other place or places as we shall mutually agree upon, during a period of about six (6) consecutive days commencing on or about November 19, 1956, unless another period shall be mutually agreed upon. The interviews shall be held for not more than four (4) hours on any one day and not more than two hours at any single session, and you will cooperate with us in scheduling the sessions.

2. We will furnish to you, within _____ days after completion of the interviews, three (3) copies of a complete transcript thereof. We will also have screened and played for you in New York and/or Kansas City, as you elect, at such times as you designate, all or any portions selected by you of the films and sound recordings of the interviews. You

shall have the absolute right to disapprove the use of any portions of the transcript, films and/or sound recordings, and we agree to keep confidential forever such portions thereof as you shall have disapproved and, if you so request, to destroy all copies of any portions thereof designated by you. Within _____ days after the material is screened for you, you will give us written notice of any portions of the transcript, films and sound recordings that are disapproved by you. All portions of the transcript, films and sound recordings not so disapproved by you shall be deemed approved; such portions are hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the material".

3. The material shall be our sole and absolute property, subject to the provisions of this agreement. We shall have the right to broadcast, publish, distribute, license the use of, and otherwise exploit, the material by any means which we, in our business judgment, consider appropriate; provided, however, that:

(a) We shall not utilize the material, or authorize any use thereof, in a manner deemed either by you or by us to be inconsistent with the dignity of your position or the character of the material; and we shall comply, and require our licensees to comply, with any determination made by you, of which you notify us in

writing, that a use thereof would contravene this condition.

(b) Before utilizing the material, or authorizing any use thereof, in any medium other than television, radio and phonograph records, we shall give you written notice of any such proposed use thereof and will not make or authorize such use thereof if you shall have notified us in writing, within ten (10) days after receipt of our notice to you, that you disapprove such proposed use.

(c) In offering for sponsorship any radio or television programs based upon any of the material, we will accept as sponsors only reputable national or local advertisers approved in writing by you, and in granting licenses to others to broadcast any such material we will require as a condition of such license that the licensee agree that such programs may be sold for sponsorship only by reputable national and local advertisers.

4. Without limiting the generality of paragraph 3 hereof, and subject to the conditions therein stated, we shall have the right to use and to license others to use all or any portions of the material in the production of radio and

television programs, in motion pictures for theatrical and home use, in the manufacture of phonograph records and wire, tape and other forms of recordings, and in books, pamphlets and other publications. Except as provided in paragraph 5 hereof, nothing herein contained shall require us to make any of the aforementioned uses of the material. We agree, however, that we will use our best efforts, consistent with our business judgment and with the terms of this agreement, to bring about profitable exploitation of the material.

5. We shall cause to be made a motion picture film based upon and utilizing the material, suitable for presentation on a ninety-minute television program in the series entitled "SEE IT NOW". We shall screen that film for you at least two (2) weeks in advance of the first telecast thereof, and shall not include therein any portions of the material or any other matter which shall not have been approved by you in writing. Such motion picture film, as approved by you in writing, is hereinafter sometimes called "the program". We shall cause the program to be broadcast at least once within six (6) months after your approval thereof over the facilities of our television network, in the evening hours that are included in the "network option time" defined by our contracts with our affiliates.

6. We agree to furnish to you first-class transportation from Kansas City to the place of the interviews and return, and all your hotel and living accommodations and meals at the place of the interviews. We also agree to furnish such round-trip transportation from the places of their residences and hotel and living accommodations and meals at the place of the interviews to such other persons, not exceeding _____, whom you wish to have accompany you. If you or any of such persons shall pay the cost of any of the aforementioned items, we agree to reimburse you or him therefor within ten (10) days after receipt of a written statement itemizing such expenditures.

7. As full compensation for your services hereunder, and for the rights granted by you to us under this agreement, we agree to pay to you:

(a) The sum of $40,000, of which $20,000 is paid to you upon the execution of this agreement, and the remaining $20,000 will be paid within ten (10) days after completion of the interviews.

(b) Sums equal to 50% of the net profits, if any, as hereinafter defined, derived by us from the program and from the exploitation of the material by any means (except through the manufacture and sale of phonograph records); and

(c) Royalties on all phonograph records manufactured and sold embodying the material or any portions thereof, as provided in paragraph 12 hereof; and for the purposes of this agreement the term "phonograph records" shall include tape and other sound reproducing devices sold for home use.

8. We understand that the firm of Rosenman Goldmark Colin & Kaye has rendered and will render legal services to you, and will act as consultants to you, in connection with this agreement and the performance thereof. We agree to pay them the reasonable value of such services, as billed by them, in an amount not exceeding $5,000.

9. As used herein, the term "cost of the program" shall mean the aggregate of all payments made by us hereunder under paragraphs 6, 7(a) and 8 hereof, plus the actual unreimbursed cost to us, determined in accordance with sound accounting practice, of photographing, recording, producing and editing the program and preparing it for broadcasting. We shall furnish to you, within _____ days after approval of the program by you, an itemized statement of the cost of the program, which statement shall be final for all purposes of this agreement unless you give us written notice, within ninety (90) days after receipt thereof, that you object thereto. If you give us such notice

and your objections are not resolved by agreement, the difference between us shall be determined by arbitration pursuant to paragraph 21 hereof. We shall be entitled to recoup the cost of the program from the proceeds derived by us from the program and from the exploitation of the material by any means, prior to the payment to you of any sums on account of the net profits therefrom as provided in paragraph 7(b) hereof.

10. (a) As used herein, the term "proceeds from the program" shall mean the aggregate of the following amounts:

(i) With respect to any sponsored broadcast of the program over the facilities of our television network or over any of our owned television stations, the net program charges (as distinguished from charges for time and facilities) paid to us by the sponsor or sponsors; and

(ii) In the event that we fail to obtain a suitable sponsor for any broadcast of the program over the facilities of our television network or over any of our owned television stations, then, with respect to any such broadcast on a sustaining basis, such sum as shall be mutually agreed upon between us in writing in advance of such broadcast; and

(iii) With respect to any licenses to broadcast the program locally over television stations in the United States not owned by us which are granted by us in the "syndication" of the program, as that term is used in the television industry, the net amount paid to us for such licenses, less a distribution fee of _____% thereof; and

(iv) With respect to any licenses granted by us for syndication of the program by others, or to broadcast the program over other networks in the United States or over the facilities of television stations in foreign countries, the net amounts paid to us for such licenses.

(b) All proceeds from the program remaining after the recoupment of the cost of the program shall constitute net profits to be divided between us in accordance with subparagraph (b) of paragraph 7 hereof.

11. In the event that we should produce radio and/or television shows (other than the program) based upon or utilizing any of the material, the proceeds therefrom and net profits thereof shall be computed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 10 hereof, except that:

(a) We shall be entitled to deduct from the

proceeds of such shows, in determining the profits therefrom, the actual cost incurred by us in making such shows from the material, it being understood that the cost of any such radio or television shows shall be recouped by us, in determining net profits for the purposes of this agreement, only out of the proceeds derived from such shows.

(b) If portions of the material are combined in a single show with other program material, the proceeds from such show and the cost thereof shall be allocated to the material in the proportion that the running time of the portions of the material used in such show bears to the total running time of the entire show.

(c) With respect to any distribution by us of transcriptions for radio shows, the proceeds from such shows shall be the net amount paid to us therefor, less a distribution fee of _____% thereof.

12. In the event that we manufacture or license the manufacture of phonograph records embodying portions of the material, the royalty payable to you under paragraph 7(c) hereof shall be _____% of the retail list price in the country of manufacture of all such records sold and paid

for. If any such record embodies portions of the material as well as other material, such royalty of _____% shall be reduced in the proportion that the playing time of such other material bears to the total playing time of the record.

13. In the event that we should utilize or exploit the material by any means or medium not specifically enumerated in paragraphs 10, 11 or 12 hereof, the net profits thereof shall be computed by deducting from the gross proceeds derived from any such means or medium only the actual costs incurred by us in connection with the utilization or exploitation of the material by such means or medium. In the event that we shall license others to utilize or exploit any of the material by any means or medium, the net amounts received by us for such license shall be included in net profits for the purpose of paragraph 7(b) of this agreement.

14. Within forty-five (45) days after the expiration of each quarter-annual period during which we derive any proceeds from the program or from any exploitation of the material, we agree to furnish to you an itemized statement of such receipts and any expenses and deductions allocable thereto. We agree, concurrently with the delivery of such statements, to pay to you any sums thereby shown to be due to you.

15. We agree to maintain full and complete records of all transactions had by us in connection with the material, which records shall be subject to inspection by your duly authorized representative at any time during regular business hours.

16. No sums derived by us from the exploitation of any of the material in foreign currency shall be deemed to be a part of the receipts from the material until they shall have been transmitted to and actually received by us in the United States. In the event of an embargo or restriction on the transfer of such funds to the United States, we will, upon your request, and if permitted by the laws of the country in which such funds are derived, deposit your share of the proceeds to your credit in any bank or other depositary designated by you in such country. Such deposit shall, for the purpose hereof, constitute payment to you of the amount so deposited.

17. You grant to us the right to use, and to authorize others to use, your name, voice, photograph and other likenesses and biographical data concerning you, for purposes of trade and advertising in connection with the exploitation of the material pursuant to this agreement. We agree that all advertising and promotional material issued by us in connection with the use of any of the material hereunder

shall be subject to your prior written approval. We further agree that in granting licenses to others to use the material in any medium or form, we will include a condition that each licensee agree that all advertising and promotional material issued by it shall be dignified in character and consistent with your position and with the nature of the material. In no event shall we authorize or permit the use of your name, voice or likeness in any manner that might be construed as an endorsement by you of any commercial product or service; and all licenses granted by us shall contain a condition that the licensee will not authorize or permit any such use of your name, voice or likeness.

18. We shall furnish to you, without charge, two prints of all film taken of the interviews and of the program, complete with sound track, and two prints of each other television program and two transcriptions, on tape or record, of any radio program which we shall cause to be made in which the material or any portion thereof is utilized. You agree that none of such prints or transcriptions shall be utilized for broadcasting or for any commercial purpose.

19. You may, by notice in writing, designate one or more agents to act on your behalf in the exercise of any right of approval or disapproval granted to you by this agreement. You may by such notice, from time to time,

change the designation of such agent or agents.

20. We agree to obtain for you an insurance policy, similar to our standard broadcaster's liability policy, protecting you against liability in amounts of not less than $_____ to one person and $_____ in the aggregate. We shall pay the premium on such policy, which shall be included in the cost of the program.

21. Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by arbitration in New York in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.

22. This agreement shall bind and enure to the benefit of our successors and assigns, and your heirs, executors, administrators and assigns; but neither of us shall assign this agreement without the prior written consent of the other. All rights granted to you hereunder shall survive your death and may be exercised by your executors or by any agent designated by you under paragraph 19 hereof, if so stated in the instrument designating such agent.

23. For any purpose of this agreement, any notice shall be sufficient if given by registered mail, postage

prepaid, addressed to you at

and to us at 485 Madison Avenue, New York 22, N.Y.

24. This agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York.

If the foregoing is in accordance with your understanding of our agreement, will you please so indicate in the space therefor provided below, whereupon this letter shall become a binding agreement between us.

Very truly yours,

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.

By_____

AGREED TO:

_____

Harry S. Truman

March 23, 1956

Dear Sam:

You perhaps know Mr. Paley is now in Jamaica. I shall hope to discuss the Truman matter with him early in April.

As ever yours,

Judge Samuel Rosenman
Rosenman, Goldmark, Colin, & Kaye
575 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

rh

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
GODFREY GOLDMARK
RALPH F. COLIN
SYDNEY M. KAYE
WALTER J. PETSCHEK
MAX FREUND
AMBROSE DOSKOW
SEYMOUR D. LEWIS
LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

March 14, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

I am enclosing herewith a rough draft of a suggested agreement between CBS and President Truman. I have retained the original amount discussed by us. I understand that you are going to reopen this with Mr. Paley.

Again, my congratulations on last night!

Very sincerely yours,

Sam

Samuel I. Rosenman

SIR:AHS
Enc.

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
GODFREY GOLDMARK
RALPH F. COLIN
SYDNEY M. KAYE
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MAX FREUND
AMBROSE DOSKOW
SEYMOUR D. LEWIS
LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

March 22, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

I understand President Truman is coming here to make a speech at the Overseas Press Club Dinner on April 3rd.

Do you think that we will be in a position to show him a contract along the lines of the draft which I sent you?

Very sincerely yours,

Sam

Samuel I. Rosenman

SIR:AHS

Conf Truman

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
GODFREY GOLDMARK
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SEYMOUR D. LEWIS
LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

March 2, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Murrow:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 29th addressed to Judge Rosenman.

Judge Rosenman is due back in the office from his vacation on March 12th, and I shall call your letter to his attention as soon as he returns.

Yours sincerely,

Anne Schwabas

Anne Schwabas
Secretary

February 29, 1956

Dear Sam:

I have just had an opportunity to discuss the Truman project with Mr. Paley. As you know, it has always been our intention to present the television version of the film after the autumn elections. In view of this, and also because the longer "Visual Document for History" should cover the widest possible sweep of Mr. Truman's experience, Mr. Paley suggests that we ought to defer the filming until after the November election. I very much hope that you and Mr. Truman will agree to this. I am sure it would increase the effectiveness, both of the original television presentations, and the historical film.

As I explained to you during our last conversation, I had not previously had a chance to discuss an appropriate fee with Mr. Paley. It is his feeling that a fee of $25,000 would be appropriate.

Perhaps you would be good enough to let me hear from you after you have had a chance to talk to Mr. Truman.

As ever yours,

Judge Samuel Rosenman
Rosenman, Goldmark, Colin & Kaye
575 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

rh
cc: Messrs. Paley, Stanton

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
GODFREY GOLDMARK
RALPH F. COLIN
SYDNEY M. KAYE
WALTER J. PETSCHEK
MAX FREUND
AMBROSE DOSKOW
SEYMOUR D. LEWIS
LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

February 21, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

As I told you on the phone, President Truman's commitments are such that the best period for him is between March 20th and April 1st. As I told you, it is impossible for Dorothy and me to make it during that time and I am writing the President to that effect; so that we will be unable to join you.

He suggests as an appropriate place Camel Back Inn, Phoenix, Arizona.

I understand that you are going to check your own commitments and see how they fit.

I am notifying Judge Clark that you must decline his invitation.

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely yours,

Sam

SIR:AHS

Samuel I. Rosenman

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
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MAX FREUND
AMBROSE DOSKOW
SEYMOUR D. LEWIS
LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

February 21, 1956

Honorable Harry S. Truman
1107 Federal Reserve Bank Bldg.
Kansas City 6, Missouri

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith copy of a letter which I sent Ed Murrow after talking with him on the phone.

Unfortunately the one period when Dorothy and I cannot make it is between March 22nd and April 1st. The reason is that we promised our son and daughter-in-law that we would take our sole grandchild during that time while they take their short vacation. We would hate to have them call off the whole trip for which they have planned and look forward to. They do not return until April 1st. I therefore suggest that you and Mrs. Truman and the Murrows carry on the project without us.

If it were possible to do it starting April 2nd, we could join you; but I realize the impelling reasons which prevent it.

I will communicate with you as soon as I hear from Ed Murrow. We have to get the contract worked out in the meantime.

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely yours,

Samuel I. Rosenman

SIR:AHS
Enc.

ROSENMAN GOLDMARK COLIN & KAYE

575 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK 22

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
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AMBROSE DOSKOW
SEYMOUR D. LEWIS
LAWRENCE R. ENO
MURRAY COHEN

MURRAY HILL 8-7800

February 6, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

I have spoken with President Truman, and he is quite willing to enter into the project we discussed.

I am writing this to you in advance of your return so that you will get in touch with me as soon as possible.

I hope you had a wonderful trip.

Very sincerely yours,

Samuel I. Rosenman

SIR:AHS

CBS TELEVISION

Office Communication

to: Mr. Paley

from: Mr. Murrow

cc: Messrs. Friendly, Seward

October 4, 1955

Yesterday I had a long conversation with Mr. Truman in Kansas City. I suggested to him the possibility of doing a long visual document for posterity -- perhaps ten hours of film which could be boiled down to an hour-and-a-half or two hours -- the only footage to be used in addition to himself would be existing footage which might be used to give change of pace, such as newreel clips of Potsdam or the meeting with MacArthur could be played over his voice describing these episodes. We discussed this project in some detail and the former President became increasingly enthused about it, particularly when I tried a discourse on the value of similar treatment of men like Lincoln, Jackson, and Jefferson if such films were available.

The "story line" for this interview could not be developed until we have digested both volumes of his memoirs; but I should like to make him a proposition as soon as may be. He wants a vacation in spring, and we talked of possibly doing this job coincident with that vacation in Jamaica, Key West, or some other place where he would be free from distraction and where we could shoot an hour or two a day.

He wants money, although I refrained from discussing figures with him. When I suggested that the continuing sale of this film for educational purposes over decades, and indeed centuries, would pay for the maintenance of the Truman Library, he replied by saying that the government would take care of that, he was interested in the maintenance of an old guy named Truman and his family.

Having no idea of the sales potential, either current or in the future, may I nevertheless suggest that we consider offering him something in the neighborhood of $50,000 plus a percentage of the secondary rights.

If you feel the idea has merit, I think we should write him a fairly definitive letter before his enthusiasm wains or his spring commitments become too heavy.

E.R.M.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK BUILDING
KANSAS CITY 6, MISSOURI

September 14, 1955

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I was pleased to talk with you in Chicago the other day, and when you are ready to make the setup here in Kansas City, I shall be glad to perform for you as best I can.

I expect to be in Arkansas on the 23rd, 24th, and 25th of September, and will probably be in St. Louis on the 27th and 28th of September. Then on October the 4th or 5th, we will be leaving for New York to meet Margaret, so the setup should be made on some of the dates when I am not out of town.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

3rd

4TH

STN answered

January 25, 1951

Dear Jimmy:

The new show is making an old man of me.

I'm sorry I can't find a place to mention the new pamphlet, but the Four Power conference is still in the offing; we'll find an opportunity then to steal liberally--perhaps with credit--from what you have written.

As ever yours,

S.O.

Mr. James P. Warburg
70 East 45th Street
New York 17, New York

ROOM 2720

TELEPHONE
MURRAY HILL 4-0163

JAMES P. WARBURG
70 EAST 45TH STREET
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

January 2,1951.

Mr.Edward R.Murrow
CBS
New York City

Dear Ed:

Your new show is wonderful. More power to you. Although the world picture stinks, I still believe that there is hope for peace without appeasement. In that belief, I am trying, so far as an individual citizen can, to leave no stone unturned. If the enclosed material strikes you as useful toward that end, a mere mention by you would help tremendously to get the case before the people. The subject is certainly hot enough.

The pamphlet tells its own story, but to save time, you can get the high spots from the release. In a way this is a sequel to my recently published book, Faith Purpose andPower. The book made a plea for a constructive long-range policy. The pamphlet deals with the immediate problems - especially those that will form the agenda of the four power conference.

As ever,

Jim

Sorry you couldn't carol.

"SPEAK UP - NOW OR NEVER!" - JAMES P. WARBURG

RELEASE FOR MONDAY MORNING JANUARY 8, 1951.

"There is a sensible middle course between the over-ambitious global containment policy - which has failed - and the defeatism of Joseph Kennedy or the illusory isolationism of Herbert Hoover. Our Government's "Europe-first" policy is basically the correct policy, but unhappily it has been so badly carried out, so little explained, and so impaired by attempted appeasement of the isolationists and "Asia-firsters" that it has become discredited in the minds of many, who would otherwise give it their wholehearted support."

This is the contention of James P. Warburg, in his latest pamphlet - "Speak Up - Now or Never" - published today by the Current Affairs Press, of New York City. The author holds that the American people are united in their desire for peace and their willingness to sacrifice for its attainment; but that they are confused as to the means of attaining peace "by a strangely confused yet cocksure leadership" - by "a President, who expresses jaunty confidence that we are 'in fine shape to meet the crisis', while his Secretary of State labors to arouse us to a sense of danger." "Oddly enough", Mr. Warburg says, "it is the Secretary of State who is denounced by members of Congress for being "soft" toward communism".

One element of confusion arises, according to Mr. Warburg, from our Government's failure to consult the people when far-reaching decisions are made - or even to inform the people what these decisions mean, why they are taken, and what commitments they involve. In this way, he contends, "our Government has taken us into a tangle of global commitments far exceeding our power to fulfill."

A second element of confusion is seen in the fact that our present policy is shaped to a world which existed in 1945 but which ceased to exist in 1949. "Our short moment of world supremacy has passed", says Mr. Warburg. "We now live in a world of divided power in which peace is attainable only through negotiation and collaboration."

Our Government maintains that war is not inevitable and that a peaceful settlement is still possible, even though difficult. At the same time, says Mr. Warburg, "our Government contends that the means for negotiating that settlement will not exist until we have acquired military power equal to that of the Soviet Union. To say this is to assume that dictators, who understand no language other than that of force, will refrain from a resort to force until their opponents are as well armed as they."

Mr. Warburg holds that common sense repudiates any such assumption. "Common sense tells us", he says, "that we need all the military power we can muster against the possibility of war, but that, if we still seek to avert war, we must negotiate for peace <u>while we are building that power</u>.

Pointing out that "negotiation is not the same thing as 'appeasement', Mr. Warburg outlines certain major issues in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, which could perhaps be negotiated, if we were willing to make the attempt. He points out a number of "concessions" which could be made on either side, without expecting either side to make any concessions which would weaken its position in the event of war. He sees Germany as "the key log in the cold war log-jam" and puts forward an alternative to our present policy

"which would strengthen our defense of Western Europe, while at the same time removing the greatest provocation to Russian attack and opening the door to a German peace settlement." This section is of particular interest in view of the approaching four power talks.

The pamphlet ends with an appeal to citizen action. "We need unity as we have never needed it before. But unity cannot be created by exhortation; it can be attained only through common understanding of the danger we face and of the means by which we seek to avert it. Common understanding cannot be created by 'salesmanship' which evades issues, ignores dissent and appeals to emotion rather than reason."

"Loyalty at a time like this," says Mr. Warburg, "demands outspoken dissent from those who are convinced that present policies lead to disaster, and that alternatives exist which hold forth a greater promise of achieving a just and honorable solution. It is not such dissent which is treason, but the attempt to suppress it, or the faint-hearted willingness to accept suppression."

"SPEAK UP - NOW OR NEVER!"
28 pages. Price: 50 cents
3 copies: $1.00
10 copies: $2.50

The Current Affairs Press
25 Vanderbilt Avenue
New York 17, N. Y.

James P. Warburg has been a persistent dissenter from certain aspects of our postwar foreign policy. He has written unnumerable pamphlets, articles and books on this subject during the past five years.

Carl Sandburg described his "Last Call for Common Sense" (1949) as "the greatest pamphlet of our time".

Here are a few comments on his "Faith Purpose & Power", published in September 1950.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch: Reasoned criticism of our foreign policy has become such a rare commodity that Mr. Warburg's annual book of complaints comes as a fresh breeze. His calm, cool and often deadly criticism is a useful contribution.

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Warburg, James P.

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January 30, 1950

Mr. James P. Warburg
70 East 45th Street
New York 17, N. Y.

Dear Jim:

I am most reluctant not to do anything you ask me to do, but in this business I feel I just have no choice except to say I can't sign anything except the stuff I write or mumble myself.

I am for London on the 17th; any chance for seeing you before then? I crave to have conversation with you. Can you suggest a suitable date when we can lunch?

As ever yours,

LET'S TALK ABOUT THE REAL ISSUE

By

JAMES P. WARBURG

SP

The "great debate" over sending troops to Europe has been almost wholly irrelevant to the *real* issue of foreign policy with which we are confronted.

That issue is posed by the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, for which the agenda is now being prepared.

Bluntly stated, that issue is this:

MORE BY LUCK THAN GOOD MANAGEMENT, WE APPEAR TO HAVE MANEUVERED THE RUSSIANS INTO A POSITION IN WHICH THEY MAY AGREE TO A GERMAN PEACE SETTLEMENT ON OUR TERMS—IF, THEREBY, THEY CAN PREVENT THE RE-ARMAMENT OF WESTERN GERMANY.

DO WE WANT A GERMAN PEACE SETTLEMENT ON OUR OWN TERMS, IF WE CAN GET IT? OR HAS THE COLD WAR BECOME AN END IN ITSELF?

Whether the impending conference re-opens the door to a European peace settlement, or slams it shut for good, will depend very largely upon whether our Secretary of State goes to the meeting with an affirmative or negative attitude. If Mr. Acheson goes seeking a German settlement, he may succeed where his predecessors have failed. If he goes merely seeking to win a propaganda battle and to justify sticking to his plan for German rearmament—which General Eisenhower has clearly failed to endorse—then the last, best hope of peace may be lost.

IF, WHEN YOU HAVE READ THIS STATEMENT, YOU FIND THAT YOU ARE IN AGREEMENT, THE BACK COVER WILL TELL YOU HOW YOU CAN TAKE A HAND IN SEEING THAT THIS GREAT OPPORTUNITY IS NOT LOST.

The Current Affairs Press
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LET'S TALK ABOUT THE REAL ISSUE

JAMES P. WARBURG

The "great debate", which has been filling the Congressional Record, the front pages and the airwaves, seems to me almost wholly irrelevant. The question of sending troops to Europe prior to the outbreak of war should have been debated two years ago, when the Atlantic Security Program was proposed to Congress and to the people in a regrettably misleading manner. This program actually involved two commitments, only one of which was frankly disclosed when the Treaty was placed before the Senate.

It was made clear that the Treaty committed us to go to war with an aggressor against the European signatories. It was not made clear that the Administration intended to go beyond the Treaty and commit the United States to fight the aggressor along the line of the Elbe river in Central Germany.

In urging the Senate to make clear, when it ratified the Treaty, that we were not undertaking to defend our allies by necessarily holding any particular line or frontier, I ventured to point out the dangers which seemed to me inherent in any such additional commitment. These were: *first,* that we should thereby commit ourselves to a pre-announced strategy in a possible war with Russia; *second,* that a commitment to hold up a Russian invasion in Central Germany involved building up a force, which as yet did not exist, precisely where it would be most likely to provoke rather than to deter attack; and, *third,* that to build up such a force we should either have to double our then existing combat strength and send most of it to Germany, or else rearm the Germans themselves.

Senators Connally, Vandenberg and other members of the Foreign Relations Committee replied that the suggested clarification was not necessary, since no such second commitment was contemplated. They relied upon the unequivocal assurances of the administration witnesses that no substantial American forces would be sent abroad in advance of war and that the United States would in no circumstances permit the rearming of Germany.

Shortly after the Treaty had been ratified, the administration sent up its Military Aid Bill and, in urging this measure, stated that its purpose was *to prevent Europe from being overrun,* in the event that an invasion

should be undertaken. To accomplish this purpose, the Bill provided merely a paltry one billion dollars.

This was the time when the "great debate" should have taken place. This was the time to make up our minds whether or not we could and should undertake the commitment, and, if so, to recognize clearly that it meant raising and equipping a powerful new combat force for European garrison duty. This was the time to ventilate the misgivings which are now belatedly expressed *after we have committed ourselves to the military defense of Western Europe's frontiers.* The issue of sending troops to Europe is no longer debatable except in terms of whether or not the United States shall go back on a solemnly given promise. That is why I say that the current "great debate" is irrelevant.

There is, however, a much more important issue before us, which, so far, has not been debated at all. There is an opportunity before us—perhaps our last—to extricate ourselves with honor from the stultifying position in which we now find ourselves. This opportunity will arise at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, for which the Deputies are even now preparing the agenda.

The issue we shall face at that meeting—the issue we should be debating now—is whether we want a peace settlement in Europe or the continuation of the arms race and the cold war.

Unless I misread the signs, this impending meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers will either signal the beginning of a process which leads to the reunification of Germany, the healing of the great scar across the face of Europe, and the ultimate making of a European peace settlement—or else it will finalize the partition of Germany, the partition of Europe and the probability of eventual conflict.

The outcome lies very largely in our hands. It will be decided at least as much by the President and the Secretary of State, *before Mr. Acheson goes to the conference,* as by what happens at the conference itself.

Let us recall at least the high-spots of the history which leads up to this meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Five and one-half long years ago, a war-weary world entrusted the formulation of a European peace settlement to this body, composed of the highest representatives of the so-called "Big Four"—the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union. During the first year and a half of its existence, the Council succeeded in making peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Our then Secretary of State,

the Honorable James F. Byrnes, proceeded on the theory that it would be best to approach the European peace settlement peripherally—that is, to reach agreement first where, presumably, it would be the easiest, leaving the difficult core of the problem, in Germany and Austria, for the last.

As I saw it then, and still see it now, this was a mistake. The postponement of any attempt to reach a German settlement prevented an early realization of the serious defects in the Potsdam Agreement for the four-power government of Germany and permitted these defects to create wholly unforeseen and extremely serious difficulties. Even worse, the postponement of discussion of a German settlement obscured for much too long the basic disagreements which existed not only between Russia and the Western powers but also among the Western powers themselves. The result of Mr. Byrnes' peripheral approach was a rapidly deteriorating picture within Germany which, in turn, contributed to the exacerbation of the tensions among the occupying powers. It was not until December, 1946, that the Council finally decided to take up the German problem and then it did no more than arrange for a conference to be held at Moscow in March, 1947.

In January, 1947, General Marshall became Secretary of State. The long-brewing crisis in Greece was at that time coming to a head. Just before Secretary Marshall left for Moscow, President Truman reached the decision to intervene in Greece and Turkey. His sudden enunciation of the belligerent yet ambiguous Truman Doctrine coincided with Secretary Marshall's arrival in Moscow. This pronouncement was intended to strengthen the Secretary's hand in negotiating a German settlement by giving evidence of what the Secretary himself described as "the assumption of a military posture." My own belief at the time was that the announcement of this major departure in American foreign policy created the worst possible auspices for the Moscow Conference. Be that as it may, the Moscow Conference failed, but in failing, it at least served to bring out clearly the hitherto obscured basic disagreements. These were, in major essence, two.

The first concerned reparations out of current German production. The Russians had been taking, and insisted upon their right to continue to take, a large part of the product of their zone of occupation in payment of the reparations to which they claimed title under the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements. (The French, incidentally, were doing much the same thing on a very small scale.) Britain and the United States contended that,

under the Potsdam Agreement, reparations out of current production could be taken only when and if Germany as a whole should have an export surplus, and not while German exports were still insufficient to pay for the needed imports of food, as they were at the time. Actually, through the breakdown of the Potsdam plan, a situation had arisen in which the United States and Britain were pouring money into one end of Germany while Russia was drawing it out at the other. No compromise was reached on this problem at the Moscow Conference.

The second major point of disagreement concerned the terms upon which the now frozen zonal barriers might be lifted and unification brought about, both economically and politically. The Russians insisted upon a strongly centralized unitary government. The Western powers favored varying degrees of decentralization. The negotiating position of the West was seriously impaired by disagreement between the United States and Britain on the one side and France on the other, France fearing even the federal republic favored by London and Washington and seeking to create merely a loose confederation of German states. Fundamental to this deadlock was the Russian belief that a strong unitary government would be more susceptible to Russian influence, and the Western conviction that a strong central government would not only be dangerous *because* it might become a Soviet-dominated dictatorship but also because a centralized Germany, even if not dominated by Russia, might one day again become a military menace. In addition, the West sought clear guarantees of political freedoms for the individual, while Russia opposed such guarantees, fearing that they would create a barrier to Russian influence. Here again, the Moscow Conference found no solution.

The Council of Foreign Ministers held one other meeting, in December, 1947. This was a perfunctory affair, which took place only because neither the Russians nor the Western powers were willing to assume the onus of refusing to meet. In the preceding summer the cold war had become a hard reality, when the Kremlin refused to cooperate in the Marshall Plan and the Marshall Plan, instead of ending the cold war, became an instrument in that struggle. By December, Washington had reached the conclusion that agreement with Russia had become impossible and that the only thing to do was to create a West German state and make it self-supporting at the earliest possible date.

Thus ended, for the time being, the attempt on the part of the Council of Foreign Ministers to carry out its mandate of making a European peace

settlement. Apart from any assessment of individual blame, the record is not one to be regarded with pride by any of the participants.

The past four years—from the Moscow Conference to the present—have constituted a period in which all thought of a peace settlement has been subordinated to the endeavor of each side to "win" the cold war. During this period the Kremlin has ruthlessly sought to expand the orbit of its power, in Asia as well as Europe; the West, under the leadership of the United States, has sought to arrest Soviet expansion. The result has been the vicious circle of a rapidly mounting arms race which, if continued, will lead to a war in which there can be no victory, and after which there can be no just, and therefore enduring peace.

The problem of Germany is still the central problem of a European peace settlement. Through bankruptcy of statesmanship the "Big Four" walked over a *Pons Asinorum* of their own making into a power struggle which now threatens the entire world with disaster. Through a revival of statesmanship—if there is to be such a revival—the "Big Four" now face what is probably their last opportunity to discharge the responsibility which they assumed in 1945 and abandoned in 1947.

Much water has flowed under the German bridge in the interval. The clearly predictable consequences of accepting a divided Germany in the pursuit of cold-war victory, rather than the pursuit of peace, have come to pass. When the West created a West German Republic in its own image of "political freedom" and "free enterprise", it became inevitable that Russia would create an East German state in its image of totalitarian dictatorship. It also became inevitable that Russia would attempt to oust the Western powers from Berlin—a clearly foreseeable trap into which we stumbled, and out of which we fortunately extricated ourselves by the brilliant improvization of the famous Airlift. When the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia frightened the West into forming a military coalition, later supplemented by the adherence of the United States and Canada through the Atlantic Treaty, and when this treaty was augmented by an American undertaking not merely to go to war, if Western Europe were attacked, but to fight that war on the line of the Elbe river, it became inevitable that each side would try, sooner or later, to rearm the Germans under its control. With both sides seeking to woo German allegiance, there could be no hope of helping the Germans to develop political maturity. With both sides seeking to rearm the Germans in order to fight each other on the soil of the German fatherland, there could be no

expectation that the Germans would, at long last, learn to become a "peace-loving people".

Looking back over this period, it seems almost incredible that a truly well-intentioned nation like ours should have participated in this folly, no matter what the provocation. It seems equally incredible that a nation so experienced as Britain should have been willing to follow our lead. One might have expected the French attitude toward Germany to be charged with emotion born of the bitter experiences of the past. Yet the French, in spite of their early obstructionism and their original demands for unjustifiable annexations of territory, have for the past year contributed the one voice of sanity and reason. The French have not only correctly foreseen the danger and the futility of German rearmament; they have put forward, in the Schuman Plan, the one piece of constructive statesmanship developed by the West throughout this dismal period. It remained for us, last September, to undermine the Schuman Plan by our hasty and ill-considered demand that German forces be included in the Western defense establishment.

The Schuman proposal, to pool the coal and steel production of Western Europe—along with that of "any other nation desiring to participate"—was the first imaginative suggestion not only for healing the cleavages within the West, but for breaking down the barriers between Eastern and Western Europe. So long as there was no talk of German rearmament, the Germans welcomed the proposal as offering their only chance of rejoining the European family of nations. Negotiations were begun. And then, under the influence of Korea, we blundered in with our sudden suggestion of German rearmament. At once, the old-line German politicians and industrialists saw their opportunity. "If they need us as a fighting force", they said, "why should we give up control of our coal mines and steel mills?" Until General Eisenhower put at least a temporary quietus upon the idea of rearming Western Germany, the Schuman Plan was dead as a dodo. Whether or not it comes to life again—and whether or not it comes to life in its original form or as a giant restrictive cartel—depends upon what happens when the Council of Foreign Ministers convenes after its four year vacation.

This brings me to the decision with which we are now confronted. As already stated, that decision is whether we do or do not wish now to seek a European peace settlement.

The Council of Foreign Ministers is not about to resume its function because we desired a meeting. Quite the contrary is the case. The Council

is about to meet because the Russians stated, last October, that they would not tolerate the contemplated rearming of Western Germany and demanded a meeting of the Council to discuss a renewal of the Potsdam pledge against remilitarization and the carrying out of the Potsdam Agreement for the creation of a peaceful and united German nation. Our first inclination was to rebuff this proposal as a piece of "effrontery". The French inclination was to welcome a meeting. The official British reaction was indecisive. Since October, there has been a voluminous exchange of diplomatic notes, in which the Western powers have tried to broaden the agenda for the meeting so as to include all the various existing causes of tension, while the Russians have sought to confine the discussions as closely as possible to Germany. The Russian notes have been couched in the now familiar language of distortion, vilification, and assumed Kremlin infallibility. The Western replies, particularly those drafted in Washington, have borne the equally familiar hallmark of weary patience maintained with increasing difficulty. They have breathed an atmosphere of "We'll go through it all again, if we must, but, of course, no good will come of it".

This atmosphere must be changed before our Secretary of State goes to a meeting which may well open or close for good the door that leads to a peaceful settlement. Certainly nothing can be expected of the conference, if we go to it without an affirmative plan of our own. If we go simply in order to defeat the Russian plan, whatever it may be, we shall continue along the present road to disaster.

As a matter of fact, we know what the Russian plan is. The Russians told us all about it last October. Strangely enough, the Russian plan looks very much like our own plan for a German settlement before we abandoned hope of reaching a settlement, in 1947.

The Russians have proposed the unification of Germany. This was our aim from 1945 to 1947. At that time two obstacles stood in the way: reparations and disagreement as to the terms of unification.

But, last October, the Russians proposed—and I quote their language—"the removal of all hindrances to the development of a peaceful German economy". Now, if this phrase means anything at all, it means that the Russians are willing to forego further reparations, probably because they think they have extracted about everything they can extract from their puppet state. If true, this removes one of the two barriers that stopped us at Moscow four years ago.

The Russians have also indicated—less clearly, because this is obviously a bargaining point—that they may be ready to permit free elections and the

maintenance of the political freedoms in the whole of a unified Germany. This could be true if, from the Russian point of view, a democratic Germany (in the Western sense) appears as less of an evil than a rearmed Western Germany. The hypothesis makes sense to me because the Politburo, while perhaps not too sincerely alarmed over the inclusion of 250,000 Germans in a Western defense force, may in fact be very much alarmed over the possibility that, once rearmed, the Germans might slip out from under NATO control and go off on military adventures of their own. In this respect Russian fear of Germany is rather similar to French apprehension. Neither is, in my judgment, unfounded.

Be this as it may, it is, to say the least, possible that the second great obstacle encountered at Moscow may also now be removed.

Why, then, has our Government been so reluctant?

It has been reluctant because the attainment of its own aims in Germany now runs counter to its program of pursuing the cold war until it has built the much discussed "situations of strength" from which it wishes to negotiate. The truth is that our Government is caught between two contradictory policies, one of which it must give up or change. It wants to make Western Europe defensible against Russian invasion *before* it negotiates a peace settlement. To do this, our Government thinks it must rearm Western Germany. On the other hand, our Government wants to arrive at a peace settlement based upon a unified, peaceful and democratic Germany. This is irreconcilable with seeking to integrate the rearmed half of Germany—two-thirds would be more accurate—in an anti-Soviet coalition.

The solution seems to me quite simple. More by accident than design, we have now maneuvered the Russians into a position where they are apparently willing to unify Germany on *our* political terms, to give up reparations, to sign a peace treaty, to end the occupation and withdraw occupation forces. *In other words, the threat of German rearmament has apparently given us the very "situation of strength" we needed to attain our ends.* Then why not negotiate and find out whether this is true? And, if it is true, why not give up German rearmament in order to obtain the kind of peace settlement we have vainly sought for five years?

As I see it, by foregoing German rearmament, we should not be giving up anything of real value to us in any case. Rearming Western Germany would not add to the strength of a West European defense, because the conditions on which West Germany might fight for the West would be precisely those conditions which would make France unwilling to fight. This

has become abundantly clear in recent months. Furthermore, rearming Germany would actually add to Russian military strength, because it would make willing allies out of such presently unenthusiastic satellites as Poland and Czechoslovakia. On the other hand, rearming Germany would almost certainly eliminate what hope remains of helping the Germans to become a peace-loving people; it would utterly destroy what little value there may have been in our democratic teaching. And, finally, rearming Germany and building up a huge army along the Elbe river would be the most provocative thing we could do—the one course most likely to bring on a Russian invasion before we were ready to meet it. It did not take General Eisenhower long to come to these conclusions.

Because our proposal to rearm Germany was, in itself, a foolish proposal—for the reasons just stated—I said, a moment ago, that we have attained our ends more by luck than good management. Shall we now be so unwise, so stubborn, so concerned with saving face as not to take advantage of this stroke of good fortune?

Shall we now pursue the cold war as an end in itself, forgetting that we reluctantly embarked upon it only as a means toward reaching a peaceful settlement?

I submit that the number one item of the President's instructions to Mr. Acheson, when he goes to the conference, should read:

You are authorized to make it clear that, if a settlement of the German question can be reached under which a freely elected All German Government will be enabled to guarantee the political freedoms to all German citizens, under which a just and honorable peace treaty may be negotiated, demilitarization assured and occupation forces gradually withdrawn, then the United States will gladly withdraw its suggestion for the inclusion of German forces in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

If our Secretary of State were to begin the discussions with a statement of that sort, defining precisely what we mean by "political freedoms", the Council would at once buckle down to the problem which lies at the heart of its assignment. If real progress were made toward reaching agreement on Germany, the Council would then find it infinitely easier to move forward on the question of the long-delayed Austrian Treaty. This, in turn, would open the way to a discussion of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria; and, finally, to a general discussion of the gradual reduction of all armed establishments.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Acheson follows the past pattern of the peripheral approach—seeking to begin with a discussion of the Austrian

Treaty or the troops maintained by or in the Soviet Satellites, and leaving the initiative, so far as Germany is concerned, to Mr. Vyshinsky—then I should say that the chances of a constructive outcome will be slim. We shall then, in all probability, witness merely another sorry spectacle of procedural wrangling and propaganda speeches, in which the relatively polite rebuttals of the West will be no less indicative of moral and intellectual bankruptcy than the slanderous vituperations of Andrei Vyshinsky.

The objection may be raised that a German peace settlement at this time, which would in effect "neutralize" Germany in the cold war, would "lay the great workshop of Europe wide open to Soviet aggression or subversion."

So far as military aggression is concerned, I am not suggesting that we abandon our commitment to defend Western Europe. As an alternative to German rearmament, I proposed some months ago that we and the British agree to maintain—not in Germany, but in France and the low Countries—an Anglo-American garrison of at least twenty divisions, provided that this force would be at least matched by our Continental allies. This army would be no further from the Rhine than the Russian army would be from the Oder. It would be a far more reliable force than one which included Germans. It would be far less provocative because it would not include Germans, and because it would not be built up, as is now contemplated, right up against a Russian army across the Elbe river.

As for political subversion of a "neutralized" Germany, why should we fear that Russian influence would be stronger than that of the West? Wendell Willkie once remarked that he could not understand why so many Americans made the assumption that, where democracy and communism come into contact, communism is likely to win. Why should we assume that a truly free German people—by which I mean a people freed not only from foreign coercion but from renascent native reaction—should be susceptible to communist conspiracy? This danger will be real only if a free Germany becomes a land in which the masses are discontented, which means, if the government pursues policies that allow the rich to become richer while the poor grow poorer. If Western influence is directed toward true democracy, why should we fear that the German people will fall for the false promises of the East?

The assumption that a "neutral" Germany will necessarily fall prey to the Kremlin is defeatism of the most dangerous variety.

Let me make certain that I have made my major point unequivocally clear.

No matter what the Russians have done or failed to do in the past—no matter how untruthful their often repeated allegations as to our motives and actions—no matter how churlish the behavior of their negotiators—there is now *apparently*—and I repeat, *apparently*—a real chance that a German peace settlement can be achieved.

A German peace settlement is fundamental to a peace settlement in Europe. A European peace settlement is a prerequisite for the establishment of enduring peace throughout the world.

Even if a kindly history should absolve us of all blame for what has happened up to this moment, history will not forgive us if we fail—through stubbornness, or pride, or stupidity—to make the most of this opportunity.

May it be given to those harassed and overburdened men, in whose hands rests not only our future but the future of all mankind, to seize upon this moment and to make it the turning point toward peace.

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Perhaps I am an optimist. Perhaps, in calling this pamphlet "Turning Point Toward Peace?"—even with the questionmark—I am attaching undue significance to certain signs of reawakened courage and common sense.

Yet it is a fact that the American people have, within the last month, become aroused, as they have not been aroused since Pearl Harbor, to the dangers which confront our nation. It is a fact that, in both Houses of Congress, the representatives of the American people are not only asking questions but suggesting answers.

Undoubtedly it would be over-optimistic to conclude—because we have at last aroused ourselves from the state of apathy in which we have been drifting toward war—that we are now safely on the road to peace. But the fact is that we are now facing, for the first time since the war, the two major questions which will probably determine the future of mankind. We are facing the economic challenge of our time, which is to find a way of conducting a successful worldwide war upon hunger, want and human misery. We are facing the political challenge, which is to find a way of so organizing world society that violence and the threat of violence may be forever banished from this earth.

We have not found the answers to these questions. But we have, at long last, begun to seek the answers. That is no justification for complacency, but it does seem to me sufficient reason to view the future with hope.

J. P. W.

February 22, 1950.

A Man From Mars Takes a Look

(Introduction to two lectures on the need for an affirmative policy toward peace, delivered in January, 1950, at the New School for Social Research in New York City.)

If the proverbial Man from Mars were to pay us a sudden visit, in order to make a report on the doings of our nation in the field of foreign affairs, he would probably begin by trying to answer the following question:

"Is American foreign policy based upon the assumption that war with the Soviet Union is highly probable, if not inevitable? Or is it based upon the belief that there is still a reasonable chance of making and preserving a just peace?"

The answer may be obvious to us, but it would not be immediately evident to a man from another planet.

In trying to understand American policy, the Man from Mars would first have a look at our national budget. He would find that we are spending, in one way or another, about seventeen billion dollars a year on preparation for war, as against about four billion dollars a year on constructive efforts to build the peace. Taken by themselves, these figures would suggest to him that our policymakers are acting on the assumption that war is very likely, if not inevitable.

Our visitor would then examine *how* we are spending the seventeen billion dollars a year on preparedness, and this would puzzle him still further. He would find that less than half of this huge sum is being spent to maintain and equip combat forces—that more than half of it goes to the maintenance of a swollen overhead "defense establishment."

Looking, next, at some maps of this unfamiliar planet the Man from Mars would find that, in one direction, our country is separated from its potential enemy by three thousand miles of Atlantic Ocean plus several hundred miles of West European territory, whereas, in the opposite direction, less than a hundred miles separate our Alaskan Territory from the Soviet Union. He would find that, to defend our

Atlantic frontier, we had recently undertaken to rearm the West European countries and had promised, in the event of war, to help them hold off a Rusian invasion somewhere in Central Germany or, at worst, at the Rhine. He would perhaps be somewhat shocked to find that, in spite of this commitment, we have only two divisions of combat troops in Germany and that we possess in all only about ten divisions which we could send to Germany if Russia were to launch an attack. Considering that Russia could attack with fifty to a hundred divisions and that Western Europe has only about a dozen divisions of its own with which to oppose an invasion, this arrangement puzzles our friend from Mars. However, he is even more startled to discover what we are doing on our Pacific frontier. He finds us acutely worried about an island, called Formosa, lying off the Chinese coast some five thousand miles from our shores, but apparently not in the least disturbed about the safety of our own Alaskan Territory. He would learn that the Governor of Alaska had recently complained that two Russian airborne divisions, launched from nearby Siberia, could easily capture his whole Territory. This would really cause our Martian friend to rub his eyes, because, from Alaska, it would appear that Russian bombers could easily reach our vital centers of production.

Speaking of these vital centers, our visitor would look in vain for any major program of dispersing our production, or of protecting our civilian population against what he finds are here referred to as the "modern weapons of mass destruction." These weapons—atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, and such—are, of course, hopelessly antiquated from the Martian's point of view. Nevertheless, he wonders how we intend to protect ourselves against them. He is reasonably sure that we, on this planet, have not yet discovered—as people have on other planets—that victory and defeat in a truly modern war have become indistinguishable from each other. He figures that, if we knew war to be utterly futile, not to say suicidal for victor and vanquished alike, we would not be preparing for war.

Assuming our ignorance of these facts, which have long been axiomatic on his own planet, our friend from Mars is unable to understand why—if we are preparing for war—our preparations should be so obviously inadequate to insure victory, or even to insure our own reasonable safety. This leads him to study what we Americans have been thinking and saying.

His conclusion from this study is even more baffling. He finds, from a careful analysis of our press and the statements of our officials, that we are not preparing for war at all but, rather, *that we are preparing for war to prevent war.* He concludes that what we *think* we are doing is to prevent Russia from starting a war by making ourselves so strong that military adventure against us will look unattractive. This still does not explain our puny combat forces, nor a wide-open Alaska, nor our undefended cities, but it gives him a glimmering of what we are up to. He thinks: "Maybe this idea has worked before on this curious planet." And so he studies a bit of Earth history.

Our troubled friend finds plenty of evidence that weak nations on this Earth have been attacked by strong nations, but very little evidence to show that preparation for war has worked out as an actual insurance against attack. He is particularly impressed by the discovery that, in 1941, Germany suddenly attacked a rather thoroughly prepared Russia. He studies German documents and finds that Germany finally decided to launch her long-contemplated attack upon Russia *precisely because Russia was preparing a defense* and because it seemed wise to Hitler to strike before the Russian preparations could be completed.

This would indicate to our Martian that any Earth nation, which seeks to prevent war through preparedness for war, had better prepare as fast as possible and as secretly as possible, so as not to provoke attack before it is ready. But here again he is puzzled, because this curious American nation seems to be making its preparations with a great deal of publicity and in a most leisurely manner, pausing every now and then to examine whether it can afford this or that item in its military budget.

"Perhaps," he thinks, mopping his brow, "these peculiar people are really betting on peace after all. But—if they are—why don't they do something about it? Why are they spending so little of their thought, energy and ingenuity—not to mention resources—on finding a way to make peace and preserve it?"

"Why," he says, "don't they move toward disarmament under world law and world law enforcement?"

"Why don't they really tackle the problem of applying the technological knowledge they possess to the elimination of hunger, poverty, disease

and ignorance? Don't they know that most of the human misery in their world is technologically obsolete?"

Finally, our friend from Mars comes to this rather sad conclusion about us, and this is what he decides to report to his superiors.

"American foreign policy, which you asked me to evaluate, seems to be a straddle between hope and fear. The American people appear to be hoping for a peace which they have not been able fully to envision, and half-preparing for a war which they do not dare fully to contemplate. This procedure seems hopelessly inadequate for the conditions which exist on the Earth, although other Earth peoples seem likewise to be following it. So far as I can see, the result will be that eventually these poor Earth inhabitants will drift into the same sort of catastrophe which finally depopulated planet S-23."

And so, shaking his head, he mounts his rocket and goes home.

Bidding farewell to our friend from Mars, let me now come down to Earth and state in one sentence what I think is wrong with our present foreign policy:

We are permitting fear of war and preparation for war so to preoccupy our minds and so to preempt our resources that we are prevented from making our maximum effort toward peace.

Granted that in the existing circumstances we must remain strong, we cannot afford to allow the existing circumstances to prevail indefinitely. Nor can we ignore the fact that there is a point beyond which preparation for war to prevent war defeats its own purpose. We are, I think, perilously near that point.

If our Government yields to the pressures which will cause us to devote still more of our own resources to the arms race—if our Government retreats from its avowed determination not to rearm Germany, or to divert Western Europe from recovery to rearmament—if our Government yields to the advice of those who would embroil us in futile military adventures in the Far East—then we shall very quickly pass beyond what airmen call "the point of no return."

If, on the other hand, we make up our minds to shift the emphasis to affirmative action toward peace, I am convinced that we can still achieve peace.

The longer we wait, the more difficult becomes the required change of direction.

If we believe that peace is still possible, the time has come for bold, imaginative and positive action toward peace.

(The substance of the two lectures, which followed this introduction, was a statement of the need for: (1) a comprehensive, overall approach, through the United Nations, to the world economic problem; and (2) the unequivocal recognition of the inadequacy of the present United Nations structure and a program for amending it.)

Turning Point Toward Peace?

The end of January, 1950, saw the low point in American post-war policy. The decision to develop and manufacture the hydrogen bomb was "the inevitable next step" in a policy of seeking peace by preparing for war. Various forms of pleas for a more affirmative leadership toward peace poured into the White House from many different groups and individuals in almost every part of the country. One such petition was circulated by the author and sent to the President on January 31, with the signatures of over 160 citizens from 28 different states in the Union. Among the signers were leading educators, clergymen, lawyers, editors, writers and businessmen.

On February 2, Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut made his now famous speech. His proposal aroused the hopes of multitudes of anxious citizens. Likewise it encountered sharp criticism on the grounds of impracticability, and a blunt rebuff from the Administration. Secretary of State Acheson described it as a statement of our goal "without any instructions as to how to get there."

Feeling that the Senator's speech did contain very definite and valuable constructive proposals, but that these proposals were tied to a proviso which rendered them inoperative, the author utilized the occasion of the "Point Four" Conference, held on February 11, by the Post-War World Council, to make the following statement.

Senator McMahon's Peace Bomb

I.

Is it a Plan or Just a Hope?

The speech delivered in the United States Senate on February 2, 1950, by the Honorable Brien McMahon, may well go down in history as the turning point in post-war United States policy. On the other hand, it is also quite possible that its echoes will die away within a few weeks or months, if the flame of hope which it kindled is allowed to flicker and die out.

For the first time since the cold war began, one of the major architects of United States foreign policy stood up and denounced the sterility of the present negative approach to peace—denounced as hopelessly outworn the ancient motto: "He who wants peace had better prepare for war." This was the beginning of hope.

But Senator McMahon did more than merely repudiate the idea that security can be attained through maintaining the greatest arsenal of destructive weapons. He put forward a constructive proposal for an affirmative approach to peace. Was this proposal a workable plan for peace? Or was it merely the expression of a desperate anxiety that a workable plan for peace should be developed?

Briefly stated, Senator McMahon proposed that, if the Soviet Union would accept effective international control of atomic energy, the United States should declare itself willing to cut its military expenditures from fifteen to five billion dollars a year, and to contribute the ten billion dollars so saved to a worldwide economic recovery program, channeled through the United Nations. The Senator envisaged a cooperative program, to which other nations would likewise contribute—a program lasting perhaps five years and calling for a total contribution of fifty billion dollars from the United States. The present European Recovery Program, the Point Four Program, atomic energy development and, presumably, all other programs of economic rehabilitation and development would be combined in this single overall plan. Under it, all nations, including the Soviet Union, would be eligible for assistance.

This proposal falls into two parts: the proposal itself, and the conditions upon which it was put forward. Let us consider each separately.

II.

The Concrete Proposal.

The plan itself recognizes and squarely meets several major defects in our present foreign aid policies.

By implication, it recognizes the futility of all *military* aid as opposed to *economic* assistance. Explicitly, as to economic assistance itself,

Senator McMahon's proposal corrects three major errors in our present procedures:

1. We have so far been attempting to deal with isolated parts of the world economy without an overall concept or plan. For example, we are trying desperately to "integrate" Western Europe by one major effort, while making another wholly separate effort to raise the living standards of the so-called underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa and the Middle East. We have so far overlooked the fact that parts of Western Europe are actually much more closely "integrated" with parts of Asia, Africa and the Middle East than they are with each other.

Senator McMahon's plan recognizes the need for a single, coordinated, worldwide effort, applied at whatever may be the points of maximum leverage on the world's economy.

2. We embarked, in 1947, upon a wholly negative concept of extending economic and military aid wherever needed to contain Soviet-communism. We then tried to switch to a positive approach, when Secretary Marshall, in launching his well-known project, declared: "Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos." Our attempt to make this switch was frustrated by Molotov's famous walk-out, which doomed the Marshall Plan to become primarily an instrument in the negative cold war. (It is beside the point of this discussion to speculate upon what would have happened, if Russia had accepted Secretary Marshall's invitation.) In January, 1949, President Truman made a second start toward an affirmative policy, when he enunciated the Point Four principle. This declaration of principle remains as yet unimplemented and the legislation now before Congress would, if enacted, constitute only a very small first step in its execution.

Senator McMahon's proposal carries the affirmative emphasis over into the whole of our foreign economic assistance effort. It restores the original Marshall Plan concept.

3. We have been operating, in our foreign aid programs, almost wholly outside the United Nations. The basic tenet of our policy has been to strengthen the United Nations; nevertheless, we have acted unilaterally in Western Europe, in Greece and Turkey, and in China.

President Truman's Point Four program will apparently attempt to channel at least some of the proposed technical aid through the United Nations, but most, if not all, of the needed capital investments are expected to flow unilaterally from the United States to the participating countries, in accordance with bilateral bargains made outside of the United Nations.

Senator McMahon's proposal recognizes the need for channeling the whole program through the United Nations.

These are three major contributions to the making of an American policy that might lead to enduring peace. There is a fourth contribution implicit in the Senator's proposal.

Because we have committed so large a part of our resources to military preparations and to European aid, we have arrived at the crisis in Asia, feeling impoverished. Our budget is heavily out of balance. Taxes are already burdensome. Therefore, whatever we do in Asia must, we think, be done without spending any substantial funds from our Treasury. This led President Truman to speak of "our vast imponderable resources" and to think in terms of technical advice rather than financial assistance. Since then, however, it has become clear that technical advice without substantial help in carrying it into effect would be of no great usefulness, and so we have built a Point Four program on the hypothesis that private investors can be induced to provide the necessary capital. To a very great extent, I believe this hypothesis to be an illusion, especially in the initial stages of the program.

Senator McMahon's proposal would make aid to the underdeveloped areas an integral part of an overall program financed largely by government contributions channeled through the United Nations. This would in no way preclude private investment. It would, on the contrary, create the only conditions in which private capital might be willing and able to make an important contribution.

We see, then, that the McMahon proposal might, if reduced to a practicable plan, cure precisely those defects from which our past efforts have suffered, and from which the Point Four program will suffer, if we pursue our present course.

III.

The Self-negating Proviso.

Let us now consider the conditions upon which this extremely interesting proposal has been put forward.

The whole plan rests upon the assumption that the United States can save ten billion dollars a year (two-thirds of its present military budget). This assumption, in turn, rests upon Russian acceptance of a modified Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic energy.

Various commentators have pointed out that this point of departure negates the whole proposal and makes it merely a clever propaganda maneuver. They have pointed out that, if Russia would not accept the Baruch Plan when we had an atomic monopoly, she would certainly not accept it now; in other words, that the Baruch Plan is out of date.

This criticism seems to me wide of the mark. It is true that the Baruch Plan is out of date. But I can find no conclusive evidence in the Senator's speech to suggest that he would object to modifying it, so long as it remained an enforceable plan fortified by the right of inspection. The real difficulty lies elsewhere.

The Acheson-Lilienthal report, from which the Baruch Plan derived, was a revolutionary document. It said, in so many words, that there was no way to prevent the construction and probable use of atomic weapons, short of establishing a World Authority capable of enacting, administering and enforcing law. The Baruch Plan was, in effect, a plan for the establishment of world government in the field of atomic energy.

Now the amazing thing was this: we, the United States, were willing to put forward this far-seeing proposal and to abide by it, *but without recognizing the revolutionary nature of our own proposition.* It never occurred to us that the principle, which we recognized as valid with respect to atomic weapons, was equally valid with regard to *all* weapons. We talked about government under law with respect to "A" bombs, but went on talking about international anarchy with respect to TNT bombs. This

is something like a community which decides to outlaw murder by the use of firearms, enacts a law to that effect and hires a policeman to enforce it, but leaves murder by knives, hatchets and poison to the discretion of individuals. For what, pray, is any attempt to control so-called conventional armaments by treaty between sovereign nation-states, other than leaving the use of such armaments to the discretion of the individual governments?

The trouble with the Baruch Plan—even if brought up to date—is that it deals only with one type of weapon. It outlaws *one method* of waging war. What we need to do is to outlaw *all* weapons of aggression. What we need to do is to outlaw *war itself*.

The puzzling thing about Senator McMahon's proposal is that he did not make *this* the condition—if there was to be a condition—for the adoption by the United States of an affirmative policy towards peace. It would be less puzzling, if Senator McMahon had not himself sponsored a resolution, now before both Houses of Congress, which would make the development of the United Nations into a world federation the avowed aim of American policy. In signing his name to this resolution, Senator McMahon recognized that there can be no peace without a world organization capable of enacting, administering and enforcing world law, in such a way as to prevent aggression by any nation against another with *any* weapons of force—from hatchets to "H" bombs.

Why not, then, combine two bravely taken positions of wise statesmanship into one? It seems to me that, were he to do this, Senator McMahon would have a theoretically impeccable plan.

It is true that the proposals thus modified would still not be a practicable plan, because the Russians would hardly accept world government with regard to *all* weapons any more readily than they would accept the enforcement of law with regard to one type of weapon. This brings me to the final observation I should like to make concerning the Senator's proposal.

IV.

The Plan Made Realistic.

If the policy suggested by Senator McMahon is a wise policy for the United States to pursue, why must it be made conditional upon any Russian action?

The obvious answer is that we cannot afford to cut our military expenditures by ten billion dollars a year, unless there is an effective agreement to disarm; and that, unless we can save the ten billion dollars out of our military budget, we cannot afford to spend them on economic reconstruction.

The first half of this answer must be accepted as correct. Disarmament by example will get us nowhere.

The second half of the answer seems to me open to question. Suppose we take for granted that no effective disarmament agreement is possible at the present time, and that we cannot, therefore, count on any substantial saving in our military budget. Is it so certain that we cannot afford to go ahead nevertheless with the constructive program put forward by Senator McMahon?

To begin with, we should not be talking about a net increase of ten billion dollars a year in our expenditure. The money we are now spending in Western Europe and in other parts of the world for purely economic aid—excluding military assistance—comes to at least four billion dollars a year. If these existing programs were integrated, as proposed, in the new overall plan, we should be adding only six billions to our annual expenditure. Thus, the five year program would cost us thirty—not fifty billions. Furthermore, it seems reasonably certain that, with or without the overall McMahon plan, we shall have to spend considerable sums in Asia and the Middle East during the next five years, if we intend to hold our own in a continuing cold war. It is, therefore, fair to say that the adoption of the McMahon plan *without any conditions whatever* would probably not add more than four or five billion dollars a year to our expenditures.

Can we afford such an increase?

I should like to put the question to you in reverse: Can we afford *not* to undertake such a plan? The last war cost us over one trillion four hundred billion dollars. *It cost us more per week than this program would cost us per year.* No one knows what the next war would cost.

Clearly we *can* afford it, if the program can reasonably be expected to get us off the greased slide that leads to atomic war and on to the long and arduous road that leads to peace.

I, for one, believe that Senator McMahon has outlined a plan that can reasonably be expected to lessen the existing tensions, to strengthen the United Nations, to put the United States into an unassailable moral position and to improve the lot of mankind. I believe that the United States should embark upon such a plan without making its decision subject to whatever the Kremlin may or may not be willing to do at the present time.

Secretary of State Acheson has said that the only agreements that can be made with the Kremlin are agreements which rest upon existing facts. Let us, then, present the Kremlin with a fact far more powerful than our decision to develop and manufacture ever more horrible weapons of destruction. Let us present the Kremlin with the fact that the United States is determined, in spite of its military burdens, to commit an act of faith—to dedicate its great strength to constructive cooperation with all the world's peoples in a worldwide crusade against hunger, poverty, disease and ignorance. Let us present the Kremlin with the fact of a challenge not only to its military power but to its purposes, which are the ultimate roots of its power.

V.

Should We Let Russia Participate in the New Overall Plan?

The condition I would attach to Senator McMahon's proposal is one that we shall not be able to impose until we, ourselves, have accepted it. That condition is that only those nations shall be eligible to participate in the plan whose peoples have made known their will to accept the rule of law—not merely in the field of atomic weapons—but in the whole field of

international relations, to the degree necessary in order to outlaw force, or the threat of force, as a method of settling disputes.

Once we declare our own willingness to transform the United Nations into an organization capable of enforcing peace under law, we shall find ourselves in company with the entire non-Soviet world. We shall then be in a position to proceed with our overall cooperative plan hand in hand with the majority of the world's peoples.

When the rulers of the Russian people decide that they, too, wish to participate on these terms, then, at long last, the arms race can come to an end, and all the world's peoples can be released from the burden which lies so heavily upon them, and from the overhanging threat of annihilation which beclouds their lives with fear.

It would, I think, be foolish to think that this can happen in the immediate future as the result of any sort of negotiations. A regime which maintains itself at home by the use of force cannot readily renounce force as an instrument of foreign policy. In the long run, however, even such a regime can be brought to realize—by "demonstration of fact"—that those peoples, who devote their energies to peaceful cooperation, will outstrip the peoples whose governments pursue only the sterile aim of widening the orbit of their own arbitrary power.

The alternatives with which we are faced today are not whether we should or should not "talk to the Russians". The alternatives we face are whether or not to do—in spite of the Russians—what needs to be done and what, in our hearts, we know we should do.

Freed from its self-defeating proviso, Senator McMahon's proposal can become a mighty weapon for peace.

Freed from its own myopic, penny-pinching fears, our Government can use this proposal to end the long nightmare in which we have been living.

Initiative on "The Hill".

Our Department of State has maintained the position, first clearly stated by Secretary Marshall on May 5, 1948, that "the problems today presented to those who desire peace are not questions of structure." In other words, the Department has maintained the position that the United Nations, as at present constituted, would be capable of enforcing peace, if the Russians would allow a just peace to be made, and if the Kremlin would permit the United Nations machinery to function.

The realization that this stubbornly held view is based upon an illusion has been dawning upon large segments of the American public and, recently, upon great numbers of Senators and Congressmen. In the House, 112 Representatives sponsored a resolution (HCR 64), which would make the development of the United Nations into a World Federation the avowed aim of American policy. This federation would be "open to all nations and would have defined and limited powers adequate to preserve peace, through the enactment, interpretation and enforcement of world law." In the Senate, the identical resolution was sponsored by 19 Senators. There has never been so wide a legislative sponsorship for any move initiating a new foreign policy principle.

After extensive hearings in January, the House Foreign Affairs Committee reached a clear majority in favor of recommending the passage of the resolution. It is expected to report shortly. In the Senate, hearings were held during the month of February by the Subcommittee on Foreign Relations. On February 17, I was invited to testify before this committee. The following is the text of my testimony:

"I am aware, Mr. Chairman, of the exigencies of your crowded schedule and of the need to be brief, so as not to transgress upon your courtesy in granting me a hearing.

"The past fifteen years of my life have been devoted almost exclusively to studying the problems of world peace and, especially, the relation of the United States to those problems. These studies led me, ten years ago, to the conclusion that the great question of our time is not whether

One World can be achieved, but whether One World can be achieved by peaceful means.

"We shall have World Government, whether or not we like it. The question is only whether World Government will be achieved by consent or by conquest.

"Today we are faced with a divided world—its two halves glowering at each other across the Iron Curtain. The world's two superpowers—Russia and the United States—are entangled in the vicious circle of an arms race, which more and more preempts energies and resources sorely needed to lay the foundations of enduring peace. We are now on the road to eventual war—a war in which the conqueror will emerge well-nigh indistinguishable from the vanquished.

"The United States does not want this war, and most authorities agree that Russia does not want it. Indeed, why should Russia prefer the unpredictable hazards of war to a continuation of her present profitable fishing in the troubled waters of an uneasy armistice? Yet both the United States and Russia are drifting—and, with them, the entire world—toward the abyss of atomic conflict.

"Mr. Chairman, I am here to testify in favor of Senate Resolution 56, which, if concurrently enacted with the House, would make the peaceful transformation of the United Nations into a world federation the avowed aim of United States policy. The passage of this resolution seems to me the first prerequisite toward the development of an affirmative American policy which would lead us out of the valley of death and despair.

"I am fully aware that the mere passage of this resolution will not solve the complex problems with which we are confronted. Our recognition of the inadequacy of the present United Nations structure, and our declared determination to strengthen that structure by Charter amendment, will not alone overcome the Russian obstacle. But it will, at long last, chart our own goal and enable us to steer a straight course toward a clearly-seen objective. Moreover, it will unite us in purpose with the vast majority of the peoples of the non-Soviet world.

"Until we have established this goal, we shall continue to befog and befuddle our own vision by clinging to the illusion that the present

structure of the United Nations would work, if only the Russians would let it work. That has been our position to date.

"Until we establish this goal, we shall continue to ask other peoples to unite with us only in the negative purpose of stopping Russia. Fear-inspired negative action makes poor cement for unity.

"Once we shall have declared a positive purpose—once we shall have cemented the united will of the free peoples in a common aspiration—we shall be in a far stronger position to deal with the obstacles presented to the realization of that purpose.

"Mr. Chairman, I prefer SR 56 to other resolutions now before you for two major reasons:

"First: SR 56 goes to the root of the evil in the present state of international anarchy. It recognizes that there is no cure for this evil short of making the United Nations into a universal organization capable of enacting, interpreting and enforcing world law to the degree necessary to outlaw force, or the threat of force, as an instrument of foreign policy. It states the objective in unequivocal terms.

"Second: SR 56 does not commit the United States to any specific next steps to be taken toward the attainment of the objective. In the present state of world affairs, it would seem to me unwise to commit ourselves to any fixed plan of action, without first exploring all the possibilities.

"In contrast to SR 56, other proposals before you seem to me either to set a goal short of what is needed to ensure peace, or to foreclose the ultimate attainment of a universal organization by an over-eager acceptance of half measures, on the theory that half a loaf is better than none.

"Limitations of time prevent my going into detail, but I should like to state specifically the conviction that any *exclusive* partial federation, such as the Atlantic Union, would not only serve to harden the existing cleavages in a divided world, *but would create new and dangerous cleavages within our half of the divided world.*

"I should like to make clear, Mr. Chairman, that I do not minimize the many and complicated problems which will remain to be solved, once SR 56 is enacted. In due course we shall have to define more closely what

we mean by world government and by what steps we propose to get there. I have given considerable study to these problems. I believe them to be soluble—but not by the adoption of any hastily conceived formulae, and —above all—not without exploring patiently and carefully what is in the minds of other peoples, who, while friendly to us, do not share our historical background nor our particular political or economic prejudices and predilections.

"If we seek peace under law by common consent, we cannot expect to impose our imprint upon the world. We must be prepared to accept some sort of a composite pattern, in which we may preserve for ourselves the things we cherish, but in which others may be equally free to do the same. We may or may not be able to find a common pattern with the present rulers of Russia. We most certainly can, and must, find a common pattern not only with the peoples of Western Europe but with the peoples of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. Perhaps a shorthand device for stating the point would be to say that we must find a common pattern with Nehru, before we can even think of trying to find a common pattern with Stalin.

"Secretary Acheson said the other day that the only agreements which can usefully be made with the Kremlin are those which rest upon established fact. I think this is true, and not only with respect to Russia. But, as to Russia, the trouble has been that we have been letting the Kremlin create the 'existing facts'.

"One of your colleagues made a speech the other day, which seemed to me to leap straight for the jugular vein in our present foreign policy. Senator McMahon proposed that we create some facts of our own.

"One of the facts, which your colleague specifically proposed to create, would, in my judgment, be far more powerful than our recent decision to develop and manufacture hydrogen bombs. Senator McMahon proposed that we present the Kremlin with the fact of our determination to dedicate our strength to a worldwide, cooperative crusade, waged through the United Nations, against hunger, poverty, disease and ignorance. This is the sort of bold affirmative action in the economic field which could, if pursued, create the climate for the attainment of our political objective—namely, the establishment of a world community living at peace under law.

"Without detracting from the imaginative courage of Senator McMahon's proposal, I regret that, in his first presentation, he has attached it to a self-negating proviso. His plan, so right in itself, would become operative only if a disarmament agreement were first reached with the Kremlin under which the United States could save ten billion dollars a year out of its military budget. This is extremely unlikely.

"Moreover, even if the Russians were to accept a modified Baruch Plan, this would not suffice, because, at best, such a plan would outlaw only one type of weapon and one method of waging war. It would, in effect, establish World Government in the limited field of atomic energy, but it would leave the use of all other types of weapons to the discretion of nation-states dwelling in a state of international anarchy.

"A few days after the Senator spoke, I ventured to put forward an alternative, in which Senator McMahon's worldwide Marshall Plan would not be conditioned upon anything the Kremlin might or might not be willing to do. Under this alternative, we should not wait for Russia. The benefits of the McMahon plan would become immediately available to those countries which made known their will to accept supra-national authority—not only in the field of atomic energy, but in the whole field of international relations—to the extent necessary in order to establish peace under law.

"Obviously, the proposed alternative condition—agreement to outlaw *all* weapons and war itself—is one which we cannot impose until we ourselves have accepted it. But, once we have accepted it, by adopting the concurrent resolution now before you, we shall be in a position to proceed with Senator McMahon's cooperative plan, hand in hand with the majority of the world's peoples.

"Thus we should present the Kremlin with two vital new facts not of its own making:

"1. The united determination of the majority of the world's peoples to establish a rule of law and thus eventually to free themselves from the burden of armaments and the spectre of atomic war; and

"2. The steady progress of the massed forces of humanity embattled in a common crusade against hunger, poverty, disease and ignorance.

"The first of these new facts would, for a time, be static. The avowed aim could not be realized without Russian cooperation.

"The second of these new facts would be dynamic. It would demonstrate how free peoples, devoting their energies and resources to cooperative effort, outstrip those peoples whose governments hold them in the shackles of a police-state, concerned primarily with the perpetuation and aggrandizement of its own power.

"Taken together, these two facts would exert a mounting pressure toward cooperation upon the Kremlin. It is true that a regime, which maintains itself by force at home, cannot readily renounce force as an instrument of foreign policy. Yet even such a regime can, in the long run, be brought to accept new facts which alter its conception of its own self-interest and self- preservation.

"The creation of one such new fact has been boldly proposed by a member of your committee. The creation of the other lies in your hands today.

"In order not to trespass upon your time, Mr. Chairman, I have left a number of gaps in the presentation of the suggested modification of the McMahon proposal. To fill in these gaps, I ask leave to have included in the record of my testimony the paper, already referred to, which was delivered last week at a conference of the Post War World Council in New York."

The two great issues are now before the American people. The decision lies in our hands.

If this pamphlet has helped you to clarify your own thinking, perhaps you may wish to send copies to some of your friends.

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GERMANY AND WORLD PEACE

Past Mistakes and Future Possibilities

By

JAMES P. WARBURG

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GERMANY AND WORLD PEACE

I.

PAST MISTAKES.

The problem of Germany in relation to the establishment of enduring world peace is one with which most of us have been familiar, if not actively concerned, throughout our lifetimes. Those of us who served in two World Wars and who were acutely conscious of the tragic mistakes made after each conflict cannot escape from a sense of repetitive failure. Yet I, for one, do not feel that there is any immutable fate which, in the sense of the ancient Greek tragedies, has fore-ordained a continuation of repetitive disaster. I am convinced that, if we have the common sense and the courage to recognize our mistakes in the past, we shall be able to avoid re-enacting them in the future.

Let me, then, begin by listing what seem to me the outstanding mistakes we have made, or toward the making of which we have contributed, with respect to Germany. In doing so, I shall not delve back beyond the limits of my own first-hand memory.

WORLD WAR I.

My category begins with our repudiation, in 1919, of the basis of a just peace laid down in the famous Fourteen Points of President Woodrow Wilson. It is true that, between the enunciation of the Fourteen Points and the German surrender, the Germans had imposed the disgraceful Peace of Brest-Litovsk upon the Russians, showing clearly what kind of a victor's peace they would have made with the Western Allies, had they been able to win the war. As a matter of retributive justice, this action on the part of the German militarists would have justified a treaty even more harsh than the Peace of Versailles. But, from the point of view of preserving our own moral position and of making a peace which could reasonably be expected to endure, it seems to me that we should have been

wiser to adhere to Wilson's original concept of "peace without victory." Even though the Treaty of Versailles contained provisions for later amendment, which are all too often forgotten because they were not utilized, it is clear, I think, that the impossible reparation clauses imposed upon the Germans not only sowed the seeds of German irredentism but created the basis for the economic catastrophe which befell the Western world in 1929-1932. The idea that the Germans could be forced to pay for the entire cost of the war not only imposed an impossible burden upon Germany, but threw out of true perspective the whole question of inter-Allied war debts, leading to false expectations throughout the Western world, to the rise of economic nationalism, the strangulation of world trade and the eventual collapse of the Western economic system.

The second major blunder in which we participated consisted in aborting the revolution which would have taken place in Germany after the surrender of November 1918, had it not been for Allied intervention. Under paragraph V of the Armistice Agreement, the Allied Armies of Occupation threw out the Workers and Soldiers Councils, which had taken over local authority in many parts of Germany, and restored to power the ousted officials of the Kaiser's Germany. The Western Allies were so frightened of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia—which, at the time, they were trying to help overthrow by military intervention—that they became frightened of *any* revolutionary trend in Germany, for fear lest it follow the Russian pattern. Thus a democratic revolution was strangled at birth, when the only hope for a peaceful Germany rested upon its completion. The failure of the Weimar Republic was, of course, in large measure due to German Social-Democratic weakness and betrayal. But the Western Allies made failure certain by lining up with what they conceived to be "the forces of law and order" against those very elements in Germany which might have produced a peaceful democratic development. As a result, the Junker-industrial-military clique, which had ruled the Kaiser's Germany, was restored to power and lost no time in plotting the resurgence of an aggressive warrior nation.

BETWEEN THE WARS.

On the whole, the period from 1920 to the rise of Hitler is not one in which the United States can be blamed primarily for the errors of Western diplomacy. It is true that our high tariff policy and our insistence

upon the repayment of the Allied war debts contributed to the collapse of world trade. It is true that our repudiation of the League of Nations contributed to the breakdown of that structure. But the United States was not primarily responsible for the dissension between France and Britain, nor for the structural defects inherent in the League of Nations, nor for the fatal policy of appeasement with which the West European nations met the rising threat of fascism. Our mistakes during that period were mostly sins of omission or errors committed here at home; they consisted in following the will-o-the-wisp of the isolationist illusion, in going on a gigantic orgy of speculation, and thus touching off a worldwide economic depression. There was perhaps one moment at which we might have performed a constructive action and at which we failed to do so; it is just barely possible that, if the World Economic Conference of 1933 had succeeded, instead of ending in failure, Hitler might never have come to power and World War II might have been averted. My own view—much as I deplored the failure at the time—is that it was then already too late to avert the rise of fascism.

There was another moment—after the disgraceful betrayal of Czechoslovakia at Munich—when overt aggression by Hitler might have been averted, if the United States had declared that, in the event of war, it would at once stand by the side of the nations resisting Axis aggression. I, for one, publicly advocated precisely this action at the time, but it is probably true that it would have been quite impossible for our government to obtain public support for such a declaration at that moment. Nevertheless, I believe that such a declaration would have served a more useful purpose then, in 1939, than when we finally made it, ten years later, in the Atlantic Treaty. In summary, I would maintain that our mistakes with regard to Germany in the period between the wars were negative rather than postive, arising out of our failure to recognize our changed position in the world and the increased responsibility which that position entailed.

WORLD WAR II.

During the Second World War, the first mistake we made with regard to Germany was, in my judgment, the announcement in January 1943 of the policy of unconditional surrender. The pledges of a just peace contained in the Atlantic Charter, of August 1941, were in many respects

analogous to the pledges of a just peace contained in Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. The Casablanca demand for unconditional surrender seemed to conflict with these pledges and to foreshadow their abrogation. While it is doubtless true that President Roosevelt was the author of the Casablanca statement, as recently stated by Winston Churchill, there is another side to this story which should, in justice to President Roosevelt, be known. Those of us, who were in charge of propaganda warfare against Germany, strongly protested against the unconditional surrender formula as playing directly into the hands of Dr. Goebbels. In May, 1943, I submitted a paper to the President, urging the modification of this formula, because, as shown by prisoner interrogation, the Nazi propaganda machine was most effectively using it to convince the Germans that they had no alternative other than to continue the war until German victory could be achieved. The President was not unfavorably inclined toward a revision and even did some careful editing of the suggested draft. Then Mr. Churchill arrived on one of his visits and, a day or so after his departure, we were told that the President now considered a revision of the formula inappropriate. Mr. Churchill is no doubt justified in saying that Mr. Roosevelt invented the formula, but it seems to me only fair to record that Mr. Churchill was the one who apparently insisted upon sticking to it.

The second great war-time mistake, as regards Germany, was made at Yalta, where it was actually decided to throw overboard the just peace pledged in the Atlantic Charter and to permit both Poland and Russia to annex parts of Germany. This decision logically led to the later annexation by France of the Saar, even though Russia, Poland and France were all bound by the Atlantic Charter Pledges against territorial annexations. Thus, as in 1919, the victorious coalition destroyed its own moral position toward the German people, and thus history began fatefully to repeat itself.

Our third war-time mistake was our failure to develop any sort of a coherent plan for the actions to be taken after German surrender. On the credit side of our ledger stands the fact that we were consistently determined not to repeat the mistake of World War I reparations, nor the mistake of trying to collect war debts from our Allies. On the debit side stands the incredible nonsense of the Morgenthau Plan which, though not adopted in the final analysis, nevertheless poisoned the directive (JCS 1067) under which General Eisenhower had to operate, as well as the Potsdam Plan for the four power government of Germany.

During the period, in 1944, when the battle over post-surrender plans was raging in Washington, I was one of those invited to suggest ideas. The plan which I presented rested upon these assumptions:

1. That only a reasonably prosperous German nation would be a peaceful German nation. (This was in opposition to the Morgenthau school of de-industrialization.)

2. That a reasonably prosperous German nation would be essential to a reasonably prosperous, and, therefore, peaceful Europe.

3. That a divided Germany could not be reasonably prosperous. (This was in opposition to the partitioning of Germany advocated by Mr. Sumner Welles and others.)

4. That it is basically not the possession of an industrial war potential *but the will to use it for war* that makes any nation a threat to peace; and that the all-important security question, as to Germany, would be how to destroy the German will to aggression.

5. That the moral regeneration and re-education of the German people would be primarily a problem which the Germans must solve for themselves; that they must be kept under surveillance until they had demonstrably solved it; but that the sooner the victorious Allies cleared out of Germany and placed this responsibility squarely upon the Germans, the sooner would there be any hope of regeneration.

6. That, once Germany had been thoroughly disarmed, her direct war-plants destroyed, and all military or para-military organizations broken up, the proper task of the victorious Allies would be to see to it that the German people had an opportunity to evolve their own social and political structure, without once again falling into the clutches of the Junker-militarist-industrialist clique which had dominated the German past. That any political or social structure imposed by the conquerors, no matter how excellent, would last only so long as the conquerors maintained it by force. In other words, that the German people must be allowed to work out their own long-deferred revolution and that we must neither seek to prevent such a revolution, as we had in 1919, nor attempt to impose a revolution from without, as Napoleon had done a century before.

This idea of permitting a revolution to occur in Germany—of letting the German people themselves take care of their war criminals to the greatest extent possible—of permitting a certain amount of bloodshed and disorder in the interests of the catharsis to be achieved—all this seemed highly dangerous and unwise to the men who were trying to work out our post-surrender plans. Again, as in 1919, our policy-making was haunted by the spectre of a communist revolution in Germany—as unlikely then as it had been twenty-five years earlier.

That was in 1944, before the Normandy invasion and a year prior to the fateful decisions of Yalta. Once it had been decided at Yalta to divide Germany into four zones of occupation, after first amputating an undetermined amount of territory in the East, and then to attempt the four power rule of Germany by an Allied Control Council, it seemed to me even more obvious that we were headed for disaster. It is hard enough to conceive of a single conquering nation successfully imposing a revolution upon a vanquished people. It was to me altogether inconceivable that four conquerors should succeed even in reaching agreement as to what sort of a revolution they desired to impose. Yet that is precisely what was attempted under the ill-fated Potsdam Agreement of August, 1945.

THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT.

Having stated this background of rather fundamental dissent from our officially adopted policy with regard to Germany, with which you may or may not agree, the following observations will, I hope, seem at least consistent with the beliefs I have expressed.

In the first place, I submit that the Potsdam Plan for the four power government of Germany could not have worked out successfully, even if there had been no Soviet Union involved in the arrangement. It could not have worked out satisfactorily, because no prolonged military occupation could have succeeded in creating a peaceful and democratic Germany; because no four occupying powers could have agreed upon a diagnosis of the German malady, much less upon a cure; and because the Potsdam Plan was contaminated by the Morgenthau theory of making the Germans peaceful through permanent impotence.

In the second place, the four power plan was foredoomed to failure by two major blunders of Western diplomacy committed at Potsdam.

These were: Western acquiescence in an excessive land-grab by Russia and Poland; and Anglo-American failure to establish a complete and workable understanding with France.

The Yalta Agreement to establish the Curzon Line as the frontier between Poland and Russia and to "compensate Poland" for the loss of its eastern provinces "by accessions of German territory in the north and west" was bad enough because it repudiated the Atlantic Charter pledge of no annexations. A reasonable case could have been made for a frank statement that these pledges would have to be somewhat modified in the interests of a peaceful Europe. A reasonable case could have been made for eliminating the strategically provocative enclave of East Prussia, and for the transfer to Polish sovereignty of the coal mines and industries of Upper Silesia, in order to give the new Poland an economy properly balanced between industry and agriculture. In my judgment, there was no justification whatever for allowing Poland to annex the agricultural regions of Lower Silesia, Pomerania and part of Brandenburg. Had Poland been given Upper Silesia and all of East Prussia it would have been amply compensated for the loss of the Polish Ukraine to the Soviet Union. But, at Potsdam, the Russians demanded possession of half of East Prussia for themselves and were granted this demand for no other reason than that they insisted upon it. Having negotiated this steal for themselves, the Russians then insisted that Poland be further compensated by taking over the breadbasket of Eastern Germany; and again the British and American negotiators agreed, taking refuge behind the formal stipulation that the final settlement of Germany's eastern frontier would have to await the signing of the peace treaty.

The result of this major blunder was, first, that some nine million Germans were expelled from their homes and crowded into the western rump of Germany; and, second, that the new truncated Germany was deprived of an area which had formerly supplied the German people with about 25% of their foodstuffs. This meant that the new Germany would have to import about half of its total food supply, instead of roughly one quarter. In other words, by agreeing to the Russo-Polish land-grab in the East, we made it certain that the Germany of the future would either have to live on Western charity, or else become an even more formidable producer and exporter of manufactured goods than it had ever been before. Thus, at the very outset, we coppered our own bet of staking

the creation of a peaceful democratic Germany upon the limitation and control of its industrial production.

The second major blunder made at the beginning of the four power experiment was Anglo-American failure to reach a solid understanding with France. Had the Russians had their way, France would have been excluded altogether from the occupation and management of Germany. At Yalta, however, both Roosevelt and Churchill insisted—rightly, I think—that France be included. Accordingly, the French were given a zone of occupation, carved arbitrarily out of the Anglo-American zones, and a seat on the Allied Control Council. But the French were not invited to attend the Potsdam Conference, at which the Control Council's frame of reference was decided, and they were never thereafter brought in as a signatory of the Potsdam Agreement. In part, this was no doubt due to the contemptuous attitude of Russia toward France, and in part to the hyper-sensitive, chip-on-the-shoulder vanity of General de Gaulle, who was then the French chief of state. But, in even greater measure, the resulting confusion was attributable to an almost incredible lack of foresight on the part of the British and American Governments.

As a consequence, France was placed in a position to obstruct the action of the Allied Control Council—since all its decisions had to be unanimous—without herself being bound by the provisions of the agreement under which the Control Council operated. In addition, the failure of the Potsdam Conference to settle Germany's western frontier, combined with the amputation of the eastern provinces and the forced migration of their populations into the overcrowded western rump, created the very pressures best calculated to arouse French fears. It is therefore not surprising that France, from the very beginning of the German occupation, assumed a dog-in-the-manger attitude, obstructing and vetoing every attempt to manage Germany as an economic and political entity, unless she could first obtain a satisfactory settlement of the Franco-German frontier. If the Allied pledge against annexations was to be jettisoned, France considered herself entitled to annex the Ruhr arsenal in order to protect herself against another German invasion. Failing that, she wanted, at the very least, to see the Ruhr politically separated from any new German nation.

While it is almost certain that the Western Allies would, in any case have encountered serious trouble with Russia in carrying out the dubious

plan concocted at Potsdam, the fact is that, during the first critical months of attempted four power management, it was France—not Russia—which made progress impossible. French obstructionism provided the original excuse for Russian violation of the Potsdam Agreement and, to a large extent, prevented a timely recognition of the basic disagreements which remained to be ironed out with Moscow. Later on, the mounting difficulties with Moscow overshadowed and obscured the unresolved differences which existed between France, Great Britain and the United States—many of which still exist today.

One might say that France should have been satisfied with the guarantees to her security provided by the United Nations Charter, or that French fears of German military resurgence were exaggerated. The fact remains that fear of Germany was so deeply ingrained in the French people as to constitute a factor not to be ignored or over-ridden. British and American failure to take account of this factor produced a long series of misunderstandings and irritations, in the course of which France has been granted some concessions to which she was *not* entitled, without ever being given the guarantee of security to which she *was* entitled.

Anglo-American acquiescence in French annexation of the Saar illustrates this point. This was a concession, contrary to the solemn pledges of the Atlantic Charter and of the United Nations Declaration, which stultified the hitherto relatively clean position—in respect to annexations and "aggrandizement"—of the Western Allies. The annexation of the Saar did nothing to increase French security. On the contrary, it directed German revisionism, which up to that point had been focused on Russia and Poland, against France and the Western Allies as well. Moreover, it became an obstacle to the integration of Western Germany in a West European union.

SUGGESTED REVISION (1946).

In 1946, after an extended visit to the four zones of Germany, I wrote a series of articles later followed by several pamphlets and a book, urging a re-examination of our whole Germany policy. The three major points of which I endeavored to convince our State Department were:

1. That we should insist upon re-opening the question of Germany's eastern frontier, with a view toward seeking a return to Germany—not of Upper Silesia or East Prussia—but of the agricultural eastern provinces.

This was actually attempted by our then Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, but completely bungled by the loose language employed in his famous Stuttgart speech. By not specifying the precise territory he had in mind, Mr. Byrnes created the impression that he was demanding a return to Germany of the Upper Silesian arsenal as well as of the agricultural provinces. This led to an instant Russo-Polish rebuff.

2. That we should unequivocally deny the French demand for annexation of the Ruhr and Saar, or even for the political separation of these areas from Germany; because, without them, a Germany already stripped of Upper Silesia, could never be anything other than a permanent slum in the heart of Europe. On the other hand, I urged upon our authorities *the creation of a European Coal Authority to allocate the production and distribution of coal throughout Europe;* this, I maintained, would give the French the guarantee of security to which they were entitled, because, if the allocation of Ruhr coal were placed in the hands of a supra-national authority, the Ruhr could never again become a German arsenal. This suggestion fell upon barren ground, although it has now again become relevant, since a similar proposal has been put forward by the French Government.

3. Finally, I endeavored to persuade our authorities that the Potsdam Plan was certain to fail—for reasons which I have already indicated—and that it should be superseded by a new agreement, under which the direct four power management of Germany would be ended and supplanted by a prolonged period of observation and control, exercized by civilian commissions and an internationally recruited police force. This suggestion likewise made no headway.

This brings us to the spring of the year 1947, when the United States embarked upon the Truman Doctrine of containment and when Secretary Marshall, then newly appointed, went to Moscow for the last real four power conference on Germany. As you know, this conference ended in a complete deadlock. As I see it, from then on the problem of Germany ceased to be a problem in and of itself; from then on, Germany has been merely one of several battlegrounds in a cold war between Russia and the West; from then on, the real problem of Germany in relation to world peace has been obscured and lost sight of in the frantic maneuverings of a sterile power struggle.

THE COLD WAR.

The frame of reference of today's discussion does not permit an analysis of our whole cold war policy. I can only conclude this part of my paper, which deals with an attempt to analyze our mistakes with regard to Germany, by briefly discussing what I conceive to have been our two major errors on the specifically German battlefield since March, 1947.

Our first cold war mistake in Germany was to accept, as more or less final, the separation of Eastern and Western Germany and to proceed on the assumption that Western Germany could be made into a bulwark against Russia. We did not, it is true, go to the extent of following Herbert Hoover's advice, which was to make a separate peace with a new West German state. But we did take the initiative in creating a West German Republic, thereby making it possible for the Russians unfairly but effectively to lay upon the West the onus of having formally partitioned the German nation. Furthermore, the manner in which this move was undertaken (in combination with a currency reform applied to the Western Sectors of Berlin) provided the Russians with an excuse to carry out the obvious counter-move. It required no prophetic gift to warn, as I did more than six months before the Russian blockade of Berlin, that the creation of a West German state would provoke a Russian attempt to oust the Western Allies from the German capital. Yet we stumbled into the clearly foreseeable Berlin crisis without the slightest idea of what to do when it arose. The brilliant improvization of the Airlift did eventually get us out of the dilemma, and even gained us an unexpected propaganda victory, but the Airlift did not, and could not, solve the Berlin crisis, which, as you know, is still with us today. Moreover, the creation of the West German Republic was followed by the inevitable counter-creation of the East German puppet state, thus freezing the partition of Germany and the partition of Europe.

Our second cold war mistake in Germany was the consequence of the unfulfillable commitment we undertook in the military defense program which accompanied the Atlantic Treaty. By the Treaty itself we undertook to try to prevent a Russian attack upon Western Europe through making it clear that we should regard such an attack as an act of war against ourselves. So far, well and good. But, under the military assistance program, we undertook—very irresponsibly, I think—to defend the

frontiers of Western Europe against invasion, in the event that an attack should occur in spite of the deterrent provided by the Treaty.

This meant, in effect, that we were undertaking to hold off a Russian invasion of Western Europe somewhere in Central Germany. Yet it was abundantly clear that we had no intention of doing any of the things which would be necessary to make the fulfillment of this pledge possible. The West European nations had less than dozen divisions, and not even these were fully trained or equipped. The billion dollars of aid we proposed to furnish would, at best, equip four modern armored divisions. We ourselves had a total combat force of only ten divisions and no intention of sending all our troops to stand guard at the Elbe or the Rhine. The only way in which it seemed possible, even in theory, to make Western Europe defensible against fifty to a hundred Russian divisions thus became the rearmament of Western Germany. For the past six months we have been uncomfortably sitting on the horns of this dilemma. The military men say that there is no way of carrying out their assignment, unless German infantry is included in a Western defense force. The political men—or those of them who have retained a modicum of common sense in spite of the cold war hysteria—recognize that rearming Germany provides no answer at all. For one thing, there would be no guarantee that the Germans would be willing to be remilitarized, or that, if rearmed, they would necessarily fight on our side. For another thing, the rearming of Germany would almost certainly destroy the already dubious fighting morale of France.

Until the whole aspect of the German future was dramatically changed by the French proposal of May 10, the following was the sad state to which our German policy had brought us:

1. In our preoccupation with the cold war against Russia, we had lost sight of the fact that there could be no peace without a united Europe, and that there could be no united Europe without a united Germany. Because the cold war had become an end in itself, we were more concerned with integrating Western Germany in the defense of Western Europe than with uniting Germany and thus laying the foundations of lasting peace.

2. We had reached the point of seriously considering German rearmament—which would destroy whatever hope there might be of the development of a peaceful, democratic German nation—as the only means by which we might fulfill the unfulfillable commitment of the Atlantic Security

Program. Instead of recognizing that the only way to protect Western Europe from being overrun by Russia was to prevent the outbreak of war, we were considering an illusory method of winning a war with Russia—namely by rearming the Germans—and thereby running the grave risk of provoking the very conflict we sought to prevent.

3. In our anxiety to create in Western Germany a bulwark against communism, we had neglected land reform, the reform of the school system, and the protection of the German people against the revived power of the industrial monopolists, thereby helping to recreate those very features of German society which had, in the past, produced an aggressive authoritarian state. By our eagerness to see what we call free enterprise re-established in Germany, we had abetted the elimination of governmental controls from the German economy, thus fostering the re-emergence of a class society with the emphasis upon profits rather than full employment. In our haste to "get things going", we had allowed denazification to become a farce.

When Secretary Acheson went to Europe early last month he took with him nothing but the dismal determination to persuade the leaders of the Atlantic community to adhere steadfastly to the hazardous experiment of containing Russia by "integrating" with a Western Germany which could neither be defended nor trusted to manage or defend itself.

II.

THE RUHR PROBLEM.

When Mr. Acheson became Secretary of State, in January 1949, an agreement had just been signed by Britain, France, Benelux and United States, concerning the future of the Ruhr area. This so-called Ruhr Agreement was then still subject to ratification by the respective governments. Presuming upon a friendship of long standing, I ventured to suggest to Mr. Acheson that this agreement be re-studied and revised.

THE AGREEMENT OF 1948.

You will recall that the Agreement, as signed in December 1948, and subsequently ratified, provided for the establishment of an International Ruhr Authority to "assure disarmament and demilitarization of Germany;

to further recovery of the countries of Europe, including a democratic Germany; and to promote that intimate association of their economic life which in the last analysis alone can assure a peaceful and prosperous Europe." The method by which the Authority was to carry out its three-fold function was through "allocating coal, coke and steel from the Ruhr as between German consumption and export", that is, consumption by other European countries. The language of the Agreement indicated clearly that the intention was to make the allocations consistent with the operations of the Marshall Plan for the recovery of the sixteen nations of Western Europe.

My comments were the following:

"1. The Agreement is good in that it does not fall into the error of attempting a political separation of the Ruhr from Germany, which would inevitably cause active revisionism.

"2. The Agreement is good in that it puts a final quietus on the ridiculous Morgenthau proposal to destroy the productivity of the Ruhr area by removing the industries and flooding the mines.

"3. The Agreement is good in that it attempts at least some integration of German productivity with the needs of Europe.

"On the other hand:

"1. The Agreement imposes upon Germany the duty to accept the permanent regulation of its production in accordance with the needs of Europe, *without imposing a similar obligation upon any other European country*. This is neither wise nor just. It will, in the long run, provoke passive, if not active, resistance. It may well produce a more dangerous form of revisionism than even the political amputation of the Ruhr area.

"2. By perpetuating the emphasis in demilitarization upon the limitation of production, rather than upon the demilitarization of the German mind, the Agreement perpetuates the fundamental error of past occupation policy.

"3. By leaving undecided the question of who is to own the Ruhr mines and industries, the Agreement opens the door to a recapture of control over the German social structure by the very elements which have, in the past, made Germany a warrior nation.

"4. By its acceptance of a divided Germany and a divided Europe, the Agreement becomes merely an implementation of the Marshall Plan for Western Europe and fails to contribute in any way toward a reintegration of the entire European economy.

"5. In so far as the Marshall Plan is in great danger of becoming wholly submerged in the cold war against the Soviet Union, the Ruhr Agreement itself is likely to be interpreted and carried out as an instrument of the cold war. This would have one of two consequences:

"Either—in spite of the assurances to France contained in the Agreement itself—Germany will become involved in the creation of a 'defense force' for Western Europe;

"Or—and this is more likely—Germany will be kept demilitarized, according to promise, while the rest of Western Europe turns its production to rearmament. This would have the effect of making Western Europe dependent upon Germany for most of its peacetime requirements, and would place Germany in a highly favorable position to compete for the export markets so badly needed by the other European countries. Since this would be intolerable, the long-run result would most likely be the recreation of a European steel cartel along pre-war lines. In other words, we should again see a dividing up of markets and a system of quota production designed not to raise living standards throughout the world, but to limit production in order to protect profits. This danger is directly related to the probable return of the German steel industry to private ownership.

"In summary: the Ruhr Agreement is a belated attempt at a constructive solution, stultified by failure to face the real issues, and distorted by the exigencies of the over-riding cold war context."

ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTION (1949).

Let me now recall a few basic facts about the Ruhr, before we discuss the alternative.

Three factors gave the Ruhr area of less than a thousand square miles its original importance: a fabulous deposit of high-grade coal; easy access to the near-by iron ore of Luxembourg and Lorraine; and cheap river transport, later augmented by an intricate network of railways and canals.

Capital investment in plant facilities and the development of a compact force of highly skilled labor completed the picture.

In spite of war damage, the Ruhr was still the most important single industrial area in Europe. Its pre-war output of hard and soft coal exceeded 120,000,000 tons per annum. Its steel capacity was more than 20,000,000 tons. In the past, the Ruhr not only formed the core of German industrial development and of German war-making capacity; it also directly affected the industrialization—or lack of industrialization—of other countries. The brains of the Ruhr coal and iron masters wove a spiderweb of restrictive monopoly over the whole Continent. German steel barons—aided by their counterparts in France, Belgium, Luxembourg and England, and financed largely by American capital—extended the tentacles of their power beyond Europe into Latin America and other distant parts of the world. Similar developments occurred in the heavy chemical and electrical industries.

The result of this intricate, German-dominated cartel system was not merely the extension of German economic power over large parts of the world, but the retardation of industrial development in many other countries. To a large extent this explains why France never modernized her factories, never adopted mass production methods, and fell hopelessly behind Germany in industrial development.

This background led me to the conclusion that two aspects of the Ruhr problem had to be considered: first, how to utilize its great productive capacity in the best interests of a peaceful world; and, second, how to sterilize the Ruhr's destructive centrifugal potential.

Viewed in this light, it seemed to me that the Agreement of 1948 fell far short of the requirements. It failed to harness the Ruhr to the best interests of a peaceful Europe, because it presupposed a divided and far from peaceful Europe, attempting to utilize the Ruhr as the cold arsenal for a continuing cold war. It failed to sterilize the Ruhr's destructive potential, because it created the very conditions that would lead back to monopolistic control and the creation of restrictive cartels.

My memorandum to Mr. Acheson therefore suggested that it would, in the long run, prove impossible to establish one principle for German coal and a different principle for French coal, or Belgian coal, or—eventually—for Polish coal. We could not expect to make Germany into a permanently second-class member of the European family.

The situation would be very different, I maintained, if the Ruhr Authority were to be set up as the precursor of an *All-European* Coal Authority, and if the Allies now said to the Germans: "You will have to accept a second-class status until you have demonstrated your moral regeneration, but, in the end, we are all going to impose upon ourselves the same obligations toward each other and toward the European community, which we are now imposing upon you." It would be better yet, I said, if, instead of promising to do this at some future date, the countries of Western Europe would forthwith establish an Authority to handle the allocation of *all West European coal,* stating as they did so, that the door would always remain open to the nations of Eastern Europe as well.

This much, I thought, could be done even within the framework of a cold war policy. In fact, it would provide a more effective cold war policy while, at the same time, creating the means of eventually liquidating the cold war. Instead of playing into Russian hands by proposing an unjust and intolerable permanent status for the German people, we should be frustrating the Russian appeal to German nationalism by clearly pointing out the road along which a regenerate Germany might once again find its way back into the family of nations. At the same time, instead of confronting the Russians with a closed door in the Ruhr, we should be indicating the only way in which the Russians might some day gain admittance to an All-European, instead of merely a West European Coal Authority. If such an Authority were to come into being, the control of coal—and hence of steel production and armaments—would be vested in a supra-national group which could make preparation for war by any nation well-nigh impossible.

THE FRENCH PROPOSAL (1950).

Nothing came of this proposal at the time, but you will note its striking similarity to the proposition recently advanced by Mr. Schuman.

The French proposal goes further in that it provides for the supranational control of steel as well as coal. This may entail technical difficulties, especially in view of the fact that some European steel industries have been nationalized, while others have not.

What interests us here is the American reaction to the French proposal. Secretary Acheson issued from London a formal statement hailing

the objectives of Franco-German rapprochement and European integration and welcoming the French initiative in that direction, but he noted that "the proposals must await the availability of details." The significance of the latter phrase was perhaps explained in a Washington dispatch to the *New York Times* by its diplomatic correspondent, James Reston. This unusually well-informed and reliable reporter stated that "Washington had some misgivings" when the text of the French proposal was received, because the proposed organization would be "open to all countries who wished to participate in it", and because the proposition was to furnish coal and steel "to all countries" on "equal terms".

"This at first raised one or two questions here", Mr. Reston reported. "Secretary Acheson had gone to Europe convinced that the cold war was here to stay and that the Western nations must organize together to fight that war. But did Mr. Schuman agree? Was he trying to organize the West to fight the cold war, or was he making some kind of general offer designed to liquidate the cold war?"

Mr. Reston went on to report that these questions were answered in "various official telegrams to the State Department and the French Embassy". The upshot of these answers, as reported by Mr. Reston, was that Mr. Schuman shared Mr. Acheson's desire to unify the Western nations, that his first aim was to bring together Germany and France, but that he meant what he had said about the new supra-national organization being "open to all who wished to participate;" on the other hand, the French explained that it appeared extremely unlikely that the communist nations would wish to give an international authority the power to direct their coal and steel production.

What better illustration could there be of the extent to which we have become the prisoners of our own past mistakes?

The French proposal, before Mr. Schuman was forced to give this explanation, would have put the Russians on the spot. If the Poles or Czechs should wish to join the European Coal and Steel Authority, they would have been exluded not by the West but by the Kremlin. If the Authority worked out well over a period of time, it seems fairly obvious that *all* the European nations would eventually wish to participate, and, if they actually did join, a great step would have been taken toward making a shooting war unlikely—if not impossible—and the cold war would have been all but liquidated. The great virtue of the French

proposal was precisely that it *might* operate toward ending the cold war, and yet, that, if it failed to do so by reason of Russian intransigeance, it would vastly strengthen the Western position in the cold war, by clearly throwing the onus for its continuance upon the Kremlin.

The cold war warriors in the Department of State were apparently unable to recognize the subtle virtue of the French proposal. They had to be assured that Mr. Schuman "was trying to organize the West to fight the cold war" and not "making some kind of general offer to liquidate it." Perhaps, had Mr. Acheson been at home, instead of in London, these questions would not have been asked by Washington. Mr. Acheson is not one who would fail to understand subtlety or to play up to the finesse of a subtle partner. On the other hand, perhaps even Mr. Acheson had reached the point where it seemed to him "politically impossible" to approve any proposal which might conceivably end the cold war, for fear lest it be denounced in Congress as appeasement or the product of master spies.

At any rate, this appears to be the point to which our negative foreign policy has carried us. The communiqué on Germany, issued on May 14 by the Big Three Foreign Ministers, made no mention of the Schuman proposal, indicating that it was being referred back for study. On the other hand, the communiqué did get our German policy back on the rails by clearly reaffirming our recently obscured and apparently forgotten objective of bringing about the unification of Germany, and by unequivocally repudiating the idea of making a separate peace with the present West German state.

III.

A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE

In spite of the rather long history of dissent, which I have here recorded, I feel for the first time that the future is not without considerable hope. If the French plan is adopted—if a European Coal (and perhaps steel) Authority is created—and if this is done with the sincere desire to make it not merely a West European, but an All-European Authority—the first step will have been taken toward rectifying some of the major mistakes of the past. Even then, there will remain many difficult problems, both with regard to Germany and with regard to the

overall context of foreign policy in which a German solution may eventually be reached. We have gone a terrifyingly long way down the wrong road, within Germany and in the worldwide context of which the German problem is only a part.

We need, in my judgment, not merely to take a new look at the kind of Germany we have been helping to create; we need even more to re-examine the kind of world we have been helping to create. The negative policy of stopping Russia—without knowing what we should do if we had Russia stopped—is not a policy worthy of the United States of America. Nor is it a policy that could conceivably lead to enduring peace. We have been letting Moscow pipe the tune to which we have been dancing. Being relatively rich in dollars and poor in constructive ideas, we have been trying to fight ideas with dollars; and now, with the dollars beginning to run out, we have confided our last best hope of peace into the hands of scientists, instructed at all costs to keep us "ahead" of all other nations in the development of ever more horrible weapons of mass destruction. If we pursue this course much longer, we shall either provoke the war we seek to prevent, or else end up by becoming more and more like our totalitarian enemy. We have already reached the point where to suggest, as I have suggested, that the cold war is not an end in itself, is to invite the accusation of being an appeaser or a fellow traveller.

Yet, if I may hazard a guess at the future, I think that we have already passed the low-water mark in our period of hysterical paralysis and intellectual and moral bankruptcy. Surely, if France, which has suffered a far more severe traumatic experience than we, can now rise above its deeply ingrained fears to constructive leadership toward peace, we, the people of America, can do no less. I hope, and even venture to believe, that we shall do far more.

Also Available

"Point Four"—Our Chance to Achieve Freedom from Fear - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 25 cents

"Turning Point Toward Peace?" - - - - - - 25 cents

"Rearming Germany—How Stupid Can We Be?" 10 cents

THE CURRENT AFFAIRS PRESS
25 Vanderbilt Avenue
New York 17, N. Y.

ROOM 2720

TELEPHONE
MURRAY HILL 4-0163

JAMES P. WARBURG
70 EAST 45TH STREET
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

January 20, 1950

Mr. Edward Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Ave.
New York City

Dear Ed:

The attached letter to President Truman has been framed by a group including: Henry B. Cabot, of Boston; Harry W. Schacter, of Louisville; Norman Cousins, editor of the Saturday Review of Literature; Stanley M. Isaacs, New York City Councilman; Hugh Satterlee, attorney; Robert E. Sherwood, historian and playwright; and myself. We have had the help and advice of a considerable number of others in different parts of the country.

I am writing you on behalf of this group to invite you to join us in signing this appeal for a greater emphasis upon affirmative leadership toward peace.

It is not our present intention to create any formal organization. Our plan is merely to obtain fifty to one hundred signatures of leading citizens across the country to this letter, and then, after sending it to the President, to release it for publication. Should we decide to supplement the news release by running the letter as an advertisement, your signing the letter would in no way commit you to bearing a share of this or any other expense.

I hope very much that you will be willing to join us in this effort to assure the President that a more affirmative leadership toward peace would enjoy wide public support. Since we are anxious to proceed as quickly as possible, we should be grateful for a prompt reply. A form is enclosed for your convenience.

Very sincerely yours,

Jim

JPW:jc

James P. Warburg, 70 East 45th Street, New York 17, N. Y.

Name (Please Print) _____

Address _____

_____

I wish to sign the Open Letter to President Truman transmitted to me by your letter of January 20, 1950.

Signature_____

Dear Mr. President:

We, the undersigned citizens, are heartened by the affirmation, in your State of the Union Message, of your belief that the danger of war is receding. We applaud the courage and confidence with which you look into the future. Nevertheless, we are deeply concerned over what appears to us the discrepancy between your affirmative attitude toward building the peace and the preponderantly negative emphasis in the foreign policies we are at present pursuing.

We recognize, Mr. President, that, until universal disarmament becomes possible under world law and world law enforcement, we owe it to ourselves and to the rest of the free world to maintain sufficient military strength to discourage and, if necessary, to ward off aggression. We feel, however, that preparedness for war cannot of and by itself prevent war. We feel that there is a point beyond which preparedness for war may actually provoke conflict; and that, in any case, preparedness for war to preserve peace will defeat its own purpose if the preparedness effort so preempts our energies and resources as to stand in the way of our making the maximum contribution of which we are capable toward building the peace.

We are reassured, Mr. President, by your steadfast determination to hold down our military expenditures and by your resistance to pressures which might drive us into a steadily mounting arms race with the Soviet Union. We wholeheartedly support your Administration's expressed determination not to permit the rearmament of Germany for the sake of the illusory addition that German rearmament might bring to West European security. We applaud your resistance to advice which might drive us into futile military adventures in the Far East.

Nevertheless, Mr. President, we feel that there is need for more affirmative action on the part of the United States to end the conditions in which military preparations must play so large a part in our total foreign policy effort. Therefore, we respectfully urge you to do two things:

1. <u>To take more affirmative leadership toward halting economic warfare among the world's hard-pressed peoples, by bringing them together in a broad cooperative plan of reconstruction and resource development</u>. You have undertaken one such action in Western Europe, the beneficial effects of which are now jeopardized largely because that action was isolated and not sufficiently geared to the economic problems of the world as a whole. In your Inaugural Address a year ago, Mr. President, you pointed out the need for dealing in a similar manner with Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. You have urged the Congress to enact your proposals which would assist technical aid programs for the underdeveloped parts of the world. In your State of the Union Message you have now frankly told us that, in addition to technical assistance, the success of your program will demand "the movement of large amounts of capital from the industrial nations, and particularly

from the United States, to productive uses in the underdeveloped areas of the world." In contrast to this bold concept, the legislative proposals now before Congress seem to us merely a first, small step toward the realization of your purpose. Can we not proceed more vigorously, Mr. President?

2. To take the leadership in halting the arms race and in bringing about those conditions which will make eventual universal disarmament possible. Many feel that this can be done only by transforming the United Nations into a limited form of World Government, and that a serious attempt should be made to obtain universal consent to Charter revision. A concurrent resolution is now before Congress to make such a transformation the avowed aim of American foreign policy. The resolution has been sponsored by 104 Representatives and 22 Senators. If the sponsors of this resolution are right, do they not deserve the official support of your Administration? If they are wrong - if, in your judgment, there exist other less drastic and more effective methods by which the same ends may be achieved - should we not energetically pursue such other methods?

We feel, Mr. President, that you are moving from a policy, the primary aim of which was to stop Russia, toward a policy, the primary aim of which is affirmative leadership toward peace. We not only applaud this shift in emphasis, we urge you to accelerate the process of change. We urge you to narrow the discrepancy between our aims and the as yet inadequate means suggested for their realization.

We are certain, Mr. President, that, in pursuing this course, you will have the support of the American people. We are convinced that, in pursuing more energetically the affirmative goals which you, yourself, have outlined, you will accomplish not merely your positive purpose of laying the foundations for lasting peace, but that you will also achieve, as a by-product of your affirmative leadership, the negative purpose of defeating the threat of totalitarianism. Finally, we believe that, by affirmative action in fulfilling the promise of democracy at home and abroad, you will create the conditions in which, at some time in the future, a general settlement of our differences with the Soviet Union may become possible.

Respectfully,

ROOM 2720

TELEPHONE
MURRAY HILL 4-0163

JAMES P. WARBURG
70 EAST 45TH STREET
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

December 1, 1949

Dear Ed:

Very little information has as yet been made available to the public on the broader implications of President Truman's "Point Four" Program. Yet I think you will agree with the thesis of the enclosed study that the future role of the United States in world affairs will be largely determined by what happens, or fails to happen, to this program in the next session of Congress. This, in turn, will depend to a great extent upon the state of public opinion.

In order to make the essential facts available, I have undertaken to publish and distribute this pamphlet. If you are in sympathy with this effort, I hope you will find it possible to use some of the material provided, or to call its availability to the attention of your listeners.

For your information, the publication date is December 7, 1949. Prior to that date, a first edition of ten thousand copies will have been sent out free to a selected list of writers, editors, commentators, educators, clergymen, and public servants, as well as to every member of the Eighty-first Congress. A second printing will be offered, through public advertisement, at 25 cents a copy. (see Times of Dec. 7)

Very sincerely,

Jim.

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

In any case I would love to get your slant on this, Ed. I think it's our last chance.

JPW:jc
Enclosure

RELEASE: WEDNESDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 7, 1949.

CHANCE FOR PEACE SEEN BY WARBURG

Urges Citizen Support of Broader "Point Four" Program

New York City. December 7. James P. Warburg, whose books and articles have been sharply critical of American post-war foreign policy as too negative and too fear-inspired, today launched a campaign urging public support for the one aspect of President Truman's foreign policy which he thinks could "reverse the present drift toward disaster."

"There are few moments in history", he said, "when citizen action in one nation can decisively influence the course of world events. You and I are living through one such moment now."

Warburg's "Call to Action", asking for militant citizen support for a broadened version of President Truman's "Point Four" program, carries the endorsement of two qualified experts on resource development and conservation: Morris Llewellyn Cooke, the well-known consulting engineer whose advice has been sought by successive national administrations, and Dewey Anderson, Director of the Public Affairs Institute of Washington, D. C.

A three-column advertisement in today's New York Times, headed: "Our Chance to Achieve Freedom from Fear - and What You Can Do About It", announces the publication of a 64-page pamphlet in which Warburg presents his case. Lauding the basic idea of aid to the world's underdeveloped areas put forward by President Truman in his Inaugural Address last January, Warburg says: "The way out of the cold war in which we are floundering - the way out of the depression toward which we are heading - lies in carrying out this wise and statesmanlike utterance. But where", he asks, "is the 'bold new program' to give these words life and meaning?"

The Administration proposal now before Congress (The Technical Assistance Act of 1949) is characterized by Warburg as "neither bold nor very new". It is, he says, "too narrow in scope, too restricted in function and too niggardly in means to carry out more than a small part of the President's purpose." As it stands, it is "merely another example of the bargain-basement diplomacy which has not only squandered our resources but weakened the ties of friendship between us and the nations we have sought to help. This pattern of penny-wisdom", Warburg contends, "has wrecked our loan to Britain, has contributed to the failure of our policy in Asia, and is in danger of wrecking the most constructive post-war effort we have undertaken - the Marshall Plan." If carried out in this spirit, Warburg holds that "Point Four will merely build another one of those half-bridges that lead nowhere."

But the President's purpose can be carried out, Warburg maintains, if the proposed Bill is amended. "Whether it is amended - whether 'Point Four' becomes a milestone in the world's progress toward

peace, or merely another brave intention wrecked by penny-pinching, timidity and lack of vision - that is up to us as citizens."

Since effective citizen action demands "a certain amount of citizen homework", Warburg has packed into his pamphlet the information (including the text of the current Bill and an indication of the needed amendments), which he thinks the citizen needs in order to make up his or her mind as to whether the effort he suggests is worthwhile.

The technical experts, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Cooke, have written a foreword in which they say: "Only a positive declaration of our faith in mankind and a practical application of that faith through well-considered international economic measures will meet the need of these days. In it are the hopes for attaining peace... We commend this analysis for your reading, your thoughtful consideration and appropriate action."

* * * * * * *

Additional Information

1. A first edition of ten thousand copies is being sent out to a selected list of educators, clergymen, writers, editors, commentators, foreign policy group leaders, etc. as well as to every member of Congress and a considerable number of Government officials. This is being done partly by me and partly by the Public Affairs Institute of Washington, D. C.

2. A second printing is being offered, by public advertisement, at 25 cents per single copy, 23 cents each for ten copies, 21 cents each for fifty copies, and 20 cents each for one hundred copies or more.

3. The question: "Can we afford the program recommended?", is answered on page 34 of the pamphlet. This, or any other part of the pamphlet, may be quoted.

4. Any further information desired may be obtained by calling MUrray Hill 4-0163.

James P. Warburg

"POINT FOUR"

OUR CHANCE TO ACHIEVE FREEDOM FROM FEAR

and

What YOU Can Do About It

Fellow Citizens:

Whatever our individual circumstances, we all have one thing in common—over all of us hangs the fear lest forces beyond our control destroy whatever security we have been able to achieve for ourselves and our families.

There is a way for us to lighten this burden of fear. There is a way to lessen the danger of war and to prevent an economic collapse here at home.

There is a way to reverse the present drift toward disaster.

Almost a year ago ***the way out was indicated by President Truman,*** in these words:

> "More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.
>
> "For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people . . .
>
> "We must embark upon a bold new program . . .
>
> "We should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge . . . and, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development. . . ."

The way out of the cold-war in which we are floundering—the way out of the depression toward which we are heading—lies in the carrying out of this wise and statesmanlike utterance.

A year has passed since these words were spoken.

Where is the bold new program of action to give these words life and meaning?

The Administration has placed before Congress a so-called "Point Four" proposal. It is neither bold nor very new. It is too narrow in scope, too

restricted in function and too niggardly in means to accomplish more than a small part of the President's purpose.

This proposal is molded in the pattern of bargain-basement diplomacy which has wrecked all our best-intentioned efforts—the pattern of trying to make one dollar do the work of two—of sending out a little boy to do a man's work. This pattern of penny-wisdom has wrecked our loan to Britain, has contributed to the failure of our policy in Asia and is in danger of wrecking the most constructive post-war effort we have undertaken—the Marshall Plan.

This bargain-basement diplomacy has not only squandered our resources but weakened the ties of friendship between us and the nations we have sought to help.

As it stands, the Administration's "Point Four" proposal will merely build another half-bridge that leads nowhere.

But the President's purpose can be carried out if the proposal is amended. Whether it is amended—whether "Point Four" becomes a milestone in the World's progress toward peace, or merely another brave intention wrecked by penny-pinching, timidity and lack of vision—that is up to us as citizens.

There isn't much you and I can do about this if we act merely as individuals. **But, if we act together, we can see to it that a timid little plan becomes a truly "Bold New Program".**

That is our great opportunity—to make "Point Four" the turning-point in post-war history.

Effective citizen action will demand a certain amount of citizen homework. To make this homework as easy as possible, I have tried to pack into a pamphlet of three chapters (62 pages) the information I think you need to make up your mind whether the effort is worth-while. You will find in this pamphlet, first of all, a brief discussion of the possibilities of citizen action; next, an analysis of our present foreign policy and a statement of why I think it has not led to peace; and, finally, the constructive alternative which could be developed out of the President's "Point Four" proposal. You will find also the text of the pending Bill and a specific indication of the type of amendments which I think are needed.

There are few moments in history when citizen action in one nation can decisively influence the course of world events. You and I are living through one such moment now.

JAMES P. WARBURG.

New York City,
Dec. 1, 1949.

(The foregoing statement has appeared as an advertisement for the second edition in the *N. Y. Times.)*

A Call to Action—

American citizens have the power to shape their own political destinies. Nowhere is this power more in need of proper expression right now than in the formulation of a sound foreign economic policy. For in these next two years—1950 and 1951—our Congress and our Government must decide the fate of the Marshall Plan and establish its immediate successor.

Some form of international economic cooperation is here to stay as the foundation of our foreign relation. But *what* form it will take is still undecided. Will the Marshall Plan blend neatly and fully into a much-broadened concept of Point Four, the "Bold New Program" of President Truman's heartening challenge, one which not only takes into account the needs of the underdeveloped areas of the world, but which is premised on the interdependence of all nations? Will our new economic policy develop a program of mutual aid administered through United Nations agencies to the fullest extent possible, a program which enables governments to improve the welfare of their people? Will this economic policy be the expression of the best thought and loftiest aspirations of the American people?

Only a positive declaration of our faith in mankind and a practical application of that faith through well-conceived international economic measures will meet the need of these days. In it are the hopes for attaining peace.

It is this big effort that we Americans are urged to make by James Warburg's pamphlet. As persons, we can do much or little according to our individual strength. But as a collection of like-purposed people we can exert the deciding influence on our Congressmen and Senators and on our Administration in Washington. This pamphlet extends an invitation to all people of good will to act in effective concert right now. We commend this analysis for your reading, your thoughtful consideration and appropriate action.

DEWEY ANDERSON,
Director, Public Affairs Institute,
Washington, D. C.

MORRIS L. COOKE,
Consulting Engineer.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In preparing this pamphlet—especially the last chapter—I have benefited greatly from consultation with many others. In particular I wish to acknowledge a debt of gratitude to all those who participated in a most illuminating week-end conference arranged by the Post-War World Council and the Foundation for World Government. The varied experience and the diverse points of view brought to bear upon the problem of world wide resource development on this occasion are largely responsible for whatever merit this presentation may possess.

I am indebted to the editors of Harper's Magazine for permission to reprint, in the section of Chapter Two subtitled "Bargain-Basement Diplomacy", a substantial portion of an article of mine which appeared in a recent issue of their publication. Also I wish to acknowledge gratefully the permission of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation to reprint, in the Appendix, Beatrice Pitney Lamb's summary of the United Nations Report on Technical Aid Programs.

J. P. W.

Chapter One

THE CITIZEN IN TODAY'S SOCIETY.

I.

"WHAT CAN I DO?"

In recent years I have been privileged to participate in many interesting discussions with all sorts of groups throughout the country—groups which had come together primarily because of a common anxiety and a common desire to help find the way out of the dangerous cold-war morass in which we are now floundering. Almost invariably these discussions came down to a single question:

"But what can the ordinary citizen do?"

It is easy enough to give a superficial answer to this question. It is easy enough to say: "Keep yourself informed. Learn to understand the problems with which our nation is confronted and to form your own opinion about them. Test that opinion in discussion against the opinions of others. Write to your Senators and Congressman. Join organizations which are working for the creation of an informed public opinion and a constructive approach to the world's problems."

All this is sound advice, but it fails to answer the question satisfactorily.

Take the simple injunction to keep yourself informed. It is perfectly true that we in this country have better access to information than any other people on this earth. But the very wealth of material available makes it difficult for us to select and concentrate. Books, magazines, newspapers, motion pictures, radio and television compete for every minute of eye and ear time. Weekly news magazines condense for us the events chronicled in the daily press, and these digests are in turn digested by ever shorter summaries, until eventually our vast resources in informational material come to us in the form of head-line paragraphs. Moreover, we are being trained to accept opinion without studying fact. Commentators and columnists present us with neatly packaged opinions on current issues, brightly phrased and ready for us to repeat as our own

when occasion arises. It is not easy to keep informed. It is perfectly possible to do so, but I, for one, find that it takes me about two hours every day to do my homework.

Unless you are informed, you cannot, of course, form your own opinions. Unless you do form your own opinions, you either cannot participate at all in the making of national policy, or else you limit your participation to the more or less blind support of someone else's opinion. If you choose the latter course, you are a ready-made victim for propaganda. That is precisely what the vast majority of us are today.

Because most of us do limit our participation to the backing of someone else's opinion, without really having an opinion of our own, a strange thing is happening in this country. We still have "government by consent of the governed", but the consent of the governed is increasingly obtained by appeal to emotion rather than by appeal to reason. This makes it extremely difficult to make any reasoned criticism of our Government's policies effective.

For the past three years we have been indoctrinated with the dogma that Russian aggressive expansionism and Russian unwillingness to cooperate constitute the sole obstacle to the establishment of enduring peace. The acceptance of this dogma by our policy-makers has provided the rationalization for their preponderantly negative foreign policies. Their propaganda of fear has produced reluctant public acceptance of the need to shore up any rickety remnant of the past as a bulwark against communism. Their propaganda of fear was used to gain public acceptance of even the one constructive element in our post-war policy, the Marshall Plan.

Ever since this trend developed I have devoted my entire time to an effort to set the very real Soviet menace in its proper context—to bring about a realization that a large part of the world crisis through which we are living has nothing to do with Russian expansionism or communist conspiracy—and to gain support for a more serene and more constructive approach to the complex world problem. This effort has been essentially an appeal to reason. As such I must say that the appeal has had more than a fair hearing. Many of the criticisms I have put forward as a private citizen have been widely and fairly reported by the press and radio. They have been patiently listened to by many audiences. I have had the

privilege of laying my suggestions before high Government executives and of testifying before legislative committees.

The lesson I have learned from this experience is that you cannot hope to alter a fear-inspired negative policy solely by an appeal to reason.

Logically, it ought to be true that, if you think a policy is wrong, the thing to do is to show why it is wrong, and then, if possible, produce a better alternative. If you see a man turn off into a road that you know ends in a dangerous wash-out around the corner, you first of all stop and warn him. The warning will be more effective if you can also produce a road-map and show the man by what other, safer road he might reach his destination. But, when you are dealing with a fear-inspired negative policy, it does not work that way. You are not dealing with a man who wants to get to a certain destination; you are dealing with a man who wants to get away—a man who is pursued, or thinks himself pursued. Telling him that the wash-out ahead is dangerous will not stop him, unless you can also tell him where he can hide safely and ambush his pursuer.

But the minute you fall into this trap, you are lost altogether. The minute you say to yourself that you can stop this frightened fugitive from killing himself only if you also tell him how to hide or ambush his pursuer, you are accepting the very premise that you seek to destroy. You are not making the man realize that his fear is exaggerated or unfounded. You are merely turning him from flight toward aggression.

When fear is in the saddle—when a great and powerful nation has lost the inspiration of a high purpose—when its government's policies consist alternately of inaction through paralysis of fear and feverish activity inspired by recurrent paroxysms of panic—then something more is needed than reasoned criticism. That "something more" is the eloquent advocacy of an act of faith.

What you and I must do, if we wish to preserve our ability to exercise a voice in the making of our country's foreign policy, is to mobilize hope as the counter-agent to fear. We need to look at the world anew, to re-assess the needs and aspirations of our fellow-men, to re-evaluate the extent and limits of our effective power to meet those needs and aspirations—and then to dedicate ourselves to the making of a promise that can and will be fulfilled. We must find the faith to believe that we shall

discover the road to peace, not merely through our power of resisting that which is evil, but through our power of creating that which is good.

I am certain of one thing. There is a wealth of common sense and courage in the American people. There is more than sense and courage. There is a deep and sincere longing to help and a willingness to sacrifice. At present these gifts are being squandered. What we need in Washington are men who will lift their eyes from the in-pouring telegrams and from the military maps on the walls of their offices, and who will look, instead, into the steady eyes and steadfast hearts of the American people.

We, as citizens, can help the harassed and overburdened men in our nation's capital to lift their eyes from the papers that litter their desks to a clearer and broader vision. We can do this by letting them know that we understand what has been wrong and that we also understand what is needed to set us right.

What We Are Up Against

The free world stands or falls on its belief in government of the people, for the people and by the people. Obviously, there can be no government *by* the people unless the individual citizen participates actively in the making of major policy decisions. We know this. And yet we are forced to recognize that, in our own free society, there is a steadily diminishing participation by the individual in the decisions made by our society as a whole. Our problem, then, is to overcome this trend and turn it into the opposite direction. To do this we must understand the factors which operate in our favor as well as the obstacles which stand in our path.

The factors which operate in our favor are, first of all, the high level of common sense, courage and cooperative impulse in our society; next, the inextinguishable optimism of the American people; and, finally, the ingenuity of the American people in finding ways to accomplish by group action purposes which cannot be achieved by individuals acting alone. The "pressure group"—which may in itself serve either social or anti-social purposes—is perhaps the most characteristic product of this cooperative ingenuity.

There can be no doubt whatever that pressure groups have played an important part in our history. For instance, the battle of two such

pressure groups—the interventionist "Fight for Freedom Committee" and the isolationist "America First" organization—served to clarify this nation's attitude in the recent war. More recently the "Committee for the Marshall Plan" played an important part in mobilizing public support for this undertaking. Innumerable other examples could be cited. They show that this is a technique which works—a technique by means of which we, as citizens acting together, can affect national decisions which we are powerless to influence as mere individuals.

If enough of us pool our common sense, our courage and our desire to help, and agree upon a common purpose, there is no reason to assume that we shall be powerless to influence policy toward that purpose. If we hit upon a program, or an idea for a program, which corresponds to the prevailing sentiments of the majority of the American people, we shall soon attract a powerful following. We shall be given the most effective sort of help from the most unexpected quarters. We shall find ourselves rolling up a snowball of public opinion.

If, on the other hand, we organize for a purpose which does not correspond to the sentiments of a large proportion of our fellow-citizens, we shall fail—and the chances are that we shall deserve to fail. I say this because I profoundly believe that, if the American people are given the facts, the American people as a whole are wiser than any group of Americans that tries to do their thinking for them.

And now, before we get down to specific cases, let us have a look at the obstacles to the maintenance of citizen participation in our free democracy.

The chief obstacles are Big Business and Big Government. To recognize this fact is not to condemn either Big Business or Big Government as evils to be eradicated by turning back the clock, but merely to face an acute problem for which we must find a solution.

Big Business is the child of the power-driven machine and the invention of the financial device known as the corporation. The machine led to the development of the techniques of mass production; the corporation developed the means to finance mass production.

Big Government is the child of Big Business. The increasing concentration of industrial and financial power produced the need for instrumen-

talities by which society as a whole might protect itself against the tyranny of the machine and the great corporation. In this country we began with the concept that the best government was that which governed least. This was because our country was born in a time when the only tyranny which threatened individual freedom was the tyranny of an absolute monarch. When Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence, there were no machines and no great corporations to produce a dangerous concentration of economic power. Hence it was thought that, if political power could be sufficiently diffused in a federal structure, individual freedom and government by the people would be assured. Because of this heritage, we still look with suspicion upon any tendency to concentrate political power—that is, any tendency toward the development of Big Government. Yet, year after year, we now create a bigger and more powerful government, because we can find no other way to regulate in the public interest the constantly growing concentration of industrial and financial power.

The growth of Big Business has not been due to the selfish cupidity of anti-social individuals. It is in the nature of technological development to promote concentration, to make complex the originally simple processes of manufacturing goods for consumption, and to demand the use of ever greater accumulations of capital. It is in the nature of finance capitalism, based upon a profit incentive system, to destroy the free market, to eliminate competition, and to create monopolies.

Before the advent of the machine and the corporation, the businessman was an individual operating as an individual. Sometimes he hired help or worked with other individuals as partners; sometimes he worked alone or with his family. He either made something and sold it, like a shoemaker; or he performed a service, like a chimney-sweep; or he acted as an intermediary, like the country store-keeper. His relation to society was relatively simple. He offered his goods or services to the consumer in competition with others similarly engaged, and competition controlled the quality of his goods or services and the prices he could obtain for them.

Today's big businessman is a totally different creature. He does not own his business; he is a manager operating for absentee owners. Neither his costs nor his prices are determined by free competition in a free market. The cost of his raw materials is affected by monopolistic control, or by government tariffs, subsidies and price regulations. His transportation and power costs are determined by government regulation. His labor

costs are affected by social legislation and union contracts. Similarly the prices at which he sells are affected by laws, trade agreements and taxes. His is still competing, but competing in a market in which both costs and prices have become semi-rigid. His business has become a highly complex enterprise, requiring any number of raw materials, tools, machines and semi-manufactured goods, any number of services and skills, and a highly complicated accounting system.

The modern business has become so complex that only the management, which devotes full time to its problems, can really understand it. A few boards of directors actually work closely with the management and participate in decisions, but in the vast majority of business corporations the directors merely follow the recommendations of management. Moreover, in most corporations, the directors are only technically elected by the shareholders. Actually they are a more or less self-perpetuating body. In most big businesses whose ownership is widely distributed, there is very little participation in management by the owners. Generally speaking, both management and directors consider quite conscientiously what they conceive to be the interests of the shareholder, but rarely, if ever, seek to discover what the shareholders themselves consider to be their interest. In other words, Big Business management has developed a sort of a benevolent paternalism toward the people who own Big Business but who in no sense participate in the direction of its affairs.

The relation of Big Business to Labor is another matter. Here, too, the tendency of Big Business management was, on the whole, paternalistic, but not sufficiently benevolent to satisfy the majority of workers. The growth of the trade union movement, as an offset to the machine and the corporation, has created its own pyramid of power to protect that segment of society which lives directly on the wages paid by Big Business. But within the labor movement itself, the participation of the individual worker has been diminished by the advent of what we might call Big Labor. Union leadership has tended to become as self-perpetuating and as paternalistic as the management of Big Business. The individual coal miner has as little to say about the policies of John L. Lewis' United Mine Workers as has the individual shareholder about the policies of the United States Steel Corporation, which employs the miner. Union leadership is nowadays only in rare instances truly responsive to the will of the rank and file member.

In between Big Business and Big Labor, in our present-day society, stands the consumer—that is, the American family. This category embraces every American citizen, including the dirt farmer, the shareholders who provide the capital for Big Business, and the workers whose dues support Big Labor. The consumer has nothing to say in shaping the policies which determine the state of the nation's business. His only way of protecting himself is through using the instruments of public power, that is through government. Consumer protest has produced government regulation of transportation and public utilities, pure food and drug legislation, anti-trust laws, and similar intervention to prevent abuse. Citizen's protest against the recurring booms and depressions of a "free economy" has caused the gradual growth of what is now called the welfare state.

It is interesting to note that, at each step in the progressive intervention by government on behalf of the ordinary citizen, the ordinary citizen himself has had grave misgivings. We recognize the need for Big Government and yet we don't want Big Government. We do not want Big Government partly because of our tradition but also because, as government gets bigger, we feel that we have less contact with it, less power to participate in its decisions, less chance to keep it a government by the people. When we lose our sense of participation in government, we are even more disturbed than over our inability to participate in the conduct of the nation's business.

This might seem paradoxical to anyone who does not understand the nature of the American people. It might seem strange that we, a business-minded people, who worry far more about another depression than about another war, should accept exclusion from participation in shaping our nation's economic affairs and protest bitterly over our loss of participation in the shaping of our political policies. Yet the answer is fairly obvious. Our ideal has been, and still is, a society in which every citizen has *an equal voice in the management.* Some other societies strive for the ideal of *an equal share for each citizen in the material benefits of society.* We do not as yet really seek economic democracy. We seek political democracy, which we like to think gives every citizen equality of opportunity. The fact that we have not achieved this goal, especially with regard to Negro citizens, does not alter the fact that this is the ideal toward which we strive. This is why we are somewhat complacent about our exclusion from the affairs of Big Business, but healthily resentful of not being able to participate in the management of Big Government. We

are convinced that government belongs to all of us as free and equal citizens. We still like to think that business belongs to each of us as a rugged individual, at liberty to make out of it what he can.

Assuming that this is the nature of our society, and that a change in our basic attitude will come about only over a long period of years, if at all, let us concern ourselves with the practical question of how we might better achieve that which we want to achieve—namely, a greater participation by each of us in the management of Big Government.

Since the United States is now the sole great reservoir of economic and military power in the Western world—since we alone among the Western peoples may be in a position to exert a decisive influence upon the future course of events—the conduct of our nation's foreign affairs has become the single most important aspect of our Government's activity. Most of us realize instinctively that this is true. Most of us are also unhappily aware that, since the war ended, we have done much but accomplished little toward helping to get the world started on the road to lasting peace and reasonable prosperity. The people I have seen and talked to across the length and breadth of our land are not happy with our present foreign policy. They suspect that it is taking us toward war rather than toward peace. They are not satisfied with our Government's repeated insistence that it is only Russia which stands in the way of a peaceful and happy world. They are angry with Russia. They have not the slightest desire to appease her, and they are doubtful whether Russia would agree to any arrangement short of appeasement. Yet they feel, if I am any judge of their feelings, that there ought to be something better for the United States of America to do than merely to try to anticipate and frustrate the moves made by the fourteen men in the Kremlin.

As I see it, the people who express these sentiments are entirely right. There *are* better things for us to do. The way for us to stop Russia is to stop letting Russia make our foreign policy. The way for us to help build world peace and world prosperity is to develop a positive, constructive policy toward that end. The way to dispel the false promise of communism is to fulfill the true promise of democracy. That is why the Point Four Program presents a great opportunity. But, before we discuss this program, let us try to discover what has prevented our taking constructive action until now.

Chapter Two

OUR IMMATURITY IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Hardly a day passes without some official in Washington telling us how successfully our foreign policies have been operating. Yet we are all more or less aware that these assurances are to some extent whistling in the dark. We have spent a fabulous amount of money in trying to restore peace and security to the world. We have given up our past attitude of selfish isolationism. We have assumed responsibility. We have tried our level best to cooperate with other nations—even to the extent of offering to yield to a supra-national authority our recent post-war monopoly of atomic energy. And yet we are no nearer to the goal of lasting peace than we were on the day that war ended.

One reason why our efforts have borne so little fruit is that we have gone at the post-war problem in an immature way. To say this is not to minimize the fact that one nation—the Soviet Union—has made the post-war problem infinitely more difficult. There can be no doubt whatever that such has been the case. But, as I see it, we have been frustrated less by Soviet intransigence than by our own immature reaction to that intransigence. We have been frustrated less by the whole, highly complex post-war problem, including Russian obstructionism, than by our own inability to face that problem in an adult way.

When we say that an individual is immature, or behaves in an immature manner, we mean that the behavior of such an individual betrays a lack of judgment attributable in large measure to lack of experience. We mean that the individual's actions seem motivated by emotion rather than reason; that his behavior seems to consist of a series of improvizations, as opposed to the step-wise procedure of a thought-out plan; and that these improvizations, based upon acquisitiveness or fear, display a tendency to over-reach and attempt the impossible. We mean by immaturity also the tendency to become too quickly discouraged in the face of failure, to seek a scapegoat rather than the reason for failure, and to vacillate between over-aggressive self-assertion and an excessive display of passive helplessness. The immature individual lacks, above all things, a true sense of proportion—a perspective of himself in relation to the world around him. Egocentricity is at its peak in infancy and sometimes

again in extreme old age. The infant feels itself the centre of the universe, surrounded by beings of vastly superior power who are either "good" or "bad" according to whether or not they gratify its desires.

The analogy between individual and group behavior must not, of course, be driven too far. But it is true, I think, that we, as a nation, have displayed some of these symptoms of immaturity. We have been motivated by fear rather than reason. We have improvized to meet changing circumstances rather than acting in accordance with a thought-out plan. We have at times overestimated our power and tried to do the impossible. At other times we have behaved as if we had no power whatever. When we have failed, we have sought a scapegoat rather than the reason for our failure. The most striking evidence of immaturity in our post-war behavior has been the consistent pattern of self-delusion upon which most of our actions have been based. This applies both to the declared aims of our policy and to the means chosen to achieve these aims. Let me cite some examples.

The major aim of our post-war foreign policy has been to achieve an enduring peace. There are, I submit, three kinds of peace which might conceivably last for a long time.

First, there is the possibility of a *Pax Americana*—that is to say, a peace enforced by the benevolent military and economic power of the United States. The outright advocates of this type of peace usually speak in terms of what they call "the American Century". They have ample historical precedent for their position. They can point to the centuries of the *Pax Romana* and to the more recent period of the *Pax Brittanica.* It is true that neither the peace enforced by the Roman legions nor the peace enforced by British seapower wholly eliminated armed conflict; both periods were interrupted by occasional wars; but these conflicts were kept localized and more or less under the control of the paramount power. The open advocates of a *Pax Americana* now wish to see the United States assume the role of the paramount power, armed with supremacy in the air and atomic weapons. Whether or not they are wise, they are at least clear.

Second, there is the theoretical possibility of a *Pax Sovietica,* in which Russia would become the world's judge and the world's policeman. This idea does not appeal to many people outside the Soviet orbit. Nevertheless, it is as logical from the Russian point of view as is the *Pax Americana* from ours.

It is clear, I think, that neither the *Pax Americana* nor the *Pax Sovietica* could be achieved without a major war. We should certainly not submit to Russian domination, nor would the Russians peaceably accept the overlordship of the United States.

There remains, then, the third kind of peace—a peace arrived at by mutual consent rather than by conquest. Such a peace has never yet been achieved on this planet. There are many people who say that such a peace cannot be achieved now or at any time within the foreseeable future. You are familiar with their arguments, many of which you have heard from the official spokesmen of our Government. These arguments can be summed up in a sentence:

"Peace by agreement is impossible so long as one-half of the world desires justice, freedom and security for all men, while the other half is dominated by a power pursuing the contrary aim."

This sentence is a fair paraphrase of President Truman's Inaugural Address and of many other official utterances within the past two years. Whether or not this is sound, it is clear that the Russians have a different concept of justice, freedom and security—a concept repugnant to us and difficult for us to understand. But it does not follow that the Russians seek to impose upon the world something *which they conceive to be injustice, slavery and insecurity.*

Let us, however, assume that the Truman thesis is correct. The logical conclusion would then be that, since a peace by agreement is impossible, we must try to impose by force a *Pax Americana.* But that is not the conclusion drawn by our present policy-makers.

The conclusion drawn by our present policy-makers is the illogical one, that a *Pax Americana* can be achieved by peaceful means—that is to say, by establishing under American leadership a preponderance of military and economic power sufficient to make us the world's policeman, *without* our having to establish our supremacy by war.

There is only one thing wrong with this conclusion: it overlooks the fact that, in a world in which power has become concentrated in only two poles of superpower, such an attempt "peacefully" to establish supremacy necessarily leads to an arms race, in which the other half of the world pursues precisely the same aim. Each side sees in its own attainment of

preponderance of power the only sure guarantee of peace. Each side makes defensive preparations and alliances which necessarily appear as offensive preparations to the other. Armament leads to counter-armament —alliance to counter-alliance—until eventually the productive resources on both sides are so pre-empted by defensive preparation that the burden becomes intolerable and mass discontent sets in. To prevent discontent from causing an overthrow of leadership, leadership on each side throws the blame for restriction and privation wholly upon the evil machinations of the other. That is the sort of vicious circle of mutual distrust and provocation in which we now find ourselves with the Soviet Union.

Never mind who started it. Let us say that the Russians began the struggle for world domination and that we have merely been acting in self-defense. The fact remains that we have been proceeding upon a wholly illogical conclusion from our own premise. We have proceeded on the assumption that, whereas the Russians would *not* let us make a peace by agreement, the Russians *would* acquiesce in our achieving a *Pax Americana* by outarming them and creating a system of alliances more powerful than their own.

The absurdity of this conclusion has been obscured by the curious process of immature self-delusion in which we have been indulging. We have not admitted frankly to ourselves that we are aiming at a *Pax Americana.* We talk about a One World-United Nations peace. We talk about strengthening the United Nations and supporting it with every means at our command. But our policy-makers have frowned upon any suggestion to transform the United Nations into a world organization capable of enacting and enforcing world law. While talking about One World, they have operated on the concept of American judgment and American power applied to the strengthening of our half of a divided world.

The process of immature self-delusion applies not only to the determination of our policy aims but to our choice of means and to our appraisal of success or failure. At the present moment we are in a mood of self-congratulation. We arrived last summer at what appeared to be a major victory in the cold war, when the Berlin airlift and counter-blockade forced the Russians to back down. At the same time the Marshall Plan had all but locked the doors of Western Europe against further communist penetration. The Atlantic Pact then showed the Russians that they could not

resort to military aggression against Western Europe without becoming involved in a war with us; and our expanded military power, plus our sole possession of the atomic bomb, made it clear to the Russians that they could not hope to win a war with the United States. In spite of their recently shattered illusion about the atomic bomb, some of our policy-makers are still inclined to think that, in Europe at least, we must be on the right road and that, if we continue along this line, we shall eventually arrive at a peace enforced by American power subtly operating behind the facade of an almost wholly impotent world organization.

Let us leave aside altogether what has been happening in China and the Far East, where, admittedly, we have been unsuccessful, and let us try to examine the facts with regard to Europe, where we feel so sure that we are on the right road.

The first fact is that we have *not* won a great victory in the cold war. It is true that we have frustrated the Russian blockade of Berlin. This blockade was imposed by Moscow for the maximum objective of halting the creation of a West German state and, failing that, for the minimum objective of forcing the Western Allies out of Berlin. The airlift and the counter-blockade denied both aims to the Kremlin. But the blockade and counter-blockade also brought into the open the basic weakness of our own position. The strangulation of East-West trade accelerated the crisis in our whole West European Recovery Program. It became almost as urgently necessary for us to end the stalemate as it was for the Russians. The Russians were forced to recognize that their so-called Molotov Plan for the recovery of Eastern Europe was wholly incapable of satisfying the needs of their satellites. We were forced to recognize that our Marshall Plan could not succeed in making Western Europe self-supporting so long as the European trading community remained split into two parts, neither of which could live without the other. Thus both sides became anxious to find a face-saving device to end the stalemate.

In the resulting moves toward cooling off the overheated cold war, we can claim to have lost less face than the Russians. But that is the extent of our victory. It remains to be seen whether we actually gained or lost at Paris in beating off the Russian attempt to stop the creation of a West German state. Both sides came to Paris asserting their desire to end the partition of Germany. Each blamed the other for the existing

state of affairs, and each made proposals as to how partition might be ended and the Iron Curtain lifted between the two Germanys. But—the Russian proposals were clearly not intended to be acceptable to the West, and the Western proposals were clearly not intended to be acceptable to the Russians.

The Russians put forward nothing more than a proposal to return to the unworkable Potsdam Agreement, probably because they feared that a unification of Germany would alienate the Poles and the Czechs, at a time when considerable unrest among the Soviet satellites already existed.

The stated reason for our making a counter-proposal, which we obviously intended to be unacceptable to the Russians, was our concern for the preservation of democracy and political freedom in the Western zones. Anyone who suffers from the delusion that democracy exists in Western Germany should read Delbert Clark's "Again the Goose-step", or Drew Middleton's "Struggle for Germany". The real reason why we were unwilling to risk making a proposal for unification which might have been accepted was that Western Germany had become the keystone of our West European Recovery Program, and that we were unwilling to allow the Russians any voice in the control of West German industry.

The simple fact is that we are caught on the horns of a dilemma, created by the cold war. Economically, Western Europe cannot become self-supporting and thus immune to communist penetration, unless it includes a healthy and productive Germany. Militarily, Western Europe cannot become capable of self-defense, unless it includes a rearmed Germany. But, politically, Western Europe will fly apart altogether, if a strong, united and rearmed Germany is allowed to come into existence.

The Russians face a similar dilemma. Eastern Europe, and Russia itself, cannot achieve full recovery without trade with the West, and particularly without trade with Western Germany. But, if the barriers are let down and a united Germany grows strong, such a united Germany—even if it maintains a position of neutrality as between Russia and the West—will be a threat to Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe. Therefore Russia wants a united Germany only if she can completely control it.

Thus, neither the Russians nor we are at present sincere in saying that we want to unite Germany. Neither the Russians nor we have reached

the point of really wanting to end the cold war in Europe. Each of us would like to carry it a little further in the hope of gaining certain advantages; but each of us, in the meanwhile, would like to loosen a little the restrictions which now strangle recovery on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The Russians have not solved their problem of meeting the urgent needs of their satellites and thus keeping them in line. Nor have we solved our problem in Western Europe, which has assumed new and menacing aspects. Neither side has as yet realized that there can be no such thing as peaceful victory in the present power struggle.

Whatever may be said about the immaturity of our approach to Europe can be doubled with respect to our post-war policy in Asia.

Bargain-Basement Diplomacy

A foreign policy may fail because it rests upon a faulty analysis of world conditions and therefore aims at the wrong targets. It may also fail because it operates with ill-chosen or insufficient means toward the achievement of soundly conceived objectives.

Not everyone will agree that our foreign policy has rested upon an over-simple analysis of the world crisis and has been too predominantly negative and fear-inspired. But, even leaving to one side such errors as there may have been in our policy-makers' appraisal of world conditions, and assuming that their postwar decisions have been altogether sound, surely there are grounds for believing that something has been radically wrong *with the manner in which we have executed these decisions*—something so radically wrong that it would account for failure to achieve our ends, even if the ends had been chosen with the most profound wisdom.

Our postwar purpose, developed during the war, was to preserve the victorious anti-Axis coalition in order to make and maintain a peace based upon great power co-operation. This meant, in effect, that our objective was to preserve harmony and co-operation between the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The assumption that such harmony could be preserved underlay the great concessions made to Russia at Yalta; it underlay the basic conception of the United Nations' structure as set up at San Francisco.

Our first postwar actions of great significance were three. We embarked upon a helter-skelter demobilization of our armed forces. We cut off wartime Lend-Lease without any prior notice or discussion. We removed rationing and price controls from our own economy.

To anyone who remembered our withdrawal from world affairs in 1919-20, these three acts taken together looked like another American retreat into isolationism. The hasty demobilization of our armed forces, which included the disorganization and demoralization of our army of occupation in Germany, frightened our Western Allies and must have made the Russians at least conscious of the fact that no force remotely comparable to their Red Army now stood between them and the Channel. The brusque termination of Lend-Lease embarrassed both our Western Allies and the Soviet Union, forcing them to make overnight the difficult transition from heavy dependence upon American aid to self-support. The removal of rationing and price controls, at a time when most of the world was underfed and in dire need of almost every conceivable kind of food, raw material, and consumer goods, must have made all our friends wonder what had become of the wartime spirit of loyal sacrifice and mutual co-operation.

As it turned out, we were not by any means returning to our former isolationist pattern. Later events showed that, in the elation of victory, our government had merely gone on a temporary binge of irresponsibility. But a certain amount of damage had been done. Suspicions had been aroused, resentments created, and the task of postwar reconstruction rendered infinitely more difficult.

Great Britain and the Soviet Union lost little time in applying to us for large loans to tide them over the period of transition. Russia applied for a loan of one billion dollars. Britain, which had to consider not merely her own needs but also her complicated obligations as the center of the sterling area, estimated her requirements at something like seven billion dollars.

So far as Russia was concerned, nothing was done. In March 1946, our government suddenly "discovered" that the Russian application of October 1945 had been "lost" in a transfer of files from the Foreign Economic Administration to the State Department. The Russian request

was formally acknowledged without explanation of the "loss" or delay. This was at a time when the stated aim of our foreign policy was still to make and preserve a peace by friendly co-operation with the Soviet Union.

Great Britain received a sympathetic hearing. But, after six months of negotiations, our government decided that three or four billion dollars would be about all that the American Congress and the American people could be expected to grant. The issue was not put up to the American people. The American people were not told that Britain estimated her needs at almost seven billion dollars. It was assumed, on the American people's behalf, that they would perhaps give Britain three or four billion dollars and no more. Our negotiators first deluded themselves into the belief that three and a half billions would actually do the job. Then they deluded Congress and the American people into thinking the same, fortifying their plea for granting the loan by painting the full picture of the disaster that would occur if Britain did not receive the required aid. The loan was approved by Congress on the utterly false assumption that a bridge had been built across the yawning British deficit. Quite apart from certain clearly unfulfillable conditions attached to the loan (which later very nearly wrecked the British economy altogether), the truth was that a bridge had been built just about half way across the gap—which, as everyone knows, is not a good way to reach the other side.

Later on, when the true facts came to light, it was inevitable that resentments should be aroused on both sides. A large segment of American opinion felt that the British had let us down—even though it was generally understood that the severe winter of 1946-47 had upset the calculation. A large segment of British opinion felt that it would have been better to accept no loan at all than to take the inadequate amount offered. Thus, the British problem remained unsolved, with each side tending to blame the other for the costly failure.

This is the pattern of method and procedure which our government has followed in almost all of its major policies since the beginning of 1946. This is the pattern of failure which dogs all our best-intentioned efforts. It has little or nothing to do with the basic aims of our policy. *It has to do with a process of self-deception which has become the habit of the bipartisan team which has made foreign policy under the Truman Administration.*

The formula runs like this. A dangerous situation is seen to be developing in some part of the world. Unless this situation is met by economic or military assistance from the United States, dire consequences will arise. Therefore the United States must act. How much will it take to meet the situation? Careful analysis shows that it will take a very large amount. To get that amount out of Congress requires a thorough frightening of both Congress and the American people. But, even if Congress is scared into granting this amount, where is the money to come from? We can't increase our huge national debt. We have promised to reduce it. Higher taxes? Don't be silly. Congress will never do that. We'd better cut down the amount.

And so the amount is cut down before the problem is ever placed before Congress—cut down to a point where we are no longer proposing to meet the dangerous situation but merely to "do something about it." And then Congress and the people are systematically frightened into building a bridge half-way across a river, under the impression that they are building a bridge all the way across.

That is what happened to the British loan. That is what happened to the Marshall Plan. That is what happened in China. That is what happened to the program to rearm Western Europe. That is what will go on happening again and again until the American people wake up to this dangerous business and put a stop to it.

The danger is not merely that we shall end up with a lot of half-bridges that get us nowhere. The danger is that each time we build a half-bridge we weaken or lose a friend. Our government is not merely frittering away our own material resources. It is also dissipating the good will which should be earned by the native generosity of the American people.

The Military Aid Program for Western Europe is the most recent example of this pattern of self-deception. We were told early in 1949 that a very dangerous condition existed because the military weakness of Western Europe invited Russian aggression. (This weakness had existed ever since the withdrawal of our own forces in 1945.) We were told that the danger had now become acute because the success of the Marshall Plan had denied to the Soviet Union the possibility of further expansion through communist penetration or subversion. (We were not told that

the Marshall Plan, in spite of its well-nigh miraculous success to date, was about to fall flat on its face, unless something were done quickly to solve the growing dollar famine. More of this in a moment.) We were told that we must do more than deter Russian aggression by openly declaring, as we have in the Atlantic Treaty, that we shall fight Russia if she invades Europe. We were told that, in addition, we must protect Western Europe against being overrun, in the event of war, because we could not afford to undertake another Normandy invasion and Europe could not afford another liberation. Therefore, we were told that we must proceed at once to build up a defense force in Western Europe which could hold off a Russian invasion at the Elbe or, at worst, at the Rhine, at least until "our own power could be brought to bear."

So what does our government propose to Congress and to the American people in order to meet this emergency? It proposes a grant of just over one billion dollars to be spent over the next two years in rebuilding the military strength of Western Europe.

What does one billion dollars mean in terms of the problem posed to us?

Western Europe has at present about ten divisions, most of them poorly equipped. In the air it has next to nothing beyond a small but efficient British Fighter Command. Russia—according to the *lowest* estimates—has over 150 fully equipped and mobilized divisions. Russia has considerable air power. Again, according to the *lowest* estimates, it would take at least forty fully equipped and mobilized divisions, supported by ample air power, to hold a Russian invasion at the Rhine "until our own power could be brought to bear." (Our own power on the ground consists, at present, of about ten combat divisions.)

It costs about one quarter of a billion dollars to equip one armored division. Where does this program of one billion dollars get us? How can it build even half the defense force so urgently needed? What good is a defense force that could *almost* hold off an invasion?

What about atomic bombs? (This was in the last halcyon days of our atomic monopoly.) Couldn't we stop the Russians with a much smaller ground force if we used atomic weapons on Russian troop concentrations and supply lines as well as upon the industrial centers of the Soviet Union? Perhaps so. But if we drop atomic bombs all over Ger-

many—which this would mean—good-by to any hope of Germany's being on our side as a bulwark against communism. As a matter of fact, the planners of this project defended it until September 23, 1949, on the now curious grounds that it was designed to create a defense force in Western Europe by 1952—*the earliest date at which the Russians could be expected to have atomic weapons.* Figure that one out for yourself.

It is obvious, of course, that our military men would like to see a much larger and faster program of rearming Western Europe, if its territory is to be made safe against invasion. But the State Department knows that it cannot afford to let rearmament in Western Europe interfere with recovery, and this limits severely the number of men who can be withdrawn for military service from the farms and factories of France, Britain, and the Low Countries. The State Department knows, too, that it cannot propose rearming the Germans without letting loose a storm of protest here and abroad. Nor can it rearm the Italians beyond the limitations of the Italian Peace Treaty. It could, of course, propose that we increase our own combat forces and station a large part of them in Western Europe now, before any war starts. But that would require a war-scare to make all previous war-scares look like amateur performances. Furthermore, it would require more billions added to our already swollen military budget.

So our government went to Congress with a program which implied an unfulfillable promise to our friends, and deluded the American people into thinking that this particular danger had been met by their willingness to fork over another billion dollars. Congress—by this time thoroughly accustomed to the pattern—went through the usual motions of anxious doubt and economy mindedness, chipping off a little here and a little there, fiddling with bookkeeping entries, striking out grants of power which were put in for the precise purpose of letting Congress strike them out, and passed the measure substantially as requested. No one who supported the program ever asked whether the appropriation was big enough for the enormous commitment undertaken. The only questions raised were whether the amount proposed might not be excessive.

This pattern of self-delusion reverses the well-known maxim of Theodore Roosevelt. We are not speaking softly and carrying a Big Stick. We shout our commitments from the housetops and equip ourselves with a fine collection of photographs of Big Sticks.

The Dollar-Sterling Crisis

Manifestly, the world is full of dangerous situations which could be met if some one put up the means of meeting them. Equally evident is the fact that the United States, rich as it is, cannot provide the means for meeting each and every emergency. What has just been said merely indicates that we should decide which emergencies we can and should meet, *and then meet them,* instead of taking half-measures all over the world. This would leave a number of doors unlocked against danger, but at least we should know that there were a few places in the world through which danger definitely could not come upon us.

Right now we are faced with the fact that the apparently successful Marshall Plan is likely to collapse in failure. The chickens are coming home to roost. The Marshall Plan was devised to meet a crisis of underproduction, shortage and inflation. It has done so with remarkable success. Western Europe as a whole is now producing half again as much as it was before the war. But Western Europe now faces rising unemployment and a curtailment of production because it cannot exchange its goods for the food and raw materials it needs to continue its production. Specifically, Western Europe cannot earn enough dollars to buy the food and raw materials which can be bought only with dollars. Consequently, instead of drawing closer together in a powerful economic union, the countries of Western Europe are competing with each other for dollars, restricting trade with each other, and desperately trying each to make itself as self-sufficient as possible in order to survive. The longer this goes on, the more the Marshall Plan will tend to go into reverse.

Many Americans, including some of our policy-makers, regard this dollar shortage as a disease of the European economy. They insist that, if the European countries would only remove all trade restrictions between each other and within their own economies, the dollar shortage would disappear. There is a widespread belief among Americans that the Europeans could do these things, if they—especially the British—were not so obstinately committed to socialistic experiments in planned economy. Governor Dewey has gone so far as to advocate that we force Western Europe to stop this nonsense by threatening to withhold further aid.

Here again we see the pattern of immature self-deception. The dollar shortage is not primarily a disease of the European economy, nor a

product of socialist experimentation. Nor does the cure lie primarily in anything the West Europeans could now do or fail to do.

In the last thirty years the United States has doubled and then redoubled its production, thereby likewise doubling and redoubling its purchasing power and its relative importance as a consumer as well as producer of the world supply of goods. During the same period, Europe, torn and partially devastated by two great wars, has suffered the obsolescence of its productive machinery, the exhaustion of its population, and the dissipation of its accumulated reserves. In the nineteenth century, Western Europe as a whole was the nerve and brain centre of a colonial world empire. In the twentieth century Western Europe has gradually become a nerve and brain centre without a body to nourish it and without arms and legs to direct and control. It is now in the position of a man who in middle-age retired to the management of an estate, acquired through hard work in early life, and who then loses the estate and is compelled to go back to the sort of work he did in his youth. Picture Western Europe not as one such man, but as nineteen such men, living close together, with each of them having suffered a similar misfortune —nineteen middle-aged men, forced to go back to manual work to support their families and competing with each other for the things their families need.

Meanwhile, we have become not only the major source of the food, raw materials and tools which the other peoples of the world need in order to work and earn a livelihood, but also the sole possible buyer of many of the goods produced by the other peoples of the world. Moreover, our development of mass production, as against the batch production of the rest of the world, has enabled us not only to produce more goods, but cheaper goods of relatively high quality.

The heart of the post-war economic crisis lies in the rise of American power, the decline of European power, and our failure to understand the full implications of our newly acquired position. We realize that we are rich while others are poor, well-fed while others are hungry, powerful where others are weak. We realize this emotionally and are ready to give, to feed, to share our good fortune. But we do not understand intellectually the kind of responsibility our preponderant strength and power place upon us. We do not understand, for example, that being the world's greatest producer and seller of goods places upon us the responsibility to

buy what other peoples produce. We are quite willing to recognize that our surplus production belongs to the world, but we are not willing to recognize that our surplus purchasing power also belongs to the world. Thus we persist in keeping our domestic industries protected by a tariff designed to protect the infant industries of a young and struggling debtor nation.

Even the Marshall Plan, by far the most adult and constructive feature of our post-war policy, was undertaken half in the spirit of charity and half out of fear-inspired anxiety to build a dam against communism; whereas, if we had fully understood the post-war problem, the primary purpose of the Marshall Plan would have been to harness our great surplus resources to the restoration of some sort of balance between the Old World and the New. Had we fully understood the nature of the post-war problem, we should have begun with the realization that we ourselves needed, in our own interest, to find a way to get rid of the huge surplus in our balance of payments with the rest of the world.

The same problem still faces us today in more acute form. The devaluation of currencies recently undertaken will not cure it. At best it will provide temporary relief. If we want Europe to stop permanently the mad scramble for dollars which is driving it toward weakness and fragmentation, we must, in one way or another, supply enough dollars so that the scramble can stop. We must not again chisel away at a generous undertaking to the point where an operation to induce lasting recovery becomes merely a never-ending subsidy to provide relief. *We must stop thinking of the money we spend abroad as expense, and think of it instead as investment.*

What is demanded of us at the present time is a far-reaching and continuing program of long-term investment abroad, in which Government must lead the way and private capital follow. Such a program must go beyond the present limited concept of the Point Four Program. It is true enough that the world needs the technical advice and know-how we are proposing to export. What it needs even more is the planned development of its natural resources. It needs such things as TVA developments on the Rhone River in France, on the Jordan River in the Middle East, and on the great rivers of India—and perhaps even of China. We cannot expect to carry out such a program effectively without channeling it through some sort of supra-national organization. If the funds for this type of imaginative reconstruction flow direct into the world from the

United States Treasury or from Wall Street, we shall make ourselves into the absentee landlord of a world which hates us, even while it thrives on the wealth we pour into its development.

Cost a lot of money? Of course it will cost a lot of money. When the Marshall Plan was under discussion, I frightened and infuriated a good friend of mine in the Department of State by publicly pleading for the Plan's adoption even though it might cost us sixty or seventy billion dollars over a period of ten years. What I am talking about now will cost us even more, because the Marshall Plan dealt with only a small part of the world, and the problem we face is a world problem. But "cost" is not the right word. If you offer a millionaire the chance to invest $50,000 a year for ten years in a sound development, he will not protest that you are asking for half of his fortune. He will consider whether the proposed annual investment of his income for ten years will or will not make him another million dollars of capital. Our annual income as a nation may soon reach three hundred billion dollars. What I am talking about is a program of foreign investment that will take something like three percent of that annual income and invest it in our own future peace and prosperity, by raising the living standards and the purchasing power of the other peoples of the world.

The immature approach is to think that peace can be built by shoring up crumbling walls and patching a leaky roof. The mature approach is to recognize that a new house needs to be built for the world to live in. That new house must be planned by many minds and built by many hands. We can neither design it alone, nor build it alone. We can help to do both, especially because at present we have what amounts to a monopoly on building materials, and because we alone have substantial surplus capital to invest. But the house, when built, must be the world's cooperative apartment, in which we—like everyone else—will be a tenant. That is the essential difference between a peace by mutual consent and a *Pax Americana.*

The mature nation thinks in terms of reasonable agreement between equals. The immature nation thinks in terms of power—power to rebuild the world's house *the way it wants,* and then to offer to others the facilities and arrangements *it thinks they should want* at terms *it thinks fair and generous.* The immature nation, like the immature individual, thinks in terms of the parent-child relationship. The mature nation, like the mature individual, thinks in terms of brotherhood.

Lest you think I have overdone the well-known parable of the moat and the beam and have treated our own foibles too harshly, let me make it clear that I have not been dealing in comparative terms. I have not been discussing the *relative* immaturity of our foreign policy, nor have I meant to imply that certain other nations are necessarily more mature or less mature than we. The thing which concerns me and in which I have tried to arouse your concern, is that, irrespective of other nations, we are up against a difficult problem arising within ourselves. This is nothing more nor less than the age-old problem of growing up to man's estate, which, as you well know, is rarely accomplished without pain.

A most encouraging sign of our advancing maturity was given in the communiqué issued on September 12, 1949, by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain and Canada, after their preliminary conference on the Dollar-Sterling crisis. Here we have the American Government officially recognizing that our foreign trade policies have not been consistent with our position as the world's greatest creditor nation and coming boldly to the conclusion that these policies must be drastically altered. Unfortunately, it is one thing to recognize the twin requirements of tariff revision and long-range investment abroad, and quite another thing to meet these requirements. Secretary Acheson courageously took the bull by the horns, but his colleague in the Treasury Department still mumbled that whatever steps were to be taken must fall within the framework of existing policy. The important thing is that working parties have been created to study the problems in detail and to work out the necessary programs.

The great question now is whether these working parties will let the chips fall where they may, or whether they will recommend only such action as may be deemed "politically possible."

If the working parties make, or are forced to make, political compromises, it is safe to predict that our pattern of immature self-delusion will be continued and that no lasting cure will be effected. If the working parties report what needs to be done, irrespective of how many probable votes can be counted "for" or "against" in the House and Senate, then it will be up to the American people—up to you and me as citizens—to see that our representatives in Congress find the necessary public support for doing the "politically *im*possible."

When that day comes—if it comes—we shall have achieved maturity.

Chapter Three

OUR GREAT OPPORTUNITY

In the next few months we, the citizens of the United States, shall have our first real opportunity to throw ourselves behind a mature and constructive effort to build the peace . . . our first real opportunity, and perhaps our last.

After four years of continuous post-war crisis—four years in which we have gone from emergency to emergency, dealing chiefly with symptoms—we shall have our first real chance to come to grips with the basic causes of the world's malady.

There are two sets of basic causes of the present state of world affairs. One set is primarily economic; the other political. The two are inter-related and require separate, though inter-related cures.

The fundamental economic causes of anxiety, tension and unrest are hunger, privation, disease and ignorance. The fundamental political causes are oppression and exploitation of the many by the few anywhere on the face of the earth. Wherever people are oppressed and exploited—whether by alien domination or domestic tyranny—whether by dictatorship of the Right or the Left—there we find the seeds of internal violence or external aggression.

Just as the disease is compounded of economic and political factors, so the cure must be designed along the same lines. The fight for peace is, in effect, the fight for higher living standards combined with the fight for freedom.

Our great opportunity in the coming months lies in the development of a program which will aid both the fight for higher living standards and the fight for freedom. Although this program will operate primarily in

the field of economics, its political impact can be profound and far-reaching.

The basis of our great opportunity lies in the fact that ignorance, want and misery are actually technologically obsolete. That is to say, ignorance, want and misery need not exist much longer anywhere on this earth, if the human race can learn how to disseminate knowledge which already exists and how to cooperate in its application.

Realizing the importance of this fact, the United Nations, and especially the Food and Agriculture Organization, began some time ago to develop programs for providing technical assistance to agriculture and industry in the underdeveloped parts of the world. Similar exploratory work was undertaken by some of the other specialized agencies, as, for example, in health and education. This work has so far been on a small scale and has been hampered by insufficient funds. A report issued by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in June, 1949, summarizes the work done and the projects under consideration. A digest of this report may be found in Appendix I.

New impetus was given to this idea in January, 1949, when President Truman, in his Inaugural Address, enunciated his "Point Four Program" of American assistance to resource development in the world's underdeveloped areas.

This is what the President said:

> "We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of under-developed areas.
>
> "More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas.
>
> "For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people.
>
> "The United States is preeminent among nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources

which we can afford to use for the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible.

"I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing development.

"Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.

"We invite other countries to pool their technological resources in this undertaking. Their contributions will be warmly welcomed. This should be a cooperative enterprise in which all nations work together through the United Nations and its specialized agencies wherever practicable. It must be a world-wide effort for the achievement of peace, plenty, and freedom.

"With the cooperation of business, private capital, agriculture, and labor in this country, this program can greatly increase the industrial activity in other nations and can raise substantially their standards of living.

"Such new economic developments must be devised and controlled to benefit the peoples of the areas in which they are established. Guarantees to the investor must be balanced by guarantees in the interest of the people whose resources and whose labor go into these developments.

"The old imperialism—exploitation for foreign profit—has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing.

"All countries, including our own, will greatly benefit from a constructive program for the better use of the world's human and natural resources. Experience shows that our commerce with other countries expands as they progress industrially and economically.

"Greater productions is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.

"Only by helping the least fortunate of its members to help themselves can the human family achieve the decent, satisfying life that is the right of all people.

"Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against their human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies—hunger, misery, and despair."

This promise of American aid aroused the interest and the hopes of mankind, and the President's ringing repudiation of old-fashioned imperialism and foreign exploitation—his clear affirmation that his purpose was to benefit the peoples of the areas concerned—gave substance to the belief that the program would indeed be both bold and new. The concrete proposals foreshadowed by the Inaugural Address were awaited here and abroad with keen interest, for it appeared that the long-awaited moment had come when the United States would give an affirmative and constructive turn to its post-war foreign policy.

Although the "bold new program" bore the label, "Point Four", the hope was kindled that it would become something more than the mere extension of a fear-inspired, negative policy. It was evident that the new program could succeed—and succeed brilliantly— if it were to become the means of shifting the emphasis in overall American policy from fear to hope—from the frantic shoring up of crumbling walls to the careful planning and building of a new dwelling place for mankind.

Similarly, it was apparent that, if the new program were to succeed, it must not be permitted to become another bargain-basement item to be squeezed out of an overburdened budget. It would have to be conceived—*not as an expense—but as a desirable investment in world peace and prosperity, and hence as a desirable investment of American capital in the future welfare of the American people.*

Ever since January, 1949, people all over the world have been asking each other: "Will the American promise come true?"

The Nature of the Need

What is required to relieve tensions and anxiety, to restore the hope of mankind in the future, and the faith of mankind in itself, is an act of faith—an act of faith which unequivocally demonstrates that somewhere on this earth there is a people ready to undertake great risks and sacrifices in order to back up its belief that man is capable of planning a better world and of achieving it.

We alone among the peoples of this earth have the resources to make such an act of faith effective.

The tensions and frustrations which are driving the world toward disaster do not originate in the so-called ideological combat between the two halves of a divided world. The ideological combat has its origins in the political, economic and social strains inherent in a world which has become physically one without learning how to govern itself as an entity—which has learned technologically how to produce abundance without learning sociologically how to apply its knowledge and distribute the fruits of production—which has learned how to prolong life without learning how to provide its increasing population with life's necessities. If hunger, disease, ignorance and poverty are basic causes of the world crisis, food, health, education and the development of the world's abundant resources for the benefit of the world's peoples are the basic cure.

To effect this cure the peoples of the world must embark upon a cooperative effort not merely to develop but also to conserve and wisely use the wealth which lies within themselves and in the Earth which they inhabit. Such an effort must apply first of all to the so-called underdeveloped areas, for here lie the greatest untapped sources of wealth as well as the greatest sources of explosive anxiety and tension. But the effort must not be confined solely to the underdeveloped areas. It is not possible to separate the development of the peoples and the natural resources of Asia, Africa or the Middle East from the pressing problem of redressing the balance of trade and the balance of payments between Europe and America. The sterling-dollar crisis arises as much in India and Malaya as it does in the British Isles. Nor can it be overlooked that the natural resources of the highly-developed countries must be included in such a program. It is true that the surplus resources of North America must supply the original impetus. But it is equally true that these resources are

not inexhaustible, unless they are conserved, put to intelligent use and further developed. The TVA is by no means a completed development project; its greatest benefits are perhaps still to come. The Missouri and Columbia Valley projects are still on paper. There are not even paper plans as yet for the effective conservation of our dwindling Western forests.

The nature of the needed program was ably defined before a recent United Nations Scientific Conference by Dr. Stephen Raushenbush, Consultant to the Public Affairs Institute and the United States Department of the Interior. He put it in these terms:

> "The task is not simply that of transferring population into industry to increase wealth, but to make that transfer under a grouping of conditions which can produce the most effective use of the resources. That combination must include at least 1) access to technology, education, and particularly understanding about productivity, 2) access to low-cost capital, 3) wide-spread use of low-cost energy, 4) low-unit-cost, large-scale production, without excessive claims for security at the start, 5) careful timing, programming and single-agency operation, 6) adequate agricultural development and conservation in partnership with industrial growth, and 7) a really adequate large-scale effort at the start of the conversion process."

Can We Afford It?

The ultimate demands of a program capable of realizing the ideal expressed by President Truman are obviously very great. In the beginning they will of necessity fall very largely, though by no means solely, upon the United States. The program is likely to grow like an inverted Christmas tree, with the smallest demand for investment in the first year and successively greater demands as resource development gets under way. Once the program gets into its stride, however, the dependence upon American capital is likely to become relatively less each year as the economic strength of other countries increases. A fair guess might be that the load upon our resources would rise from something less than half a billion dollars in the first year to several billions in the second and third year and perhaps to as much as five or six billions in the fourth and fifth years, declining thereafter, even though the program itself would continue to expand. What we need, of course, is not a guess but a concrete plan based upon careful study. The guess is submitted merely to give some

indication of the probable trends and some approximation to the amounts involved, in order that we may consider whether such a program lies within or without the realm of the possible.

One thing seems clear. We should not embark upon this much-needed program at all, unless we are able and willing to see it through. The American people must not be misled by the relatively small financial requirements of the first year. They must not be beguiled into a commitment they do not fully understand nor misguided into building another half-bridge that leads nowhere. As yet no effort whatsoever has been made to enable the American people to understand such a program and to make up their minds about it.

Assuming that the nature of the problem is something like what has been indicated above, can we afford it?

At present we are producing approximately twenty billion dollars a year more in goods and services than we consume. We have, in other words, about twenty billion dollars a year of excess productive capacity to use in the implementation of our foreign policy—whatever we decide that foreign policy should be. This twenty billions can be increased over a period of time by further development and conservation of our own great natural resources, even though we simultaneously increase our domestic consumption.

At the present time we are spending some fifteen billions a year on our own military establishment, one or two billions more on atomic energy development, and one billion and a half on military aid to potential allies in a possible war against the Soviet Union. In addition we are spending about four billions a year on the Marshall Plan. This makes a total of about twenty-three billion dollars a year, of which only a little more than one sixth is being spent in a constructive effort to build the peace. The rest is devoted to the negative purpose of preventing Russian military aggression—or Russian victory in the event of such aggression.

Of this total expenditure on foreign policy, all but the Marshall Plan funds and the Military Aid appropriations—together about five and a half billions—are being spent in this country. These five and a half billions, which we are giving away, serve for the moment to fill the gap in our balance of payments and thus enable us to keep our own economy going. But these five and a half billions do not suffice to enable other countries to buy enough of what they need in this country to keep their economies going on more than a hand-to-mouth basis. Moreover, the

Marshall Plan is now running into heavy weather and is likely to be drastically cut down by Congress as it becomes painfully evident that its goal of making Western Europe independent of American aid in 1952 will not be realized.

The answer seems clear. The Marshall Plan has served its purpose of restoring production in Western Europe. It cannot solve the crisis of trade and exchange which now blocks complete European recovery. But that crisis could be solved if the Marshall Plan were integrated in a new and broader plan of worldwide reconstruction and development—a plan which would take into consideration, as the Marshall Plan did not, that Europe, and particularly Western Europe alone, cannot be considered separately from Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

My own conclusion, on the basis of these considerations is that we not only can afford to undertake our part in a worldwide development program, but that we actually cannot afford *not* to undertake *some* program which will gradually eliminate the dangerous gap in our balance of payments. Since only a small part of this gap can be closed by increased American imports, it seems evident that the only way to offset our continuing excess exports of goods is to embark upon a deliberate program of exporting capital. The alternative is to face a drastic shrinkage in our domestic economy.

What better program of capital export can there be than one which will build up the purchasing power of the other nations of the world to a point where, eventually, there will be no unbalance to correct?

The question, it seems to me, is not whether a truly "bold new program" is practical or within our means, but rather whether we have the imagination, the courage and the will to undertake it.

In the long run it is, of course, obvious that we cannot pile more billions on to the huge amounts we are already spending to implement our foreign policy. But if, at the same time that we begin a program of long-term investment abroad to build up the living standards and the purchasing power of the rest of the world, we also re-examine and revise our present expenditures on stop-gap solutions, then we can well afford a temporary increase of our overall expenditures.

It is true that the arms race cannot now be halted overnight. But it is also true that we can, overnight, redirect our policy toward halting the

arms race, by assuming the leadership in a determined effort to develop the United Nations into a kind of world organization that alone will make disarmament possible. An important move in this direction has already made considerable headway in Congress where a concurrent resolution to this effect has been sponsored by 104 Representatives and 22 Senators.

Moreover, some of the money we shall spend on the new program can be saved—by coordinating the Marshall Plan with the new worldwide development plan—by recognizing that the only way to protect Western Europe from military invasion is to prevent that invasion from being attempted—and by cleaning up the Augean stable which now apparently exists in our defense establishment. All this could be done without jeopardizing our national security and without over-straining our national resources.

What Is the Great Opportunity?

The opportunity we face in 1950 is to extricate ourselves from a dilemma which is becoming increasingly apparent. The Marshall Plan is not going to make Western Europe self-supporting by 1952, the year in which it is supposed to terminate. This places before us the choice of indefinitely protracting this particular effort, or abandoning it. Indefinite protraction is difficult to defend, precisely because it is indefinite. Abandonment of Western Europe is, on the other hand, unthinkable.

The opportunity we face now is to develop a new plan, which will avoid the basic error of the Marshall Plan—namely, that it attempted to deal with Western Europe as if it were, or could be made into, a self-contained entity. The opportunity we face is to save what has been accomplished by the Marshall Plan and to carry the work to a successful conclusion, by integrating our efforts in Western Europe with a simultaneous attack upon those aspects of the problem which lie in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America.

This, too, will be an undertaking of unknown duration and unknown magnitude. But, because it will be directed at the whole of the problem, it *can* succeed, whereas any attack upon an isolated part of the problem is necessarily foredoomed to failure. In trying to bring about recovery in Western Europe alone, we have tried to fill a relatively small bucket—but a bucket which leaked into every other part of the world. In undertaking a worldwide cooperative plan of reconstruction and development, we shall be attempting to fill a much larger bucket, but a bucket which is reasonably sure not to leak.

II.

Let us now try to reduce our ideas to a few basic principles and then see to what extent the concrete proposals, which have so far been submitted to Congress, conform to these principles.

The four big questions to answer are:

How big in scope should the program be—or how big must it be in order to succeed?

What should be the relation of the program to the free world's struggle against totalitarianism?

Through what agencies should the program be planned and carried out?

How should the program be financed?

Four Principles

1. *Scope of the Program.* Since the basic economic problem of our time is one of unbalance—especially unbalance between North America and the rest of the world—the problem of the underdeveloped areas cannot be separated from the problem of redressing the balance of payments between Europe and the United States. The contemplated program must therefore be worldwide, or at least as worldwide as is possible in view of the existing cleavages. Since the surplus resources of the North American Continent are essential to the carrying out of a worldwide program, but are, on the other hand, themselves not inexhaustible, the program must also concern itself very seriously with the further development, conservation and use of the resources of Canada and the United States.

2. *Relation of Program to Totalitarian Menace.* The program cannot ignore the existing threat of totalitarianism. On the other hand, it cannot succeed if it becomes merely another instrument in the existing negative power struggle. The work undertaken in the underdeveloped areas, especially in Asia, must not be controlled by considerations arising out of European cold war alliances. The success of the program as a whole will depend very largely upon its adoption being coincident with a conscious shift of emphasis in present United States foreign policy.

3. *The Channeling of the Program.* Since the impact of economic action under the program will carry the widest social, political and cultural implications, the cooperative program for the development, conservation and use of the world's resources must obviously be planned by governments cooperating through international agencies. The program obviously cannot be planned, or simply be permitted to develop through uncoordinated private initiative. The contemplated program should, therefore, be channeled through the United Nations, if possible; if not, through some other international organization—perhaps an ad hoc organization—and only in the last resort through bilateral arrangements between the United States and any beneficiary country. In the event of resort to such bilateral arrangements, they should be made only in such a way as to be consistent with the overall policies developed through the United Nations or other international organizations.

4. *Method of Financing the Program.* The nature of the long-term investments required will be such as to provide their primary return to the lending countries in the benefits of increased purchasing power on the part of the beneficiaries, rather than in conventional interest or dividends. On the other hand, the development of the under-developed areas will undoubtedly provide increasing orthodox investment opportunities.

It follows that the germinal funds for carrying out the proposed program must be public funds. Such public funds will be required especially for harbors, transportation facilities, public health and education. Some of these funds can be provided through loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Others may flow from the Export-Import Bank, or from national treasuries through some central agency. Public investment should stimulate and create the necessary climate for private investment, but it is essential that such private investment must not be permitted to create social, economic, or political conditions which run counter to the overall cooperative plan or to the interests of the peoples concerned. The same safeguards must, of course, be applied to all investment of public funds in any given area.

The Current Proposals

Let us now consider to what extent the proposals before Congress conform to the four major principles just stated. The current proposals consist of the following Bills:

1. The Administration-sponsored Kee Bill (HR 5615) entitled "The International Technical Cooperation Act of 1949."

2. The Administration-sponsored proposal to provide Export-Import Bank guarantees for private American investment abroad (S. 2197).

3. The Republican-sponsored Herter Bill (HR 6026) entitled "The Foreign Economic Development Act of 1949."

The text of the Administration proposal will be found in Appendix II.

1. *As to Scope.* The Administration program for implementing "Point Four" is limited to the underdeveloped areas. It is therefore as yet too restricted to meet the needs, and requires broadening by amendment.

The Herter counter-proposal, while not confined to the underdeveloped areas, is even more limited by two other disturbing qualifications: (1) "willingness to cooperate with the United States"; and (2) willingness "to struggle against communism and other forms of statism."

"Willingness to cooperate with the United States" is quite explicitly defined in the Herter Bill. It involves willingness to sign a bilateral economic treaty with the United States (Section 11) which would grant to American business a number of inducements to investment. These inducements include greater rights, privileges and immunities than those enjoyed by the indigenous business enterprises in the participating country. They would, if granted, enable American capital to become the absentee owner of many of the participating country's productive resources, and to remain the absentee owner even after the original investment had been repaid. They would enjoin indigenous business from competing with American-owned enterprise, even where such American enterprise did not fully meet the needs of the country concerned. The treaty would in some cases call for repeal of existing laws against majority foreign ownership, and would provide for exemption from currency controls affecting indigenous enterprises. In return for all these rights and immunities the Herter proposal would not guarantee to the signatory of the proposed treaty that any American capital would actually be invested, that any American goods or technical processes would actually be made available, or that anything at all would happen other than the making of cooperative surveys and reports for which the foreign signatory would be expected to pay "its proportionate share". This qualification seems so one-sided as to make the whole program inoperative. Our experience with the Bell-Tydings Act in the Philippines should be a warning.

The second qualification, which stipulates a willingness to "struggle against communism and other forms of statism" is ambiguous in the extreme. It is clearly intended to make the development program into an instrument in the existing negative power struggle. In addition, the qualification seems to imply that the whole program is intended to become the instrument of a worldwide crusade to promote American free enterprise capitalism. This raises such questions as whether the Labor Government of Britain is "struggling against statism", whether the Scandinavian countries would be ineligible because of their Socialist Governments, and whether Western Germany would be eligible only so long as the free enterprise Christian Democrats remain in power.

2. *As to Channels of Operation.* The preceding comments serve to show that the Herter proposal relies entirely upon bilateral arrangements between the United States and each of the would-be beneficiaries. If carried out, such a proposal would result in making the United States the economic overlord of the world. There is nothing cooperative about this concept.

The Administration proposal emphasizes cooperation with the United Nations, the Inter-American Organization and other international agencies. It looks toward cooperative planning of technical assistance through the United Nations. It seems, however, to be based upon the tacit assumption that in the later financing of development projects, bilateral arrangements will have to play a very important part. This is an element of danger. The Administration has been at pains to make clear that it condemns old-fashioned imperialism or foreign exploitation and that its program is to be based upon "democratic fair dealing". In the President's own words, "New economic developments must be devised and controlled to benefit the peoples of the areas in which they are established." This intention is admirable, but it seems doubtful whether it can be realized unless a more conscious effort is made to restrict bilateralism.

3. *As to Methods of Financing.* The Administration proposal relies heavily, and the Herter proposal almost entirely, upon inducing a flow abroad of private American capital. The Administration hopes to stimulate the flow of private capital through indirect Government guarantee by means of the Export-Import Bank. The Republican Bill seeks to attract American private capital abroad by forcing the beneficiary countries to offer it special inducements. Both proposals seem in this sense unrealistic.

As already stated, the germinal funds for the program will have to be provided in large amounts by governments, although some private capital might simultaneously be invested and more might be expected to follow later, when the preconditions for private investment have been created.

A special word of caution seems appropriate with regard to the Administration proposal to provide indirect Government guarantees for private American investors in foreign countries. From the private investor's point of view, these guarantees are likely to prove unsatisfactory because they will probably cover only certain specific foreseeable contingencies. Even these guarantees are likely to be subject to more than one interpretation should the contingencies arise. From the Government's point of view—that is, from the taxpayer's point of view—contingent liabilities of unknown dimensions would seem equally unsatisfactory. Over and beyond these considerations, the principle of causing the Government to act in this capacity is far-reaching and wide open to abuse. It would seem wiser to let private investors assume whatever risks they wish, leaving other risks to be assumed or not assumed by Government in its discretion. Then each party will know where it stands.

4. *As to the amount of financing required.* Reliance upon the export of technical advice and "know-how", supported by loans from the International Bank and such private capital as might be induced to flow abroad, will be inadequate—even if the International Bank greatly liberalizes its present policy and speeds up its procedure. The Administration proposal has no doubt been conditioned by the present mood of Congress, which is clearly against any further expansion of foreign loans at this time. But the fact is that, if this program is to succeed, the Administration must undertake to change the mood of Congress and of the people. It must place this program before Congress and the people in its true light—as an enterprise of great magnitude requiring a truly bold and new approach to stable peace and prosperity.

In a speech on November 1, 1949, to the American Society of Civil Engineers, President Truman himself adopted a wise motto. "Make no little plans", he said. "You can always amend a big plan, but you can never expand a little one."

The present Administration-sponsored proposal for carrying out the "bold new program" is as yet a "little plan".

Our job is to make it a big one.

To accomplish this purpose we shall have to bring about constructive amendments to the present Administration proposals. These amendments would aim at three major purposes:

1. To broaden the *geographical* scope of the program so as to include not only the underdeveloped areas but also the partially developed areas and even the highly developed areas such as the United States.

2. To broaden the *functional* scope of the program so as to include, from the beginning, not only technical aid and possible private investment but also the use of public funds as seed-money for actual project development.

3. To commit the program more definitely to a multilateral co-operative approach through an international agency, in preference to bilateral bargains between the United States and each of the participating countries, which would throw the United States into the role of the "harsh banker" who imposes conditions.

We shall have to fight hard for such amendments and for the ultimate passage of the amended legislation. Not only do the facts need to be presented to the American people, but expert study is needed before the appropriate amendments can be drawn and the case built up for their adoption. I have reason to hope that at least some of this expert study will be undertaken promptly by a qualified research organization under foundation sponsorship.

When this introductory study has been published, I shall have gone about as far as a single citizen can go in a matter of this sort. Several thousand copies are being sent, with the message stated on the back cover, to a selected list of educators, writers, editors, public servants and public-spirited citizens, as well as to every member of the 81st Congress. I wish I had the ability to do more and thus to make this initial effort more effective.

From here on the job can be done only through cooperative action—such as was discussed in the first chapter—by citizens who see the need for such action and who are willing to pool their energies, their skills and their resources to see it through.

Would you like to help?

The back cover will tell you how.

APPENDIX I.

United Nations Report

Meeting a month after the President's Inaugural Address, the Economic and Social Council instructed the Secretary-General to consult with the directors of the specialized agencies and draw up a "comprehensive program," including "methods of financing" and "ways of coordinating the planning and execution of the program."

At the beginning of June, the report of the Secretary-General on technical assistance was released. It is the result of intensive study and cooperation among the secretariats of the U. N. and the specialized agencies. The report describes in considerable detail the many types of projects for technical assistance proposed by the U. N. itself and individually by five of its specialized agencies. The proposals are based on actual experience. They are an extension and enlargement of advisory work which the various agencies have already begun in a smaller way. They provide for expert help in every field that plays a part in determining the standard of living of a nation; in improving agriculture and thus increasing the supply of food and raw materials; in expanding industry and the production of goods; in building up transport systems so that men and materials can move to the places where they are most needed; in providing a basic education and technical training without which new machines would stand idle and social growth would be stunted; in health conditions to give people energy and ambition. The U. N. plan is truly a comprehensive one, bringing into focus many types of activities. It adds up to an impressive total.

The projects described in the report are so numerous that only a few samples can be given here of what each agency proposes to do.

Projects of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

Steel mills and other heavy industries often seem to the under-developed nations like a magic cure for all their ills, but economists point out that before they can succeed in feeding an industrial population, they must produce more food. Most of the people in the under-developed countries make their living by farming, yet their rate of production is less than one-tenth of that of farmers in the more advanced countries, and

hunger is a chronic condition. Agricultural changes must come before the building of the longed-for factories. The kind of technical aid which the Food and Agriculture Organization is equipped to give is of the utmost importance.

Irrigation and drainage

In a large part of the world there is either too much of too little water for the best growth of crops. Either irrigation or drainage is needed. FAO proposes to send out experts to show Member governments how to set up water control projects.

Soil Management

Improper use has damaged the soil in many areas especially where rainfall is scanty or the slopes are steep. Under proper management, however, even soils that have been in use for thousands of years can be made far more productive. It is a matter of choosing the right crops for the soil and for the slope, and of using good tillage methods plus fertilizers and chemicals, if necessary. FAO proposes to expand its present program on soil management with special emphasis on the training of local technicians so that under-developed countries may carry out soil use programs of their own.

Farm implements

One of the most fundamental means of increasing agricultural production is to make better implements available to farmers. Large-scale power machinery may theoretically be the ideal solution but its introduction is costly and its operation is far beyond the technical knowledge of farmers in many of the under-developed countries. Better hand tools, animal-drawn implements and simple machines must first be introduced. FAO proposes to give local demonstrations of how these should be used. It proposes also to help governments set up agricultural extension services through which agricultural information of the kind needed locally can be spread to farmers through the under-developed countries.

Better seeds

In many countries little or no attention has been given to the use of better seed, though this is one of the quickest and most effective means of improving food production. For example, it is estimated that if the best

variety of rice were sown, yields could be increased by 10%, which would mean more food for millions of people. FAO proposes to push further its program of supplying improved seeds and helping governments to teach farmers to use them.

Animal breeding

It is estimated that livestock production could be increased by 25% in 10 years if modern breeding methods were generally applied. FAO plans to send experts to under-developed countries to help work out livestock breeding programs.

Better use of forests

About 30% of the land of the world is covered with forests. Properly managed, these forests can provide at least twice the present world output of timber. They can also guard against erosion and reduced floods by protecting the head waters of rivers. At the present time, most countries are not using their forests properly either for production or protection. FAO proposes advisory work along these lines.

Among the other programs proposed by FAO are ones to combat *plant diseases,* to combat *insect pests,* to control *animal diseases,* to improve *poultry raising* and to promote better use of *fisheries.*

Projects of the World Health Organization (WHO)

Low productivity and poor health tend to form a vicious circle. People grow unhealthy if they have not enough to eat but if they are unhealthy it is hard for them to produce enough food or other goods exchangeable for food. As indicated above, the program of the FAO aims to break this vicious circle by spreading improved agricultural techniques. For its part, the WHO proposes to attack the circle by helping governments improve the health of their people. If the farmer has good health and improved agricultural techniques his productivity will rise rapidly and the vicious circle will be broken.

In the past international health work has emphasized quarantine measures to check the spread of epidemics. WHO suggests that this approach is wasteful, that money would be better spent on a more positive approach, that if certain reservoirs of disease were eliminated, fewer epidemics would break out and the need of quarantine measures would be cut down. WHO proposes a concerted attack on these areas or reservoirs.

Malaria

The weakening effect of malaria is now a major obstacle to productivity in many lands. Yet WHO believes that malaria can be controlled and in time can be eliminated. In Greece by spraying DDT from aeroplanes the incidence of malaria was reduced in some parts from 95% to 5%. As an important part of its work towards economic development, WHO proposes to advise governments on methods of control of malaria and to give demonstrations.

Tuberculosis, venereal disease, cholera, and *plague,* are among the other diseases which WHO proposes to combat as part of the development program.

Environmental sanitation

WHO points out that disease has the greatest chance of spreading when living conditions are unhealthy. It proposes a number of programs to educate governments on proper health measures and to show them how to teach people certain fundamentals about sewage disposal, safe water supplies, insect control, sanitary handling of food and milk and adequate housing.

Health demonstration areas

WHO plans to choose a limited number of areas in which to demonstrate all the forms of health activity which it believes important; for example, eliminating the diseases of the areas, improved public health administration, environmental sanitation, maternal and child health work. In these demonstration areas WHO hopes to show what can be accomplished by giving a broad health education to the people.

Projects of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

Progress in agricultural productivity and also in public health depends in the last analysis on the education of the people. A number of projects suggested by UNESCO would thus dovetail closely into projects of the other specialized agencies.

Technical education

The under-developed countries need skilled personnel at every level. But they have few if any training courses and technical schools where their

people can learn the skills needed for economic development. UNESCO proposes to give countries which request it help and advice in setting up technical education systems.

Elementary education

Technical education, however, is impossible unless it is based on efficient and widespread elementary education. Many under-developed areas are in great need of assistance regarding methods of teaching, textbooks, curricula and a lot of other essential questions. UNESCO proposes to give advice in these fields upon request.

Fundamental adult education

Unless economic development is to wait for a new educated generation to grow up, adults must be given some fundamental education. Two-thirds of the human race are unable to read and write. This blocks progress since the printed word is one of the chief methods of spreading ideas and facts needed for development. UNESCO has been conducting experiments in literacy campaigns. It proposes to continue and expand its work along these lines, and it stresses that the teaching of reading and writing must be combined with the teaching of subjects which especially interest adults in the under-developed areas such as health, agriculture and rural industries.

Training of teachers

Through fellowships, scholarships, demonstration projects and training centers UNESCO proposes to help in the training of the teachers and scientific workers needed for economic development.

Protection of local cultures

"Every society is a living unity: all its institutions are interrelated. . . . To introduce new ways of living . . . without taking into account the problem of readapting the whole society does not lead to progress. . . . History furnishes dramatic examples of societies thrown into upheavel—sometimes with grave consequences to the whole world—by unbalanced programs of industrialization." These are UNESCO's words of caution. In order to safeguard against such disasters UNESCO proposes to send out sociologists and anthropologists to help plan development programs.

Projects of the International Labor Organization (ILO)

Much of the development program is a labor problem. How can workers be found to do the many new types of jobs that need to be done? How can the migration of people from country districts to new centers of industry be handled in orderly fashion? How can the hours and working conditions of the new laboring groups be protected?

On the basis of its twenty-nine years of work with labor problems, the International Labor Organization proposes to help show the under-developed countries how to solve problems such as these.

Employment service machinery

To place workers in the jobs best suited for them, well-run employment services are needed. The ILO proposes to give nations assistance and advice on organizing and operating such services. It proposes to help link up these services in different areas so that workers will not migrate aimlessly but go where they are needed.

It also proposes to set up centers to give professional training to staff members of the employment services.

Vocational training and apprenticeship

In certain under-developed areas ILO has recently been teaching governments new methods of training workers for particular occupations, methods which were worked out in England and the United States under the war-time need of speeding up all training processes. ILO proposes to increase this form of aid. It also proposes to set up training centers to teach instructors.

Wage policies

If wages are too low, workers do not have the incentive to good work. If they are too high, they place too heavy a burden on the industries. ILO points out that the under-developed countries need help in forming wage policies. For example, it proposes to advise them what kind of wage laws may be needed under particular conditions and how minimum wages rates can be decided.

Industrial safety

The workers in the under-developed areas know little about machines. Therefore, it will be particularly hard to prevent industrial accidents. The

ILO proposes to give governments advice on the safety laws and regulations which are needed and to show them how to teach workers simple safety rules.

Women and children in industry

Experience shows that when new industries are developing there is particular danger that women and children will be exploited. The ILO proposes to give advice on this subject.

Projects of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

Under-developed countries lack means of transport. Roads and railroads take years to build. Meanwhile, air transport can help development. It can make it possible for the country to make use of men and materials in places otherwise difficult to reach. In several ways, ICAO proposes to help governments develop their air transport systems.

Air transport surveys

A first step is to study the geography of an area, take stock of what means of transport exist and estimate what new links are needed and what the cost would be. ICAO proposes to furnish experts to help make such surveys.

Airports and air facilities

ICAO proposes to furnish experts to design improvements in existing airports and in the radio stations which aid air traffic.

Projects of the United Nations

The United Nations itself proposes that its part in the program of technical assistance will be to give aid in fields not handled by the specialized agencies and to coordinate their work.

Industrial assistance

In developing new industries, the under-developed countries need to find out what kind of machines and what processes make the best use of local materials. The U.N. proposes to advise them on this problem and help set up small pilot plants to test out particular processes.

Road construction

Roads are essential to development. The U.N. proposes to send out experts to demonstrate how they may be built. They would also help decide what local materials can best be used and help plan where the new roads should go.

Surveys of natural resources

To develop its resources a country must know what resources it has. In many areas no surveys have ever been made. The U.N. proposes to send out experts to show local personnel how to collect the knowledge that is needed.

Housing

As workers collect in new centers of industry they must be housed. Bad slums may easily develop. The U.N. proposes to send housing experts to help plan model communities.

Over-all advice

The U.N. proposes to help governments make an over-all plan of action, decide what to undertake first and which services it most needs from the specialized agencies.

The U.N. itself would also give aid in connection with *mining industries, electric power development, railroads, inland water ways, government administration and social welfare services.*

Funds for Technical Assistance.

To make available the kind of aid described in the report, both the U.N. itself and the specialized agencies will require more funds than their ordinary budgets provide. The Secretary-General's report proposes that special budgets be set up for the purpose. It also proposes that a Technical Assistance Committee, composed of representatives of the U.N. and the specialized agencies, sift the requests for aid which governments submit, allocate these to the proper agencies and in general act as a coordinating body.

The estimated cost of the complete program for two years is $86,042,383, of which $35,862,576 would be spent in the first year and

$50,179,807 the second. However, the plan is still tentative. Since aid is to be given to particular countries only on their request, the projects actually undertaken will depend upon what governments ask for. Furthermore, the plan must be approved by the Assembly of the U.N. and the policy-making bodies of the other agencies involved. The necessary funds must also be raised.

As the wealthiest nation in the world, the United States pays a major part of the expenses of all inter-governmental agencies. Because of this other nations are watching to see what this government will do now that a detailed draft has been worked out in response to President Truman's request for a "bold new program." Within the United States government, an inter-departmental committee, headed by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Mr. Willard L. Thorp, has been studying both the U.N. proposals and other ways of aiding the under-developed countries. On June 24, President Truman asked Congress to approve his plan for the under-developed regions of the world. He asked for an appropriation of $45,000,000 for technical assistance in the coming year. Some of this would be spent through the U.N. and the specialized agencies. But it is apparently planned that some of it will be spent apart from the United Nations.

Capital for Development

The important questions of policy to be decided by Congress and the American people are these: How much aid will this country give to the under-developed areas? Will it give this aid singly, according to its own plan? Or will it give it through international channels and thus help build up not only the under-developed countries but also the machinery for international cooperation?

The giving of technical assistance is only one part of the problem of development. The other part is the securing of vast sums of capital to carry out the various projects which technical advice indicates are needed. It is not enough to plan out what irrigation and drainage projects a country needs. Money must be found actually to build dams and irrigation canals. It is not enough to advise a government that the cost of moving food on human backs or on wheelbarrows is many times what it would cost to move the same food by modern means of transportation. Railroads must be built, canals must be dug, boat docks and wharfs must be constructed. The advice which the countries obtain through technical assistance always tends to point to the need for large loans or grants.

How then is economic development to be financed? In June, the Secretary-General published a separate report on this subject. There are, he reminds us, only two ways of financing development. Money must either come from within the under-developed countries or from outside. The major share of the capital will have to be raised domestically, but foreign capital must play an important part especially at the beginning. As soon as exports have grown and the country is therefore earning foreign exchange, there will be less need for investment from abroad.

The chief obstacle to domestic financing is that very little money is saved in the under-developed countries because people live so near the subsistence level. Almost all they produce is acutely needed. As the Food and Agriculture Organization has pointed out, even very inexpensive equipment—a sythe, a wheel hoe, or a single donkey—is beyond the means of millions of farmers. Furthermore, in the under-developed areas, the wealthy few tend to keep their wealth in unproductive forms, to collect precious stones or hoard gold. If the under-developed countries are to find the money needed for development, more money must be saved and this must be directed into the productive enterprises which are needed.

The Secretary-General's report points out a whole series of steps that might be taken to influence this process. Better banking systems must be established, government administration must be improved, tax policies must be changed.

As for the other possible source of money,—capital from abroad,—the report points out that foreign financing can take a number of forms. Individuals or private concerns from the more advanced countries may themselves start up enterprises in under-developed countries. In this "direct investment," the outside concern retains control over the enterprise. Secondly, money may be loaned by private foreign investors, but without retaining this control. Thirdly, money may be loaned or granted by foreign governments. Finally, the loans may be made by some international agency, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Since the war, there has been very little private investment. Because of unsettled conditions and other factors, the incentives for private foreign investment seem to be lacking. Hence the increased emphasis on loans from governments and international agencies.

The report makes it clear that the chief problem is how to reconcile the aims of under-developed countries with the interests of individual busi-

ness enterprises or governments which would have money to lend. The under-developed countries, of course, wish to be as free as possible of foreign control. They dislike the outside interference which foreign investors have usually exerted in the past. The latter, on the other hand, are concerned with the security of their investments. Past experience has shown the possible dangers. Too often governments have nationalized foreign enterprises without giving the previous owners prompt and adequate compensation. In some cases, currency restrictions have prevented the transfer of income and capital back to the investor. Often the under-developed countries have proved unable to maintain enough law and order to safeguard the investment.

To help bridge the gap between the investor's need for security and the borrower's desire for freedom from outside control, the International Chamber of Commerce has suggested the adoption of an international code of fair treatment for foreign investments, setting forth the relative rights and duties of both the investor and the borrower. A draft of such a code is included in the Secretary-General's report. It will undoubtedly be considered by the Economic and Social Council.

But even if such a code were adopted many difficulties would remain. Many of the projects needed by the under-developed countries are not of a kind to earn money and repay the investment. This is true of such important items as school systems, roads and health services. For such purposes, the under-developed coutries have clearly hoped that they might secure from the United States outright grants similar to the aid received by the Marshall Plan countries of Western Europe.

The report also discusses the scale at which capital investments will be needed. According to estimates of the Food and Agriculture Organization, the under-developed coutries will need $17 billion a year for the next four years, of which $4 billion would have to be raised from outside.

Though primarily interested in agricultural problems, the Food and Agriculture Organization points out how much attention must be given to non-farm industry if the living standards in these countries are to be raised. In most of the countries the size of each farm is small and the number of people working on the land is greater than would be needed if even a few labor-saving implements were introduced. Some of the population should begin to manufacture simple products needed for a higher standard of living such as textiles, pots and pans, milk cans, beds, scythes and other simple farm equipment. "With millions of the people . . . dressed in

rags, literally sleeping on the ground, hauling their daily water in heavy clay pots, and tilling and harvesting their crops with only a hoe and a sickle, the potential demands for clothing, house furnishings and farm equipment are almost unlimited, as soon as their farm production and their buying power expand."

Besides simple industries the Food and Agriculture Organization recommends investment in water control projects, transport and communications, food processing, storage and marketing, houses, electricity, telephone and other improved communication so that business men can learn in time where goods are for sale, and where the demand for such goods exists.

The Secretary-General's report also contains a statement by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development which has been frequently attacked by under-developed countries for not having loaned more money for development projects. The Bank points out that it is not empowered to make loans except for projects that are sound financially. It states that up to now there has been a great shortage of sound development projects in shape for financing.

This summary, by Beatrice Pitney Lamb, is reprinted from Vol. 4, No. 7, of the *United Nations News* by permission of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation.

APPENDIX II.

81st CONGRESS
1st Session

H. R. 5615

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

July 12, 1949

Mr. Kee introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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A BILL

To promote the foreign policy of the United States and to authorize participation in a cooperative endeavor for assisting in the development of economically underdeveloped areas of the world.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
3 That this Act may be cited as the "International Technical
4 Cooperation Act of 1949".
5 Sec. 2. The Congress hereby finds that the United
6 States and other nations of the world have a common interest
7 in the material progress of all peoples, both as an end in
8 itself and because such progress will further the advance of
9 human freedom, the secure growth of democratic ways of

1 life, the expansion of mutually beneficial commerce, and the
2 development of international understanding and good will.
3 The Congress further finds that the efforts of the peoples
4 living in economically underdeveloped areas of the world
5 to realize their full capabilities and to develop the resources
6 of the lands in which they live, can be furthered through
7 the cooperative endeavor of all nations to assist in such
8 development. It is, therefore, declared to be the policy of
9 the United States, in the interest of its people, as well as
10 that of other peoples, to promote the development of econom-
11 ically underdeveloped areas of the world.

12 SEC. 3. It is the objective of this Act to effectuate the
13 policy set forth in section 2 by enabling the Government
14 of the United States to participate in programs, in coopera-
15 tion with other interested governments, for the interchange
16 of technical knowledge and skills which contribute to the
17 balanced and integrated development of the economic
18 resources and productive capacities of economically under-
19 developed areas.

20 SEC. 4. In carrying out the objective of this Act—

21 (a) the participation of the United Nations, the
22 Organization of American States, and their related
23 organizations and of other international organizations
24 shall be sought wherever practicable; and

1 (b) the participation of private agencies and per-
2 sons shall be encouraged.
3 SEC. 5. As used in this Act—
4 (a) the term "technical cooperation programs"
5 means activities serving as a means for the inter-
6 national interchange of technical knowledge and skills
7 which are designed primarily to contribute to the
8 balanced and integrated development of the economic
9 resources and productive capacities of economically
10 underdeveloped areas. Such activities may include,
11 but need not be limited to, economic, engineering, medi-
12 cal, educational, and fiscal surveys, demonstration,
13 training, and similar projects that serve the purpose
14 of promoting the development of economic resources
15 and productive capacities of underdeveloped areas.
16 The term "technical cooperation programs" does not
17 include such activities authorized by the United States
18 Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948
19 (62 Stat. 6) as are not primarily related to economic
20 development, nor activities undertaken now or hereafter
21 pursuant to the International Aviation Facilities Act
22 (62 Stat. 450), nor pursuant to the Philippine Re-
23 habilitation Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 128), as amended,
24 nor pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1948

1 (62 Stat. 137), as amended, nor activities under-
2 taken now or hereafter in the administration of areas
3 occupied by the United States armed forces;
4 (b) the term "United States Government agency"
5 means any department, agency, board, wholly or partly
6 owned corporation or instrumentality, commission, or
7 independent establishment of the United States Govern-
8 ment; and
9 (c) the term "international organization" means
10 any intergovernmental organization and subordinate
11 bodies thereof, of which the United States is a member.
12 SEC. 6. In order to carry out the objective of this Act,
13 the President is authorized to plan, undertake, administer,
14 and execute technical cooperation programs and, in so
15 doing, to—
16 (a) prescribe such rules and regulations as may be
17 necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions
18 of this Act and to prosecute technical cooperation pro-
19 grams to completion;
20 (b) coordinate and direct existing and new techni-
21 cal cooperation programs carried on by any United
22 States Government agency;
23 (c) utilize the services and facilities of private agen-
24 cies and persons;
25 (d) make advances and grants in aid of technical

1 cooperation programs to any person, corporation, or
2 other body of persons, or to any foreign government or
3 foreign government agency or to any international
4 organization;

5 (e) make and perform contracts of agreements in
6 respect of technical cooperation programs on behalf of
7 the United States Government with any person, corpora-
8 tion, or other body of persons however designated,
9 whether within or without the United States, or with
10 any foreign government or foreign government agency
11 or with any international organization;

12 (f) enter into contracts, within the limits of ap-
13 propriations or contract authorizations hereafter made
14 available, that, subject to the action of any succeeding
15 Congress, may run for not to exceed three years in any
16 one case;

17 (g) acquire or accept in the name of the United
18 States Government by purchase, devise, bequest, gift,
19 grant, or otherwise, any money, services, and property,
20 both real and personal, as he finds to be necessary, and
21 in any manner dispose of all property so acquired except
22 property declared to be surplus. Receipts arising from
23 the disposition of property not acquired with appro-
24 priated funds, except surplus property, shall be avail-

able for expenditure for the purposes of this Act in the country in which the property is located. Any money acquired hereunder shall be received and accounted for under such regulations as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe;

(h) provide for printing and binding outside the continental limits of the United States, without regard to section 11 of the Act of March 1, 1919 (44 U. S. C. 111); and

(i) appoint such advisory committees as he may determine to be necessary or desirable.

SEC. 7. The President shall terminate United States support for and participation in any technical cooperation program or programs whenever he determines that such support and participation no longer contribute effectively to the objective of this Act.

SEC. 8. The President may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act through the Secretary of State or through any other officer or employee of the United States Government.

SEC. 9 To further the objective of this Act, the Secretary of State may establish an Institute of International Technical Cooperation within the Department of State.

SEC. 10. In order to carry out the objective of this Act—

(a) officers, employees, agents, and attorneys may

be employed for duty within the continental limits of the United States in accordance with the provisions of the civil-service laws and the Classification Act of 1923, as amended; except that the President may, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint one person who shall be compensated at a rate fixed by the President without regard to the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, but not in excess of $16,000 per annum;

(b) persons employed for duty outside the continental limits of the United States shall receive compensation at any of the rates provided for the Foreign Service Reserve and Staff by the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 999), together with allowances and benefits established thereunder, and may be appointed to any class in the Foreign Service Reserve or Staff in accordance with the provisions of such Act. Alien clerks and employees may be employed in accordance with the provisions of such Act;

(c) officers and employees of the United States Government may be detailed to offices or positions to which no compensation is attached with any foreign government or foreign government agency or with any international organization: *Provided,* That while so detailed any such person shall be considered, for the pur-

1 pose of preserving his privileges, rights, seniority, or
2 other benefits, an officer or employee of the United
3 States Government and of the United States Govern-
4 ment agency from which detailed and shall continue to
5 receive therefrom his regular compensation, which shall
6 be reimbursed to such agency from funds available under
7 this Act: *Provided further,* That such acceptance of
8 office shall in no case involve the taking of an oath of
9 allegiance to another government;
10 (d) experts and consultants or organizations thereof
11 may be employed as authorized by section 15 of the
12 Act of August 2, 1946 (5 U. S. C. 55a), and individuals
13 so employed may be compensated at a rate not in excess
14 of $50 per diem; and
15 (e) such additional civilian personnel may be em-
16 ployed without regard to section 14 (a) of the Federal
17 Employees Pay Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 219), as
18 amended, as may be necessary to carry out the policies
19 and purposes of this Act.
20 SEC. 11. The President shall transmit to the Congress
21 an annual report of operations under this Act.
22 SEC. 12. (a) There are hereby authorized to be ap-
23 propriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the
24 purposes of this Act. Activities provided for under this
25 Act may be prosecuted under such appropriations or under

1 authority granted in appropriation acts to enter into con-
2 tracts pending enactment of such appropriations. Unobli-
3 gated balances of such appropriations for any fiscal year
4 may, when so specified in the appropriation act concerned,
5 be carried over to any succeeding fiscal year or years. The
6 President may allocate to any United States Government
7 agency any part of any appropriation available for carrying
8 out the purposes of this Act. Such funds shall be available
9 for obligation and expenditure for the purposes of this Act
10 in accordance with authority granted hereunder or under
11 authority governing the activities of the Government agencies
12 to which such funds are allocated.

13 (b) Nothing in this Act is intended nor shall it be
14 construed as an expressed or implied commitment to pro-
15 vide any specific assistance, whether of funds, commodities,
16 or services, to any country or countries, or to any interna-
17 tional organization.

18 SEC. 13. If any provision of this Act or the application
19 of any provision to any circumstances or persons shall be
20 held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and the
21 applicability of such provision to other circumstances or
22 persons shall not be affected thereby.

[SEE FOLLOWING PAGE]

This pamphlet is an experiment. It has been printed and published by the author because commercial facilities do not exist for making this type of material available quickly and inexpensively, at a time when both are of the essence.

A first edition of ten thousand copies is being sent out free to a selected list, of whom you are one. A second edition will be offered publicly at 25 cents per copy. This offer will be made by means of a display advertisement in the *New York Times* carrying the text of the letter printed on the front cover of this pamphlet. The cost of the operation up to this point comes to about 50 cents per copy of the first edition.

If, having read this pamphlet, you find yourself in sympathy with the effort to present the facts about this chance to achieve freedom from fear to the American people, here are some things you can do, if you feel so inclined:

1. You can pay for the cost of the copy you have received. (Fifty cents will cover it. A dollar will pay for some one else's free copy as well.)
2. You can order a number of copies and send them to your friends. (See enclosed order blank for second edition.)
3. You can contribute ideas or money to further promotion in whatever way you like. (For example, by organizing a group to pay for an advertisement in your local paper, or in some magazine whose readers you think would be interested. Coupons in such an advertisement should be addressed to me and identify the publication in which the advertisement appeared.)
4. Most important of all. WILL YOU WORK? Money is needed to do the job, but money alone won't get it done. If a Citizens Committee is formed, will you join it? Will you pool your ideas, energy, skill and resources with others working toward the same end?

The enclosed self-addressed envelope will carry back your answer on a form prepared for your convenience.

Will you mail it? *Today?*

And will you be kind enough not to be offended if you receive only a printed acknowledgment on a penny postcard? Orders will be filled promptly, but ideas contributed will take time to digest and correlate.

Thank you.

JAMES P. WARBURG
70 East 45th Street
New York 17, N. Y.

ROOM 2720

JAMES P. WARBURG
70 EAST 45TH STREET
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

TELEPHONE
MURRAY HILL 4-0163

SP

December 23, 1949

Rearming Germany

Dear Ed:

Although my recent effort to arouse support for affirmative action toward peace apparently did not ring a bell with you, maybe the enclosed rather intemperate blast against rearming Germany will.

Best to you.

As ever,

Jim

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting Company
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

JPW:jmw
Enc.

October 17, 1949

Mr. James P. Warburg
70 East 45th Street
New York 17, N. Y.

SP

Dear Jim:

Many thanks for yours of the 30th; I'm glad you sent over a copy of your October 4th talk on "Our Immaturity in World Affairs". I found it stimulating reading.

Best regards.

As ever yours,

ROOM 2720

TELEPHONE
MURRAY HILL 4-0163

JAMES P. WARBURG
70 EAST 45TH STREET
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

September 30, 1949

Dear Ed:

Enclosed herewith is an advance copy of an address to be delivered before the World Affairs Council at Buffalo, on the evening of October 4th.

The main theme is the pattern of immature self-delusion in our post-war foreign policy, which results in bargain-basement shopping for solutions and frustrates our best-intentioned efforts. On subsequent occasions this fall, I intend to develop further the outline of a more fundamental approach indicated in the last four pages.

With best regards and hoping that you have had a good summer, I am

Very sincerely,

Jim

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

JPW:jc
Enclosure

Proof of September 22, 1949.

FOR RELEASE 8 P.M. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1949.

OUR IMMATURITY IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Address before

WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL

Buffalo, New York

by

JAMES P. WARBURG

October 4, 1949.

OUR IMMATURITY IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Hardly a day passes without some official in Washington telling us how successfully our foreign policies have been operating. Yet we are all more or less aware that these assurances are to a large extent whistling in the dark. We have spent a fabulous amount of money in trying to restore peace and security to the world. We have given up our past attitude of selfish isolationism. We have assumed responsibility. We have tried our level best to cooperate with other nations—even to the extent of offering to yield to a supra-national authority our post-war monopoly of atomic energy. And yet we are no nearer to the goal of lasting peace than we were on the day that war ended.

One reason why we have done so much and achieved so little is that we have gone at the post-war problem in an immature way. To say this is not to minimize the fact that one nation—the Soviet Union—has made the post-war problem infinitely more difficult. There can be no doubt whatever that such has been the case. But, as I see it, we have been frustrated less by Soviet intransigence than by our own immature reaction to that intransigence. We have been frustrated less by the whole, highly complex post-war problem, including Russian obstructionism, than by our own inability to face that problem in an adult way.

When we say that an individual is immature, or behaves in an immature manner, we mean that the behavior of such an individual betrays a lack of judgment attributable in large measure to lack of experience. We mean that the individual's actions seem motivated by emotion rather than reason; that his behavior seems to consist of a series of improvizations, as opposed to the step-wise procedure of a thought-out plan; and that these improvizations, based upon acquisitiveness or fear, display a tendency to over-reach and attempt the impossible. We mean by immaturity also the tendency to become too quickly discouraged in the face of failure, to seek a scapegoat rather than the reason for failure, and to vacillate between over-aggressive self-assertion and an excessive display

of passive helplessness. The immature individual lacks, above all things, a true sense of proportion—a perspective of himself in relation to the world around him. Egocentricity is at its peak in infancy and sometimes again in extreme old age. The infant feels itself the centre of the universe, surrounded by beings of vastly superior power who are either "good" or "bad" according to whether or not they gratify its desires.

The analogy between individual and group behavior must not, of course, be driven too far. But it is true, I think, that we, as a nation, have displayed some of these symptoms of immaturity. We have been motivated by fear rather than reason. We have improvized to meet changing circumstances rather than acting in accordance with a thought-out plan. We have at times overestimated our power and tried to do the impossible. At other times we have behaved as if we had no power whatever. When we have failed, we have sought a scapegoat rather than the reason for our failure. The most striking evidence of immaturity in our post-war behavior has been the consistent pattern of self-delusion upon which most of our actions have been based. This applies both to the declared aims of our policy and to the means chosen to achieve these aims. Let me cite some examples.

The major aim of our post-war foreign policy has been to achieve an enduring peace. There are, I submit, three kinds of peace which might conceivably last for a long time.

First, there is the possibility of a *Pax Americana*—that is to say, a peace enforced by the benevolent military and economic power of the United States. The outright advocates of this type of peace usually speak in terms of what they call "the American Century". They have ample historical precedent for their position. They can point to the centuries of the *Pax Romana* and to the more recent period of the *Pax Brittanica*. It is true that neither the peace enforced by the Roman legions nor the peace enforced by British seapower wholly eliminated armed conflict; both periods were interrupted by occasional wars; but these conflicts were kept localized and more or less under the control of the paramount power. The open advocates of a *Pax Americana* now wish to see the United States assume the role of the paramount power, armed with supremacy in the air and atomic weapons. Whether or not they are wise, they are at least clear.

Second, there is the theoretical possibility of a *Pax Sovietica,* in which Russia would become the world's judge and the world's policeman. This idea does not appeal to many people outside the Soviet orbit. Nevertheless, it is as logical from the Russian point of view as is the *Pax Americana* from ours.

It is clear, I think, that neither the *Pax Americana* nor the *Pax Sovietica* could be achieved without a major war. We should certainly not submit to Russian domination, nor would the Russians peaceably accept the overlordship of the United States.

There remains, then, the third kind of peace—a peace arrived at by mutual consent rather than by conquest. Such a peace has never yet been achieved on this planet. There are many people who say that such a peace cannot be achieved now or at any time within the foreseeable future. You are familiar with their arguments, many of which you have heard from the official spokesmen of our Government. These arguments can be summed up in a sentence:

"Peace by agreement is impossible so long as one-half of the world desires justice, freedom and security for all men, while the other half is dominated by a power pursuing the contrary aim."

This sentence is a fair paraphrase of President Truman's Inaugural Address and of many other official utterances within the past two years. The thesis itself seems to me questionable. The Russians clearly have a different concept of justice, freedom and security—a concept repugnant to us and difficult for us to understand. But it does not follow that the Russians seek to impose upon the world something *which they conceive to be injustice, slavery and insecurity.*

Let us, however, assume that the Truman thesis is correct. The logical conclusion would then be that, since a peace by agreement is impossible, we must try to impose by force a *Pax Americana.* But that is not the conclusion drawn by our present policy-makers.

The conclusion drawn by our present policy-makers is the illogical one, that a *Pax Americana* can be achieved by peaceful means—that is to say, by establishing under American leadership a preponderance of mili-

tary and economic power sufficient to make us the world's policeman, *without* our having to establish our supremacy by war.

There is only one thing wrong with this conclusion: it overlooks the fact that, in a world in which power has become concentrated in only two poles of superpower, such an attempt "peacefully" to establish supremacy necessarily leads to an arms race, in which the other half of the world pursues precisely the same aim. Each side sees in its own attainment of preponderance of power the only sure guarantee of peace. Each side makes defensive preparations and alliances which necessarily appear as offensive preparations to the other. Armament leads to counter-armament —alliance to counter-alliance—until eventually the productive resources on both sides are so pre-empted by defensive preparation that the burden becomes intolerable and mass discontent sets in. To prevent discontent from causing an overthrow of leadership, leadership on each side throws the blame for restriction and privation wholly upon the evil machinations of the other. That is the sort of vicious circle of mutual distrust and provocation in which we now find ourselves with the Soviet Union.

Never mind who started it. Let us say that the Russians began the struggle for world domination and that we have merely been acting in self-defense. The fact remains that we have been proceeding upon a wholly illogical conclusion from our own premise. We have proceeded on the assumption that, whereas the Russians would *not* let us make a peace by agreement, the Russians *would* acquiesce in our achieving a *Pax Americana* by outarming them and creating a system of alliances more powerful than their own.

The absurdity of this conclusion has been obscured by the curious process of immature self-delusion in which we have been indulging. We have not admitted frankly to ourselves that we are aiming at a *Pax Americana*. We talk about a One World-United Nations peace. We talk about strengthening the United Nations and supporting it with every means at our command. But our policy-makers have frowned upon any suggestion to transform the United Nations into a world organization capable of enacting and enforcing world law. While talking about One World, they have operated on the concept of American judgment and American power applied to the strengthening of our half of a divided world.

The process of immature self-delusion applies not only to the determination of our policy aims but to our choice of means and to our appraisal of success or failure. At the present moment we are in a mood of self-congratulation. We arrived last summer at what appeared to be a major victory in the cold war, when the Berlin airlift and counter-blockade forced the Russians to back down. At the same time the Marshall Plan had all but locked the doors of Western Europe against further communist penetration. The Atlantic Pact then showed the Russians that they could not resort to military aggression against Western Europe without becoming involved in a war with us; and our expanded military power, plus the atomic bomb, made it clear to the Russians that they could not hope to win a war with the United States. Having obtained these results, our policy-makers are inclined to think that, in Europe at least, we must be on the right road and that, if we continue along this line, we shall eventually arrive at our objective—namely, a peace enforced by American power thinly disguised behind the smokescreen of an almost wholly impotent world organization.

Let us leave aside altogether what has been happening in China and the Far East, where, admittedly, we have been unsuccessful, and let us try to examine the facts with regard to Europe, where we feel so sure that we are on the right road.

The first fact is that we have *not* won a great victory in the cold war. It is true that we have frustrated the Russian blockade of Berlin. This blockade was imposed by Moscow for the maximum objective of halting the creation of a West German state and, failing that, for the minimum objective of forcing the Western Allies out of Berlin. The airlift and the counter-blockade denied both aims to the Kremlin. But the blockade and counter-blockade also brought into the open the basic weakness of our own position. The strangulation of East-West trade accelerated the crisis in our whole West European Recovery Program. It became almost as urgently necessary for us to end the stalemate as it was for the Russians. The Russians were forced to recognize that their so-called Molotov Plan for the recovery of Eastern Europe was wholly incapable of satisfying the needs of their satellites. We were forced to recognize that our Marshall Plan could not succeed in making Western Europe self-supporting so long as the European trading community remained split

into two parts, neither of which could live without the other. Thus both sides became anxious to find a face-saving device to end the stalemate.

In the resulting moves toward cooling off the overheated cold war, we can claim to have lost less face than the Russians. But that is the extent of our victory. It remains to be seen whether we actually gained or lost at Paris in beating off the Russian attempt to stop the creation of a West German state. Both sides came to Paris asserting their desire to end the partition of Germany. Each blamed the other for the existing state of affairs, and each made proposals as to how partition might be ended and the Iron Curtain lifted between the two Germanys. But—the Russian proposals were clearly not intended to be acceptable to the West, and the Western proposals were clearly not intended to be acceptable to the Russians.

The Russians put forward nothing more than a proposal to return to the unworkable Potsdam Agreement, probably because they feared that a unification of Germany would alienate the Poles and the Czechs, at a time when considerable unrest among the Soviet satellites already existed.

The stated reason for our making a counter-proposal, which we obviously intended to be unacceptable to the Russians, was our concern for the preservation of democracy and political freedom in the Western zones. Anyone who suffers from the delusion that democracy exists in Western Germany should read Delbert Clark's "Again the Goose-step", or Drew Middleton's new book on Germany. The real reason why we were unwilling to risk making a proposal for unification which might have been accepted was that Western Germany had become the keystone of our West European Recovery Program, and that we were unwilling to allow the Russians any voice in the control of West German industry.

The simple fact is that we are caught on the horns of a dilemma, created by the cold war. Economically, Western Europe cannot become self-supporting and thus immune to communist penetration, unless it includes a healthy and productive Germany. Militarily, Western Europe cannot become capable of self-defense, unless it includes a rearmed Germany. But, politically, Western Europe will fly apart altogether, if a strong, united and rearmed Germany is allowed to come into existence.

The Russians face a similar dilemma. Eastern Europe, and Russia itself, cannot achieve full recovery without trade with the West, and particularly without trade with Western Germany. But, if the barriers are let down and a united Germany grows strong, such a united Germany—even if it maintains a position of neutrality as between Russia and the West—will be a threat to Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe.

Thus, neither the Russians nor we are at present sincere in saying that we want to unite Germany. Neither the Russians nor we have reached the point of really wanting to end the cold war in Europe. Each of us would like to carry it a little further in the hope of gaining certain advantages; but each of us, in the meanwhile, would like to loosen a little the restrictions which now strangle recovery on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The Russians have not solved their problem of meeting the urgent needs of their satellites and thus keeping them in line. Nor have we solved our problem in Western Europe, which has assumed new and menacing aspects. Neither side has as yet realized that there can be no such thing as peaceful victory in the present power struggle.

The new problems facing us in Western Europe illustrate how our pattern of immature self-delusion frustrates our best-intentioned efforts. This pattern is one of making ourselves believe that we can buy an automobile for the price of a motorcycle.

We began this pattern in 1946 when we gave Britain a loan, which was just about half of what she needed. We continued it when we cut down the Marshall Plan bit by bit until it was quite obviously insufficient to accomplish its purpose. We have just recently carried the pattern to absurdity in a program to make Western Europe capable of defending itself against 150 Russian divisions by re-equipping less than ten divisions. The worst thing about this pattern of bargain basement shopping for peace, is that each time we embark upon these half-measures we not only fritter away our resources without accomplishing our purpose, but we also weaken the ties of friendship between ourselves and those whom we are sincerely trying to help. Because we fool ourselves into thinking that one dollar will do the work of two, we become disappointed and resentful when, after great expense, we find the problems of our friends still unsolved. And our friends become resentful because we continually

expect them to do the impossible with help for which they are grateful, but which they know to be inadequate.

Right now we are faced with the fact that the apparently successful Marshall Plan is about to collapse in failure. The chickens are coming home to roost. The Marshall Plan was devised to meet a crisis of underproduction, shortage and inflation. It has done so with remarkable success. Western Europe as a whole is now producing half again as much as it was before the war. But Western Europe now faces rising unemployment and a curtailment of production because it cannot exchange its goods for the food and raw materials it needs to continue its production. Specifically, Western Europe cannot earn enough dollars to buy the food and raw materials which can be bought only with dollars. Consequently, instead of drawing closer together in a powerful economic union, the countries of Western Europe are competing with each other for dollars, restricting trade with each other, and desperately trying each to make itself as self-sufficient as possible in order to survive. The longer this goes on, the more the Marshall Plan goes into reverse.

Many Americans, including some of our policy-makers, regard this dollar shortage as a disease of the European economy. They insist that, if the European countries would only remove all trade restrictions between each other and within their own economies, the dollar shortage would disappear. There is a widespread belief among Americans that the Europeans could do these things, if they—especially the British—were not so obstinately committed to socialistic experiments in planned economy. Governor Dewey has gone so far as to advocate that we force Western Europe to stop this nonsense by threatening to withhold further aid.

Here again we see the pattern of immature self-deception. The dollar shortage is not primarily a disease of the European economy, nor a product of socialist experimentation. Nor does the cure lie primarily in anything the West Europeans could now do or fail to do.

In the last thirty years the United States has doubled and then redoubled its production, thereby likewise doubling and redoubling its purchasing power and its relative importance as a consumer as well as producer of the world supply of goods. During the same period, Europe,

torn and partially devastated by two great wars, has suffered the obsolescence of its productive machinery, the exhaustion of its population, and the dissipation of its accumulated reserves. In the nineteenth century, Western Europe as a whole was the nerve and brain centre of a colonial world empire. In the twentieth century Western Europe has gradually become a nerve and brain centre without a body to nourish it and without arms and legs to direct and control. It is now in the position of a man who in middle-age retired to the management of an estate, acquired through hard work in early life, and who then loses the estate and is compelled to go back to the sort of work he did in his youth. Picture Western Europe not as one such man, but as nineteen such men, living close together, with each of them having suffered a similar misfortune —nineteen middle-aged men, forced to go back to manual work to support their families and competing with each other for the things their families need.

Meanwhile, we have become not only the major source of the food, raw materials and tools which the other peoples of the world need in order to work and earn a livelihood, but also the sole possible buyer of many of the goods produced by the other peoples of the world. Moreover, our development of mass production, as against the batch production of the rest of the world, has enabled us not only to produce more goods, but cheaper goods of relatively high quality.

The heart of the post-war economic crisis lies in the rise of American power, the decline of European power, and our failure to understand the full implications of our newly acquired position. We realize that we are rich while others are poor, well-fed while others are hungry, powerful where others are weak. We realize this emotionally and are ready to give, to feed, to share our good fortune. But we do not understand intellectually the kind of responsibility our preponderant strength and power place upon us. We do not understand, for example, that being the world's greatest producer and seller of goods places upon us the responsibility to buy what other peoples produce. We are quite willing to recognize that our surplus production belongs to the world, but we are not willing to recognize that our surplus purchasing power also belongs to the world. Thus we persist in keeping our domestic industries protected by a tariff designed to protect the infant industries of a young and struggling debtor nation.

Even the Marshall Plan, by far the most adult and constructive feature of our post-war policy, was undertaken half in the spirit of charity and half out of fear-inspired anxiety to build a dam against communism; whereas, if we had fully understood the post-war problem, the primary purpose of the Marshall Plan would have been to harness our great surplus resources to the restoration of some sort of balance between the Old World and the New. Had we fully understood the nature of the post-war problem, we should have begun with the realization that we ourselves needed, in our own interest, to find a way to get rid of the huge surplus in our balance of payments with the rest of the world.

The same problem still faces us today in more acute form. The devaluation of currencies recently undertaken will not cure it. At best it will provide temporary relief. If we want Europe to stop permanently the mad scramble for dollars which is driving it toward weakness and fragmentation, we must, in one way or another, supply enough dollars so that the scramble can stop. We must not again chisel away at a generous undertaking to the point where an operation to induce lasting recovery becomes merely a never-ending subsidy to provide relief. *We must stop thinking of the money we spend abroad as expense, and think of it instead as investment.*

What is demanded of us at the present time is a far-reaching and continuing program of long-term investment abroad, in which Government must lead the way and private capital follow. Such a program must be far bolder than President Truman's so-called "bold new program". It is true enough that the world needs the technical advice and know-how we are proposing to export. What it needs even more is the planned development of its natural resources. It needs such things as TVA developments on the Rhone River in France, on the Jordan River in the Middle East, and on the great rivers of India—and perhaps even of China. We cannot expect to carry out such a program effectively without channeling it through some sort of supra-national organization. If the funds for this type of imaginative reconstruction flow direct into the world from the United States Treasury or from Wall Street, we shall make ourselves into the absentee landlord of a world which hates us, even while it thrives on the wealth we pour into its development.

Cost a lot of money? Of course it will cost a lot of money. When the Marshall Plan was under discussion, I frightened and infuriated a good friend of mine in the Department of State by publicly pleading for the Plan's adoption even though it might cost us sixty or seventy billion dollars over a period of ten years. What I am talking about now will cost us even more, because the Marshall Plan dealt with only a small part of the world, and the problem we face is a world problem. But "cost" is not the right word. If you offer a millionaire the chance to invest $50,000 a year for ten years in a sound development, he will not protest that you are asking for half of his fortune. He will consider whether the proposed annual investment of his income for ten years will or will not make him another million dollars of capital. Our annual income as a nation is approaching three hundred billion dollars. What I am talking about is a program of foreign investment that will take something like three percent of that annual income and invest it in our own future peace and prosperity, by raising the living standards and the purchasing power of the other peoples of the world.

The immature approach is to think that peace can be built by shoring up crumbling walls and patching a leaky roof. The mature approach is to recognize that a new house needs to be built for the world to live in. That new house must be planned by many minds and built by many hands. We can neither design it alone, nor build it alone. We can help to do both, especially because at present we have what amounts to a monopoly on building materials, and because we alone have substantial surplus capital to invest. But the house, when built, must be the world's cooperative apartment, in which we—like everyone else—will be a tenant. That is the essential difference between a peace by mutual consent and a *Pax Americana.*

The mature nation thinks in terms of reasonable agreement between equals. The immature nation thinks in terms of power—power to rebuild the world's house *the way it wants,* and then to offer to others the facilities and arrangements *it thinks they should want* at terms *it thinks fair and generous.* The immature nation, like the immature individual, thinks in terms of the parent-child relationship. The mature nation, like the mature individual, thinks in terms of brotherhood.

Lest you think I have overdone the well-known parable of the moat and the beam and have treated our own foibles too harshly, let me make it clear that I have not been talking in comparative terms. I have not been discussing the *relative* immaturity of our foreign policy, nor have I meant to imply that certain other nations are necessarily more mature or less mature than we. The thing which concerns me and in which I have tried to enlist your interest, is that, irrespective of other nations, we are up against a difficult problem arising within ourselves. This is nothing more nor less than the age-old problem of growing up to man's estate, which, as you well know, is rarely accomplished without pain.

A most encouraging sign of our advancing maturity was given in the communiqué issued on September 12, by the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain and Canada, after their preliminary conference on the Dollar-Sterling crisis. Here we have the American Government officially recognizing that our foreign trade policies have not been consistent with our position as the world's greatest creditor nation and coming boldly to the conclusion that these policies must be drastically altered. Unfortunately, it is one thing to recognize the twin requirements of tariff revision and long-range investment abroad, and quite another thing to meet these requirements. Secretary Acheson has courageously taken the bull by the horns, but his colleague in the Treasury Department still mumbles that whatever steps are to be taken must fall within the framework of existing policy. The important thing is that working parties have been created to study the problems in detail and to work out the necessary programs.

The great question now is whether these working parties will let the chips fall where they may, or whether they will recommend only such action as may be deemed "politically possible."

If the working parties make, or are forced to make, political compromises, it is safe to predict that our pattern of immature self-delusion will be continued and that no lasting cure will be effected. If the working parties report what needs to be done, irrespective of how many probable votes can be counted "for" or "against" in the House and Senate, then it will be up to the American people—up to you and me as citizens—to see that our representatives in Congress find the necessary public support for doing the "politically *im*possible."

When that day comes—if it comes—we shall have achieved maturity.

(6013)

Warburg

June 27, 1949

Miss Sylvia Schlesinger
Office of James P. Warburg
70 East 45th Street
New York 17, N. Y.

Dear Miss Schlesinger:

Thank you very much for sending me Mr. Warburg's talk, "Last Call for Common Sense". I appreciate both his, and your, thoughtfulness.

Sincerely yours,

ROOM 2720

TELEPHONE
MURRAY HILL 4-0163

JAMES P. WARBURG
70 EAST 45TH STREET
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

June 20, 1949

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Mr. Warburg, who is at present on a speaking tour for the American Friends Service Committee and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, has asked me to send you the enclosed advance copy of his final address on the West Coast. It is to be delivered on the evening of June 22, before the World Affairs Council at San Francisco. Mr. Warburg asked me to tell you that the address bears the same title as his new book because it contains much of the book's major substance.

Very truly yours,

Sylva Schlesinger

Secretary to Mr. Warburg

Enc.

LAST CALL FOR COMMON SENSE*

Address

to the

WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF NORTHERN CALIFORNIA

by

JAMES P. WARBURG

San Francisco, California

June 22, 1949.

* The author's latest book bearing the same title has just been published by Harcourt, Brace & Company.

LAST CALL FOR COMMON SENSE

JAMES P. WARBURG

In recent years we have had our fill of headlines proclaiming that the ultimate crisis has arrived. We are tired of being told that "America Stands at the Crossroads", or that "The Hour of Decision Is at Hand". We have discovered that whichever road we choose at the crossroads leads merely to another parting of the ways, and that "hours of decision" have a way of stretching into weeks and months and years. Nevertheless, I have chosen the title, LAST CALL FOR COMMON SENSE, because I believe that the time has come, when we must begin to apply that native American commodity to our foreign policy, or else slip down the well-greased slide that leads to atomic war.

Consider, for a moment, the gyrations and contradictions of our post-war foreign policy.

Having established the basis for a just and lasting peace in the Atlantic Charter, which was solemnly signed by the entire anti-Axis coalition, we then agreed with Britain and Russia at Yalta to throw it overboard and to adopt instead the pattern of an old-fashioned victor's peace. Having pledged no annexations of territory, we agreed to let Russia, Poland and eventually France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg annex pieces of Germany; and, without consulting China, we agreed to let Russia annex or control important territory in the Far East. Having talked about One World, we proceeded to divide the world into old-fashioned spheres of influence.

When the end of the war came, we demobilized our armed forces and fell all over ourselves to "get the boys back home". Hardly had we done this than we began frantically to rebuild the military machine we had dismantled. Similarly, when the war ended, we brusquely cut off Lend-Lease aid to our recent Allies, without giving any consideration to building some

sort of a bridge over which they might pass from war-time dependence upon American aid to peace-time independence and self-support. No sooner had we taken this step than we found overselves compelled to reverse our course—making a belated and inadequate loan to Britain and eventually giving emergency aid and then Marshall Plan assistance to our European friends.

From 1945 to 1949 we have swung from complete trust of our dear friend, Uncle Joe, to distrust and fear. Having built the United Nations on the assumption of continuing unanimous agreement between ourselves, Britain, France and Russia, we have found ourselves disagreeing with Britain over Palestine, with France over Germany and with Russia over just about everything. Having embarked upon a cold war with Russia for the sake of trying to stop Soviet expansion and eventually to obtain a peace settlement, we have reached a point, in 1949, where the cold war threatens to become an end in itself and where a possible peace settlement is weighed against the possible advantages of continuing the cold war a little longer.

Granted that, in the four years since the war ended, we have had to face extraordinarily complex and difficult problems and that these problems were largely not of our own making, it must, I think, be admitted that it is time to re-examine some of the basic premises upon which we have been operating.

We are, as of now, spending about six billion dollars a year on a constructive program of building the peace. At the same time we are spending over three times that amount to insure ourselves against the failure of that program. We are up to our necks in an armament race with the Soviet Union and are now contemplating dragging the nations of Western Europe into that arms race as well.

In our fight to preserve human freedom in the world, by attempting to contain an idea within a physical frontier manned by physical force, we are in the process of destroying freedom here at home. We are beginning to equate dissent with disloyalty. Once we accept the totalitarian idea of strength through uniformity of opinion, in place of the democratic concept of strength through diversity of opinion, we shall have yielded the central bastion of our position.

That is why it is not crying wolf to insist that it is time for our native common sense to assert itself in the making of our nation's policy.

To insist upon a common sense audit at this time is not to assert that the ultimate moment of crisis has arisen. I do not believe it has. As I see it, we are living in a period of more or less chronic crisis, in which it is just as foolish to expect an immediate solution as it is to accept the inevitability of war. The challenge of our time is to convert this critical period from one of steadily mounting tensions to one in which tensions are gradually relaxed. Our problem, for the time being, is not to reach but to envisage clearly the ultimate goal of lasting peace, and to start moving toward it, instead of allowing a vicious circle of mutual provocation to lead us eventually to the abyss of atomic war.

In order to accomplish even this limited objective we must, I think, revise our thinking in at least four major respects.

I.

The Nature of the World Crisis.

We see the world crisis as being essentially caused by the existence in the world of the communist doctrine and by the ruthless propagation of that doctrine by the Russian state. We see the failure of the United Nations as being caused solely by the intransigence of the Kremlin. We see the present threat to world peace solely as a threat of Soviet conquest. Holding this view of the nature of the world crisis, which has been explicitly stated and expounded by our Government, we quite naturally have made the stopping of Soviet-communist expansion the major aim of our foreign policy.

The fact is, however, that we are living in a world crisis which, though ruthlessly exploited by the Kremlin, is not originally due either to the existence of the communist doctrine or to the nature and intentions of the Soviet state. The world crisis is, as I see it, primarily the product of the time in which we live. To say this is not to absolve the men in the Kremlin of their all-too-evident guilt but merely to place their sins of omission and commission in proper perspective.

The simple truth is that we are living in a period of far-reaching and fundamental change. The world has outgrown many of the devices by which man has sought to satisfy his needs and aspirations while at the same time living at peace with his fellow man. The human family has outgrown the house in which it was accustomed to live. Wherever we look in the world, we see people on the move, seeking change from one kind of social and economic structure to another, in the hope of thus attaining a greater degree of what they conceive to be justice, freedom and security. The destruction and dislocation caused by two great wars have accelerated the evolutionary process and, in many areas, have turned evolution into revolution. We see this most clearly in the two continents which were the battlegrounds of recent conflict.

In Europe, the traditional structure of society has been undermined or destroyed. The middle-class structure of the Western countries has been weakened by the expropriations incident to conquest and liberation, by the dispersal or dispossession of managerial power groups, and by the depreciation of currencies. The squirearchical structure of society in the predominantly agricultural countries of Eastern and Central Europe has been similarly undermined by the breaking up of the large landed estates. Throughout the continent the normal channels of trade have been disrupted. Germany, once the central gear-wheel of the European economy, can function neither as a market nor as a supplier of goods. Private capital and private initiative can no longer cope with the problem of providing food, clothing, shelter and employment for the peoples struggling to regain economic and political health. In varying degrees the inhabitants of the European countries have found it necessary to reach for the instruments of public power and to alter the traditional relationship between citizen and state. This alone would be enough to cause tensions, unrest and political instability. In addition, the war wrought certain permanent changes in Europe's economic base. Western Europe, which used to live to a large extent on income from foreign investments and the proceeds of colonial empire, has in great measure lost these two sources of economic strength. Eastern Europe, which, even before Hitler, had become almost a colonial empire of industrial Germany, has lost the German nerve-centre upon which it formerly depended.

All this would have happened to Europe, if there had been no Soviet Union in the post-war world and if Karl Marx had never written a book.

On the other hand, it is certainly true that these conditions and the resulting tensions have been aggravated and exploited by post-war Russian policy.

Finally, we must add, in seeking to gain a true perspective, that the unhappy state of Europe has been rendered infinitely worse and made dangerously explosive by the arbitrary division of the European trading community into two parts, neither of which can prosper without the other. Here, too, it is necessary to recognize—if we are in search of the truth—that it was not Russia alone which caused the division of Europe. It is undoubtedly true that, when the Big Three met at Yalta, Stalin wanted a divided Europe in order to expand the Soviet sphere of influence. But it is also true that Churchill wanted a dividing line at which to halt Soviet expansion, and that President Roosevelt reluctantly accepted a divided Europe as the price for Russian help in the war against Japan. To admit this does not condone the crimes committed later on by Russia behind the Iron Curtain.

In Asia we see a very similar picture. The defeat of Japan and the weakening of the European centres of Asiatic empire left a political and economic vacuum. The traditional semi-feudal and semi-colonial structure of Asian society had been undermined and in part destroyed by conquest and liberation. Restoration of the old order was impossible, even had it been desired by the peoples concerned. But, even more clearly than in Europe, restoration was not desired by the peoples of Asia. On the contrary, new aspirations for independence had been kindled and new problems had arisen. Most urgent among these post-war problems were rising population pressure against a diminishing food supply, and the absence of Japanese consumer goods.

In Asia, as in Europe, the post-war crisis was rendered more difficult and explosive by the breakdown of the victorious anti-Axis coalition and the resulting East-West power struggle. Here, again, it must be recognized that Moscow did not create the popular movements against foreign domination and domestic oppression. Moscow made hay at the expense of the West, but less because of its own initiative than because of the bankruptcy of Western policy in Asia. In China, our espousal of a government, foredoomed to fall by reason of its own weakness and corruption, left to the Soviet Union the eagerly seized opportunity of identifying the inevitable peasant revolt with the communist doctrine. In Southeast Asia,

stubborn European colonialism, tacitly backed by us for the sake of our European cold war alliances, left Russia in the position of being able falsely to identify herself with the aspirations of the Asian peoples emerging into freedom.

Instead of seeing these developments in their true context, we have obscured our own vision with the easy devil-theory of the world crisis. We have been so busy building up the belief that Moscow is wholly responsible for every aspect of the world's troubles that we have missed many of our greatest post-war opportunities. Our obsession with communism as the sole cause of the crisis has led us to ally ourselves with any government or group that was anti-communist, irrespective of other considerations. Thus we have stultified our position and alienated that vast mass of middle-of-the-road people throughout the world, who are not attracted to communism but who are likewise unwilling to accept the status quo as a solution for their problems. Thus, in our preoccupation with a purely negative aim, we have lost much of the traditional American power of attraction, which derived from our natural affiliation with all men everywhere seeking change for the better.

II.

War Is No Longer an Instrument of Policy.

The second factor we must consider, in applying common sense to the conduct of our foreign relations, is that science and technology have brought us to a point where war is no longer an acceptable instrument of foreign policy.

Clausewitz, the first of the German geopoliticians, stated the axiom that "war is the extension of policy by other means." This is the principle upon which practically all foreign policy between great nation-states has operated throughout modern history. The corollary to this axiom has been that the maintenance of military force—present or potential—is essential in order that policy may at all times be fortified by the presence of the ultimate instrument of persuasion. Thus the pursuit of policy "by peaceful means" has traditionally included the ever-present threat of force.

Both the axiom and its corollary have now been invalidated. War is no longer the ultimate instrument of persuasion. It has become the final

negation of policy. A resort to arms is no longer an effective, though immoral, method of gaining an objective. Victory has become indistinguishable from defeat. Nations can no longer commit murder—even in self-defense—without simultaneously committing suicide. This throws a new light upon the value of maintaining military establishments.

If we examine our present policy, it is apparent that we have not yet fully grasped the change which has taken place. We have been sincerely trying to avoid war, but we still hold in the back of our minds the belief that, if worst comes to worst, we can defeat Russia by force of arms and thus save ourselves and Western civilization.

The fact is that we very likely can defeat Russia—though probably not as quickly or easily as many of us like to think. But the unpalatable truth we must recognize is that we cannot defeat Russia without likewise defeating ourselves. Nothing is more certain to destroy the free world, which we seek to preserve, than a third world war.

The corollary to this reversed axiom is that the maintenance of military power is of no value whatsoever, unless it serves to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. This means that, in so far as we risk provocation of conflict in order to increase our chances of victory in the event of conflict, we are not only wasting our substance but actually endangering rather than protecting our own vital interests.

The new Atlantic Security Program serves as an apt illustration. So long as we merely undertake to deter Russian aggression against Western Europe, by making it clear that a military attack upon our friends means war with us, well and good. Obviously, to make such a deterrent effective, we must maintain sufficient military power to make it clear to Moscow that war with the United States means ultimate Russian defeat. But, the moment we go one step further—the moment we enter into any sort of commitment to defend the Oder, or the Elbe, or the Rhine, in the event that war should break out—we should be undertaking to build up military power in an area where it must necessarily provoke counter-preparations and perhaps the very attack we seek to deter. An army capable of defending the Oder is also capable of invading the Soviet Union. We and our European friends may be quite certain that we have no intentions of invading Russia, but we can no more expect the Russians to take

this for granted than we should take for granted that, let us say, an Argentinian army, stationed in Mexico to implement a defensive alliance, might not some day cross the Rio Grande.

The Atlantic Security Program, as proposed to the Senate, was ambiguous on this crucial point. It was not clear whether our undertaking would be merely to deter aggression or whether it also involved a commitment to defend Western Europe's frontiers in the event that the deterrent provided by the Treaty should fail. In testifying before the Foreign Relations Committee, I have urged that the Treaty should not be ratified without making it clear that we are not entering upon a commitment which we could fulfill only at the risk of provoking the very conflict we are seeking to prevent.

III.

Balance of Power Mechanism Destroyed.

The third factor we must consider is that the march of history has destroyed the device by means of which a world composed of sovereign nation-states has, in the past, managed temporarily to preserve the peace. This device was the so-called balance of power mechanism.

By constant maneuvering in ever-shifting alignments, the nation-states were accustomed to preserve, if they could, a state of affairs in which no nation, or group of nations, might reasonably think it could safely resort to a trial of physical force. This was possible so long as there were at least five or six major powers among which the maneuvering could take place. It is no longer possible, since the world's military and economic power has become concentrated in only two poles of superpower—the U. S. and the U. S. S. R.

This, again, has little to do with the nature or intentions of the two surviving giants. The mere fact that power is concentrated in two superpowers means that there are no other comparable forces to maneuver in order to preserve a balance. In the absence of complete solidarity between the two survivors, it means that there must be a struggle for preponderance of power, in which each side believes quite sincerely that its own attainment of preponderance constitutes the only sure guarantee of peace.

So long as there is no world organization endowed with the exclusive right to maintain armed force, such a bipolar struggle for preponderance of power necessarily takes the form of an armament race.

IV.

There Can Be No Peace While an Arms Race Continues.

This brings me to the fourth, and last, major factor which I think we must take into consideration; namely, that there can be no reasonable hope of lasting peace so long as the world's two most powerful nations are engaged in an arms race.

A struggle for preponderance of power through competitive armaments is a vicious circle of mutual provocation, which, sooner or later, may be expected to lead to a war that neither side desires. Increasingly, each side sees itself compelled to take measures of defense which appear as offensive preparation to the other. Furthermore, competitive armament devours more and more of the energies and resources of the competitors, and thus stands in the way of that degree of world economic recovery which is a precondition of peace. Finally, because an arms race imposes on each side the necessity of working for guns instead of butter, it leads the government on each side to throw the blame for reduced living standards upon the evil machinations of the other.

The vicious circle begins when mutual distrust leads to fear of attack. Fear of attack leads to armament, which provokes counter-armament. Armament and counter-armament lead to reduced living standards and potential mass discontent. To overcome discontent, official propaganda is used on both sides to fan the original distrust and fear. Thus the vicious circle is completed, with each side more and more believing the lies it has created about the other.

That is the point at which the United States and the Soviet Union had arrived by March 1947, less than two years after the first American patrols had met their Russian comrades in arms in the heart of a defeated Germany.

Let me make it quite clear that I am not saying that we are more to blame, or equally to blame with the Russians. It is true that I think we have made mistakes, but our intentions have, on the whole, been good intentions, whereas the Russians have not only made mistakes but have pursued a policy which can hardly be described as anything other than selfish and cynical. The point I wish to make is that the dangerous state of world affairs which now exists arises very largely from factors which have little to do with our intentions or Russian intentions—factors which we should understand and have so far failed to understand, because we have become the prisoners of our own past misconceptions.

V.

What is the Answer?

It seems to me that five broad conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing analysis:

1. We shall never find the path to peace so long as we contemplate the possibility of a last resort solution of our difficulties through war.

2. We must recognize that there will be an increasing danger of war so long as the arms race continues.

3. We must be clear in our minds that, until disarmament can be brought about, the sole purpose of maintaining military power is to prevent any other nation, or group of nations, from risking war, either in the expectation that we shall not intervene against aggression, or in the hope that our intervention will not be decisive in denying success to the aggressor.

4. We must face the fact that there can be no disarmament, or even effective limitation or control of armaments, until there is established a supra-national authority capable of enacting and enforcing world law. This does not mean abandoning the United Nations. It does mean recognizing that the United Nations must be developed into a World Government of defined and limited powers, endowed with the exclusive right to maintain and, if necessary, to use armed force. Obviously, this cannot be done overnight. But we can, overnight, make up our minds that this is the goal toward which our policy is directed. At present our Government

takes the view that the existing structure of the United Nations would be adequate to preserve the peace, if only the Russians would permit a peace to be made. Our failure to realize that the present structure is nothing more than a multilateral treaty between fully sovereign nation-states, good only so long as there is unanimous agreement among the major nation-states, prevents us from steering a straight course toward a clearly envisaged goal. Were we to set World Government as our avowed objective, we should, of course, encounter Soviet opposition. But, in a constructive and imaginative program of peacefully uniting a divided world, we should enjoy far greater and more effective support from the peoples of the world than we can ever hope to muster in the present sterile and highly dangerous power struggle.

5. We must try to shift the emphasis in our foreign policy from fear-inspired negative action to confidence-inspired positive procedure. In other words, we must try to shift our major effort from the Churchill policy—misnamed the Truman Doctrine—to our native-born, Marshall Plan approach to reconstruction and rehabilitation. We must rid ourselves of our obsession with Russia and see clearly that our primary job is not to anticipate and frustrate the intentions of the fourteen men in the Kremlin, but to infuse with new life and vigor the hopes and aspirations we share with the masses of mankind.

Our mission has never been, and is not now, to defend an existing order, but to lead forward through peaceful change toward a future fit for man.

If we fulfill that mission, we can let Russia do the worrying about how to reconcile her differences with a free world on the march toward the goal of lasting peace.

The way to stop Russia is to stop letting Russia make our foreign policy.

The way to stop communism is to realize that it is not a physcial force to be contained or eradicated by physical means, but merely an idea which—whatever its original merit—has already lost much of its power through becoming the tool of Soviet totalitarianism. The way to stop communism is not to oppose a rigid doctrine, which falsely promises free-

dom, with an equally rigid doctrine, but to oppose it with a dynamic, imaginative pursuit of justice, freedom and security for all of mankind.

There have been some recent indications that our new Secretary of State understands these things and that a common sense revision of our policy is actually under way.

What we need to do, as citizens, to help such a revision, is to forget the recent past, in which we have become fat, smug and afraid of change, and revert to the native characteristics which once made this nation great, when as yet it had neither wealth nor military power. All we have to do is to re-read the words which Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence, and rededicate ourselves to their fulfillment.

NORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY PROGRAM

STATEMENT TO UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

By
JAMES P. WARBURG

May 10, 1949

STATEMENT TO UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

On the

NORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY PROGRAM

May 10, 1949. JAMES P. WARBURG.

Permit me, Mr. Chairman, to express my grateful appreciation to you and to the members of this Committee for the opportunity to testify on the important and far-reaching proposal now before you. I speak for no group or organization, but merely as one citizen anxious for the safety and welfare of our country. I am neither a lawyer nor a military expert. Such competence as I may possess derives merely from practical experience in international affairs—as a banker, as a public servant and as a free-lance observer and reporter. I can say that I have for many years diligently studied the problems of American foreign policy, and that I have given particular attention to the twofold proposal now under consideration, ever since its outlines first emerged into public view. Your own far greater knowledge and experience will enable you to detect any fallacies which may underlie the opinions I shall venture to express.

The Atlantic Security Pact and the program to rearm Western Europe must, I think, be considered together. The forthright testimony of the Secretary of State has made it clear that the Treaty is the consequence rather than the cause of the rearmament program launched by the Brussels Treaty Powers on March 14, 1948 and endorsed on the same day by President Truman.

I should like first to say a word about the context of this twofold proposal. It springs from a policy which should, in my opinion, go down in history as the Churchill Doctrine, instead of being associated with the

name of our President. This policy rests upon the theory, advanced by Mr. Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, in March 1946, that the Soviet Union alone is responsible for the world crisis and that the Soviet threat to peace is essentially a threat of physical conquest. From this theory derives the policy of seeking to contain the Soviet threat within a physical frontier manned by physical force. This essentially negative approach to peace has become one of the two major trends in our present foreign policy. The other, positive trend is the plan developed by President Truman and Secretary Marshall to attack the causes of mass discontent which invite communist exploitation.

My own belief has been that the present world crisis derives from a number of factors, some of which are the products of the time in which we live and have nothing whatever to do with the nature or intentions of the Soviet Union; that, in addition to these non-Russian factors, there has been, and is, a very definite Soviet threat to peace; but that this Soviet threat has been, and still is, primarily a threat of communist penetration or subversion and only secondarily a threat of military conquest. Holding this belief, I have been an enthusiastic supporter of the Marshall Plan and a persistent critic of the doctrine of physical containment. For the past two years, I have viewed with increasing misgivings the ever greater preemption of our energies and resources by the negative and not very successful policy of strategic containment and the consequent slow strangulation of our positive program.

In terms of dollars the ratio now stands at about three and a half to one. We are now spending less than six billion dollars a year on our constructive program for peace. At the same time we are insuring ourselves against the failure of that program to the tune of more than eighteen billion dollars.

This anomaly results, I think, from two basic misconceptions: first, the oversimplified scapegoat analysis of the world crisis; and, second, the widespread acceptance of a very dubious analogy to the Nazi design of military conquest. Our obsession with these two misconceptions blinds us to those aspects of the world crisis which have nothing to do with Russia or communism, and, at the same time, prevents us from seeing the true nature of the Russian or communist menace.

If we could shake off this obsession, I believe that two things might happen.

First, we might recognize that the way to stop Russia is to stop letting Russia make our foreign policy; in other words, we might see that Soviet expansionism can best be halted as the by-product of a constructive American policy for peace.

Second, we might change our attitude about the United Nations. Instead of sadly shaking our heads over an impotent "debating society" and consoling ourselves with the easy notion that the United Nations would work, if only the Russians would let it work, we might set out to make the United Nations into an organization capable of enacting and enforcing world law. Were we to set out to do this, we should, of course, encounter Soviet opposition. But it would be Soviet opposition to a constructive program of peacefully uniting a divided world, in which we should enjoy far greater and more effective support from the peoples of the world than we can ever hope to muster in the present sterile and highly dangerous power struggle.

So much for the context of the Atlantic Security Program. I am prepared to amplify these few remarks, if time permits and the Committee so desires. Given this context, which cannot be changed overnight, it seems to me that the twofold North Atlantic Security Program must be examined from the point of view of its efficacy as an instrument in our present policy. I shall now state my position from this narrower point of view as quickly and as precisely as I can.

So long as we live in a world of international anarchy dominated by a power struggle between the two halves of a divided world, I am in favor of any declaration which makes it clear to ourselves and to others that a physical attack upon Western Europe is an attack upon us, and will be so regarded by us. I have spent most of my adult life fighting the isolationist illusion. I supported our entrance into the League of Nations and opposed the Neutrality Acts. When Western Europe was faced by the threat of Nazi conquest, I was horrified by our connivance in the so-called Peace of Munich and, shortly thereafter, publicly advocated an open military alliance with Britain, France and the Low Countries as the only hope

of preventing the outbreak of World War II. I do not object to such an alliance now, provided that it does not take our eyes off the real danger—*which is now not military but political*—and provided that we do not fool either ourselves or our friends about what we are doing.

We are fooling ourselves, I think, when we try to clothe this Treaty in moral garments. To say that all the signatories are united by a common heritage of ethical belief and democratic conviction seems to me a dubious statement about large segments of the French, Dutch, Belgian and Italian populations which willingly collaborated with and lived quite contentedly under fascism. It seems a dubious statement about any country in which 25% the people are today communists, or about any country whose government seeks to deny democratic freedom to colonial peoples. This moral pretense becomes a complete mockery when Portugal is one of the signatories and when flirtatious eyes are cast at Franco Spain.

Likewise I think we are fooling ourselves when we maintain that we are undertaking this program in order to strengthen the United Nations, when it is clear that we are trying to find a means of filling the gap left by the failure of the United Nations.

These two polite hypocrisies seem to me to weaken our undertaking. I do not think they are vitally important because I do not believe that the American people take either pretense very seriously. There is, however, one respect in which I am afraid that some one is being seriously and dangerously led astray. In what is perhaps the most important aspect of the twofold proposal, I believe that either the American people do not realize what is afoot, or else our friends abroad are under a most regrettable misapprehension.

From what I myself heard in Europe recently and from the published utterances of foreign officials, it seems clear that our friends abroad expect the new program to secure the frontiers of Western Europe against invasion by the Soviet Union. They are not interested in the promise of another liberation from enemy occupation. "Next time", said Premier Queuille of France, "you would be liberating a corpse."

To secure the frontiers of Western Europe means to hold an invading Russian army at the Oder, or the Elbe, or—at the very worst—at the

Rhine. Being no military expert, I have tried to find out what military experts think this undertaking would require. The impression I have gathered, here and abroad, is that there would have to be created in Western Europe a ground force of at least forty fully equipped and highly mobile divisions and that such a ground army would have to be supported by great tactical and strategic airpower, fully functioning services of supply and adequately protected sea communications with the Western hemisphere. To say that it would take at least ten billion dollars and a million men under arms to secure the frontiers of Western Europe against invasion is probably a gross understatement.

Assuming that we were to supply all the money and equipment—assuming that, in the event of war, we undertook to provide much of the needed airpower and the protection of the sea-lanes—there would still remain the question of trained and mobilized manpower to secure the West European frontier. So far as I know, there are only three sources from which this manpower can be drawn: Western Europe itself, Western Germany, or the United States.

Western Europe as a whole is suffering from a shortage of manpower, which at present is one of the chief obstacles to recovery. Italy is the only country which has a manpower surplus, but Italy cannot be rearmed without violating the Italian Peace Treaty. If a million men are withdrawn for military service from the farms and factories of France and the other European signatories, the recovery effort will come to a standstill and the door will be opened wide to communist subversion or penetration.

If military manpower were to be recruited in Western Germany, it is clear, I think, that two things would happen: Russian retaliation would be provoked, and the already dubious morale of any potential French army would be destroyed. I say "the already dubious morale" because we cannot ignore the fact that, with 25% of France voting communist, the Russians have a far more dangerous fifth column in France today than the Nazis had in 1940.

That leaves the United States, and perhaps Canada, as a source of the necessary manpower. A former French Prime Minister has been making speeches in this country urging that we send a large American force to Europe now to stand guard over its frontier. However, even if

we were prepared to do that, it is necessary to bear in mind that, in spite of our huge military budget of fifteen billion dollars a year, we have at present a combat force of only about ten divisions.

It would seem clear, then, that if the Atlantic Security Program means what our European friends think it means, either Western European recovery will have to be halted in its tracks, or else the United States will have to undertake a vastly greater commitment than the American people realize today. Halting the European Recovery Program means that we shall have to face the necessity of increased and indefinitely prolonged Marshall Plan assistance, or else throw open the door to communist penetration at the very moment when it has been almost locked by patient and costly effort.

If the Atlantic Security Program is intended to mean that we are to secure the frontiers of Western Europe against invasion, then the presently proposed $1,130,000,000 is merely the first bite at a very much larger commitment. It costs something like $250,000,000 to equip one armored division. I do not know what it would cost to create a force of forty divisions—either European or American—in Europe. But, whatever it costs, this would again be only the beginning, because we could hardly assume that the Russians would sit still on their side of the Iron Curtain while we proceeded in a leisurely manner to build up a defense capable of holding their presently available striking force. Actually, all the Russians would have to do to double their present immediate striking power would be to bring up another fifty existing divisions from wherever they are at present stationed in the Soviet Union. If they did that, our defense force would again have to be proportionately strengthened. And even this sort of calculation would only work out satisfactorily, if the Russians did not hit upon the bright idea that maybe they had better get the whole thing over with before we had built up any defense at all.

These seem to me the facts to be faced, if we are talking about securing the West European frontier against invasion.

If, on the other hand, we are not undertaking to do what our friends think we are doing, what is the point of diverting European manpower and resources from recovery to rearmament? What good will it do to build

half a defense force? Twenty divisions are no better than the ten or twelve which exist in Western Europe today, if it takes forty to do the job. Surely, it is folly to think that the French, or the Dutch, or the Belgians would fight a delaying action for the benefit of Britain and the United States, if they knew in advance that their countries would be overrun and occupied. Surely, it is folly to weaken our own military strength by putting some of our stock of weapons in the hands of troops who—in the event of war—would be forced to surrender them to the invader.

Before the Treaty is ratified, Mr. Chairman, I think the American people have a right to know what it means. I think our friends abroad have a right to know what it means. Either we are, or we are not, undertaking to defend Western Europe against invasion. If we are, let us not deceive ourselves about the costs or the risks involved. If we are not—if we are merely undertaking to deter invasion—let us not permit our friends to be deceived. Let us make clear to them what it is that we are promising to do.

Shortly after the Treaty was signed, our Chief of Staff, General Bradley, made a speech, which I understand was cleared with the State Department, and in which I thought he clearly implied that our European friends were right in assuming that the frontiers of Western Europe are now to be secured against invasion in the event of war. On April 27th, the Secretary of State himself said to this Committee:

> "It is understandable that the free nations of Western Europe cannot look forward with equanimity to invasion and occupation in the event of war, even if we guarantee subsequently to liberate them. Nor it is to our own interest to permit them to be occupied with the consequent necessity of the costly liberation of these areas."

On the same day, according to the New York Times, the Secretary of State told this Committee in response to a question that "there was absolutely no intention to send substantial numbers of American troops to Europe in any eventuality short of war." In response to another question he is reported to have said that "there was no thought of bringing Western Germany into the alliance." And finally, speaking of the proposed American subsidy of $1,130,000,000 to West European rearmament, Mr.

Acheson is reported to have stated that "the countries to be aided would themselves put up from six to seven times what the United States provided."

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that these statements add up to the conclusion that the Western European signatories are to provide *all* the manpower and roughly 85% of the material resources required to secure the frontiers of Western Europe against invasion. I am unable to reconcile this conclusion with the repeated assurance given by the State Department that rearmament is not to take precedence over or interfere with West European recovery. I fear that the Secretary of State, for whose integrity, wisdom, skill and courage I have the greatest respect and admiration, has fallen heir to an unclear position not of his own making and is, to a certain extent, its prisoner.

In these circumstances it seems to me that precisely the sort of occasion has arisen when the Senate, in the fulfilment of its Constitutional duties and prerogatives, is in a position to help the President and the Secretary of State in their patient pursuit of peace, by bringing about a clarification of the proposal.

Two kinds of clarification are possible.

The first would establish that the twofold program means our participation in a determined effort to defend Western Europe's frontiers in the event of war.

The second would establish that we are undertaking to make our utmost effort to deter a would-be aggressor from attacking Western Europe, but that, if this effort should fail, we are committed to avenge and liberate, but not necessarily to prevent invasion.

In the event of the first alternative, I would feel compelled—if I had a vote—to cast it against the ratification of the Treaty. I would do so most reluctantly, knowing that, in the present circumstances, our failure to ratify would involve grave risks. Yet I would feel that these risks were not as serious as those involved in the attempt to erect a dubious defense against what I conceive to be the secondary danger of military attack, at the price of weakening Western Europe's defenses against what I conceive

to be the primary danger—namely, the threat of communist penetration through exploitation of economic distress and political instability.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that the wisdom of the Senate will lead to a clarification of the twofold program in the opposite sense. *Such a clarification would rest upon the recognition that the only effective way to protect Western Europe against military invasion is to prevent the outbreak of war.* Were this premise accepted, a clarifying statement might take approximately the following form:

> "1. The Treaty means that the United States recognizes that it has a vital interest in the security of Western Europe and that it will fight, if necessary, to maintain that security.
>
> "2. The Treaty means that the United States serves notice upon any potential aggressor that military attack upon Western Europe means war with the United States.
>
> "3. The Treaty implies that, so long as no effective, supranational peace-enforcement machinery is established, the United States will do its utmost to maintain sufficient military power to make it apparent to a potential aggressor that any attempt at military conquest of Western Europe is foredoomed to failure.
>
> "4. If, in spite of the foregoing deterrents to aggression provided by the United States, an aggressor should nevertheless embark upon military adventure, the United States preserves full freedom of action to fight the aggressor in whatever manner, by whatever means, and in whatever theatre or theatres of action it may deem expedient, in order to restore as rapidly as possible the security and freedom of the North Atlantic Area."

If the Treaty were thus clarified, I should be in favor of its ratification. I should even be in favor of a limited amount of military aid, designed primarily to enable the *freely elected* governments in Western Europe to deal effectively with possible internal threats of violence, and to promote a greater feeling of self-respect and security. But I should stipulate that such military aid must not be given to governments which are not freely elected, and that it must not assume dimensions which would

divert any of the nations of Western Europe from their primary task for achieving economic health and political stability.

In voting for a program thus clarified, I should be well aware of certain defects in the Treaty which, I am afraid, it is now too late to remedy. By including Norway, the Treaty pushes the declared area of our vital interest right up against the Soviet frontier at its northern extremity. At the same time, the Treaty limits our commitment to certain countries of Western Europe, leaving others—notably Finland, Sweden, Turkey and Iran—unprotected. This seems to me inconsistent and unwise. In spite of these now probably irremediable defects, I would consider that the Treaty has two offsetting virtues, provided that the whole program is clarified as suggested. These virtues are: first, that the Treaty makes explicit to every American citizen a commitment which has long been implicit in our whole foreign policy; and, second, that it makes this commitment unequivocally clear as a warning to any would-be aggressor and as an encouragement to our friends.

I hope, Mr. Chairman, that my recommendation is at least precise and clear. I am grateful for the opportunity to present it for the consideration of your Committee.

Should you find merit in the suggestion I have ventured to place before you, you will, I believe, have cured the Atlantic Security Program of its most dangerous defect. This program may then well become a most useful stopgap device to buy the time in which a positive, constructive American program for peace may be developed. Its ultimate effectiveness as such a device will then be determined by what we do with the time gained, in Europe and in Asia—more specifically, in Germany and in the southeastern rim of the Asiatic continent.

SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTATION.

In order to document the ambiguity which I have stressed, the following quotations have been extracted for the convenience of the members of the Committee. The two quotations from General Bradley are from the New York Times texts of his speech of April 5 in New York and his testimony before this Committee on May 3. The quotations from the testimony of the Secretary of State before this Committee are taken from the official transcript of April 27. In order to facilitate reference to the context of the statements quoted from this transcript, I have noted in each case the page or pages on which the quoted statements are to be found.

I.

The Atlantic Security Program means securing the frontiers of Western Europe against invasion.

A. General Bradley—April 5, 1949. New York.

1. "It must be perfectly apparent to the people of the United States that we cannot count on friends in Western Europe, if our strategy in the event of war dictates that we shall first abandon them to the enemy with a promise of later liberation . . . It is a strategy that would produce nothing better than impotent and disillusioned Allies . . . "

General Bradley—May 3, 1949—to this Committee.

2. "Geographically many of these member nations are already in a position where any aggression into Western Europe would be a conquest of their homelands. I assure you that our frontiers of collective defense lie, in common with theirs, in the heart of Europe.

Speaking of the Normandy landings in World War II,

"I hope that the occasion shall never arise when I might be called upon to participate in such a hazardous and costly operation."

B. Secretary Acheson.

1. Page 19: "It is understandable that the free nations of Western Europe cannot look forward with equanimity to invasion and occupation in the event of war, even if we guarantee subsequently to liberate them. Nor is it in our interest to permit them to be occupied with the consequent necessity of the costly liberation of these areas."

2. Page 89, in response to a question from Senator Wiley:

"They" (the European signatories) "say, if there were a really serious all-out attack we know that in the long run, probably, the great strength of the United States would, in the end, defeat the aggressor. But, in the meantime, they say, we would be overrun. Most of us, they say, would be dead, our countries would be destroyed, our civilization would be pretty well destroyed. The final outcome would be that the United States would be liberating a corpse."

(This is almost an exact paraphrase of a statement made by Prime Minister Queuille of France, while the Treaty was still under negotiation.)

II.

The Atlantic Security Program does not mean securing the frontiers of Western Europe against invasion.

Secretary Acheson (April 27 testimony):

1. Senator Connally: (page 40) "The proposed arms agreement does not necessarily envisage the increase in the armed forces of the signatories, but rather the furnishing of supplies and equipment to bring up to date their armed forces?"

Secretary Acheson: "Correct."

2. In response to a question from Senator Hickenlooper as to whether the program could be considered aggressive (page 72), Secretary Acheson said in part:

"The nations of Western Europe have small military forces. The action which is contemplated and outlined in what I have told you about the President's proposed recommendation on a military assistance plan could not, by any stretch of the imagination be regarded as aggressive. There is nothing to aggress with under that program. What would be done is to take the existing small forces and make their equipment more modern and better rounded, so that, to the best of their ability, they can defend themselves if they are attacked."

3. Senator Donnell (page 181), speaking of the meaning of the word "effective":

"Does it contain the idea of sufficiency? That is to say, by means of continuous and sufficient self-help as to accomplish the maintenance and development of individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack?"

Secretary Acheson: "No. It cannot mean that because probably the provision of sufficient forces at the present time is impossible for everybody. Otherwise, if you were trying to get sufficient forces, you would have to maintain military establishments which would be quite impossible both for Europe and for us."

III.

Recovery Has Priority.
Manpower will not be drawn from Western Europe.

Secretary Acheson, on April 27:

1. To Senator Wiley (page 47):

"The size of the forces is limited by the primary necessity for recovery."

2. To Senator Smith of New Jersey (page 66):

"ECA has complete priority."

3. To Senator Hickenlooper (page 75):

"The first primary necessity is the economic recovery of Western Europe. That means that there are very definite limitations on the size

of the military forces which Western Europe can maintain, because, if you withdraw greatly increased numbers of men from production and put them into military service, you would impair recovery and you would impair the very ability of those nations to resist and to remain free nations. Therefore, recovery comes first. . . . Nothing which is proposed under our military assistance program will interfere with the recovery program."

Later, on page 81:

"The size of the forces will not, as many people erroneously assume, mushroom into vast numbers of troops."

IV.

Rearmament will require six or seven billion dollars per annum from Western Europe.

1. In answer to a question from Senator Vandenberg (page 45) Secretary Acheson said:

"United States assistance" ($1,130,000,000) "will be somewhere between one sixth and one seventh of the total effort which will go into military efforts in Europe."

2. Substantially the same answer was given to Senator Hickenlooper (page 74).

V.

Manpower for defense of Western Europe's frontiers will not come from Germany. Nor will arms.

1. Senator Lodge: (page 119) "Is it planned to bring back the Ruhr as a source of arms production?"

Secretary Acheson: "No, sir, it is not. We are very clear that the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany must be complete and absolute."

2. In answer to Senator Fulbright (page 129), Secretary Acheson said: "A discussion of including West Germany in the Pact is not possible . . . At the present stage of affairs in Germany we could not contemplate a military program in Germany."

VI.

Manpower for the defense of Western Europe's frontiers will not come from the U. S.

Senator Hickenlooper (page 98): "Are we going to be expected to send substantial numbers of troops over there as a more or less permanent contribution to the development of these countries' capacity to resist?"

Secretary Acheson: "The answer to that question, Senator, is a clear and absolute no."

DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY

CONVOCATION ADDRESS

to the

FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO

by

JAMES P. WARBURG

Boulder, Colorado
April 10, 1949

It is good to be here again. I wonder how many of you, who live and work in Boulder, know what an extraordinary place this is—a place to which a man may come as a total stranger, as I did just a year ago, and then leave after a week's visit with a feeling of sadness like that which one feels at parting from lifelong friends. I came out here last year not knowing a single member of the faculty or student body. I came because a friendly voice on the long-distance telephone conveyed a sense of casual urgency—a sense that something important was about to happen out here in which I might help—something which I would in any case be sorry to have missed. I had no idea what I was supposed to do. I just came—bringing with me what little material I could hastily throw together.

After two days of lecturing and participating in discussions I felt like a man who has brought two little buckets of water to quench the thirst of an army on the march. My buckets were empty—I had no idea how or where to refill them—yet here were you, thirsty as ever. And then the miracle happened. The rubbing together of eager minds began to draw water from the clouds. It literally rained ideas and I soon discovered that instead of coming out here to help slake your thirst, I had slaked my own.

One does not revisit the scene of such an experience without some degree of anxiety lest repetition dull the lustre of a shining memory. Yet—so strong is the nature of whatever it is that gives Boulder its peculiar magic—anxiety vanished within the first hour of my return and left me feeling only the warm pleasure that a man feels upon coming home to his native village.

Tomorrow we start again upon a week of intensive study of the problems presented to us by the continuing world crisis. We shall, I think, find this crisis sharpened and more clearly defined than it was last year, though not essentially changed. We shall find ourselves faced with a far more difficult problem than that which we confronted last year, when we considered the possible means of bringing about a change in our Government's negative, fear-inspired foreign policy.

Tonight, before we embark upon the week's work, it is perhaps appropriate to take a more leisurely and contemplative view of the context of the crisis in world affairs. In its more obvious and immediately urgent

manifestations, the present crisis is economic and political. But, in its deepest sense, it is essentially a crisis of the human spirit—a crisis in which mankind stands before the alternatives of war and peace precisely because man's spirit has now come face to face with the ultimate challenge of man's material progress.

The long quest for knowledge, the centuries of striving after necessity, comfort and pleasure—the long chain of human invention piled upon invention—have brought man at last to the point where, in his search for the ultimate security, he has discovered the means of his own total destruction. The crisis is one of the human spirit, because it is only man's spirit which can turn the human race from self-destruction to progress—which can metamorphose the new and terrible tools of fratricide into instruments of enduring fraternal cooperation.

The dictionary defines crisis as "a turning point at which a decisive change for better or worse is likely to take place". But a more accurate description of the emotional content of the word can be gained from the way in which it is translated into Chinese. There being no such word in the Chinese language, a substitute is compounded of the characters for two other words—the ideographs for danger and opportunity. That is how the word is written: "danger-opportunity". That is what the world faces today—the greatest danger of extinction in the history of the human race, as well as the greatest opportunity in the long life of man to free himself once and for all from the threat of self-destruction.

At the present moment the danger tends to obscure the opportunity. Most of us know or feel instinctively that we are drifting towards war—the kind of war which will leave the victor indistinguishable from the vanquished. The sense of impending disaster seems to freeze us in our tracks, as a rabbit is frozen helplessly in the presence of a snake. Our anxiety beclouds our reason and induces a state of confusion which undermines our faith and paralyzes our will. Yet it is only through a combination of faith and the will to live that we can convert the danger into an opportunity—an opportunity to achieve at last that peace on earth for which countless generations have vainly striven.

There has never been an inevitable war. There has never been a war which could not have been averted, if reason had prevailed over greed and envy, if faith had conquered fear, if man had learned to live according to his beliefs. Nor is the ultimate catastrophe which now threatens inevi-

table. But the greatest danger of its coming to pass lurks in the widespread acceptance of its inevitability.

When I say the widespread acceptance of war's inevitability I do not mean only that all too many people are **convinced** that there is no way to escape the catastrophe. I mean also that an even greater number of people—and especially men in government—are today **doubtful** whether war can be averted and are trying to insure themselves against the failure of their own efforts to preserve the peace. These doubting Thomases are in a way more dangerous than the straight-out pessimists. The complete defeatist is an evil influence because he tends to produce total inaction in the face of danger—which is bad enough. But the doubting Thomas tends to cause hasty and ill-advised action motivated by frantic fear rather than by reason—and this is likely to precipitate disaster.

We are not threatened by the Russians—nor they by us. We are each threatened primarily by our own fears. We are together threatened by the hypnotic influence exerted by our fear, which makes us freeze to the world's steering gear as a frightened novice bicycle rider freezes to the handlebars and cannot avoid hitting the one pebble in the middle of a broad road.

There is very little that is really new about our problem. Since the earliest beginnings of human history, men have resorted to violence when their sense of justice has been sufficiently outraged and when they could find no peaceful means of remedying what seemed to them injustice. Montesquieu truly stated long ago that "Man's sense of justice is older than his reason". He might have added that man's sense of injustice, or his fear of injustice, retains the capacity to supplant reason as the prime mover to human action. This being true, it follows that the precondition of peace is the presence of justice in the minds of the majority of men. But the concept of justice is neither universal nor static; what seems just to one man seems unjust to another; what seems just to the majority today may seem unjust tomorrow.

The problem of achieving enduring peace has always been and still is the problem of achieving an organization of society so permeated with justice as to permit constant compromise and change without violence. It must permit constant compromise between the various concepts of what is just, so as to produce a composite picture of justice. It must permit accommodation to change in this composite picture, in order that all men

may feel that if justice is not present today, it is at least attainable through the peaceful processes of the established order.

What we face today is essentially a crisis of confidence in our own ability to establish such an order. What we face today is a failure of faith.

There are, I think, two kinds of faith which have broken down. There is the faith of man in Divine Providence; and the faith of man in himself. Faith in Divine Providence leads man to accept injustice on this earth in reliance upon ultimate justice in the Hereafter. The faith of man in himself leads him to believe in the essential goodness of his fellow-man, and to rely upon that ultimate goodness to react justly to the dictates of reason.

The faith in Divine Justice—the willingness to accept injustice on earth in the hope of reward in Heaven—has become enfeebled as man's material progress has widened the horizons of physical well-being attainable here on earth. The faith of man in his fellow-man has become attentuated in the face of the widening gap between progress in discovering how to attain material satisfaction and the lack of corresponding progress in the just distribution of attainable satisfaction among all men. In other words, I suspect that one of the chief causes of the failure of faith in our age is the lag between the development of man's acquisitive techniques, which are fratricidal, and the development of man's social conscience, which is fraternal.

Different peoples have sought to meet this problem in different ways. No people has solved it. Least of all have the peoples of the earth solved it together. Within those curious compartments of human society, which we call nation-states, various habits, customs and laws have grown up which attempt to express the composite sense of justice of the people concerned. We think we are confronted today with a new challenge. We think that we are faced with the new and terrible threat of what we call communist totalitarianism, springing out of an enigmatic doctrine called Marxism. Let me read you a description of this "new" antithesis:

> "The Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common sense of the citizens. The Russian centres all the authority of society in a single arm. The principal instrument of the former is freedom; of the latter, servitude. Their starting point is different

and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems to be marked out by the will of Heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe."

I think you will agree that this is a fairly accurate statement of the now familiar problem. It was written over a century ago. Does not this illustrate the futility of seeking a solution to the Russian enigma solely in the behavior of men now living, or in books as yet unwritten when de Tocqueville composed the paragraph just quoted? Let me cite an example of the sort of contemporary thinking I have in mind.

In his Inaugural Address of January 20, 1949, President Truman restated the American objectives of "universal freedom, justice and peace." He proclaimed the righteousness of the American cause and then said: "In pursuit of these aims we and other like-minded nations find ourselves directly opposed by a regime with contrary aims and a totally different concept of life."

To say that we seek "freedom, justice and peace" and that "we are directly opposed by a regime with contrary aims" is to say that the Soviet regime wants slavery, injustice and war. I, for one, do not think the President believes this. I think he believes that we are opposed by a regime with a totally different concept of justice and freedom. I would agree with such a belief. I would agree further that the manner in which that regime pursues its aims constitutes a threat to world peace and to our own security. But this is quite different from saying that the Soviet regime wants war or wants something which it conceives as slavery and injustice.

The President then proceeded to state the antithesis between "communism" and "democracy" in greatly oversimplified terms. His eight paragraphs on this subject could have been condensed into six words: "Communism is bad. Democracy is good."

Even if one accepts this simple ethical antithesis as a point of departure, one cannot accept such broad supporting generalities as: "Communism maintains that social wrongs can be corrected only by violence. Democracy has proved that social justice can be achieved by peaceful change."

If, by communism, we mean the Soviet regime, it must be recognized that communism has achieved quite a number of things without

violence—such as the establishment of racial equality in the Soviet Union. It has accomplished a number of other social changes by deceit and chicanery. It is true that the Soviet regime has not hesitated to use violence nor bothered to justify its use. But that does not warrant our concluding that "Communism maintains that social wrongs can be corrected **only** by violence."

Much more important, however, is the other half of the statement. It is bad enough to misunderstand the nature of the opposing regime and to underestimate its capabilities. It is even worse to overestimate our own capabilities and to lull ourselves into happy complacency with the assertion that "Democracy has proved that social justice can be achieved through peaceful change." Where has "democracy" achieved social justice? Has social justice ever been achieved anywhere on the face of this earth? And, if it has not been achieved, how has "democracy" proved that it can be achieved through peaceful change?

Much of Mr. Truman's condemnation of "communism" would have applied to the Russia of de Tocqueville's day, before the Communist Manifesto was ever written. Much of his praise of "democracy" has little application to some of the so-called "democracies" of our own Western Hemisphere.

It is all very well to believe in the righteousness of what one is **trying** to do. But righteousness becomes merely self-defeating complacency when one begins to believe that one has already accomplished it.

What we need most is to recapture a sense of humor and a sense of proportion about ourselves. Then—and then only—shall we be able to see others with some degree of objectivity. Once we recognize that, in our peculiarly fortunate community, we have not yet wholly solved the age-old problems of building a just and therefore peaceful human society, we shall view the attempts of others to solve the same problems with greater sympathy and understanding. It is then even conceivable that we may derive useful lessons from social systems quite different from our own.

At the present time we are allowing smugness to blind us not only to the good in other forms of society but to the imperfections in our own. This leads us into the fatal error of seeing in black and white a world picture composed of an infinite variety of grays. It leads us to become intolerant and doctrinaire, insisting upon the American way of life as the

only road to salvation with much the same fanaticism as that displayed by the communists. It leads us to distrust self-criticism as "deviation" and even treason. It leads us to deny that two plus two equals four, if that obvious truth happens to be stated by a member of the Politburo. This is the process by which a free society ceases to be free and becomes more and more like the very evil against which it is seeking to defend itself.

I do not propose tonight to discuss the newly-signed Atlantic Pact or any other specific aspect of our contemporary foreign policy. We shall have ample time for this in the week to come. But I would like to cite, as an example of our present self-blinding complacency, the aura of righteousness with which we tend to surround a relatively simple act of practical power politics.

The Preamble to the North Atlantic Security Pact begins as follows:

> "The parties to this treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.
>
> "They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."

Article 10 of the treaty provides that:

> "The parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this treaty . . ."

Under this article the original parties have already invited Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy and Portugal to join. Portugal has asked that Spain be included. Secretary Acheson, replying to a question in a recent press conference as to the possible inclusion of Spain, is reported to have said that he could foresee arguments on both sides of the matter. At the same conference the Secretary of State was asked whether Portugal had been asked to join more on the ground for securing the North Atlantic area than because Portugal could be expected to further the democratic principles in that area. His reply, as paraphrased by the New York Times, was that he "could not probe into the operations of the minds of others" but that "his own vote was cast on both counts."

In a broadcast to the American people, Mr. Acheson developed more fully the idea that common beliefs and principles unite the signatories to the treaty. The relevant passage read as follows:

> "There developed on our Atlantic Coast a community, which has spread across the continent, connected with Western Europe by common institutions and moral and ethical beliefs. Similarities of this kind are not superficial but fundamental. They are the strongest kind of ties, because they are based on moral conviction, on acceptance of the same values in life.
>
> "The very basis of Western civilization, which we share with other nations bordering on the North Atlantic, and which all of us share with many other nations, is the ingrained spirit of restraint and tolerance. This is the opposite of the communist belief that coercion by force is a proper method of hastening the inevitable. Western civilization has lived by mutual restraint and tolerance. This civilization permits and stimulates free inquiry and bold experimentation. It creates the environment of freedom, from which flows the greatest amount of ingenuity, enterprise and accomplishment . . ."

Mr. Acheson's statement of common institutions, common standards of value and common ethical and moral beliefs is, broadly speaking, true as to the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Scandinavia, the Low Countries, France and Italy. Even within this area, however, we must not overlook that most of the Italian people dwelt quite happily under Fascism for a number of years, that a large part of France and other occupied countries was collaborationist, and that today about one quarter of the French and Italian populations are, as members of the Communist Party, actively opposed to "our common heritage". This does not, perhaps, invalidate the generality. But when we come to the Iberian Peninsula, we are forced to see how flimsy is this moral rationalization.

By no stretch of the imagination can the dictatorship of Salazar be considered a "democracy". By no stretch of the imagination can it be maintained that this regime is based upon "individual liberty and the rule of law." The inclusion of Portugal—and the mere consideration of the inclusion of Franco's Spain—make a mockery of the moral antithesis upon which the Atlantic treaty is allegedly based.

The North Atlantic Security Pact is a pragmatic move in a power struggle between the Soviet Union and the anti-communist West. As

such it may be a wise move or a foolish move. As I shall attempt to show, later in the week, the wisdom or foolishness of the enterprise will depend less upon the wording of the treaty than upon the manner in which we try to carry out the obligations we recognize in the treaty. That is not what concerns us here. What concerns us here is the fact that we are undertaking a far-reaching step in the development of our foreign policy in a haze of self-induced illusion. We think we need the Iberian Peninsula —or at least a part of it—for purely military reasons. Instead of facing that fact and admitting it, we pretend to ourselves that we have common ideals and beliefs with a Fascist dictator. That is precisely the point of absurdity to which we were bound to be driven by a policy of negative anti-communism. That is precisely the danger we discussed last year.

Mr. Acheson has not created this illusion. He has fallen heir to it. It is part and parcel of the Churchill-Truman Doctrine.

To avoid misunderstanding, let me make it quite clear that I consider even more absurd the allegation by the communists throughout the world that the Atlantic Pact is proof of our aggressive intention. In the same broadcast from which I have quoted, Secretary Acheson said:

> "This country is not planning to make war against anyone. It is not seeking war. It abhors war. It does not hold war to be inevitable. Its policies are devised with the specific aim of bridging by peaceful means the tremendous differences which beset international society at this time."

Personally, I believe every word of that paragraph, even though I question the wisdom of some of the policies chosen. As a matter of fact, I do not differ with the most fundamental element in the Atlantic treaty. I have believed, ever since I was old enough to think, that the vital interest and security of this nation were bound up with the vital interest and security of Western Europe. I believed this—and acted upon the belief—in two wars. I believe it now. In fact, I have now come to realize that our vital interest and security are bound up with more than Western Europe and that, by our belated preoccupation with Western Europe, we are driven to neglect our equally vital interests in other parts of the world. I believe also that we misunderstand the nature of the Soviet threat to Western Europe and are locking the wrong door. All that is for later discussion.

The point I wanted to make tonight is simply that we need to arouse ourselves from the hypnotic trance in which we are at present moving. We need to recapture the inquiring spirit that seeks truth rather than justification. We need to draw more clearly—both as to ourselves and others—the distinction between belief and behavior. We need to learn that, if we wish to compare ourselves to others, we must compare belief with belief, and behavior with behavior. At present we tend to make the comparison between our own ethical beliefs, as if we fully lived up to them, and the behavior of the other fellow, as if this corresponded in all respects to his beliefs.

There are fundamental differences of belief to be reconciled. The reconciliation is no easy task. But the reconciliation becomes utterly impossible if it becomes confused with the equally difficult task of reconciling the existing differences of behavior.

The first step, it seems to me, must be an honest re-examination of our own aims and aspirations as well as of our present policies. We have already reached a point in the progressive malady where the mere suggestion of such a self-examination is likely to be interpreted as disloyalty. We have already become infected with the germs of totalitarianism to the point where we begin to suspect dissent and equate it with sympathy for an alien cause. Once we allow the totalitarian concept of strength through uniformity to supplant our native concept of strength through diversity, we shall have abandoned the central bastion of our position.

When we have accomplished this self-examination, we shall for the first time be able to assess the extent and limits of our own power—we shall for the first time obtain a clear view of the nature and strength of the forces arrayed against us—we shall for the first time be able to recognize the faces of our friends.

We can—I firmly believe—succeed in building a world order so permeated with justice that men will no longer be moved to violence. We can—I am sure—re-kindle faith and hope in a world obsessed with fear. But the place to begin is here at home. The first faith to re-kindle is faith in ourselves. The first fear to overcome is the fear of recognizing our own errors.

In the conduct of our post-war foreign policy we have made mistakes. So has every other nation. Our trouble is not that our mistakes

have been particularly serious or numerous. Our trouble is that, instead of learning from our mistakes, we have rationalized them and thus become increasingly the prisoner of each succcessive error.

If, in this crisis of the human spirit, we are to convert danger into opportunity—if, at this decisive moment in human history, we are to develop a capacity for constructive leadership commensurate with our power—we shall have to discard the comfortable moral platitudes, the glib generalities and the complacent self-righteousness which now obscure our vision. We shall have to cast out fear, and be willing to walk serenely into a more or less unknown and unknowable future.

There is all the difference in the world between serenity and smugness. Serenity is the product of faith, wisdom and calm confidence in the slow progress of a changing world. Complacency is compounded of pride in possession and fear lest change diminish privilege or power. The one moves forward willingly; the other is dragged along on slow, reluctant feet.

Our choice as a nation is the choice between emerging out of youth into serene maturity—or slipping imperceptibly from youth into senile decay.

That, as I see it, is the deeper meaning for us, as a people, of the present crisis in world affairs.

A BASIS FOR REVISION

of

U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

By

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The one thing we need most in our foreign policy is a positive aim in the attainability of which we believe.

A growing number of American citizens is beginning to realize that our present policy rests upon the assumption that we are living in a permanently divided world. Our Government conveys the impression that it does not want a divided world but that it is powerless to alter a fact created by Russian intransigeance. Hence, we find ourselves repeatedly protesting our devotion to the "principles of the United Nations", yet repeatedly demonstrating in action that we really do not expect any universal organization to work. Our practice is increasingly one of by-passing or ignoring the United Nations when we think that by so doing we can gain an advantage in the all-absorbing power struggle with the Soviet Union, and of appealing to the United Nations only when we run into a dead-end street in that power struggle. The result is that the United Nations is rarely given a chance to solve a soluble problem and is constantly requested to find a solution to the insoluble.

We excuse this procedure on the grounds that Russian obstructionism makes it impossible to channel constructive action through the United Nations. To a very large extent this contention is justified. There could, for example, have been no badly needed Marshall Plan, if we had been unwilling to proceed unless a recovery program could be channeled through Lake Success. Nevertheless, the fact remains that, if Russia continues to obstruct the United Nations, and if we continue to accept Russian obstructionism as insuperable and to act outside the United Nations, the UN will soon cease to be anything more than a debating society.

Faced with this unhappy prospect, a growing number of Americans, and an even greater number of people in other parts of the world, have begun to realize that one of two things has got to happen soon:

Either the United Nations will sink gradually into impotence and oblivion, or it will be strengthened into an organization capable of enacting and enforcing world law.

Even as recently as a year ago, most people in this country were inclined to believe that the United Nations structure could work, if only it were given a chance to work. Today, people are beginning to realize

that the structure itself is inadequate and that it must be amended. Many of the outstanding members of the United Nations Association, who originally believed that the ultimate machinery for the maintenance of world peace had been created at San Francisco in 1945, have now come to realize that what was done at San Francisco was little more than the taking of a first important step. These people are now quite willing to admit that the United Nations will eventually have to be transformed into a Federal World Government, if it is to be effective. They no longer differ from the advocates of World Government in principle. They differ only in the matter of timing. They say that the time is not ripe to undertake the necessary transformation.

When asked for what event or development they are waiting, they usually reply that we must wait "until the existing tensions are relaxed". If pushed to state what, in their judgment, will relax the existing tensions, the more optimistic seem to hold a vague belief that our present cold war policy will eventually lead to a point where the Soviet leadership will mellow and become more reasonable. The more pessimistic seem to accept war as inevitable and to hope for World Government only after the Soviet Union has been defeated in war.

In my judgment, the optimists are hoping for a development which is most unlikely, while the pessimists are accepting the ancient fallacy that peace can be achieved through war.

My effort this evening will be to try to remove the World Government idea from the realm of idealistic hope and fantasy and to bring it into the realm of the practically possible. I should like to demonstrate, if I can, not only that the United Nations must be transformed into an organization capable of enacting and enforcing world law, but to show as well how this can actually be done, in spite of all the difficulties which stand in the way. To do this, we must first of all recognize what the obstacles are and then see whether a way can be found to overcome them.

THE TWO ROAD-BLOCKS.

The real obstacle is, of course, that not enough of the world's peoples and governments have as yet realized the imperative need for a supranational government. If we analyze this general statement, we find that the trouble is more specific. We find that quite a number of national governments now in power have placed themselves on record as favoring the establishment of World Government. The British Government and the governments of all the British Dominions are so recorded. The French and Italian Constitutions, adopted since the War, actually contain provisions to enable these two countries to join a World Government. Nehru's Indian Administration favors World Government, and many of the Latin American Republics have declared themselves in its favor. So far as I know, there are only two major nations of the world whose leadership is on record *against* World Government; these are the United States and the Soviet Union.

The real obstacles to the establishment of World Government may, therefore, be more closely defined as the unwillingness of the world's two most powerful nations to permit such a government to be created. Since American reluctance and Russian reluctance are based upon somewhat different factors, we shall have to consider the two problems separately.

THE AMERICAN OBSTACLE.

The attitude of our Government toward any basic Charter revision was indicated by Secretary of State Marshall, when he testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee last May. At that time various proposals for amending the Charter were being considered by the Committee. These proposals ranged all the way from minor amendments to basic transformation of the UN into a World Government. In opposing any change in the Charter, Secretary Marshall said: "The problems presented to those who desire peace are not questions of structure."

The present attitude of our Government appears to be that it believes the existing United Nations structure would be adequate to preserve the peace *if* a peace settlement could be made—in other words, if the Russians would permit a just peace settlement to be made.

In my opinion, two basic misconceptions underlie this attitude. The first is the belief that the peace can be made without disarmament. The second is the belief that Russia alone is responsible for the failure to make a peace settlement.

OVERCOMING THE AMERICAN OBSTACLE.

1.

Half of the job of overcoming American reluctance to accept the idea of world government would be accomplished, if the American people came to see clearly—and forced their Government to see clearly—**that the peace can neither be made nor preserved so long as the armament race continues; and that there is no way to stop the armament race without transforming the United Nations into an effective World Government.** Both halves of this statement require proof. Let me take them up in order.

There are three reasons why a peace settlement cannot be made so long as the armament race continues:

First, because an armament race constantly increases tensions. The search for national security means a vicious circle of mutual provocation, in which each side is driven by fear of the other to take measures of defense which appear as measures of offense to the other.

Second, because, so long as the armament race continues, each side is compelled to devote the major part of its substance and effort to non-productive work. This means depriving the world of the surplus production of its two greatest surplus producers and thereby impeding and delaying that degree of economic recovery which is a prerequisite for the establishment of peace. We today, for example, are spending only about $6,000,000,000 a year to promote recovery as against about $17,000,000,000 a year on re-armament. We have already reached the point where the contemplated lend-lease re-armament of Western Europe threatens to cut down our future recovery program.

Third, because, so long as the armament race continues, the participants will increasingly impair the living standards of their own people. This almost inevitably leads to scapegoatism on both sides, because each

government will increasingly tell its people that their sufferings are due to the evil nature of the other. The utterances of the Kremlin and the scapegoat analysis of the world crisis submitted by our own President to Congress show how far we have already drifted in that direction.

That is why there can be no reasonable hope for a peace settlement so long as the armament race continues.

Now for the second half of my assertion—**why can the armament race not be halted so long as a state of international anarchy is permitted to exist?**

First of all, I think you will agree that we are today living in a state of anarchy *among* nations, as opposed to the varying degrees of law and order which exist *within* nations. We have, it is true, some rudimentary elements of international law. We have had, and still have, a certain number of important international agreements. But we have never had a fundamental body of world law; we have never had a world constitution; we have never had a supra-national authority endowed with the power to make world law and enforce it. This is roughly analogous to a state of society in which the individuals agree among each other to respect each other's property, to help each other to catch thieves or put out fires, and so forth, so long as it suits them to do so.

This sort of anarchic society could perhaps work reasonably well so long as all the individuals in it were approximately equal in physical strength, in resources and in needs. It breaks down as soon as inequality develops, as it must in any human society. *Within* nations we have long ago learned that to protect the weak against the strong, a society needs a government of law enforced by an authority superior to all individuals. *Among* nations we have failed so far to face this necessity.

In spite of this condition of international anarchy, the world has managed to get along—not too well, but at least without wholly destroying itself—until now. But **there are two reasons why the world can now no longer expect to get along without wholly destroying itself, unless a supra-national authority is created.**

First. The mechanism of getting along in the past has been destroyed. A balance of power peace is no longer possible because power has become

polarized in only two poles of superpower. There is no longer any room for maneuver among the sovereign nation-states to prevent any nation, or group of nations, from attaining a preponderance of strength sufficient to let it believe that a resort to naked force might be successful. With power polarized in only two superpowers there must inevitably be a struggle for preponderance of power, in which each of the two superpowers believes quite sincerely that the only guarantee of peace lies in its own attainment of preponderance over the other. That is the point in history at which we have now arrived.

Second. The development of atomic and bacteriological weapons has removed the resort to armed force from its historical status as the ultimate instrument of foreign policy. Given these new weapons, a resort to force has now become not merely an immoral and uncivilized method of settling disputes—which it always was—but an utterly futile form of murder and suicide combined, which can settle nothing.

The argument so far adduced would probably suffice to prove to any reasonable person that the armament race is both dangerous and futile and that it must be stopped. It will not, however, convince many reasonable people that the armament race cannot be stopped without the establishment of World Government, so long as the illusion exists that there can be a limitation of armaments, or international control of armaments, without World Government. This illusion, unfortunately, persists among our own policy-makers and in the minds of the statesmen of other nations, including the present Soviet leadership. Our own proposal for the international control of atomic energy and the Russian proposal for a general disarmament agreement among the sovereign nation-states illustrate the point. The disappointing part of our otherwise remarkable proposal was that we recognized the need for establishing world law and a supra-national authority to enforce it in order to bring about atomic disarmament, but failed to apply the same reasoning to national disarmament as a whole.

The persistence of this illusion in the minds of otherwise realistic statesmen is perhaps largely due to one of the occupational diseases of statesmanship; namely, their jealous fear of any curtailment of the sovereign rights of their respective governments. That, however, is no reason why the ordinary citizen should fall prey to the same illusion.

So much for the assertion that the peace can neither be made nor preserved so long as the arms race continues, and that there is no way to end the arms race without creating an effective World Government.

2.

The other half of the job of overcoming American reluctance consists in destroying the second misconception which underlies our present attitude—namely, that the Soviet Union alone is responsible for the failure to make a just and honorable peace settlement. If the American people came to see clearly—and forced their Government to see clearly—that this is a far too simple and one-sided analysis of the complex world problem, then we should be ready to tackle the job in hand.

To show how we can overcome American opposition to World Government, I must therefore take a little time to deal with this second part of our Government's present attitude. There is no need to speculate about what that attitude is. President Truman expressed it very clearly to Congress on March 14, 1948. Maintaining that the world crisis and the threat to peace were not due to the after-effects of the War, he made this important statement:

> "The agreements reached, though imperfect, could have provided the basis for a just and honorable peace, if they had been kept. But they were not kept. They were ignored and violated by one nation. . . . One nation, and one nation alone, has failed to cooperate in the making of a just and honorable peace, and—worse—has actively sought to prevent it."

Our current foreign policy rests upon this belief, and upon the further assertion, made by the President on the same occasion, that Russia, "having destroyed the independence and the democratic character of a whole series of nations in Eastern and Central Europe," harbors the clear design "to impose this ruthless course upon the remaining free nations of Europe."

I have no wish to defend the Soviet Union's policies, much less its tactics. Nor is such a defense in the least necessary in order to lay bare the dangerous errors in Mr. Truman's analysis.

In the first place, I submit that it is wholly untrue to maintain that "the agreements reached, though imperfect, could have provided the basis for a just and honorable peace, if they had been kept." The agreements referred to were those made at Teheran, Yalta, San Francisco and Potsdam.

What happened at Teheran and Yalta? What happened was that Russia, Britain and the United States agreed, *by common consent,* to throw overboard the principles of a just and honorable peace which they had solemnly pledged in the Atlantic Charter, and to adopt instead the pattern of an old-fashioned victor's peace involving a division of the world into spheres of influence. At Teheran and Yalta, the United States and Britain agreed—as the price for Russian participation in the war against Japan—to allow Russian annexation of territory in Europe and Asia, to allow Russian domination of Eastern and Central Europe and to draw across Europe that very line which has since become an Iron Curtain.

At Potsdam, we carried out, with respect to Germany, what had been agreed at Yalta. We went even further. We acquiesced in the explusion of 13,000,000 Germans from their homes and the annexation of German territory—not only by Poland, as compensation for its eastern territory ceded to Russia—but by Russia itself. Having agreed to this eastern land-grab, having deprived Germany of its breadbasket and crowded 13,000,000 Germans into an already overcrowded rump, we then committed the fatal error of leaving Germany's western frontier undetermined. And—having thus aroused every possible French apprehension of a renewed German push westward—we gilded the lily by putting the French into a position where they could veto the carrying out of the whole Potsdam Agreement without being a party to it.

I need not go into the details of the San Francisco Agreement which produced the present United Nations structure. Its imperfections are clear to you.

I submit, then, that Mr. Truman's statement to Congress concerning the agreements reached must be re-examined. Not only did these agreements fail to provide the basis for a just and honorable peace; they actually destroyed what basis had previously existed in the pledges and principles of the Atlantic Charter.

In the light of the foregoing, it becomes less important to determine who violated these agreements. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize —if we are in search of the truth—that it was not Russia alone which ignored and violated these covenants. France, for example, was the first of the four occupying powers to obstruct the Potsdam Agreement. She did not violate it, because she had never been asked to sign it. But she refused to let it be carried out, hoping thus to force a settlement of the Ruhr question. Russia did not seriously violate the Potsdam Agreement until after it had been prevented from going into effect for several months by French obstructionism.

Nor was it Russia alone which obstructed the work of the United Nations. This was another item in the Truman indictment. Russia has certainly been guilty of obstruction. But have all others been innocent? We ourselves, for example, have not abused the veto, but we have certainly undermined the strength and authority of the United Nations—by acting unilaterally in Turkey, Greece and China, and by our incredible vacillations over Palestine.

As to Russia's ruthless course of action toward her neighbors in Europe and her intention to extend this design westward, I submit that we shall never successfully deal with this threat—and it *is* a threat—until we understand it. We shall never understand it, so long as we spend our time angrily looking for a scapegoat instead of patiently looking for the truth.

At present, in our state of truly hysterical suspicion and fear, we are acting on two conflicting theories as to the nature of the Soviet threat to peace.

One theory—represented by the original Marshall Plan approach—is that the Soviet threat to peace arises primarily from the danger of communist penetration through Soviet exploitation of mass discontent. This theory led Secretary Marshall to say, on June 5, 1947, that our policy should not be "directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos." We are currently betting about $6,000,000,000 a year that this theory is correct.

The second theory holds that the Soviet threat to peace is primarily military and must be met by physical containment through physical force.

This theory demands that our policy *should* be directed against a country and against a doctrine. In hedging on the first theory, we are currently betting at least $17,000,000,000 a year that the second is correct.

I submit that we have got our bet and the hedge against it upside down.

I submit that—unless Russia becomes convinced that we intend war—there is now very little danger of Soviet military attack, and that there can be no such danger, unless and until Russia integrates into her orbit the productive capacity of Western Europe. Were this to happen—and were Russia thus to obtain a far greater war-making capacity—then there would probably be a very serious military danger. I submit further that there is no evidence of Russian preparation for military adventure; that there is no tradition of aggresive Russian militarism; and that there is, on the contrary, considerable evidence that the Kremlin is afraid of war and would greatly prefer to continue fishing in the troubled waters of an uneasy armistice. Why else, do you suppose, has the Red Army refrained from over-running a defenseless Europe?

On the other hand, there doubtless exists a very serious threat of further communist penetration, which might later provide the solid basis for military aggression. There are strong, highly disciplined communist parties in most of the countries of Western Europe, especially in France and Italy. Communism is gaining in Asia. It is clear that the communist parties seek to gain control of their respective governments and that, if they succeed, they will bring their countries into the Soviet orbit.

If the way to stop communist penetration is not to build a Maginot Line around it, but to attack "hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos," then we ought to be spending greater sums than we are on the Marshall approach, and much less than we are on armament and physical containment.

We cannot do both. We have about $20,000,000,000 to play with. That is all our country can produce over and above our own needs—unless we convert to a rigidly controlled war economy. Right now we are spending more than three quarters of our available resources on the Truman Doctrine of military containment. If we add a program of re-

arming Western Europe, we shall add several billions more—which means that there will be, in effect, no Marshall Plan, because the Marshall Plan will quietly starve to death.

These are the facts as I see them. They cause me to view with considerable alarm our Government's latest proposal to superimpose upon our own rearmament a program for rearming Western Europe. Since early in the year I have been engaged upon an effort to bring about a modification of this program, which seems to me more likely to provoke military attack by Russia than to deter it. Moreover, by diverting Western Europe from recovery to rearmament, we shall weaken its defenses against the primary danger of political penetration, without being able to erect any real barrier against the secondary danger of military conquest. The simple fact is that we cannot defend Western Europe against invasion without either rearming the Germans or stationing a very large American army in Europe before any war starts. Either would almost certainly provoke the very war we are seeking to prevent.

In a proposal for modification of the Atlantic Pact program submitted to the Secretary of State on February 26, and subsequently presented to every member of Congress, I have suggested what seems to me a better way of deterring Soviet military aggression without weakening Europe's political defenses and without letting ourselves in for the cost of European rearmament, the cost of an indefinitely protracted ERP, and the implied assumption of a commitment we are unable to fulfill. The essence of this proposal, which does not lend itself to quick summarization, is that it lays upon Western Europe the duty to lock the door against political penetration, and upon Great Britain, Canada and ourselves the duty to maintain the military power to deter aggression—or, in the last analysis, to be applied where it would hurt most if an aggressor should use force to break through the door.

Let me now summarize what I have said about overcoming the American obstacle to World Government. The job in hand is to convince our fellow citizens and our Government:

1. That the peace cannot be made or preserved without ending the arms race.

2. That the arms race cannot be halted except by a policy which clearly envisages the establishment of World Government.

3. That the simple, scapegoat analysis of the world crisis does not hold water; and that, because of our belief in this erroneous analysis, we are at present frittering away our strength in a preponderantly negative effort to stop a political threat with military weapons.

4. That our long-run objective should be to end the vicious circle of mutual provocation, and to end the all-devouring arms race, through the establishment of world law and world law enforcement.

5. That our immediate objective should be to relax existing tensions by maintaining our own military strength as a deterrent to aggression, without seeking to draw others into the armament race; and to use all our remaining available resources to cut the ground of mass discontent from under the feet of those who seek to exploit it for subversive purposes.

THE RUSSIAN OBSTACLE.

And now what about the Russian obstacle to World Government? What is the use of trying to bring about American initiative in the transformation of the United Nations, when it is almost certain that the Russians would veto any attempt to amend the Charter?

It would take a greater optimist than I to believe that, in the present state of mutual distrust and fear, one could reasonably hope for Russian consent and cooperation. So long as the Soviet Union finds itself, in the United Nations, constantly opposed to a majority apparently hostile to Soviet interests, the Soviet leadership will hang on to and use its veto to block any strengthening of that organization. If we ourselves, therefore, become convinced of the need for basic amendment, we should do everything in our power to make clear that we are proposing World Government—not as a device of furthering our present anti-Soviet crusade, but as a means of abandoning it.

Even if we frankly recognized the error of our present ways—even if we did everything in our power to make Russia believe that we were proposing a World Government amendment in order to abandon the cold war and work for peace—I must admit that I doubt if we should be believed in Moscow.

This, however, should not deter us from making the effort. We need to recognize the error of our present ways—not to conciliate Russia—but to save ourselves from disaster. We need to take the initiative toward World Government and disarmament—not to allay the suspicions of the men in the Kremlin—but because the whole non-communist world is waiting for us to take that initiative.

If we make the effort and it fails because of Soviet opposition, we shall have made it clear to the peoples of the world that we, at least, are no longer a road-block on the path to peace. And remember—at present we are as bad a road-block on the path to World Government as the Soviet Union.

All this, you may say, is very fine; but it gets us nowhere. Suppose we make the effort and Russia blocks it—where are we then? How can we stop the arms race then any better than we can now?

There are two things we can do.

1. Pilot Plant Federation.

If Russia blocks amendment of the UN Charter—if patient and sincere effort fails to convince the Soviet leaders that World Government is not a sinister device of Western imperialism—we could proceed to organize—**within** the United Nations, under Article 52 of the Charter—a federal government of all those nations which are willing to proceed. I am not talking about a Federal Union of the "democracies"—nor of a Federal Union of the English-speaking peoples, nor of the "Atlantic Community." I am not talking about any sort of **exclusive** federation. I am talking about a federation that would include **any and all** nations ready to join in transforming the United Nations into a World Government—a federation that would in no way slam the door on a later reconsideration of Charter amendment by the Soviet Union. Such a pilot plant federation would leave the existing authority of the United Nations unimpaired. It would not alter the existing power relationships within the United Nations.

But what effect—you are doubtless thinking—would the establishment of such a federation have on the arms race? We could still not disarm, so long as Russia remained armed and outside the federation.

True enough. And yet, one very important step would have been taken. If the federation were formed, **the member nations would disarm as individual states**; they would jointly maintain a federal military establishment, instead of each maintaining its own army, navy and air-force. So long as Russia remained outside—and kept its satellites outside the federation—the federal military establishment would have to be kept at sufficient strength to deal with any threat of non-member aggression. This would mean a large and costly establishment. But it should not be anything like as costly as the combined defense budgets now carried by the individual nations.

Furthermore, were such a federation organized within the United Nations, it would become increasingly difficult for the men in the Kremlin to make the Russian people believe that they must remain armed to the teeth in order to protect their nation against attack. **If the federation pursued a wise policy,** it would soon become evident—in spite of all propaganda to the contrary—that its military establishment existed solely for the purpose of preserving the peace. Once that were believed in Russia, the day would not be far off when any Soviet regime would have to consider entering the ever-open door to World Government and to the abolition of all national armaments.

2. Treaty of Europe.

The other way in which we could proceed is the way which I have recently suggested as an alternative to the Atlantic Pact and the rearmament of Western Europe. That is, in essence, **to abandon the idea of guaranteeing Western Europe against attack on condition that Western Europe rearms; and to substitute, instead, a series of proposals which would bring about the disarmament of the entire European Continent —except for such forces as are necessary to preserve internal security.** The modification of the Atlantic Pact and the negotiation with Great Britain and the Soviet Union of a tripartite Treaty of Europe, a specific outline of which I have put forward would, I think, be the most effective approach we could make at the present time to the problem of what to do about Russia. I regret that time does not permit a full discussion of this proposal.

Whichever way we proceed, there must be a re-examination of the basic premises upon which our present foreign policy rests. **We shall never get to World Government, unless we do two things:**

1. Recognize that we want to get to World Government.

2. Develop a policy that will relax rather than exacerbate the existing tensions in order that an approach to World Government may become possible.

Revised Policy.

In speaking about a possible approach through pilot plant federation of those nations willing to proceed I said, a moment ago, that this approach could only work **if the federation pursued a wise policy. What would such a wise policy be?**

The answer is similar to that which I should give if the question applied only to United States policy at the present time. **A wise policy would, in my judgment, rest upon the following assumptions:**

1. That a real peace settlement cannot be reached with the Soviet Union until the arms race is halted; and that the arms race cannot be stopped until the Soviet Union can be induced to see that World Government is in the interest of the Russian people.

2. That, until that day is reached, there will continue to be a serious Soviet threat to peace; but that the nature of that threat is primarily political rather than military. In other words, that, unless the Soviet Union can first greatly expand its present sphere of influence through subversion and penetration, there is no great likelihood that it will risk war.

3. That the way to block communist subversion and penetration is to eliminate the causes of mass discontent within the borders of the non-communist world. This would be killing two birds with one stone, because:

To create the foundations for lasting peace it is, in any case, necessary to promote that degree of economic recovery and social change required in order to relieve the existing sense of injustice and dissatisfaction.

At the same time, the elimination of the sense of injustice and dissatisfaction within our own non-communist world will strike the most effective weapon from the hands of those who seek to subvert or penetrate it.

Given the recognition of these basic factors, a wise policy would demand that we:

1. Pursue a patient and persistent effort to bring about Soviet acceptance of the invitation to expand the federation into a World Government, thus making final disarmament possible;

2. Maintain a military establishment sufficiently strong to make military challenge by the Soviet Union unlikely;

3. Avoid provocative programs of "defense," such as the Atlantic Security Pact with its accompanying program of rearming Western Europe, or the acquisition of forward bases, unless the most careful consideration of the actual military commitments and their political implications clearly demonstrates that the risk of provocation is justified.

4. Steadfastly endeavor to employ the maximum proportion of available resources consistent with security to a constructive program of rehabilitation and reform.

5. Pursue a firm non-communist—but not anti-communist—policy. That is to say, make it clear that no external attempt at penetration or subversion will be tolerated, making it equally clear that, on the other hand, no attempt will be made to undermine communism within the communist orbit.

The sum total of such a policy would be both a challenge and an invitation. It would be a challenge, not to the physical strength of the Soviet Union, but to the strength of its belief in its own system—a challenge, if you like, to engage in peaceful rivalry, with each half of the divided world concentrating its efforts upon making its own system work within its own area, abandoning the present hostile effort to place stumbling blocks in the path of the other. It would be an invitation eventually to unify the divided world in such a way that this peaceful rivalry could continue, with both sides relieved of the burden of maintaining armaments.

Much would depend upon the tone in which both challenge and invitation were issued. Nothing but harm would be accomplished, if they were issued merely for the record, in the hope that their refusal would place the Soviet Union in an invidious position before the world.

On the other hand, if the Soviet Union did persistently refuse such an offer made in obvious sincerity and patiently maintained, it would without doubt alienate from itself and from its cause much of the sympathy and prestige which it now enjoys.

The policy just outlined is that which I would recommend as a wise policy for a partial, non-exclusive world federation to pursue. I would recommend it with equal conviction as a wise policy for the United States to adopt right now, in place of our present fear-befuddled fumbling.

Little as we may like it, communist totalitarianism is here to stay—for quite a time at least—in a large part of the earth which we inhabit. Little as the Kremlin may like it, a society based upon belief in the dignity and freedom of the individual is here to stay on a large part of the earth —we hope forever. In our own country we have eliminated the crudest form of human slavery, but we have not yet achieved full freedom for every citizen. Much as we detest every form of enslavement and oppression, it does not follow that "the world cannot exist part slave and part free." It has so existed for a long time. It will continue so to exist until, eventually, the slow march of civilization eliminates all forms of oppression from the farthest and darkest corners of our planet.

Meanwhile, the challenge is not so much to find a basis for agreement—that is, way of getting along with the totalitarian half of the world—as to find a way of not getting along together, without letting our basic disagreements lead to armed conflict and the destruction of all hope for a decent future.

SOME ECONOMIC PREDICATES FOR PEACE

Address to the

WORLD CONFERENCE OF THE CHURCH PEACE UNION

by

JAMES P. WARBURG

June 16, 1948.

You have asked me to discuss the world economic scene, with special reference to our responsibilities in Germany. In attempting to deal with this assignment I shall necessarily be discussing matters which are somewhat remote from the central theme of a conference "for the moral and spiritual support of the United Nations." Unhappily, due to the present state of world affairs, the relationship of the United States to the world economic scene lies mostly outside of the United Nations. Our relation to the crucial problem of Germany lies altogether in another channel, because, as you know, the United Nations was created—not to make the peace—but to preserve it once it is made.

Nevertheless, it is true that **a solution of the world economic crisis is fundamental to the making of a peace for the United Nations to preserve; and a solution of the German problem is basic to a cure of the economic crisis.**

Furthermore, economic recovery is a condition precedent to the development of the United Nations into that type of world organization which could reasonably be expected to maintain the peace once it is made. By this I mean that **unless and until the world is clearly back on the road to economic health, there will be little chance to unite the peoples of the world in a world community effectively governed by world law.** I must not, on this occasion, yield to the temptation to develop further the urgent need for building the United Nations into a World Government, since this would be an unwarranted digression from the matters you have asked me to discuss. But I do venture to express the hope that other speakers will treat this subject before your conference adjourns.

In dealing with my particular assignment, let me try first to give you a quick overall appraisal of the world economic crisis and then use what time remains to focus more sharply upon the immediate problem which confronts us in Germany.

As I see it, **the world economic picture of 1948 is essentially one of unbalanced production and consumption. This state of disequilibrium has two broad aspects.**

The first is a lack of balance between the production and consumption of food—more accurately a growing discrepancy between the amount of work spent by the human race in producing food and the satisfaction of the race's minimum requirements to sustain normal health and even life.

The second aspect of economic disequilibrium might be described in broad terms as a crisis of underproduction in the Eastern hemisphere and a potential crisis of overproduction in the Western half of the world —in other words, a disequilibrium in production between the Old World and the New.

Neither of these aspects are entirely due to the war, but both have been rendered more acute by the destruction and dislocation incident to worldwide conflict.

In 1939—before war broke out—roughly three-quarters of the world's two billion inhabitants were engaged in the production, processing and distribution of food. Yet, even then, more than half of the world's inhabitants were consuming less than 2,200 calories per day, which is generally considered the minimum to maintain normal health. Two-thirds of the world's population were living on less than 2,700 calories, compared to an average consumption in the United States of about 3,200.

Think what this means. **Three out of every four people in the world were struggling to raise food, only one in three was getting a reasonable amount to eat, and more than half of the world's population was seriously undernourished.**

In this country, when it was young, we too had about three-quarters of our people raising food. Gradually, because of our fertile soil, natural resources and great industrial and technological development, we have reached a point where less than a quarter of our population is engaged in producing food. Better than that, with less than one out of four Americans working to produce food, we are able to export a very substantial surplus of certain foodstuffs.

This happy state of affairs exists to some extent in a few other countries of the Western hemisphere—notably in Argentina and Canada. But in most of the world—especially in Eastern Europe and in Asia—the bulk of human effort still goes into a backbreaking struggle to wrest bread

from the soil, a struggle which still leaves the majority of the human race undernourished and hundreds of millions constantly threatened by famine.

All this was bad enough before the war. Since the war, it has been infinitely worse, for not only was food production interfered with, but the manufacture of machinery, tools and fertilizers was impeded and the delicately balanced system of distribution thrown out of kilter. As a result, some areas which used to be producers of surplus food can now barely produce enough for their own populations, and other still productive areas are unable to market their surplus of food through the normal channels of trade.

In addition to the ravages of war and the artificial impediments to trade arising out of post-war political disputes and tensions, the advance of medical science has considerably prolonged human life. It has reduced the overall death rate faster than slowly rising living standards have as yet been able to reduce the birth rate.

These seem to me the outstanding facts concerning the first of the two major aspects of worldwide economic disequilibrium. They may be summarized by the simple statement that, **in spite of man's greatest effort on this planet being devoted to producing food, the majority of the earth's inhabitants are still unable to obtain adequate nourishment.** Let me stress again that this is not a new problem, but rather an old problem recently rendered vastly more difficult.

The answer lies, of course, in the worldwide application of modern science and technology to the production, processing and distribution of food. This is more easily said than done, but the direction in which human efforts must be channeled is clearly indicated. The worldwide modernization of agriculture—that is, the reclamation and conservation of land, the use of new seeds and fertilizers, and the application of modern farm machinery—will not only increase the world's dwindling food supply; it will also free a large part of the world's population for other productive work. It follows that, if newly freed agricultural labor is to find productive employment along other lines, **modernization of agriculture must go hand in hand with the gradual industrialization of those areas which are now predominantly agricultural.**

It will have occurred to you, I am sure, that both the **modernization of agriculture and the industralization of the so-called backward areas require not only economic planning on a worldwide scale but also an educational effort of worldwide dimensions, accompanied by far-reaching changes in the social structure of a large part of human society.** To guide and promote this effort will be the long-range task of UNESCO and of the Social and Economic Council of the United Nations. It would seem to me—although your judgment is better than mine—that this is also a field in which the churches have a great part to play, reaching as they do across all physical boundaries and language barriers.

So much for the great problem of food and population pressures.

Let me now touch briefly upon the second major aspect of world economic disequilibrium; namely, the present state of underproduction in the Eastern hemisphere as against potential overproduction in the Western half of the globe.

We have already noted that the ravages of war greatly reduced the agricultural productivity of large parts of Europe and Asia and stimulated increased production in those parts of the world which were happily remote from the scene of conflict. Similarly and even more spectacularly, **the war reduced the industrial productivity of Europe and Asia while greatly stimulating the output of the Western hemisphere—especially of the United States.** At the conclusion of the conflict, it was estimated that the **United States alone was producing something like two-thirds of the entire world's industrial output.**

The result of this unbalanced productivity was, of course, the now familiar post-war phenomenon of **shortage** and **inflation** throughout the Eastern hemisphere from the British Isles to Japan, accompanied by a corresponding **demand for American dollars** with which to buy goods from the only available sources of supply.

The machinery of industrial production in the Eastern hemisphere had been largely worn out or destroyed. Stocks of raw materials were exhausted. Transport was disorganized. Managerial power-groups were dispersed or dispossessed.

The most pressing needs were for **food, fuel, fertilizers and fibres** out of which to make clothing. But, even with these immediate necessities taken care of, the industrial machine of the Old World required all sorts of **raw materials, machines** and **machine parts** in order to get itself re-started. **It was in a vicious circle.** It needed coal to make steel and all manner of machines and machine-made products. But, in order to get coal it had to repair the mines and the transportation system. To repair the coal mines and the railroads in turn required steel and machinery. **There was no way out of the circle except to obtain the pump-priming necessities from the New World.**

The New World had plenty of goods to sell. While the productive capacity of the Old World had diminished, the New World's capacity had enormously increased. It had increased to a point where its power to produce far exceeded its own capacity to consume. The New World was anxious to sell to the Old, but **the Old World was in no position to buy because it had no dollars, and no way of earning dollars until its economy could be pushed off dead centre.**

It was primarily in order to meet this disequilibrium between the two hemispheres that the United States developed the idea of the **European Recovery Program.** The details of this program are familiar to you. You know that it is based upon the idea of helping the Old World once more to become self-supporting. You know also that the original plan contemplated the application of this idea to **all** of Europe, whereas, due to US-USSR tensions, it now **applies only to the Western part of the Continent.**

At this point the question inevitably arises: **"Will the European Recovery Program work?"**

I wish I could give an unqualified affirmative answer to this question. The best I can do is to state the conditions under which I think the ERP can work and the conditions under which I think it cannot.

Two of the most important conditions for success are stated in the plan itself. These are:

1. That there will be a substantial revival of trade between Eastern and Western Europe; and

2. That there will be a more or less stable price level in the United States.

Both of these conditions carry far-reaching implications.

A substantial revival of trade between Eastern and Western Europe is essential because **all of Europe is one natural trading community.** The West depends upon the East for food and raw materials; the East depends upon the West for manufactured goods. **The line from Stettin to Trieste, which now divides the Continent, is an arbitrary and unnatural division imposed by the dismal failure of the victors in World War II to make an adequate peace settlement.** It lies beyond the scope of my today's assignment to speculate upon the likelihood of a solution. I can only state as my opinion that, unless the Continent is united as one economic trading community—which does not necessarily involve political unification—there is little hope that the present Foreign Assistance Act will bring about the re-establishment of a self-supporting Western Europe. This is not to say that the much-discussed Western Union cannot be rehabilitated without East-West trade. Perhaps it can—but only at a far greater cost and over a much longer period than is at present contemplated.

As to the **second** condition, it stands to reason that **any plan based upon a given number of dollars providing certain minimal assistance will fail, if the purchasing power of the dollars diminishes substantially before they are spent.** In 1946 we made a large loan to Britain. It was very closely calculated to meet British needs. Due to the uncontrolled rapid rise of prices in this country, the dollars we agreed to lend Britain in the Spring had lost 27 per cent of their purchasing power by the time they became available in the summer. The same thing could easily happen to the entire European program. **The question here at issue involves the whole spectrum of future domestic economic policy in the United States.** Again, it is not within my province to speculate upon the outcome. I can only state the belief that, **unless we do adopt measures of overall economic planning and control** by Government, business, labor and farmers working together—much as we did in wartime—the chances are that **our present plan to rehabilitate Western Europe will require drastic revision.**

These two major conditions were clearly foreseen and stated in the plan submitted to Washington by the sixteen nations of Western Europe. If they are to be met, **there will have to be a major change in the political climate here at home**—with regard to both our foreign policy and our domestic policy.

In the field of foreign affairs it is clearly implied that, if the Marshall Plan is to succeed, it must be freed from the panic-inspired context of the Truman Doctrine.

In domestic affairs it is clearly necessary to substitute a positive policy for aimless drifting and waiting around for the so-called natural forces to eliminate the necessity for courageous decision.

There are a number of other conditions which seem to me necessary to the success of our Recovery Program. There is time to mention only a few of them here.

In the first place, if we are to promote world recovery—which we must do in our own self-interest—we shall have to give increasing consideration to some **crucial sectors of the world economy other than Western Europe.** As an example, let me mention the surplus **food-producing countries of Southeast Asia.** The fact that Burma, Indonesia and parts of Indo-China—the great rice producers—are slowly emerging into independence represents an important change in the problem of world food supply and distribution. A small amount of aid applied at the right places in this area might well produce great return. Similarly, our present rather negative attitude toward the social and economic problems of **Latin America** might well benefit from re-examination. Were we thus to expand our Recovery Program, it would of course involve additional expenditure.

You are doubtless thinking, as I say this, that, after all, **our resources are not unlimited.** I agree. I agree that **we can succeed only if we carefully husband our strength and apply it purposefully at those points in the world economy where it will produce the maximum results. But this is precisely what we shall be unable to do so long as we continue our present preoccupation with a fear-inspired negative anti-Soviet crusade. I say this for three reasons:**

1. **We are today spending about three times as much in carrying out the purely negative Truman Doctrine as we are spending on the positive approach to recovery and peace represented by the Marshall Program.**

2. **We are building up a vested interest in a re-armament prosperity which will become increasingly difficult to abandon.**

3. **We are foreclosing the possibility of promoting recovery at some of the most obvious points of maximum leverage on the world's economy because these points lie within what is now considered a hostile orbit.** To state just one concrete example: for purely political reasons we are pouring large sums into **China** and refusing to consider a relatively small amount of aid to **Poland.** Without considering the merits or defects of our present Chinese policy, it is clear that $500,000,000 given to the Nanking Government for political reasons is at best a mere drop in the bucket in terms of solving China's economic problem. It is equally clear that a tenth of that amount given to Poland in the form of coal-mining machinery would greatly increase the production of Polish coal and thereby could correspondingly relieve Western Europe of the necessity to obtain coal in the United States and pay ocean freight as well with borrowed dollars.

I am not saying that these things can be changed so long as we are engaged in a negative anti-Soviet crusade. I am merely pointing out that, so long as we are engaged in this negative crusade, the chances of success in our affirmative approach to economic recovery and peace will be seriously jeopardized.

And now, in the few moments that remain, let me turn to **the more specific aspect of the world economic scene, which you have asked me to discuss.**

One of the greatest contributing causes to the disequilibrium between the two hemispheres, which I have not mentioned up to this point, is that **the two great workshops of Europe and Asia—to wit, Germany and Japan—are out of business.** In the Far East, Japan used to fulfill a function somewhat similar to that of Great Britain in Europe. Japan was the great trading and carrying nation of the Far Eastern economy. It

was also, though less than Britain, the centre of manufacture, especially of low-priced consumer goods. The post-war absence of these goods has removed one of the chief incentives to work in much of the Far East.

The elimination of Germany from the European economy is even more serious. **Before the war Germany fulfilled a quadruple function in the European trading community.**

1. **It supplied raw material.** Germany was the chief source of surplus coal on the Continent, upon which depended the whole industrial structure of most of the other European countries. Germany's other chief raw material export was potash, which had an important bearing upon European agriculture.

2. **Germany contained the greatest industrial concentration and the largest and most compact force of skilled labor on the Continent.** It supplied much of the steel, machines, machine parts and chemicals for the Continent as well as a considerable proportion of consumer goods.

3. **Germany provided a market** for the production of other European countries, especially for the raw materials and agricultural produce of Eastern Europe, for the dairy products of the Netherlands and Denmark, and for the specialty manufactures of Czechoslovakia. And finally,

4. **Germany was an important factor in the transport system** of Europe. The German merchant fleet carried much of the Continent's overseas trade. German rivers, canals and railroads were the heart of intra-Continental traffic. German trans-shipment trade constituted the bulk of the business done by the Dutch and Belgian seaports.

Today, after three years of Allied occupation, Europe's great workshop and market-place is an economic desert. To all intents and purposes there are neither German exports nor imports. There is no German merchant marine. An artificially erected barrier separates Eastern and Western Germany, blocking the core of the intra-Continental transport system. On one side of the barrier lies the industrial heart of Germany. On the other side lies the breadbasket.

All of Europe is suffering from lack of German coal, German steel, German machines and machine-parts. Rotterdam and Antwerp lie

idle. The recovery of the whole Continent is impeded because the former central gear wheel of its economy lies broken and rusting in the rubble of inter-Allied disagreement.

Germany itself is a fairly accurate miniature of a disrupted Europe. Its Western half, cut off from its normal source of foodstuffs in the East, depends upon the charity of the Western hemisphere for sustenance. Its Eastern half, cut off from normal intercourse with the West, suffers from lack of manufactured goods and is enslaved and exploited by the Soviet Union. The same thing is true, in the broad sense, of the entire Continent.

There is not time, on this occasion, to trace the **origins** of this disaster. It is a long and tragic story which I have endeavored to set forth in detail in a recent book and in several shorter pamphlets and magazine articles. Let me summarize it here by the simple statement that **the present condition of Germany is not the result of a deliberate plan. It is in part due to the short-sighted and vengeful nonsense introduced into Allied planning by the Morgenthau proposal and in part to the equally short-sighted and ruthless preoccupation of Russia with reparations; but most of all it is due to the failure of the victorious anti-Axis coalition to reach a workable post-war understanding.** This failure first became apparent at Yalta and was later crystallized in the Potsdam Agreement of August 1945.

Even this wretched compromise might perhaps have been developed into a workable plan, had it not been for **two great blunders—the excessive Russo-Polish land-grab in Eastern Germany and the failure to make France a party to the Agreement.** Taken in combination, these two blunders gave France a reason for fearing the revival of a United German nation, as well as the means of sabotaging the Potsdam Plan for treating Germany as an economic whole. For, while France was given a zone and an equal voice on the Allied Control Council, which operates on the principle of unanimity, France was not bound by the terms of the Agreement. **Contrary to widespread belief, it was not Russia but France which—as the result of these two blunders—vetoed the carrying out of the Potsdam Plan during the first period of its existence.**

Unfortunately, it was precisely during this early period that an understanding with Russia might still have been possible. From 1946 onward,

the failure in Germany has increasingly become merely a function of the worldwide breakdown of US-USSR relations.

The position in which we find ourselves today is a very ticklish one. For the time being, there seems to be no hope of treating Germany as an economic unit—any more than there seems to be any immediate hope of restoring the economic unity of Europe. We are faced with the urgent necessity of reviving the industries of Western Germany to the extent necessary to make possible the recovery of Western Europe under our Recovery Plan. We are faced with the fact that such revival necessitates the economic unification of the British, American and French zones under some kind of central authority. At the same time, we are faced with continued French fears lest the creation of a strong Western Germany once more threaten French security and the consequent demand that the Ruhr be in some way taken out from under any possible West German sovereignty. Finally, we are faced with the danger that—if we create any sort of West German sovereignty—we shall be held responsible by the Germans for the final partition of the German nation. This last point requires a word of explanation.

For the past year there has been a **growing trend of opinion in this country in favor of accepting as final the division of Germany and of making a separate peace with a new West German nation.** Even before the war ended, Mr. Morgenthau and Mr. Sumner Welles—whose plans for Germany were in other respects quite dissimilar—agreed on one thing: that Germany should be partitioned. More recently, some leaders who opposed partition but who have lost patience with the effort to reach an understanding with Russia—such as Mr. Hoover, Mr. Byrnes and Senator Vandenberg—have spoken out in favor of a separate peace.

In my judgment, such a step would be a very serious mistake. In my judgment, such a step would in effect hand over all of Germany to the Soviet Union. Once we recognize West German sovereignty—and we cannot make a peace treaty unless we do recognize sovereignty—we shall have nothing more to say about the relations of the new West German state with Eastern Germany. Yet the economic life of West Germany will depend to a great extent upon its relations with Eastern Germany, and these relations will then lie exclusively in the hands of the Soviet Union and the West German Government. Thus, **while we should be**

committed to making a huge effort to rehabilitate West Germany, the success or failure of that effort would be determined in Moscow and Frankfurt—or, perhaps Berlin.

More important still, once we create and recognize a West German state, only the Soviet Union can hold out the promise of restoring German unity. This promise is without doubt the most powerful magnet of political attraction in Germany today. From my own observation, I would say that **the one live spirit in Germany at the present time is the spirit of resurgent nationalism. A separate peace would leave only Russia in a position to exploit it.**

There is no easy answer to this complicated problem, any more than there can be an easy answer to the overall problem of finding a way of getting along with Russia without either open conflict or appeasement. Nevertheless, **the broad outlines of a sensible course can be perceived.**

The first thing to do is obviously to reach **an understanding with France,** which would make possible the economic unification of Western Germany and its effective incorporation into the European Recovery Plan. **This requires a solution to the problem of the Ruhr.** My own solution, which I have advocated for some years, is the creation of an international authority which would have the power to allocate Ruhr coal and coke to Germany and to the other countries of Europe. Such a plan would avoid the pitfalls inherent in any scheme for internationalizing the Ruhr area. It would avoid separating more millions of Germans from German sovereignty and thus sowing the seeds of future trouble. At the same time, it would effectively remove the threat of a German-controlled Ruhr arsenal, because **the power to control the allocation of Ruhr coal likewise means the power to control German heavy industry and the German war potential.** Something of this sort seems to be emerging from the recent conference at London, although the scheme there proposed involves allocating Ruhr steel, as well as coal and coke. This seems an unnecessary complication.

The next thing to do is to **establish as much of an economic and political entity in Western Germany as can be done short of recognizing sovereignty**—that is, short of slamming the door on the eventual unification of the Eastern and Western parts. This precludes making a separate

peace. It permits, on the other hand, a sincere maintenance of the Allied purpose to create a unified Germany and a unified Europe. **It denies to the Soviet Union the sole opportunity to exploit resurgent German nationalism. It gives the Western Allies a justifiable reason for remaining in Berlin.**

Here, too, the recent London conference of the six Western powers has been moving in the right direction, but it remains to be seen **whether the six governments—especially the French Government—will finally ratify the London recommendations.** As has so often been the case in the past, any settlement with Germany always becomes, so far as France is concerned, the football of **internal** politics. In this case, the precariously ensconced Schuman Government is subject to attack from both the Communists on the Left and the de Gaullists on the Right. The Communists are shouting the Moscow line that the London proposal makes the Western Allies responsible for the division of Germany, while the followers of de Gaulle denounce the London proposal as threatening French security by creating too strong a Germany. **The Schuman Government's position is all the more difficult, because it is defensible only upon the assumption of consistent American support—an assumption rendered dubious by the unpredictable irresponsibility of our present Congress.**

Even if a reasonably sensible agreement with regard to Western Germany is finally ratified by the Western powers, and even if that agreement does not provoke further Russian moves toward ousting the Western powers from Berlin, **much will still depend upon what kind of Western Germany comes into being.** At present we are following the dangerous direction of trying to rebuild in Western Germany a free enterprise economy on the American model. This leads to **a restorationist policy which may well return to power the very elements which have in the past made Germany a warrior nation.** So long as we resist the socialization of the monopolies—so long as we resist the breaking up of the big landed estates—we shall be creating for the German people **a forced choice between a return to the discredited past and the acceptance of a distorted version of the future.**

What is happening in **Eastern Germany** today under Soviet influence **is** a distorted version of the future—a version of **socialism without political freedom, and of land-reform without emancipation from exploitation.**

What is happening in **Western Germany** under our influence is the same thing that happened under Allied influence after World War I. **We are again so frightened of communism that we fear any sort of change from the old order.** Rather than foster the emergence of democratic socialism, we are frantically trying to find and restore to power reasonably uncompromised successors to the Krupps and Thyssens of the past.

Given this choice between the discredited past and the distorted future, there is no telling which way the German mind will go, for it is still a sick mind in a sick body.

Only if we can make Western Germany into a land where the German people can work out their own salvation in their own way can we be reasonably sure that the German mind will, in the end, solidly identify itself with the West. And only if the German mind does identify itself with the West can there be any hope of the eventual emergence of a peaceful, democratic German nation.

We are at present making the mistake of meeting Soviet dogma with a no less uncompromising dogma of our own. **We are making the mistake of trying to create a Western Germany in our own image.**

What we need to learn with regard to Germany—and, for that matter, in all our dealings with the world beyond our borders—is that our road toward justice and freedom is not the only road. We need to rid ourselves of the notion that it is up to us to invent solutions—especially so long as our native genius for invention is beclouded by an over-riding fear of Russia and an over-riding anxiety to block whatever we conceive the Russian purpose to be.

What we need most is to rid ourselves of fear.

What we need is a positive policy for peace—a policy based upon humility as well as strength—a policy which seeks to guide rather than to lead—to help rather than to dominate.

Perhaps, in speaking of matters which concern the mind of man and the spirit of man rather than the state of man's physical well-being,

I have wandered from my assigned theme. But the economic crisis and the spiritual crisis of our time are, I think, inseparable. **There can be no freedom from want unless there is also freedom from fear.** It is fear which turns fraternal cooperation into fratricidal conflict. It is fear which erects barriers, both physical and spiritual, to the free exchange of all the manifold products of human society.

We, as a nation, have less cause to fear than any other people on this earth. We, more than any other people, have it in our power to break out of the vicious circle of fear-inspired negativism which now drives the world inexorably toward disaster.

It is true that a physically sick world needs the support of our great material resources. But, even more, a spiritually sick world needs the restoration of its hope, the reaffirmation of its faith, and the revival of its belief in the brotherhood of mankind.

Our greatest strength as a nation—the strength upon which the world depends for recovery—rests neither in our wealth nor in our stockpile of atomic weapons, but in the great untapped reservoir of native faith and **courage** and **kindliness** which lies in the hearts of the American people.

HOW TO ACHIEVE ONE WORLD

Address to the

CONFERENCE OF THE SOCIETY
OF FRIENDS

by

JAMES P. WARBURG

Cape May, N. J.
June 29, 1948.

There is probably no single group of human beings in this world as steadfastly dedicated to the cause of peace as the Society of Friends. No one can fail to acknowledge the consistency with which your Society has opposed the use of force in settling disputes among nations. No one can fail to recognize the great humanitarian work you have done in helping to repair the spiritual and physical ravages of recurring conflict.

I must confess that I have not always fully agreed with your position. I have never been a pacifist in the sense that my conscience would forbid me to participate in armed conflict, nor even to the extent of feeling that a resort to arms could in no circumstances be justified. I have felt, in the past, that a nation must resort to arms when its vital interests were threatened and all peacable means of defending them had been exhausted. In 1917, a group of us at Harvard, feeling that such circumstances had arisen, enrolled as cadet flyers before President Wilson finally reached his decision to declare war. Again, in 1938, after the betrayal of Munich, I was one of those to whom it seemed that a war, which would once more threaten our vital interests, had become inevitable, unless we ourselves prevented it. This, it seemed to me, we could do by a clear affirmation that the outbreak of hostilities would at once find us on the side of the nations resisting Axis aggression.

I advocated such a declaration in a foreign policy discussion before the Economic Club of New York in March 1939. My colleagues on that occasion were **Senator Wheeler** of Montana and Mr. **John Foster Dulles.** Senator Wheeler took his well-known isolationist position. Mr. Dulles, who was then more of a pacifist than I, somewhat surprisingly aligned himself with the Senator and made a statement which seems worth recalling in view of his present influence upon our foreign policy.

"There is no reason to believe," Mr. Dulles said, "that any totalitarian states, separately or collectively, would attempt to attack the United States or could do so successfully . . . . Only hysteria entertains the idea that Germany, Italy or Japan contemplates war upon us."

Times change. **Today it is Mr. Dulles who is one of the major architects of a foreign policy which I consider to be inspired by hysterical**

fear, although—in fairness to Mr. Dulles—I suspect that he too feels that hysteria has now gone too far.

Be that as it may, the point is that I cannot come before the Society of Friends in good conscience without stating that my **moral** position with regard to war has not substantially changed. I still believe that a nation must fight when there remains no other way to defend its vital interests. I still believe that a citizen must take up arms once the die has been cast, so long as we live in a world in which there is no temporal authority over and above that of the sovereign nation-states.

As a practical matter, however, it is my belief that **the time has passed when even the strongest nation-state can effectively defend the vital interest of its people by force of arms,** and also that the **time has passed when the world can do without a supra-national authority.** The recent inventions of modern science have made war between nations into a suicide pact. They impose a new duty upon the citizens of all nations—the duty to recognize that **armed conflict is no longer an acceptable instrument of foreign policy.**

Thus, to all intents and purposes, the moral position against war has become merged with the pragmatic concept of patriotism. Even today I would hold that a nation which is physically attacked must offer resistance, on the primitive basis that "it is better to die on one's feet than live on one's knees." But this, I think, is only a temporary and rather meaningless concept, since the first duty of any citizen of any nation-state today must be to prevent, by every means in his power, the outbreak of armed conflict anywhere on this suddenly shrunken planet.

You have asked me to discuss: "How to Achieve One World." To this I must reply that, in the physical sense, the world has already become irrevocably one. **The great challenge of our time is not how to achieve political unity, but how to prevent unification by conquest and bring about, instead, the unification of the world through peacable means.**

We are at present slipping down the well-greased slide that leads to a political unification of the world by conquest. If a trial of strength between the two potential conquerors—the United States and Russia—takes place soon, the chances are that the world will become one under

American domination. If the trial of strength is postponed, there is no telling what the outcome will be.

The knowledge that this is true obscures the vision of our policy-makers with respect to the outstanding new fact of our time. **The realization that we could win a war with Russia, if it comes soon, is what blinds our policy-makers to the fact that victory in atomic war has become almost indistinguishable from defeat.**

It is sometimes useful, when one is engaged as a participant in a squabble, to try to see the affair through the eyes of a bystander. It is, of course, even more useful to see it through the eyes of one's adversary; but this becomes difficult once the facts are obscured by charge and counter charge. Let me attempt to give you a bystander's view of our present squabble with the Soviet Union by quoting some observations recently made by an outstanding European observer. **Louis Martin-Chauffier** is a well-known liberal Catholic. He was a key figure in the French resistance movement and emerged from a Nazi concentration camp to write a scholarly work on Chateaubriand. Before the war he had been the editor of a leading French magazine. The quotations I am about to cite are derived from a recent essay entitled, "The Walls of Jericho," a translation of which appeared in the June issue of the magazine, "Tomorrow".

"The world scene," writes this French observer, **"is dominated by two hostile blocs which appear to be mustering all their forces in an attempt to seize as much strategic territory throughout the world as is possible without resort to war. Neither will admit to imperialist aims. Each, instead, defines its acts as precautionary measures taken as a protection against the imperialist aspirations of the other. Everywhere the preparations for war are described as purely defensive."**

"The noise of weapons," he gloomily prognosticates, **"eventually brings about the clash. War is finally declared to stop the threat of it and to put an end to a disastrous competition. War is declared, allegedly, to stop the fear of war and to achieve peace."**

That seems to me an extraordinarily clear statement of the present position. Martin-Chauffier goes on to analyze the false concept upon which the US-USSR antagonism is based. He rejects universal control

by either Russia or the United States on the ground that neither is the sole possessor of all the elements of civilization which the world needs in its present state of development. Each, he says, possesses some of these elements. But the tragedy, he shrewdly observes—and here I quote him verbatim—"is that **both are staking their claim to supremacy not on the elements they possess, but on those which they condemn in the other."**

Does not this statement possess the ring of truth? Does it not precisely describe the war of words now being carried on between Washington and Moscow?

What does this French bystander mean when he says that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union possesses all the elements of civilization which the world needs? He explains that neither the Soviet system nor the American system can be accepted as a world system, because the one enslaves the individual whereas the other rests upon a false identification of Western civilization with one form of economic organization—to wit, free enterprise capitalism.

"Western man," he says, "will not attain a proper perspective until religion and culture denounce this imposture instead of remaining both its accomplices and its victims." In other words, in the eyes of this French bystander, **the achievement of One World by Soviet conquest would mean the enslavement of the human spirit; the achievement of One World by Western conquest would mean the suffocation of the human spirit, because religion and culture have become subservient to the profit motive, or—to use his own words—"because Christianity, in its submission to capitalism, has lost sight of its goal."**

Without necessarily accepting Martin-Chauffier's absolutes with regard to capitalism and the socialist alternative, one cannot, it seems to me, escape from the basic soundness of his contention that unification by conquest is unacceptable. Nor can one escape from the conviction that the world cannot long continue divided into two hostile camps. This leads to **two conclusions:**

1. **A way must be found to arrest the present drift toward unification through conquest; and**

2. **A way must be found to create One World through peaceful means—One World which will be neither wholly that of Moscow nor wholly that of Washington—One World which will neither enslave nor suffocate the human spirit.**

Let me attempt to deal briefly with the first and somewhat more fully with the second of these two problems.

The present drift toward unification by conquest is less the product of any clash of rival interests than of mutual fear. There is actually no real clash of vital interest between the Soviet Union and the United States. We do not covet each other's possessions. We do not compete for markets, and only to a very small extent for raw materials. Both our economies are to a high degree self-sufficient. Russia needs certain imports, most of which we could readily and profitably supply; we need certain export markets in which Russia is not now interested nor likely to become interested. The mere fact that Russia has one kind of economic system while we have another constitutes no threat to the existence of either.

Yet Russia is desperately afraid of us and we are desperately afraid of Russia. Why?

We are afraid of Russia because we think she harbors a design of world conquest. And Russia is afraid of us for precisely the same reason. Neither fear is entirely groundless.

Our fear is not groundless because Russia has openly avowed in the past the purpose of promoting a worldwide communist revolution, and is pursuing at present a ruthless course of incorporating her neighbors into a Soviet-dominated bloc, while, outside of her orbit, she is operating fifth columns in the shape of Moscow-controlled communist parties. This leads us to support any sort of anti-communist elements wherever we can find them, to suppress communists wherever we can suppress them and to fortify the countries outside the Soviet orbit with military and economic aid.

Russia's fear of us is not groundless because we have been hostile to the Soviet Union since its birth. We originally used our military force to try to overthrow the Bolshevik Revolution. Then we refused to recognize the Soviet Government during the first fifteen years of its existence.

From the Russian point of view, the United States shared to a large extent in Anglo-French appeasement of Franco, Mussolini and Hitler, as well as in the exclusion of Russia from the Munich meeting at which Czechoslovakia was betrayed. This led to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which in turn reinforced Western distrust and hostility. At the present time, Russian fears are rationalized by the Marxist doctrine that capitalism leads to aggression, and fortified by the fact that we are sitting around the Soviet periphery with bases from which our bombers could launch atomic and bacteriological attacks upon the vital centres of the Soviet Union.

Fear feeds upon fear. As our French bystander observed, "The noise of weapons brings about the clash of war."

The immediate challenge is how to eliminate, or at least weaken the prime mover in the present state of world tension. This is a long and arduous process, because we have so thoroughly inoculated ourselves with the poison. Until we conquer our own fear of Russia, we shall not be able to alleviate Russia's fear of us; for, so long as we are driven by fear, we shall be compelled to take actions which we believe to be solely for our defense but which will necessarily appear to the Kremlin as additional threats to Russian security.

It is bad enough for a great and powerful nation to permit its action to be dictated by fear. But **our chief trouble is not so much that we are afraid, but that we are afraid of the wrong thing. War—even a victorious war—represents a far greater threat to us than the by no means certain aggressive intention of the relatively weak Soviet Union.** If we thought more about what war means, since Hiroshima, we should at least re-channel our fear and thus cause it to supply the motive power for a positive policy for peace.

The same thing is, of course, true of Russia. **But the re-channeling of fear cannot begin in Russia so long as we hold the preponderance of military strength and strategic position, as we do today.**

Once both the United States and the Soviet Union recognize that war itself represents to each of them a greater danger than the possible aggressive intent of the other, then we shall find ourselves in a position in which common interest supersedes the existing points of difference.

If we succeed in re-channeling our own fear, the immediate consequence would be a shift in emphasis between the two contradictory elements which now make up our foreign policy. We are now spending $6,000,000,000 a year on a constructive program for peace and $15,000,000,000 on preparation for war. The reverse ratio would result if we were able to see the existing dangers in their true perspective.

So much for the prevention of the unification of the world by conquest. Let me now take up the other half of the problem—namely, **how to achieve One World by peaceful means.**

The first prerequisite for this great undertaking is the realization that Russia and the United States—while they are the two most powerful nations on the earth—contain, even if taken together, only a minority of the world's inhabitants. It is true that of the 1,500,000,000 people, who are neither Russians nor Americans, many are still living in primitive conditions of backwardness and illiteracy. But it is also true that by no means all Americans, and certainly not all Russians, have attained a state of civilization equal to that of the average West European.

This brings me to a brief statement of what seem to me **three major predicates of effective world organization.**

The first predicate of a world united by peaceful means must be that it shall be united in a form which is representative of all the nations of the world, expressive of all the various cultures and religions, and responsive to the variegated aspirations of all the world's peoples. Such a world organization must be developed out of a process of distillation far more complicated than the mere attempt to find some sort of meeting ground between Russia and the United States. The nature of the world community—if it is to be a peaceful world community—cannot be determined merely by compromise between infra-red and ultra-violet. It must reflect all the colors of the spectrum.

The second predicate, closely allied to the first, is that the relative possession of military power by the various nation-states must not be the determinant of their relative importance. This is the great shortcoming of the present concept of the United Nations. The idea that peace can be enforced only if those nations, who possess the power to enforce

it, are also determined to enforce it, is fatal to any structure of world organization. If the world is to become unified by peaceful means, its unification must rest upon precisely the **absence** of military power in the hands of **any** nation-state.

The third predicate is that an effective world organization must be founded upon the delegation of certain powers to a World Government according to the federal principle. The first and most obvious of these powers is the maintenance and use, when necessary, of force to preserve peace.

What are the other powers which must be delegated? Let me first attempt to state the principle which should, in my judgment, govern their selection. It is this:

Broadly speaking, the powers which should be delegated to a World Government are those which—when exercised—affect the people of more than one nation-state.

Besides the sole right to use force to maintain peace, these powers obviously include **the power to regulate the exchange of goods and services across national frontiers.** This involves the supra-national control of any form of restrictive device, such as tariffs, quotas, export subsidies and currency controls. A start in this direction has been made in the formulation of an International Trade Charter at the recent Geneva and Havana conferences. The present effort, however, is merely to shape a multilateral treaty between sovereign nation-states; whereas the real goal can be attained only by an actual delegation of power to a World Government which stands over and above the nation-states. (It is perhaps necessary to observe at this point that the proposed delegation of these powers does not in itself mean that all tariffs, quotas, subsidies and currency controls would be abolished. It does mean that such restrictions could be imposed only by the World Government acting upon the carefully considered request of one or more nation-states.)

The regulation of emigration and immigration is clearly another power which, when exercised, affects the peoples of more than one nation-state. This power, too, would have to be delegated to an effective World Government. But, again, it does not follow that all restrictions upon the migration of peoples would be abolished. It follows only that population

movements would be regulated by supra-national, instead of national, authority.

At this point **the objection doubtless occurs to some of you that for the United States to delegate these powers to a World Government would mean placing in non-American hands the control over the American standard of living. My answer is simple. The control over our living standards has already escaped from our own hands. It is today at the mercy of a state of international anarchy which may at any moment result in disaster. The American living standard is today just about as well protected by our sovereign right to erect tariff and immigration walls as French security was protected in 1940 by the Maginot Line.**

We come now to a problem which is less easily answered. **What about the power to enact, or fail to enact, a Bill of Rights?**

Should the World Government be given the power to insist upon worldwide protection of the individual against the state? Should there be a worldwide habeas corpus, trial by jury, freedom of worship, freedom of thought, speech and press and the right of free assembly?

Obviously, the inclination of any American is to answer: "Yes." And, in the long run, it is doubtless true that peace will never be really secure so long as vast multitudes of human beings lack protection against the arbitrary use of power by dictatorial governments. But I am a firm believer in the maxim that politics is the art of the possible. I cannot escape from what seem to me **two facts of contemporary life, which indicate that it is impossible to impose the Western concept of freedom upon the entire world at the present moment.**

The first fact is that the Soviet system, which now embraces a considerable part of the world, is based upon the opposite of the Western concept of the desirable relationship between the individual and the state; and that we cannot reasonably hope to see the Soviet system change its fundamental nature in the immediate future.

The second fact is that the Bill of Rights concept is not only foreign to most of the peoples in the Soviet orbit, where it is consciously

denied, but foreign to hundreds of millions of people in Asia and Africa, where it has never been heard of.

To insist upon the immediate inclusion of the power to **enforce** a worldwide Bill of Rights would, to my mind, kill all hope of arriving at a worldwide agreement. **This does not, however, preclude immediate agreement to include in the World Constitution a declaration of human rights, which would guarantee individuals in all countries against the infringement of those rights by the World Government.** There is no reason to suppose that such a provision would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union, since most of the rights in question are guaranteed in principle by the Soviet Constitution, even though they are denied by present Soviet practice. **The thing which cannot immediately be done, in my judgment, is to give World Government the power to enforce the carrying out of such Constitutional guarantees by a member state within its own frontiers.** We have an apt analogy in our own country where the Federal Government is only now, after 150 years, slowly moving to enforce the carrying out of our Constitutional Bill of Rights by the State governments.

Lest this seem a cynical concession to the facts of life, let me remind you that, if World Government controls the movements of peoples and the exchange of goods and services, a first great step will have been taken toward the free exchange of ideas. Once there is an exchange of ideas throughout all parts of the world, is it not reasonable to suppose that there will gradually develop more of a common ideal concerning the relationship of the individual to the state? Similarly, with a freer exchange of people, goods and services, there will be a gradual approach toward equalization of living standards—not by dragging down the high-standard peoples but by bringing up the living standards of the backward areas. This gradual equalization will likewise promote the development of common ideas and attitudes. Finally, once the fear of war is removed, the Soviet regime will be deprived of the single most cogent reason for secrecy.

It is obvious that this brief sketch of the broad outlines of a World Government leaves many important questions unanswered. I do not pretend that I could go very much further, even were there time to do so on this occasion. I do not pretend, for instance, that I know the perfect formula by which proper representation may be given to the widely differ-

ing parts of the world's population—nor the perfect formula for an equitable system of taxation. Nor can I tell you the precise method by which the composition of the World Government's police force should be determined. A Chicago group, which publishes the magazine, **Common Cause,** has recently put forward a provocative draft of a World Constitution, which does not answer all these questions of form and structure, but which goes a long way toward showing how they could be answered.

For our purposes at this moment, it seems to me that **the important thing is to hold fast to two major objectives:**

The first objective is: to arrest the present trend toward the unification of the world by conquest. Our part in doing this consists primarily in learning to see in proper perspective the incalculable danger which lurks in an atomic struggle for world supremacy—even if we win it—as against the real but presently exaggerated threat to our security through Soviet expansionism. Once we see these dangers in their true proportions, we shall be able to throw the major emphasis in our foreign policy upon affirmative action for peace, instead of upon negative action in blocking the Soviet Union and preparing for armed conflict.

The second objective is: to prepare the way for the unification of the world by peaceful means. Our part in doing this consists in making an immediate clear declaration of our intention: 1) to help build the United Nations into a World Government upon the federal principle; 2) to join the other peoples of the world in delegating to that Government those sovereign powers which we now hold but cannot exercise without affecting the peoples of other nations; and 3) to contribute our fair share to the maintenance of World Government, to the staffing of its organizations and to supplying the manpower for its military forces.

In closing this brief statement, let me say a word more concerning some of the **current proposals** for what is commonly called strengthening the United Nations. Broadly speaking, these proposals fall **into three categories.**

First: **those which seek to avoid any basic amendment** to the Charter of the United Nations, on the ground that an attempt to amend would cause the Soviet Union to withdraw from the United Nations altogether.

Second: **those which seek immediate amendment** of the Charter and involve as a probable consequence the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. And,

Third: **those which seek to alter the basic concept of the United Nations** from a multilateral treaty between sovereign nation-states to a supra-national authority governing all or part of the world.

In the first category belong a number of proposals toward which our Government has indicated a sympathetic attitude. Secretary **Marshall's creation of the so-called Little Assembly** was one such proposal. **Hamilton Fish Armstrong's proposal** for agreement to act against aggression outside the United Nations under Article 51 of the Charter is another. **Senator Vandenberg's recent resolution,** embodying a mild reinterpretation of the veto power, is a third.

In the **second** category, we find various proposals to abolish the veto altogether; the **Acheson-Lilienthal-Baruch proposal** for the control of atomic energy (which is, in effect, a basic Charter amendment so far as its limited reach is concerned); and the **Culbertson Quota Force Plan,** recently sponsored by a group of United States Senators and opposed by Secretary Marshall.

This last-mentioned plan is essentially the Baruch Plan amplified to include all heavy weapons or other means of mass destruction. Its scope is limited to the purpose of making a successful war impossible, although its avowed ultimate aim is World Government. It proposes, however, merely a world organization limited to partial disarmament by the great powers, inspection to see that agreed quotas are not exceeded, and a world police force recruited exclusively from the smaller nations. A careful reading of the testimony before Congress of the plan's sponsors suggests that none of them seriously expect the Soviet Union to agree to such a proposal. Secretary Marshall rejected the plan chiefly on these grounds, stating that it would disrupt the world community and divide the world into rival military alliances and isolated groups of nations.

In the **third** category, we likewise find some proposals which tacitly or overtly propose the acceptance of a divided world, although they are ostensibly plans for World Government. **Clarence Streit's Federal Union,** for example, is merely a union of the Atlantic Community, dominated by

the English-speaking peoples and projected as a scheme which **might** later attract to membership the Soviet Union and the so-called backward nations. This and other similar proposals are rejected by the **United World Federalists** for much the same reasons which caused Secretary Marshall to reject the Culbertson Plan. The United World Federalists insist upon a world Government which **is** a World Government and therefore must include the Soviet Union. Their projected world organization is, however, one of more narrowly restricted powers than that advocated here.

The purpose of this brief summary of the current proposals is to point up what seems to me **the necessity for making two basic decisions:**

1. **We must either accept or reject the present position of our Government, as expressed on May 5 to Congress by Secretary Marshall, that an effective plan for peace does not involve the necessity for any change in the basic structure of the United Nations.**

Mr. Marshall's words on this occasion were: "The problems today presented to those who desire peace are not questions of structure."

2. **We must either accept or reject our Government's position that there can be no effective plan for peace which assumes as more or less permanent the division of the world into two rival camps.**

My own answer is that we must reject our Government's position on the first of these two basic questions and support our Government's position on the second.

As to the question of structure, it is true enough that the problems presented to those who desire peace are not **solely** questions of structure. The peace has to be made before it can be preserved, and making the peace is not, I agree, a question of structure. **But preserving a peace once made becomes very largely a question of structure.** Moreover, unless and until we know clearly the ultimate goal toward which we are striving, every step along the way toward making the peace will be doubly difficult. Unless and until we know the harbor toward which we are steering, our helmsman—no matter who he is—will fail to keep our Ship of State upon a steady course.

It is, I think, of the utmost urgency that our Government should at long last recognize that the United Nations in its present form is incapable of preserving the world's peace, and that it must be built as rapidly as possible into a Federal Government of the World, commanding the direct allegiance of all the citizens of the world and responsive to their will.

In reaching this conclusion, our Government would not be making any startling departure from contemporary thought. It would merely be catching up to the procession. Most of the nations of Western Europe, Latin America and the British Commonwealth already have officially declared their acceptance of the idea. Here at home nearly half of our state legislatures have passed resolutions in favor of World Government. There is widespread support for it in public opinion.

On the **second** major question, **I believe that our Government's insistence that peace cannot long be maintained in a divided world deserves the unqualified support of every thinking citizen.** I need not repeat what I have said concerning the present dangerous drift toward unification by conquest. In closing, I would only reaffirm the hope that our Government will soon come to recognize the need for reversing the present emphasis as between the two contradictory trends in its own current policy. For, **unless the United States does shift its emphasis from the fear-inspired building of armaments and defense positions to affirmative action for peace, the world will remain a divided world—until the day when it is finally unified in the dust and rubble of atomic war.**

OUR ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS— PRESENT AND POTENTIAL

Address to

FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, N. Y.

by

JAMES P. WARBURG

July 20, 1948.

You have asked me to discuss the role of the United States in world affairs. My effort to meet this challenging assignment will be divided into two parts: first, an attempt to picture the role we are playing at present; and, second, a brief discussion of the part we could play if we realized our potential.

I. Our Present Role.

Seen through the eyes of the non-communist world, the present role of the United States in world affairs is that of a well-meaning but dangerously clumsy and wholly unpredictable giant.

To put this statement in proper context, let me say that the same non-communist world sees the Soviet Union as a ruthlessly purposeful monolithic power, whose intentions are variously regarded as enigmatic or definitely evil. However, the role of the Soviet Union in world affairs lies outside of the scope of my assignment, except insofar as it is necessary to remember two things: that Soviet behavior affects the behavior of the United States; and that Soviet propaganda exaggerates our failings and arouses or magnifies doubt and distrust of our intentions. (The same two factors operate to some extent in reverse.)

In spite of Soviet propaganda, few people in the non-communistic world today question the good intentions of the American people, but a growing number question the intentions of our Government and of the power groups which are, rightly or wrongly, thought to exercise their influence upon its policies. Strange as it may seem to us, a European is quite likely to draw a distinction between the American people and its Government, rather like the distinction which we are in the habit of making between the Kremlin and the Russian people. The distinction may or may not be valid, but it is drawn just the same.

Similarly, few people of the non-communist world doubt the vast resources which are at the disposal of the American people to carry out its good intentions. Yet an increasing number question whether, in the end, these resources will be so employed or diverted to other purposes.

The most puzzling thing about us in the eyes of our friends appears to be that we seem planless in spite of our power, frightened in spite of our relative security and bungling in spite of our recognized efficiency.

Even if there were no justification for this impression, it would still be wise for us to try to find out why it exists, because the fact that we are so regarded—whether justly or unjustly—profoundly affects our whole future and that of the entire world.

Let us try, then, to examine as objectively as we can whether there is any justification for the belief that, in spite of our great power, we have no clear plan of action; that, in spite of our relative security, we are unreasonably motivated by fear; and that, in spite of our pragmatic efficiency as a people, we seem to lack skill and know-how in our behavior as a nation among other nations. Let us, in other words, try to make up our minds whether the job in hand is one of substance or public relations—whether it is one of remedying actual shortcomings or merely one of correcting an erroneous impression.

There is, among some Americans, a growing tendency toward self-righteousness—a tendency to assume that any self-criticism is a defense of the Soviet Union or of communism. As we proceed with this self-examination, I must ask you to bear in mind that our purpose is to find facts rather than to assess responsibility or to make comparisons. Specifically, we are not inquiring into how the blame for the present unhappy state of world affairs should be apportioned as between ourselves and Russia. We are concerned here solely with finding out, if we can, what our present role is, how it is regarded and what we can do to make our contribution more effective.

1. Are We Without A Plan?

First, then, is it true that we are planless in spite of our power?

Certainly we were not planless so long as the war lasted. No one knows this better than the man who is now President of this great University. Until victory was achieved we had an aim, a series of objectives leading to the achievement of that aim, and a planned procedure leading to the attainment of each objective. The aim was the unconditional sur-

render of the Axis Powers. The objectives were the step-by-step liberation of the conquered territories and the ultimate invasion of Italy, Germany and Japan. To accomplish these objectives almost all other considerations were put aside. Until our single aim of victory was achieved, we had and consistently pursued a definite plan.

Whether or not our plan of action during the war was a wise plan is another matter. From the military point of view it would be hard to find fault with it. If, however, one accepts the Clausewitz axiom that "war is the extension of policy by other means"—that a war must be fought not merely to deny victory to the enemy but to gain a positive end—then our plan of action during the war can be criticized as being a plan shaped too exclusively by military expediency. The consequences of the pursuit of military expediency are evident today in Europe, in Asia and in practically every part of the world.

Our war plan was a plan to prevent world conquest by the Axis Powers and to subdue them by the quickest and cheapest means. In carrying out this plan we achieved victory, but not peace. Actually, **we bought quick victory at the expense of peace.**

For each military step along the road to victory we paid a political price. We paid for North Africa with Darlan and the survival of fascism in Spain. We paid for Italy in similar coin. We paid for Russian help in the war against Japan by agreeing to an old-fashioned victor's peace instead of the just peace pledged in the Atlantic Charter. We agreed to annexation of territory and the division of the world into spheres of influence. To get the Red Army moving against Japan in Manchuria, we paid the price of letting it conquer Berlin and liberate Czechoslovakia.

No one can say that the genius of great leadership in war might not have been transformed into equally great leadership toward peace—in spite of the price paid for victory—had that leadership and the war-time spirit of the American people continued. But the sad fact of the matter is that with the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt the spark of genius, which might have wrested peace out of the shambles of victory, sputtered out; and—once victory was achieved—the spirit of the American people changed.

In spite of all the compromises of expediency, people throughout the world somehow still had faith in the ultimate purposes of the United

States—even after the death of President Roosevelt—**until the events of August and September 1945.** But their faith was shaken by the Potsdam Agreement, by the bomb that fell on Hiroshima and by the summary cutting off of Lend-Lease. These events, plus the helter-skelter demobilization of our armed forces and the irresponsible termination of rationing and price controls, presented the world with a new picture of the United States. **A faithful and effective war-time ally had suddenly turned into a nation disinterested in the world, concerned primarily with its own comforts and possessed of a secret weapon which revolutionized all previous concepts of warfare and security.**

A Wendell Willkie might have resisted the turning tide of public opinion, at least enough to preserve the faith of the world in the United States —and, with it, the opportunity to recapture the spirit, if not the letter, of the great principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter—the principles of a just and honorable peace, which had gone overboard at Teheran and Yalta. Given the preservation of that faith in our purposes, which President Roosevelt had inspired, we might have been able to work out the plan for peace which was unhappily not a part of his legacy. But the men who succeeded to the unfinished task were unequal to the challenge. They were men of good will, but they lacked vision. They were sincere executors of the contemporary desires of the American people, but they lacked the wisdom, the conviction and the courage to see that the contemporary mood of the people was dangerously irresponsible, and that the task of leadership was to change rather than cater to it.

Ever since the autumn of 1945, we have been drifting. We have lost the inspiration of a high purpose. We have had no clearly seen goal, no planned stepping-stones along the road to an ultimate destination, and no consistently calculated procedure. Faced with a world weakened and disorganized by war, a world order compromised by war-time concessions to Soviet ambition, and a Soviet regime fully conscious of its purposes and ruthlessly determined to accomplish them, we have vacillated between accepting a divided world and pursuing a steadfast course toward healing the division. We have had plans, but no plan. We have had ideas, but no vision.

At present, we are caught between two conflicting foreign policies. We are impaled on the horns of a dilemma created by two contradictory theories of what the world crisis is about.

One theory—put forward by Secretary Marshall—is that the world crisis arises primarily from the widespread distress caused by economic maladjustment and dislocation. This theory recognized that we have emerged from the war in possession of the sole surplus production out of which the rest of the world can be helped to get back upon its own feet. It recognizes that, in our own self-interest, we must aid the world to regain its health. It sees "hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos" as the causes of communism and as the causes of the present threat to world peace. This theory has produced the European Recovery Program.

The other theory—put forward by President Truman and his bipartisan advisors—is that the world crisis arises solely from the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to cooperate in the making of a just peace and from the Soviet Union's ruthless pursuit of its own selfish ends. This theory has produced the so-called Truman Doctrine—a purely negative policy with the sole aim of stopping Soviet or communist expansion. The original version of the Truman Doctrine rested upon the belief that we could contain Soviet expansion by arming and otherwise financially assisting any nations, or groups within nations, hostile to Russia or to communist ideas. The later version, announced on March 17 of this year, envisages the use of our own armed force, if dollars and bluff fail to accomplish the objective.

At the present time, we are betting about $6,000,000,000 a year on the constructive approach to peace embodied in the first theory, and almost three times that amount upon the negative approach embodied in the second. Stated in other terms, we are spending about 15 cents out of each taxpayer's dollar on an effort to build the peace, and then betting against our own effort by taking out war-risk insurance to the tune of something like 45 cents out of each taxpayer's dollar.

This in itself is fairly conclusive proof that we are planless in spite of our power. But that is not all.

We are also planless in dealing with the various individual problems which combine into the major problem of the peace settlement. For example:

We have no plan for Germany, which is the central problem of Europe. For three years we have been vacillating between the desire to destroy Germany's industrial capacity in order to eliminate its war poten-

tial, and the desire to build up German industrial capacity in order to promote European recovery. For the past twelve months, we have not known whether we were more afraid of a unified Germany in which Russia would have a voice, or a divided Germany in which Russia would completely control one half and we the other.

We have no plan for Palestine, which is the central problem of the Middle East. We are for partition at one moment and against it the next. We favor trusteeship today and oppose it tomorrow. Our zig-zag course in the Middle East is dictated by a strange mixture of outworn strategic concepts, commercial interests, varying emotional tides and partisan politics.

We have no plan for China, which is the central problem of Asia. Our Secretary of State, after a careful study on the spot, declared that we should discontinue our subsidies to the Central Government of Chiang Kai-shek and maintain a hands-off policy in the struggle between it and the Chinese Communists. Yet our Congress decided to vote an additional subsidy to Chiang amounting this year to $500,000,000, and the Republican candidate for the Presidency favors still greater subsidies.

Our planlessness goes still further. **Not only are we without a plan for making the peace; we are also without a plan for preserving the peace once it is made.** Our Government takes the position that the United Nations, as at present constituted, is an instrument capable of preserving the peace. It opposes any change in its structure. Yet our Government's own proposal for the control of atomic energy clearly implies that the present United Nations structure is wholly inadequate and will remain inadequate until the United Nations is built into some sort of World Government capable of enforcing world law.

The conclusion from the foregoing seems to me inescapable. The world is correct in thinking of the United States as a nation which, in spite of its great power and its desire to help make and maintain the world's peace, is nevertheless without a plan for peace.

2. Are We Unreasonably Motivated by Fear?

The second point for us to examine is whether the world's impression is correct that, in spite of our relatively secure position, we are unreasonably motivated by fear.

There can be no doubt that we are motivated by fear—fear of Russia, fear of communism and fear of war. The question is whether we are **unreasonably** afraid, or whether our fears are well-grounded.

The answer is, I think, that our fears are partly exaggerated, partly misdirected, and wholly out of proper proportion. Let me briefly develop each part of this threefold assertion.

Our fear of Russia, as a nation—that is, our fear of Russian attack—is, I think, exaggerated. We have no common frontier with the Soviet Union. We can reach each other only by air or by sea. Our Navy controls the world's seas; Russian submarines could interfere with our seaborne movements; but Russia lacks the means, which we possess, of transporting a striking force across either ocean. As for air-power, we hold a lead in long-range bombers; we have bases around the periphery of the Soviet Union; we have atomic bombs. Even assuming that Russia, too, has atomic bombs, there are no Soviet bases in Mexico or Canada or Greenland which correspond to our bases in Japan, Britain, North Africa and the Middle East. Furthermore, there is no evidence whatsoever that Russia's interests would be served by war. There is no evidence that the Soviet regime—which might conceivably act contrary to Russia's interests—is at present thinking in terms of military attack either upon us or upon any other nation. Yet—oddly enough—we seem to be more afraid of Russia's attacking Western Europe than the Western Europeans themselves.

What about our fear of communism? This, I think, is not exaggerated but misdirected. What we fear most are the revolutionary or subversive techniques of communism—"the imposition from within or without of totalitarian dictatorships". What we should fear are the social and economic conditions anywhere in the world which make the application of these techniques possible.

Because we emphasize the purposeful Soviet exploitation of these conditions, and often lose sight of the conditions themselves, our fear of communism becomes indistinguishably merged with our fear of Russia as an aggressive nation. This confuses our thinking and leads us to play into the hands of both communism and Soviet imperalism. It leads us in China to back a regime of corrupt and oppressive landlords against the

peasant masses, thereby handing the Chinese Communists a monopoly in exploiting the most powerful magnet of political attraction. It leads us, in Germany, to oppose socialism and to restore to power the remnants of the old monopolistic clique. It leads us to coddle Franco in Spain, and to deal delicately with the petty potentates of the Middle East. Here at home it leads us into anti-communist witch-hunts and increases internal tensions of all sorts. All this is made to order for those who seek to persuade the oppressed and unhappy peoples of the world that communism offers the only road to a better future while, at the same time, they seek to convince the ruling cliques that an alliance with the Soviet Union provides the only guarantee of "national independence." The latter myth is now beginning to be exploded in Yugoslavia.

Apart from being in some respects exaggerated and in others misdirected, the most important thing about our fears is that they are altogether out of true proportion to the actual dangers. At present, we seem to fear Russia most, communism second and war third. The order should, I think, be reversed.

By far the greatest danger we face is war. Even a victorious war would destroy more of the things we rightly value than could possibly be destroyed without war by Russia and Soviet-inspired communism.

This is the outstanding new fact of our time, to which we are partially blinded by the thought—attractive to some of our present leaders—that, if all else fails, we could almost certainly win a physical struggle with the Soviet Union.

This is what terrifies not only the Russians but our friends throughout the world. This is what makes us—even to those who do not question our good intentions—a dangerous element in world society—an irresponsible, good-natured drunk wandering about in a crowded market-place with a loaded tommy-gun in his hands.

To be sure, it would be much more terrifying to most of the world if Brother Ivan, rather than Uncle Sam, were wandering around in this condition. Brother Ivan is less likely to be good-natured when drunk, and more likely to loose off his weapon just to see what would happen. Nevertheless, it is Uncle Sam who holds the weapon today and who, every now and then, seems not too careful about how he handles it.

The conclusion seems indicated that we are unreasonably motivated by fear—partly because our fear of Russia is exaggerated, partly because our fear of communism is misdirected, but most of all because we fear too little the danger we should fear most.

3. Are We Bunglers?

This brings us to the question of bungling. Are we, as the world seems to think, lacking in skill and know-how in our behavior as a nation among nations?

It would not be difficult to present a damning indictment against our present leadership in recent months. Palestine—the Bedell Smith fiasco—many of the impromptu utterances of our President are sitting ducks if one is looking for targets. So are the actions of our Lower House in passing a resolution inviting Franco into the ERP, in sabotaging the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act and in slashing the ERP funds. All these things add up to a far from pleasant picture. The blame falls upon the White House, the State Department, the various and sundry Presidential advisors and upon both Parties in Congress. It falls upon the Third Party candidate. It falls upon the press. It falls upon all groups and individuals who have contributed to the confusion by losing sight of the world woods for seeing only their particular parochial trees. In the last analysis, the blame falls upon all of us as citizens, because the picture we present to the world as a nation is a fairly accurate picture of the confusion which exists in our own minds.

In this respect, however, I venture to doubt whether any of our friends abroad have the right to criticize us. What nation has not bungled? What Government has pursued a consistent course? What people is less confused than the American people?

The fact is that the whole world is living in the same glass house. The fact is that mankind has come to a point in its history at which the old techniques of adjustment within and among nations have become wholly inadequate, so that new techniques must be developed or invented.

The price of man's continued existence upon this planet is the universal recognition that the brotherhood of man is no longer merely

an ethical or religious concept but a pragmatic fact. This recognition cannot be accomplished by governments unless it is first accomplished by peoples. The techniques of adjustment in a world community, which recognizes itself as being a world community, can be developed. There can be no effective techniques of adjustment for a world which is one, but refuses to recognizes its existing unity.

We are, I think, no worse and no better—so far as bungling is concerned—than the world we live in. Others may be more skilled in that official chicanery which goes by the polite title of diplomatic intercourse. Others may have structural forms of government which lend themselves to faster and more consistent action. But all this is beside the point. What hampers us most is not our lack of skill and know-how, nor yet the structural form of our Government. Both could be improved without doubt. **But what really hampers us is the fact that we have not yet fully comprehended the changed nature of the world in which we live—that we are afraid and resentful of the change to which our own discoveries have so largely contributed.**

Thus, our effect upon the world is that of a man who has bought a new car and takes his family for a ride in it before he has learned how to drive. He starts off proudly, enjoying new respect and admiration. As he begins to realize that he does not know how to control the bright new contraption, he becomes afraid. His fear transmits itself to the passengers. When he meets a road-hog and, partly through his own lack of skill, narrowly misses a collision, he curses the other driver. Eventually, the entire family joins him in screaming abuse at other vehicles and even at pedestrians. The whole street is gripped by panic.

In the eyes of the world, Russia is a selfish road-hog driving an ancient jalopy—or perhaps even a team of horses—stolidly and ruthlessly down the middle of the road. The United States is the man in the new streamlined roadster who doesn't quite know how it works.

II. What Can We Do About It?

So much for our present role in world affairs. What can we do about it? How can we make ourselves more effective in helping to make the peace? How can we make ourselves more effective in helping to build the structure to preserve it?

Fully aware that there is no easy, quick answer to the world problem, let me nevertheless suggest to you **three major lines of endeavor which, combined, might lead toward a solution. The first has to do with domestic policy, the second with making the peace, and the third with preserving it.**

1. Domestic.

A nation's foreign policy inevitably reflects that nation's domestic state of mind and health. We cannot be an element of strength if we are weak, an element of order if we are disorderly, an element of stability if we are unstable.

The true measure of a nation's strength is not to be found in the number of its planes, atomic bombs, battleships and infantry divisions. The measure of a nation's strength is to be found in the health, the education, the housing and the full employment at fair wages of its people. Put in other terms, the ultimate strength of a nation depends upon the solidarity of its people, which in turn depends upon the degree to which all its citizens feel themselves justly treated.

The true measure of orderliness is not the absence of change, but the degree to which change is permitted constantly to occur without violence.

The true measure of stability is not the maintenance of one particular state of equilibrium, but the maintenance of **an** equilibrium in spite of a constant shifting of the conflicting forces.

In order to permit our foreign policy to reflect a healthy, strong, orderly and stable society, we have many things to attend to here at home.

We are now spending $15,000,000,000 a year on rebuilding that miltary strength which we so irresponsibly dissipated three years ago. We need to re-examine this figure in the light of what military strength we really need, in the light of what we can afford to spend altogether, and also in the light of what we are investing in the health, education and housing of the American people. Three billion dollars—one-fifth of the amount we are spending on preparing for war—would assure every American citizen of adequate medical and dental care and send every American child through high school, plus one-half of them through two

years of college. A fraction of our expenditures for planes and ships and guns would overcome the disgraceful shortage of adequate low-cost housing.

We need to take a look at our runaway price level and to recognize that a continuation of our present dearly-beloved do-nothing policy will not only make hash of all our plans for promoting world recovery but will also drive us into another one of our so-called cyclical depressions.

Finally, we need to find **some** way—whether through state or federal action—to remove from our national prestige the blot of **racial discrimination.**

These are all things which are generally considered remote from foreign policy but which nevertheless have a direct bearing upon it.

2. Making the Peace.

The second line of endeavor has to do with helping to **make** the peace. Here we need to re-examine our present fears, to range them in proper perspective, and to develop a positive program of action in place of panic-inspired negative and often self-defeating counter-action. Next, we must fit into our overall plan a specific policy for each of the many individual problems of the peace settlement.

Once we see war, rather than Russia, as the predominant danger, we shall begin to change the present relationship between the money and effort we are putting into the two contradictory elements in our foreign policy. Instead of spending $6,000,000,000 a year to promote world recovery and peace, we shall probably spend considerably more. Instead of spending $15,000,000,000 a year on getting ready for war, we shall probably spend considerably less.

This is the most important change we need to make in our overall policy. I should like, however, to put forward one other tentative suggestion.

I can think of no better way to arrest the present drift toward war than to eliminate Europe as a bone of contention. At present, Europe

is divided into an Eastern half, completely under Soviet domination, and a Western half increasingly afraid of communist penetration or Russian attack, and increasingly dependent upon American protection. The major attention of the United States is directed toward blocking Soviet penetration through soundly conceived economic aid and, more recently, through unsoundly conceived military assistance. I say "unsoundly conceived military assistance, first, because no amount of feasible rearmament by Western Europe could stop the Red Army from marching to the Atlantic seaboard; second, because United States aid could not reach Europe in time to stop the Red Army's invasion; third, because the rearmament of Western Europe will place an intolerable burden upon its already over-strained economy; and, finally, because rearmament, especially if it includes Western Germany, is likely to provoke the very attack against which it is intended to insure. **Whatever their present intentions, the Russians are not likely to sit still on the East bank of the Elbe while we assemble a great army on the opposite shore.**

We have recently made an abortive approach to Moscow. When the Kremlin seized upon our somewhat ambiguous invitations to sit down and talk things over, we backed away—probably because our Government was convinced that the only thing Moscow wanted to talk about was another Yalta deal—another agreement to stay out of each other's back yards.

Certainly our Government is right in rejecting any further crystallization of the unfortunate spheres of influence created at Yalta.

But why should we not propose a different and more constructive approach? Why should we not propose that Russia, Britain and the United States withdraw all armed forces from Europe west of the Soviet frontier, and sign a treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of the entire European Continent?* This, combined with an agreement to promote rather than obstruct East-West trade, would relieve the present tensions and free the European nations from the burden of supporting essentially useless military establishments.

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*The idea of neutralizing the Continent of Europe was put forward by Mr. F. Van Rossen Hoogendyk in a letter to the New York Times dated May 26, 1948. In this proposal the idea of a three-power guaranty of European neutrality was, however, combined with a plan for the federalization of the Continent. Federalization, if it is possible at all, will require a long time, but the idea of neutralization by three-power treaty does not require federalization and could be made effective by itself in a much shorter period.

I realize that there are some Americans who will say—and not without reason—that it is dangerous to assume that the Soviet Union would stick to any agreement to keep its troops out of Europe. They might also point out that the evacuated Russian forces could far more easily return than British and American contingents, once they were withdrawn across the Channel or across the Atlantic.

To this I would reply:

First, that, **sooner or later, we shall in any case have to believe in the possibility of reaching an agreement that will be kept—or else accept the inevitability of war.**

Second, that, **by withdrawing our forces from the Continent we should not be giving up an effective physical barrier to a Russian advance, but merely a psychological barrier, which exists because the presence of our handful of soldiers makes it clear that a Red Army advance would start a shooting war. Much the same sort of psychological barrier would be erected by the proposed treaty.** Neither with or without their present contingents on the Continent would Britain and the United States be able to prevent the Red Army from over-running Western Europe; they would, in either case, have to embark upon a war to subjugate Russia and once again liberate Europe from occupation.

It is obvious that this proposal involves a radical change of direction in Germany. But the time for such a change seems to me to have come. On June 24, at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet orbit, Russia, for the first time, proclaimed her readiness to end the military occupation of Germany. Prior to that date, the Kremlin had favored an indefinite occupation. Almost two years ago, I put forward a suggestion for a revised American policy with regard to Germany, which involved, among other things, ending the period of full occupation, establishing instead a period of observation and control, and substituting for the four armies of occupation an international police force of highly mobile contingents, strategically located and subject to the call of the Allied Control authorities. At that time, such a proposal seemed utopian because no one believed that the Russians would agree to withdraw their army. Now, however, the Russians themselves have put forward the suggestion. I cannot see that we have anything to lose by being willing to discuss it. On the contrary, it seems to me that the opportunity now exists to break the

existing stalemate, to end the idiotic competition for the favor of the Germans by their conquerors, and to establish the beginnings of an all-German Government with which we can eventually sign a peace treaty.

If such an agreement with regard to Germany is reached as part of an overall agreement to withdraw armed forces from Europe and guarantee its neutrality, the key log in the log-jam of world affairs will have been lifted.

3. Preserving the Peace.

Having had the temerity to advance a few thoughts on the making of the peace, let me now conclude with some brief comments on the question of **preserving the peace,** once a satisfactory settlement is made.

At the present time, our Government takes the position that the existing structure of the United Nations is basically satisfactory and does not require drastic amendment. On May 5, Secretary Marshall said in his testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee:

"The problems today presented to those who desire peace are not questions of structure."

With all due respect, I submit that this is a shortsighted view of the challenge which confronts the world. It is true that the problems of making the peace are not questions of structure. But the problems of maintaining a peace once made most assuredly involve questions of structure.

I submit that the United Nations, as it exists today, is not a structure capable of preserving the peace—even if the present East-West tensions were eliminated. The United Nations, as it exists today, is nothing more than a multilateral treaty between sovereign nation-states. It can function only when and if there is unanimous agreement on the part of the great powers. In the absence of such unanimity, it is helpless.

This defect is not due to the veto; nor is it curable by eliminating the veto. The veto merely makes explicit the basic defect implicit in any international structure which fails to establish an authority over and above the sovereign nation-states.

The only kind of peace which can reasonably be hoped for under the present UN Charter is an uneasy armistice, resting upon a precarious balance of power. In the world of today—in a world of atomic energy—a world in which power has become polarized in only two poles of superpower—the search for a balance of power inevitably becomes a struggle for preponderance of power. Such a struggle necessarily becomes an armament race.

An armament race is dangerous not only because it is likely to lead to armed conflict. The danger of an armament race is also that it tends to make the participants into garrison states, spending more and more of their substance on unproductive effort and increasingly restricting the freedoms of their peoples.

These considerations have for a long time led me to the belief that **there is no way to preserve the peace short of building the United Nations into a World Government.** I began to explore the idea of World Government in a book written in 1939, when the war was still in its early stages. The post-war creation of a United Nations structure based upon great power agreement, seemed to me disappointing, except if viewed as a first necessary step on the road to World Government. Unfortunately, our Government seems more and more to consider that what was accomplished in 1945 is not a first step but a finality. In taking this view, it lags behind the Governments of most of the Western European nations, of many of the countries of Latin America and of all of the nations of the British Commonwealth.

In order to develop a policy to preserve the peace, I suggest that what we need most is to make up our minds that the present UN structure is unsatisfactory and to align ourselves with those who have already declared themselves in favor of converting it into an effective World Government.

This brief statement of a point of view necessarily leaves many questions unanswered. What powers should be delegated to a World Government? How should it be constituted? There is not time to deal with these matters here, but to the limited extent that I am able to supply the answers, I did so in an address entitled "How To Achieve One World", delivered before the Conference of the Society of Friends three weeks ago. Copies of this paper are available to those of you who may be interested.

What I have said today is not likely to make you feel any too happy with the role at present played by the United States in world affairs. I hope, however, that I have not left you with a feeling of discouragement or despair. I have tried not merely to point out what seem to me the defects of our present policy but also to indicate the lines along which we might proceed to cure them. Yet, even if you should think well of the tentative suggestions put forward, I fear that you may go away wondering by what means the average citizen can possibly do anything to bring about their adoption.

The only answer I can give is that, in the long run, our Government is responsive to the will of the people. Every one of us has it in his or her power to learn the facts of contemporary life, to discuss them, to form an opinion and to test that opinion as against the opinions of others. Every one of us has a right to ask questions and demand answers from any of the candidates who will this year present themselves for election to office. **One of the things we ordinary citizens might consider doing this summer is to institute a national "Quiz Your Congressman" Week,** during which each incumbent or candidate would have to stand up and be counted on whatever issues seem important to each constituency.

This much is certain:

If this nation is to become the effective champion of political freedom, its citizens must find a way to educate themselves and each other. They must assume personal responsibility. "Eternal vigilance"—the traditional price of freedom—means more today than mere alertness to danger. It means the conscious effort to understand what is going on in the world, the conscious effort to see the various existing dangers in true perspective, and the concentration of planned endeavor upon the attainment of a clearly seen goal.

In the world of yesterday, it may or may not have been true that God was on the side of the big battalions. In the world of today and in the world of tomorrow—if there is to be a world of tomorrow—God will be found on the side of those peoples who are determined that never again shall this world's streets echo to the tramp of armed men marching into conflict.

Once upon a time, physical strength was the guarantee of survival. Today, the price of life itself is the moral strength to believe in peace,

the will to work for peace and the readiness to sacrifice for peace the outworn relics and fetishes of the past.

Geography, geology and technology have combined to make the United States the physical giant among those nations which carry the common heritage of the Judaeo-Christian civilization. But as yet the very newness of our position of preponderant power robs us of clear vision and the ability to take decisive action. What is more, the corrupting influence of great wealth tends to make us materialistic and unduly conservative. Fear of losing even a little of what we possess blinds us not only to the danger of losing all, but to our greatest opportunity.

The present role of the United States in world affairs is unworthy of a great people. Our potential role staggers the imagination. Whether or not we fulfill the mission which history has entrusted to us depends upon citizenship more than upon leadership—upon us as a people more than upon those individuals whom we elect to office.

The President of this University recently said that he preferred to devote himself to teaching and preaching in the cause of peace rather than to accept nomination to the highest political office in the land. In making this decision, he has, it seems to me, set us all an example of responsible citizenship.

LET'S TAKE THE TOUGH ONES

Address to the

SECOND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED WORLD FEDERALISTS
Minneapolis, Minn.

by

JAMES P. WARBURG

November 13, 1948.

LET'S TAKE THE TOUGH ONES

Mr. Chairman and fellow-members of the United World Federalists.

It is a pleasant and unusual experience to address an audience which needs no convincing on the outstanding foreign policy issues of our time. If each and every one of you were not convinced of the necessity for establishing a world government, you would not be here tonight. I need not, therefore, waste time in analyzing the problem which confronts the world nor in pointing out to you the shortcomings of our present foreign policy.

You know as well or better than I what needs to be done to change our present myopic and fear-befuddled fumbling into a constructive policy for peace.

This enables me to devote my time tonight to a discussion of how to attain our goal, rather than to the usual attempt to define what our goal should be.

Let me state at the outset that I am not going to talk about the relative merits of the various current approaches to the attainment of world government. Our chief immediate objective at this time must still be to bring as many people as possible in all parts of the world to the realization that a start toward world government **now**—not at some indeterminate time in the dim future—is a cardinal necessity. Nothing could be more foolish or more futile than for those who believe in this necessity to dissipate their energy in a debate as to whether the so-called Parliamentary approach, or the People's Convention approach, or the United Nations approach is the most effective. Any approach is good, if its propagation helps to bring about a widespread understanding of the need for world government now. No approach is of any use whatsoever if it becomes a fetish with its protagonists and serves to split the world movement. Moreover, one approach may suit the particular requirements of one group or nation while quite another approach fits more easily into a different social or political context.

I am not, then, going to talk about methodology. What I shall try to do is to answer as best I can some of the really tough questions with which we Federalists are frequently confronted by the doubting Thomases, because—unless we can answer those questions—we shall find it difficult to make many converts.

The two major questions I should like to try to answer are ones which I am sure you have all encountered.

The first one reads: "Why talk about a method of preserving the peace until you have a peace to preserve?"

The second question, closely related to the first, is usually phrased something like this: "What is the use in talking about world government now, when you know that there isn't the slightest chance that Russia will join, or permit her satellites to join?"

Such questions are legitimate. They must be raised and answered before any reasonably intelligent person can be expected to take off his coat and go to work for world government. I propose, therefore, that you let me try as best I can to answer them, and that you deal as roughly as you like with my answers, if you find them unsatisfactory. In that way we shall all be sharpening our tools for the job in hand.

I.

Let us, then, without further preliminaries, tackle the first of these two questions—**why talk about a method of preserving the peace before you have a peace to preserve?**

I submit that a positive American policy for peace must follow two separate but inseparable broad aims: to help make a just peace; and to help devise a means of preserving the peace once it is made.

These two aims can**not** be pursued in chronological sequence. They must be pursued simultaneously by coordinated parallel efforts. It is obvious that the peace cannot be preserved until it has been made. It is much less obvious, but equally true, that the peace cannot be made until there is in sight a means of preserving it.

Why?

Because **the peace cannot be made while an armament race continues between the United States and the Soviet Union;** and because **the armament race cannot be halted so long as a state of international anarchy is permitted to exist.** Both halves of this statement require proof. Let me take them up in order.

There are three reasons why a peace settlement cannot be made so long as the armament race continues:

First, because an armament race constantly increases tensions. The search for national security means a vicious circle of mutual provocation, in which each side is driven by fear of the other to take measures of defense which appear as measures of offense to the other.

Second, because, so long as the armament race continues, each side is compelled to devote the major part of its substance and effort to non-productive work. This means depriving the world of the surplus production of its two greatest surplus producers and thereby impeding and delaying that degree of economic recovery which is a prerequisite for the establishment of peace. We today, for example, are spending only about $6,000,000,000 a year to promote recovery as against about $15,000,000,000 a year on re-armament. We have already reached the point where the contemplated lend-lease re-armament of Western Europe threatens to cut down our future recovery program.

Third, because, so long as the armament race continues, the participants will increasingly impair the living standards of their own people. This almost inevitably leads to scapegoatism on both sides, because each government will increasingly tell its people that their sufferings are due to the evil nature of the other. The utterances of the Kremlin and the scapegoat analysis of the world crisis submitted by our own President to Congress last March show how far we have already drifted in that direction.

That is why there can be no reasonable hope for a peace settlement so long as the armament race continues.

Now for the second half of my assertion—**why can the armament race not be halted so long as a state of international anarchy is permitted to exist?**

First of all, I think you will agree that we are today living in a state of anarchy **among** nations, as opposed to the varying degrees of law and order which exist **within** nations. We have, it is true, some rudimentary elements of international law. We have had, and still have, a certain number of important international agreements. But we have never had a fundamental body of world law; we have never had a world constitution; we have never had a supra-national authority endowed with the power to make world law and enforce it. Consequently, the maintenance of existing international agreements and the observance of existing international law are dependent upon the willingness of the various sovereign nation-states to stick to agreements, to obey law and to act collectively to enforce obedience by others. The United Nations, like the League of Nations before it, is nothing more than a multilateral treaty among sovereign nation-states. It is valid only so long as it suits the governments of the major sovereign nation-states to maintain it. This is roughly analogous to a state of society in which the individuals agree among each other to respect each other's property, to help each other to catch thieves or put out fires, and so forth, so long as it suits them to do so.

This sort of anarchic society could perhaps work reasonably well so long as all the individuals in it were approximately equal in physical strength, in resources and in needs. It breaks down as soon as inequality develops, as it must in any human society. **Within** nations we have long ago learned that to protect the weak against the strong, a society needs a government of law enforced by an authority superior to all individuals. **Among** nations we have failed so far to face this necessity.

In spite of this condition of international anarchy, the world has managed to get along—not too well, but at least without wholly destroying itself—until now. But **there are two reasons why the world can now no longer expect to get along without wholly destroying itself, unless a supra-national authority is created.**

First. The mechanism of getting along in the past has been destroyed. A balance of power peace is no longer possible because power has become polarized in only two poles of superpower. There is no longer any room for maneuver among the sovereign nation-states to prevent any nation, or group of nations, from attaining a preponderance of strength sufficient to let it believe that a resort to naked force might be successful. With

power polarized in only two superpowers there must inevitably be a struggle for preponderance of power, in which each of the two superpowers believes quite sincerely that the only guarantee of peace lies in its own attainment of preponderance over the other. That is the point in history at which we have now arrived.

Second. The development of atomic and bacteriological weapons has removed the resort to armed force from its historical status as the ultimate instrument of foreign policy. Given these new weapons, a resort to force has now become not merely an immoral and uncivilized method of settling disputes—which it always was—but an utterly futile form of murder and suicide combined, which can settle nothing.

The argument so far adduced would probably suffice to prove to any reasonable person that the armament race is both dangerous and futile and that it must be stopped. It will not, however, convince many reasonable people that the armament race cannot be stopped without the establishment of world government, so long as the illusion exists that there can be a limitation of armaments, or international control of armaments, without world government. This illusion, unfortunately, persists among our own policy-makers and in the minds of the statesmen of other nations, including the present Soviet leadership. Our own proposal for the international control of atomic energy and the Russian proposal for a general disarmament agreement among the sovereign nation-states illustrate the point.

Our proposal for the international control of atomic energy is interestingly realistic and unrealistic. It is realistic in that it faces—so far as atomic energy is concerned—the necessity for establishing a definitely supra-national authority, with ownership or control over the sources of raw material, the right of inspection and the power to enforce sanctions against the violation of supra-national law. It is unrealistic in that it rests upon the belief that a supra-national authority can be created for this limited purpose alone, in a world in which national sovereignty remains supreme in all other respects. It is, in a sense, like proposing that government should be established in a lawless community for the sole purpose of preventing murder by the use of firearms—leaving such matters as murder by the use of poisoned arrows, or rape, theft and arson, to voluntary agreement among the individuals in the community.

The Soviet proposal for outlawing atomic weapons and achieving limited disarmament by international agreement is totally unrealistic. It

rests upon the belief that there can be effective disarmament without a supra-national authority capable of independently enforcing it. This is about as reasonable as the expectation that a group of wild-cat oil prospectors will, in the absence of law and a law enforcement agency, voluntarily agree not to jump each other's claims or carry weapons. The Soviet proposal rests upon the further assumption that there can be a half-way station between total national armament for total war and total national disarmament for total peace. This assumption is invalidated by recent history, which has clearly shown that the attempt to limit armaments by international treaty merely serves to give the initial advantage to an aggressor. We and the British should have learned this lesson from our experience with Japan under the Naval Disarmament Treaties. The Russians should have learned it from their experience with Hitler.

The persistence of this illusion in the minds of otherwise realistic statesmen is perhaps largely due to one of the occupational diseases of statesmanship; namely, their jealous fear of any curtailment of the sovereign rights of their respective governments. That, however, is no reason why the ordinary citizen should fall prey to the same illusion.

In summary, I submit that the answer to our first question—"What good does it do to talk about a method of preserving the peace until you have a peace to preserve?"—is: We must talk about a method of preserving the peace before the peace is made, 1) because the peace cannot be made unless the armament race is halted; and 2) because the armament race cannot be halted without the creation of a supra-national authority to enforce disarmament.

II.

We come now to the second of the two major questions posed at the outset; namely, **"What is the use of talking about world government now, when you know that there isn't the slightest chance that Russia will join or permit her satellites to join?"**

This is, I think, the key question in any discussion of world government. Let me say at once that I can give you no wholly satisfactory answer. There can be no magic formula which will dissipate the distrust and hostility which exists between the Soviet Union and the West. But

neither is there any valid reason to assume that this distrust and hostility can never be dissipated and must therefore lead eventually to war.

The premise upon which I shall base my answer to the key question we are now discussing is this:

We are not going to have a war during the next five years, but neither are we going to reach complete agreement with the Soviet Union during that period. In other words, we may look forward to a period of more or less continuous crisis, during which we shall either see a gradual relaxation of tensions leading eventually to agreement, or a gradual exacerbation of tensions leading eventually to open conflict.

If you accept this premise as a point of departure, it follows that the challenge which confronts our new leadership here at home—and the challenge which confronts all the world's statesmen—is how to act in such a way as to render the maximum assistance to the relaxation of tensions without jeopardizing the national interest. A few days ago, I attempted to spell out this challenge, so far as United States foreign policy is concerned, in an address to the Foreign Policy Association at Baltimore. I pointed out that the analysis upon which our present contradictory foreign policy is based is in part incorrect and, beyond that, absurdly over-simplified. In its place I submitted a radically different analysis of the causes of the world crisis and of the present threat to world peace. It would take far too long to repeat this discussion here, but I can provide those of you who may be interested with reprints, and I shall repeat in brief form some of the major conclusions to which I came as the result of this analysis.

It is my belief that **the greatest contribution which could be made by the United States to the relaxation of tensions and the ultimate making of a just peace during the period of the immediate future, would be to reverse the present emphasis upon the two conflicting trends in its current foreign policy.**

We are spending today at the rate of about $6,000,000,000 a year on an attack upon social and economic conditions which cause unrest and provide the breeding-ground for communism. This, if you like, is a bet that the way to stop communism is as the by-product of a constructive policy for recovery and peace.

Simultaneously, we are spending about $15,000,000,000 a year on re-armament plus substantial amounts on military aid to China, Greece and Turkey, and we are contemplating more billions to re-arm Western Europe. This, if you like, is a bet that the way to stop communism is by the wholly negative procedure of encircling the Soviet Union and its doctrine within a physical frontier defended by military force.

The first and smaller bet was made on Secretary Marshall's then held belief that our policy should not be "directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos." The second and much larger bet was made on President Truman's expressed conviction that the sole cause of the world crisis was to be sought in the failure of the Soviet Union to cooperate in the making of a just peace, in its violation of agreements, its obstruction of the United Nations and its aggressive designs upon all the countries of Europe.

Being convinced that Mr. Marshall's analysis, though very incomplete, was right and that Mr. Truman's analysis was not only incomplete but badly distorted, I believe that the best thing we could do for ourselves and for the world would be to reverse the amounts we are betting on each.

This can obviously not be done if those of our bipartisan policy-makers are right, whose primary fear is of a Russian military attack upon her neighbors and eventually upon the United States. It can be done only, if those are right who believe that there is relatively little danger of Russian military action, but considerable danger of further communist penetration; and that the way to stop communism is not by attempting to erect a fortified barrier against its encroachment but by cutting the ground of mass discontent from under its feet.

I belong to the second school of thought, which is obviously in a small minority in Washington. However, even though I believe that the emphasis is badly misplaced in our present efforts, I also recognize that we cannot now simply reverse it and thereby, through a show of weakness, invite military aggression. Furthermore, things have gone so far in the panic-inspired vicious circle of mutual provocation between Washington and Moscow, that we cannot altogether omit from consideration the possibility of sudden irrational action on the part of the hitherto cantankerous but cynically realistic Soviet leadership. Such irrational action might take a

military form, even though all the evidence indicates that the Soviet leadership knows it has far more to gain from continuing to exploit an uneasy armistice than from an adventure in military conquest.

But how can we risk reversing our bets and reducing our expenditures for military preparedness? How can we make what would be our greatest contribution toward the relaxation of tensions without inviting Soviet military aggression?

This is where we come home to the question under discussion. **We can deliver our greatest contribution to the making of the peace only if we simultaneously move toward creating the fundamental prerequisite for stopping the armament race. That is why we must move now toward world government.**

But—you will say—"That still only answers the first question—not the second. You have not yet told us what good it will do to talk about world government now if it is certain that Russia will refuse to join."

I think I have indicated the answer. But let me put it in more direct terms.

To say that there is no use in talking about world government, when there isn't a chance that Russia will join, is like saying that there is no use in stopping small-pox in Western Europe and the Western Hemisphere so long as the people of Asia refuse to be vaccinated. In the first place, the fact that Russia would refuse to join today or tomorrow does not mean that she would necessarily refuse to join the day after tomorrow. The fact that a superstitious and suspicious Chinese coolie refuses to be vaccinated, because he thinks that vaccination is some dangerous form of white man's magic, does not mean that he will forever cling to this belief. In the second place, if you were in Mr. Stalin's shoes, I doubt if you would fall all over yourself to join a world organization in which you would relinquish important power to a majority openly hostile to what you conceived to be your country's interests.

Russia cannot possibly be expected to join a world government until it becomes evident that to do so is in her own interest.

This can never become evident until there **is** a world government, until it is clear that the peoples who have joined it are better off than those who have not, and until it is clear that this world government truly stands over and above **all** the component nation-states and is not merely an instrument of domination by the most powerful.

This argument no doubt raises in your minds a third question—namely:

"How can the initial establishment of a world government, without the Soviet Union, bring about that end of the armament race which is essential to the making of a peace?"

My answer is that it cannot entirely stop the armament race, but it can completely change its nature; and it can make possible a long first step toward stopping the armament race altogether.

The establishment of a federation without the original participation of the Soviet Union and the nations in the Soviet orbit would have two consequences relating to armament. It would mean the national disarmament of all the member nations and the creation of a federal military establishment. This federal military establishment would have to be maintained at sufficient strength to stop aggression by one member nation against another, **and also** to protect any and all member nations against non-member aggression.

The Soviet Union would thus be faced with the fact that the only superior military force in the world belonged—not to any one nation or group of nations—but to a supra-national government created by the majority of the peoples of the world. Unless the United States—or the United States and Great Britain together—made the fatal mistake of using their superior resources and industrial development to dominate this federation, the Soviet leaders would have a hard time making the Russian people believe that the superior military force of the federation was being maintained for any other purpose than to preserve the peace. They would have a hard time attributing to such a federation a design of "capitalist imperialism"—unless, I say again, the United States were foolish enough to use its great power to dominate the federation, and to lead it into a continuation of the Truman Doctrine and the cold war.

If the United States pursued a wise and restrained policy within the federation, the day would eventually come when the Russian people would tire of guns instead of butter, when any Russian leadership would be forced to recognize that world government was not a sinister device of Western imperialism and that the Russian people would be better off if the Soviet Union were to become a member nation.

"But," you may say, "How can any Russian leadership, unless it abandons Marxism and the dream of worldwide communist revolution, ever come to think that the Russian people would be better off in an anti-communist world federation?"

The answer, it seems to me, is that the world federation should not be anti-communist in the sense that it would seek to destroy communism. It should be pledged against the imposition of totalitarian regimes by minorities within any of its component states. It should be pledged to protect any member nation against having a totalitarian regime imposed upon it from without—or, for that matter, to protect all members against any external interference in their internal affairs. But this would not mean that Yugoslavia, or the Soviet Union itself, could not join the world federation unless it abandoned its own totalitarian communist government. It **would** mean that neither Yugoslavia nor the Soviet Union could foster a communist revolution in Greece.

In other words, in order to join the world federation, Soviet leadership would not have to abandon Marxism or the belief in communist totalitarianism **within.** It **would** have to abandon the attempt to foster a worldwide communist revolution by any means other than by making communism work so successfully **within** the communist orbit that other peoples would voluntarily wish to follow the Soviet example.

Over a reasonable period of time, I submit that acceptance of this proposition is not too much to expect without undue optimism, provided that the vitally important corollary to the proposition is likewise posited. That corollary would be that the members of the non-communist federation would on their part abandon the idea of creating a non-communist world, except by making their system, or systems, work so well within their own countries as to bring about a voluntary change within the communist orbit.

And now, one last question, which I can see hovering in your minds:

"Would not the creation of a supra-national federation without the initial adherence of the Soviet Union in effect destroy the United Nations, and thereby increase tensions and the likelihood of war?"

I think not, if we go about it the right way. Our effort should be to convert the United Nations into a world federation. If the Russians oppose this, as they probably would, we should then proceed, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to organize as much of a world federation as we could. This would leave the United Nations unimpaired as a forum for discussion with the Soviet Union and its friends and as an instrument of such limited action as is possible under the present charter. It is true that the Russians would then be dealing, in the United Nations, with an even more solidified majority. But whether this would increase or decrease tensions would depend upon the behavior of the majority under these changed conditions.

If the federation—comprising the majority of UN members—behaved according to the pattern of present American policy, its creation would increase the tensions. If the federation pursued a constructive policy for recovery and peace—a policy designed to stop communist penetration by eliminating the causes of mass discontent and not by subsidizing any and all anti-communist governments, parties or groups, irrespective of their nature—if the federation abandoned the idea of the cold war and constantly worked for disarmament by constantly urging Russian participation—then, I believe that its creation would reduce tensions and lead to peace.

This presupposes, I admit, a drastic change in the present attitude of our bipartisan team of policy-makers. But, unless there is such a change, the tensions will inevitably be increased, with or without a supra-national federation.

That is the challenge which confronts us, as citizens.

That is the challenge which you are here to meet.

CAN THE MARSHALL PLAN PRODUCE PEACE?

Address to the

FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY

Nashville, Tennessee.

by

JAMES P. WARBURG

November 18, 1948.

Can the Marshall Plan Produce Peace?

Your program committee has asked me to state whether or not I believe that the Marshall Plan can produce peace. My answer falls into two parts:

In the present context of United States foreign policy, I do not believe that the Marshall Plan can produce peace.

In a different context of United States foreign policy, I believe that the Marshall Plan could make a great contribution towards peace.

Before developing the argument to sustain each half of this answer, let us agree upon what we mean by the term, "Marshall Plan". I take it that the framers of this question had in mind the program of American aid to the economic recovery of Europe originally proposed by Secretary Marshall on June 5, 1947, and not merely the program for aiding the sixteen nations of Western Europe, which has since gone into effect. If this assumption is incorrect—if the question relates only to the current ECA program—my answer would be that this program could not, in my opinion, produce peace, even in a different context of American foreign policy. It could at best—given a different context—make an important but not decisive contribution.

One other preliminary clarification seems desirable. When we ask whether any plan could produce peace, I think we mean two things: Can it bring about the making of the long-deferred peace settlement? And—can it provide the means for preserving the peace after a settlement has been made? That is why I found it necessary to qualify the affirmative part of my answer by saying that, in a different context of American foreign policy, the Marshall Plan could make a great contribution towards peace—instead of expressing the opinion that it could *produce* peace. A Marshall Plan, in its broadest sense, is, I think, essential to the making of a peace settlement. But, even in its broadest sense, A Marshall Plan could not alone provide all the ingredients necessary to make a peace—much less provide the means of preserving it.

The reasoning behind this conviction will become evident from the elaboration of the two parts of my answer, with which I shall now proceed.

I.

THE NEGATIVE ANSWER.

There are four reasons for my belief that, in the present context of American foreign policy, the Marshall Plan cannot produce peace:

1. The Marshall Plan attacks only one of the four fundamental causes of the world crisis and the present threat to peace, the other three causes being ignored by the analysis upon which our present bipartisan policy is based.

2. The Marshall Plan is submerged in the surrounding atmosphere of the Truman Doctrine and diverted from its original purpose by the cold war against the Soviet Union.

3. The Marshall Plan is undernourished, because the arms race is depriving it of necessary sustenance and will in future demand an even greater share of our national resources.

4. The original scope of the Marshall Plan was too narrow; its present field of action is altogether inadequate; and its future field is likely to be even more closely restricted.

Each of these four assertions requires proof. Let me take them up in order.

FIRST. The Marshall Plan, as defined by its author, is a policy "not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos". It is—or was intended to be—a planned attack upon the basic causes of mass discontent, arising during a period of rapid and far-reaching social and economic change. It recognized that we are living in what amounts to a social and economic revolution, accelerated by the impact of two great wars. This is one of the four fundamental causes of the world crisis.

On the other hand, *the Marshall Plan fails to take cognizance of three other basic factors in the world crisis. To make matters worse, these three other factors are not only ignored but in part distorted by the overall context of present American foreign policy.*

The first unrecognized basic factor is that science and technology have made the world physically one, whether or not it is politically unified; and further, that the invention of atomic and bacteriological weapons has ended that period of human history in which war could be considered an effective, though immoral, instrument of foreign policy.

The second ignored factor is that the polarization of power in only two poles of superpower—Russia and the United States—has destroyed the only device by which a world composed of sovereign nation-states has in the past been able to preserve the peace—namely, the device of maintaining a balance of power by ever-shifting alignments. There can be no shifting alignments to preserve a balance of power when power is concentrated at two points of superpower. There can then be only a struggle for preponderance of power between the two surviving giants, in which each believes that its own predominance is essential to the maintenance of peace. This polarization of power and the resulting struggle for preponderance must necessarily lead to an arms race, unless and until disarmament is achieved through the establishment of world law and world government.

The final factor consists of certain events in recent history, which are not only ignored but distorted by a Truman Doctrine based upon the contention that Russia—and Russia alone—has destroyed the basis for a just and lasting peace. The fact is that not Russia alone, but Russia, Great Britain and the United States acting together, divided the world into spheres of influence. The war-time agreements of the Big Three at Teheran and Yalta drew the line which has since become an Iron Curtain. The war-time agreements destroyed the basis for a just and lasting peace by throwing overboard the pledges and principles of the Atlantic Charter. The war-time agreements laid the foundation for a post-war power struggle between Russia and the West—a power struggle in which future historians may well decide that the first overt move was not made by Russia, but by us at Hiroshima.

Some of you may wish to question the validity of these assertions. I shall be glad to submit them to cross-examination. It is important that we make up our minds whether President Truman was right or wrong, when he said to Congress, on March 14, 1948: "The agreements reached, though imperfect, could have provided the basis for a just and honorable peace, if they had been kept. But they were not kept. They were ignored and violated by one nation." I consider this statement a dangerous distortion of history, which has led us to accept an all-too simple scapegoat analysis of the world crisis.

Subject to later discussion, I now rest my case for the contention that the Marshall Plan cannot produce peace because it deals with only one of the four major causes of the present threat to peace.

SECOND. *I maintain that the Marshall Plan cannot produce peace so long as it operates in the surrounding atmosphere of the Truman Doctrine and is diverted from its original purpose by the cold war against the Soviet Union.*

This contention rests upon the belief that no policy can succeed which straddles two conflicting analyses of what the world crisis is about and goes galloping off on two horses in opposite directions. In pursuit of the Truman Doctrine, which holds that Russia alone is the cause of our present trouble, we are making huge efforts to contain Russia and its communist doctrine within a physical wall defended by physical force. In pursuit of the Marshall Plan, we are making substantial efforts to promote economic recovery, on the theory that our policy should not be directed against the Soviet Union or against communism, but against the social and economic causes of mass discontent.

In such a context of contradiction and confusion, it was inevitable that the Marshall Plan should become infected with the bacilli of the Truman Doctrine. It is not surprising that, in passing the European Recovery Program, Congress should, in the same breath, have insisted upon $500,000,000 of additional subsidy to Chiang Kai-shek in order to help him fight the Chinese Communists. The whole Marshall Plan for Western Europe was, in fact, pushed through Congress by a de-

liberate campaign of fear based upon the devil-theory of the Truman Doctrine.

In part, the infection of the Marshall Plan was, no doubt, due to the Russian refusal to cooperate in the original project. But the Russian refusal must itself have been largely influenced by the fact that the Marshall Plan was launched three months after the Truman Doctrine and without any explicit repudiation of the anti-Soviet crusade. Furthermore, once the officially inspired panic was on, it is extremely doubtful whether Congress would have passed any Foreign Assistance Act whatsoever, if Russia had joined instead of refusing, and thus become eligible for a share in American aid.

Be that as it may—and be the fault where it may—the march of events has made the Marshall Plan into an instrument of the cold war. It is no longer a policy "not directed against any country or doctrine". It has been diverted from its original concept and purpose.

My third statement was that the Marshall Plan cannot produce peace because it is undernourished—because the arms race is now depriving it of necessary sustenance and will in future demand an even greater share of our national resources.

The figures tell the story.

We are currently spending at least $15,000,000,000 a year on armament, large additional sums on military aid to China, Greece and Turkey, and are now contemplating an entirely new program of re-arming Western Europe. No one knows exactly how much this new program will involve.

We are spending nearly $6,000,000,000 a year on the Marshall Plan.

The American economy is today producing about $20,000,000,000 in goods and services over and above what the American people are consuming. In producing that much surplus, it is turning out about all that the supply of labor and materials permit without re-imposing war-time controls.

We are, in other words, already living beyond our means, if we intend to preserve a peace-time economy. The same thing is true from a budgetary point of view; at the present rates of taxation, we shall probably run into a deficit this fiscal year, even without the added expenditure involved in re-arming Western Europe.

These facts add up to a very simple conclusion. Unless we are prepared to convert to a war economy, involving stringent controls and higher taxation in order to stretch both our productive capacity and our budget, the increasing demands of re-armament at home and abroad will come out of the hide of the recovery program. That is to say, the Marshall Plan will become even more subservient to the Truman Doctrine.

The fourth statement in support of the negative half of my answer was that the Marshall Plan's original scope was not wide enough, that its present field of activity is altogether inadequate, and that its future field is likely to be even more narrowly circumscribed.

The scope of the original plan was not wide enough because it neglected Asia and Latin America. It is true that Europe provided the point of maximum leverage for an attack upon the worldwide post-war economic crisis. But there were also other points of great leverage in certain non-European areas—notably in the great food and raw material producing areas of Southwest Asia and Latin America. I am not saying that our resources would necessarily have permitted launching the attack along a broader front—they would certainly not have sufficed if we were simultaneously going to carry out the Truman Doctrine. I am merely stating that even the original Marshall Plan could not have produced peace, because, among other things, its scope was too limited.

If this was true of the original plan for all of Europe, it is even more true of the current program, which involves only the Western half of Europe. Moreover, the success of the current program is admittedly predicated upon the assumption that trade between Eastern and Western Europe will flow freely—an assumption which is now largely invalidated by the context of the cold war.

As to the future, I have already indicated how the growing demands of the arms race are eating into the funds available for even the present limited effort to bring about a healthy recovery.

This concludes the argument in support of my contention that, in the present context of American foreign policy, the Marshall Plan cannot produce peace. To avoid any misunderstanding, let me state as clearly as I can that I was in favor of the original Marshall Plan; that I am in sympathy with the current program in so far as it seeks to carry out the original intent of the Marshall Plan; that I do not think this program should be abandoned; but that, on the other hand, it cannot succeed without a much higher priority, a much wider target and a basic change in American policy.

II.

THE AFFIRMATIVE ANSWER

In the affirmative half of my twofold answer to your question, I stated the belief that the Marshall Plan could make a great contribution toward peace, if it were permitted to operate in a different context of American foreign policy. Let me now attempt to sketch briefly what that different context would have to be.

The first requirement is a revised analysis of the nature of the present threat to world peace, an analysis which would abandon the search for a scapegoat and take up, instead, an honest search for truth. Such an analysis would have to take into consideration all of the four basic factors which I have mentioned, and very likely others which I may have overlooked.

The second requirement is a policy, derived from the new analysis, which could reasonably be expected to arrive at two separate but interrelated goals: the making of a just and honorable peace settlement; and the development of the means to preserve the peace, once the settlement is made.

The makers of the new policy would have to recognize that these two broad aims must be pursued simultaneously—and not in chronological sequence. They would have to recognize that both aims require the same two preconditions—namely, the halting of the arms race and sustained worldwide economic recovery.

No peace settlement can be made so long as the arms race produces a vicious circle of mutual provocation and preempts the resources needed for recovery.

No peace settlement will stick, unless a way is found to bring about disarmament and establish lasting economic cooperation.

It follows that disarmament and worldwide economic recovery must become the twin inseparable objectives of a new policy.

Under our present bipartisan policy, we are in theory seeking disarmament, while in practice spending more than three-quarters of our available resources on armament. This is not because our purpose is insincere, but because our policy-makers have failed to grasp the outstanding fact of our time—that the hope of disarmament by treaty between sovereign nation-states is an illusion—that any form of partial disarmament is another illusion—and that, in the long run, there is no possible middle ground between a total armament race and total national disarmament under world law and world government.

I do not expect you to accept this statement without supporting argument. But the argument can, I believe, be quite brief.

Let me ask you whether you believe that the individuals in a community could reasonably be expected to forego violence and respect each others' rights, without codifying their mutual agreement to that effect in some sort of law, and without establishing some sort of agency effectively to enforce that law? Let me ask you whether you believe that an agreement, without law and law enforcement, would protect the weak against the strong? And, if not, whether a mutual covenant among the individuals to act collectively in defense of the weak against the strong would bring about the desired result?

If you answer these questions in the negative—and our society has for generations so answered them—then why would you expect a different result in a community of nations, which seeks to avoid violence without law and without law enforcement? Why is it any more reasonable to expect nations to renounce force, in the absence of an authority superior to all nations, than to expect individuals to renounce force in the absence of an authority superior to all individuals?

Our present policy-makers have not yet faced the fact that polarization of power has destroyed the balance of power makeshift. Our present policy-makers have not yet fully understood that a nation cannot today commit murder without also committing suicide—that a nation cannot today even commit manslaughter in self-defense without likewise destroying itself.

"But"—you may say—"Does not our proposal for the international control of atomic energy prove precisely the contrary?"

The Baruch proposal does prove that our policy-makers have recognized that there can be no atomic disarmament without the establishment of what amounts to world law and world government in the field of atomic energy. But our policy-makers seem to hold the curious belief that world law and world government can be established in this one narrow sector alone, while in all other respects there continues to be a state of international anarchy. This is as if a community of individuals were to adopt a single law prohibiting the use of fire-arms and were carefully to establish an agency to enforce this solitary prohibition—depending upon voluntary agreement among individuals not to kill each other with bows and arrows, or knives, or poisoned highballs.

If we want disarmament, there is only one way to attain it. That way is to establish world law and world government.

During recent months I have noticed a significant development in the attitude of those who are reluctant to make any basic change in the present United Nations structure. A year ago, I used to encounter all sorts of arguments to the effect that world government was neither necessary nor desirable. Recently, I took part in a debate on whether our Government

should or should not now take the initiative toward transforming the United Nations into a world government based upon the federal principle. The proponents of the negative were staunch and able defenders of the present United Nations structure; yet every one of them admitted under cross-examination: that the United Nations, in its present form, could not preserve the peace; that world government would ultimately be essential to the preservation of the peace; and that the whole question was only a matter of timing. When asked for what event or development they were waiting, these gentlemen could only express a vague feeling that we should wait until the present tensions were somewhat relaxed.

This sounds reasonable enough. *But what is going to relax the present tensions?* What is gong to stop the arms race, short of the establishment of world law and world government? What is going to give the effort to promote recovery a chance, so long as the arms race continues?

I think you see now what I mean, when I say that the Marshall Plan needs a new context of overall policy. Undoubtedly, however, you are thinking:

"It is all very well to say that the United States should take the initiative now toward transforming the United Nations into a world government. But where will that get us, if Russia vetoes the proposal, as Russia surely will?"

A few days ago I was privileged to address the United World Federalist Convention at Minneapolis. I took this opportunity to spell out the best answer I could give to the question just stated, because it is one which federalists must be prepared to answer, if they expect reasonable people to join their cause. Time does not permit me to repeat this discussion in full, but I shall indicate the high-spots and leave the rest to the question period.

There are some nations in the world today which do not yet realize that it is to their advantage to eliminate rabies and the hoof-and-mouth disease. Is that any reason why other nations cannot do anything about such pestilences? And is there any sound reason for believing that all nations will not eventually see that it is in their own interest to protect their populations against mad dogs and infected cattle?

Given the present distrust and tension, Russia is certainly not going to make the first move toward transforming the United Nations into a world government. Nor is Russia ever going to join a world government which exists only on paper, because no mere blueprint will allay Russian suspicions. But Russia might some day join a world government which actually existed in embryonic form, *if* the operations of the pilot-plant allayed her suspicions, and *if* her observations of its results convinced her that it would be in her own self-interest to become a member.

Our first effort should be to try to persuade the Russians that it is in their interest to transform the United Nations into a world government, in order that all nations may disarm and peace be assured. If that effort fails, as it probably will in the present circumstances, then we should take the initiative in organizing the pilot-plant to make a practical demonstration. This pilot-plant would take the form of a federation of all the peoples of the world, who are now prepared to subordinate their national sovereignty to a supra-national authority. This can be done under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, without in any way undermining the existng limited authority of the United Nations.

There is all the difference in the world between this proposal and the current project of proceeding under Article 51 to organize—not an embryonic world government—but a defensive military alliance. The latter project would merely accelerate the arms race and further crystallize the existing cleavage. But the formation of a federation could be the first step toward disarmament.

The first result of the formation of such a federation would be that its member states could disarm, as individual nations, combining their military strength in a federal military establishment. Thus at least the first move toward international disarmament would have been taken. It is true that the federation itself would have to remain strongly armed, so long as the Soviet Union declined to join and continued its present policies. It would have to remain strong enough to protect its member states and itself against non-member military aggression. But—if the federation pursued a wise policy—if it de-emphasized strategic containment and concentrated its energies upon halting communist penetration through promoting recovery and through curing existing evils within its own house—the day

might come quite soon when Russia would find it in her own interest to join, and thus finally to make full national disarmament possible.

That, in essence, is my answer to this vexing problem. You will doubtless wish to debate many angles of this suggestion.

Let me, therefore, conclude this brief development of the affirmative half of my answer by saying:

The Marshall Plan, in its originally conceived form, could lead to peace, if it could become the major policy of the majority of the peoples of the world, united in a supra-national federation dedicated to disarmament and peace. In other words, the Marshall Plan could lead to peace if—instead of being the secondary policy of the United States—it were to become the primary policy of the non-communist world—a non-communist world which recognized that a real Soviet threat to peace would exist only so long as masses of people *outside the Soviet orbit* remained unhappy and dissatisfied.

Is it too much to hope that we shall wake up in time to shake off the shackles of fear which now distort and encumber a program of action originally conceived with courage and clear vision? Is it too much to hope that sanity will return to the minds of men now sick with blind passion?

I think not. For the past year I have travelled up and down this country of ours and found people everywhere weary to death of this war of words, frightened to death—not of Russia or of communism—but of the armament race, which they instinctively recognize as the greatest danger. I have found the same thing among the peoples of other countries. But the peoples of other countries are powerless to stop the armament race, unless we lead the way.

The way is clear. For what are we waiting?

Cabinet —

Troops —

Budget —

Western Defense Plant. —

A

A Challenge to New Leadership

I.

OUR PRESENT POLICY.

It is just over a year since I had the privilege of addressing you on the subject of "The United States and the World Crisis." Since then, much has happened. Last year at this time we had no clearly discernible foreign policy. Now we have two contradictory foreign policies.

This state of affairs has not derived from any conflict between President Truman's Democratic Administration and the Republican-dominated Congress. The strange concoction was brewed by the leadership of both major political parties. It is as much the brainchild of Mr. John Foster Dulles and Senator Vandenberg—the Republican foreign policy experts—as it is the creation of Mr. Truman, Secretary Marshall and the other policy-making members of the President's cabinet. The election—whichever way it went—could not alone bring about any basic change. This makes it all the more important to understand what our present policy is and where it is taking us.

The Contradiction.

Let us begin by stating the two conflicting elements which make up our present bipartisan and bifurcated foreign policy.

The first of these two elements is represented by the so-called Truman Doctrine, vaguely enunciated by the President on March 12, 1947, and reaffirmed in much more precise language a year later. When last we met, it was difficult to define this doctrine. It has now quite clearly emerged as a purely negative policy of "containing" Soviet expansion. It rests upon the President's unequivocally stated conviction that "one nation, and one nation alone, has not only failed to cooperate in the making of a just and honorable peace, but—worse—has actively sought to prevent it." In addressing Congress last March, after a year of none too happy experience with his experiment, the President reaffirmed his belief that

the world crisis and the threat to peace were not due to the natural after-effects of war but to the fact that the Soviet Union, having "destroyed the independence and democratic character of a whole series of nations in Eastern and Central Europe," harbored "the clear design to impose this ruthless course upon the remaining free nations of Europe." Holding these views, Mr. Truman has promulgated a policy based upon the single negative aim of blocking Soviet, or communist, expansion by economic aid and, if necessary, by military assistance to any nations, or groups within nations, hostile to communism and the Soviet Union.

The second element in the bipartisan foreign policy is represented by the original Marshall Plan for European Recovery. This policy, first announced in June 1947, began as a positive plan of action to strike at the sources of unrest throughout the world. In Secretary Marshall's own words, it was "not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos." It rested upon an implied analysis of the world crisis and of the threat to peace quite different from that which underlay the Truman Doctrine.

To what extent the Marshall approach would have superseded the Truman Doctrine, had Russia joined in the proposed overall European Recovery Plan, is a matter of conjecture. With public opinion deliberately inflamed by the President's repeated utterances and with isolationism far from dead in the 80th Congress, it is, to say the least, doubtful whether any foreign aid plan would have been enacted, if such a plan had included assistance to the Soviet Union or to nations in the Soviet orbit. The chances are that Mr. Molotov would have left our Secretary of State in an extremely embarrassing position and wrecked the Marshall Plan altogether, had he joined it or even permitted some of his friends to join. The fact is, however, that the Russian walk-out—while assuring the passage through Congress of *a* Foreign Assistance Act—made the contemplated plan for European recovery merely a plan to aid the recovery of the sixteen nations of Western Europe. Thus, the Marshall approach never had a chance to supersede the Truman approach, and an American foreign policy developed which straddled two basically contradictory conceptions of the nature of the world crisis.

We are today spending about $6,000,000,000 a year on a bet that the way to insure peace is to attack "hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos." At the same time, we are spending $15,000,000,000 a year on

armaments and more billions on aid to Greece, Turkey and China, on a bet that the way to insure peace is to contain the Soviet Union and its doctrine within a physical wall of armed resistance.

Its Effect Abroad.

This basic contradiction in United States policy expresses itself in many ways and in many parts of the world.

In Europe, the recovery program for the Western Nations is based upon the assumption of a revival of trade between Eastern and Western Europe. Yet the shadow of the Truman Doctrine looms over the Marshall Plan to such an extent that any suggestion of action to promote such trade is at once attacked on the grounds that it might help Russia. Moreover, the economic recovery of Western Europe is becoming more and more linked to the notion that Western Europe must be re-armed, which introduces an entirely new factor likely to upset all previous calculations of cost—as well as all the political implications of an outright military alliance between Western Europe and the United States.

American policy in Germany—confused though it has been from the start—has nevertheless consistently aimed at a unified Germany rendered militarily impotent by some degree of "de-industrialization" and democratization. Yet, under the impact of the cold war and the Truman Doctrine, our policy has veered toward a divided Germany and the building up of its western part as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. Western European recovery under the Marshall Plan demands the extensive exploitation of German industry. This, in turn, means the rebuilding of a German military potential; and the idea of a re-armed Western Europe—if it is to be anything more than a total illusion—means the actual re-creation of a German military establishment.

Similarly, in the Far East, our policy has become more and more the mere adjunct of the overall anti-Soviet crusade and less and less of a constructive policy for recovery and peace. Our original purpose—to strengthen the emerging democratic forces and aid the economic recovery of Asia—has been all but submerged in strategic thinking. In China we are—for cold war reasons—subsidizing the wholly anti-democratic regime of Chiang Kai-shek. In Japan we are more concerned with building

a strategic base against the Soviet Union than with rebuilding a peaceful, democratic nation integrated into the economy of a prosperous Far East.

In the Near East, too, constructive projects, such as building a TVA on the Jordan River and restoring the food-producing capacity of erosion-ravaged lands, have been put aside in a cold war scramble for control of strategic oil. Our own painfully developed plan for establishing peace in Palestine was jettisoned, for fear lest its enforcement by the United Nations might permit the participation of Russian contingents.

Finally, in our own hemisphere, the Good Neighbor Policy of economic cooperation with Latin America has become a policy of strategic hemisphere defense, ignoring almost entirely the post-war economic needs and problems of our sister republics.

These examples suffice to illustrate the extent to which the two parallel but conflicting analyses of the world crisis and the two parallel but conflicting trends of our foreign policy affect our action in every part of the world. They affect with no less importance our own state of mind here at home.

Its Effect at Home.

The conflict of native common-sense humanitarianism with unreasoning officially-inspired fear has produced a state of frustration, in which anxiety and paralyzed inaction alternate with sudden outbursts of angry aggression. We see daily evidence of this state of mind in our domestic as well as in our foreign affairs. Where common sense and confidence would welcome the ventilation of conflicting ideas—where faith in our beliefs demands respect for the diversity of human nature—fear breeds the demand for uniformity and the desire to suppress the non-conformist.

Our state of anxiety and frustration is without doubt aggravated by our possession of the atomic bomb. We suffer from a sense of guilt—not so much because we invented and used this terrible weapon against Japan—as because we are now sorely tempted to use it against Russia. If one believes that Russia is the sole cause of the present world crisis, and if one possesses what one conceives to be a weapon capable of eliminating the

Soviet menace, the temptation to use that weapon must obviously exist. The mere existence of the desire to "drop a few things on Moscow"—even though it be resisted—places a burden of guilt upon our conscience. It creates the desire to believe that Russia is in fact so utterly evil as to justify the use of the most inhuman weapons against her. This is perhaps the greatest danger of a scapegoat analysis of the world crisis.

The problem of American foreign policy is, in other words, very largely a problem of understanding our own psychology. Its solution would be easier if our present state of mind were due to a clearly perceived clash between two contradictory points of view, each striving to gain control over public opinion and public policy. Unfortunately, there is no such clash. It is true that President Truman and his Secretary of State have enunciated conflicting analyses and doctrines. But the march of events has made the Marshall Plan more and more of a mere method of carrying out the Truman Doctrine; and Mr. Marshall himself seems in recent months to have become the prisoner of a belief closely akin to that of the President. Instead of two rival schools of thought struggling for ascendancy in the open forum of debate, there is merely a tired and anxious group of men pursuing a policy which attempts to reconcile the irreconcilable.

The Vicious Circle.

Mr. Truman's panic-inspired pronouncement produced its dangerous counterpart in Moscow. Whatever one may think of Russian post-war objectives and tactics, it is a fact that Russian policy up to March 1947 followed a clear and positive purpose—namely, to extract the utmost advantage from the shrewdly driven war-time agreements. But a careful examination of Russian policy after March 1947 clearly shows the increasing influence of fear and, at the present time, it is no exaggeration to say that Russian foreign policy—like our own—has become less the product of purpose than of panic.

Thus, we have now reached a stage in which the entire world is being driven nearer and nearer to destruction by the fact that the two centres of superpower are locked in a panic-driven vicious circle of mutual provocation. Each side defines its policy as a policy for peace. Each side describes its actions as precautionary measures taken against the possible

aggressive designs of the other. On both sides fear of attack leads to defensive preparations which provoke attack.

Just as it takes two to make a quarrel, it also takes two to end a quarrel without violence, once it has begun. A change in our foreign policy cannot alone arrest the present trend toward war. But neither can the present trend be arrested *without* a change in American policy.

II.

BASIS FOR REVISION.

If it is true that our present foreign policy inspires little hope that it can lead to a peaceful solution of the world crisis, what changes are required to convert it into a policy for peace?

Revised Analysis.

The first requirement must be a re-examination of the conflicting analyses upon which the two major trends in our present split-minded policy are based.

The Truman Doctrine rests upon its author's clearly stated belief that the world crisis and the present threat to world peace exist solely because the Soviet Union alone:

(1) has refused to cooperate in making a just peace;

(2) has violated agreements which, if kept, could have provided the basis for a just peace;

(3) has obstructed the work of the United Nations; and

(4) because the Soviet Union harbors the clear intention to destroy the independence and democratic character of all the nations of Europe.

This analysis leads to the obvious conclusion that the way to cure the world crisis and eliminate the threat to world peace is to stop the one disturber of the peace—by diplomatic effort and economic aid, if possible —by armed force, if necessary.

The Marshall approach originally recognized that the crisis and the threat to peace arose in large measure from "hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos." This implied at least a partial recognition of the first of *four major factors, which were ignored by Mr. Truman and which have nothing whatsoever to do with the nature or intentions of the Soviet Union.* These are:

Four Major Causes.

CAUSE ONE. We are living in a worldwide socio-economic revolution, greatly accelerated by the destruction and dislocation wrought by two great wars. The whole Eastern Hemisphere is suffering from shortages. The Western Hemisphere is threatened by potential over-production resulting from lost markets. The masses of Europe and Asia are struggling not only to dig themselves out of the ruins but to emancipate themselves from old forms and structures and to develop new forms and structures promising a greater degree of justice, security and freedom. The essentially middle-class structure of European society has been undermined by a series of expropriations, the depreciation of currencies, and the almost total inhibition of the formation of new private capital. Its managerial power-groups have been largely dispersed or dispossessed. Similarly, the colonial and feudal structure of society in the so-called backward areas is tottering—especially the traditional structure of Asia. Colonial empires are in the process of liquidation, giving rise to new problems for both the peoples emerging into freedom and the peoples whose living standards were in the past supported by colonial exploitation. In other words, we are living in a period of far-reaching social and economic change, resulting from mass suffering and mass discontent. Any such period is bound to produce tensions within nations and among nations; it is certain to arouse antagonisms between those who desire change and those who wish to preserve the old order.

This primary factor in the present world crisis was ignored by Mr. Truman's analysis and recognized—though probably without its full implications—by Mr. Marshall.

CAUSE TWO. We are living in a technological revolution, more far-reaching than the Industrial Revolution of the late 18th Century. Airpower and electronics have made a world formerly divided by oceans,

mountains and deserts into one world—one little world in which both peace and prosperity have become indivisible. Medical progress, while bringing great benefits to humanity and prolonging human life, has also, for the time being, vastly magnified the problem of feeding the world's rapidly growing population. And finally, atomic science has opened a door which leads either to the world's greatest era of progress or to the suicide of the human race.

Neither the Truman nor the Marshall analysis recognizes that something has happened which totally invalidates the old Clausewitz dictum that "war is the extension of policy by other means." Neither analysis takes into account that even a victorious war has now become the negation of policy.

CAUSE THREE. For the first time in the history of the modern world, military, political and economic power have become polarized at only two poles of superpower—Washington and Moscow. This has destroyed the only device by which a world composed of sovereign nation-states has, in the past, been able, even temporarily, to maintain peace. There can be no careful maneuvering to preserve a balance of power peace, when power is concentrated in only two poles of power. There can then be only a struggle for preponderance of power, in which each of the two participants is convinced that its own predominance is essential for the preservation of peace. To recognize that this is the point at which we have arrived is to recognize the futility of striving for disarmament or for "international control" of armaments in a world lacking a supranational authority.

There is no evidence that the makers of our bipartisan foreign policy have achieved any such recognition.

CAUSE FOUR. A world which has become physically one is at present politically divided into two hostile camps because Russia, Britain and the United States decided, by mutual consent, to abandon the principles of the Atlantic Charter and to adopt instead the pattern of an old-fashioned victor's peace. The solemn pledges against territorial annexation, against any change of sovereignty without the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and the guarantees to all peoples of freedom to choose their own forms of government and to enjoy equal access to raw materials—all these went overboard at Teheran and Yalta.

The "basis for a just and honorable peace" was not destroyed, as President Truman asserts, because the agreements reached between the Allies were violated by the Soviet Union, but because the agreements themselves violated the principles of a just and honorable peace.

Distorted Facts.

At Teheran and Yalta, Russia promised to enter the war against Japan soon after German surrender in exchange for territorial and political concessions in Europe and Asia. These concessions in effect divided the world into Russian and Western spheres of influence. It has remained divided ever since. Because of Yalta, General Patton's victorious Third Army stopped dead at Pilsen, leaving the liberation of Czechoslovakia to Russian forces. Because of Yalta, the American First Army withdrew from Thuringia and Saxony, which it had conquered, leaving these territories to Russian occupation. From Yalta flowed the ill-fated Potsdam Agreement, the annexation of Eastern Germany by Russia and Poland, and the expulsion of some 13,000,000 Germans from their homes. The line which divides Europe from Stettin to Trieste was drawn by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin in February 1945 by mutual agreement. What Russia has done *behind* that line since the war ended is another matter, but this does not alter the fact that one of the basic causes of the present crisis is that the line was drawn at all.

The fact is that President Roosevelt came to Yalta with the conviction—based upon the advice of the American Chiefs of Staff—that Japanese surrender could not be achieved without an extremely costly invasion of the Japanese Home Islands. He had been told that the invasion of Honshu alone would take a toll of 500,000 American casualties. The atomic bomb was as yet unproved. Mr. Roosevelt's primary concern was to achieve quick victory. To save casualties he wished above all to obtain the promise of effective Russian aid against Japan as soon as possible after German surrender.

Less concerned with Japan and by this time certain of victory over Germany, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Stalin came to Yalta with their eyes fixed primarily upon the shape of the post-war world. Mr. Churchill's objective was to restore as nearly as possible the pre-war balance of power. Mr. Stalin's objective was to alter it as much as possible in Russia's favor.

Mr. Stalin wanted a divided world because he considered this the most effective way to protect Russian national interests and to expand the Soviet revolution. Mr. Churchill wanted a divided world because he deemed this the best way to contain Soviet expansion. Mr. Roosevelt accepted a divided world as the price for quick victory and with the undoubted hope that he could later on glue it together again.

By the time the Big Three met again, at Potsdam five months later, Mr. Roosevelt was dead, Germany had surrendered, the atomic bomb had been proved at Los Alamos, and a Socialist Government had come to power in the United Kingdom. Both the British and American ships of state had lost their steerageway. Britain had dismissed the Captain and taken aboard a new pilot, who had not yet worked out the compass bearings of the course he intended to steer. The American ship of state, suddenly equipped with new and terrifyingly powerful armament, was in the hands of an untried and inexperienced navigator. But the Russian ship of state, with the same pilot at the wheel who had steered through to victory, was still ploughing along on a steady course under a full head of steam.

By this time it had become evident that Japan was at the end of her rope and that, even without the use of the atomic bomb, Russian help was no longer needed. Mr. Truman thus found himself in the position of having to carry out what must have seemed to him an extremely bad bargain. Nevertheless, the Anglo-American negotiators at Potsdam not only loyally applied the Yalta Agreement to Germany but permitted an even greater annexation of German territory by Russia and Poland than had been contemplated. In addition, they made the fatal mistake of leaving Germany's Western frontier unsettled, thereby arousing French fears of a German-controlled Ruhr arsenal. To cap the climax, they admitted the French to equal partnership in the four-power management of Germany without securing French adherence to the Potsdam Agreement. The result was that the execution of the Potsdam Agreement was blocked from the very start—and not, in the first instance, by the Russians, but by French insistence that it be held in abeyance until the question of the Franco-German frontier could be settled.

I submit that these facts of recent history add up to a major contributing cause in the present crisis. Not only do they find no recognition in the current bipartisan analysis. They were actually distorted by the Presi-

dent's claim on March 14, 1948, that: "The agreements reached, though imperfect, could have provided the basis for a just and honorable peace, if they had been kept. But they were not kept. They were ignored and violated by one nation."

Surely any analysis is worse than useless which does not recognize that it was precisely the nature of the agreements reached between Russia and the West which destroyed the basis for a just peace. Surely any analysis is worse than useless which does not recognize that both sides have violated these agreements.

Soviet Sins Re-examined.

If it be accepted that the socio-economic revolution, the technological revolution, the polarization of power, and the wartime agreements are major contributing causes of the world crisis, the dangerous futility of attempting to load the blame upon any one scapegoat becomes apparent. It also then becomes possible to examine the charges against any putative scapegoat in the light of the greater objectivity provided by the context.

It is true that the Soviet Union has failed to cooperate in making the peace. It is true that the Soviet Union has violated agreements. It is true that the Soviet Union has obstructed the work of the United Nations. But it is glaringly untrue to assert that the Soviet Union alone has been guilty on these counts.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that the Soviet Union has exploited the socio-economic revolution of our times in order to propagate its communist doctrine. But—to a lesser extent—is it not also true that the United States has exploited the same conditions to propagate its doctrine of free enterprise capitalism?

There can be no doubt whatsoever that the Soviet Union has ruthlessly exploited the existing condition of international anarchy to push forward wherever possible not only the Russian frontiers but the frontiers of Soviet influence. But have not we, too—though less ruthlessly—pushed forward the frontiers of our influence? We have not annexed territory nor created satellites in the Soviet manner, but surely we have made Greece, Turkey and Italy into something less than independent nations, and Japan into an American outpost.

We may think that we have done these things because the Russians did them first. The Russians may think the same in reverse. The facts of our respective actions remain unaltered. Some of these facts are not yet clear. One question, which remains for future historians to decide, is whether or not—apart from conscious motivation—our use of the first atomic bombs against Japan was actually the opening move in a post-war power-struggle against the Soviet Union. Mr. P. M. S. Blackett, an eminent British scientist, who was advisor to the Royal Navy during the war, comes—after a careful sifting of evidence—to the flat conclusion that "the dropping of the atomic bombs was not so much the last military act of the Second World War as the first act of the cold diplomatic war with Russia now in progress." One can accept the undoubted sincerity of Secretary Stimson's statement that the bombs were used to shorten the war and save lives, and yet also recognize the fact that the use of the bombs at that precise moment in history did actually deny to the Soviet Union any legitimate claim to a major share in the victory over Japan, thereby establishing the post-war supremacy of the United States in the Far East. Was this the opening move? Or had the cold war already begun?

Whichever way the question is answered, the facts of Soviet action and the facts of American action remain. Any analysis—if it is to serve as the basis for a new constructive policy—will fail of its purpose so long as it ignores facts and proceeds on the basis of self-justification. The only analysis which can serve as the foundation for a new American policy is one which seeks the truth and not a rationalization of past action or present prejudice.

III.

A REVISED POLICY.

Aims.

What conclusions emerge from this reconsideration of the problem we face? What should be the positive aims of our foreign policy? What fears are justified, and what negative counter-measures should be embodied in our policy to insure against actually existing dangers?

The two broad positive aims of our policy should be:

First: to help make "a just and honorable" peace settlement.

Second: to help devise the means of preserving the peace, once a just and honorable settlement is made.

These two aims cannot be undertaken in chronological sequence. They interlock and require simultaneous parallel effort. It is obvious that the peace cannot be preserved until it has been firmly established. It is less obvious, but equally true, that the peace cannot be made until there is in sight a means of preserving it.

Reverse Emphasis.

Let us consider first how the United States could more effectively help toward making an equitable peace settlement.

If there is any validity to the revised analysis which I have suggested, it seems clear that the greatest contribution the United States could theoretically make would be to reverse the emphasis at present placed upon the two conflicting elements in its policy. That is to say, the greatest contribution the United States could make—if this were possible—would be to double or triple its present expenditure on constructive economic recovery —without cold war strings attached to the assistance given—and to cut in half, or reduce even further, its present expenditures on conducting the cold war and preparing against actual armed conflict.

This can obviously not be done—or even recommended—unless a re-examination of our present fears leads to the conclusion that some of them are baseless or exaggerated.

Our Fears Re-examined.

I submit that a large part of our anxiety is misdirected or exaggerated by psychological factors within ourselves.

The fear of worldwide communist revolution—which means in the first instance the fear of communist penetration of Western Europe and

non-communist Asia—is *not* without foundation in reality. There is still justified mass discontent in large segments of the world's population. There are well-organized and highly disciplined communist parties operating within most of the Western European nations—especially in France and Italy. These parties seek eventually to gain control of the governments of their respective countries; and, should they gain control, they would no doubt seek to make these countries subservient to Moscow; they would likewise without doubt abolish the Western concept of political freedom. In China, the communists already control vast areas and are waging an increasingly successful civil war against the Central Government. Communism seems to be on the increase in the important food-producing countries of Southeast Asia. The American policy-makers are therefore probably justified in their fear of communist penetration and revolution. We shall return to the question of whether their present counter-measures are, or are not, effective.

Our second great fear is of Soviet military aggression. This, too, is in the first instance a fear for Western Europe, but it also includes apprehensions with regard to Asia and the very definite fear of an atomic blitz upon our own cities, once the Russians come into possession of atomic weapons.

This fear seems to me exaggerated. There is no tradition of aggressive Russian militarism. As General Clay recently stated—and he should know—there is no sign of Russian preparation for aggressive warfare. There is, on the contrary, much evidence that the Russian regime fears war and believes that it can gain far more from continuing to exploit an uneasy armistice than it could from an attempt at world conquest by military means. If this were not true, it is difficult to see what has kept the Red Army from over-running Europe before now. As to an atomic attack upon the United States—assuming that the Russians have atomic weapons and the means of delivering them—it is hardly likely that the realists in the Kremlin believe that they could achieve quick and decisive victory by these means. And, if they failed of quick victory, they would merely have forged an anti-Soviet coalition which would ultimately destroy them.

There is, of course, the danger that panic may produce irrational action.

I submit, nevertheless, that our fear of Soviet military aggression is probably founded less upon reality than upon our own unconscious desire to shift the conflict out of the realm of politics and ideology, where we feel uneasy and uncertain, into the realm of military force, where we feel ourselves on familiar ground and are confident of our preponderant strength. We must also bear in mind that we—having once used the atomic bomb and being tempted to use it again—are predisposed to attribute a similar attitude to others.

If there is any truth in the foregoing examination of our two major fears, it would seem to follow that we should, in our own self-interest, expend the greater part of our efforts in stopping the spread of communism and the smaller part in preparing for military conflict.

Stopping the Armament Race.

But how can the United States cut down its present high rate of expenditure on armaments without jeopardizing its safety and without inviting Soviet aggression through a demonstration of weakness? And, unless it cuts down on its own armament and the projected re-armament of Western Europe, how can the United States double its expenditures on reconstruction?

These highly pertinent questions carry us to the point where it becomes evident that the effort to develop a policy that will help *make* the peace must be paralleled by an effort to develop a policy that will *preserve* a peace once it is made.

Past experience has clearly demonstrated the futility of all attempts to attain even limited disarmament by agreement among the sovereign nation-states. So long as there is no supra-national world law and no supra-national authority to enforce it, it is clearly hopeless to expect the sovereign nation-states to forego the ultimate sanction of force. To harbor any such hope is about as reasonable as to expect gold prospectors in a new frontier community, where there is neither law nor a sheriff, to abandon the habit of carrying fire-arms. The world's statesmen have realized this for the past fifty years. But—instead of coming to the only logical conclusion—the world's statesmen have deluded themselves and

the peoples of the world with the notion that, while total disarmament might be impossible, limited disarmament might be brought about by international agreement. The fact is that, in a world of international anarchy, limited disarmament simply means giving the initial advantage to an aggressor. The experience with Nazi Germany and Japan should have proved that point once and for all.

The fact is that there can be no half-way house between total armament for total war and total disarmament for total peace. There can be no half-way house between an armament race and world government. The present United Nations structure is precisely an attempt at building such a half-way house. It cannot produce disarmament because it lacks the authority of a world government.

This Requires World Government.

Once this is realized, any nation which truly wants peace cannot escape from the conclusion that it must throw its full energy and power behind the effort to develop the United Nations into a world government. Our present leadership has so far failed to grasp this all-important fact. Secretary Marshall has expressed the opinion that "the problems presented to those who desire peace are not questions of structure." Our present bipartisan policy-makers apparently hold the view that the existing United Nations structure would be adequate to preserve the peace, *if* the peace could be made—that is to say, if Russia would permit the peace to be made and the United Nations to function.

I submit that the peace cannot be made unless a way is found to stop the armament race, and that the armament race cannot be halted except by making the United Nations into a world government, endowed with the exclusive right to maintain and, if necessary, to use armed force.

What About Russia?

To say that it is useless to discuss the establishment of world government so long as the Soviet Union would obviously refuse to join, is like saying that it is useless to stop smallpox in Europe and the Western Hemisphere so long as the peoples of Asia refuse to be vaccinated. It

takes years of educational effort to persuade a suspicious and superstitious coolie that vaccination is not some form of evil magic. It may take years to persuade the suspicious and—in a sense—superstitious Soviet leadership that world government is not some sinister device to destroy the Soviet Revolution. Russia cannot be expected to subordinate its national sovereignty to that of world government, until Russia is convinced that Russian interests would best be served by such action.

No such considerations are involved for the United States. There can be no legitimate fear that the subordination of American sovereignty to a world government might mean subordination to a world government hostile to American interests. This is all the more true, if it is assumed that the Soviet Union and its satellites would decline to participate in the early formative phase of world government.

If, as is likely, the Soviet Union would at first refuse to agree to an American proposal to transform the United Nations into a world federal government, we could then proceed, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to organize a federal government of all the peoples prepared to unite in this manner. It is true that the establishment of such a federation within the United Nations framework would not make immediate disarmament possible. But it would make possible a long step in that direction. It would let the majority of the peoples of the world, united on the federal principle, disarm as individual nations and concentrate their military strength in a single supra-national military establishment. This establishment would have to be maintained at sufficient strength to deal with any realistic threat of military aggression, until the day when the Soviet Union might tire of standing alone and of supporting the heavy burden of unnecessary armaments. Then, and then only, would complete disarmament become possible. In the meantime, however, there would no longer be an armament race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders would have to realize that the only element of superior force in the world belonged, not to one nation, but to the majority of the peoples of the world. I question whether the Soviet regime could long persuade the Russian people that such a force was arrayed for any other purpose than to maintain the peace. It would not be easy to make the charge of "capitalist imperialism" stick against the united peoples of Western Europe, the Western Hemisphere of Australasia and much of Africa, Asia and the Near and Middle East.

Means of Halting Communism.

Much would, of course, depend upon the role of the United States in such an embryonic government of the world. If we sought to dominate the other peoples and used our preponderant economic and military resources to assert domination, nothing but harm would be accomplished. Perhaps the most dangerous way in which we could abuse our strength would be by forcing upon an embryonic world government a wrong method of combatting the spread of communism. This brings us finally to the question of means to be employed.

The means so far employed by the United States to stop communist penetration fall into two major categories: first, an attack upon the social and economic conditions which breed mass discontent; and, second, subsidies, arms and eventually outright military assistance to nations, or groups within nations, hostile to communism and the Soviet Union. In the first category belong UNRRA, the American loan to Britain and a large part of the funds being spent by ECA. In the second category belong the subsidies to Chiang Kai-shek, the re-arming of Turkey and our intervention in Greece and in the recent Italian elections. Due to the merging of the Marshall Plan into the Truman Doctrine, the distinction between the two categories cannot always be clearly drawn.

The operations conducted primarily as an attack upon economic distress have been, on the whole, fruitful. The economic recovery of the United Kingdom is the outstanding example.

The operations conducted as outright anti-communist or anti-Soviet campaigns have either produced limited and perhaps temporary results, or have backfired altogether.

Our intervention in Greece can at best be described as a temporarily successful holding operation, which has bought time without producing a cure. Italy is another example of limited success; by bringing to bear every known kind of pressure, we succeeded in holding down the communist vote in last Spring's elections; but, in spite of an American threat of starvation and a Papal threat of excommunication, one Italian out of every three still dared to vote the communist ticket. The social and economic evils which tempted the Italian peasant and factory worker toward communism remain to be cured.

China is an example of outright failure. It is not too much to say that American aid to a corrupt and reactionary Central Government has actually benefited the Chinese Communists. This is primarily because, in backing oppressive landlordism, we have left the communists free to exploit the most powerful sentiment among the Chinese masses—namely, the desire for land reform.

Apart from these direct results of the two methods, it is clear that the negative anti-communist approach entails another important basic disadvantage. It puts us into bed with our natural enemies and estranges us from our natural friends. If hostility to communism is the chief qualification for American aid, not only fascist and semi-fascist governments but reactionary political parties and groups within all countries may hope to qualify. This, in turn, alienates the sympathy and support of middle-of-the-road liberals and of the vast masses in Europe and Asia, who are not predisposed toward communism, but who are even less disposed to acquiesce in the maintenance of an intolerable status quo.

IV.

Conclusions.

We come, then, to these three major conclusions:

1. We cannot effectively help in making the peace unless we simultaneously help effectively in devising the means to preserve it, because:

(a) The peace cannot be made unless the armament race is halted;

(b) The armament race cannot be halted without the establishment of a supra-national authority.

2. There is relatively little danger of Soviet military aggression unless there is first a further communist penetration sufficient to alter greatly the present power relationship between Russia and the United States. There is, however, a very real danger of further communist penetration.

3. The way to stop communist penetration is to seek this result as the by-product of an effective attack upon economic distress and social injustice.

This means a policy which will truly carry out Secretary Marshall's great sentence. It means a policy—for us and for the embryonic world federation to be established—which is actually "not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos."

Such a policy must rest upon an honest quest for facts, and not upon the hysterical search for a scapegoat. It must be born out of courage, clear vision and confidence, and not out of fear-befuddled confusion. It must, above all, be carried out by men who look steadfastly ahead to the goal of peace, and who do not pause every now and then in their search for peace to consider the foul alternative of atomic war.

Such a policy must be demanded and supported by a people which recognizes that, even if quick victory could be achieved by atomic war, such a victory would destroy all that is good in ourselves and in our nation.

The American people have given President Truman a vote of confidence. They have given him a new and better Congress to work with—a Congress fully controlled by Mr. Truman's own Party.

Will a new leadership emerge to meet this challenge?

Will it sweep away the misreading of our time, the distortion of history, the false fears and contortions of self-justification which have produced our present policy?

It can, if it has the courage and the will.

THE BERLIN CRISIS

Address to the

COUNCIL ON WORLD AFFAIRS

by

JAMES P. WARBURG

Providence, Rhode Island

December 7, 1948.

The Berlin Crisis

You have asked me to discuss the Berlin crisis. I should like to begin by trying to set this problem in the context of contemporary history.

The present crisis in Berlin is the logical culmination of three years of mounting tension over the larger and more complicated problem of Germany. The tensions in Germany, and in other trouble-spots on this troubled planet, are in turn symptoms of the malady from which the entire world is suffering. They are like the rash which accompanies a case of measles. At times they itch so agonizingly as to appear to be the real source of our affliction.

Yet the true seat of the evil lies deeper—in the breakdown of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and the West. Even this is not the ultimate source of the disturbance, for the breakdown of the wartime coalition, upon the maintenance of which the fragile structure of peace was precariously erected, arises from a number of factors; some of them have little or nothing to do with the nature or intentions of either the Soviet Union or the West.

For one thing, the world is full of tensions because we are living in a period of far-reaching social and economic change. For another, the world has almost overnight become physically one, and can henceforth be governed peacefully only as one entity. This means that the ill-prepared human race now faces the grim choice of either rapidly devising the means of peaceful political unification, or else submitting to unification by conquest through atomic war.

Given the technological, sociological and economic facts of life, we should be facing a major crisis in world affairs, even if there were no Soviet Union, no communist doctrine, no breakdown in Germany and no minor crisis in Berlin.

Within this framework of overall context, it is true that Germany and China are at present the itchiest spots in the rash of trouble which

covers the face of the globe. They, more than any other points of irritation, arouse the temptation to scratch frantically, thereby causing a serious and perhaps fatal infection.

Germany is important, not merely because of its explosive potential, but for three other reasons.

In the first place, there is no other spot on the globe where the whole theory of a peace based upon great power cooperation is as explicitly on trial as it is in Germany. Nowhere else are the three leading Western powers and Russia so deeply committed to the experiment of cooperative management. Nowhere else have they failed so dismally. The fiasco in Germany has not only postponed the making of a peace settlement; it has undermined the at best flimsy structure set up to preserve the peace, once a settlement is made. The United Nations organization rests upon the assumption of continued great power unanimity. The attempted quadripartite control and management of Germany rested upon precisely the same assumption, except that it involved only the four occupying powers—the US, the USSR, Great Britain and France.

In the second place, Germany—not Russia—is still, in the minds of vast numbers of Europeans, the psychological storm-centre of Europe. The French, as well as the Czechs and Poles, see the greatest threat to peace in resurgent, aggressive German nationalism. This fear of Germany may appear as strange and even pathological to many Americans. It exists, nevertheless, and has an important bearing upon the problem of achieving anything like Western European unity.

Finally, Germany—even in defeat—is still the central gear-wheel of the European economy. Before the war Germany fulfilled a quadruple function in the European trading community:

1. It supplied raw material. Germany was the chief source of surplus coal on the Continent, upon which depended the industrial structure of most other European countries. Germany also exported large quantities of potash, which had an important bearing upon European agriculture.

2. Germany contained the greatest industrial concentration and the largest and most compact force of skilled labor on the Continent. It

supplied much of the steel, machines, machine-parts and chemicals for the Continent, as well as a considerable proportion of its consumer foods.

3. Germany provided a market—for the raw materials and agricultural produce of Eastern and Central Europe, for the dairy products of Denmark and the Netherlands, and for the specialty manufactures of Switzerland and Czechoslovakia.

4. Germany was an important factor in the European transportation system. Its merchant fleet carried much of the Continent's overseas trade. Its rivers, canals and railroads were the heart of the intra-Continental traffic. German trans-shipment trade created most of the business done by the Dutch and Belgian seaports.

Today, after three and a half years of Allied occupation, Europe's great workshop and market-place is an economic desert. It can neither buy nor sell. An artificially erected barrier separates Eastern and Western Germany, blocking the core of the intra-Continental transport system. On one side of the barrier lies the industrial heart of Germany. On the other side lies the breadbasket. As a result, all of Europe is suffering from lack of German coal, German steel, German machines and machine-parts. Rotterdam and Antwerp lie idle. The recovery of the whole Continent is delayed and impeded because the central gear-wheel of its economy lies broken and rusting in the rubble of inter-Allied disagreement.

Germany itself is a fairly accurate miniature of a disrupted Europe. Its Western half, deprived of its normal source of foodstuffs in the East, depends upon the charity of the Western Hemisphere for sustenance. Its Eastern half, cut off from normal intercourse with the West, suffers from lack of manufactured goods and is enslaved and exploited by the Soviet Union. The same thing is true, in a broad sense, of the entire Continent.

How did this come about?

In part, the German fiasco is due to the short-sighted and vengeful nonsense introduced into Allied planning by the Morgenthau proposal. In part it is due to the equally short-sighted and ruthless preoccupation of Russian leadership with reparations. But, most of all, the present state of Germany is due to the failure of the victorious anti-Axis coalition to

reach a workable post-war understanding. This failure first became apparent at Yalta and was later crystallized—so far as Germany was concerned—in the Potsdam Agreement of August 1945.

The Potsdam Agreement was a compilation of compromise and unreconciled contradiction. Yet even this wretched document might perhaps have been developed into a workable plan, had it not been for two great blunders. The first blunder was to permit an excessive Russo-Polish land-grab in Eastern Germany, involving the expulsion of 9,000,000 Germans from their homes, while at the same time leaving the question of Germany's Western frontier undecided. The second blunder was the failure to make France a party to the Potsdam Agreement, while at the same time giving the French a zone of occupation, an equal voice in the four-power management of Germany and, hence, the right to veto any four-power action under the Agreement. Taken in combination, these two blunders gave France good reason for fearing the revival of a united German nation, as well as the means of obstructing the unification called for by the Potsdam Plan.

Contrary to widespread belief, it was not Russia but France which—as the result of these two blunders—vetoed the carrying out of the Potsdam Agreement during the first period of its existence. Unfortunately, it was precisely during this early period of four-power occupation that an understanding with Russia might still have been possible. From the very beginning, the Russians regarded France as a participant invited only out of courtesy at the urgent request of Britain and the United States. They expected Britain and the United States to put an end to French obstructionism in much the same way as they would have dealt with recalcitrance on the part of one of their satellites. It was not until after the United States and Britain had shown that they were neither able to reach an understanding with France nor willing to coerce French cooperation, that Russia began seriously to violate the Potsdam Agreement and to go its own way in its zone of occupation.

From 1946 onward, the failure in Germany has increasingly become merely one manifestation of the worldwide breakdown of Soviet-Western relations. Yet it is important to recognize that the dramatic clash between the Soviet Union and the Western powers has obscured a continuing unresolved dissonance among the Western powers themselves.

Until the Moscow Conference of March 1947, there appeared to be some hope of reconciling the differences among the four occupying powers and of working out some modifications of the Potsdam Plan under which it might become possible to eliminate the zonal barriers and permit Germany to function as an economic and political entity. But whatever hope there had been vanished with the enunciation—during the Moscow Conference—of the Truman Doctrine, and the launching of an American crusade against the Soviet Union. Had the Marshall Plan been put forward at this time—instead of three months later—and had the Western powers been willing to make some concessions with regard to reparations, the whole picture might have changed—not only as to Germany, but throughout the entire world.

Here is a rough idea of what I think we could have said to the Russians about reparations at that time:

"We admit that the Yalta Agreement is ambiguous as to reparations. By its terms you may perhaps consider yourselves entitled to greater and earlier reparations from Germany than you are now receiving. On the other hand, the subsequent Potsdam Agreement—which you signed—clearly limited reparations to specified removals of capital assets and prohibited the taking of reparations out of current German production—certainly so long as Germany remained unable to produce enough to pay for its essential imports.

"In violation of the Potsdam Agreement, you have been taking reparations out of current production from your zone, while we and the British have been pouring money into our zones, to keep the Germans there from starving to death, and in order to bring about recovery. To a much smaller extent, the French too have been making a profit out of their zone, while we have been taking a loss on ours.

"This cannot go on."

Let us try to iron out the differences—political and economic—which have stood in the way of our carrying out our joint plan for treating Germany as an entity. If we can agree on these other matters, we are willing to make a compromise on reparations. In view of the devastation

wrought by the Germans in Russia, we are willing to modify the Potsdam formula as follows:

"When a united Germany is again self-supporting, and when it shall have repaid to Britain and to us the amounts we shall have advanced to make recovery possible, then we are willing to let Germany begin paying you reparations out of current production.

"The questions of how much Germany is to pay each year and how much Russia is to receive altogether must be carefully worked out. This involves our reaching an agreement as to what living standard, and what imports to sustain that standard, are to be considered necessary for a peaceable German nation."

Had we made some such proposal in March 1947 and coupled it with a Marshall Plan to aid European recovery, I believe that recent history might well have assumed a different aspect. We should then have been in a position to demand political concessions, not only in Germany, but in all of Europe, which might have ended the cold war before it involved East and West in a vicious circle of mutual provocation. It is true that such an approach might also have failed. Certainly it would not have provided an immediate solution for all the problems which had arisen. But it might well have opened the door to their gradual solution, whereas the Truman Doctrine and our uncompromising attitude on reparations wrote "finis" to the endeavor to find a basis for agreement.

From March 1947 to the present, the course of events in Germany and elsewhere has followed the predictable pattern of a Greek tragedy. Once the Moscow Conference had ended in failure, it was a foregone conclusion that Britain and United States would proceed to relieve themselves of an intolerable burden by a rapid rehabilitation of the West German economy. It was a foregone conclusion that the economic unification of the Western zones would raise the problem of political unification, the idea of creating a West German state, and the notion of making a separate peace with that state. It was a foregone conclusion that such action on the part of the Western powers would provoke some sort of Soviet retaliation—probably in Berlin.

This is not hindsight. In a book written just a year ago, after the London Conference had sealed the earlier failure at Moscow, I

stated that it was now certain that Britain and the United States would proceed to organize "Bizonia" as an integral part of that Western Europe in which the truncated Marshall Plan was to operate, and I expressed the belief that this raised four important questions to be answered in 1948:

"First: Would France join her zone to Bizonia? Or would she hold off because of her objection to an even partially unified Germany?

"Second: What were the Anglo-American intentions concerning the Ruhr? Were the Ruhr industries to be turned back to the Germans? And, if so, to what Germans? Were they to be socialized or turned over to German "free enterprise"? These questions about the Ruhr were closely related to the question of future French attitude. If the Ruhr were to be "internationalized", the French would probably join in the unification of Western Germany. But political "internationalization" involved a number of dangerous pitfalls of which the British and Americans seemed well aware . . .

"Third: A very tricky and immediate question was left for Britain and the United States in effecting the economic unification of their zones without, in effect, creating so much of a political entity in Western Germany as to block the road to eventual unification with the East. Even without committing the ultimate folly of slamming the door by making a separate peace and creating a definite West German sovereignty, the Western Allies faced the danger of playing into Russian hands by making it appear to the Germans that they—rather than the Soviet Union—were responsible for keeping Germany divided.

"This question led to the fourth and last: Would the Soviet Union itself slam the door on eventual unification by trying to oust the Western Allies from Berlin, on the grounds that their action in Western Germany had violated the Potsdam Agreement and rendered the Allied Control Commission in Berlin useless and obsolete? And, if the Russians did thus turn the facts upside down and undertake such a move, would they, in the face of Allied refusal to leave, try to carry it out by such sanctions as shutting off power and light from the Allied sectors of the German capital?

"These four questions," I concluded a year ago, "compose a dangerous pile of dry tinder in the heart of the European Continent."

I have not quoted this passage in order to prove my talent as a soothsayer, but rather the contrary. It took no second sight to foresee these problems—including the Berlin crisis—a year ago. The pattern of the future had been established. I have quoted my own observations merely to point out the extraordinary frivolity with which Britain and the United States have walked into a clearly foreseeable crisis, without any idea of how they were going to get out of it.

Instead of shutting off power and light—as I thought they might—the Russians chose to shut off overland communications. This was fortunate, because it gave us a chance to improvize the air-lift and, by an extraordinary feat of organization, not only to meet the challenge but to win a major propaganda victory. But the air-lift has solved no problems. It has merely bought time. The problems which culminated in the Berlin crisis remain to be faced and met.

What are these problems?

First of all, there is the question of the Ruhr. Upon this there is disagreement, not only between Russia and the West, but between France and the Anglo-American policy-makers. There is also considerable disagreement, momentarily glossed over, between Britain and the United States.

France wants the Ruhr physically separated from a new Germany—or even a new West Germany. She wants the whole area politically and economically removed from any German sovereignty and placed under some sort of international trusteeship. What many Frenchmen really want is to annex the Ruhr and the Rhineland, as they have annexed the Saar; but French leaders recognized, soon after the war ended, that this was impossible. The impellng motive behind French policy is not greed but fear—fear that any kind of Germany which controls the Ruhr will once again attack France.

Russia wants the Ruhr to remain part of a "united" German nation—"united", that is, except for the territory annexed by Poland and

the Soviet Union. The Russians want a unified Germany primarily because they want a major voice in the control of the Ruhr.

Britain and the United States have, from the outset, also wanted the Ruhr to remain part of Germany. Originally they wanted—and still claim to want—the Ruhr to remain part of a united Germany. But the Anglo-American position has become stultified in recent months by the cold war with Russia. What Britain and the United States now want is for the Ruhr to remain part of a West German state which is fully integrated into the Marshall Plan. They propose a Ruhr Coal Authority, in effect controlled by Britain and the United States, which shall be empowered to allocate the output of the Ruhr coal mines to German and non-German users.

The disagreement between the United States and Britain is at a different level of the Ruhr problem. The British Labor Government wishes to see the Ruhr mines and industries socialized. We would like to see them returned to private German ownership. The matter has been neatly deferred by trusteeship, but in practice it seems to be drifting toward the American solution. France wants neither the British nor the American solution, fearing both public and private German ownership of the Ruhr arsenal.

As stated a moment ago, the cold war against the Soviet Union has made a mess of the Anglo-American position with regard to Germany. Originally, Britain and the United States steadfastly adhered to the sound conviction that a unified Germany presented the only hope of a peaceful and productive Germany. Having made the fateful mistakes of Potsdam, they opposed all French and other demands for annexation of German territory in the West, and belatedly sought an opportunity to revise the Russo-Polish land-grab in the East. But the opportunity for revison in the East was bungled by our then Secretary of State in September 1946; and a few months later the Saar was conceded to France. After the Moscow fiasco and the launching of the Truman Doctrine, Anglo-American insistence upon a unified Germany became largely a matter of form. When Russia walked out of the Marshall Plan, taking her satellites with her, it was no longer possible to maintain even the polite pretense of an Anglo-American desire for unification. The Ruhr had now become the key element in the American

Recovery Program for the Sixteen Nations of Western Europe. Britain and the United States had now become definitely afraid of unification, for unification would mean giving Russia a substantial voice in the control of the Ruhr. I, myself, heard an American delegate reporting on the London Conference of December 1947, make the following illuminating statement:

"There was one very bad day", he said, "when it looked as if the Russians might make a substantial concession, so that we would really have to talk. But, fortunately, they didn't."

That is how far the Truman Doctrine and the cold war had taken us a year ago. Since then, we have drifted even further.

Apart from the question of frontiers and the disposition of the Ruhr, clearly foreseeable political problems have arisen in connection with the creation of a West German state. Obviously, economic unification of the Anglo-American zones had to mean some degree of political unification. For reasons already indicated, the hoped-for inclusion of the French zone failed to materialize. Going ahead on their own, the Anglo-American policy-makers were wise enough to avoid the pitfalls of going too far in the direction of creating a West German sovereignty. They resisted the arguments Mr. Herbert Hoover and others, who urged making a separate peace with a fully recognized West German state. Yet even their tentative steps toward creating a state with strictly limited sovereignty, subject to later integration in a unified Germany, were enough to provoke the Berlin crisis. This could hardly have been the cause of legitimate surprise in either London or Washington. Yet both professed utter outrage and amazement when the Russians took the action which any one who had studied their behavior would have expected them to take.

The Russian position was that, by proceeding to create a separate nation in West Germany, the Western Allies had nullified the Potsdam Agreement and made the Allied Control Council a meaningless anachronism. Therefore, the Russians claimed, the Allies had no right to remain in Berlin, since they had been accorded their sectors of the German capital as part of the agreement for the four-power control of Germany. This is not what the Russians said when they first cut off land communi-

cations. But, this is what the Russian position boiled down to after all the nonsense about "technical repairs" and so forth had been brushed away in last summer's conversations at the Kremlin.

As pointed out in the official State Department documents, this Russian position is legally indefensible. The rather loose arrangements for the four sectors of Berlin and the corridor leading to the Western sectors were not part of the Potsdam Agreement at all. They antedated the agreement for the four-power government of Germany and were part of a previous deal which fixed the boundaries of the zones of occupation. The Russians would thus have been on very thin ground indeed, had not Western carelessness provided them with a much stronger basis for action than existed in the legalistic aspects of their case.

While proceeding slowly and with considerable caution in the direction of creating a West German state, the Western authorities suddenly decided last Spring to introduce the long-overdue currency reform in the Western zones. No one can criticize this action in itself. Currency reform should have been carried out in all of Germany three years ago —and would have been carried out much sooner had not the French and Russians taken turns at making it impossible. But the timing of the move was ill-considered, and the attempt to introduce the new currency in the Western sectors of Berlin was especially unfortunate. Since Berlin lies in the heart of the Soviet zone, it must have been obvious that the introduction of the Westmark in the Western sectors of the capital would affect not only the Soviet sector but the economy of the entire Soviet zone. This presented the Russians with a just grievance at precisely the moment when they badly needed some sort of justification for slapping on the morally and legally indefensible blockade. It placed the Western Allies in a position from which they quickly saw the need of retreating, but from which they obviously could not retreat under duress.

What has happened since then is essentially very simple. We have wanted to give ground on the currency issue in Berlin; but—quite properly —we have refused to negotiate until the blockade was lifted. The Russians have used one pretext after another to defer lifting the blockade because their real reason for imposing it lies much deeper than the currency issue. A careful study of the protracted conversations held at Moscow during the Summer clearly shows that what the Russians really

want is to prevent the setting up of any kind of West German state, and to resume negotiations for the unification of Germany at about the point where they were discontinued a year ago. Failing this, they want to oust the Western Allies from Berlin and to incorporate the entire city in their zone.

We, on the other hand, are now so deeply committed to the cold war and to a West European Recovery Program which demands the integration of a fully controlled Ruhr, that we are unwilling to re-open the subject of Germany as a whole. We cannot agree to the unification of Germany—which we originally wanted, and still want as a long-range objective—without giving the Russians a voice in the control of the Ruhr. This we cannot do without dangerously weakening the Recovery Program for Western Europe, which, in turn, would dangerously weaken our position in the cold war. The alternative is to abandon Berlin; but this we cannot do without working a great injustice upon the people of the Western sectors and losing face everywhere in the struggle against totalitarian communism.

That, as I see it, is the essence of the present crisis in Berlin. I have purposely skipped over a mass of technical detail, including the protracted negotiations under United Nations auspices in Paris, because all this seems to me irrelevant to an understanding of the basic issues involved.

The choice we shall sooner or later have to make in Berlin is the same choice we shall have to make in the Far East and in every part of the world. It is the choice between a continued drift toward war and a reversal in the direction of peace. It is the choice between continuing to spend most of our available resources on armament, military alliances and military preparation for conflict, or—alternatively—devoting our major efforts and resources to a policy such as that once envisioned by Secretary Marshall, when he said: "Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos."

Today our policy *is* directed *primarily* against a country and against a doctrine. It is less and less concerned with the elimination of hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. We are on the wrong road.

There is still time to change.

There is still time to realize that the peace cannot be made so long as the arms race continues; that the arms race will continue until the United Nations is transformed into an effective world government; and that such a transformation cannot come about so long as we continue to oppose it.

There is still time to realize that Secretary Marshall was right, in June 1947, when he said, in effect, that the way to stop communism is to cut the ground of mass discontent from under its feet. There is still time to realize that we are now dangerously wrong in operating on the opposite theory—namely, that the way to stop communism is to contain it by physical force within a physical frontier.

Time does not permit me to discuss in detail just how I believe that our present overall foreign policy should and could be changed. I have publicly put forward specific proposals on several recent occasions. The point I wish to make here is this:

There is no answer to the Berlin crisis as such. There is an answer to the basic problems which have brought about the Berlin crisis, but this involves a fundamental change in our foreign policy.

I cannot tell you what we should or should not do in Germany, if we stick to our present disastrous foreign policy. I do not know, because I cannot see how the German problem can be solved peacefully in the context of a policy which must, in my judgment, inevitably lead to increasing tensions.

In a different context of overall policy, I would venture to put forward once more a few basic principles which I have been steadily advocating for several years. These are:

1. That only a reasonably prosperous German nation will be a peaceful German nation.

2. That a reasonably prosperous German nation is essential to a reasonably prosperous Europe.

3. That a divided Germany cannot be reasonably prosperous, because the Eastern and Western parts of it are interdependent.

4. That Germany could afford to cede the coal mining and the industrial area of Upper Silesia to Poland and still remain reasonably prosperous, provided it retained the Ruhr; that Germany could afford to lose the strategically provocative enclave of East Prussia, provided that it retained the remainder of its agricultural territory in the East. Holding this view, I have long contended that the frontier fixed tentatively at Potsdam should be revised so as to return to Germany Pomerania, Lower Silesia and the amputated slice of Brandenburg.

5. By the same reasoning, I have contended that the Ruhr should remain a part of Germany, but that the output of the Ruhr coal mines should be allocated by an international Coal Authority to non-German and German industries and consumers. In putting forward this suggestion two years ago, I had in mind a truly representative international authority, which would in time allocate not only Ruhr coal but *all European coal* among the users. This idea has now been partially adopted in the Anglo-American plan, but its chief value has been lost, because—in the context of a cold war policy—the Authority now proposed is to be controlled by Britain and the United States, instead of by a broad consortium of European users.

The five broad principles just enumerated relate to the question of *what physical Germany is to be re-created.* The following principles relate to the question of *security* and to the *political nature of the reconstituted German nation.*

As to security, I have maintained:

1. That German manufacture of planes, tanks, guns and weapons of any sort should be prohibited.

2. That pre-war Germany had erected an industrial capacity—especially in steel—far in excess of German needs, except for purposes of building up military power; that German industry should not again be permitted to expand beyond Germany's peaceful needs; and that this limitation could be achieved by controlling German imports and the amount of coal which Germany might be allowed to retain for her own use.

3. That, beyond these measures, there should be no attempt to de-industrialize Germany—especially since the loss of a large part of her farm lands in the East will compel her to import nearly half of her foodstuffs and to pay for them through exports of manufactured goods.

4. That it is basically not the possession of an industrial war potential but *the will to use it for war* that makes any nation a threat to peace; and that the all-important security question, as to Germany, is *how to destroy the German will to aggression.*

5. That the moral regeneration and re-education of the German people is primarily a problem which the Germans must solve for themselves; that they must be kept under surveillance until they have demonstrably solved it; but that the sooner the victorious Allies clear out of Germany and place this responsibility squarely upon the Germans, the sooner will there be any hope of regeneration.

As to the political and social structure of the new Germany, I have held, and still hold, the following basic beliefs:

1. That it is not the structural form which shapes the nature of a people, but the nature of a people which shapes the house in which it lives; and that any structural form is meaningless which does not arise out of the realized needs and ideals of the people who intend to use it.

2. That the proper task of the occupying powers would have been to see that the German people had an opportunity to evolve their own social and political structure, without once again falling into the clutches of the Junker-militarist-industrialist clique which has dominated the German past.

3. That—if Germany had been conquered by one nation—it might have been possible for that one nation to impose a political and social structure upon the vanquished German people; but that any structure so imposed, no matter how excellent, would endure only so long as the conqueror maintained it by force.

4. That any attempt to impose a political, social and economic revolution by four-power edict would founder on the inability of the four

powers to agree among themselves; and that—given the division of Germany into four zones of occupation—it was inevitable that each of the four occupying powers would attempt, in its zone, to re-create its own image.

Holding these views—which are, of course, debatable—I have several times put forward the suggestion that the United States should take the initiative in proposing the withdrawal of all armies of occupation from Germany, except for a small mobile police-force to be supplied by a broad international group, or—better yet—by the United Nations.

Last July I carried this thought one step further and suggested that we propose a withdrawal, by Britain, the United States and Russia, of all armed forces from the European Continent west of the Soviet frontier, together with the simultaneous signing of a three power treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of the European Continent.

It is obvious that such a proposal will not be seriously considered by a Government which is more preoccupied with winning than with ending the cold war. But it might well be considered seriously in the context of a basically revised foreign policy.

Right now we stand before our last good opportunity to reconsider our fundamental aims and objectives. We have elected a President in circumstances which give him extraordinary freedom of action and extraordinary responsibility. We face two immediate problems—China, and the question of whether to re-arm Western Europe.

The Far Eastern problem lies outside the scope of our discussion tonight. But the question of re-arming Western Europe is intimately linked to the problem of Germany. Unless the contemplated program of re-arming Western Europe is to be the most cruel hoax ever perpetrated, it is a program which must involve the remilitarizing of Western Germany.

Had you thought of this?

Had you realized that, if Western Europe is to be put in a position to defend itself by physical force, there is only one arsenal and one source of manpower which can be employed to bolster France, the Low Countries,

Scandinavia and Italy? Unless we remilitarize the Ruhr and draw on the forty odd millions of Germans in the Western zones, we shall re-arm Western Europe merely to fight a delaying action—to be once more over-run and conquered, and perhaps eventually to be once more liberated. That would indeed be a cruel hoax upon the peoples of Europe.

On the other hand, consider the probable results if we do re-arm the Germans. Would the Russians sit quietly on the Eastern bank of the Elbe River while this program went into effect? And—even if our action did not provoke the very attack against which it sought to erect a defense—what would be the effect upon the peoples of Europe upon whom we count as our friends? How good would be the morale of a re-equipped French army when it is asked to fight side by side with German soldiers? How good would be the morale of Belgian, Dutch, Norwegian or Italian troops in these circumstances?

This—not the Berlin crisis—is the urgent decision which confronts us at the present moment.

It is true that we face, in Berlin, a difficult and explosive tactical situation. But the real crisis we face lies not in Berlin but in Washington.

The real crisis we face is the necessity of choosing now either to revise our basic policy or to become the prisoner of our past mistakes.

The Soviet threat to peace is a very real threat. But, in thinking of it primarily as a military threat to be met by military means, we dangerously misunderstand its nature. What is more, in thinking of the peoples of Western Europe as pawns to be sacrificed in the opening moves of a worldwide power struggle, we are making a serious miscalculation.

The Soviet threat to peace is primarily a threat of communist penetration or subversion. The way to meet it is not with guns placed in the hands of harassed and unhappy peoples. The way to meet it is to remove the causes of mass discontent—to promote economic recovery and social justice—and thus to strike from the hands of the communists the only dangerous weapon they possess.

ROOM 2720

TELEPHONE
MURRAY HILL 4-0163

JAMES P. WARBURG
70 EAST 45TH STREET
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

Recd 3/11/49
Interesting

Dear Ed.
Here she be!
Jim

Note to Editors, Editorial Writers and Commentators:

In the course of recent weeks, I have raised a number of questions concerning the proposed Atlantic Pact and the accompanying program of rearming Western Europe.

Since I am in thorough sympathy with the objective of protecting Western Europe against aggression and merely question the efficacy of the methods proposed, it has seemed appropriate to offer a constructive alternative.

Accordingly, on February 26, I submitted a proposal for modification of the program to the Secretary of State.

On Thursday evening, March 10, I shall publicly state that proposal in an address to be delivered at Philadelphia. Simultaneously, I am submitting the proposal to each member of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. (The action of the House will be important in relation to the rearmament program.)

An advance copy of this address is enclosed herewith, The first half summarizes my criticism of the current proposal. The second half - beginning on page 10 - states the alternative suggested.

Whatever action our country may take involves risk. It is my hope that public discussion of the ideas tentatively put forward may lead to the development of a program which will more effectively protect Western Europe, without creating ambiguities likely to provoke miscalculation, or involving the United States in commitments beyond our power to fulfill.

Your attention is invited to the eight points of summary argument presented on page 18, and your comment on their validity would be most welcome.

James P. Warburg

March 7, 1949

THE ATLANTIC DEFENSE PACT

And the Proposal to Rearm Western Europe.

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION AND
A PROPOSAL FOR MODIFICATION.

By
JAMES P. WARBURG

Address to

UNITED WORLD FEDERALISTS
Philadelphia, Pa.

March 10, 1949.

With your permission, I am going to talk to you tonight about a subject which may appear to some of you as being somewhat remote from World Government; namely, the proposed Atlantic Security Pact and its accompanying program of lend-lease rearmament of Western Europe.

If I were not in full sympathy with the aims of the United World Federalists, I should not be here tonight. But—though I am in full sympathy with your aims—though I have the honor to be a member of your National Executive Council—I have felt for some time that this organization must concern itself with more than the direct pursuit of its ultimate objective, if it is to work effectively toward the realization of that objective. In other words, I feel very strongly that UWF must concern itself, more than it has in the past, with day-to-day events in the world and with the manner in which our Government reacts to and meets these events.

By this I do not mean that UWF should attempt to take a position on every issue that comes up in the conduct of this nation's foreign affairs. But I do mean that, in my judgment, UWF must take a position in favor of any major program which it thinks will lead toward a just and lasting peace, and against any program which it thinks will exacerbate tensions, give added momentum to the armament race and perhaps provoke armed conflict.

Holding these views, I make no apology for speaking to you tonight on the subject of the proposed Atlantic Security Pact and the projected rearmament of the Western European signatories.

The Need for Discussion.

There has been a tendency on the part of our Government to discourage discussion of the Atlantic Pact proposal, on the grounds that one cannot intelligently discuss a treaty one has never seen. There has also been a tendency on the part of our Government to clothe the preliminary negotiations for this treaty in a veil of wartime security. In combination, these two tendencies lead toward a most undesirable result—namely, the

eventual presentation to the American people of an accomplished fact. That is precisely what was done in March, 1947 with the Greco-Turkish Aid Bill, with the result that any member of Congress, or any ordinary citizen, who ventured to express doubts as to the wisdom of the proposal, was told that failure to accept it would mean a repudiation of the Chief Executive at a moment of international crisis.

I submit that this is a most unwise way to make foreign policy in a democracy such as ours. It means that a policy is adopted before it is understood and fully debated. It means that high-pressure propaganda must be used to "sell" the policy on an emotional basis, which rarely provides a solid or lasting foundation. Finally, it is likely to mean that the Government becomes the victim and the prisoner of its own propaganda, thereby beclouding its own vision and judgment.

I am not suggesting that the delicate details of treaty negotiation can be carried on in a goldfish bowl. But I am suggesting that the basic assumptions upon which a policy is based, the basic purposes and principles for which it is proposed, and the basic commitments involved or implied in its adoption can and should be frankly disclosed and freely debated.

When it became apparent, toward the end of January, that the negotiations for the Atlantic Pact were already far advanced and likely to advance rapidly to the point of actual commitment without any public discussion whatsoever, it seemed to me appropriate to make an attempt to provoke discussion of some of the issues involved. I proceeded to act as an individual in accordance with what seemed to me not merely the right but the duty of citizenship.

While it was true that the exact terms of the proposal were at that time unknown, enough had been disclosed by the Department of State and by the Chief Executive to warrant some very serious doubts as to the basic assumptions upon which the proposal appeared to be founded. I ventured to raise these doubts in a letter to the Secretary of State, and subsequently in two memoranda sent to a number of Senators and Representatives.

Five Reasons for Reconsideration.

In the first of these memoranda I stated five broad reasons for carefully scrutinizing the proposal. These were:

1. *The Geographical Loophole.* The proposed treaty will attempt to protect *some but not all* of the free nations of Western Europe. This implies that the United States and Canada will not protect non-signatories. *Thus the treaty invites aggression against the non-signatories.*

By inviting aggression against nations not included in the security pact, *the proposed treaty endangers the signatories themselves.* If, for example, Norway participates while Sweden and Denmark do not, and if either of the two non-signatories should become the victim of aggression, the defense of Norway would become well-nigh impossible. Similarly, if Iran is left exposed, Turkey is endangered; if Turkey is left unprotected, Greece is imperilled; if Greece is not included, Italy becomes vulnerable; and if Italy is not a signatory, the southern flank of France becomes exposed.

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2. *The Constitutional Loophole.* Under the proposed treaty Congress will, of course, preserve the right to declare war, to pass upon various means of carrying out our treaty obligations, and to appropriate the necessary funds. This means that, until Congress takes action—which may be a matter of months—*there will be no actual certainty whether, when, and in what circumstances the United States will actually throw its full weight into the conflict.*

The proposed treaty, therefore, creates precisely the kind of uncertainty which invites miscalculation by a potential aggressor and lulls the nations to be protected into a false sense of security. A similar uncertainty as to the position of Great Britain led the Kaiser to miscalculate in 1914, and Adolf Hitler to repeat the error in 1939.

---

3. *The Defense Dilemma.* The proposed rearmament of the European signatories *will not provide them with adequate defense—*

because of their insufficient manpower, inadequate present industrial capacity and political instability—*unless rearmament includes either*

(a) the remilitarization and rearmament of Western Germany, or

(b) the stationing in Europe, *before any war starts,* of large American contingents.

As to (a), we are committed not to rearm or remilitarize Germany. Moreover, even if we were not so committed, the rearmament of Germany would split Western Europe asunder and destroy its fighting morale.

As to (b), the attempt to build up a great American army in Europe before any war started would certainly provoke countermeasures by the Soviet Union, *if not an actual "spoiling attack" to prevent the completion of our preparations.*

Thus the proposed treaty will either fail to provide an adequate defense, or—in attempting to provide it—will provoke the very attack which it is designed to deter.

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4. *Defense against what?* The primary threat to the free nations of Europe at the present time is political rather than military. The primary threat is that of communist subversion or penetration. This is a serious threat to our own security because, if Russia gained control of Western Europe, the Russain war potential would be increased to a point where Russian leadership might consider that a military challenge to the United States offered a chance of ultimate success.

Therefore, the best defense for Western Europe at this time is the rapid rebuilding of its economic health and political stability. That is the basic assumption of the Marshall Plan.

The proposed treaty stipulates that the European signatories shall rearm themselves and each other as the *quid pro quo* for American assistance in rearmament. To the extent that Western Europe turns from recovery to rearmament, its defenses against political

penetration will be weakened. To the extent that American resources are diverted to rearming Western Europe, American aid to recovery will be diminished.

The proposed treaty creates an ineffective defense against the secondary danger of military aggression at the price of weakening the defense against the primary danger of political penetration.

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5. *The Dunkirk Danger. From the point of view of our own national security, the proposed treaty commits us, in the event of war, to a strategy which would involve the re-enactment of Dunkirk on a gigantic scale,* unless we had taken measures prior to the outbreak of hostilities which would insure our being able to hold Western Europe.

Are we prepared to take such measures?

Could we complete them without provoking attack?

If we should suffer a Dunkirk, we would have no one to fall back upon in the sense that Britain had us in 1940. Unless both the foregoing questions can be answered by our military men in the affirmative, *have we any right to commit our armed forces to the certainty of initial defeat?*

It is now over a month since these questions were raised. To date, not one of them has been satisfactorily answered.

There has been, during the past few weeks, very full discussion of what I called "the Constitutional Loophole". This debate, which has taken place largely behind the diplomatic scenes, has brought about much public discussion—most of it based on speculation as to the exact wording of the so-called "operative clause" in the treaty, which attempts to define what sort of assistance the signatories are to render each other in the event of attack. The word, "military" has wandered in and out of this clause, causing loud misgivings in the Senate when it was inserted and louder screams of anguish from abroad when it was deleted.

There has also been some public discussion of what I have called the "Geographical Loophole". The question of what nations are to be included in the Pact was brought into the open through our Government's efforts to induce the Scandinavian countries to join the Pact before its exact terms had been determined. Although, officially, the proposed treaty is still a "North Atlantic Security Pact", it has now become evident that our Government has already made some sort of approach to Italy, that Britain's Foreign Secretary has been talking to Greece and Turkey, that France wants her North African possessions included, and that we would like to see Portgual and perhaps even Spain among the signatories.

These are important matters and merit the fullest possible debate and consideration. But the most vital questions concern the fundamental assumptions underlying the treaty and the rearmament program. These assumptions have not yet been examined and debated.

The memorandum of February 1, in which I raised the five questions just quoted, ended with the following conclusion:

> The argument up to this point adds up to the contention that the proposed treaty, in its present form, *is an unsound and dangerous weapon to use in the cold war.*
>
> This raises the broader question of whether the time has not come to re-examine the basic premises of a foreign policy which has led, quite logically, to the present proposal. It raises the question of whether we are not placing too little emphasis upon our constructive efforts for peace and too much emphasis upon a purely negative policy of strategic containment. It brings out the need to re-examine the nature of the threat to peace, to see whether it is, in fact, essentially a threat which can be met by strategic containment, or whether it is essentially a political, or ideological threat to be met by means other than strategic containment.
>
> *Finally, the proposal raises the question of whether we have not reached the point in our present policy at which the cold war will cease to be a method of seeking a peace settlement and become, instead, merely the preparation for an atomic war tacitly assumed to be inevitable.*

The Defense Dilemma.

In order to focus attention upon some of these basic questions—particularly upon that question which I have called the "Defense Dilemma"—I followed up my first memorandum with another, in which I compiled such published data as I could find concerning the possible defense of the Rhine frontier against Soviet attack. I shall re-state here only a summary of the conclusions.

1. For an immediate attack upon Western Europe, the Russians have available a fully equipped and relatively mobile striking force of at least 30 divisions—probably nearer 50. This force could be doubled by merely bringing additional existing forces to a state of readiness in Poland or just behind the Soviet frontier.

2. To repel an immediate attack upon the Rhine line, there are available in Western Europe *at most* 18 fully equipped divisions. This estimate rests upon the doubtful assumption that the widely scattered American, British and French Armies of Occupation in Germany could be safely withdrawn under attack and used for the defense of the Rhine position. This estimate also includes 2 French divisions now in North Africa. It does not include French and Dutch forces in the Far East.

3. Allowing for a minimum reserve to guard against a breakthrough, this means that 12 divisions would have to cover a front of almost 500 miles. In 1944-45 the Allies came up to the Rhine line with 7 Armies comprising about 125 divisions. Against this formidable array, the Germans—with most of their forces employed on the Eastern Front—nevertheless brought off an initial breakthrough on a front of 75 miles. It is true that this German breakthrough was aided by weather which grounded all airpower, and that the resulting Battle of the Bulge ended in a costly German defeat. It is also true that the initial Russian striking force would probably not be numerically equal to the German Armies defending the Rhine in 1944-45. It would, however, be the cream of the Russian Army supplied with adequate airpower, whereas the German Army in the West was a badly depleted force, comprising some good and some second-rate divisions and woefully lacking in air support.

Furthermore, the Germans had to spread out their forces to defend the long line of the Rhine, while the Allies could concentrate their major

strength at whatever points they might choose for attack. This situation would be reversed. The Allies would have to spread their defense, while the Russians could concentrate their forces at points of their own choosing.

These considerations lead to the conclusion that there is no force in Western Europe today which would be capable of holding the most favorable position from which France and the Low Countries could be defended against the immediately available forces of the Red Army

4. *Air Power.* At the present time the combined Air Forces of France and the Low Countries would be wholly inadequate even to hold their own against the Soviet Air Power that would be thrown against them. It is doubtful whether the present operational strength of the RAF is sufficient to bring the Western Allies up to parity. It is certainly not sufficient to give the defending forces a superiority in the air which would offset their inferiority on the ground. On the other hand, immediate intervention by the United States Air Forces now in Europe and their rapid reinforcement from the United States—*plus the tactical use of atomic bombs*—could greatly aid an inferior ground force to hold the line of the Rhine. *Even with the assistance of such air support, however, the presently available ground forces would be wholly inadequate.*

5. The assumption is submitted—for challenge and correction by competent authority—that a ground force capable of holding the Rhine line would have to comprise *at least* forty (40) fully equipped divisions, 10 of them armored. In addition, this front line force would have to have full tactical and strategic air support, and air-raid protection would have to be provided for the cities and industrial centres of Western Europe and the British Isles. Furthermore, since Western Europe would depend upon American supplies, and since the Soviet Union disposes of a substantial fleet of modern submarines, the overseas routes of supply would have to be protected by powerful naval and air forces.

6. To create an adequate defense establishment for Western Europe—even if we supplied the greater part of the equipment and undertook to keep the sea-lanes protected—would require a mobilization of manpower and resources sufficient to disrupt the present efforts to achieve recovery and economic self-support. *To whatever extent recovery might*

be impeded, the defense of Western Europe against political penetration would be weakened.

7. And finally, assuming that the sacrifice in political security were accepted, it would take at least a year and probably considerably longer—even with the full cooperation of the United States and Canada—to create a force in Western Europe capable of holding the Rhine frontier against presently available Soviet forces. *During this time it would be possible for the Soviet Union to double its initial striking force by merely concentrating and making ready a larger number of its existing forces.*

In other words, at the end of a year of stupendous effort on the part of the West, the Red Army would still be in a position to march to the Channel, if it were not deterred from so doing by considerations other than the state of Western European defenses.

One other factor must be borne in mind. France might normally be expected to supply the bulk of the ground forces necessary to defend the Rhine. (In 1939 France was able to put 90 divisions into the field.) But this is now a dangerous illusion. The French military establishment was utterly destroyed in 1940 and must be rebuilt from the ground up. France has practically no modern equipment and very few reserves trained in its use—even if we were to supply the equipment for expansion. Worst of all, if France resorts to conscription, *at least one out of every four recruits is likely to be a Communist or Communist sympathizer.* The recent utterances of MM. Thorez and Cachin leave little doubt as to the attitude of French Communists in a war against the Soviet Union. Russia would have a far more numerous and more highly disciplined fifth column in France than the Nazis had in 1939-40.

In varying degrees, this same factor must be considered in all the countries of Western Europe.

There are only two ways of escape from this defense dilemma: one is the conscription and rearmament of perhaps 20 German divisions; the other is the stationing in Europe of two full American or Canadian Armies, with their own air support and services of supply.

Either alternative would be provocative in the extreme.

In addition, the remilitarization of Germany would destroy the fighting morale of Western Europe, whereas the commitment of two full Armies to the holding of Western Europe would seriously impair the freedom of action of Canada and the United States, thereby prejudicing their chances of ultimate victory in the event of war.

This will suffice to illustrate what I mean, when I say that the basic premises of the proposed Treaty and rearmament program urgently require re-examination.

Alternative Proposal.

In ordinary circumstances, I do not think it is incumbent upon one, who criticizes a proposal, to offer a substitute. If you see a man about to walk off a precipice, it is enough to shout a warning.

But these are not ordinary circumstances. We are already so deeply committed to some sort of Atlantic Security Pact that a complete reversal of policy is out of the question. Moreover, I have no quarrel with the purpose of the current proposal. I think it is most desirable to deter the Soviet Union from military adventure and to give Western Europe as much reassurance against attack as we possibly can. I merely contend, for the reasons already stated, that the current proposal is more likely to provoke than to deter attack, that it does not give Western Europe anything more than the illusion of military security, and that it seriously weakens the defense against political penetration.

Given these circumstances, I have felt under obligations to state an alternative which I believe would better accomplish a purpose with which I am in full agreement. The following proposal for modification of the Atlantic Security Pact and for the initiation of negotiations for a broader security system was presented to the Secretary of State on February 26. It has not hitherto been published.

I.

Working Hypothesis.

1. Russia wants to gain control of Western Europe. (This is not necessarily true but it is unsafe to start from any other assumption.) In the event of war, it would be Russia's primary objective to capture Western Europe, North Africa and the Middle East.

2. Russian control of Western Europe would be a direct threat to the security of the United States.

3. Without having first gained control of Western Europe, Russia does not want to risk war with the United States.

4. Russia will, therefore, try every means short of risking war to gain control of Western Europe. So far, her effort has been political—an attempt to exploit discontent, to sabotage recovery, to create cleavages and promote civil strife in order to bring Western European Governments under Communist control.

5. Failing in this political effort, Russia will resort to armed force, only if

   a) she thinks that the United States would not intervene, or

   b) she thinks she is strong enough successfully to challenge the United States, or

   c) civil war in Western Europe offers an irresistible opportunity for decisive intervention, or appears to threaten her own security.

II.

Indicated Policy for the United States.

1. To continue and reinforce our present efforts to secure Western Europe against *political* conquest by promoting economic recovery and political stability.

2. To make it as clear as we can, within the Constitutional process, that a military attack upon Western Europe would be regarded by us as an attack upon ourselves.

3. To make it clear beyond any doubt that Russia cannot hope to win a war against the United States.

4. To avoid crystallizing the division of the world into two orbits and to maintain as much fluidity as possible in the middle areas.

5. To seek, rather than to avoid, an overall settlement of the German problem.

6. To get the Red Army back behind the Soviet frontier.

III.

Suggested Implementation of Such a Policy.

In order to carry out the six aims just stated, I have put forward four specific recommendations:

A. A modification of the proposed Atlantic Security proposal.

B. The re-convening of the Council of Foreign Ministers to settle the East-West dispute over Berlin and to create the conditions in which progress toward a final German peace settlement becomes possible.

C. The initiation of preliminary talks with Great Britain and the Soviet Union leading to the negotiation of a Treaty of Europe.

D. The eventual negotiation of a similar Treaty of Asia.

Let me now take up each of these four points in order.

A.

Modification of the Atlantic Security Proposal.

1. Limit the Pact to the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Suspend all other conversations or negotiations.

2. Abandon the attempt to force, promote or assist rearmament, except for purposes of *internal* security, by the four Continental signatories.

3. Provide, instead:

   a) that the Continental signatories, while maintaining armed forces sufficient to preserve internal order, shall cease wasting any of their resources on rearmament against possible Soviet attack, and shall devote their entire energies and resources to the achievement of economic recovery and political stability.

   b) that France and the Netherlands shall agree to accept and abide by United Nations mediation of their current colonial wars and shall repatriate their troops now in the Fast East.

   c) that Great Britain, Canada and the United States shall coordinate their military, naval and air establishments in such a way as to provide jointly the maximum of power which can be brought to bear instantly upon a potential aggressor against any of the signatories.

Note: The purposes of this modification are:

1. To make it clear that the United States, Great Britain and Canada would consider an attack upon the Continental signatories as an attack upon themselves, which would cause them forthwith to treat the attacking power as an enemy, *without, however, implying that the United States, Great Britain and Canada would, if they went to war, necessarily fight such an enemy on the European Continent.*

2. To relieve the Continental signatories of the burden of rebuilding and maintaining armaments, and to enable them to apply their full energies to the strengthening of their social and economic defenses against political penetration or subversion.

I submit that this proposal conforms to the realities of the situation as it exists today. It avoids ambiguities which might lead to miscalculation by a potential aggressor or false expectations on the part of our friends. If certain objections occur to you, as I am sure they will, I would ask you to withhold judgment until you have heard the whole of my proposal.

I come now to the matter of Germany.

B.

Reconvening the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Proposed Action.

1. Suspend temporarily the attempt to write an Occupation Statute or a constitution for a West German State.

2. Demand the lifting of the Soviet blockade of the Western Sectors of Berlin as a precondition for an overall discussion of the entire problem of Germany.

3. Fix a date within the next three months upon which the Council of Foreign Ministers is to meet in Berlin.

4. Make it clear that our Secretary of State is going to Berlin with the intention of bringing about:

   a) a Four Power Agreement to permit Germany to function as an economic whole;

   b) the removal of the zonal barriers to trade and travel;

   c) the creation of conditions in which the Laender (State) Governments may function under Four Power supervision on a basis similar to that now established with regard to the Austrian Government, and in which the Laender

Governments may gradually work toward the establishment of a Federal Government for all of Germany;

d) the withdrawal of occupation forces other than the minimum contingents required to maintain internal order and to prevent illegal rearmament.

Notes.

1. It should be made perfectly clear that the Council of Foreign Ministers would *not* now be expected to write a German Peace Treaty.

2. We are at present in the position of seemingly not wishing to resume the attempt to unify Germany on the federal principle, although our official policy has been in favor of unification. If we are now in favor of partition, we should say so. If not, we should deny to the Russians the propaganda advantage of apparently favoring unification while we oppose it.

3. Two major obstacles to agreement with the Russians are:
   a) *Control of the Ruhr.* If we are willing to permit Germany to function as an economic entity under Four Power supervision, the Russians would automatically obtain a voice in the control of Ruhr industry.
   b) *Reparations.* If we have the desire to do so, there is a way to reach a compromise on the ambiguous Yalta Agreement, namely: to agree that Germany *shall* pay certain reparations out of current production, *but not until after she is self-supporting and has repaid the United States and Great Britain for the money pumped into the Western Zones.*

4. If agreement is reached on the Ruhr and Reparations, it may be possible to obtain Russian agreement to a revision of the Polish-German frontier with respect to some of the purely agricultural territories.

So much for the proposal with regard to Germany. Here, too, I must ask you to consider the suggestions made as part of the plan as a whole, and particularly to bear in mind that this German proposal goes hand in hand with the next item, namely, the Treaty of Europe.

C.

Treaty of Europe.

What is suggested here is a tripartite treaty between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, to be proposed to Great Britain and the Soviet Union as an extension to all of Europe of the disarmament idea contained in the modified Atlantic Security Pact.

This treaty would:

1. *Guarantee (a) the permanent demilitarization of Germany, and (b) the control of Ruhr coal and steel for the benefit of all of Europe, including Germany. The guarantee of (b) should be contingent upon agreement that the principle of allocating coal and steel should be applied to all European producers of these products, not, however, including Great Britain or the Soviet Union.*

Note: This would mean that Russia, Great Britain and the United States, as non-Continental powers, would have no voice—except perhaps as arbiters—in the allocation of coal and steel among the European countries. Continental countries, like France or Poland, would have a voice only if their own production of coal or steel were likewise subject to allocation by the European Coal Authority. (The present Ruhr Agreement is, in the long run, unenforceable, because it denies the Eastern countries any voice in the distribution of Ruhr products and creates for Germany a status of permanent second-class nationhood. Both defects would be remedied by the foregoing proposal.)

2. *Provide for the withdrawal from the European Continent West of the Soviet frontier of all United States, British and Russian troops, with the following exception:*

   So long as the Occupying Powers deem it necessary to maintain Armies of Occupation in Germany or Austria, or in both, the United States and Great Britain combined may maintain on the Continent the equivalent of not more than 1 armored division and 1 motorized infantry division; and the Soviet Union may maintain a like force if it so desires. (The reason for excluding France from the exception will be apparent from article 3.)

Note: *Nothing in this agreement should prevent the United States from stationing whatever forces it might, in agreement with Great Britain, decide to maintain in the British Isles.*

3. *The Treaty would guarantee all the nations of Europe west of the Soviet Frontier against aggression, as defined by the United Nations Security Council, on condition that these nations themselves would agree to maintain only such military forces as are necessary to preserve internal order, and that they would agree further to permit inspection by United Nations authorities of all military establishments and factories capable of producing offensive weapons.*

Note: This would mean that no country on the Continent of Europe would be permitted to create or maintain a military force capable of offensive action against a neighbor, nor to own or manufacture heavy weapons, such as tanks, heavy artillery, bombs or bombing planes.

Conversely, it would mean that the peoples of the entire Continent would be relieved of the burden of maintaining armaments, and would rely, for "police protection" upon the three guarantors.

D.

Treaty of Asia.

It is suggested that the negotiation of a similar treaty with regard to Asia be contemplated at some time in the not too distant future. In this treaty, Australia might perhaps take the place of Great Britain as the third guarantor.

Summary Argument in Support of the Proposal.

You have now heard the whole of the alternative which I have ventured to suggest in place of the Atlantic Pact—Rearmament Proposal sponsored by our Government. In presenting these ideas, I wrote to the Secretary of State as follows:

"These suggestions are put forward—not as an ultimate solution—but as a means of providing the most effective temporary guaranties of

peace and security in a world which still operates on the anachronistic principle of power politics. The ultimate solution requires the establishment of a world organization capable of enacting, administering and enforcing world law. In the meanwhile, however, the foregoing procedure might offer the following eight advantages over the course at present contemplated:

1. It would make clear to the Soviet Union and to the world that the cold war has not become an end in itself—that we seek and are willing to reach a peace settlement.

2. It would provide a realistically strong deterrent to Soviet aggression, without creating dangerous ambiguities or provocation.

3. It would get the Russian Army out of Europe (except for 2 divisions in Germany), while still leaving a token American force in Germany, which would have to be over-run if the Red Army moved westward. This is probably the strongest guarantee of immediate military action by the United States.

4. It would result in much faster attainment of economic self-support and political stability in Western Europe, thereby strengthening its political defenses and frustrating the Russian design of conquest by penetration and subversion.

5. It would save the United States not only the cost of rearming Western Europe, but also the cost of an indefinitely protracted ERP.

6. It would free the United States to apply its surplus economic resources at the points of maximum leverage throughout the world, instead of concentrating them only in Western Europe.

7. It would enable the United States, Great Britain and Canada (and perhaps other members of the Commonwealth) to preserve their freedom of action and to build up their military strength where it would count as a deterrent, or, in the last analysis, where it would count in a war—instead of prematurely committing a large part of their strength to the dubious defense of Western Europe.

8. Once the Continent of Europe west of the Soviet frontier were neutralized by the proposed Treaty of Europe, it would become possible for the Western Powers and the Soviet Union to discuss

realistically the reduction of their own armaments and the ultimate transformation of the United Nations into an organization capable of enacting, administering and enforcing world law."

That is the case presented to the Secretary of State.

That is the case I present to you. Doubtless it contains flaws and is subject to objections. I have put it forward in the hope that criticism and discussion will shape it into a more useful program than that at present sponsored by our Government.

It may well be that the negotiations have gone so far that a modification of the pact itself is no longer possible. Even if that should be the case, the rearmament program will remain open to discussion and reconsideration. Nor is there anything in the treaty to prevent our undertaking the other parallel actions suggested.

The suggestions put forward add up to nothing more than a method of seeking a relaxation of existing tensions and thus providing a breathing space in which to work for the ultimate solution. Even the best of treaties between sovereign nation-states will not bring about a lasting peace. The fact remains that there is no way to achieve lasting peace without ending the state of international anarchy—no way to end that anarchy or the all-devouring arms race without the establishment of world law and the agencies to enforce it.

This is the goal we must steadfastly keep before us. This is the house we must build, if our children and grandchildren are to live out their lives in peace. But—and here I end where I began—we shall never build that house of peace, if we concern ourselves solely with the blueprints and the builder's contract, while the material we have painfully collected goes up in flames.

We must work now for the assumption of the initiative by our Government toward transforming the United Nations into a World Government. But we must also work for the breathing space in which that transformation can take place.

E. R. MURROW - 3/11/49 - 3-3-3-3-3-3-3-3-3-3-3 EXCERPT - WARBURG INTERVIEW

Today, the representatives of the Protestant Churches meeting in Cleveland called upon the Senate not to take final action on the North Atlantic Pact until the American people have had an opportunity to gain a full understanding of its meaning. What we know about the terms of the Pact has come from a series of statements made by the State Department; and since it is the Department's job to get this Pact approved it cannot be regarded as wholly impartial.

In the interests of stimulating discussion on this important subject, I think you ought to hear from one of the most persistent and able critics of the North Atlantic Pact. James P. Warburg, former banker and expert on international affairs, has been submitting a series of memoranda to Congressmen and to the State Department. On the matter of straightaway military defense, Mr. Warburg holds that, because of insufficient manpower, inadequate industrial capacity - Western Europe can never reach a position where it could beat off a Russian attack, unless we re-arm Western Germany or station American armies in Europe.

But the nub of Mr. Warburg's objection is that the real threat to the free nations of Europe is political rather than military; that instead of spending their money and ours on re-armament they should concentrate on economic recovery and political stability. Having sufficient armed strength to maintain internal security, without trying to build up a military force that in any event couldn't stop the Russians.

Jimmy Warburg has proposed, and in fact has printed an alternative proposition that he thinks would achieve the desired objective. We'll start with a simple question: Jimmy, what's the real essence of your alternative plan?

WARBURG: The real essence is that I believe the present proposal is more likely to provoke than deter aggression, and that my alternative will deter military aggression without opening the door to political penetration.

MURROW: Do you propose that we should go to war if any European nation is attacked?

WARBURG: I propose that we make the clearest commitment we can within the Constitutional process, to go to war against the Soviet Union if it attacks any country in Europe outside the Soviet orbit. But I also propose that we make it completely clear

that this is a commitment to avenge, to try to liberate, but not necessarily to defend Western Europe against invasion.

MURROW: Now wait a minute: are you saying that Western Europe can't be defended?

WARBURG: I am saying that the present proposal implies that we shall defend Western Europe, and Mr. Queuille, the French Prime Minister, clearly stated the other day that this is his understanding. Whereas we cannot defend Western Europe without doing one of two things, either of which is likely to provoke the very attack we seek to prevent - re-arming the Germans, or committing two full American armies to the defense of Western Europe, and stationing them there before any war starts. Let's get this clear: there is a Soviet threat to Western Europe which is a definite threat to our own security. But the nature of this threat is primarily political. If it were primarily military, the Red Army could long ago have marched to the Channel.

MURROW: All right, how are you going to meet this political threat?

WARBURG: Whereas our Government's proposal demands as a quid pro quo that the Western European nations shall re-arm themselves, my suggestion is that we demand precisely the opposite - namely, that the Western European nations shall maintain only such military forces as are necessary to preserve internal order; and shall concentrate their entire resources and efforts on building their political defenses, that is, on achieving economic recovery and political stability. You have to bear in mind, Ed, that if we re-arm say forty French divisions today, at tremendous cost, one out of every four men we arm will be a Communist.

MURROW: And the only way to reduce that Communist Fifth Column is not to put them in the army, but to improve their working conditions, their economic stability, and remove the mass discontent on which Communism thrives. Is that what you're saying?

WARBURG: Precisely: and my proposal goes further. In addition to a modified Atlantic Pact I have proposed a Treaty of Europe which applies the same idea of disarmament to all the countries of the Continent - on both sides of the Iron Curtain; and which would get the Red Army back behind the Soviet frontier.

MURROW: I can see that you don't want to talk to the Russians unless you've got something concrete to talk about. But tell me this: how are you going to get that Red Army out of Germany?

E. R. MURROW - 3/11/49 - 5-5-5-5-5-5-5-5-5-5 EXCERPT - WARBURG INTERVIEW

WARBURG: I have made a specific proposal with regard to Germany. I have suggested that we stop running away from the German problem and that we deliberately face it; that we propose the removal of zonal barriers, and the withdrawal of all occupation forces - except for a maximum of two Russian divisions and two Anglo-American divisions. This is what the Russians have been proposing themselves, thereby putting us on a spot - by making it appear that they want to get out of Germany and we don't. I have proposed that we call that hand.

MURROW: Then you would delay the formation of a West German government?

WARBURG: I have specifically proposed that we suspend the creation of a West German State, while we make one more effort to create conditions from which a united democratic federal German State may emerge. If that is no longer our purpose, and if we are now in favor of permanent partition, I have suggested that it is high time we should say so.

MURROW: As I understand it, you agree that Western Europe is threatened by Communism.

WARBURG: Yes, it is threatened by political penetration, and if it succumbs to Communist penetration there will be a very real military threat to the United States which at present does not exist.

MURROW: And you would meet that threat of penetration with economic rather than purely military measures.

WARBURG: I would meet it with both. But the military measures apply to maintaining our own strength and our own freedom of action, whereas the economic measures apply to the countries to be protected. In other words, it is Europe's job to lock the door against political penetration; and our job to deter military aggression by the maintenance of superior power...and the freedom to apply it where it will hurt most - if the Russians come through the door.

MURROW: What chance do you think your proposals have of being adopted?

WARBURG: I would be quite optimistic if I thought the American people would be given a chance to understand the problem, and to apply their native common sense to its solution.

MURROW: That's the reason I asked you to join me tonight, in the hope that what you said would not only illuminate an alternative but start a few first-class arguments.

E. R. MURROW - 3/11/49 - 6-6-6-6-6-6-6-6-6-6

C O M M E R C I A L

MURROW: Well Ernest, since the weekend's coming up here are two quotations instead of one. Either one might fit what Jimmy Warburg had to say. The first is from Longfellow: "We judge ourselves by what we feel capable of doing, while others judge us by what we have already done." The second from Macauley: "Men are never so likely to settle a question rightly, as when they discuss it freely."

Good night and good luck!

ROOM 2720

TELEPHONE
MURRAY HILL 4-0163

JAMES P. WARBURG
70 EAST 45TH STREET
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

February 17, 1949

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

Dear Ed:

I enclose herewith a follow-up which I am sending today to the same group of Senators and Representatives to whom I sent my first memorandum on the Atlantic Alliance on February 1. This material is marked for release Monday, February 21.

Very sincerely,

Jim

Que penses-tu, mon vieux?

JPW:jmw
Enc.

June 14, 1948

Dear Mr. Warburg:

Your letter of June 3rd was received last week during Mr. Murrow's absence. As you may know, his nightly broadcast is off the air for the Summer, and Mr. Murrow is now out of town on vacation.

Your letter will be called to his attention upon his return to the office.

Sincerely yours,

Dorothy McDonough
Secretary to Mr. Murrow

Mr. James Warburg
70 East 45th Street
Room 2720
New York 17, New York

ROOM 2720

TELEPHONE
MURRAY HILL 4-0163

JAMES P. WARBURG
70 EAST 45TH STREET
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

June 3, 1948

Dear Ed:

We don't seem to have much luck reaching each other on the phone. One of the things I had hoped to talk to you about is an item which I think might make a very interesting subject for one of your broadcasts on some night when the hot news is thin.

A Mrs. Potter from Greenwich, whom I got to know through the usual fan mail business, sent me a copy of a letter she had written to President Truman, a copy of which I enclose. The letter struck me as so good that I got in touch with her and went to see her the other night. I was interested both in how she came to write it and what response she got. I will not go into details here about either, except to say that both made a very interesting story, especially the amazing number of thoughtful letters she received from all sorts of business, labor, educational and religious leaders.

The value of the story -- if you are interested -- would be that it shows how much a completely unknown individual citizen can do if he or she really gets down to it. Should you be interested, I think it would be worth-while to get her to tell you her story first-hand, but in any case I would like to know your reaction.

As ever,

Jim

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

JPW:jm
Enc.

Mr. President:-

Each citizen in our country and in Russia has the privilege of defending his land, his institutions and his people on the field of battle. Surely it is equally the right and duty of each citizen to wage defense of any other honest sort. And so I am writing today to the two men most responsible for continued life upon this planet. I am not presumptuous and do not pretend to know as much as you do, or as Marshall Stalin does, but perhaps in one small way I may know more. For I am not beneath fierce pressure of any but one strict constraint - to give my mind, my will, my life to strengthening conditions on this earth which, alone, could justify my having brought two sons to live upon it.

Nor do I for one moment think that something less than gradual improvement for each person everywhere can realize a safe advantage for a person anywhere. Since I am not committed to the maintenance of a system or a party at the expense of other systems and of other parties, I am free to see the limitless advantage of collective effort for a common benefit, and the measureless menace that coils in a frozen, obsolete adherence to self interest, party promotion and myopic nationalism. I can see, sir, that the welfare of my sons is quite dependent on the welfare of a Russian's sons, and that Americans are free to enjoy life, liberty and pursuit of happiness only if there be expanding hope for these same privileges everywhere in terms contributing to each local definition of what those things may mean. There must be men and women who need shelter more than liberty, and food far more than either. We, in our wealth and freedom must indeed be ready to assist the needy without seeking to impose on them an American pattern of happiness or an American Century. And just as surely Russia, with her power and her zeal and her renascent strength must modify her messianic mission to impose her brand of happiness on nations which prefer to move or flounder towards goals that do no envisage a Communistic State. Can you, Mr. Truman, and can Marshall Stalin, in the midst of crushing burdens of responsibility, see as clearly as can an unencumbered citizen, the awful and imperative need to believe NOW, TODAY that you can maintain your nations and your systems only if such maintenance be founded on real faith and not on fear? Can you, as well as I, believe that we must somehow give the Russians confidence

in our willingness to be an operating part of an interlocking world in which a Communistic State may play a stellar role, and that to this same extent the Russians must some how find a way to give you confidence that they will co-operate in this all too closely bound up world in which non-Communistic states must soon be freed from reasonable fear of infiltration and of seizure?

For those of us not dominated by a military caste or by big pressure groups and selfish interests, it is all too keenly evident that two nations such as ours, cannot, because we fear each other, push out extending "friendly" spheres in order to protect ourselves, when every such extension is in fact, if not intention, an offensive move against the other. We cannot reach out into areas along the Russian frontiers without alarming them and causing them to grasp another bastion, which in turn intensifies our fear - and so the hideous contest still persists until the tensions grow too taut to bear - and all that they have hoped and worked to build, and all that we have striven to achieve is lost in a vast holocaust of splintered bodies, shattered minds, demolished cities and ravaged countrysides.

And all the dreams of all the Russians, and all the hopes and institutions of America will be dirty silence, fetid quiet. The noise of building will be stilled. The sound of searching will be hushed. The glow of dreaming will be cold and dead. Perhaps some Russians will survive and in the wilderness that would remain, the Communist Party could hardly attract them from the caves, and the Manifesto would have little meaning for the miserable and lonely, terror-ridden creatures slinking from an ash heap to a crater, picking bits of sustenance among the bones of all their dead.

But equally, the few Americans who then would still exist, would watch with terrible bewilderment the ruins of our land - ruins out of which would creep the ones that had been spared. Would all the shining words of our great Constitution have a message for them then?

And every line of every poem not remembered in these minds would all be lost forever. And all the pictures that the gifted men had painted, all the plans great men had carried out, all the spires of all Cathedrals, and all the sounds of symphonies - all lost.

And why?

Because at this late moment neither of you two all empowered men could reach a point of grandeur at which a first beginning could be made towards substituting faith for fear, and confidence for military planning.

I understand, indeed, that Russia must recall the march of British and American soldiers on her soil soon after the first world war, and that they did not trust us. I can see with horrid clarity that they would transform the former Cordon Sanitaire of "unfriendly" states imposed along their borders into states they could control. Nothing could be plainer than that Munich and the Russo-German Pact should spawn a horde of fears and erect a wall of dark distrust - and that Russia should determine grimly that the West would never sell her out again. And as this resolve was translated into ruthless seizures, newly won affection and admiration of large masses of Americans grew colder. Irresponsible hot-heads in their country and in ours began to mutter threats, then shout for war. There was little difference in degree of provocation.

And so we frightened them and they reached further to acquire more protection. That frightened us and you sent out our ships, our wealth, our experts and technicians to protect the ones who would protect the ones protecting us. And there we are - unpoised, unbalanced and afraid.

I plead with both of you - acknowledge that the frightful import of our danger - theirs and ours - transcends at this most fateful moment, the significance of who is first to blame. What is of poignant, critical importance NOW, TODAY, is this - will it be you, or will it be the Russian who will come forth in gleaming armour of great courage and display the valour necessary for that first step in turning back this sinful and so terrible a trend? For, standing here in the valley of annonymity and unimportance, I will not believe that from your mighty heights of unexhausted power, one of you will not make the gesture which will redeem the world from savage desolation - a world admittedly imperfect, often base, and always moving forward towards achievement of the high and luminous goals set for it by the illustrious of all the earth.

Very truly yours,

Belle Haven, Greenwich, Connecticut
March 23, 1948

May 20, 1948

MR. JAMES WARBURG
C/O MRS. GRACE FRY
584 EAST BROAD STREET
COLUMBUS, OHIO

FORGIVE DELAYED ANSWER YOURS MAY 5TH BUT SOMEWHAT RUSHED STOP SORRY

UNABLE UPPICK PORTIONS YOUR SPEECH TODAY STOP ANXIOUSEST SEE YOU PLEASE

TELEPHONE WHEN YOU RETURN. REGARDS

ED MURROW

ROOM 2720

TELEPHONE
MURRAY HILL 4-0163

JAMES P. WARBURG
70 EAST 45TH STREET
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

May 5,1948.

Hi, Ed, you old spaghetti-hound!

That was a beautiful job of reporting. I've been meaning to get in touch with you before this but I've been so much of an itinerant preacher that I've either been away or getting ready to go somewhere, Some day soon I want to hear some more and also tell you about a really exciting time I had at the University of Colorado. Right now I'm off to the deep South where I've got to do three-a-day for four days next week.

The enclosed speech is a sequel to the one I did in Philly April 3, which you read when we had lunch. That one got remarkable coverage and has really produced some results. For one thing it's being reprinted and used as a text in quite a number of different parts of the country.

This effort is less of a critical analysis of what is and more of an attempt to outline what should be. I'd love to get your reaction to it. Obviously it's too long for radio, but - if you think there's enough in it to make it worth while - I'd be glad to do a short version. If the evening hours are full of other things, you might care to pick me up at noon or thereabouts in Columbus Ohio on the 20th when I have to talk to group which supports the Columbus Town Meeting. I'd have to know in advance because otherwise I'll do that one extemporaneously.

Love to you both.

Jim

Mr.Edward R.Murrow
CBS New York

c/o Mrs Grace Fry
584 East Broad St
Columbus, Ohio

Proof of May 4, 1948.

RELEASE FOR MORNING PAPERS OF MAY 13

LISTEN TO THE PEOPLE

Address to

THE FACULTY AND STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA

Tuscaloosa, Alabama

May 12, 1948

JAMES P. WARBURG

LISTEN TO THE PEOPLE

JAMES P. WARBURG

There is an old saying that, in the long run, a people gets the government it deserves. This may not be true of peoples held in subjugation by force or kept in ignorance by exploitation. But it certainly is true of an informed, free people. If our Government today seems vacillating and incompetent to understand or deal with the complicated problems of a world crisis, this is primarily because it reflects our own uncertainty, our own failure to understand the forces at work in the world and our own inability to envision clearly the task which confronts us as a nation.

In recent months—since my return from abroad last October—I have been privileged to discuss foreign policy with many individuals and groups in widely separated parts of the United States. I have talked with farmers, labor leaders and factory workers—with educators, college students and high school classes—with business men, newspaper men, women's clubs and men's clubs. Wherever I have gone, I have found a common denominator of anxiety and confusion. Wherever I have gone, I have found people eager for facts concerning the world problem, apprehensive concerning our present foreign policy, and suspicious of the propaganda being fed to them from high quarters.

It is probably true that we have today the Government which we deserved on the basis of the state of mind which existed in 1946, when the present Congress was elected. But I am convinced that the state of mind of the American people is now far advanced over what it was in 1946 and —as a consequence—far ahead of the present Congress and Administration.

One cannot travel about this great land of ours without being impressed with three essential qualities which seem inherent in its people. These common characteristics are courage, common sense, and an abiding faith in the future. One should perhaps expect to find these attributes among a people which is the most fortunate on this earth. And yet, re-dis-

covering these qualities at a time like the present is a refreshing experience for one who has seen the fear, the despair, and the resignation one encounters today among many of the peoples of Europe and Asia.

To find courage, common sense and faith in a better future throughout the length and breadth of this land is also a healthy antidote for any citizen who has recently spent much time in our nation's capital. **For it is a sad fact that our Government is, to a very large extent, acting out of fear rather than faith and that it is deliberately promoting anxiety among the people in order to obtain a mandate for its fear-inspired policies.**

The original concept of the Marshall Plan was a major exception to this broad indictment. This was a project born out of characteristic American courage, common sense and idealistic vision. Yet even this brave project has been furthered through Congress by a deliberate campaign of officially instigated fear. It has been launched upon the world in the context of a panic-inspired negative crusade. As originally designed by Secretary Marshall, the European Recovery Plan was a "policy not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos". It was later sold to Congress primarily as an instrument of power politics to be used in a "cold war" against the Soviet Union and the communist ideology.

But, whereas the Congressional pot was boiled by piling on the fuel of fear and hate, **it was not fear and hate which sold the European Recovery Plan to the American people.** A Roper Public Opinion Survey, published in April, shortly after the Foreign Aid Bill passed through Congress, stated that "Heavy majorities want to help a sick and hungry Europe and to assist the Western democracies to become self-supporting again. Among the people, the least persuasive reason for backing the Marshall Plan is that it will halt Communism."

This survey corroborates my own impression that the American people are today far ahead of their elected Government. They have no illusions about Russia or Communism. They recognize that both must be checked. They want no part of any policy of appeasement. But they instinctively reject the over-simplified notion that the whole world crisis is caused by Moscow and that American policy should pursue the sole aim

of blocking whatever the Russians try to accomplish. The American people seem to feel—without quite knowing why they feel it—that there is something undignified and unworthy of a great nation in our present policy. Beyond that, they feel—if I am any judge of their feelings—that our present policy will lead us sooner or later to war.

In both respects the American people are, I think, profoundly right. There **is** something undignified and unworthy of a great nation in our present conduct. **To put it baldly, American foreign policy is today made in Moscow rather than in Washington. If Moscow pulls or pushes, we pull or push in the opposite direction. If Moscow waits, we wait. If Moscow says that two plus two equals four, we say automatically that two plus two equals something else. The same thing is true in reverse.** Russian policy is today made less in Moscow than in Washington, and by the same fear-inspired and undignified process. The two greatest nations on this troubled planet—the two nations upon whose action depends the future of mankind upon this planet—are acting like two angry little boys. . . .

"Yah! Your sister has a wart on her nose!"

"Boo! That's a lie! My mother says your mother never washes her hair!"

Never mind who started it. What matters to you and me is that the Government of the United States of America is conducting an infantile "Yah! Boo!" diplomacy, and that this is unworthy of a mature people.

The American people are also probably right in their intuition that the present course of their Government leads to war. The people are certainly right in their conviction that war is no longer an acceptable instrument of policy, and in their inarticulate but nonetheless firmly rooted belief that **what we need is a positive American policy for peace.**

The fact that we are in an election year should by rights make it easier for ordinary citizens to assert their will. But, unless the issues are clarified in the coming conventions and during the campaign this summer, there is little chance that the normal electoral process will cure the ills from which we are now suffering. This is because **our present foreign**

policy is the product of both of our two major Parties. It is just as much Senator Vandenberg's policy, or Mr. Stassen's policy, or the policy of Mr. John Foster Dulles as it is the policy of the President, or his Cabinet. Each Party can, and will no doubt, claim as its own whatever it conceives to be good in the bipartisan product and blame the other Party for what it admits to be bad. But the fact remains that both Parties have had a hand in the making of the pudding and both are committed to eating it. The leadership of both Parties is committed to the doctrine that Russia —and Russia alone—has caused the present state of world affairs and that the way to cure the crisis is to stop Russia. Both sides of the aisle would like to stop Russia short of war, but both are ready to employ our own military force, if loud words, lavish dollars and military bluster fail to do the job.

What about the Third Party? In rejecting both the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, it throws away the good along with the bad. Nevertheless, it recognizes many of the mistakes made by the bipartisan leadership. Mr. Wallace articulates many of the misgivings of the American people concerning our present course of action. But—unhappily—**the Third Party's recognition of the basic fallacy in the bipartisan Stop-Russia crusade is more apparent than real. The Third Party merely turns the fallacy upside-down.** Where Mr. Truman and his bipartisan advisors assert that our basic aim must be to checkmate the Soviet Union, Mr. Wallace and his followers seem to believe that the whole world crisis can be cured if we make some sort of deal with the Soviet Union.

The point I wish to make is not merely that the details of this proposed agreement remain shrouded in mystery, but that Mr. Wallace, too, has lost sight of the woods for seeing the Soviet trees. The bipartisans blame Russia for everything and think getting together with Russia is not only impossible but, at this point, undesirable. Mr. Wallace divides the blame for the present deadlock between Russia and ourselves. But Mr. Wallace, too, conveys the impression that the world crisis is primarily a Russo-American crisis, which he proposes to cure, if elected President, by sitting down and talking to Mr. Stalin.

Thus, all three of the political Parties have so far ignored the one fact which must be fundamental to any constructive program for peace—

the fact that the world crisis cannot be cured either by merely trying to stop Russia or by merely trying to reach a friendly agreement with the Soviet Union.

What we need at last to realize is that **the world crisis derives from a number of major causes which are the product of the time in which we live, and which have little or nothing to do with the nature or intentions of either the Soviet Union or the United States.**

This is not to say that Mr. Truman is wholly wrong in his accusations against Moscow, nor that Mr. Wallace is wholly wrong in his accusations against our present bipartisan leadership. Both Washington and Moscow have contributed to the sharpening of the crisis and to the present threat to world peace. Mr. Truman is right in his conviction that Soviet expansion must be stopped. And Mr. Wallace is right in his conviction that the cold war must be stopped, and that Mr. Truman's present policy is the road to an atomic war—a war which may check Soviet expansion, but which may also destroy western civilization. But both our bipartisan leaders and Mr. Wallace, who aspires to leadership, exaggerate—not the importance—but the **relative** importance of the existing tensions between the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. These tensions are dangerous and must be relaxed. But we cannot afford to forget that, though Russia and the United States are now the two most powerful nations on this earth, there remain some 1,500,000,000 people in the world who are neither Americans nor Russians and who—no matter how much we disregard them as power-factors—will nevertheless have a hand in shaping the world's destiny—unless they are ground to pieces in a naked power struggle for world supremacy between the rival giants.

The U. S. and the U. S. S. R. do have the power to launch an atomic and bacteriological war which may well set back the human race to the primitive condition of its earliest beginnings. The U. S. and the U. S. S. R. do have the power to **prevent** the making of a just and enduring peace. **But the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. do not alone have the power to make such a peace. That power rests, to a large extent, in hands which we are all too prone to regard as powerless.** That power rests, not only in the two super-states but in the hands of the hard-pressed peoples of Europe, the starving masses of Asia, the young nations of Latin America and of the British Commonwealth—and even in the hands of the dependent peoples now slowly emerging into freedom.

While the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. have been glowering at each other in a state of increasing hostility, these 1,500,000,000 human beings have already set their feet upon the road to peace. **We do not have to discover the answer to the world crisis. We have merely to recognize the answer which has already been given and to support the peoples who are leading the way. Broadly speaking, this already indicated answer to the world crisis falls into two main parts.**

The **first part of the answer** consists of a recognition that modern science and technology have made a world formerly divided by oceans, mountains and deserts into One World—one little world in which there can be neither peace nor prosperity for any people unless there is peace and prosperity for all peoples. It consists of a recognition that a world, which has physically become one, cannot long remain politically divided; and that it is going to become unified either—through war—as a Russian-or American dominated world, or else—without war—as a world united under world law enforced by World Government.

Except for the Soviet Union and the United States, most of the nations of the world have already recognized that the only way to achieve One World by peaceful means lies through building the United Nations into a World Government of limited powers, endowed with the sole right to maintain and, if necessary, to use armed force to preserve the peace. They have declared themselves in favor of this course. But we and the Soviet Union are each so obsessed with the nightmare of a world dominated by the other that we each think only of preventing that catastrophe by acquiring world domination ourselves. Russia, being in a minority in the UN, is afraid of a strong world organization which she cannot control. We, who could lead the majority of UN members, consider the whole UN expendable in the interest of stopping Soviet expansion.

The **second part of the answer** lies in the recognition that we are living in a world-wide revolution—a state of far-reaching and fundamental change, in which the old structural forms of society are gradually being replaced by new forms arising out of present needs.

Outside of the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. few people believe that the time has come when all the inhabitants of this earth must choose to become either good little communists or good little free-enterprise capitalists.

But the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. are each preaching their respective doctrines—like two rival church hierarchies—as the only road to salvation.

Outside of the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. most of the inhabitants of this earth are in the process of developing a way of life—or ways of life—which combine their ideals of liberty with what they conceive to be social justice and reasonable security. They are reaching for the instruments of public power to solve their problems within a framework of belief in the freedom and dignity of the individual. They are trying to do this primarily by two means:

FIRST, by breaking up the oppressive power of the big landlords, who have for centuries enslaved the world's producers of food; and

SECOND, by breaking up the oppressive power of the private business monopolists who have for generations exploited the world's industrial workers.

This process of peaceful change—this age-old process of man's striving for a better future—has been accelerated by the destruction and dislocation caused by two great wars. The old power-groups have been destroyed or weakened. The old leaderships have been discredited—the old systems disrupted. Power vacuums have been created throughout the world. And into these power vacuums the distressed peoples of the world have sought to penetrate by much the same means and with much the same hopes which once brought the early settlers to the shores of this continent.

The great failure of our Government—the great failure of all of us as citizens of this "land of the Free"—is that we have not understood this peaceful revolution—that we have not placed ourselves in its vanguard as once we placed ourselves in the vanguard of freedom and justice for all men everywhere. We have had our eyes fixed so hysterically upon the Soviet Union, which we conceive to be our enemy, that we have not recognized or even seen the faces of our friends. We have seen only the faces of those who shared our hatred and our fear of communism. We have embraced these strangely assorted people as our friends, not stopping to realize that they opposed not only communism but all

progress—not stopping to realize that in lending them our support we were backing selfish landlords against hungry peasants and corrupt monopolists against the masses of mankind.

We have recently had a much-publicized crisis in **Italy.** We have recently been dragged by our Government through an emotional orgy of fear lest Soviet communism burst out from behind the Iron Curtain and obtain a foothold in Western Europe. We have seen every kind of American power mobilized in an effort to persuade the Italian people to "vote for the United States against Russia." We have won this battle and are now very pleased with our victory. An anti-communist Government is firmly in the saddle—an anti-communist Government which is as definitely, though more politely, committed to be a satellite of the United States as the Czechoslovakian Government is committed to be a satellite of the Soviet Union. This Government will not sneeze without consulting Washington. **What are we going to ask this Government to do?**

Are we going to see that it acts to remove the economic causes which made approximately one Italian voter out of every three vote communist in spite of all the influence and pressure we could bring to bear? Are we going to urge Mr. de Gasperi to take drastic action to help the Italian share-cropper become a self-respecting farmer owning his little family-type farm? Or are we going to look the other way while things go on as before, leaving to the communists a monopoly in promising land reform? And what about the people in the towns and cities? Are we going to ask Mr. de Gasperi to take steps to regulate the Italian economy so that two million unemployed will find jobs and so that employment will mean enough food to keep body and soul together? Or are we going to look the other way while things continue as they are, with the masses starving and the privileged few eating black-market luxuries and riding in mahogany motorboats on Lake Como?

These are the questions which the peoples of the world are waiting to see answered by the Government of the United States. The same questions arise in **China,** in **Greece,** in **Germany** and **Japan.** They arise everywhere, where American power is dominant, **and where American power has so far been so concerned with building bulwarks against communism that it has lost sight of the injustices which foster the growth of communism even behind our freshly-erected barricades.**

The world revolution in which we are living was not created by any nation or doctrine. It would have occurred if Marx had never written and if Russia did not exist. But, by our failure to understand and help the struggling masses of humanity—**by our fear of change and our newly-discovered affinity for the status quo—we have left to the Soviet Union the golden opportunity to exploit the revolution—to create the illusion in the minds of the oppressed that totalitarian communism offers the only road to a better future.**

Our statesmen and would-be statesmen go up and down our country telling the American people that their own way of life is threatened by any change in the old order anywhere. They seem to have forgotten that once—when we ourselves were hungry and oppressed—we raised the standard of revolt against an old order, and "fired a shot heard round the world."

What we need is to relax from our present spastic condition of self-induced fear. What we need is a completely new appraisal of the world in which we live. **What we need is to turn off the tap which now drips poison into the hearts and minds of the American people.**

More than new leaders we need a pause in the struggle for leadership during which the sound sense and the native courage of the people may assert their influence upon all men—irrespective of Party—who aspire to leadership.

We need to pass from fear of communism to faith in democracy—from fear of Russia to confidence in ourselves.

So long as we conceive our sole mission to be the frustration of whatever evil design may or may not be hatched in the Kremlin—just so long shall we continue to fail both ourselves and the whole human race. **So long as we let Moscow dictate our policy, we shall continue to become more and more like Moscow in our behavior.** We shall increasingly meet intolerance with intolerance—fanaticism with fanaticism—brutality with brutality—and chicanery with chicane.

We are already well on our way toward becoming a garrison state—a nation armed to the teeth, yet constantly looking over its shoulder or under the bed for hidden enemies. Such a nation is easily tempted to

resort to the ultimate sanction of armed force. At best, such a nation cannot succeed in harnessing its productive energy to reconstruction and peace. Rich are we are, we cannot spend 50 per cent of our national budget on armament and at the same time lend adequate help to world recovery. Without our help, there can be no world recovery, for two-thirds of the entire world's industrial production at present comes from the United States.

Right now—under our present bipartisan leadership—we are burning the candle at both ends. **We are simultaneously pursuing two contradictory philosophies in our foreign policy.** We are spending something like $6,000,000,000 a year on a positive program for recovery and peace and probably about three times that amount on preparedness for war. Our present defense budget is $11,000,000,000, to which Congress will very likely add at least $4,000,000,000—perhaps considerably more. In addition, there is now the probability of a new Lend-Lease program to rearm Western Europe.

When all is said and done, **we shall probably be betting something like 15 cents out of each taxpayer's dollar on peace and at least 45 cents out of each taxpayer's dollar on war.**

.Sir John Boyd Orr, head of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN and one of the world's leading authorities in nutrition, recently made a challenging statement. He said that we could do more for peace by spending 5 cents on stimulation of world food production than by spending $1.00 on armaments.

It would be the height of folly to take out no insurance whatsoever against the failure of our efforts to bring about a lasting peace. But surely it is equally foolish to carry such heavy insurance against war as to **guarantee the failure of our efforts to build the peace.**

Our present Foreign Aid Act provides help only to Western Europe. This is undoubtedly the most crucial sector of the world's economy. But the fact remains that Western Europe cannot fully recover unless reasonable prosperity is restored in Eastern Europe, in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is true that we cannot do everything. But it is also true that we shall probably have to do considerably more to promote recovery than we as yet realize.

One danger of our present two-way course is that we shall commit ourselves so heavily to military expenditures that we shall be both unwilling and unable to take care of such additions to our recovery program as may turn out to be absolutely necessary to its success.

Another danger is that, once we believe in the probability of war to the extent of spending $15,000,000,000 a year on preparedness, we shall begin to wonder whether it makes any sense to pour money into areas like Western Europe, which are almost certain to fall into Russia's hands the moment war begins.

Before President Truman rang the fire alarm on March 17, we were already spending $11,000,000,000 a year on preparedness. Yet Secretary Marshall testified before Congress that our armed forces are "a hollow shell". It might be appropriate to ask why this should be the case, when we have been spending such vast sums on our military establishments? It might be useful to know **how much of the $11,000,000,000 is being wasted on armaments suited to the last war instead of to the next one—how much is being wasted in duplication and competition between our theoretically unified services—how many unnecessary chairborne officers are still on the nation's payroll?**

It might be useful to bear in mind that—apart from the need for helping other nations—only **$1,000,000,000 more a year would put every school child in our own country through second-year high school, and half of them through two years of college, as well as providing adequately trained teachers and safe and sanitary school rooms.** This figure is derived from a recent study by the Twentieth Century Fund. The same source declares that **for only $2,000,000,000 more a year we could provide every person in the nation with adequate medical and dental care.**

Certainly we must be strong in the face of the present crisis. But we must not lose all sense of perspective. We must, it seems to me, **re-appraise the nature of the strength we seek.** We must be sure whether we want that strength to be applied primarily to building the peace or primarily to insurance against defeat in the event of war. The one does not altogether preclude the other. But **the balance between the two will largely determine whether the great weight of this nation falls into the scales on the side of peace or on the side of war.**

It is time for our leaders and would-be leaders to take careful note of the greatest asset which this nation possesses—the courage, the common sense and the belief in man of the American people. **The people know—even if their leaders do not—that the only real danger of war is the fear of war and the acceptance of its inevitability.**

The way to stop that fear is to have the courage and the vision to make a spectacular bet on peace. That is what Secretary Marshall tried unsuccessfully to do last summer. That is what we must redouble our efforts to do now.

The way to stop Russia is to realize that the security of the United Nations is more important to us than the security of the United States, because there can be no security for the United States until the United Nations becomes the effective guardian of the world's security. The people know—even if most of their leaders do not—that the United Nations must be built into a World Government.

Fifteen of our state legislatures have already responded to the popular demand by adopting resolutions approving World Government. Your state of Alabama and my state of Connecticut are among them. In nineteen other states, one house of the legislature has passed such a resolution. A popular referendum in Massachusetts approved the idea by 9 to 1.

Congress is beginning to consider the problem in this light, although so far merely in terms of limited amendments to the UN Charter. **Limited amendments will not do the job,** although they may perhaps lead to some improvements. **The world faces a choice between an armament race leading to war and total disarmament** except for the police power of the United Nations. It has been shown again and again that the idea of **limitation of armaments is an illusion.**

The way to stop Russia is to unite the non-Soviet world in the determination to establish a world community and then to make every effort to get Russia to see that it is in her interest to join that community.

Our present leadership seems to consider such a course foredoomed to failure. There are always men who deny the future because they clutch

the past. There were men who thought that a federal union of the thirteen original states was a utopian, unachievable ideal. But the American people achieved the unachievable, even though they later had to fight a war for the preservation of the union.

It may be that the peoples of the world cannot form a world community without another war for the preservation of the union. Such a war would be no less horrible and destructive than the war which now threatens in the form of a naked power struggle between the United States and Russia. But at least such a war would be fought for a constructive purpose. It would leave the world shattered, but at last united in the one form in which it can be united for enduring peace. **It may also be that this great ideal can be achieved without war. It CAN be achieved without war, if the non-communist world can prove its case.**

Just as the way to stop Russia is to oppose Russian nationalism—not with American nationalism—but with the determination to achieve the ideal of a world community, **so the way to stop communism is to oppose it—not with American dogmatism—but with the determination to realize the ideal of democracy—here at home as well as abroad. This means helping all men everywhere to find their own way toward justice and freedom.**

There are many roads that lead to justice and freedom. Naturally, our road seems to us the straightest and best. But other peoples start from vastly different places—some from arid deserts, some from tortuous valleys, some from ice-covered mountains and some from the steaming jungle. Some of the peoples of the world must travel toward justice and freedom in ancient jalopies, in ox-drawn caravans, on muleback, or even on foot. Each people must choose its own road according to its own sense of direction. Each people must travel by its own means. But the goal of justice and freedom is the same—even for those unhappy peoples who must drag chains as they struggle forward.

All these people are our friends. They are—if you like—**our fellow-travelers.** They need our help. **But so do we need their help,** their wisdom and their experience born of long suffering.

We knew all this once, when we were still a young nation, before our great wealth and power made us timid and suspicious of all change. The

knowledge still lies dormant in the great mass of the American people. **The small farmers, the workers in factories and offices, and—above all—the young people of America are not afraid of change, because for them change still means hope—hope for a better future.**

The acquisition of great wealth and luxury—like the attainment of power or privilege—often breeds not only intelligent conservatism but blind fear of change and, hence, resistance to all progress. **Unfortunately, our present bipartisan leadership is super-sensitive to the fears of the powerful few, has identified itself with these fears and sought to propagate them among the broad masses of the people**—frightening them with the hobgoblin that all change threatens their security and undermining their native faith in human progress.

Our leaders and would-be leaders need to refresh their memories of what has made this nation great. I know of no better way to do this than by walking humbly among the American people—listening to what they have to say and realizing that they still have courage, dignity, faith in themselves and faith in the future of mankind.

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The United States and the World Crisis

James P. Warburg

Your President, Ladies and Gentlemen, is a wise man. I say this because it was presumably he who designated as your overall topic "How to Achieve One World." In our present state of anxiety and confusion, this is a refreshingly hopeful and, I think, accurate statement of the world's problem. It implies a realization that the present world crisis requires a positive solution - that it cannot be met by negative means. It implies a recognition that peace is threatened precisely because a world, which has physically become One and can be governed peacefully only as One World, has so far failed to find the means of achieving political unity.

Unfortunately, such vision and wisdom are rare - especially among those who are today shaping the policy of the United States. Had President Truman - or any of his "bipartisan" advisors - been asked to formulate the caption for this conference, the narrower and purely negative definition, "How to Stop Russia", would almost certainly have been suggested. This would have tended to confuse and frustrate your deliberations, much as our policy-makers have confused and frustrated the Congress and the people of the United States.

Make no mistake about it - there is going to be One World. There is going to be One World no matter what foreign policy we pursue. The only question is by which of three possible means our world is going to be unified. We shall shortly see either a Russian-dominated world, or an American-dominated

world, or a world united under world law and governed peacefully on the federal principle.

At present, our policy-makers apparently see only the threat of a Russian-dominated world - which, as things are going now, is a very real threat and a most unpleasant one to contemplate. But, in seeking to forestall this danger, the makers of United States policy are unfortunately thinking in purely negative terms - in terms of "How to Stop Russia." This means, in effect, that they are consciously or unconsciously thinking of an American-dominated world as the sole alternative. And this, in turn, means a rapid approach to a trial of physical strength between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Our policy-makers are so preoccupied with stopping Russia that they have totally disregarded, or at least pushed into the background, the one constructive solution which is still possible - the solution of achieving One World through World Government. I do not say that this solution can be easily or quickly attained. I do say that ultimately it is the only acceptable solution and that it will never be attained if we pursue our present course of action.

If we pursue our present course, it seems almost inevitable that we shall sooner or later come to an armed conflict with the Soviet Union. The fact that our Government now recognizes this conflict as a possibility must be evident to anyone who has carefully followed recent events and studied the President's latest proposals. Even the most unskilful politician would scarcely, in an election year, raise an issue like the re-establishment of Selective Service, unless he felt driven by urgent necessity. It is clear, I think, that our Government

hopes to avoid armed conflict. But it is equally clear that it is now preparing to resort to armed force if it fails to stop Russia by means short of war. This being the case, it is high time that we consider what the probable outcome of such a war would be.

The chances are that we should win a war with Russia. As of today our industrial capacity is infinitely greater than that of the Soviet Union - something like four times as great, according to recent estimates. Our Navy controls the seas. We have bases in Alaska, Japan, the Middle East, Britain and Iceland from which our bombers could reach most of the Soviet Union and which would be difficult for Russia to capture from us. Russia has no corresponding bases from which to reach most of the United States. We have at least a substantial head-start in atomic and bacteriological weapons. If the war comes reasonably soon, we are almost certain to win it. The realization that this is true is what makes our present foreign policy reckless and irresponsible.

We are considering war as an undesirable but nevertheless possible alternative to a peaceful solution precisely because we are reasonably sure that we could win a war against Russia.

But - suppose we did win such a war - what should we accomplish? We should, it is true, prevent a Russian-dominated world. We, who have no desire to dominate the world, should emerge from the war as the world's undisputed master. But at what cost?

Let us picture the cheapest victory imaginable. Let us imagine that we could be sufficiently Machiavellian to get the war started in our own way and at a time of our own choosing.

Let us assume that we could loose atomic and bacteriological destruction upon the Soviet Union without Russian retaliation upon the United States. The first thing the Russians would do would be to occupy all of Europe up to the Atlantic seaboard. There would be nothing to stop them. In the same way the Russians would occupy large parts of Northern China and all of Korea. In order for us to force a Russian surrender, we should then have to pulverize not only the Russian centres of production but the cities of Europe as well - we should have to poison not only Russian crops and reservoirs but the crops and water-supply of Europe and the Far East. And then let us be optimistic enough to imagine that we could force a Russian surrender without a costly invasion by our ground-forces of Europe, Africa and Asia.

What would be the result of this cheapest of all imaginable military victories? So far as Western Europe is concerned - and remember, it is Western Europe that we should, in the first instance, be fighting to save - it would immediately be overrun and plundered by the Red Army. Next it would be reduced by us to a condition of ruin far worse than that which exists in Germany today. Its cities would be dust and rubble, its crops and water-supply poisoned, its population decimated and infected with hitherto unheard-of pestilence. The same thing would be true of most of Russia and large parts of China and the Far East.

Can you picture the Western Hemisphere as an island of prosperity in such a world? Can you picture what it would mean to try to rebuild such a world? Can you imagine what it would involve to occupy and police the Soviet Union? Can you envisage what it would be like to be a member of the all-conquering American master race?

This would be the result of the cheapest victory we could win. To believe in so cheap a victory is almost to believe in miracles. This - or worse - will be the result of a continuation of our present foreign policy, which assumes that, if peaceful methods fail, we can always stop Russia by means of war.

What, then, is the alternative?

Certainly the alternative is not to fold our hands and do nothing. Nor is the alternative a policy of appeasement. Either of these courses would mean an unthinkable acceptance of a Soviet or communist-dominated world, or else a war of doubtful outcome fought in desperation to preserve our independence at a time of Russia's choosing.

The alternative that I see is an awakening on our part to the true nature of the present world crisis - a jettisoning of our present foreign policy - and the rapid development of a substitute which could still save Western civilization from the suicide toward which it is now rushing under our leadership.

You are all familiar with the recent history of our foreign policy. You remember the Truman Doctrine of March, 1947, which launched us on an adventure in "containing" Russia by providing arms and dollars to any nation, or to any group within a nation, which opposed communism and the Soviet Union. You remember the apparent shift, last June, from this dangerous experiment to the more sane approach of the Marshall Plan. You remember how Russia declined to accept the good faith of Mr. Marshall's proposal of a policy "not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos." You recall the events of the last eight months, which have in effect

been a period of deployment - a period during which the East-West split was recognized as irreconcilable for the time being, and during which each side has proceeded as rapidly as possible to build up its power.

Last year, when the President enunciated the original Truman Doctrine, he appeared as a man somewhat bewildered by his own sudden belligerence. It was not at all clear from his message whether he was launching a world-wide crusade against the communist ideology, or asking this nation to embark single-handed upon a near-military geopolitical struggle with the Soviet Union, or both. His speech was calculated to arouse fear - fear of communism, fear of Russia, and fear of war - though neither Russia nor communism were mentioned. The menace to peace was described as "totalitarian dictatorships imposed from within or without", which a few naive liberals mistakenly took to include the fascist or near-fascist dictatorships in Latin-America and the Iberian peninsula.

A year later, on March 17, 1948, Mr. Truman knew exactly what he wanted to say and said it. His analysis of the world crisis was contained in four brief statements, which I shall quote verbatim.

1. "The situation in the world today is not primarily the result of the natural difficulties which follow a great war. It is chiefly due to the fact that one nation has not only refused to cooperate in the establishment of a just and honorable peace, but - even worse - has actively sought to prevent it."

2. "The agreements we did obtain, imperfect though they were, could have furnished the basis for a just peace - if they had been kept. But they were not kept. They were consistently ignored and violated by one nation."

3. "One nation has persistently obstructed the work of the United Nations."

4. "The Soviet Union and its agents have destroyed the independence and democratic character of a whole series of nations in Eastern and Central Europe. It is this ruthless course of action and the clear design to extend it to the remaining free nations of Europe that has brought about the critical situation of Europe today."

This is the analysis of the world crisis upon which our present foreign policy rests. Believing in its validity, the President and his "bipartisan" advisors hold that the major aim of the United States must be to stop Russia. To stop Russia they demand the prompt passage of ERP, more funds for military aid to Greece and Turkey, some $500,000,000 additional aid to Chiang Kai-shek, and Universal Military Training and Selective Service here at home.

Clearly implicit in this 1948 Truman Doctrine is the admission that our attempt to stop Russia with dollars and military bluff has failed, and that we must now prepare for the possible use of our own military force to accomplish it.

Let me, as one deeply troubled citizen, attempt to show where I think the basic analysis falls down and where the resulting policy defeats its own purpose. I am not one who thinks that our present policy derives from the sins of any one political party - much less from the evil intentions of sinister individuals in or behind our Government. Nor am I - because I stress our own shortcomings - unmindful of the shortcomings of others. My concern is with the facts of the world situation, as I see them, and with certain conclusions which seem to me inescapable even though they are at variance with high authority.

The President said, first, that the world crisis has arisen because one nation - the Soviet Union - has refused to cooperate in the establishment of a just and honorable peace and - even worse - has actively sought to prevent it.

I submit that a partial basis for a just and honorable peace was laid down in the Atlantic Charter and reaffirmed in the United Nations Declaration of January 1942. Russia, Great Britain

and the United States signed this declaration, along with all the other nations then fighting the Axis. Among other things, the signatories renounced territorial annexations and any territorial changes which did not conform to the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned. I submit that these pledges were abrogated at Teheran and Yalta, when the Western Powers purchased Russian help in the war against Japan by agreeing to Soviet annexation of territory in Europe and Asia and to the division of the world into spheres of influence. At the time - because we did not know how near Japan was to the end of its rope - this seemed necessary in order to win the war - or to save lives and win the war more quickly. Mr. Roosevelt had been told, when he went to Yalta, that an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands would cost over half a million American casualties.

Hindsight makes this decision seem of doubtful wisdom, but that is not the point with which we are here concerned. The historical fact is that the basis for a just and honorable peace - in so far as it ever existed - was thrown overboard by mutual consent before the war ended.

Further, I submit that we not only agreed at Yalta to allow Russia to violate the principles of a just peace, but that we ourselves have violated them - by destroying our own project of international trusteeship in the former Japanese-mandated islands - by introducing the vindictive nonsense of the Morgenthau Plan into the German settlement - and by backing Churchill's restorationist intervention in Greece and elsewhere.

Finally - still speaking of the first count in the indictment - I suggest that the true nature of the world crisis is quite different and far more complicated than one might be led to believe by Mr. Truman's over-simplified analysis. Of this I shall speak

in a moment, after I have made a few observations concerning the other three counts in the indictment.

In his second charge, Mr. Truman says that the agreements we did obtain, though imperfect, could have furnished the basis for a just peace - if they had been kept. But they were not kept. "They were consistently ignored and violated by one nation."

I have already expressed the conviction that the late wartime agreements not only failed to furnish the basis for a just peace but actually destroyed what basis had previously been created. Does anyone believe that the Potsdam Agreement for the post-surrender treatment of Germany could by any stretch of the imagination have furnished the basis for a just peace? This was, after all, the major agreement reached after the European war ended. It was an agreement which sanctioned the annexation of German territory not only by Poland but by Russia, which permitted the forcible expulsion from their homes of some thirteen million Germans, which failed to fix Germany's Western frontier and left the crucial problem of the Ruhr unsettled, which contained enough remnants of Morgenthauism to wreck the hopes of early European recovery, and which gave to one nation - France - a veto over all four-power action without making that nation a party to the agreement. Does Mr. Truman really believe today that the agreement which he signed with Stalin in August 1945 could have furnished the basis for a just peace? Would he sign it again if he could turn back the clock?

As to keeping agreements - it is true that Russia violated the ambiguous Yalta pledges for "free elections". It is also true that Russia violated the Potsdam Agreement. But it is not true that post-war agreements were "ignored and violated" by only one nation. The Potsdam Agreement, for example, was, first of

all, ignored and violated by France, which refused to let it be carried out unless her demands for frontier revision in the West were first satisfied. Then - and only then - was it violated by the Soviet Union. Our own Military Government officials have confirmed this. Our own Military Government officials will also confirm that we ourselves violated and ignored the Potsdam Agreement by stopping reparations in May 1946 in a vain attempt to get France and Russia to see the error of their ways. At present, all four of the occupying powers are violating it.

The third charge is that Russia alone has persistently obstructed the work of the United Nations. It certainly is true that Russia has persistently vetoed, abstained, boycotted and abused the United Nations as a forum for recrimination. But are all others innocent? What about the United States? Have we not undermined the authority of the United Nations by our unilateral action in China, in Greece, in Turkey and in Italy? Have we not ignored the United Nations and set ourselves up in its place? And have we not just recently come perilously close to destroying the United Nations altogether by our incredible gyrations with regard to Palestine? Was it the Soviet Union which obstructed a solution of that tragic problem?

Let me make myself perfectly clear. I am not in the least interested in defending against false or exaggerated charges those masters of distortion and prevarication who sit in the Kremlin. But I <u>am</u> concerned with the fact that we are beclouding our own judgment and reason by attributing all our troubles to the Soviet Union. I <u>am</u> concerned with the fact that, because we blame Moscow for everything that has gone

wrong, we prevent ourselves from seeing the truth, at a time when only a clear recognition of the truth can save us from disaster.

We come now to the last charge, which consists of two parts. First: "The Soviet Union and its agents have destroyed the independence and democratic character of a whole series of nations in Eastern and Central Europe." So far as independence is concerned, I submit that not one of these little nations - except Finland - was ever really independent. Before the first World War all but two of them did not exist. Between the two World Wars most of these little nations were members of the French-led Little Entente and depended for their security upon the French Army. It is true that there was a vast difference in degree of independence under French protection and Soviet domination. It is true that France was polite and considerate to her small allies where Russia is rude and exploits them ruthlessly. But the Czechoslovakia of 1928 would have dared to offend France just as little as the Czechoslovakia of 1948 dares to offend the Soviet Union. The same thing is true of Yugoslavia. This has always been the fate of little nations in Europe. Furthermore, we ourselves agreed at Yalta to perpetuate this traditional pattern of dependence. We agreed to spheres of influence. One result of this agreement was that we let the Red Army liberate Czechoslovakia. When the day came, our Third Army sat and waited at Pilsen while the Czechs were rising against the Germans a few miles away at Prague, with the Red Army still unable to come to their rescue.

So much for independence. What about the destruction of the "democratic character" of these nations in the Soviet orbit? I submit that most of these nations never had a truly

"democratic character" to destroy. Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia were ruled by feudal squirearchies which exploited their predominantly peasant populations. Poland was not much better. The only two countries now in the Soviet orbit which had a "democratic character" to destroy were Finland and Czechoslovakia. There is no doubt that the communists have brutally destroyed this "democratic character" in Czechoslovakia. They probably will destroy it in Finland. This much of the charge is a true bill. It constitutes a much more powerful indictment of the Soviet-led Cominform when stripped of irrelevant and dubious generalizations.

Finally, Mr. Truman stated: "It is this ruthless course of action and the clear design to extend it to the remaining free nations of Europe that have brought about the critical situation of Europe today." Is there, beyond peradventure of doubt, a clear design on the part of Russia to include all of Europe in her sphere of influence? And, if so, is the threat one of conquest - in other words, to Western Europe's independence? Or is it a revolutionary threat to internal security - in other words, to democracy? Or is it a combination of the two?

These are key questions. I cannot presume to answer them. I suggest only that they require far more study than Mr. Truman and his advisors appear to have undertaken. I suggest only that Russian action to date <u>could</u> be explained on the basis of existing evidence as something quite different from a Hitlerian design for conquest. It <u>could</u> be explained as a gigantic disengagement operation, in which the basic aim is to tighten ruthlessly every nut and bolt in the security belt around the Soviet Union and then retire into complete isolation. There are authoritative

anti-communist students of Russian history and Russian policy who incline to this belief. There are also others who believe that Soviet expansionism is a fact, but that it derives at least as much from fear as from a desire to dominate Europe, and that the fear is largely a fear of the United States. This idea that we might attack the Soviet Union is widespread in Europe and Asia, and not only in the Soviet orbit. I myself have encountered it not only among those who dread that it may be true but among those who hope that it is true. There can be no doubt that recent developments in Washington have added to its credibility.

Before I go on to suggest a different analysis of the world problem and a different approach to its solution, let me summarize the case against our present policy as I have stated it thus far.

1. Our present policy rests upon the belief, clearly stated by the President, that the Soviet Union alone has caused and is causing the world crisis. This belief is buttressed by four charges: a) that Russia alone has refused to cooperate in and has actively sought to prevent the making of a just peace; b) that Russia alone has violated agreements which, though imperfect, could have created the basis for a just peace; c) that Russia alone has obstructed the work of the United Nations; and d) that Soviet destruction of the independence and democratic character of the Eastern European nations and Soviet intentions to carry out the same ruthless design in Western Europe are the causes of the present threat to world peace.

2. Starting from this analysis, our present policy pursues the single negative aim of stopping Russia, which we at first tried to achieve with dollars and bluff and are now preparing to accomplish, if necessary, with our own military force.

3. Our present leaders are reasonably sure that we could win a war with Russia, if the issue is not too long postponed. They, therefore, consider that war - though undesirable - is a possible last-resort alternative to a peaceful solution.

I have so far submitted two major points for your consideration:

1. That, if we fight Russia, we shall probably win; that we shall thus prevent a Russian-dominated world and ourselves achieve world domination; but that, in order to defeat Russia, we shall first have to hand Western Europe over to Russian occupation and then destroy it ourselves; that even the cheapest victory imaginable in an atomic and bacteriological war would merely leave us triumphant among the ruins of Western civilization, facing an impossible task of reconstruction and the consequent ruin of our own moral character and physical well-being.

2. I have called your attention to certain facts of history which, to me at least, suggest that the basic analysis upon which our policy rests is over-simplified and in part incorrect. Without in any way justifying what the Russians <u>have</u> done, I have tried to show that it was not Russia <u>alone</u> which destroyed the basis for a just peace; that the inter-Allied agreements reached would <u>not</u> - even if they had been kept - have furnished the basis for a just peace; that Russia was <u>not</u> the <u>only</u> nation which violated them, nor the <u>only</u> nation which undermined the United Nations; that it is only partly true to say that Russia has destroyed the independence and democratic character of a whole series of nations; and finally, that neither the precise nature of the apparent Russian design upon Western Europe nor its origin is clear beyond peradventure of doubt.

That is the case I have tried to make so far. I should now like to submit to you that, whatever the wrongs committed by the Soviet Union and whatever the true motivation and present

purpose of Russian policy, the world crisis and the present threat to world peace are caused by four major factors, three of which have nothing whatsoever to do with the Soviet Union.

The first factor, as I see it, is that we are in a technological revolution, at least as far-reaching in its implications upon human society as the industrial revolution of the late eighteenth century. This technological revolution has shrunk a world formerly divided by oceans, mountains and deserts into One World - one little world, in which there can be neither peace nor prosperity for any people unless there is peace and prosperity for all peoples. The technological revolution has also vastly increased the problem of feeding the world's population, because it has greatly prolonged human life, eliminated to some extent the occasional mass slaughter by pestilence, and has in general decreased the death-rate far more rapidly in the world's backward areas than higher living standards have so far reduced the birth-rate. Finally, the technological revolution has made war between nations into a threat of genocide.

The second great factor is that we are living in a socio-economic revolution, accelerated and sharpened by the destruction wrought by two great wars. The whole Eastern Hemisphere is suffering from shortages. Its machinery of production has been worn out or destroyed, its raw materials depleted, its populations exhausted, its managerial power-groups dispersed or dispossessed. The middle-class structure of Europe has been undermined by a series of expropriations, by the depreciation of currencies and by almost totally inhibited formation of new private capital. Similarly, the colonial and feudal structure of society in the world's backward areas, and especially the traditional structure of Asia is tottering. Colonial empires are in the process of liquidation, giving rise to new

problems for both the peoples emerging into freedom and the peoples whose living standards were in the past supported by colonial exploitation. In other words, a large part of the world is in a state of fundamental and far-reaching change.

The third factor in the current crisis is that an accelerated process of elimination among the great powers has caused the world's military, political and economic power to become concentrated in only two poles of super-power - the Soviet Union and the United States. This has destroyed the only mechanism for preserving peace which the world has ever known - the mechanism of preventing armed conflict through a precarious balance of power. In the history of the world, we have had peace only so long as an ever-shifting alignment of sovereign nation-states could keep any one nation or group of nations from acquiring a preponderance of power sufficient to let it believe that it could safely resort to a trial of naked force. A balance of power is, in the long run, impossible without room for maneuver among the nation-states. There can be no room for maneuver when power is polarized in only two nation-states. There is then room only for an armament race between the two rival powers. This means that we have come to the end of the long period of international anarchy - that we have come to the end of that part of human history in which men could live within nations under law while nations lived among each other in a state of jungle anarchy.

These, as I see it, are the three primary causes of the present crisis in world affairs. None of them has anything whatever to do with the nature or intentions of the Soviet Union. We should be in a world-wide technological, social and economic revolution if Marx and Lenin had never lived or written. We should

be living in a state of no longer tolerable international anarchy if power had become concentrated in any two super-powers other than Russia and the United States.

I do not for one moment deny that there is a fourth and very important cause of the present world crisis. The Soviet Union has without doubt been cynically fishing in troubled waters. It has exploited the world-wide socio-economic revolution in order to propagate the communist ideology. It has exploited the existence of international anarchy among the sovereign nation-states in order to gain every possible advantage for itself. The Soviet Union has obstructed the making of a just peace; the Soviet Union has pursued a ruthless course of action; the Soviet Union must not be permitted to expand its sphere of influence any further.

The trouble is that our Government sees only the Soviet Union's contribution to the present state of world affairs. It does not see its own contribution, nor that of others. Above all, it fails to recognize that the most important causes of the present crisis are no one's fault in particular but are to be sought in the historical developments of the time in which we live.

The consequence of this myopic vision on the part of the Government of the United States is that the Western World, under our leadership, has gone into a state of panic - that it has embarked upon a frenzied course of negative action and become so obsessed with stopping Russian expansion that it has lost sight of the basic factors which make Russian expansion possible.

In the recent past, this had led us to ally ourselves with the forces of reaction throughout the world instead of allying ourselves with the forces of progress. We have driven the

masses of Asia toward communism because we have backed anti-democratic and corrupt feudal regimes which oppose land reform, thus giving the communists a monopoly on the one great magnet of political attraction in that teeming continent. We have driven the peasants of Eastern Europe in the same direction by the same foolish means. And we have alienated the urban industrial workers of Europe by looking askance at democratic socialism, fearing it as a step toward totalitarian dictatorship and seeking to restore discarded systems and dispossessed and discredited power groups. Thus, we have left to the Soviet Union the exploitation of the world-wide aspiration for a new and better future. Thus, we have failed to destroy the illusion that communist totalitarianism is the road to a better future. Thus, in our anxiety to stop the spread of communism, we have actually been helping the Soviet Union to fertilize the soil for its growth.

In the same way we have, by default, left to the Soviet Union the inestimable advantage of exploiting the existing condition of international anarchy. We, who have nothing to lose and everything to gain from strengthening the United Nations and building it into a World Government, have undermined the United Nations, have lacked faith in it, have failed to infuse it with our own great strength and have not - even at this late date - made up our minds to achieve One World as once we made up our minds to achieve one nation.

Two positive implications flow from this critical analysis of our present approach to the world crisis. Let me express them in terms of what I think should be the two broad aims of our foreign policy. As I see it, these should be:

First. To throw our great moral and economic strength behind the emerging non-communist progressive movements throughout the world, respecting the native characteristics of those movements, irrespective of whether or not they conform to our particular prejudices and predilections.

Second. To throw the full weight of our military and economic resources behind a United Nations which we openly declare our intention of building into a World Government.

If these were our positive aims - and, if we pursued them with intelligence and determination - a large part of our present limited and negative objective would automatically be realized. We should then have drawn to our side those existing forces which can and will, if supported, stop communism and which can and will achieve One World. We should, in other words, achieve the stopping of communism as a by-product of a positive policy.

I realize that these things cannot be accomplished overnight. In the meantime, there remains the immediate problem posed by the present aggressive attitude and action of the Soviet Union. How are we to deal with it, pending the development of a new and constructive policy?

First. We can declare ourselves. While it is true that we cannot overnight win to our side the progressive forces in the world nor make the United Nations into an effective World Government, we can overnight make up our minds that this is what we want to do. The mere declaration of such a change in our outlook and policy could profoundly and dramatically affect the present sombre world picture. Secretary Marshall's courageous

pronouncement of last June had an almost miraculous effect upon the tired, discouraged and frightened peoples of Europe - even though they well knew that there could still be many a slip between promise and fulfillment.

Second. We can make hash of the Kremlin's two fondest hopes. In effect, these two hopes are one and the same - the hope that we shall fail to maintain our social and economic health here at home - and the hope that we shall fail to carry through, over the next few years, our avowed intention to help the rest of the world get back upon its feet. To make hash of these hopes will require not only determination but far more careful planning than we are now doing here at home, together with considerable self-discipline and sacrifice on the part of Americans in every walk of life.

Third. We can stop the armament race. We can cut into the increasingly dangerous vicious circle of preparation for war in which the Soviet Union and the United States are presently engaged. We can do this only if we bring ourselves to realize that the threat to Western Europe - and via Western Europe to our own security - is not primarily a military threat and cannot be met by military force - that it is essentially a moral and political threat which must be met by moral and political means.

What, then, should we do about the President's latest proposals for UMT and Selective Service? These measures alone are, of course, hopelessly inadequate if we are really preparing for a possible war. They were intended in the first instance, I believe, chiefly for psychological effect. They will doubtless be followed by other recommendations for a greatly expanded military budget. Personally, I should favor much fuller preparedness

and a declared readiness to fight, if I thought that by fighting we could save Western Europe. I favored precisely this course in 1917 and enrolled as a cadet flyer before we entered World War I. It is a matter of public record that I favored precisely this course against the Nazis even before they entered Prague in March 1939. But today my reason tells me that the danger we face cannot be halted by the threat of armed force because, in the final showdown, we can stop Russia by armed force only if we first destroy the very civilization we should be fighting to save. My reason tells me that preparedness for war is now an illusion. And that - if it is an illusion - it is high time that we stop playing with fire.

There is still a chance for the American people to say to its Government: "Halt! About Face!"

There is still time for us to realize that war is no longer an acceptable alternative to the achievement of One World by peaceful means. There is still time for us to awaken to the fact that, if the fatal drift toward war is to be halted, we, the most powerful and least vulnerable people on this vulnerable planet, must be the ones to arrest it.

It would be irresponsible and futile to try to stop the armament race by opposing the specific measures of preparedness which our President has demanded. To do that at this moment and without bringing about a complete change of policy would merely discredit the dwindling authority of our Government and issue an open invitation to further Soviet aggression.

We can and must stop the armament race by insisting that our Government revise its basic analysis of the world crisis - that it develop and proclaim a new foreign policy and a corresponding domestic policy which will truly harness our great human

and physical resources to the peaceable building of One World. Unless we can do this, we shall very shortly be spending something like $20,000,000,000 a year on our military establishments. We are spending over half that amount already. Surely it must be plain that, even without a reduction of taxes, we cannot spend 40 per cent of our national budget on armament and at the same time effectively help the world to recover. If we do this, we shall be on our way to becoming a garrison state. On the other hand, think what it would mean if - instead of adding $10,000,000,000 to unproductive armament - we should add half that amount to a broader and more generous recovery program, aimed at helping the progressive forces throughout the world. Think what it would mean in the way of restoring world stability if, instead of doubling our military budget, we were to double our recovery program at only half the cost to our taxpayers.

If ever there was a moment which should bring together all parties, all candidates and all citizens in a common effort, it is this moment in our history. For at this moment we alone hold the power to turn the world from suicide toward unity and peace.

Our strength in the past has flowed from a native courage and a native vision of a better future. Our power of attraction has flowed from our natural affinity with all peoples everywhere seeking change for the better. Recently, fear of change and a newly-discovered affinity for the status quo have all but drained that reservoir of goodwill of which Wendell Willkie wrote before he died.

Let us halt and about face before it is too late. Let us refill the reservoir of our strength at its ancient sources. Let us recapture courage and common sense and the vision of a future fit for man.

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
485 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

February 13, 1948

Dear Jim:

Your Sarah Lawrence effort was, as usual, magnificent. Thanks for sending it to me. I am now shouting at your publishers trying to get a copy of the book to read over the weekend.

As ever yours,

Mr. James Warburg
70 East 45th Street
New York, New York

COPY

Ed — you'll get the book later this week. Meanwhile here's the major thesis to chew on. Jim

Release:
2 P.M.

Address to
The Faculty and Students
of
Sarah Lawrence College
by
James P. Warburg

Feb. 10, 1948

There has never been a time when a single nation held in its hands so much of the world's total effective power as the United States holds today. There has never been a time when any one people carried as great a burden of responsibility for the future of mankind as we carry at this moment. We have not sought this responsibility. We are ill prepared for the problems which it entails. And yet we, as a people, have, I think, come to realize that there is no escape from the burden which history has laid upon us.

Most of us have at present a rather desperate sense of moving toward war while earnestly seeking peace. Our anxiety and our confusion breed a feeling of frustration which leads either to a paralysis of reason or to unreasoning anger and aggression. We cannot afford to remain very long in this condition. We cannot afford to act in unreasoning anger. Nor dare we by our inaction permit the present dangerous deterioration to continue.

We are in a vicious circle. Our so-called experts and political leaders grope in vain for a feeling of support in public opinion. And the average citizen, who makes up public opinion, is bewildered by the confusion which afflicts the experts and political leaders.

There are, I think, two things we can do about this.

The first is to relax. Not in the sense of brushing aside our problems and responsibilities, but in the sense in

which any good athlete learns to relax in order to put forth his best effort. The tense batter never knocks out the winning single. The tense half-back never catches a touchdown pass. A tense nation cannot be expected to exert its power effectively in a time of crisis. We are today a tense nation. We need to stretch - to look around for a moment - to acquire a little of that wry humor and sense of comradeship with which a good soldier moves into battle.

The next thing we need to do is to realize that we have been, and are, dealing with two separate problems as if they were only one problem. There is a world economic crisis and a world political crisis. The two are inseparable; but they are also separate. Neither can be cured without the other; but each requires its own separate diagnosis and treatment.

The world economic crisis is a crisis of lagging or wholly impeded production. Because a great war has been fought in Europe and Asia, ravaging those continents, exhausting their peoples, and throwing out of kilter the delicate balance of their economies and social structures, the Eastern Hemisphere - from the British Isles to Japan - is suffering from acute shortages. Peoples who have for centuries been self-supporting find themselves unable to produce enough to sustain life at even the lowest level. Or, if they can produce a surplus of some things, they find themselves unable to exchange this surplus for other necessities which they have never in the past produced for themselves and have always purchased from other countries. The

normal incentives for work have been destroyed. Consumer goods are practically unobtainable and saving has become meaningless because there is no longer any guaranty that money saved today will buy goods that might become available tomorrow. These conditions produce unrest and political instability.

We, in the Western Hemisphere, have so far been almost untouched by this economic crisis. Our half of the world has a surplus of food and raw materials. Its productive capacity has increased while that of Europe and Asia has diminished. In money value, the United States alone at present turns out about two-thirds of the world's entire production. Moreover, the United States is at present the sole surplus producer of most of those particular things which are needed in Europe and Asia to re-start the wheels of production.

In dealing with this world economic crisis, we have, broadly speaking, embarked upon the road which leads to recovery and peace. We have given emergency relief assistance and are now trying to use our great resources to push the crucial sectors of the world's stagnating economy off dead-centre. The Marshall Plan may still be wrecked and turned back into a continuing relief operation by foolish penny-pinching and crippling amendments, or by failure to control our own economy, but the basic plan itself is sound. It is a plan to meet the economic crisis in the only way by which it can be met - by helping others to help themselves. This is not merely the product of decent humanitarianism. It is the product of enlightened self-interest - the

product of our recognition that prosperity as well as peace has become indivisible.

The same thing is not at all true of our approach to the world political crisis. The Truman Doctrine is not the product of enlightened self-interest. It is the product of ignorance, prejudice and fear. Whereas, in dealing with the world economic crisis, we are, broadly speaking, on the road to peace, in dealing with the world political crisis, we are on the road to war.

The instinctive knowledge that this is the case is what makes us anxious and uncertain. And - because we do not separate one problem from the other - our justified anxiety concerning the ultimate results of the Truman Doctrine makes us unjustifiably apprehensive concerning the Marshall Plan.

It is quite true that the Marshall Plan cannot work - cannot achieve its objective of laying the economic foundations for peace - when coupled with a political policy that leads to war. But the proper conclusion is not, therefore, to question or reject the Marshall Plan. The proper conclusion is to question and - in my opinion - to reject the Truman Doctrine, developing in its place a political policy based upon a calm re-examination of what the world political crisis is really about.

The political crisis today expresses itself in dangerously mounting tension between the two great centres of power - the United States and the Soviet Union. This rising tension is accompanied by increasing pressure upon all the peoples of the world to line up with one or the other of the two growling

antagonists. The post-war ideal of One World has more and more receded into the background until we are now faced with the prospect of a world divided into two rival if not openly hostile camps. Since neither half of the world can achieve full prosperity without exchanging goods and services with the other, such a state of affairs inevitably leads to discontent and mutual recrimination. Each half blames the other. Each takes precautions against the other. Armaments drain more and more of the national budgets. The more guns there are, the less butter remains for the people. The less butter, the greater the discontent and the greater the readiness to blame an external enemy.

Our present effort to stop this sort of drift toward war rests upon what seems to me an incomplete understanding of history and a false appraisal of the historical forces which operate in the present. Perhaps even more important is the fact that our present policy is so largely based upon our own fear and so little upon an understanding of the hopes and fears of the other peoples of the world.

The present tensions did not arise overnight. Their origins go back to the original impact upon Western society of the Bolshevik Revolution. They have their roots in the period which produced the rise of fascism, the appeasement of fascism by the West, and the turning away of the Soviet Union into the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. To understand the present state of affairs, one has to trace through the wartime agreements and disagreements of the Nazi-forged anti-Nazi coalition; one has to study the dubious premises upon which the Yalta deal was made and the Atlantic Charter jettisoned; one has to recognize the vagueness and the

ambiguity of the understandings reached. Above all, one has to recognize the inherent weakness of a United Nations structure which stops short of World Government in a world where power has become concentrated in only two real centres of power.

Any such approach at once precludes the simple answer that the solution to the world political crisis consists merely in finding a way to stop Soviet or communist expansion. Yet that is essentially the assumption upon which our present political policy is based. Having made that assumption, we proceeded to develop a theory about what makes the Russians expansive, and then worked out a policy to fit that theory.

Our theory was that the primary cause of Russian expansionism is the need of a dictatorial regime to concentrate the attention of the oppressed Russian people upon an external enemy. Only thus - so runs the so-called Kennan thesis - can a regime of terrorism, originally created to stamp out internal opposition to the revolution, maintain itself in power. It follows, since such expansion grows by what it feeds upon, that the Soviet Union must be "contained" before its expansionism can reach such proportions as to cause a war. It follows further that, if Soviet expansionism is contained, there will be a strong possibility that the dictatorial regime will mellow or crumble and perhaps be overthrown.

This was the belief which clearly underlay the thinking of those of Mr. Truman's advisers who drafted the famous message of March 12, 1947. With all due respect to these gentlemen and their intimate knowledge of Russian affairs, this thesis seems far too simple. It omits, for one thing, the possibility that

Soviet policy may also have been influenced to a large extent by an actual fear - ridiculous as this may seem to us - of attack by the United States. It omits any consideration of the fact that, in a world in which national sovereignty is the supreme authority and in which power has become concentrated in only two centres of super-power, there is a natural tendency toward mutual hostility between those two centres - quite irrespective of the nature or intentions of either. Finally, the Kennan thesis, while recognizing the oppositeness inherent in the nature of the United States and the USSR, tends to regard this oppositeness as irreconcilable, until such time as a contained USSR changes its nature and becomes what we should consider "more democratic". It omits the possibility that we, too, may have to revise some of our ideas.

This analysis led quite naturally to an American policy of holding firmly to what Mr. Dulles called "our invigorated policies" and keeping the Soviet Union in check until it changed its policies. Such a policy must presuppose: first, that we are able to contain Soviet expansion by peaceful means; second, that, if Soviet expansion is checked, the present regime will mellow or fall; and, third, that, if the present regime falls, the Russian people will turn out to have convictions and predilections so like our own that a reconciliation will be possible.

The first supposition - that we could contain the Soviet Union by peaceful means - can neither be proved nor disproved until it is too late. The second supposition - that containment would cause the Soviet regime to crumble or fall - seems to rest upon the belief that there is a strong latent resistance to the present regime among the Russian people - of which, so far as I know,

there is very little evidence. And the third supposition implies a belief that, if the Russian people are free to choose any form of government, they would choose a form which approximated the Western concept of democracy. This seems to be contrary to contemporary evidence as well as to past history.

Like most revolutions, the Bolshevik Revolution was chiefly concerned with achieving a more equitable distribution of the material benefits of society. It was not - like our Revolution - primarily concerned with establishing self-government and the political freedoms. The Russian people threw out the Czar's management because it had oppressed and exploited them - they wanted to be governed more justly - they had not reached the point of wanting to govern themselves. The Russian ideal of "democracy" is still that of a society in which everyone shares more or less equally in the material benefits. This is an ideal typical of a people accustomed through long generations to a low standard of living, while seeing its rulers living in luxury.

Our ideal of "democracy" is that of a society in which each individual has an equal voice in the management, rather than an equal share in the benefits. This is an ideal typical of a fluid society and of a people accustomed to relatively easy access to a high standard of living.

The two ideals are not antithetical. Neither can alone produce the perfect freedom. Both are included in Aristotle's definition: "Freedom is to govern and be governed." We have so far emphasized the first half of that definition. The Russians have emphasized the second. Or, if you prefer Lincoln to Aristotle, both the Russian ideal and the American ideal are included

in the perfect democracy, defined as "Government by the people, of the people and for the people." We have so far stressed "by the people". The Russians have stressed "for the people".

These national ideals, or emphases, will change only when the conditions change out of which they grew. If our system continues to produce booms and busts, if it continues periodically to expose the majority of the people to hardship and insecurity, if it continues increasingly to freeze the strata in our society so that access to wealth is no longer open except to the privileged few - then we shall again face a rising demand for more economic or social democracy. In the last great depression we saw how the majority of people were willing to sacrifice some of the fetishes of political "freedom" in order to obtain economic security and greater social justice. But with a return of prosperity, we have reverted to our traditional emphasis. It would probably take not one but several more major depressions to make us permanently change our emphasis from political to economic democracy.

In the same way, it will take many years of economic security and a relatively high living standard to make the Russian people change their emphasis from the economic to the political ideal. If there is any present threat to the Soviet regime, it is not likely to be found in a latent revolt against political oppression, but rather in dissatisfaction with a management which fails to raise the living standards of the worker and peasant.

But - so long as the Russian people believe that there is any threat to the security of the Russian nation - there

is little chance that they will revolt against a management which holds down their living standard in order to build up and protect the national security. So long as American policy lends any reality to the claim of the Soviet regime that the USSR is in danger, American policy is in fact protecting the regime against whatever domestic trouble might otherwise be in store for it.

Let us now consider a somewhat different theory than that upon which our Government has been proceeding. Let us consider the theory that the Russians have a long-range aim of creating a communist world, but that - unlike Hitler - they have no time schedule and no fixed objectives which they are determined to gain, if necessary by force of arms. Let us consider the theory that Soviet aggressiveness derives in large measure from fear and feeds upon fear. This does not necessarily make Russia any less dangerous, but it alters our approach to the danger. It would make our policy aim at removing the causes of Russian fear, in so far as it lies within our power to do so without taking foolish risks with our own security.

The two major Soviet fears with which we have to deal are: fear of war with the United States; and fear that we may use our economic power to force our kind of economic system upon so much of the world as to isolate and encircle the Soviet Union. This would postpone into infinity the realization of the still powerful Russian dream of an eventual world revolution. We may consider the mere existence of such a dream dangerous. But we should be wise to recognize that a totally frustrated dream would be far more dangerous at this moment. For a suddenly frustrated deep-seated aspiration can become a grim and irrational determination.

As to Russian fear of war, we know that we do not want to make war upon the Soviet Union. But we must realize that we have in the past year conveyed the impression, not only to the Russians, but to many Europeans and Asiatics that we think we may have to fight the Soviet Union. Many Frenchmen think - and many Czechs, too - that our German policy is primarily designed to create a bulwark against Russia in Central Europe. Many Asiatics think that our policy in Japan, Korea and China is shaped to the same sort of purpose in Asia. Our Latin-American policy, our huge military expenditures, our sole possession of the atomic bomb, and our continued stock-piling add to this impression. To brush all this aside as the figment of Russian propaganda is to fool no one except perhaps ourselves.

The truth of the matter is that while we are trying sincerely to avoid a clash with the Soviet Union, we are, at the same time, taking out all sorts of insurance against possible failure to do so. Our policy in Germany is not designed to create a bulwark against Russia - which would be foolish in any case - but it is influenced by the consideration that we may have to fight Russia. So is our policy in Japan, China, Korea, Greece, Turkey and Latin America.

This is a very dangerous business. It is doubly dangerous because the Soviet Union is playing precisely the same game. Never mind who started it. The important thing to realize is that this two-sided policy of taking out insurance against war is the road to war. What constitutes insurance for us is a threat to the Soviet Union. What constitutes insurance to the Soviet Union is a threat to us.

Moreover, most of this insurance business is a very silly business. If we ever do fight the Soviet Union, most of our mutual provocations will have insured neither of us against anything. In an atomic and bacteriological war, fought largely by air across the polar region, what good will it have done us to have armed Senor Peron? What good will it have done the Russians to have insisted upon pushing out their frontier into Central Europe? The Red Army is not going to land in Argentina and we shall be swept out of Europe overnight. We are both of us taking out insurance against the last war - not against the next one. But, by taking out these useless, expired policies, we each lend reality to the distrust and fear of the other.

I am not suggesting that we should be so foolish as to disarm ourselves unilaterally. We did that once with disastrous results. We must remain strong in scientific research, in Polar aviation and wherever strength would count in an atomic war, until we can bring about universal disarmament. But I am suggesting that we make it much clearer than we have to date that we desire to disarm, and that we look to the United Nations to take over the job of policing the world at the earliest possible moment. I am suggesting that we stop thinking in strategic terms which are now meaningless. And, above all, I would like to suggest that we, as citizens, think more about how to prevent the next war and less about what we shall do if war comes. The greatest danger of an atomic war is the widespread acceptance of its inevitability.

We have able military and naval leaders. It is their business always to be prepared for the worst, until the day

comes when all the nations lay down their arms. But it is not the business of our military and naval leaders to guide our policy in trying to make a lasting peace. Their thinking must not be allowed to shape the thinking of the American people. The American people must learn to think for peace if they want peace.

So much for the military aspect. What can we do to allay Soviet fear of what we might do with our great economic power? This fear rests, I believe, upon considerably more than the fertile imagination of a dictatorial regime trying to maintain itself in power. It rests upon the conviction that the United States is determined to maintain an economic system which must either lead to imperial exploitation (and ultimate war) or collapse. We are perhaps more concerned with a different and more reasonable version of this fear which affects most of the peoples of Europe and Asia. This version, which one finds articulately expressed by Western Europeans, runs as follows.

The United States is determined to preserve its own free enterprise economy. It believes that it can preserve its free enterprise economy only in a preponderantly free enterprise world. It will, therefore, use its great economic power to bludgeon the other peoples of the world into a return to laisser-faire capitalism.

We, as a nation, are at present making the dangerous mistake of meeting communist fanaticism with a doctrinaire fanaticism of our own. One becomes acutely aware of this in talking to almost any thinking person in Europe or Asia. Traveling about outside this country, one encounters everywhere a

resentment - directed at us almost as much as against the Soviet Union - resentment at being forced to choose between the undesirable and the impossible - to line up either on the side of communist dictatorship or free enterprise laisser-faire.

Most Americans do not realize that our alternative is impossible outside of our own hemisphere - that people cannot re-establish private capitalism in countries where private capital has been dispersed or destroyed. Nor do most Americans realize that the majority of Europeans have reached the conviction that a certain amount of government planning and control over a nation's economy is to be desired, even though it may restrict the free initiative of the individual.

The fear that we may try to tie strings to our aid which would force people, against their own judgment and will, back into a system they have discarded, is not a fear one finds only in the Soviet orbit. One finds it everywhere abroad, except among the tenacious remnants of the former economic power groups. Coupled with this fear, one finds a resentment at being told what to do, even by the most benevolent outsider.

We have the power to help and guide the world in the direction in which the masses of mankind desire to move. We do not have the power to reverse the direction.

On this ground at least, we can kill two birds with one stone. We can, to some extent, put Russian fears to rest and at the same time vastly improve our relations with the non-communist world.

There is another reason why we should be wise to abandon our present doctrinaire tendency. Intolerance and coercion are an integral part of the present Soviet system. They act as a foreign body when introduced into the philosophy of life upon which this nation was founded - a foreign body which could poison our whole system and rob it of its power.

The burning issue of our time is economic rather than political. Food, fuel and shoes are, for the moment, more important than political freedoms. But there is a moral issue, which will some day become more important as the economic crisis subsides. If the great moral issue of our time is belief in the Rights of Man - and especially the right of man freely to choose the form of society in which he wants to live - then we cannot effectively fight for that issue and at the same time peddle our own form of society as the only road to salvation. In doing so, we stultify our case and throw away our greatest power of attraction. For our greatest power of attraction in the ideological competition, which seems likely to follow the present economic competition with the Soviet Union, is our traditional belief - imperfectly fulfilled though it be - in the great propositions laid down in our Declaration of Independence.

The change of policy here suggested requires, first of all, an unequivocal statement of our changed position - a statement which the world will understand as a final repudiation of the underlying thesis of the Truman Doctrine and of the policy derived from that thesis. This policy - to put it baldly - is a policy of appointing ourselves the world's judge and the world's policeman - of considering the United Nations expendable in the

interest of containing Soviet expansion - and of seeking to effect that containment by backing with dollars and military bluff any and all governments or groups which oppose communism, no matter how corrupt or anti-democratic they may be.

Next, the suggested change of policy requires the recognition that - whether we like it or not - we shall have to transact a large part of our foreign trade with governments rather than with private firms or individuals. It suggests further that we may have to channel through our own Government a considerable portion of our commercial dealings with other countries. There is no doubt that this would have certain implications for our domestic economy. But these carry no further than the implications already inherent in our European Recovery Program. To carry out that program we must in any case permit our Government to plan and control certain sectors of our economy. We may not like moving in this direction. We may not like admitting that there can be no world-wide restoration of "free enterprise" and that, even in our own country, private initiative may be somewhat further restricted. Nevertheless, these are some of the facts of life we have to face. We cannot turn back the clock.

If there were time, I should like to spell out the possible effects of such a change of overall policy upon what are now the individual hotspots in the making of the peace, such as Germany, Austria, Korea and Japan. I should like to point out the implications of such a policy in our dealings with Greece and China. Most important of all, I should like to show how a different overall approach might move the key log in the

log-jam which now prevents the United Nations from developing gradually into a world government. This is what I have attempted to do in the book which is about to be published and to which your President has referred.

In closing, let me re-emphasize what seems to me fundamental in any discussion of our foreign policy problem.

We have a good plan for dealing with the world economic crisis. Let's stick to it, fight for it, get it adopted and carry it out.

We have a bad plan for dealing with the world political crisis. Let's have another look at the problem and see whether we cannot develop a more satisfactory answer.

Because we need to re-examine and, in my opinion, revise our political plan, let us not become confused and uncertain about the nature of the economic crisis. It is true that the Marshall Plan cannot work in the context of the Truman Doctrine. But that does not affect the validity of the Marshall Plan. On the contrary, the Marshall Plan is essential to whatever new and better political program we may develop.

One final word about our dealings with the USSR. The men in the Kremlin are difficult, arbitrary, and often - by our standards - just plain ornery. Patience and friendliness will not necessarily overcome this difficulty. Both are too often misunderstood as weakness. And yet there is no alternative to patience and friendliness, because - if we, too, become ornery - the result will be war - the kind of war in which one man can carry in a suitcase the means of poisoning or destroying the entire population of a great city.

We are living in a time which requires the most difficult formula of statesmanship. It demands courage tempered by wisdom, determination conditioned by respect for the rights of others, and strength made gentle by a sense of responsibility for mankind. A terrible burden rests upon our public servants. A single word spoken carelessly or in anger may have fateful consequences. The more our public servants feel behind them the pressures of prejudice and fear, the greater will be their temptation to yield to weariness and irritation. The more they feel behind them the calm confidence of an informed people, the greater will be their serenity and effectiveness. If they are to be patient in the face of impatience, tolerant in the face of intolerance, and wise in the face of unwisdom, we too must learn patience, tolerance and restraint.

I have called my new book, "Put Yourself in Marshall's Place", because that is what I think all of us need to do, if we are to fulfill the obligations of democratic citizenship.

Mr. James P. Warburg

announces the marriage of his daughter

Kay James

to

Mr. Robert A. Levin

on Friday, the thirty-first of October

Nineteen hundred and forty-seven

New York

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
485 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

October 23, 1947

Dear Jim:

You really rang the bell in Baltimore but, by God, you're still a banker—the papers say so! I think we ought to do the next one with our heads in the same barrel. Saw Lucius Clay at lunch the other day who spoke right kindly of our effort.

As ever yours,

Mr. James P. Warburg
70 East 55th Street
New York 17, New York

COPY

ROOM 2720

TELEPHONE
MURRAY HILL 4-0163

JAMES P. WARBURG
70 EAST 45TH STREET
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

October 16,1947.

Dear Ed:

Many thanks for the recording. I'm glad you were happy with our joint effort. I've rarely enjoyed anything more than chicking merrily along with you.

Enclosed is a major effort I'm making next Monday at the Foreign Policy Association meeting in Baltimore. I've packed in too much for one speech,I think, but I want to get all of this off my chest somewhere. So they'll have to take it. Perhaps some of this might be material for another conversation piece. (What about doing the next one in a Louis XVI chaise de conversation in powdered wigs?)

As ever,

Jim

Mr.Edward R.Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
New York City.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD CRISIS.

Address by James P. Warburg
to
Foreign Policy Association
Baltimore, Maryland
October 20, 1947

Release for Morning Papers
October 21, 1947

It is difficult for us in the United States to realize that we are in the midst of an acute world crisis. We live in a comfortable well-stocked house, high up on a hill which overlooks the plain where dwell the other peoples of the world. Down on the plain there are floods and pestilence and famine. We know this. We are saddened by it. We send medicine and food. We do what we can to help the neediest c ases. But we do not fully realize that the floods are rising and will, unless arrested, engulf our own hill-top. We are not fully aware that, without meaning to do so, we have collected on our hill-top practically all the available equipment for fighting and controlling flood-waters and that, unless we make this equipment available, the people in the valley are helpless.

The world crisis is a crisis of lagging or wholly impeded production. Because a great war has been fought in Europe and Asia, ravaging those continents, exhausting their peoples and resources and throwing out of kilter the delicate balance of their economies, the Eastern Hemisphere - from the British Isles to Japan - is suffering from acute shortage and much of it is in a state of political unrest.

Peoples, who have for centuries been self-supporting, find themselves unable to produce enough to sustain life at even the lowest subsistence level. Or, if they can produce some things, they find themselves unable to exchange them for other necessities which they have never in the past produced for themselves and have always purchased in other countries.

We, in the Western Hemisphere, have so far been untouched by this crisis. Our half of the world has a surplus of food and raw materials. Its productive capacity has increased while that of Europe and Asia has diminished. In money value, the United States alone at present turns out about two-thirds of the entire world's production. Moreover, the United States is at present the sole surplus producer of most of those particular things which are needed in Europe and Asia in order to re-start the wheels of production.

The needs of Europe and Asia fall into three categories: I shall name them in order of immediate necessity, although this is the reverse of their order of ultimate importance.

First, there is the need for food, fuel and fibres. Unless Western Europe and large parts of Asia receive food and coal from overseas, as well as some textile raw materials, this winter will bring disease and starvation to millions of people. Medical supplies also belong in this category.

Second, there is the need for all sorts of incentive goods. That is, the necessities beyond the minimum of food and fuel, which all men desire for themselves and their

families and for which they will work. I mean such things as shoes, clothes, household utensils, simple tools and simple materials with which to repair and rebuild. One must realize that throughout large parts of Europe and Asia today people can see no use in working beyond the point required to eke out a bare living. The things they would like to buy with the money they might earn simply do not exist - or exist only on a small black market which is hopelessly out of their reach. They see no point in saving money because they have lost confidence in its future purchasing power. The chief reason why people seem to have lost the will to work is that they are deprived of the means for translating their work into either the satisfaction of their present needs or insurance against a rainy day in the future.

Third and last, there is the need for the tools of production and especially for the tools or equipment with which to make other tools. Modern industry begins with coal. Coal means power, transportation, steel, machines, machine-parts and every sort of manufacturing equipment. Coal also means food through fertilizer; it means metal containers for preserving food; it means fuel for homes, and thus enables men to work in factories. But, to supply an industry with coal, you need mining machinery, you need men with tools in their hands and the incentive to use them, you need a transportation system to get the coal from pithead to factory and home. If you supply the tools and machinery to rehabilitate your coal mines and to get your transportation system working - if you supply your workers with food and the incentive to work - then you have moved the key log in the log jam.

The next thing is iron. Once you have coal and iron, you can make steel. With steel you can rebuild or repair factories of all sorts. Given a certain number of machine-tools to begin with, you can then make factory equipment. You can make steel rails and rolling stock.

All along the line, as you get started, you will find yourself up against an increasing number of problems. Each factory will require certain raw materials or semi-manufactured goods in order to get going. For each factory that gets under way you need more incentive goods in order to have more workers willing to work. As the process of rehabilitation continues, each country finds that it is more and more dependent upon being able to obtain certain things from other countries. These imports have to be paid for by a corresponding volume of exports. Very soon it becomes apparent that, unless recovery in the various countries of major importance goes more or less hand in hand, no single country or group of countries can get very far along the road to normal health. On the other hand, it also becomes apparent that, if recovery sets in at a number of key points in the world's economy, a powerful push is given to the world economy as a whole.

The purpose of this homely and oversimplified description of the present crisis of production is merely to indicate the nature of the economic problem which we face at the present time. Unfortunately the crisis is sharpened and its cure made more difficult by political factors of which we are made more aware every day.

In the last six months we have moved away from a world-wide cooperative effort to repair the ravages of war -

away from the attempt to create a ~~simple~~ SINGLE community of peoples based upon the rea lization that not only peace but prosperity had become indivisible. We have moved far in the direction of a world divided into two competing, if not hostile camps, each trying to overcome the economic crisis in its own sphere of influence, in its own way and with little consideration for the other. It may not be a popular thing to say, but I think it is important for us to realize that in the eyes of other peoples the blame for this tragic development does not rest exclusively upon the Soviet Union.

Most Europeans and many Asiatics feel about the recent attitude and actions of the Soviet Union much as we do. The Soviet leadership seems to them - as it seems to us - needlessly harsh, inconsiderate and doctrinaire. They are aware of many of the distortions of Soviet propaganda. In spite of this, what we consider Russian expansionism and aggression is not always regarded in quite the same light by Europeans or Asiatics. They are more inclined than we to regard Russian annexations of territory as merely the recapture of lands which once belonged to Czarist Russia. They are more aware than we of Russia's sufferings and needs, and less fearful of her present military power.

We, on the other hand, appear to most of the peoples of Europe and Asia both as the one ray of light in the present darkness and, at the same time, as one of two great thunderclouds on the horizon. We are the ray of hope because we alone possess the resources which, if used, can push the world's economy off

dead-center. We are one of two thunderclouds because, under Russian provocation, we seem at times to become provocative ourselves. It is a curious experience for an American studying conditions abroad to discover that the United States, while on the whole better liked than the Soviet Union, is almost equally feared. In trying to discover why this should be true I have run into a number of recurring themes.

First - due to the separation of powers between our Executive and Legislative Branches, people abroad feel that they cannot count on assurances or declarations of policy by our President or Secretary of State. Furthermore, they feel that, in an election year, our foreign policy is likely to be swayed by considerations of domestic partisan politics. This arouses both fear and resentment that so huge a power factor in the world should be almost completely unpredictable.

Second - the belief is widely held that we are becoming as doctrinaire and fanatical about free enterprise capitalism as the Russians are about totalitarian communism. We seem at times bent on attaching such political strings to economic aid as would force other peoples to remodel themselves in the American image.

Undoubtedly this is true to some extent. Many of our leaders - and perhaps many of our people - seem to feel that there is no real distinction between totalitarian communism and the kind of democratic socialism or semi-socialism which is now emerging in most of the Eastern Hemisphere. One has only to visit Scandinavia or Britain - or for that matter, Finland or Czechoslovakia - to see how great is the difference between a

totalitarian police state, such as Yugoslavia, and a country in which people can write and talk and think as they please, even though the big landed estates have been broken up and big business has been put under public ownership. It is hard for us to understand that a system which has brought us so many benefits may not be applicable to other peoples. It is even harder to understand that most Europeans and most Asiatics are less afraid of public control or ownership than they are of private monopoly. But it should not be difficult for us to understand that no self-respecting people likes to be told by even the most benevolent outsider how it should run its domestic affairs.

The fact is that a restoration of our kind of free enterpise capitalism in Europe or Asia is a physical impossibility - even if it were desired by the peoples concerned. The old power groups have been weakened or destroyed. There is little chance for the formation of new private capital. You can't have capitalism without capitalists .

If we intend to pursue a constructive foreign policy, we cannot afford to lose any more time in recognizing that democratic socialism is on our side in the struggle to preserve human freedom and dignity. If we fail to recognize this fact, we shall drive some of our best friends into the totalitarian wilderness. It is worth noting in this connection that the recent manifesto of the new Communist International singled out the leaders of democratic socialism in Europe for an attack, more violent even than that upon our so-called economic imperialism. We may not recognize these Socialist leaders as our friends,

but the totalitarians recognize them as their most dangerous enemies.

The third recurring theme I found abroad was the impression that a strong, if not dominant, segment of United States opinion considers war with Russia inevitable, and that an important part of this group is actually contemplating a preventive attack upon the Soviet Union with atomic weapons. I do not believe that any responsible official of our Government - or, for that matter, any sane citizen - is seriously thinking of such action. Surely it is all too obvious what an atomic war would mean to victor as well as vanquished. Surely it is clear that, even were we to conquer Russia without receiving a scratch in return (which is a most unlikely hypothesis), we should then merely have saddled ourselves with the job of occupying a country considerably larger than our own and of policing a people vastly more numerous. We have some measure of what such an undertaking would mean in our current experience with our zone of Germany, where less than twenty million people are involved.

Nevertheless, upon returning from an absence of two months abroad, I myself have been shocked by the pre-occupation of the press and the man in the street with the question of whether and when there is to be war with Russia. I have been shocked at the extent to which we seem to take for granted the continuation of what is now called "the cold war" with the Soviet Union - the extent to which we seem to have forgotten the key sentence in Secretary Marshall's now famous speech at Cambridge last June.

That sentence - which cut like a keen fresh wind through the fog of confusion over the so-called Truman Doctrine- read as follows:

"Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos."

I hope those words are still the key to our foreign policy. No matter what the Kremlin may say or do, I am convinced that this sane approach is still the only road to recovery and peace. It is time that we re-affirmed it - in words and in action.

The fourth and last reason I was given, to account for fear of our influence in the world, was our inclination to take unilateral action, and thus to undermine the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations. The two examples most frequently cited were our intervention in Turkey and Greece, and our present apparent desire not to route Marshall Plan aid through the United Nations machinery. The danger of delay and obstruction in the United Nations channels is recognized, but the fear persists that, by avoiding present difficulties, we may be storing up trouble for the future.

So much for how we look to our friends across the water. This is more important, I think, than how we look to those who may for the moment be blinded by hostile sentiment.

And now let me put before you, very briefly, what seem to me the essential principles we must follow during the next few months, in order to make a sane policy successful.

First of all, there are certain things we must do here at home. We cannot supply even the world's most urgent needs out of our present exportable surplus of consumer's goods and

capital resources. We shall have to re-direct a part of our productive efforts into channels other than those dictated by normal business considerations of making a reasonable profit out of satisfying domestic consumer demand. We shall have to manufacture things that others need at the expense of not making some things that we want ourselves. We shall not only have to produce more, but produce differently - and we shall also have to consume less ourselves.

I believe that, if the American people were given a clear picture of the facts, and what the facts mean in terms of intelligent self-interest, they would be wise enough and generous enough to accept the implications. These implications are not pleasant. I see no sense in being other than completely frank about them.

As I see it, we cannot successfully tackle the job which lies before us unless we recognize and remedy the mistakes we have made in the recent past. Immediately after hostilities ceased, we did three irresponsible things: we cut off Lend Lease without any attempt to work out some sort of a post-war bridge to normal conditions; and we went off food rationing. A few months later we removed price controls and priority allocations. The result of these three actions was to impede the post-war recovery of our friends abroad, and to let our own economy run hog-wild into an unhealthy inflationary spiral. Every housewife knows what this has meant in terms of her market basket.

Let us not waste time over trying to fix the blame for these mistakes. In a sense we were all responsible for them. What concerns us now is to recognize that they were mistakes and that they must be rectified. In plain language - and I think we must use plain language even in an election year - we shall have to re-establish some degree of overall planning and control by Government, business and farm and labor leadership working together, as they did in war-time. We shall have to control prices and maintain a stable purchasing - power wage level. We shall have to make some things even scarcer than they are today in order to do our job abroad, and this means that we must not only control the price of what remains for the domestic consumer but see to it that what remains is fairly distributed. You cannot do that by any voluntary rationing. But I believe that the American people would gladly accept both food rationing and price controls, as well as a certain amount of actual deprivation, if they understood the facts - if they were talked to as grown-ups and not as children - and if they felt that whatever system was put into effect would operate efficiently and, above all, fairly.

Whether or not we face this issue squarely - whether or not the people are given a chance to face it at all in an election year - will, I think, be the supreme test of our two-party system.

The other great test which faces our bi-partisan leadership in the next few months is whether it will have the courage to tell the American people the real facts about the situation which confronts them in the world. Let me give you an example:

In the spring of 1946, Congress authorized a loan of $3,500,000,000 to Great Britain, which was supposed to bridge over the gap of re-conversion. Britain was faced not only with reconversion to peace-time production, but also with an adjustment to the permanent loss of most of her former income from foreign investments. These investments had been sold to buy planes and tanks and guns in order to hold the fort until we made up our minds about Lend-Lease aid. The British knew and said at the time that the amount was insufficient for the purpose. But our negotiators believed that Congress would refuse to appropriate more because, supposedly, the American people wouldn't stand for it. So we built a bridge three-quarters of the way across the river - which is no bridge at all. Had the American people known the facts, I believe they would have wanted to do the whole job - or else nothing.

And that is not all. I am not going into the unwise technical conditions attached to the loan. But an important simple fact - which few people here realize - is that, having made the insufficient loan, we then proceeded to cut it by another 27%. Not because we meant to do any such thing, but because we removed price controls and let our price level skyrocket out of sight, which meant that the $3,500,000,000 which the British had borrowed would buy only about $2,500,000,000 worth of our goods.

The same sort of thing will happen again to any loans we may make, unless we control our home economy. These are the kind of facts which I think the people are entitled to have placed before them.

Our Government is at this moment struggling with an extremely difficult two-fold problem. In order of ultimate importance the two halves are:

First - how to re-activate world production and world trade so that the various nations and peoples may again become self-supporting.

Second - how to prevent a further calamitous deterioration of world conditions in that interim which must elapse before any recovery plan can be worked out and put into effect.

Chronologically these problems come in the reverse order. If too little is done now in the way of immediate relief at the crucial sectors of the world's economy, the recovery plan will be still-born. If too much is done merely to stave off catastrophe, not enough resources will be left to prime the pump of world recovery.

Any one who examines the dire needs of the Eastern Hemisphere is at once forced to the grim conclusion that, if United States aid toward putting the world back upon its own feet is to be effective, United States relief of human misery must in itself be held down to the absolute and cruelly insufficient minimum.

Our resources - though great, if we mobilize them under careful control - are not unlimited. We could spend them all on relief, and there would still remain countless cold and hungry millions, with world recovery still just as far away as ever. There is no surer way to fail than to attack the secondary problem of relief as if it were primary.

In allocating our resources to immediate relief and to later recovery measures we must not only carefully restrict the first but also apply to both types of operation the principle of throwing in our weight only at carefully selected points of maximum leverage. Our help must be concentrated at those points from which recovery is most likely to spread into other areas. Once these points are selected, we must make up our minds to throw in at each crucial spot an amount of help which will really accomplish the desired purpose. It will be better to pick fewer spots, and really do the job where we decide to tackle it, than to overreach ourselves in the number of bridges we try to build at the risk of again leaving some of them spanning only part-way across the river.

The qualifications for a point of maximum leverage will necessarily be both economic and political. They might be defined roughly as follows:

1. Countries or areas which, when re-activated, will become important suppliers or markets for other countries or areas.

2. Countries or areas which are capable of rapidly reactivating their machinery of production and which require only a type of aid that can be quickly supplied.

3. Countries which are not going to use external aid to build up or maintain excessive military establishments, or to distort their economies for political reasons (such as striving for autarchy), or merely to improve their living standards at the expense of achieving economic health. And, finally,

4. Countries which have achieved sufficient political

stability to attract private capital. This means not merely the absence of civil strife but the existence of a government which does not permit the draining off of the fruits of production into the pockets of either corrupt officials or predatory private monopolists.

It goes without saying that nations desiring our assistance must qualify by making their maximum efforts at self-help and mutual aid amongst each other- that they must put their financial houses in order and, above all, firmly establish the confidence of their peoples in their governments and in themselves.

These are not absolute yardsticks. Nor can it be expected that any one country or area will conform to all the criteria. But the criteria must exist in order to establish the priorities without which we shall merely waste our resources in a scatter-gun attack, where precision target-shooting is required.

Unfortunately, the simple arithmetic upon which our calculations must be based - especially now, at the beginning - will not always correspond to our predilections nor even to our sense of justice. In Europe, Great Britain is our most obvious point of maximum leverage. Distasteful though it may be, western Germany is probably, because of its coal, the next point from which a limited recovery could most quickly spread into other areas. I say "a limited recovery" because I do not mean to suggest that we re-build Germany beyond the point necessary quickly to restore the health of her neighbors. Other points in Europe at which a small amount of assistance would probably

produce maximum results are the Low Countries, Czechoslovakia and Poland. In Asia there areprobably two points of maximum leverage: the rehabilitation of the surplus food producers - Burma, Siam and Indo-China; and - again distastefully - the reactivation of Japanese light industry to produce incentive goods for the entire Continent.

From a political point of view, France, Italy and Greece are the hot-spots of Europe, while China, Korea, India and Pakistan occupy a similar position in Asia. These political hot-spots constitute a two-fold danger to our whole undertaking: first, because their internal instability makes it extremely difficult to appraise just what and how much could be accomplished by a given amount of expenditure; and, second, because our own attitude toward the political issues at stake in these countries is confused by ignorance and prejudice or predilection. In the case of India and China an additional difficulty arises from the sheer magnitude of immediate need on the part of the vast, chronically undernourished populations.

One thing is clear: whatever stop-gap aid we render in these humanly and politically important but economically doubtful areas, must be rigorously held within that global sum which we feel can safely be subtracted from the total resources available to finance world recovery. If we allow political anxiety or even humanitarian sympathy to carry us beyond that point, we shall fail both the world and ourselves.

These are some of the unpalatable realities with which, I think, we must quickly become familiar, if we intend to harness

our strength to the task in hand.

There remains one other important element - a psychological factor of which an American becomes acutely aware in conversations with Europeans and Asiatics alike. If we are to discharge the great responsibility, which we have not sought but which history has laid upon us, we must learn not to expect gratitude. We must know - and act as if we knew - that we are giving what we give, not out of unselfish generosity or pity, but out of wise self-interest in the common cause of mankind. Saving men's lives matters less than helping them to save their self-respect.

This is perhaps the most difficult requirement we shall have to meet. Here too we shall not fail - if the American people are given the information to which they are entitled and the chance to make their own decision.

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The United States and the World Crisis

Address by

JAMES P. WARBURG

to

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
Baltimore, Maryland

October 20, 1947

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD CRISIS

It is difficult for us in the United States to realize that we are in the midst of an acute world crisis. We live in a comfortable well-stocked house, high up on a hill which overlooks the plain where dwell the other peoples of the world. Down on the plain there are floods and pestilence and famine. We know this. We are saddened by it. We send medicine and food. We do what we can to help the neediest cases. But we do not fully realize that the floods are rising and will, unless arrested, engulf our own hill-top. We are not fully aware that, without meaning to do so, we have collected on our hill-top practically all the available equipment for fighting and controlling flood-waters and that, unless we make this equipment available, the people in the valley are helpless.

The world crisis is a crisis of lagging or wholly impeded production. Because a great war has been fought in Europe and Asia, ravaging those continents, exhausting their peoples and resources and throwing out of kilter the delicate balance of their economies, the Eastern Hemisphere—from the British Isles to Japan—is suffering from acute shortage and much of it is in a state of political unrest. Peoples, who have for centuries been self-supporting, find themselves unable to produce enough to sustain life at even the lowest subsistence level. Or, if they can produce some things, they find themselves unable to exchange them for other necessities which they have never in the past produced for themselves and have always purchased in other countries.

We, in the Western Hemisphere, have so far been untouched by this crisis. Our half of the world has a surplus of food and raw materials. Its productive capacity has increased while that of Europe and Asia has diminished. In money value, the United States alone at present turns out about two-thirds of the entire world's production. Moreover, the United States is at present the sole surplus producer of most of those particular things which are needed in Europe and Asia in order to re-start the wheels of production.

The needs of Europe and Asia fall into three categories: I shall name them in order of immediate necessity, although this is the reverse of their order of ultimate importance.

First, there is the need for food, fuel and fibres. Unless Western Europe and large parts of Asia receive food and coal from overseas, as well as some textile raw materials, this winter will bring disease and

starvation to millions of people. Medical supplies also belong in this category.

Second, there is the need for all sorts of incentive goods. That is, the necessities beyond the minimum of food and fuel, which all men desire for themselves and their families and for which they will work. I mean such things as shoes, clothes, household utensils, simple tools and simple materials with which to repair and rebuild. One must realize that throughout large parts of Europe and Asia today people can see no use in working beyond the point required to eke out a bare living. The things they would like to buy with the money they might earn simply do not exist—or exist only on a small black market which is hopelessly out of their reach. They see no point in saving money because they have lost confidence in its future purchasing power. The chief reason why people seem to have lost the will to work is that they are deprived of the means for translating their work into either the satisfaction of their present needs or insurance against a rainy day in the future.

Third and last, there is the need for the tools of production and especially for the tools or equipment with which to make other tools. Modern industry begins with coal. Coal means power, transportation, steel, machines, machine-parts and every sort of manufacturing equipment. Coal also means food through fertilizer; it means metal containers for preserving food; it means fuel for homes, and thus enables men to work in factories. But, to supply an industry with coal, you need mining machinery, you need men with tools in their hands and the incentive to use them, you need a transportation system to get the coal from pithead to factory and home. If you supply the tools and machinery to rehabilitate your coal mines and to get your transportation system working—if you supply your workers with food and the incentive to work—then you have moved the key log in the log jam.

The next thing is iron. Once you have coal and iron, you can make steel. With steel you can rebuild or repair factories of all sorts. Given a certain number of machine-tools to begin with, you can then make factory equipment. You can make steel rails and rolling stock.

All along the line, as you get started, you will find yourself up against an increasing number of problems. Each factory will require certain raw materials or semi-manufactured goods in order to get going. For each factory that gets under way you need more incentive goods in order to have more workers willing to work. As the process of rehabilitation con-

tinues, each country finds that it is more and more dependent upon being able to obtain certain things from other countries. These imports have to be paid for by a corresponding volume of exports. Very soon it becomes apparent that, unless recovery in the various countries of major importance goes more or less hand in hand, no single country or group of countries can get very far along the road to normal health. On the other hand, it also becomes apparent that, if recovery sets in at a number of key points in the world's economy, a powerful push is given to the world economy as a whole.

The purpose of this homely and oversimplified description of the present crisis of production is merely to indicate the nature of the economic problem which we face at the present time. Unfortunately the crisis is sharpened and its cure made more difficult by political factors of which we are made more aware every day.

In the last six months we have moved away from a world-wide co-operative effort to repair the ravages of war—away from the attempt to create a single community of peoples based upon the realization that not only peace but prosperity had become indivisible. We have moved far in the direction of a world divided into two competing, if not hostile camps, each trying to overcome the economic crisis in its own sphere of influence, in its own way and with little consideration for the other. It may not be a popular thing to say, but I think it is important for us to realize that in the eyes of other peoples the blame for this tragic development does not rest exclusively upon the Soviet Union.

Most Europeans and many Asiatics feel about the recent attitude and actions of the Soviet Union much as we do. The Soviet leadership seems to them—as it seems to us—needlessly harsh, inconsiderate and doctrinaire. They are aware of many of the distortions of Soviet propaganda. In spite of this, what we consider Russian expansion and aggression is not always regarded in quite the same light by Europeans or Asiatics. They are more inclined than we to regard Russian annexations of territory as merely the recapture of lands which once belonged to Czarist Russia. They are more aware than we of Russia's sufferings and needs, and less fearful of her present military power.

We, on the other hand, appear to most of the peoples of Europe and Asia both as the one ray of light in the present darkness and, at the same time, as one of two great thunderclouds on the horizon. We are the ray of hope because we alone possess the resources which, if used, can push the world's economy off dead-center. We are one of two thunderclouds

because, under Russian provocation, we seem at times to become provocative ourselves. It is a curious experience for an American studying conditions abroad to discover that the United States, while on the whole better liked than the Soviet Union, is almost equally feared. In trying to discover why this should be true I have run into a number of recurring themes.

First—due to the separation of powers between our Executive and Legislative Branches, people abroad feel that they cannot count on assurances or declarations of policy by our President or Secretary of State. Furthermore, they feel that, in an election year, our foreign policy is likely to be swayed by considerations of domestic partisan politics. This arouses both fear and resentment that so huge a power factor in the world should be almost completely unpredictable.

Second—the belief is widely held that we are becoming as doctrinaire and fanatical about free enterprise capitalism as the Russians are about totalitarian communism. We seem at times bent on attaching such political strings to economic aid as would force other peoples to remodel themselves in the American image.

Undoubtedly this is true to some extent. Many of our leaders—and perhaps many of our people—seem to feel that there is no real distinction between totalitarian communism and the kind of democratic socialism or semi-socialism which is now emerging in most of the Eastern Hemisphere. One has only to visit Scandinavia or Britain—or for that matter, Finland or Czechoslovakia—to see how great is the difference between a totalitarian police state, such as Yugoslavia, and a country in which people can write and talk and think as they please, even though the big landed estates have been broken up and big business has been put under public ownership. It is hard for us to understand that a system which has brought us so many benefits may not be applicable to other peoples. It is even harder to understand that most Europeans and most Asiatics are less afraid of public control or ownership than they are of private monopoly. But it should not be difficult for us to understand that no self-respecting people likes to be told by even the most benevolent outsider how it should run its domestic affairs.

The fact is that a restoration of our kind of free enterprise capitalism in Europe or Asia is a physical impossibility—even if it were desired by the peoples concerned. The old power groups have been weakened or destroyed. There is little chance for the formation of new private capital. You can't have capitalism without capitalists.

If we intend to pursue a constructive foreign policy, we cannot afford to lose any more time in recognizing that democratic socialism is on our side in the struggle to preserve human freedom and dignity. If we fail to recognize this fact, we shall drive some of our best friends into the totalitarian wilderness. It is worth noting in this connection that the recent manifesto of the new Communist International singled out the leaders of democratic socialism in Europe for an attack, more violent even than that upon our so-called economic imperialism. We may not recognize these Socialist leaders as our friends, but the totalitarians recognize them as their most dangerous enemies.

The third recurring theme I found abroad was the impression that a strong, if not dominant, segment of United States opinion considers war with Russia inevitable, and that an important part of this group is actually contemplating a preventive attack upon the Soviet Union with atomic weapons. I do not believe that any responsible official of our Government—or, for that matter, any sane citizen—is seriously thinking of such action. Surely it is all too obvious what an atomic war would mean to victor as well as vanquished. Surely it is clear that, even were we to conquer Russia without receiving a scratch in return (which is a most unlikely hypothesis), we should then merely have saddled ourselves with the job of occupying a country considerably larger than our own and of policing a people vastly more numerous. We have some measure of what such an undertaking would mean in our current experience with our zone of Germany, where less than twenty million people are involved.

Nevertheless, upon returning from an absence of two months abroad, I myself have been shocked by the pre-occupation of the press and the man in the street with the question of whether and when there is to be war with Russia. I have been shocked at the extent to which we seem to take for granted the continuation of what is now called "the cold war" with the Soviet Union—the extent to which we seem to have forgotten the key sentence in Secretary Marshall's now famous speech at Cambridge last June. That sentence—which cut like a keen fresh wind through the fog of confusion over the so-called Truman Doctrine—read as follows:

"Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos."

I hope those words are still the key to our foreign policy. No matter what the Kremlin may say or do, I am convinced that this sane approach is still the only road to recovery and peace. It is time that we re-affirmed it—in words and in action.

The fourth and last reason I was given, to account for fear of our influence in the world, was our inclination to take unilateral action, and thus to undermine the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations. The two examples most frequently cited were our intervention in Turkey and Greece, and our present apparent desire not to route Marshall Plan aid through the United Nations machinery. The danger of delay and obstruction in the United Nations channels is recognized, but the fear persists that, by avoiding present difficulties, we may be storing up trouble for the future.

So much for how we look to our friends across the water. This is more important, I think, than how we look to those who may for the moment be blinded by hostile sentiment.

And now let me put before you, very briefly, what seem to me the essential principles we must follow during the next few months, in order to make a sane policy successful.

First of all, there are certain things we must do here at home. We cannot supply even the world's most urgent needs out of our present exportable surplus of consumer's goods and capital resources. We shall have to re-direct a part of our productive efforts into channels other than those dictated by normal business considerations of making a reasonable profit out of satisfying domestic consumer demand. We shall have to manufacture things that others need at the expense of not making some things that we want ourselves. We shall not only have to produce more, but produce differently—and we shall also have to consume less ourselves.

I believe that, if the American people were given a clear picture of the facts, and what the facts mean in terms of intelligent self-interest, they would be wise enough and generous enough to accept the implications. These implications are not pleasant. I see no sense in being other than completely frank about them.

As I see it, we cannot successfully tackle the job which lies before us unless we recognize and remedy the mistakes we have made in the recent past. Immediately after hostilities ceased, we did three irresponsible things: we cut off Lend Lease without any attempt to work out some sort of a post-war bridge to normal conditions; we went off food rationing; and, a few months later, we removed price controls and priority allocations. The result of these three actions was to impede the post-war recovery of our friends abroad, and to let our own economy run hog-wild into an

unhealthy inflationary spiral. Every housewife knows what this has meant in terms of her market basket.

Let us not waste time over trying to fix the blame for these mistakes. In a sense we were all responsible for them. What concerns us now is to recognize that they *were* mistakes and that they must be rectified. In plain language—and I think we must use plain language even in an election year—we shall have to re-establish some degree of overall planning and control by Government, business and farm and labor leadership working together, as they did in war-time. We shall have to control prices and maintain a stable purchasing-power wage level. We shall have to make some things even scarcer than they are today in order to do our job abroad, and this means that we must not only control the price of what remains for the domestic consumer but see to it that what remains is fairly distributed. *You cannot do that by any voluntary rationing.* But I believe that the American people would gladly accept both food rationing and price controls, as well as a certain amount of actual deprivation, if they understood the facts—if they were talked to as grown-ups and not as children—and if they felt that whatever system was put into effect would operate efficiently and, above all, fairly.

Whether or not we face this issue squarely—whether or not the people are given a chance to face it at all in an election year—will, I think, be the supreme test of our two-party system.

The other great test which faces our bi-partisan leadership in the next few months is whether it will have the courage to tell the American people the real facts about the situation which confronts them in the world. Let me give you an example:

In the spring of 1946, Congress authorized a loan of $3,500,000,000 to Great Britain, which was supposed to bridge over the gap of reconversion. Britain was faced not only with reconversion to peace-time production, but also with an adjustment to the permanent loss of most of her former income from foreign investments. These investments had been sold to buy planes and tanks and guns in order to hold the fort until we made up our minds about Lend-Lease aid. The British knew and said at the time that the amount of $3,500,000,000 was insufficient for the purpose. But our negotiators believed that Congress would refuse to appropriate more because, supposedly, the American people wouldn't stand for it. So we built a bridge three-quarters of the way across the river—which is no bridge at all. Had the American people known the facts, I believe they would have wanted to do the whole job—or else nothing.

And that is not all. I am not going into the unwise technical conditions attached to the loan. But an important simple fact—which few people here realize—is that, having made the insufficient loan, we then proceeded to cut it by another 27%. Not because we meant to do any such thing, but because we removed price controls and let our price level skyrocket out of sight, which meant that the $3,500,000,000 which the British had borrowed would buy only about $2,500,000,000 worth of our goods.

The same sort of thing will happen again to any loans we may make, unless we control our home economy. These are the kind of facts which I think the people are entitled to have placed before them.

Our Government is at this moment struggling with an extremely difficult two-fold problem. In order of ultimate importance its two halves are:

First—how to re-activate world production and world trade so that the various nations and peoples may again become self-supporting.

Second—how to prevent a further calamitous deterioration of world conditions in that interim which must elapse before any recovery plan can be worked out and put into effect.

Chronologically these problems come in the reverse order. If too little is done now in the way of immediate relief at the crucial sectors of the world's economy, the recovery plan will be still-born. If too much is done merely to stave off catastrophe, not enough resources will be left to prime the pump of world recovery.

Any one who examines the dire needs of the Eastern Hemisphere is at once forced to the grim conclusion that, if United States aid toward putting the world back upon its own feet is to be effective, United States relief of human misery must in itself be held down to the absolute and cruelly insufficient minimum.

Our resources—though great, if we mobilize them under careful control—are not unlimited. We could spend them all on relief, and there would still remain countless cold and hungry millions, with world recovery still just as far way as ever. There is no surer way to fail than to attack the secondary problem of relief as if it were primary.

In allocating our resources to immediate relief and to later recovery measures we must not only carefully restrict the first but also apply to

both types of operation the principle of throwing in our weight only at carefully selected points of maximum leverage. Our help must be concentrated at those points from which recovery is most likely to spread into other areas. Once these points are selected, we must make up our minds to throw in at each crucial spot an amount of help which will really accomplish the desired purpose. It will be better to pick fewer spots, and really do the job where we decide to tackle it, than to over-reach ourselves in the number of bridges we try to build at the risk of again leaving some of them spanning only part-way across the river.

The qualifications for a point of maximum leverage will necessarily be both economic and political. They might be defined roughly as follows:

1. Countries or areas which, when re-activated, will become important suppliers or markets for other countries or areas.

2. Countries or areas which are capable of rapidly re-starting their machinery of production and which require only a type of aid that can be quickly supplied.

3. Countries which are not going to use external aid to build up or maintain excessive military establishments, or to distort their economies for political reasons (such as striving for autarchy), or merely to improve their living standards at the expense of achieving economic health. And, finally,

4. Countries which have achieved sufficient political stability to attract private capital. This means not merely the absence of civil strife but the existence of a government which does not permit the draining off of the fruits of production into the pockets of either corrupt officials or predatory private monopolists.

It goes without saying that nations desiring our assistance must qualify by making their maximum efforts at self-help and mutual aid amongst each other—that they must put their financial houses in order and, above all, firmly establish the confidence of their peoples in their governments and in themselves.

These are not absolute yardsticks. Nor can it be expected that any one country or area will conform to all the criteria. But the criteria must exist in order to establish the priorities without which we shall merely waste our resources in a scatter-gun attack, where precision target-shooting is required.

Unfortunately, the simple arithmetic upon which our calculations must be based—especially now, at the beginning—will not always correspond to our predilections nor even to our sense of justice. In Europe, Great Britain is our most obvious point of maximum leverage. Distasteful though it may be, western Germany is probably, because of its coal, the next point from which a limited recovery could most quickly spread into other areas. I say "a limited recovery" because I do not mean to suggest that we re-build Germany beyond the point necessary quickly to restore the health of her neighbors. Other points in Europe at which a small amount of assistance would probably produce maximum results are the Low Countries, Czechoslovakia and Poland. In Asia there are probably two points of maximum leverage: the rehabilitation of the surplus food producers—Burma, Siam and Indo-China; and—again distastefully—the reactivation of Japanese light industry to produce incentive goods for the entire Continent.

From a political point of view, France, Italy and Greece are the hot-spots of Europe, while China, Korea, India and Pakistan occupy a similar position in Asia. These political hot-spots constitute a two-fold danger to our whole undertaking: first, because their internal instability makes it extremely difficult to appraise just what and how much could be accomplished by a given amount of expenditure; and, second, because our own attitude toward the political issues at stake in these countries is confused by ignorance and prejudice or predilection. In the case of India and China an additional difficulty arises from the sheer magnitude of immediate need on the part of vast, chronically undernourished populations.

One thing is clear: whatever stop-gap aid we render in these humanly and politically important but economically doubtful areas, must be rigorously held within that global sum which we feel can safely be subtracted from the total resources available to finance world recovery. If we allow political anxiety or even humanitarian sympathy to carry us beyond that point, we shall fail both the world and ourselves.

These are some of the unpalatable realities with which, I think, we must quickly become familiar, if we intend to harness our strength to the task in hand.

There remains one other important element—a psychological factor of which an American becomes acutely aware in conversations with Europeans and Asiatics alike. If we are to discharge great responsibility, which we have not sought but which history has laid upon us, we must

learn not to expect gratitude. We must know—and act as if we knew—that we are giving what we give, not out of unselfish generosity or pity, but out of wise self-interest in the common cause of mankind. Saving men's lives matters less than helping them to save their self-respect.

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COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
485 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

October 14, 1947

Dear Jim:

This is my belated thanks for your contribution the other evening—I have not ceased to hear favorable comments about it. My colleagues here in the News Room were particularly impressed with your crisp, concise answers to questions, and as you can imagine, they are not easily impressed. I have caused a record of the interview to be sent you. We must do it again.

Sincerely yours,

COPY

Mr. James P. Warburg
70 East 45th Street
New York 17, New York

E. R. M.
F. 1155

36 EAST 70TH STREET

Dear Ed:

I haven't your and your home address or telephone number so must send this to the office.

Robert Lutyen and his wife have just arrived from England. He is Barbie Jaeger's

brother - They would like to meet you and Janet so I am wondering if you would both dine at my flat next Tuesday, October 1st at 7.15?

Do hope you can.

Sincerely,

Phyllis (Warburg)

September 23, 1947

My telephone number is Regent 7-3250.

Warburg Ap

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM

EDWARD R. MURROW AS BROADCAST

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1947

7:45 - 8:00 PM

CUE: (COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM)
(..... 30 seconds .....)

CHAPPELL: (COMMERCIAL)

Now, Edward R. Murrow!

MURROW: This is the news! The United States believes that the Communists in Europe are trying to prevent, if they can, the economic recovery of Europe. This country's reaction to the so-called propaganda bureau set up by the nine Communist Parties in Europe was made known by Under-Secretary of State Lovett and he had this advice for Europeans -- don't be taken in by the Communists' malicious and unscrupulous distortion of American policies, and this advice for the American people. This is a time for coolness and clarity of judgment. We must stick to our course and continue to study with sympathy and realism how we can best help Europe.

Another State Department official added this. Assistant Secretary Willard L. Thorpe told the United Nations Committee: "If the United States does not provide extensive aid to Europe, we are told we are heartless and irresponsible.

fdm (more)

MURROW
Cont'd:

If we do give assistance, we are said to be acting politically and invading the sovereignty of others."

And in London, Sir Stafford Cripps, the new Economics Minister, says: "Unless some form of dollar aid is made available to Great Britain by America this year, Britain must again cut her imports from America, but if Britain is told the Marshall Plan can be ready by next June then she can get along till then."

Andrei Vishinsky made another strong attack against American policies in the Balkans - to no avail.

The General Assembly's Political Committee has voted to set up a new commission to keep an eye on what's going on in the Balkans, particularly along the borders of Greece. Thirty-four nations voted for this American proposal and six voted against it, all members of the Soviet bloc. The Committee also called on Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, and Albania to cooperate with the new Commission, and if they agree to that the United States will drop its charges of aggression against each of them. The Committee may take up the "aggression" charge tomorrow.

Now the word is out at Lake Success that the United States has decided to support the partition of Palestine, with some reservations.

fdm

(more)

MURROW (CTD): The second big test of the food-saving campaign comes up tomorrow, - no eggs, no poultry. Mr. Luckman, the Chairman of the Food Committee, feels the campaign got off to a first rate start yesterday and a few minutes ago he announced that the nation's distillers will close down for two months, a move that he estimates will save between 10 and 20 billion bushels of grain, perhaps as much as a fifth of the overall goal of a hundred million bushels.

The President made two appeals today on behalf of the food campaign. In a letter to the American Federation of Labor Convention in San Francisco he called on all workers to conserve food and to cooperate with management to increase pdoduction and in a radio broadcast to women members of the Democratic Party he said: "Housewives can help their country and the world by saving food."

In London there was more excitement over the secret of the design of Princess Elizabeth's wedding gown than a test flight of a small pilotless rocket plane launched from a bomber high above the Atlantic. British experts say it is reasonable to assume that the plane may have surpassed the speed of sound - 760 miles per hour. It may have approached a thousand miles an hour. It will take at least a week of checking records to tell.

fdm

(more)

MURROW (CTD): And the FBI tonight announced that two more former servicemen have been arrested on charges of stealing photographs and film from Los Alamos, the Atomic Energy Plant. The material has been recovered and now George Thompson, of Riverside, New Mexico, and Ernest Paparello, of Albuquerque, New Mexico, face maximum penalty of five years in jail, five-thousand-dollar fine, or both.

And, now, a friend of mine, James P. Warburg, has just returned from Europe. He's a former banker, an economist, and expert on European affairs. The latest of his several books is called "Germany, Bridge or Battleground." I've asked him to come along to the studio tonight and answer a few questions.

Jimmie, how long were you over this time?

WARBURG: Two months, Ed! Some of it I spent behind the so-called "iron curtain," as I did last year.

MURROW: Well, let's start with Germany. You know that country and its people as well as any American I know. What were your impressions this year against last year?

WARBURG: The quickest way for me to answer your question, Ed, is to say - the same only more so!

MURROW: Well, that's a little too quick! Explain, please.

fdm

WARBURG: There really isn't much change, Ed, except a slow deterioration. The country is still an economic desert and a moral morass. The Four Power snarl remains more hopelessly tangled than ever. Much of the rubble has been cleared away from the streets, but little of the rubble has been cleared away from the German mind.

MURROW: And whose fault is that?

WARBURG: It's not the fault of the man on the spot. Our own man, General Clay, continues to face his impossible task with great courage and determination!

MURROW: Well, that's a strong statement! Why is his task impossible?

WARBURG: Because the Big Four, Ed, -the occupying powers, are as far away from agreement as ever and not only about Germany.

MURROW: Well, the four Foreign Ministers are going to try to agree about Germany in that meeting in London in November. Do you think they will?

WARBURG: I doubt it very much, Ed! What will probably happen is that, as a result of Anglo-American failure to agree with Russia, the three western zones of Germany will be merged and rehabilitated.

MURROW: And then the division of Germany and of Europe will be complete and probably final, won't it?

fdm

WARBURG: No ... I don't think so! .. In fact, I think the only hope now for a united Germany and a united Europe lies in our going our own way, always keeping the door open for the Russians and letting them go their way until they are ready to come in.

MURROW: And just exactly what makes you think they will want to come in?

WARBURG: At present the Russians have a going concern in their zone. We have a bankrupt concern in ours. The Russians are gradually milking their cow dry. If we make western Germany self-supporting, I believe the Russians will want to have a voice in its control and eventual complexion. I say this especially because they will want a voice in the future of Ruhr coal and industry.

MURROW: Now, Jimmie, you're an economist, aren't you?

WARBURG: Well, I wouldn't call myself an economist!

MURROW: Well, how much will it cost us to make Germany a going concern and can we afford it?

WARBURG: Well, that's not a question to ask even a fake economist! The original estimate for the Anglo-American zones alone was, as I remember, one billion dollars.

MURROW: I think that was optimistic!

fdm

WARBURG: If we figure on adding the French zone and allow for the deterioration and delay since that estimate was made, my own guess (for what it is worth!) would be nearer two billion, most of which will probably have to be paid by us.

MURROW: I notice that you say we will have to pay most of it. Don't we get any help?

WARBURG: Not much, Ed. Neither Britain nor France are going to be able to contribute very much, especially dollars or things that have to be bought with dollars.

fdm

MURROW: Well, Jimmie, there are a lot of people who think the British could do more if they wanted to and others who think that Britain is in a mess because they have a Socialist Government. What do you think?

WARBURG: Ed, I could talk for an hour about that. To hit only the highest high spots; first -- I think the British are going everything they could possibly do. Second - I do not think that their present predicament, which is very serious, results from anything they have done or failed to do since the war ended. The British internal economy is healthy. Production is at a higher level than pre-war. There is no unemployment. Wages and prices are in good balance. The only bad spot in this internal picture is coal and this is an old story that goes back twenty years. Britain is in trouble for one very simple reason. She is like a man who always worked hard and lived well because, in addition to his earnings, he had an income from invested capital. Then a family emergency arose and he had to spend all his capital to meet it. The emergency in Britain's case was the war, which made her sell most of her foreign investments to buy planes and tanks and guns till Lend-lease came into operation. Today, Britain finds herself without foreign exchange income from foreign investments and, therefore, can buy abroad only as much as she can sell.

(MORE)

WARBURG: CONT'D: This means that the British people have to do two things -- cut down their standard of living and find ways and means of earning much more than they did in the past. That takes time, Ed, and it isn't easy. To make the adjustment, Britain has to borrow, just like an individual would.

MURROW: Now, do you, as an ex-banker, regard Britain as a good risk?

WARBURG: In banker's terms, Ed, no European country is a good risk, but Britain is, in my judgment, the best. In addition, Britain is the political and economic center of the position we have decided to hold. If Britain goes under there can be no recovery in western Europe.

MURROW: Well, how far east do you think that position goes? Does it include any of the countries behind the so-called "iron curtain"? Specifically, what about Czechoslovakia?

WARBURG: I was in Czechoslovakia this summer. There isn't any "iron curtain" around the Czechs, unless we put it there. It is true that the Czechs are dependent on Russia in foreign policy as they used to be dependent on France before the Munich betrayals, but the Czechs are by no means Sovietized and don't want to be. Their present internal set-up is a very interesting half-way house, between eastern and western ideas.

(MORE)

WARBURG CONT'D : Most of the reforms which have taken place were planned by the Czechs in the days of the first republic or by their exiled government in London.

MURROW: But, Jimmie, the Czechs refused to go to Paris to help draw up the requirements for the Marshall Plan and the Czech Communist Party is a memeber of the new nine-power Communist International. Wouldn't American assistance for Prague be, in effect, help for Moscow and contrary to the Marshall Plan?

WARBURG: Ed, one of the things that worries me most since I've come home is the extent to which Americans are thinking in terms of what is now called a "cold war" with the Soviet Union and the extent to which they have forgotten the key sentence in that Marshall speech. That sentence read: "Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos." I think the best way to avoid war and keep the free peoples of the world free is to stick to that basic idea. So far as the Czecks are concerned, a very small amount of money would go a long way to help them maintain their precarious position. The Czecks themselves feel that their greatest danger of being really Sovietized comes not so much from anything the Russians may do as from the possibility that the west may cut them off from their natural trade channels and that would certainly drive them into the Soviet wilderness.

fdm

MURROW: Well, Jimmie, one question. Why is it that so many European nations that are friends of ours are so critical of us and of our policies?

WARBURG: Before answering that let me say one thing, Ed. If we are going to tackle the job of helping the world to get back on its feet, we must learn not to expect gratitude. We must know, and act as if we knew, that we are giving whatever we give not out of unselfish generosity but of wise, self-interest. Saving men's lives matters less than helping them to save their self-respect.

MURROW: Jimmie, what do you think is the real crux of this whole problem in Europe?

WARBURG: Ed, I think the crux of the matter is this. The Marshall Plan is worth the sacrifice (and it's a big sacrifice!) only if it is designed to help the world to go in the direction in which the masses of mankind want to go. That direction is certainly not totalitarian Communism, but neither is it our own particular brand of free enterprise democracy.

MURROW: Thank you, Jimmie Warburg, for answering questions so frankly.

Mr. James Warburg, former banker, economist, and writer on foreign affairs, who has just returned from one of his trips to Europe, has been answering questions for us here this evening.

fdm

(more)

CHAPPELL: (Commercial)

Now, Ed Murrow and the word-for-today.

MURROW: The word-for-today is this, quote: "Our difficulties are, indeed, great but when viewed in comparison to those of Europe they are the joys of Paradise." For some reason or other, the European has rarely been able to see America except in caricature. We do not ask to be sprinkled with rose water, but may perhaps fairly protest to being drenched with the r rinsings of an unclean imaginationl" (unquote) Those words represent the combined views of two Americans - John Lowell and Thomas Jefferson, and still stand up though they were written nearly a hundred and fifty years ago.

Good night and - good luck.

CHAPPELL: (COMMERCIAL)

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JAMES P. WARBURG
70 EAST 45TH STREET
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

August 27, 1947

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Colubmia Broadcasting System
Madison Avenue and 52nd Street
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Mr. Warburg has written from Prague asking that I send you a copy of his series of articles written for the Chicago Sun Syndicate, on his impressions of Czechoslovakia during his recent stay there. The articles have not yet appeared in print.

Sincerely yours,

Margaret Adams
Secretary to
Mr. Warburg

REPORT ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA

I.

James P. Warburg

The little Republic of Czechoslovakia - in area about the size of Illinois - may well turn out to be the pilot plant of the European future. Given a chance to work out their problems in peace, 12,500,000 Czechoslovaks very likely hold in their hands the key to the major problems of that troubled and troublesome continent.

In spite of numerous domestic handicaps - in spite of an incredibly difficult foreign policy problem - the Czechs appear to be evolving a new type of political and economic organization which may prove to be the very much missing link between East and West.

Whether or not they succeed will depend partly upon themselves, partly upon the Soviet Union, and partly upon the Western democracies - especially upon the United States.

This series of articles is concerned primarily with the role of the West, and particularly with the impact of United States policy upon the Czechoslovak future.

Any American who visits Czechoslovakia today will first of all wish to test the validity of three widely held Western beliefs:

1. That present-day Czechoslovakia is a police-state modelled in the Soviet image and that its people live behind an iron curtain.

2. That free enterprise has been abolished in favor of a Soviet-style totalitarian economy. And

3. That Czechoslovakia is now a Russian satellite which, by not attending the Paris Conference last July, abdicated its independence and chose its side in a permanently divided Europe.

Before presenting the evidence for this observer's conclusions that these three beliefs are fallacious, a little background may be useful.

1. On the map Czechoslovakia looks like a somewhat mis-shapen fish land-locked in the heart of Europe. The head and upper body of the fish, comprising the Czech Lands of Bohemia and Moravia, lie embedded between Germany and Austria. Its lower body - Slovakia - lies between Poland and Hungary. Its truncated tail rests against the Soviet Union. Except for one short stretch touching upon the United States Zones of Germany and Austria, all of Czechoslovakia's long frontier borders on areas now under Soviet control or influence.

2. Czechoslovakia is a bi-national state. Its population consists of nearly 10,000,000 Czechs and over 2,500,000 Slovaks. Almost 3,000,000 former Sudeten Germans citizens have been expelled because they betrayed the Republic. Over 98% of them voted before the Hitler invasion for annexation to Germany and later collaborated with the German occupation.

The Czechs and Slovaks are very different from each other. The Czechs are a politically sophisticated people, proud and tenaciously determined to regain the freedom lost in 1620 to the Hapsburg monarchy. When their dream was realized in 1918 they successfully emancipated themselves from their former German ruling class. They became in spirit a free people.

The Slovaks are for the most part feudal-minded peasants accustomed for a thousand years to passive acceptance of an inferior status. The Hungarians played a role in Slovakia similar to that played by the Austro-Germans in the Czech lands. When the Republic was established in 1918 the Slovaks remained partly under the thumb of the old Hungarian-minded aristocracy, reinforced by the Catholic Church, and partly under the newly established Czech leadership at Prague.

From an economic point of view the Germans in the Czech lands and the Hungarians in Slovakia clung to a large part of their privileged position, even under the Republic. They acted as an ex-ruling class arrogantly and stubbornly trying to maintain their former position. They never identified themselves fully with the Czechoslovak State.

Under the German occupation the vast majority of Czechs remained loyal to their oppressed country. During the six terrible years of Nazi rule they maintained a courageous and stubborn resistance. There were, of course, some Czech collaborators, especially among the big businessmen and landholders, but these were the exception. The story of Slovakia under the occupation was less creditable. Under the Fascist leadership of Father Tiso the majority of Slovaks formed a Nazi puppet state, and sent a sizeable army to fight the Russians. A minority formed a partisan resistance movement. It is only by courtesy to the Czechs that Slovakia is now considered an Allied rather than an ex-enemy nation.

Today, because the Czechs need Slovak manpower and resources to rebuild their country, all this is largely forgotten. The Slovaks now are being encouraged to shake off their feudal habits, to help modernize agriculture, to establish new industries, to re-settle the Sudeten territory, and to assume a position of political equality.

3. The Czechoslovak Republic's pre-war economy depended very largely upon its ability to import raw materials and to export finished products. Agriculture was insufficient to supply all foodstuffs. High-grade coking coal and motor fuels were imported as well as cotton, rubber and other raw materials. Textiles, shoes, china, glass

and furniture were large items of export as well as machinery and certain products of the iron and steel industry. Big Business was largely German-controlled. The six years of Nazi occupation served to incorporate the Czech economy almost wholly into that of the Reich.

4. In foreign affairs Czechoslovakia was, until 1938, chiefly oriented toward the West - particularly toward France and Britain. It relied for security upon the League of Nations as well as upon its French alliance and membership in the Little Entente. Its relations with the Soviet Union were friendly but not paramount. It was regarded with some envy by Poland and with some hostility by Hungary. After the betrayal of Munich, Czechoslovakia's orientation changed, as might be expected, to one of primary reliance upon the Soviet Union, the only friend who had stood by in Czechoslovakia's hour of need.

The United States occupied a special position in the pre-war feelings of the Czechoslovak people. The Republic had been founded in America and conceived very largely in the image of American democracy. Hundreds of thousands of Czechs and Slovaks lived in the United States. Trade flourished between the two countries. The role of the United States in the betrayal of Munich, although secondary, considerably damaged American prestige, yet this damage was more than offset by President Roosevelt's subsequent leadership in the fight for freedom.

When the day of liberation came, in May 1945, the people of Czechoslovakia would perhaps have been even happier had American troops rather than Russian first entered their capital. As a matter of fact, two of General Patton's tanks did enter Prague during the uprising of May 5thh - and then withdrew for reasons which are still mysterious to the inhabitants of the city.

One of the things that troubles and puzzles many Czechs today is that they believe - perhaps not without reason - that we agreed at Yalta to let the Red Army liberate Czechoslovakia.

But - as we shall see - other things about our policy since the war ended trouble and puzzle them even more.

Czechoslovakia shows few outward signs of having passed through a war. In Western Bohemia the great Skoda plant at Pilsen, which our bombers partially destroyed, is being rebuilt. In Prague a few buildings in the heart of the beautiful "old city" were heavily damaged during the uprising of May 1945. And then there is the obscene scar left by the wanton total destruction of the little town of Lidice. But Czechoslovakia's worst war wounds lie beneath the surface of her ancient cities, her neat little villages and her fertile fields.

II

Iron Curtain?

The first thing one learns upon entering Czechoslovakia today is that, as Mark Twain would have said, "One knows a lot of things that ain't so."

Having spent some time in the Russian Zone of Germany a year ago, and having followed recent Western accounts of developments in Central Europe, this observer expected to find at least a modified form of police state and considerable evidence of what is commonly called "living behind the Iron Curtain."

A few hours served to dispel this illusion, and a week confirmed the first impression beyond any doubt.

To begin with, landing at the Prague airport is rather like landing at the La Guardia Field in New York. In the usual inefficient hurly-burly of newly arrived passengers struggling to get their baggage assembled and passed through customs, one hears every language of Europe. Planes arrive from the Balkans, from France, Britain, Scandinavia and the Low Countries - from the Near East, the Far East - from Germany, Russia and the United States. The multi-lingual Czech passport officials ask only a few polite questions - fewer and politer than are asked by our own officials. Fifteen minutes after arrival the visitor is free to wander where and how he pleases through the entire country.

The hotel is crowded - mostly with foreign visitors - but a reservation in Prague means that one's room is actually available on arrival. The personnel speak a little English or French, or - if need be as a last resort - German. A standard joke is to say - when all else fails - "do you speak a little Swiss?"

On the particular afternoon of this visitor's arrival the streets were crowded. Groups of teen-agers were wandering about in various uniforms - some of them singing. A youth congress was in town with delegations from all over Europe.

Wandering along Vaclavske Namesti - Prague's "main-stem" - one is struck by the number of book-shops and news-stands. One particularly large shop of this sort had over its door the name of the leading Communist newspaper "Rude Pravo." Inside was a long table displaying various periodicals and newspapers. Expecting to find Communist literature, one was not surprised to find - alongside of various local newspapers - the "London Daily Worker", "Humanite" from Paris and "The New Masses" from New York. But there were also - displayed with equal prominence - the "Paris Herald Tribune," the "London Daily Mail," the "London Times," and other French, English and Swiss newspapers of every political hue. What is more they were the issues of that same day. Browsing along further back one came upon recent issues of "Time, Inc." , "Business Week," "The New Republic" and the "London Economist."

The Czechs are v oracious newspaper readers, and since a large part of the population reads at least one foreign language, they are an extremely well-informed people concerning events and opinions outside their own country.

Their own press is uncensored. There is an agreement that the native press must not criticize Czechoslovakia's ally, the Soviet Union, but this does not prevent very free criticism of the local Communist Party by the more conservative/news papers.

Each political party - there are four in the Czech lands and four in Slovakia - has its own daily newspaper. Other Prague dailies are published by the Trade Union Movement, the Union of Czech Youth, the Legionaries Association, the Czech Army, the Federation of Cultural Associations and the Union of Agriculturalists.

Under the new law the principle is established that "newspapers and periodicals must not be the object of profitable enterprise by individuals and anonymous groups." In addition to recognized political parties, government departments and public corporations, only bodies of importance for the whole nation are qualified to apply for licenses. The only exception is in the fields of art and science.

This is one of the ways in which Czechoslovakia is very interestingly breaking new ground and finding a link between Western laisser faire and Soviet Communism. It seems to be a satisfactory experiment, avoiding the evils of private irresponsibility and monopolistic control without falling into the pitfalls of a parrot press expressing only the views of the Government.

It is true that the citizen of Czechoslovakia who depends only upon the native press at the present time reads no criticism of the Soviet Union. It is also true that he gets a somewhat distorted view of the West because here there is no corresponding ban. But Western criticism of the Soviet Union circulates freely through the imported foreign press and by word of mouth to those who cannot read it.

Speaking of word of mouth, one cannot find in Czechoslovakia today the slightest sign of fear to express any opinion or tell any joke at no matter whose expense. There is, one is told, a secret police. But no one seems to be in the least aware of its existence. The Communists, although they are the strongest party in the Czech lands, are the butt

of constant humorous criticism. A shop-keeper, when asked for something not in stock, is likely to shrug and say: "Sorry, we've got nothing in stock but a lot of Communism." One of the most popular reviews pokes fun at the Communist Party. Quite a few of the Communists themselves have something which they sadly lack in other countries - a sense of humor.

If there is today an Iron Curtain around Czechoslovakia, it has not been placed there by the Czechs nor by the Soviet Union. There is perhaps something of that nature created by the false assumptions of the West and by the actions of the West taken upon the basis of those assumptions. Believing that Czechoslovakia lives under Russian domination, has become a police state and re-modelled its economy in the Russian image, the West - particularly the United States - has recently tended to ostracize the Czechoslovak Republic. Not wanting to help the Soviet Union in the present state of affairs, many Westerners object to helping what they consider a satellite of the Soviet Union. Sometimes we go even further. Not only do we not want to help Czechoslovakia, we seem at times not to want to have anything to do with her.

Our State Department, for example, refused to allow a representative delegation of American youth to attend the Youth Congress at Prague presumably because it was to be held under Communist auspices. Yet this did not prevent a motley crew of American leftist youth from coming here on individual passports and making a miserable impression. While other groups put up impressive exhibitions, the United States exhibit contained such posters as one sees at a Communist rally in Union Square - posters critical of the United States and of the American way of life. The Russians and the Yugoslavs "stole the show."

Things such as this cause the Czechs to wonder and sadly shake their heads. And when a Czech buyer wishing to go to the States is refused a passport because he belongs to the Czech Communist Party - the party of his Prime Minister - the Czechs begin to feel that they <u>are</u> behind an Iron Curtain - an Iron Curtain drawn by their former friends in the West.

III

Political Scene

What sort of a state is the new Czechoslovakia? Is it turning its back upon Western democratic principles and becoming a Communist dictatorship? Let us examine first its political and then its economic aspect.

The political evolution now taking place in Czechoslovakia did not begin with liberation by the Red Army. It did not even begin with Munich and the Nazi occupation. It began in the days of the First Republic, when it became apparent that the government of the new state under its Wilsonian Constitution faced two serious difficulties. These were: the minority problem; and the growth of a top-heavy and somewhat inflexible bureaucracy. Even before the advent of Hitler the Czechs were considering various innovations to overcome these difficulties.

The minority problem arose over the inclusion in the new Republic of not only 2,500,000 backward Slovaks, 3,000,000 disgruntled Germans and a substantial number of disaffected Hungarians, but also of Carpatho-Ukrainians in the extreme eastern tip of the country. The frontiers of the new Republic were drawn at Versailles with an over-heavy emphasis upon strategic considerations. The Carpatho-Ukraine was included in order to seal the Carpathian gateway against Russia. The Sudetenland was included in order to secure the Moravian gateway against Germany. (The Sudetenland was also important because of its coal and industry.)

The bureaucracy problem derived in large measure from the old Austro-Hungarian machinery taken over and re-staffed by the Czechs. It was cumbersome, antiquated and required far too large a proportion of the population. It did not provide sufficiently for local home rule. The

Czechs were slow in introducing reforms but not unaware that reforms were needed. This was especially true of the school system which continued in the rigid and outworn Austro-German pattern.

The parliamentary institutions of the First Republic worked, on the whole, rather well, although the Senate never achieved its intended position of authority and importance. The Presidency, due to the prestige and ability of Thomas Masaryk and his successor, Eduard Benes, ably fulfilled its constitutional functions; so did the Judiciary.

The political reforms which we now see going into effect had their origin more in the factors just mentioned than in recent history. During the Nazi occupation the Czechoslovak Government in Exile at London worked out the beginnings of a reformed Second Republic. In April 1945 the various elements of the resistance movement within Czechoslovakia met with the Government at Kosice and worked out their own program of political and economic reform. In London and at Kosice most of the decisions were reached which later were carried out first by the Fierlinger Government and now by the Gottwald administration.

These decisions included a settlement of the minority problem by expelling the Germans from the Sudetenland and the Hungarians from Slovakia, while ceding the Carpatho-Ukraine to the Ukrainian Republic of the Soviet Union. Except for the still pending question of a Hungarian minority, these steps have since been carried out.

The Kosice program provided for the creation of a system of popularly elected local, district and provincial National Committees to supplant the system of appointive District Executive Officers and Provincial Governors inherited from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

This step - likewise envisaged by the Exile Government in London - has now been taken. The first Committees were appointed by the political parties in accordance with their respective votes polled. They are functioning fairly well in spite of the inexperience of most of the members.

A Constitutional Assembly was elected shortly after liberation and this body is now working on a new Constitution. In the meantime, the Assembly is functioning as a Legislature. The new Constitution will in all probability provide for a unicameral legislature, abolishing the old Senate. Otherwise, it is expected to make few changes.

So much for the formal side of the political evolution. What has happened and what is happening within this formal framework?

It must be understood, first of all, that liberation after six years of occupation was equivalent in itself to a revolution. The organs of Government had to be completely purged of the officials who had served under the Germans. This applied as well to the school system and to other social serv ices. Liberation - no matter by whom - supplied the impetus for reform.

Second, the nature of the revolutionary reform undertaken immediately after liberation would, of course, be strongly influenced by the nature of the liberating forces. The fact that it was the Red Army which liberated Czechoslovakia - that the Government returned, not from London but from Moscow, gave additional authority and prestige to the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Even though the Czechoslovak uprisings constituted a large measure of self-liberation, the composition of the National Committees, as well as the setting up of the political party machinery bore evidence of Soviet influence.

This is not to say that Soviet influence perverted or radically altered the development, which was essentially indigenous. It means, however, that the native leftward trend was somewhat accelerated and, in some respects, given a more ruthless character. It is a fact worth noting that all the Ministers who composed the Government in Exile are in the present Gottwald cabinet. The same continuity does not exist in Poland or in Yugoslavia.

In the Czech lands there are now four political parties. In order of present strength they are:

The Communist Party, of which Premier Klement Gottwald is the leader.

The National Socialists (President Benes' party which proudly retains its pre-Hitler name) of which Deputy Prime Minister Zenkl is the leader.

The Social Democrats, of which Deputy Prime Minister Fierlinger is the leader.

The Catholic People's Party, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Jan Sramek.

In Slovakia there are likewise four parties in the following order of strength:

Democrats, (conservative church party)

Communists

Social Democrats

Freedom Party, (which represents an attempt to form a liberal Catholic party).

In the National Constitutional Assembly the Communist Party has 40% of the seats, the next strongest being the National Socialists. The Social Democrats, however, under Fierlinger's radical leadership, have tended to cast their 11% of the vote with the Communists, thus frequently giving the latter an actual majority. On the other hand, it must be said that Premier Gottwald is far from a radical Communist. Under his leadership the party has so far shown little tendency to ride rough-shod over opposition. In fact, the more conservative leaders find it easier to deal with Gottwald than with his more fiery and unpredictable Social Democratic predecessor.

Pending the adoption of a Constitution and the election of a legislature the four parties have formed a National Front. The Communists, having polled the largest vote, hold the Prime Ministership and several important portfolios including the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of the Interior. The Foreign Office, under the brilliantly able Jan Masaryk, is non-political. The other parties each have a Deputy Prime Minister and one or more Cabinet positions. The Cabinet operates on the principle that decisions shall require unanimity of the four parties.

Obviously this set-up favors the Communists, but they have so far not abused their advantages, except perhaps in their use of the Ministry of Information. They have tolerat ed outspoken opposition and made compromises to conform to majority opinion. They will probably continue to act in this manner so long as the nation remains, as it is now, solidly united behind the major aims of the Government's program.

Anti-Communist Czechs, much as they hate many Communist methods and tactics, do not as a rule question the loyalty to Czechoslovakia of most of the Czech Communists. They fight them tooth and nail as Czechs with whom they disagree; they do not consider them a fifth column serving the interests of Moscow.

These high-spots of the political scene in Czechoslovakia indicate that the Czechs have by no means turned their backs upon the political principles of Western democracy. Above everything else, the Czechs want to remain free men. But the evidence also shows that the Czechs are moving with the times, modifying their methods and, where necessary, their institutions in order to meet practical necessity. Where the Czechs, including the Czech Communists, differ most from the Russians is in that they are intensely practical without being cynical. Where they differ most from us is in that they are idealistic without being naive.

The Czechs will not have an easy time maintaining the integrity of their national character against external pressures from West as well as East. But, unless force is used against them, they will in the end work out that political system which best conforms to their ideals and their political needs. That system will not be the Russian system of one-party dictatorship.

That it will not be our system either will become clear when we next consider the economic aspect of present-day Czechoslovakia.

IV

Economic Picture

The economic development of present-day Czechoslovakia - like the political evolution - has its roots in the past. It too is a native phenomenon, accelerated but not essentially distorted by external factors.

The two outstanding changes in the economic order - Land Reform and partial Nationalization of industry - were seriously contemplated in the days of the First Republic. The demand for both sprang from three strictly indigenous factors: the legacy of Austro-Hungarian feudal land ownership; the fact that industry and "Big Business" were largely in the hands of a German-speaking and German-oriented clique; and a growing distrust of laisser faire capitalism after the Great Depression.

The German occupation and the collaboration of big landowners and industrialists with the enemy, plus the rising tide of socialist thinking throughout Europe, brought the pot to a boil. Liberation let loose the accumulated forces. And - as in the political arena - liberation by the Soviet Union tended to accelerate the reform and to add a certain element of ruthlessness to its nature.

The Kosice Program called for the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and the confiscation of land held by all land-holders, irrespective of nationality, who had given aid to the enemy. This has resulted in the confiscation of over 6,000,000 acres of land, more than half of which is agricultural. The Government has taken over the forest lands. Some 500,000 Czechs and Slovaks are being re-settled on over 3,500,000 acres of confiscated farm land. Deeds conferring hereditary possession are being issued to the settlers. The large estates are being broken up and the small farms taken over and increased in size when they comprise

less than fifty acres. According to the plan, Czechoslovak agriculture is to be based upon independent, self-supporting families farming their own land with as little hired labor as possible. At the same time efficiency is to be increased by the wider use of machinery owned by the farmers or through cooperative societies. The latter have long been well established in Czechoslovakia. Under the Two Year Plan of the Gottwald Government a special effort is being made to increase animal husbandry and dairy farming. The only serious food shortages in Czechoslovakia today are meat, fats and citrus fruits. This year's grain harvest will be about cut in half by drought and hail-storms.

The Exile Government in London, long before liberation established the principle of nationalizing "Big Business". A large part of Czechoslovak industry had belonged to Germans before the occupation. An even larger part had been stolen or acquired by the Germans through quasi-legal means. And a considerable portion belonged to collaborators. In October 1945 President Benes issued a decree conforming to the previous London pronouncement under which the Republic took over the ownership of the mines and key industries.

Properties formerly owned by the German or Hungarian States or by persons who collaborated with them were simply to be confiscated. Loyal Czechoslovak owners or Allied nationals were to be given full compensation for the value of their properties. An exception was made in the case of unexploited mineral wealth since this was held not to have come into being through the owner's efforts.

The decree described in detail which industries were to be nationalized. Broadly speaking these were: enterprises of vital importance to the nation, such as mines, banks, public utilities or armament plants; enterprises of cultural importance to the nation such as

the film industry or the manufacture of phonograph records; and lastly enterprises of more than a certain size and importance in any given field. The formula devised for establishing this latter factor of size and importance is not an altogether happy one. It is based primarily on the number of people employed in a given enterprise - varying from 300 to 500 in most industries.

Outside of the three categories mentioned private enterprise is not only tolerated but encouraged. This applies to shops, trading concerns and small manufacturing establishments.

Most anti-Communist Czechs seem whole-heartedly to approve of the general principles of the nationalization program. In some cases the manner in which it is being carried out is criticized as being done somewhat too much by rule of thumb. There is also some grumbling about the delay in fixing values and paying out compensation and, in some instances, about selection of management for political reasons. These are the exceptions. On the whole, the plan seems to correspond to the freely expressed wishes of the great majority of the people. Even the more conservative businessmen admit that, given the historical development of Czechoslovakia and the conditions created by the occupation, no other course was practicable. The Communists are perhaps the least satisfied with the program since, from their point of view, it does not go far enough.

Having put through land-reform and partial nationalization of industry, the Government announced, in June 1946, its Two Year Plan for bringing production back to slightly better than the 1937 level by January 1, 1949. The plan was adopted in July 1946 and went into effect on the first day of this year. The goals set vary slightly for different

parts of the economy. There is a heavy emphasis upon manufacturing for export in order that the country may be able to pay for the necessary food, raw materials and machinery. This means rather severe restriction upon domestic consumption, which is cheerfully accepted. It means also a careful allocation of raw materials and capital expenditure by overall planning and control. Finally, the success of the plan requires the proper use of available manpower. Although the plan depends entirely upon the voluntary cooperation of the workers, the fact that the people are solidly behind the Government's program has so far made the rather difficult ex periment fairly successful. The only serious blemish upon an otherwise remarkable record of achievement in the first six months of operation under the plan, appears to be the still heavily over-staffed civil service.

There is a black market in Czechoslovakia, as in all countries where there is rationing and price control. But black market prices are comparatively reasonable - in a few cases actually below the officially established figures. The worst feature is the black market in foreign exchange which more than doubles the official rate for dollars. This is perhaps because of considerable confusion in the minds of the Czech people as to the somewhat complicated currency reform recently undertaken.

Contrasted with the record of some of the larger Western European countries, Czechoslovakia's recovery program makes an excellent showing. This is not because Czechoslovakia possesses any particular advantage in natural resources. She suffers, in fact, from an acute shortage of manpower due to the expulsion of almost one-fifth of her pre-war population. She suffers also from the loss of a large part of

her former foreign markets and her former sources of raw material supply.

Two factors offset these handicaps: newly developed trade with the Soviet Union; and, by far the most important, the solidarity and determination of her people. The elimination of the nationality problem, land reform, and nationalization have very largely removed the sources of inner conflict. The people of Czechoslovakia face a tough problem, but they face it as a united nation determined to work shoulder to shoulder until the job is done.

That is how the economic picture looks to this observer at the present time.

There is one cloud upon the domestic horizon. So far the Trade Union Council, largely under Communist domination, has thrown its great power behind the program. Should reaction set it, should the conservative groups - possibly under Western pressure - seek to undo what has been done or arrest progress, the Communist Party may turn ruthlessly radical. In that case strikes will occur and the Two Year Plan may fail. But the chances of a strong reactionary movement in Czechoslovakia are not very great, since most of the former reactionary power groups eliminated themselves by their behavior under the occupation.

The only other great danger to the Czechoslovak future lies beyond the borders of the Republic, which brings us to a consideration of Czechoslovakia's knotty foreign policy problem.

V
Soviet Satellite?

We might sum up the preceding analysis of internal conditions in present-day Czechoslovakia in the words of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk: "We are a socializing state but we are free men."

How correct is the Western belief that Czechoslovakia has become a Soviet satellite in foreign affairs?

In the first place it is true that so long as the world is divided into a number of large and small nation-states - so long as there is no supra-national world authority - all small nations are to a greater or less extent satellites of one of the great powers. This has been true in the past and is even more true today when the number of great powers in the world has been reduced from five or six to perhaps half that number. As a practical matter there are in the world today only three great poles of power, one focusing around the Soviet Union and the others around the United States and the British Commonwealth. Even that statement must be modified to the extent that the British Commonwealth is at present heavily dependent upon the United States.

The first Republic of Czechoslovakia was born out of the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I. It was created upon Wilsonian principles. Had the American people not disavowed Wilson's peace treaty and withdrawn from European affairs, Czechoslovakia would in all probability have looked to the United States as its closest friend among the great powers. When the United States failed to enter the League of Nations and failed likewise to guarantee French security in the future, the whole European picture changed. One result was that France in addition to her Treaty with Britain, built a system of European alliances which became known as the Little Entente. Thus France became the protector of Central Europe both against Germany and, to a certain extent, against the

ostracized Soviet Union. From the birth of the first Czechoslovak Republic until the rise of Hitler, Czechoslovakia was, in the sense in which we are using the word, a satellite of France. That is to say, she depended upon France to come to her assistance in case of trouble. This being the case, Czechoslovak foreign policy was naturally based upon taking account of French interests.

But when trouble came in 1938, France was torn by internal dissension. And Britain, upon whom France in turn depended for help, was caught morally and physically unprepared. The Western world, including the United States, was equally if not more afraid of the rise of Communist Russia than of the Fascist Axis. The result was the shameful betrayal of Munich.

During the anguished period leading up to Munich, Czechoslovakia found that she had only one friend among the great powers ready to march to her assistance - the Soviet Union. In those days, when Carpatho-Ukraine was still a part of Czechoslovakia, the Red Army would have had to cross either Polish or Rumanian territory to reach Czechoslovak soil. Neither Poland nor Rumania were prepared to countenance this, since both were at that time flirting with Hitler. Betrayed by France and Britain, cut off from their only source of help by hostile neighbors, the Czechs were left alone to fight a suicidal war or grimly to accept Nazi occupation.

These facts of history are already dim in the minds of many Americans. They are vivid in the memory of the Czechoslovak people.

Since the war ended, the Czechs have thrown themselves wholeheartedly behind the United Nations. Experience has taught them, perhaps more than any other European people, that peace is indivisible and that national security cannot be achieved by any old-fashioned system of alliances. Today they view with alarm the increasing tension between Russia and their

friends in the West. They do not want a divided Europe and a divided world. They know what this meants to them, even if it does not mean the ultimate horror of another war.

Czechoslovakia cannot achieve prosperity for her people if she is forced to choose between trading only with the East or only with the West. The Soviet Union in pre-war days accounted for only a little over 1% of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade. Poland, Hungary, Rumania and B ulgaria were likewise not of primary importance. The bulk of Czechoslovakia's imports came from Germany or the West and the great part of her exports flowed back in the same direction. Today a very substantial portion of Czechoslovak foreign trade is with the Soviet Union and with Poland. Under the new trade agreement Czechoslovakia obtains Russian grain, cotton and other raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods such as electric motors, iron pipe, shoes and narrow-guage railway equipment for use in the Russian forests. She obtains coal from Poland and sells a certain amount of her products there. But the outlet for Czechoslovakia's old-established industries still lies in the West, and the Western European countries need the textiles, ceramics and machinery which the Czechs can make. Nor can Russia fully supply Czech needs of foodstuffs and raw materials. Unless Czechoslovakia can trade freely in both directions she cannot achieve a decent standard of living for her people nor make her full contribution to European recovery.

From an emotional point of view, the Czechs feel that they belong fully neither to East nor West. They are Slavs but they are also Europeans. Here again they cannot fulfil themselves if they are forced to choose between two alternatives. Their language is of the East, yet their music, their art and their literature are largely of the West.

The present attitude of the Czech people, in so far as one can learn to understand it in a short time, is one of determination to resist being forced to accept a divided world and to make a choice between the Soviet Union and the United States. They like the United States, but fear the results of its present foreign policy. They admire and feel grateful to the Soviet Union, like it less than they do the United States, but also fear it less than they do America.

The Czechs know that if, contrary to their hopes, they should one day be forced to choose sides, their choice will be purely academic. The Red Army stands at their borders.

Nevertheless, strange as it may seem to Americans, the Czechs are less apprehensive that the Soviet Union will force a showdown than that an eventual decision may be forced upon them by well-meaning but bungling foreign policy of the United States.

This brings us to the main point of this series of articles.

VI

U.S.Policy

If it is correct to say that the Czechs like the United States as well or better than the Soviet Union but nevertheless fear the United States more than they fear the Soviet Union - why is this the case?

The reasons, so far as this correspondent was able to discover them, are as follows:

The Czechs as a whole do not regard Russia as an aggressively expansionist world power. They consider that most of the actual territorial annexations by the Soviet Union are nothing more than a recapture of lands which once belonged to Czarist Russia. This applies to the Polish Ukraine east of the Curzon Line, to Bessorabia and Bukovina taken from Rumania, and even to the Baltic States. Significantly it also applies to the Carpatho-Ukraine which the Czechs themselves have ceded to the Soviet Uion. The Czechs, even when the First Republic was set up, had misgivings about the inclusion in Czechoslovakia of this eastern region.

So far as Russian interference in the internal affairs of the Balkan countries is concerned, the Czechs do not apparently regard this as imperialistic expansion. They will explain to you that the peoples of Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia never had democracy or political freedom and were oppressed, politically and economically, by selfish and corrupt ruling cliques. Insofar as the Russians have aided or inspired Communist-led revolutionary movements in these countries, many if not most Czechs consider that they have helped the peoples of these countries to better their conditions. The Czechs may not like communist techniques and methods - they certainly do not want totalitarian dictatorship at home - but the Czechs are a pragmatic as well as an idealistic people. From their point of view the people of Yugoslavia - whom they like - are better off under Tito than they were under the Kara-georgovic dynasty. As to recent events

in Hungary, the Czechoslovaks know that the so-called allegedly democratic Small Landholders Party, ousted from power by the Communists, was dominated by their old enemies, the feudal Hungarian landlords. They do not like the unconstitutional procedures of the Communists, but they do not get very excited about them so long as they take place in Hungary.

This is not to say that the Czechoslovaks do not fear Russia. They do. They can never forget for one moment that the Red Army is only a few hours away from any part of their country. They are made apprehensive by the frequently arbitrary and always extremely tough attitudes of Soviet negotiators. But they do not feel that the Russians have designs upon them nor upon their freedom, so long as they themselves do not slip into reaction or become tools of reactionary forces outside of their own country.

The Czechs are really afraid of Russia in only one eventuality - if they are forced to choose sides in a divided world. In that case they know that they have no choice and that the march of events will bring them under Soviet domination.

The Czechs fear the United States precisely because they fear that the United States may bring about this very eventuality. Their apprehensions are based upon a number of factors.

1. The Czechs read the Western press and their direct familiarity with the waves of Russophobia which break out from time to time, especially in the United States, is distorted out of proportion by Soviet propaganda exploitation of the more extreme examples. Many Czechs believe, for example, that the United States is not only preparing for an eventual conflict with Russia but is seriously contemplating starting a preventive war quite soon. This question is frequently raised with an

American visitor.

2. The Czechs are acutely sensitive to the fact that the West has very largely written them off as a Soviet satellite after their failure to attend the Paris Conference. As a matter of fact it was the West - not the Soviet Union - which forced the Czechs to reverse their original decision. Both the Czechs and the Poles had decided to attend the Paris meeting, even though the Soviet Union had declined to participate. Certainly they had not reached this decision without consulting the Soviet Union. But the Western press, especially the conservative American press, played up the Czech decision as a break on the part of Czechoslovakia with its Soviet ally. When this happened the Czechoslovak Government had no choice but to reverse its decision, just as it would have had no choice before the war but to avoid any action which would have been interpreted as a break with France. Foreign Minister Masaryk was not "ordered to come to Moscow" as reported at that time. He went to Moscow, as arranged a month before, to negotiate a trade treaty. Before he left for Moscow he must have known that the Western press had made his trip to Paris impossible. The Czech people are not the kind of people, and least of all is Jan Masaryk the kind of man, who takes orders from any other country - no matter how great and powerful that country may be. By failure to understand this the West not only offended the Czechs, but drove them closer to the Soviet Union.

3. The Czechs are worried by the attitude frequently expressed in the United States that democratic socialism is merely a step on the road to Communist dictatorship. One example is a statement recently made on the floor of the Senate to the effect that "If the choice in Europe is between Socialism and Communism, we had better have nothing to do with it." To the Czechs - in fact to any European, including the most

conservative Europeans - such an attitude is not only incomprehensible but frightening. It indicates that the United States is planning to use its great economic power to turn back the clock of history, or at least to refuse aid to countries which are moving toward some degree of democratic socialism. The American loans to Socialist Britain and Socialist France show that this is not entirely true of our present policy. But some of the statements appearing in America and some of our actions - as in Greece and China - arouse the fear that it may become true.

4. Finally, the Czechs fear the United States because of what they consider to be our policy in Germany. They believe - and the Communist press hammers this into them - that we are determined not only to rehabilitate Germany ahead of Germany's victims, but to re-build a reactionary "free enterprise" Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and against the rising tide of Socialism. The native Czech attitude toward Germany is not one of vengefulness. The Czechs do not want a starving or bankrupt Germany as a neighbor. But they fear that if we obstruct socialization and return German industry to private German control, the old aggressive Germany is certain to be re-created.

It would be a wise move on the part of our Government to take considerable trouble to explain to the Czechs just what our German policy really is. At present it is being interpreted to them by the Russians.

There are many other things we could do to help the cause of peace in this small but important country, where a little moral support and a little economic help would go a long way. It is not a question of billions or even hundreds of millions of dollars. Nor is it a question of a gift for relief. A revolving credit of $50,000,000 for the purchase of American cotton would accomplish miracles.

As stated at the outset, Czechoslovakia, if permitted to work out its own destiny in its own way, may hold the key to a united Europe. As this correspondent sees the picture, aid and moral support to the Czechs at this time would neither give aid to Soviet expansionism nor to the spread of Communist totalitarianism. Nor would a more friendly attitude toward Czechoslovakia provoke Russian hostility. On the contrary, Prague might prove a meeting-ground of East and West.

REPORT ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA

By

JAMES P. WARBURG

James P. Warburg

REPORT ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The little Republic of Czechoslovakia—in area about the size of Illinois—may well turn out to be the pilot plant of the European future. Given a chance to work out their problems in peace, 12,500,000 Czechoslovaks very likely hold in their hands the key to the major problems of that troubled and troublesome continent.

In spite of numerous domestic handicaps—in spite of an incredibly difficult foreign policy problem—the Czechs appear to be evolving a new type of political and economic organization which may prove to be the very much missing link between East and West.

Whether or not they succeed will depend partly upon themselves, partly upon the Soviet Union, and partly upon the Western democracies —especially upon the United States.

This series of articles is concerned primarily with the role of the West, and particularly with the impact of United States policy upon the Czechoslovak future.

Any American who visits Czechoslovakia today will first of all wish to test the validity of three widely held Western beliefs:

1. That present-day Czechoslovakia is a police-state modelled in the Soviet image and that its people live behind an iron curtain.

2. That free enterprise has been abolished in favor of a Soviet-style totalitarian economy. And

3. That Czechoslovakia is now a Russian satellite which, by not attending the Paris Conference last July, abdicated its independence and chose its side in a permanently divided Europe.

Before presenting the evidence for this observer's conclusions that these three beliefs are fallacious, a little background may be useful.

1. On the map Czechoslovakia looks like a somewhat mis-shapen fish land-locked in the heart of Europe. The head and upper body of the fish, comprising the Czech Lands of Bohemia and Moravia, lie

embedded between Germany and Austria. Its lower body—Slovakia—lies between Poland and Hungary. Its truncated tail rests against the Soviet Union. Except for one short stretch touching upon the United States Zones of Germany and Austria, all of Czechoslovakia's long frontier borders on areas now under Soviet control or influence.

2. Czechoslovakia is a bi-national state. Its population consists of nearly 10,000,000 Czechs and over 2,500,000 Slovaks. Almost 3,000,000 former Sudeten German citizens have been expelled because they betrayed the Republic. Over 98% of them voted before the Hitler invasion for annexation to Germany and later collaborated with the German occupation.

The Czechs and Slovaks are very different from each other. The Czechs are a politically sophisticated people, proud and tenaciously determined to regain the freedom lost in 1630 to the Hapsburg monarchy. When their dream was realized in 1918 they successfully emancipated themselves from their former German ruling class. They became in spirit a free people.

The Slovaks are for the most part feudal-minded peasants accustomed for a thousand years to passive acceptance of an inferior status. The Hungarians played a role in Slovakia similar to that played by the Austro-Germans in the Czech lands. When the Republic was established in 1918 the Slovaks remained partly under the thumb of the old Hungarian-minded aristocracy, reinforced by the Catholic Church, and partly under the newly established Czech leadership at Prague.

From an economic point of view the Germans in the Czech lands and the Hungarians in Slovakia clung to a large part of their privileged position even under the Republic. They acted as an ex-ruling class arrogantly and stubbornly trying to maintain their former position. They never identified themselves fully with the Czechoslovak State.

Under the German occupation the vast majority of Czechs remained loyal to their oppressed country. During the six terrible years of Nazi rule they maintained a courageous and stubborn resistance. There were, of course, some Czech collaborators, especially among the big businessmen and landholders, but these were the exception. The story of Slovakia under the occupation was less creditable. Under the Fascist leadership of Father Tiso the majority of Slovaks formed a Nazi puppet state, and sent a sizeable army to fight the Russians. A minority formed a partisan resistance movement. It is only by courtesy to the Czechs that Slovakia is now considered an Allied rather than an ex-enemy nation.

Today, because the Czechs need Slovak manpower and resources to rebuild their country, all this is largely forgotten. The Slovaks now are being encouraged to shake off their feudal habits, to help modernize agriculture, to establish new industries, to re-settle the Sudeten territory, and to assume a position of political equality.

3. The Czechoslovak Republic's pre-war economy depended very largely upon its ability to import raw materials and to export finished products. Agriculture was insufficient to supply all foodstuffs. High-grade coking coal and motor fuels were imported as well as cotton, rubber and other raw materials. Textiles, shoes, china, glass and furniture were large items of export as well as machinery and certain products of the iron and steel industry. Big Business was largely German-controlled. The six years of Nazi occupation served to incorporate the Czech economy almost wholly into that of the Reich.

4. In foreign affairs Czechoslovakia was, until 1938, chiefly oriented toward the West—particularly toward France and Britain. It relied for security upon the League of Nations as well as upon its French alliance and membership in the Little Entente. Its relations with the Soviet Union were friendly but not paramount. It was regarded with some envy by Poland and with some hostility by Hungary. After the betrayal of Munich Czechoslovakia's orientation changed, as might be expected, to one of primary reliance upon the Soviet Union, the only friend who had stood by in Czechoslovakia's hour of need.

The United States occupied a special position in the pre-war feelings of the Czechoslovak people. The Republic had been founded in America and conceived very largely in the image of American democracy. Hundreds of thousands of Czechs and Slovaks lived in the United States. Trade flourished between the two countries. The role of the United States in the betrayal of Munich, though secondary, considerably damaged American prestige, yet this damage was more than offset by President Roosevelt's subsequent leadership in the fight for freedom.

When the day of liberation came, in May 1945, the people of Czechoslovakia would perhaps have been even happier had American troops rather than Russian first entered their capital. As a matter of fact, two of General Patton's tanks did enter Prague during the uprising of May 5th—and then withdrew for reasons which are still mysterious to the inhabitants of the city.

One of the things that troubles and puzzles many Czechs today is that they believe—perhaps not without reason—that we agreed at Yalta to let the Red Army liberate Czechoslovakia.

But—as we shall see—other things about our policy since the war ended trouble and puzzle them even more.

Czechoslovakia shows few outward signs of having passed through a war. In Western Bohemia the great Skoda plant at Pilsen, which our bombers partially destroyed, is being rebuilt. In Prague a few buildings in the heart of the beautiful "old city" were heavily damaged during the uprising of May 1945. And then there is the obscene scar left by the wanton total destruction of the little town of Lidice. But Czechoslovakia's worst war wounds lie beneath the surface of her ancient cities, her neat little villages and her fertile fields.

II.

IRON CURTAIN?

The first thing one learns upon entering Czechoslovakia today is that, as Mark Twain would have said, "One knows a lot of things that ain't so."

Having spent some time in the Russian Zone of Germany a year ago, and having followed recent Western accounts of developments in Central Europe, this observer expected to find at least a modified form of police state and considerable evidence of what is commonly called "living behind the Iron Curtain."

A few hours served to dispel this illusion, and a week confirmed the first impression beyond any doubt.

To begin with, landing at the Prague airport is rather like landing at the LaGuardia Field in New York. In the usual inefficient hurly-burly of newly arrived passengers struggling to get their baggage assembled and passed through customs, one hears every language of Europe. Planes arrive from the Balkans, from France, Britain, Scandinavia and the Low Countries—from the Near East, the Far East—from Germany, Russia and the United States. The multi-lingual Czech passport officials ask only a few polite questions—fewer and politer than are asked by our own officials. Fifteen minutes after arrival the visitor is free to wander where and how he pleases through the entire country.

The hotel is crowded—mostly with foreign visitors, but a reservation in Prague means that one's room is actually available on arrival. The personnel speak a little English or French, or—if need be as a last resort—German. A standard joke is to say—when all else fails—"Do you speak a little Swiss?"

On the particular afternoon of this visitor's arrival the streets were crowded. Groups of teen-agers were wandering about in various uniforms —some of them singing. A youth congress was in town with delegations from all over Europe.

Wandering along Vaclavske Namesti—Prague's "main-stem"—one is struck by the number of book-shops and news-stands. One particularly large shop of this sort had over its door the name of the leading Communist newspaper "Rude Pravo". Inside was a long table displaying various periodicals and newspapers. Expecting to find Communist literature, one was not surprised to find—alongside of various local newspapers —the "London Daily Worker", "Humanite" from Paris and "The New Masses" from New York. But there were also—displayed with equal

prominence—the Paris Herald Tribune, the "London Daily Mail" the "London Times" and other French, English and Swiss newspapers of every political hue. What is more they were the issues of that same day. Browsing along further back one came upon recent issues of "Time, Inc.", "Business Week", "The New Republic" and the "London Economist".

The Czechs are voracious newspaper readers, and since a large part of the population reads at least one foreign language, they are an extremely well-informed people concerning events and opinion outside their own country.

Their own press is uncensored. There is an agreement that the native press must not criticize Czechoslovakia's ally, the Soviet Union, but this does not prevent very free criticism of the local Communist Party by the more conservative newspapers.

Each political party—there are four in the Czech lands and four in Slovakia—has its own daily newspaper. Other Prague dailies are published by the Trade Union Movement, the Union of Czech Youth, the Legionnaires Association, the Czech Army, the Federation of Cultural Associations and the Union of Agriculturalists.

Under the new law the principle is established that "newspapers and periodicals must not be the object of profitable enterprise by individuals and anonymous groups." In addition to recognized political parties, government departments and public corporations, only bodies of importance for the whole nation are qualified to apply for licenses. The only exception is in the fields of art and science.

This is one of the ways in which Czechoslovakia is very interestingly breaking new ground and finding a link between Western laisser faire and Soviet Communism. It seems to be a satisfactory experiment, avoiding the evils of private irresponsibility and monopolistic control without falling into the pitfalls of a parrot press expressing only the views of the Government.

It is true that the citizen of Czechoslovakia who depends only upon the native press at the present time reads no criticism of the Soviet Union. It is also true that he gets a somewhat distorted view of the West because here there is no corresponding ban. But Western criticism of the Soviet Union circulates freely through the imported foreign press and by word of mouth to those who cannot read it.

Speaking of word of mouth, one cannot find in Czechoslovakia today the slightest sign of fear to express any opinion or to tell any joke at no matter whose expense. There is, one is told, a secret police. But no one seems to be in the least aware of its existence. The Communists, although they are the strongest party in the Czech lands, are the butt of constant humorous criticism. A shop-keeper, when asked for something not in stock, is likely to shrug and say: "Sorry, we've got nothing in stock but a lot of Communism." One of the most popular reviews pokes fun at the Communist Party. Quite a few of the Communists themselves have something which they sadly lack in other countries—a sense of humor.

If there is today an Iron Curtain around Czechoslovakia, it has not been placed there by the Czechs nor by the Soviet Union. There is perhaps something of that nature created by the false assumptions of the West and by the actions of the West taken upon the basis of those assumptions.

Believing that Czechoslovakia lives under Russian domination, has become a police state and re-modelled its economy in the Russian image, the West—particularly the United States—has recently tended to ostracize the Czechoslovak Republic. Not wanting to help the Soviet Union in the present state of affairs, many Westerners object to helping what they consider a satellite of the Soviet Union. Sometimes we go even further. Not only do we not want to help Czechoslovakia, we seem at times not to want to have anything to do with her.

Our State Department, for example, refused to allow a representative delegation of American youth to attend the Youth Congress at Prague presumably because it was to be held under Communist auspices. Yet this did not prevent a motley crew of American leftist youth from coming here on individual passports and making a miserable impression. While other groups put up impressive exhibitions, the United States exhibit contained such posters as one sees at a Communist rally in Union Square—posters critical of the United States and of the American way of life. The Russians and the Yugoslavs "stole the show."

Things such as this cause the Czechs to wonder and sadly shake their heads. And when a Czech buyer wishing to go to the States is refused a visa because he belongs to the Czech Communist Party—the party of his Prime Minister—the Czechs begin to feel that they *are* behind an Iron Curtain—an Iron Curtain drawn by their former friends in the West.

III.

POLITICAL SCENE.

What sort of a state is the new Czechoslovakia? Is it turning its back upon Western democratic principles and becoming a Communist dictatorship? Let us examine first its political and then its economic aspect.

The political evolution now taking place in Czechoslovakia did not begin with liberation by the Red Army. It did not even begin with Munich and the Nazi occupation. It began in the days of the First Republic, when it became apparent that the government of the new state under its Wilsonian Constitution faced two serious difficulties. These were: the minority problem; and the growth of a top-heavy and somewhat inflexible bureaucracy. Even before the advent of Hitler the Czechs were considering various innovations to overcome these difficulties.

The minority problem arose over the inclusion in the new Republic of not only 2,500,000 backward Slovaks, 3,000,000 disgruntled Germans and a substantial number of disaffected Hungarians, but also of Carpatho-Ukrainians in the extreme eastern tip of the country. The frontiers of the new Republic were drawn at Versailles with an over-heavy emphasis upon strategic considerations. The Carpatho-Ukraine was included in order to seal the Carpathian gateway against Russia. The Sudetenland was included in order to secure the Moravian gateway against Germany. (The Sudetenland was also important because of its coal and industry.)

The bureaucracy problem derived in large measure from the old Austro-Hungarian machinery taken over and re-staffed by the Czechs. It was cumbersome, antiquated and required far too large a proportion of the population. It did not provide sufficiently for local home rule. The Czechs were slow in introducing reforms but not unaware that reforms were needed. This was especially true of the school system which continued in the rigid and outworn Austro-German pattern.

The parliamentary institutions of the First Republic worked, on the whole, rather well, although the Senate never achieved its intended position of authority and importance. The Presidency, due to the prestige and ability of Thomas Masaryk and his successor, Eduard Benes, ably fulfilled its constitutional functions; so did the Judiciary.

The political reforms which we now see going into effect had their origin more in the factors just mentioned than in recent history. During the Nazi occupation the Czechoslovak Government in Exile in London worked out the beginnings of a reformed Second Republic. In April

1945 the various elements of the resistance movement within Czechoslovakia met with the Government at Kosice and worked out their own program of political and economic reform. In London and at Kosice most of the decisions were reached which later were carried out first by the Fierlinger Government and now by the Gottwald Administration.

These decisions included a settlement of the minority problem by expelling the Germans from the Sudetenland and the Hungarians from Slovakia, while ceding the Carpatho-Ukraine to the Ukrainian Republic of the Soviet Union. Except for the still pending question of a Hungarian minority, these steps have since been carried out.

The Kosice program provided for the creation of a system of popularly elected local, district and provincial National Committees to supplant the system of appointive District Executive Officers and Provincial Governors inherited from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. This step—likewise envisaged by the Exile Goverment in London—has now been taken. The first Committees were appointed by the political parties in accordance with their respective votes polled. They are functioning fairly well in spite of the inexperience of most of the members.

A Constitutional Assembly was elected shortly after liberation and this body is now working on a new Constitution. In the meantime the Assembly is functioning as a Legislature. The new Constitution will in all probability provide for a unicameral legislature, abolishing the old Senate. Otherwise it is expected to make few changes.

So much for the formal side of the political evolution. What has happened and what is happening within this formal framework?

It must be understood, first of all, that liberation after six years of occupation was equivalent in itself to a revolution. The organs of Government had to be completely purged of the officials who had served under the Germans. This applied as well to the school system and to other social services. Liberation—no matter by whom—supplied the impetus for reform.

Second, the nature of the revolutionary reform undertaken immediately after liberation would, of course, be strongly influenced by the nature of the liberating forces. The fact that it was the Red Army which liberated Czechoslovakia—that the Government returned, not from London but from Moscow, gave additional authority and prestige to the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Even though the Czechoslovak uprisings constituted a large measure of self-liberation, the composition of the National

Committees, as well as the setting up of the political party machinery bore evidence of Soviet influence.

This is not to say that Soviet influence perverted or radically altered the development, which was essentially indigenous. It means, however, that the native leftward trend was somewhat accelerated and, in some respects, given a more ruthless character. It is a fact worth noting that all the Ministers who composed the Government in Exile are in the present Gottwald cabinet. The same continuity does not exist in Poland or in Yugoslavia.

In the Czech lands there are now four political parties. In order of present strength they are:

The Communist Party, of which Premier Klement Gottwald is the leader.

The National Socialists (President Benes' party which proudly retains its pre-Hitler name) of which Deputy Prime Minister Zenkl is the leader.

The Social Democrats, of which Deputy Prime Minister Fierlinger is the leader.

The Catholic People's Party headed by Deputy Prime Minister Jan Sramek.

In Slovakia there are likewise four parties in the following order of strength:

Democrats (conservative church party).

Communists.

Social Democrats.

Freedom Party (which represents an attempt to form a liberal Catholic party).

In the National Constitutional Assembly the Communist Party has 40% of the seats, the next strongest being the National Socialists. The Social Democrats, however, under Fierlinger's radical leadership, have tended to cast their 11% of the vote with the Communists, thus frequently giving the latter an actual majority. On the other had, it must be said that Premier Gottwald is far from a radical Communist. Under his leadership the party has so far shown little tendency to ride rough-shod over opposition. In fact, the more conservative leaders find it easier to deal with Gottwald than with his more fiery and unpredictable Social Democratic predecessor.

Pending the adoption of a Constitution and the election of a legislature the four parties have formed a National Front. The Communists, having polled the largest vote, hold the Prime Ministership and several important portfolios including the Ministry of Information and the Ministry of the Interior. The Foreign Office, under the brilliantly able Jan Masaryk, is non-political. The other parties each have a Deputy Prime Minister and one or more Cabinet positions. The Cabinet operates on the principle that decisions shall require unanimity of the four parties.

Obviously this set-up favors the Communists, but they have so far not abused their advantages, except perhaps in their use of the Ministry of Information. They have tolerated outspoken opposition and made compromises to conform to majority opinion. They will probably continue to act in this manner so long as the nation remains, as it is now, solidly united behind the major aims of the Government's program.

Anti-Communist Czechs, much as they hate many Communist methods and tactics, do not as a rule question the loyalty to Czechoslovakia of most of the Czech Communists. They fight them tooth and nail as Czechs with whom they disagree; they do not consider them a fifth column serving the interests of Moscow.

These high-spots of the political scene in Czechoslovakia indicate that the Czechs have by no means turned their backs upon the political principles of Western democracy. Above everything else, the Czechs want to remain free men. But the evidence also shows that the Czechs are moving with the times, modifying their methods and, where necessary, their institutions in order to meet practical necessity. Where the Czechs, including the Czech Communists, differ most from the Russians is in that they are intensely practical without being cynical. Where they differ most from us is in that they are idealistic without being naive.

The Czechs will not have an easy time maintaining the integrity of their national character against external pressures from West as well as East. But, unless force is used against them, they will in the end work out that political system which best conforms to their ideals and their political needs. That system will not be the Russian system of one-party dictatorship.

That it will not be our system either will become clear when we next consider the economic aspect of present-day Czechoslovakia.

IV.

ECONOMIC PICTURE.

The economic development of present-day Czechoslovakia—like the political evolution—has its roots in the past. It too is a native phenomenon, accelerated but not essentially distorted by external factors.

The two outstanding changes in the economic order—Land Reform and partial Nationalization of industry—were seriously contemplated in the days of the First Republic. The demand for both sprang from three strictly indigenous factors: the legacy of Austro-Hungarian feudal land ownership; the fact that industry and "Big Business" were largely in the hands of a German-speaking and German-oriented clique; and a growing distrust of laisser faire capitalism after the Great Depression.

The German occupation and the collaboration of big landowners and industrialists with the enemy, plus the rising tide of socialist thinking throughout Europe—brought the pot to a boil. Liberation let loose the accumulated forces. And—as in the political arena—liberation by the Soviet Union tended to accelerate the reform and to add a certain element of ruthlessness to its nature.

The Kosice Program called for the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and the confiscation of land held by all land-holders, irrespective of nationality, who had given aid to the enemy. This has resulted in the confiscation of over 6,000,000 acres of land, more than half of which is agricultural. The Government has taken over the forest lands. Some 500,000 Czechs and Slovaks are being re-settled on over 3,500,000 acres of confiscated farm land. Deeds conferring hereditary possession are being issued to the settlers. The large estates are being broken up and the small farms taken over and increased in size when they comprise less than fifty acres. According to the plan, Czechslovakian agriculture is to be based upon independent, self-supporting families farming their own land with as little hired labor as possible. At the same time efficiency is to be increased by the wider use of machinery owned by the farmers or through cooperative societies. The latter have long been well established in Czechoslovakia. Under the Two Year Plan of the Gottwald Government a special effort is being made to increase animal husbandry and dairy farming. The only serious food shortages in Czechslovakia today are meat, fats and citrus fruit. This year's grain harvest will be about cut in half by drought and hail-storms.

The Exile Government in London, long before liberation, established the principle of nationalizing "Big Business". A large part of Czechoslovak industry had belonged to Germans before the occupation. An even larger part had been stolen or acquired by the Germans through quasi-legal means. And a considerable portion belonged to collaborators. In October 1945 President Benes issued a decree conforming to the previous London pronouncement under which the Republic took over ownership of the mines and key industries.

Properties formerly owned by the German or Hungarian States or by persons who collaborated with them were simply to be confiscated. Loyal Czechoslovak owners or Allied nationals were to be given full compensation for the value of their properties. An exception was made in the case of unexploited mineral wealth since this was held not to have come into being through the owner's efforts.

The decree described in detail which industries were to be nationalized. Broadly speaking these were: enterprises of vital importance to the nation, such as mines, banks, public utilities or armament plants; enterprises of cultural importance to the nation such as the film industry or the manufacture of phonograph records; and lastly enterprises of more than a certain size and importance in any given field. The formula devised for establishing this latter factor of size and importance is not an altogether happy one. It is based primarily on the number of people employed in a given enterprise—varying from 300 to 500 in most industries.

Outside of the three categories mentioned, private enterprise is not only tolerated but encouraged. This applies to shops, trading concerns and small manufacturing establishments.

Most anti-Communist Czechs seem whole-heartedly to approve of the general principles of the nationalization program. In some cases the manner in which it is being carried out is criticized as being done somewhat too much by rule of thumb. There is also some grumbling about the delay in fixing values and paying out compensation and, in some instances, about the selection of management for political reasons. These are the exceptions. On the whole, the plan seems to correspond to the freely expressed wishes of the great majority of the people. Even the more conservative businessmen admit that, given the historical development of Czechoslovakia and the conditions created by the occupation, no other course was practicable. The Communists are perhaps the least satisfied with the program since, from their point of view, it does not go far enough.

Having put through land-reform and partial nationalization of industry, the Government announced, in June 1946, its Two Year Plan for bringing production back to slightly better than the 1937 level by January 1, 1949. The plan was adopted in July 1946 and went into effect on the first day of this year. The goals set vary slightly for different parts of the economy. There is a heavy emphasis upon manufacturing for export in order that the country may be able to pay for the necessary food, raw materials and machinery. This means rather severe restriction upon domestic consumption, which is cheerfully accepted. It means also a careful allocation of raw materials and capital expenditure by overall planning and control. Finally, the success of the plan requires the proper use of available manpower. Although the plan depends entirely upon the voluntary cooperation of the workers, the fact that the people are solidly behind the Government's program has so far made the rather difficult experiment fairly successful. The only serious blemish upon an otherwise remarkable record of achievement in the first six months of operation under the plan, appears to be the still heavily over-staffed civil service.

There is a black market in Czechoslovakia, as in all countries where there is rationing and price control. But black market prices are comparatively reasonable—in a few cases actually below the officially established figures. The worst feature is the black market in foreign exchange which more than doubles the official rate for dollars. This is perhaps because of considerable confusion in the minds of the Czech people as to the somewhat complicated currency reform recently undertaken.

Contrasted with the record of some of the larger Western European countries, Czechoslovakia's recovery program makes an excellent showing. This is not because Czechoslovakia possesses any particular advantage in natural resources. She suffers, in fact, from an acute shortage of manpower due to the expulsion of almost one-fifth of her pre-war population. She suffers also from the loss of a large part of her former foreign markets and her former sources of raw material supply.

Two factors offset these handicaps: newly developed trade with the Soviet Union; and, by far the most important, the solidarity and determination of her people. The elimination of the nationality problem, land reform, and nationalization have very largely removed the sources of inner conflict. The people of Czechoslovakia face a tough problem, but they face it as a united nation determined to work shoulder to shoulder until the job is done.

That is how the economic picture looks to this observer at the present time.

There is one cloud upon the domestic horizon. So far the Trade Union Council, largely under Communist domination, has thrown its great power behind the program. Should reaction set in, should the conservative groups—possibly under Western pressure—seek to undo what has been done or arrest progress, the Communist Party may turn ruthlessly radical. In that case strikes will occur and the Two Year Plan may fail. But the chances of a strong reactionary movement in Czechoslovakia are not very great, since most of the former reactionary power groups eliminated themselves by their behavior under the occupation.

The only other great danger to the Czechoslovak future lies beyond the borders of the Republic, which brings us to a consideration of Czechoslovakia's knotty foreign policy problem.

V.

SOVIET SATELLITE?

We might sum up the preceding analysis of internal conditions in present-day Czechoslovakia in the words of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk: "We are a socializing state but we are free men."

How correct is the Western belief that Czechoslovakia has become a Soviet satellite in foreign affairs?

In the first place it is true that so long as the world is divided into a number of large and small nation-states—so long as there is no supranational world authority—all small nations are to a greater or less extent satellites of one of the great powers. This has been true in the past and is even more true today when the number of great powers in the world has been reduced from five or six to perhaps half that number. As a practical matter there are in the world today only three great poles of power, one focusing around the Soviet Union and the others around the United States and the British Commonwealth. Even that statement must be modified to the extent that the British Commonwealh is at present heavily dependent upon the United States.

The first Republic of Czechoslovakia was born out of the defeat of Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I. It was created upon Wilsonian principles. Had the American people not disavowed Wilson's peace treaty and withdrawn from European affairs, Czechoslovakia would in all probability have looked to the United States as its closest friend among the great powers. When the United States failed to enter the League of Nations and failed likewise to guarantee French security in the future, the whole European picture changed. One result was that France in addition to her Treaty with Britain, built a system of European alliances which became known as the Little Entente. Thus France became the protector of Central Europe both against Germany, and, to a certain extent, against the ostracized Soviet Union. From the birth of the first Czechoslovak Republic until the rise of Hitler, Czechoslovakia was, in the sense in which we are using the word, a satellite of France. That is to say, she depended upon France to come to her assistance in case of trouble. This being the case, Czechoslovak foreign policy was naturally based upon taking account of French interests.

But when trouble came in 1938, France was torn by internal dissention. And Britain, upon whom France in turn depended for help, was caught morally and physically unprepared. The Western World, including

the United States was equally if not more afraid of the rise of Communist Russia than of the Fascist Axis. The result was the shameful betrayal of Munich.

During the anguished period leading up to Munich, Czechoslovakia found that she had only one friend among the great powers ready to march to her assistance—the Soviet Union. In those days, when Carpatho-Ukraine was still a part of Czechoslovakia, the Red Army would have had to cross either Polish or Rumanian territory to reach Czechoslovak soil. Neither Poland nor Rumania were prepared to countenance this, since both were at that time flirting with Hitler. Betrayed by France and Britain, cut off from their only source of help by hostile neighbors, the Czechs were left alone to fight a suicidal war or grimly to accept Nazi occupation.

These facts of history are already dim in the minds of many Americans. They are vivid in the memory of the Czechoslovak people.

Since the war ended, the Czechs have thrown themselves wholeheartedly behind the United Nations. Experience has taught them, perhaps more than any other European people, that peace is indivisible and that national security cannot be achieved by any old-fashioned system of alliances. Today they view with alarm the increasing tension between Russia and their friends in the West. They do not want a divided Europe and a divided world. They know what this means to them, even if it does not mean the ultimate horror of another war.

Czechoslovakia cannot achieve prosperity for her people if she is forced to choose between trading only with the East or only with the West. The Soviet Union in pre-war days accounted for only a little over 1% of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade. Poland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria were likewise not of primary importance. The bulk of Czechoslovakia's imports came from Germany or the West and the greater part of her exports flowed back in the same direction. Today a very substantial portion of Czechoslovak foreign trade is with the Soviet Union and with Poland. Under the new trade agreement Czechoslovakia obtains Russian grain, cotton and other raw materials in exchange for manufactured goods such as electric motors, iron pipe, shoes and narrow-gauge railway equipment for use in the Russian forests. She obtains coal from Poland and sells a certain amount of her products there. But the outlet for Czechoslovakia's old-established industries still lies in the West, and the Western European countries need the textiles, ceramics and machinery which the Czechs can make. Nor can Russia fully supply Czech needs

of foodstuffs and raw materials. Unless Czechoslovakia can trade freely in both directions she cannot achieve a decent standard of living for her people nor make her full contribution to European recovery.

From an emotional point of view, the Czechs feel that they belong neither to East nor West. They are Slavs but they are also Europeans. Here again they cannot fulfill themselves if they are forced to choose between two alternatives. Their language is of the East, yet their music, their art and their literature are largely of the West.

The present attitude of the Czech people, in so far as one can learn to understand it in a short time, is one of determination to resist being forced to accept a divided world and to make a choice between the Soviet Union and the United States. They like the United States, but fear the results of its present foreign policy. They admire and feel grateful to the Soviet Union, like it less than they do the United States, but also fear it less than they do America.

The Czechs know that if, contrary to their hopes, they should one day be forced to choose sides, their choice will be purely academic. The Red Army stands at their borders.

Nevertheless, strange as it may seem to Americans, the Czechs are less apprehensive that the Soviet Union will force a showdown than that an eventual decision may be forced upon them by well-meaning but bungling foreign policy of the United States.

This brings us to the main point of this series of articles.

VI.

U. S. POLICY.

If it is correct to say that the Czechs like the United States as well or better than the Soviet Union but nevertheless fear the United States more than they fear the Soviet Union—why is this the case?

The reasons, so far as this correspondent was able to discover them, are as follows:

The Czechs as a whole do not regard Russia as an aggressively expansionist world power. They consider that most of the actual territorial annexations by the Soviet Union are nothing more than a recapture of lands which once belonged to Czarist Russia. This applies to the Polish Ukraine east of the Curzon Line, to Bessorabia and Bukovina taken from Rumania, and even to the Baltic States. Significantly it also applies to the Carpatho-Ukraine which the Czechs themselves have ceded to the Soviet Union. The Czechs, even when the First Republic was set up, had misgivings about the inclusion in Czechoslovakia of this eastern region.

So far as Russian interference in the internal affairs of the Balkan countries is concerned, most Czechs do not apparently regard this as imperialistic expansion. They will explain to you that the peoples of Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia never had democracy or political freedom and were oppressed, politically and economically, by selfish and corrupt ruling cliques. Insofar as the Russians have aided or inspired Communist-led revolutionary movements in these countries, many if not most Czechs consider that they have helped the peoples of these countries to better their conditions. The Czechs may not like communist techniques and methods—they certainly do not want totalitarian dictatorship at home—but the Czechs are a pragmatic as well as an idealistic people. From their point of view the people of Yugoslavia—whom they like—are better off under Tito than they were under the Kara-georgovic dynasty. As to recent events in Hungary, the Czechoslovaks consider that the so-called allegedly democratic Small Landholders Party, ousted from power by the Communists, was dominated by their old enemies, the feudal Hungarian landlords. They do not like the unconstitutional procedures of the Communists, but they do not get very excited about them so long as they take place in Hungary.

This is not to say that the Czechoslovaks do not fear Russia. They do. They can never forget for one moment that the Red Army is only a few hours away from any part of their country. They are made appre-

hensive by the frequently arbitrary and always extremely tough attitudes of Soviet negotiators. But most Czechs, rightly or wrongly, do not feel that the Russians have designs upon them nor upon their freedom, so long as they themselves do not slip into reaction or become tools of reactionary forces outside of their own country.

Most Czech officials as well as ordinary citizens seem to be really afraid of Russia in only one eventuality—if they are forced to choose sides in a divided world. In that case they know that they have no choice and that the march of events will bring them under Soviet domination.

The Czechs fear the United States precisely because they fear that the United States may bring about this very eventuality. Their apprehensions are based upon a number of factors.

1. The Czechs read the Western press and their direct familiarity with the waves of Russophobia which break out from time to time, especially in the United States, is distorted out of proportion by Soviet propaganda exploitation of the more extreme examples. Many Czechs believe, for example, that the United States is not only preparing for an eventual conflict with Russia but is seriously contemplating starting a preventive war quite soon. This question is frequently raised with an American visitor.

2. The Czechs are acutely sensitive to the fact that the West has very largely written them off as a Soviet satellite after their failure to attend the Paris Conference. Foreign Minister Masaryk maintains that it was the West—not the Soviet Union—which forced the Czechs to reverse their original decision. Both the Czechs and the Poles had decided to attend the Paris meeting, even though the Soviet Union had declined to participate. Certainly they had not reached this decision without consulting the Soviet Union. But the Western press, especially the conservative American press, played up the Czech decision as a break on the part of Czechoslovakia with its Soviet ally. When this happened the Czechoslovak Government felt that it had no choice but to reverse its decision, just as it would have had no choice before the war but to avoid any action which would have been interpreted as a break with France. Foreign Minister Masaryk was not "ordered to come to Moscow" as reported at the time. He went to Moscow, as arranged a month before, to negotiate a trade treaty. Before he left for Moscow he must have known that the Western press had made his trip to Paris impossible. The Czech people are not the kind of people, and least of all is Jan Masaryk the kind of man, who takes orders from any other country—no matter how great

and powerful that country may be. By failure to understand this the West not only offended the Czechs, but drove them closer to the Soviet Union.

3. The Czechs are worried by the attitude frequently expressed in the United States that democratic socialism is merely a step on the road to Communist dictatorship. One example is a statement recently made on the floor of the Senate to the effect that "If the choice in Europe is between Socialism and Communism, we had better have nothing to do with it." To the Czechs—in fact to any Europeans, including the conservative Europeans—such an attitude is not only incomprehensible but frightening. It indicates that the United States is planning to use its great economic power to turn back the clock of history, or at least to refuse aid to countries which are moving toward some degree of democratic socialism. The American loans to Socialist Britain and Socialist France show that this is not entirely true of our present policy. But some of the statements appearing in America and some of our actions—as in Greece and China—arouse the fear that it may become true.

4. Finally, the Czechs fear the United States because of what they consider to be our policy in Germany. They believe—and the Communist press hammers this into them—that we are determined not only to rehabilitate Germany ahead of Germany's victims, but to re-build a reactionary "free enterprise" Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and against the rising tide of socialism. The native Czech attitude toward Germany is not one of vengefulness. The Czechs do not want a starving or bankrupt Germany as a neighbor. But they fear that if we obstruct socialization and return German industry to private German control, the old aggressive Germany is certain to be re-created.

It would be a wise move on the part of our Government to take considerable trouble to explain to the Czechs just what our German policy really is. At present it is being interpreted to them by the Russians.

There are many other things we could do to help the cause of peace in this small but important country, where a little moral support and a little economic help would go a long way. It is not a question of billions or even hundreds of millions of dollars. Nor is it a question of a gift for relief. A revolving credit of $50,000,000 for the purchase of American cotton would accomplish miracles.

As stated at the outset, Czechoslovakia, if permitted to work out its own destiny in its own way, may hold the key to a united Europe. As

this correspondent sees the picture, aid and moral support to the Czechs at this time would neither give aid to Soviet expansionism nor to the spread of Communist totalitarianism. Nor would a more friendly attitude toward Czechoslovakia provoke Russian hostility. On the contrary, Prague might prove a meeting-ground of East and West.

GERMANY RE-VISITED

By

JAMES P. WARBURG

GERMANY RE-VISITED

A quick impression of Germany today, as compared to Germany one year ago, could be expressed in one phrase—the same only more so. The country is still an economic desert and a moral morass in the heart of Europe. The four-power snarl remains more hopelessly tangled than ever. The four doctors still disagree about the patient's malady and the treatment required. The patient is slowly getting weaker—less able and less willing to cooperate in bringing about his own cure. Much of the rubble has been cleared away from the streets of cities. But little, if any, of the rubble has been cleared away from the German mind.

One year ago the disease of apathy and hopelessness had not yet greatly affected the four conquerors. The Allied Control Council was fighting against the frustration imposed by the failure of the Big Four Foreign Ministers to reach a working agreement. One year ago the Berlin Komandatura was functioning as a miniature model of what the Allied Control Council might some day be for all of Germany. Today the Allied Control Council has sunk into purely formal existence and even the four-power government of Berlin has lapsed into apathy and inaction.

The men on the spot are not to blame for the demoralization of what was intended to be a four-power government of Germany. In fact, our own man on the spot, General Clay, continues to face his impossible task with indomitable courage and determination—one might even say with a certain amount of wry optimism. But no amount of hard work by military government can arrest the slow wasting away of the physical and moral strength of a people which lacks both the vision of a future and the incentive to work for anything more than the immediate necessities of life. No amount of courage and determination can fully counteract the wastage of morale among the conquerors themselves, nor the loss of prestige which results from their inability to work together.

Last year one found among the Allied officials the hope that before too long Paris, London, Moscow and Washington would iron out their differences. Today the prevailing mood is one of pessimism as to four-power cooperation. If the November meeting of the Foreign Ministers results in another failure to agree, the men on the spot will not be surprised.

So far as British and American officials are concerned, two schools of thought predominate. The more pessimistic are inclined to accept the division of Germany into East and West, with the French Zone ultimately

being joined to the Anglo-American area. Men who hold this view are impatient to get on with the job of making West Germany capable of supporting itself and thus relieving the strain upon British and American taxpayers.

The more optimistic school of thought still believes that an eventual unification of Germany is possible; that, while agreement to unify is unlikely in November, it will eventually come about as the result of Russia's desire to have a voice and a share in the future control of the Ruhr coal and industry. This school is equally anxious to get going in the rehabilitation of the Bi-zonal area—but for a different reason. The sooner we have a going concern, they argue, the sooner the Russians will want to come in.

The first group, which regards the East-West division as inevitable, is anxious to obtain French adherence as soon as possible and therefore more inclined to listen to French claims and demands. The second group, which aims at overall unification, tends to pay less attention to the French, believing that they, like the Russians, will be easier to deal with once the Bi-zonal area is on a profitable basis.

This is the background to the recent Anglo-American decision to revise upward the level of German industry in the Bi-zonal area, over the protest of France and the Soviet Union.

French reaction to this decision has been fully reported in the press, although part of the French position is perhaps somewhat obscured by the diplomatic language of the official statements. The French wanted, first of all, the promise of a greater share of Ruhr coal than they were entitled to receive under the sliding-scale agreement reached at Moscow last April. This might be arranged. But, in addition to a greater immediate share in Ruhr coal, the French actually wanted the assurance that raising the permitted level of German steel production from 5,800,000 tons per annum to 10,000,000 would never permit German steel production to exceed that of France. This is more far-reaching than it sounds.

French steel capacity is at present about 7,000,000 tons. German *capacity,* which used to be over 21,000,000 tons is still—in spite of war damage—considerably in excess of the 10,700,000 tons now to be permitted. Due chiefly to shortage of coal, German steel *production* is now only about 3,000,000 tons per annum. The French demand therefore means that German steel production should be held back not until French production reaches present capacity, *but until French capacity is increased by roughly 50%*. To effect such an increase would require the building of new French plants, which in turn would require a large quantity of steel

and a considerable length of time. To meet the French approval therefore would mean that the whole of European recovery would be delayed by lack of steel in order to give France the lead over Germany which she desires. That is one reason why Britain and the United States could not wholly meet French desires.

Another reason not yet obvious to the American newspaper reader is that transportation is rapidly becoming as great a bottleneck in European recovery as the mining of coal. The rehabilitation of European railways requires large quantities of steel. The quickest and cheapest way to get steel is by using the plants now standing idle in the Ruhr Valley. No one wants to build up Germany ahead of France but the quickest way to get out the coal so desperately needed by all of Europe to heat homes, to get factories started, and to make fertilizer in order to bring up food production is to prime the pump in the Ruhr.

But why, one may ask, was it necessary to bring up the matter of steel production now, when Germany is producing only a little more than half of the steel it was permitted to make under the old level of industry plan? Why raise this thorny question when production is held back by factors other than the limit imposed by the occupying powers? The answer given by the British-American authorities is that the whole question of reparations was involved in the level of industry. Until it was definitely decided what the level of industry was to be, there could be no decision as to which plants were to be retained and which dismantled. And until this was known there could be no rehabilitation of plants.

The Russians had agreed last April that the German level of industry should be raised. Nevertheless, the Russians likewise protested against the Anglo-American decision to proceed without waiting for the four-power conference in November. The Anglo-American reply was that the decision concerned not Germany as a whole but merely the Bi-zonal area; that Britain and the United States had tried ever since the Potsdam Declaration over two years ago to get France and the Soviet Union to carry out the agreement to treat Germany as an ecomonic whole; and that the French and Russians are still welcome to join whenever they are ready to do so. In the meantime the United States and Britain declared that they were unwilling further to delay the rehabilitation of their part of Germany at least to the point where it would become self-supporting.

Shortly after the decision was announced this writer was able to obtain a first-hand and rather frank reaction from an excellent Soviet source. "You are closing the door on the unification of Germany", this individual

said. "Why couldn't you wait till November?" The writer pointed out that we had been waiting two years, and paying in some half a billion dollars a year to sustain our part of Germany while Russia was milking Germany at the other end. The reply was, first, the usual statement as to Russia's desperate need for reparations, her sacrifices and losses in the war, and her chagrin at Anglo-American failure to take these factors into account; second, and far more interesting, the assertion that we did not need to pour money into Germany if we would properly manage the economy of our zones. "You don't have to build up industry to make your zones self-supporting," the Russian said. "All you have to do is to make the Germans grow and deliver more food." He had his case well documented too. He knew just what percentage of West German arable land was producing food and how much of it was in forest or pastures. He insisted that, if we made the Germans cut down some of the forest and plow up some of the pasture land, the Bi-zonal area could produce enough food to provide a low calorie diet for its population.

The next day the writer tried this out on a high American official. This American did not altogether deny the Russian's case—in theory. But in practice, he said, it would take years and a lot of expensive machinery to cut down forests; and, as for changing the whole traditional nature of the West German agricultural economy, nothing short of force would accomplish any such purpose. "So long as we are trying to teach the Germans democracy," he said, "we cannot treat them as coolie labor."

The last sentence contains the key to much of our dilemma. It also indicates the reason why Russia is probably not yet ready to integrate her zone with Western Germany. The Soviet Zone is not yet milked dry. When it is—and when Western Germany shows a profit balance instead of a huge annual loss—the Russian attitude may change. The danger is that by that time we too may change our attitude about unifying Germany. If we do, it will most likely not be because our representatives in Germany will have lost sight of their objective, but because of sentiment at home and developments in other parts of the world.

The men on the spot know the danger which lurks in a divided Europe and a divided world. But at this moment they can see no better way to hasten the process of unification than to do the best job they can in restoring to reasonable prosperity that part of Germany which they control.

To accomplish this requires more than the adoption of a new plan. It requires unending patience and perseverance. Above all it requires the solid support of public opinion at home.

WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH BRITAIN?

By

JAMES P. WARBURG

WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH BRITAIN?

I.

The average American cannot help but be puzzled by the speed with which events in Britain are moving toward a crisis. What has gone wrong? Why has the loan been exhausted so soon? What reason is there to suppose that additional help will not simply mean pouring money down a rathole?

There are any number of glib answers to these questions, such as: the Labor Government has cluttered up the British economy with red tape and ill-advised experiments; the British coal miners refuse to dig coal; the British Treasury officials miscalculated their country's position; or, the British are spending too much money and wasting too much of their manpower in maintaining unnecessary military forces. There is some truth in each of these answers, but not the whole truth. Nor can the whole truth be arrived at by merely adding the answers together.

It is important for us to try to understand the British picture because—whether we like it or not—we are going to have to reach a decision which will affect not only the future of the British people but our own future as well. In 1940 and 1941, when Britain stood alone against the rising tide of Nazi conquest, we alone held the power which, if used, could enable resistance to continue—and which, if withheld, could force the last island of resistance to go under. In 1947 we alone hold the power, which, if used, can enable Britain to surmount a different kind of crisis and lead Europe toward economic recovery and peace—and which, if withheld, will doom Britain to economic collapse and Western Europe to economic chaos and political anarchy.

In 1941 our interest in Britain's survival was interest in our own survival. In 1947 our interest in preserving Britain from economic disaster is interest in preserving our own prosperity. If Britain collapses, the whole economy of the Western world suffers a catastrophe which will mean the cutting off of most of our foreign markets; and, if our foreign markets are closed, our own economy will head straight into a major depression. Helping Britain to ride out the storm will not alone set the economy of the Western world on the road to recovery. But failure to help Britain to right itself will render whatever assistance we extend elsewhere of no avail.

More than our prosperity is at stake. For better or worse, we have embarked upon a course of helping those peoples of the world whom we consider free to remain free. We have made this decision because we believe that only thus can we preserve our own freedom. Britain is the keystone of the structure we have chosen to support. It is the central political and economic front of our world strategic position. The political flanks of this position lie in China and in France. Its economic flanks rest upon Germany and Japan. The flanks are difficult to hold; they are each a problem in itself. But, if we lose our political and economic center in Britain, our whole position becomes untenable.

That is why we must try to understand the red hot problem which now confronts us in the British Isles.

The crucial aspects of this problem are psychological, rather than political or economic. The end of World War II has left Britain in a position which neither the British people nor most of its leaders have yet fully realized. The truth of the matter is that World War II has economically bled Britain white, much as World War I physically bled France white. Britain still thinks of itself—and we still think of Britain—as one of the three or four great powers in the world. It may well again occupy such a position in the future. It would be in our interest that it should regain such pre-eminence. But the fact is that Britain today is not a great world power in the sense in which Russia is a world power, or the United States. It has become for the moment a small nation carried on in part by the momentum of its great past, in part by the loyalty of the independent Dominion peoples, and in part by its own indomitable courage. Britain today is "keeping up to the Joneses", trying to maintain itself at a level beyond its reach and seeking to carry commitments beyond its strength. This is our fault as much as Britain's.

Both we and the British people are still living in an illusion created by the last war. We are living in the illusion of an equal partnership. Morally this conception was justified in 1941. Britain had held the fort alone while we made up our minds and mobilized our strength. Had it not been for British courage and British sacrifice, we should have fought a very different and more costly war—a war from which we might not have emerged as the strongest and most fortunate nation on this earth. But the fact remains that our wartime fifty-fifty partnership with Britain came about, not as the result of equal power deployed in our joint endeavor, but as the result of the earlier and more dangerous employment of relatively small British power and the later and safer employment of far greater power by the United States. There was nothing wrong with the

translation of these contributions into a fifty-fifty management of our combined effort. The difficulty arose after victory had been won.

Because they had purchased at enormous sacrifice a position beyond their actual power, the British have been slow to realize that with their diminished power this position has become untenable. And we, because we have been reluctant to assume responsibility commensurate with our increased power, have continued to expect the British to carry commitments beyond their means which we desired to see maintained.

Germany and Palestine serve to illustrate the point. In Germany, Britain and the United States together are responsible for over 40,000,000 Germans, living in an area which contains that nation's chief raw material and industrial resources but which cannot supply itself with foodstuffs. To make the area self-supporting will require several years of intensive effort and considerable capital investment. At present it takes over half a billion dollars a year merely to feed the population at a bare subsistence level. It requires the maintenance of expensive military government organizations as well as sizeable armies of occupation. Altogether the cost comes to more than a billion dollars a year. Because we marched into Germany as fifty-fifty partners (in spite of the preponderance of American troops), we have maintained the fifty-fifty basis in the management of our zones of occupation. The British have wanted us to take a greater share of the financial burden, which we have until now declined to do. We would have liked to have had a greater share in the management of the Ruhr, which, until recently, was strictly a British preserve. This arrangement is now in the process of being readjusted. For different reasons each of us has wanted to preserve the fiction of a fifty-fifty relationship. Britain has been unwilling to face the fact that the commitment involved exceeded her power. We have been unwilling to face the fact that Britain's diminished power placed a greater burden upon us.

The Palestinian situation is more complex and more obscure. But here too Britain is committed beyond her means and we, while unwilling to assume even a part of the commitment, and while loudly criticizing the British performance, still want British protection of the Middle East oilfields to be maintained.

This is the psychological handicap under which British-American relationships labor at the present time. Its unfortunate consequences appear in a number of ways. Each of us is becoming unduly critical of the other. The British fail to make allowances for the fact that the false front which they themselves maintain stands in the way of greater American

understanding and greater willingness to assume a larger share of the burden. We, in turn, fail to make allowances for the fact that, just because the British have been carrying a burden beyond their capacity, they are desperately tired and unable to perform according to their usual high standard. In setting the terms of the British loan from the United States, both parties made mistakes and miscalculations. These were based largely upon the illusion which prevailed on both sides of the water as to Britain's inherent position. The mistakes and miscalculations were aggravated by an abnormally severe winter. And now the British are inclined to regard the terms of the loan as having been forced upon them, whereas we are inclined to regard British failure to live up to the impossible as a default or as a sign of suddenly developed weakness.

If we are to meet the crisis which now confronts us in the British Isles, we must first of all rid ourselves of the misconception which has so largely contributed to its making. We in the United States must be on our guard not to be impatient, over-critical and—above all—patronizing. The British must be on their guard not to be oversensitive to ill-founded criticism and to the American habit of blunt speech. It is a platitude to say that our two peoples differ most in their traditional modes of expression. During the war they learned to understand each other's habits and customs. We must not again let British understatement become misunderstood as hypocrisy, nor American hyperbole as boastfulness.

Bearing these psychological factors in mind, we shall perhaps more profitably examine the hard facts of Britain's present predicament.

II.

What are the hard facts with regard to Britain's present economic picture? Are they such as to warrant the belief that, with a certain amount of help, the United Kingdom can surmount the present crisis? Or do they indicate that further assistance will only postpone the inevitable day of reckoning?

From having blandly assumed until a short time ago that Britain was still as solid a credit risk as in the days before the war, many people have now rushed headlong into the belief that the British economy is all but bankrupt. Ever since the dollar crisis became acute—or rather, ever since its acuteness was at last openly recognized in London and Washington—there has been a growing impression that something has suddenly gone radically wrong. Nobody seems to know exactly what it is.

The facts show, first of all, that there is relatively little the matter with the United Kingdom's internal economy. Physical production is higher than pre-war production—the London *Economist* estimates it at 110-120% of 1938. Steel production, the key factor in British industry, is running at better than 125% of 1938. Ship-building, another vital industry, has doubled over pre-war. Much of the chemical industry is producing more than ever before in peace-time. The manufacture of trucks and automobiles is making new high records. Some of the light industries are doing less well, and the declining coal production is a very serious problem, which we shall consider in a moment. But the overall picture is one of remarkable achievement. The national budget shows a substantial surplus. There is practically no unemployment. Factory workers are earning high wages. Farmers are getting good prices by reason of subsidies which keep food prices in line with wages. Most businesses are making profits. Except for the coal industry, labor disputes are few. In short, the facts about Britain's internal economy reveal what looks like an extraordinarily healthy condition.

As for coal production, it must be realized that there is little new in this distressing picture. British coal production has been declining for many years. In 1913 Britain exported 78,000,000 tons of coal. Since then coal exports have more or less steadily declined, partly because of increased domestic consumption and largely because of declining production. Production has decreased—not because the mines were worked out—but because, by and large, British coal mine owners milked their properties. Not enough of the earnings were ploughed back into developing the mines themselves nor into equipping them with modern machinery. Another factor, which is world-wide, has been the increasing difficulty in finding men willing to earn their living by digging coal. Failure to modernize has made this difficulty more acute in Britain.

Despite the long-term trend the first six months of 1947 showed a coal production of 4,000,000 tons more than the corresponding period of 1946, even though the first part of this period belonged to the coldest winter on record. Ice and blizzards not only impeded production but hopelessly tied up transportation.

After this excellent record in the first half of the year, production fell off in July and is now seriously impeded by the strike in Yorkshire. The drop in coal production, coming as it did at the moment when the dollar crisis was finally brought into the open, served to create somewhat of a red herring. Coal is the only major industry which has been nationalized by the Labor Government. It is also the worst blemish on Britain's

economic picture. The obvious inference is tempting. But the facts lend little support to the conclusion that nationalization has disrupted the mining of coal. Not all the facts are readily available. Quite possibly the Coal Board has been inefficient in some aspects of management. The Government has moved hesitantly and has made mistakes. But the Government inherited the position left by the former private owners; and the first half year's production figures are sufficient rebuttal of any glib accusation of overall mis-management. Likewise, the figures concerning the recruitment of coal miners show 20,000 men added in the first half of 1947 against a loss of almost 10,000 men in the first half of 1945 when the mines were still under private ownership.

The facts take us, then, to two preliminary conclusions: the internal British economy is not at all in bad condition except for unsatisfactory coal production; and unsatisfactory coal production is not due to "socialist experimentation" or to any other new factor, but to a condition which has been staring every one in the face for at least twenty years.

If these conclusions are correct, why is Britain in trouble?

Primarily for one very simple reason. Pre-war Britain was like a man who lives partly on his current earnings and partly on the income from inherited or previously earned capital. Post-war Britain is like this same man who has had to spend his capital in order to take care of a serious emergency in the family, and who now must live on his current earnings alone. There are only two things such a man can do: he can try to maintain his standard of living by working much harder than before; or he can drastically cut down his expenses by moving into a smaller house or apartment, denying himself and his family luxuries, some of which habit had made into necessities, and perhaps for a time even cutting down on real necessities. Neither alternative, nor any combination of the two is easy or pleasant. To find a way of earning more money or to cut down expenditure may take time, and, to accomplish his purpose, our hypothetical individual may have to try to borrow some money to tide him over the period of re-adjustment.

That is almost exactly what has happened to Britain.

The pre-war United Kingdom paid for its imports from other countries partly out of its exports (which are equivalent to the individual's current earnings), and partly out of interest and dividends on its foreign investments (equivalent to the individual's invested capital). When the war came, Britain had to spend its capital in order to survive until

American Lend-Lease aid could be mobilized. In other words, Britain had to take over the foreign investments of its nationals in order to sell them abroad to pay for planes and tanks and guns. From that moment Britain's status changed. From that moment Britain had no income from capital and would have to pay for its imports by what it could currently make and sell to other nations.

The realization of this ugly fact and of its consequences was delayed and obscured by the operation of Lend-Lease during the next four and a half years. When—after VJ Day—Lend-Lease aid was summarily cut off, the British Government knew it must face a drastic reorganization of its economy. It would have to increase its exports as much as possible and close the remaining gap by decreasing its purchases abroad. To do these things would take time, particularly with a people and an industrial machine exhausted by six years of war. That was why Britain came to us for a loan, to tide over the period of readjustment.

In arranging the amount and the terms of this loan both sides miscalculated. We, as most lenders will, tried to hold down the amount and to exact such terms as we thought would best aid world recovery. Britain, as most borrowers in need will do, agreed to the best terms she could obtain, even though they made her task of reorganization difficult and precarious. Had greater wisdom prevailed on both sides of the table much subsequent trouble could have been avoided. (The fact that a Labor Government had come into power had its effect upon the negotiations as well as upon subsequent developments, but the political aspect of Anglo-American post-war relations will be discussed in a separate article.)

The loan was granted in the spring of 1946. By the last quarter of that year Britain had already shown great progress. By hard work exports had been increased to over 110% of pre-war in volume—over 125% in money value. Imports were being rigidly controlled and curtailed. The gap left by the missing income from investments was being closed. And then two things happened.

Britain was hit by the worst winter in modern history; and price control ended in the United States. The weather reduced British production and cut down the painfully built-up exports, while at the same time increasing the need for imports. The ending of price control in the United States caused a rise in prices which cut down by something like 25% the purchasing power of Britain's borrowed dollars in the American market.

The slim margin by which it had been calculated that the loan might be sufficient disappeared almost overnight. As early as April 1947, when

Britain began to dig itself out of the winter set-back, it should have been evident to both the British and American Governments that further assistance would be needed. But neither Government would face the issue until almost the last drop of the loan had been drained away. The reasons for this failure are to be found in political factors on both sides of the ocean.

Before we come to the consideration of these political aspects of the problem, it may be well to summarize our economic conclusions. In this observer's opinion they might be stated as follows:

1. Since the war ended, Britain's *internal* economy has performed as well, if not better than could be expected of it. In spite of exhaustion and continued conditions of war-time austerity, production has been brought back to better than the pre-war level.

2. The one major exception to this general finding, lagging coal production, has been caused by pre-war mistakes and omissions rather than by post-war shortcomings. (A protracted work stoppage, should it develop, would be an exception to this statement.)

3. Since the war ended, Britain's *external* economy has been in an extremely precarious position due to the loss of income from foreign investments. The present dollar crisis is due less to failure on the part of Britain to do everything in her power to close the resulting gap than to three extraneous factors:

(a) the insufficient amount of the American loan and the terms attached to it;

(b) the harsh winter of 1946-1947; and

(c) the price rise in the United States.

The present gap between imports and exports is about two hundred million dollars per month.

4. Failure to face facts in time has precipitated a crisis, which might have been avoided and which will now in itself retard British recovery and increase the amount of American assistance required.

These overall conclusions—if correct—leave little excuse for wasting time over mutual recrimination. This is not to say that an objective critic could find no fault with what the British have done or failed to do since the war ended. A strong case can and has been made against the present Government for indecision, for the imposition of too many controls

and restrictions, and for creating an inflationary trend—not by deficit finance, but by permitting wages and earnings to rise when consumer goods were kept in short supply. Yet it is hard to see how most of these things could have been avoided, especially by a Labor Government pledged to a certain amount of centralized control over the economy. In fact, an equally strong case can and has been made by the more radical members of the Labor Party itself—on precisely the same grounds—that not enough control has been established and not enough planning done and carried out.

No British Government—whatever its political complection or economic orientation—would probably have done much better or much worse. Given the extremely difficult and distasteful task which the war forced upon the inhabitants of these islands, it is hard to imagine how any other people could have performed as uncomplainingly or as well.

III.

While the fundamental nature of the present British crisis is economic, the crisis itself is the result of political factors—partly internal, but to a much larger extent external to the United Kingdom.

By far the most important of these political factors is the failure of the victorious coalition to cooperate in laying the firm foundations of enduring peace. One aspect of this failure is clearly expressed in the United Nations Charter. The inherent fault of the old League of Nations was that, in the last analysis, it was little more than a multilateral treaty between sovereign states; it failed to create a world authority over and above the contracting parties endowed with power to enforce. The United Nations Charter failed to cure this defect. It did not create a league of sovereign peoples nor a parliament of man. It merely created formal machinery for united action in certain defined circumstances. It substituted for the notion of equality among sovereign states the concept of Great Power authority and responsibility.

Britain was named as one of the five great powers to whom there was entrusted a super-responsibility for the maintenance of peace. So were China and France, along with the United States and the Soviet Union. The power formula is at best a very questionable one. But, if this formula was to be adopted, the inclusion of Britain, France and China as powers co-equal with the Soviet Union and the United States placed upon each of these three nations a burden of responsibility exceeding its effective strength. So far as Britain is concerned, her nomination as a super-power

could be justified if the power of the Dominions were added to that of the United Kingdom and its possessions. But the fact is that Britain does not control the power of the free Dominions; each of them is free to make its own foreign policy and to dispose of its own armed forces. Thus Britain's position, already precarious due to the loss of her overseas investments, was rendered more unbalanced by the assumption of new and far-reaching commitments.

Another political factor affecting the position of the United Kingdom was the impact of the war upon colonial imperialism in general and upon the peoples of the British Empire in particular. It precipitated the long-smoldering question of Indian independence and of the liberating of Burma and Ceylon. Post-war Britain had to make the difficult transition from Winston Churchill's famous, "I did not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the liquidation of His Majesty's Empire," to the Labor Government's policy of freeing India, Burma and Ceylon. The decision to adopt this policy was all the more courageous because—irrespective of its justice and long-range wisdom—it involved a further weakening of the already strained resources of the United Kingdom.

We have already mentioned the political problems of Palestine and Germany and the burdens which they impose upon British manpower and the British Treasury. We must add the British contribution to the effort to establish political stability in the Far East and in the Mediterranean Basin, as well as the cost involved in transferring from Egypt southward the strategic center of British colonial power.

These are some of the external political elements which have combined to create Britain's present economic crisis. We are as much responsible as any other nation for whatever mistakes may have been embodied in the United Nations Charter, and especially for the creation of the veto power. Certainly we can only commend the decisions made by Britain with regard to India, Burma and Ceylon. If Britain has made mistakes in Greece, we have taken over the essential elements of British Mediterranean policy ourselves. And, if Britain has acted both unwisely and unjustly with regard to Palestine, we have contributed more to the difficulty than to its solution.

In facing the problems involved in Britain's present dollar crisis, it is only fair to Britain and to ourselves for us to bear in mind that, to a very large extent, Britain has become over-extended because we as well as the British themselves have operated upon a false appraisal of the physical and financial resources of the United Kingdom.

This brings us to a consideration of the internal political factors which have had some influence upon the present crisis. These must be examined from two points of view: first, the direct effects of the election of a Labor Government upon the British economy; and, second, the indirect effects of the election through its repercussions in the United States.

It is extremely difficult for an American to appraise the extent to which Britain's internal economic picture has been affected by the political overturn of 1945. In the last analysis, this is a question of whether the change has been good or bad for public morale—that is, whether it has given the British people more or less of what it wanted. It is probably safe to say that the British people themselves would find it difficult to answer this question. The essential post-war problems would have been the same under any Government. The road would have been difficult and austere, no matter which party was in power. Nevertheless, it is perhaps possible to make a few general observations.

Perhaps the most important difference between a Labor Government and one which might have been organized by the Conservatives lies in the emphasis upon the use of government powers and controls to ensure full employment. The Labor Government has made its primary objective the maintenance of wage-price stability while restricting home consumption of goods in order to build up exports. A Conservative Government would probably have placed greater emphasis upon the formation of capital through profits, by allowing wages and employment to drop off in certain sectors of the economy, and hoping thus to increase the supply of labor in others. In other words, a Conservative Government might have produced goods at somewhat lower prices. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether a Conservative Government could have obtained as complete popular acceptance of the self-denial imposed by the restriction of consumption, especially if it had permitted some degree of unemployment to set in. Given the temper of British workers at the time of the election, it is also doubtful whether a Conservative victory would not have caused a considerable amount of work stoppage and labor disputes.

Paradoxically, it is probably also correct to say that a Conservative Government, while opposed to "planning", would have planned somewhat more consistently and efficiently within the framework of its policy. But, while its policy would have pleased the upper income groups more, it is doubtful whether it would have pleased the broad mass of the people as well.

Perhaps the most severe criticism directed against the Labor Government is that it has not brought home to the people the seriousness of the present crisis. Some go further and say that the Government itself has not realized the acute nature of its dilemma. The answer seems to this observer to lie largely in the nature of the crisis itself. Given the healthy state of the *internal* economy, with full employment and high production, it is difficult for the ordinary citizen to comprehend that all is not well. He is, of course, aware of the scarcity of food and of all consumer goods. But such scarcity is associated in the public mind with war conditions; it is not a traditional symptom of economic crisis such as, for instance, a glut of goods or unemployment.

These seem to be the main points of direct political impact upon the British economy. It will be noted that "socialization" is not, in this writer's opinion, one of them. It seems very doubtful that the nationalization of the coal mines or of the Bank of England has had any real plus or minus effect upon the present position. On the other hand, the uncertainty as to how far nationalization is to be carried undoubtedly exercises a dampening influence—both upon those who want it to go further quickly and those who want it to go no further at all.

The indirect effect of "socialization"—through its repercussion upon the attitude of the United States—is a factor of considerable importance. At the time of the loan negotiations, in early 1946, a vocal section of American opinion opposed granting any loan "to help a Socialist Government." Undoubtedly this attitude was not without influence upon the American negotiating officials and upon the Congress. It could not stop the loan; but it did undoubtedly contribute toward cutting it down and toughening its conditions. Insofar as this is true, the effect of the Labor victory via its impact upon the United States has made the present crisis more acute.

Far more important than what has happened in the past is the fact that there is considerable danger of the same thing happening again. The opinion that we should not give aid to any socialist government has been gaining rather than losing ground. It has recently been expressed in Congress by a leading Senator, who is neither a reactionary nor an isolationist. Still more recently it was expressed by the most internationally-minded of the Republican candidates for the Presidency. The latter went so far as to suggest, as a condition of further aid, that Britain agree to halt any further socialization.

Apart from the fact that such utterances are likely to produce just the opposite of the desired effect in other countries, there is great danger to the ultimate success of the whole "Marshall Plan" in this type of thinking. If we fail to draw a distinction between totalitarian Communism and the type of democratic socialism which is tending to evolve not only in Britain but in most of Western and even some of Central Europe, the "Marshall Plan" is finished before it has been put into action. The fact is that the free peoples, whose freedom we wish to help preserve, today either cannot afford or do not wish our kind of economic freedom. It does not follow that they are any less deeply committed to the maintenance of their political freedom. If we fail to recognize this fact—if we adopt the slogan that democratic socialism is "the road to serfdom"—we shall write off as enemies the only friends who can help us to do the job. And, if we write off our friends in Europe and in Asia, we shall end up by supporting only the rickety remnants of reaction and thus drive our friends into the very wilderness from which we seek to preserve them.

The recognition, before it is too late, that our particular form of "free enterprise" economy is not the only road toward human dignity and freedom is the key with which we can unlock the door to peace.

CAN OUR RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA BE IMPROVED?

Put Yourself in Marshall's Place

by James P. Warburg

Author of "FOREIGN POLICY BEGINS AT HOME"

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JAMES P. WARBURG

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FOREWORD

WE, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, are in a tough spot. We are charged with an inescapable responsibility which we have not sought and which seems to many of us remote from our own daily lives. This responsibility has two broad aspects.

It is difficult for us to realize that we are in the midst of an acute world crisis. We live in a comfortable, well-stocked house, high up on a hill which overlooks the plain where dwell the other peoples of the world. Down on the plain there are floods and pestilence and famine. We know this. We are saddened by it. We send medicines and food. We do what we can to help the neediest cases. But we do not fully realize that the floods are rising and will, unless arrested, engulf our own hilltop. We are not fully aware that, without meaning to do so, we have collected on our hilltop practically all the available equipment for fighting and controlling flood waters and that, unless we make this equipment available, the people in the valley are helpless.

The world crisis is a crisis of lagging or wholly impeded production. Because a great war has been fought in Europe and Asia, ravaging those continents, exhausting their peoples and resources and throwing out of kilter the delicate balance of their economies and their social structures, the Eastern Hemisphere—from the British Isles to Japan—is suffering from acute shortages. Peoples who have for centuries been self-supporting find themselves unable to produce enough to sustain life at even the lowest subsistence level. Or, if they can produce a surplus of some things, they find themselves unable to exchange this surplus for other necessities which they have never in the past produced for themselves and have always purchased from other countries. These conditions produce unrest and political instability.

We in the Western Hemisphere have so far been almost untouched by this crisis. Our half of the world has a surplus of food and raw materials. Its productive capacity has increased while that of Europe and Asia has diminished. In money value, the United States alone at present turns out about two-thirds of the world's total production. Moreover, the United States is at present the sole surplus producer of most of those particular things which are needed in Europe and Asia in order to re-start the wheels of production.

This is one of the two great responsibilities which history has placed upon us.

The other great responsibility is that we, as militarily the strongest nation on this earth, hold in our hands the delicate balance between war and peace. This, too, is hard for us to realize. It is true that there is another great power which shares this responsibility with us, but not quite in equal measure, for we are the more mature and, for the moment, the more powerful. If we and the Soviet Union can find the road to peace, the world may at last find itself free of the recurrent curse of armed conflict. If we fail, atomic and bacteriological war may well return the human race to the primeval slime of its earliest beginnings.

The twofold task of helping to rebuild the world's shattered economy and of finding the road to peaceful reconciliation with the Soviet Union is your task and mine. If we believe in the principles upon which this nation was founded, then we know that our Government is our servant and not our master. The servant cannot tell the master what decisions to make nor what action to take in a time of crisis.

We, as citizens, must try to discover what we think our nation should do and why. To do this, we need to learn or brush up on the facts of recent history.

As one citizen, conscious of this responsibility, I have tried my hand at gathering facts here at home and abroad. The official documents of 1947 alone make a fascinating story. The most important of them are included in the Appendix.

In studying and writing about our foreign policy problems over a period of years, I have come to a few conclusions. These are stated in the last chapter and are wide open to discussion and criticism.

One major conclusion is that it is absolutely essential that the United States should provide continuing aid to re-start the wheels of production in the crucial sectors of the world's economy. Without such aid there can be no real recovery; and without recovery there can be no political stability, or—in the long run—peace. Furthermore, unless the United States acts rapidly to help reactivate production in other parts of the world, the United States itself will face a major depression.

A second broad conclusion is that the present European Recovery Program, while essential as a first step, cannot possibly succeed in its ultimate purpose unless it operates in a climate of greatly improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. This leads to a re-examination of those relations, the causes of the existing tensions, and the premises upon which our present policy is based. This re-examination brings me, in turn, to a different analysis and a specific recommendation for a different basic policy.

In reaching these conclusions and recommendations, it may well be that I have overlooked certain factors of importance or failed to see others in their right perspective. If so, I shall welcome being set right. Whatever the validity of my conclusions, the important thing is the factual background study out of which they grew. This study, too, is subject to correction, as is any attempt to catch history in the making, but it may, nevertheless, help others to find out where they stand, what they think, and what they feel about the fateful decisions which are theirs to make.

No public servant of this nation has ever carried a heavier burden nor had a greater right to expect every American citizen to support him than George Catlett Marshall. The help he needs is not that of blind allegiance but of loyal, constructuve criticism and guidance. We private citizens are not just a cheering section. We are on the team.

You, as a fellow member of the team, may find it helpful to try to put yourself in Secretary Marshall's place for a few hours—to understand the position he inherited, to trace what he has done, and to see clearly the problems he now faces. These problems will not be solved in the next few weeks or months, but the clock is fast ticking away the hours in which we may acquire the information we need in order to play our part as free citizens.

JAMES P. WARBURG

January 7, 1948

CHAPTER ONE

What Marshall Inherited

WHEN GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL was appointed Secretary of State, on January 8, 1947, he was not merely entrusted by the President with the conduct of this nation's foreign affairs—he was placed by the hand of history in a position of almost terrifying responsibility for the future of mankind. When he took office on January 20, after being confirmed by the Senate, Secretary Marshall assumed a burden concocted of all the human mistakes and failings which had first produced a devastating war and then had brought the newly won peace into immediate jeopardy.

The task Mr. Marshall faced was far more difficult than that of a doctor who is called in to save a patient dangerously weakened by wrong treatment and unnecessary operations; for, in such a case, the new doctor is in a position to demand complete authority. He does not have to explain his diagnosis to the entire family, persuade them that it is correct, and then get vouchers signed for each bottle of medicine. He sizes up the case and goes ahead with such treatment as each moment may dictate.

Mr. Marshall took charge of a patient—World Peace—who might at any moment die or lapse into an incurable condition. He had to make a quick diagnosis. But, having made it, he was unable to take action until he had won the consent and support of Congress and of the American people.

In his first year in office, Mr. Marshall has made his appraisal of world conditions—he has laid out the first part of the course he wishes to pursue—he has taken such preliminary action as could be taken on the great but limited authority of the Executive. He is now engaged in the difficult task of trying to win the consent of Congress and the American people to his program of action, while at the same time trying to gain the confidence and help of the peoples of the world.

In spite of enforced delay, the patient has neither died nor become incurable. His physical condition has somewhat improved, but his nervous system and psychological state have deteriorated. He is still in a highly critical condition—a condition which demands that the doctor be freed of family arguments and permitted to proceed with a treatment of artificial nourishment and gland stimulation. Only after this emergency treatment has been successfully applied for some time will it be possible for the doctor to explain the real nature of the illness. The doctor himself may not yet fully understand the whole trouble, but he knows what has to be done now in order to keep the patient alive.

To help free the doctor for action is your job and mine. Not by blindly accepting his recommendation, for that is not the way our democracy works, but by carefully studying the full and patient explanation we have already been given. The first step in that process is to understand the problems Secretary Marshall inherited.

1. THE ABSENCE OF POLICY

Since the war ended, we had been drifting. We had lost the inspiration of a high purpose. We had no clearly defined plan. Our action and our inaction at home and abroad had been dictated by fluctuating fears, contradictory desires, partisan politics, and changing circumstance. This was not merely due to lack of vision and skill in high places. It was due primarily to the state of mind in which we as a people found ourselves at the time. This state of mind was caused, to some extent, by the suspension of Presidential fireside chats and the failure of President Truman's Administration to make any serious and continuing effort to inform the people about the problems faced by their Government. Even more, our state of mind was brought about by the fact that we did not fully realize how radically our position in the world had changed since the war ended.

We, as a people, had never fully understood what the war was about. It took most of us some time to realize that Nazi Germany and its Axis satellites had deliberately set out to conquer the world. Then we thought for a time that Hitler's design of conquest could be frustrated without our armed intervention. When Japan entered the arena on the side of Germany and attacked us, we had—I think—almost reached the conclusion that our first premise had been wrong and that we would have to take up arms to prevent an Axis victory. Be that as it may, once we were booted into the war, we understood very clearly that we were up to our necks in a war of survival. We fought that war determinedly and well. But we never fully understood that we were also up to our necks in a worldwide revolution—not a revolution with any particular ideological label, but a revolution of peoples throughout the world against various forms of exploitation and oppression.

This revolution, or civil war, was hard to see clearly

because it crossed all national frontiers and took different forms in different countries. It was hard to understand because it became hopelessly entangled with the war of survival. Moreover, the war of survival made strange bedfellows, ranging dictatorships along with democracies and democracies with dictatorships.

Once military victory in a war of survival becomes a nation's sole aim, military expediency dictates objectives and procedures. Thus we found ourselves for a time in alliance with the traitorous Vichy dictatorship against the people of France. We found ourselves later supporting Marshal Badoglio and King Victor Emmanuel against the Italian people. We found ourselves buying Spanish so-called neutrality by supplying Francisco Franco with the means of continuing to oppress the Spanish people. These were all policies determined by the sometimes abused argument of military expediency to save lives and to hasten victory in the war of survival. Some of them did, for the moment perhaps, hasten victory and save lives. But they left a heritage of confusion which later brought victory without peace—a confusion out of which there began immediately to loom the threat of another and more terrible war.

Our own dim vision of what was actually happening in the world was further obscured by the fact that our closest ally, Great Britain, was fighting a different kind of war of survival. Survival meant to us literally keeping our rather remote hemisphere free from invasion or penetration. But for Churchill's Britain, survival meant preserving the far-flung British Commonwealth and Empire. It meant not only preserving the British Isles, the Dominions, India, and the Empire from invasion or penetration; it meant also safeguarding the long lines of communications which held the Empire together. Thus the British alliance ranged us for a time with an already outworn and dying British colonialism—as well as Dutch and French colonialism—and muddled our entire position toward the peoples of the East. Even more important, it brought our strategy in Europe under strong British Tory influence.

It is no secret that Winston Churchill would have vastly preferred to carry the war to Germany via what he called "the soft underbelly of the Axis" rather than by a cross-Channel invasion of France. This was not merely because Churchill considered a drive through the Balkans the most effective road to Berlin. It was because Empire strategy demanded that Britain fight Germany with one eye on Russia—fight Germany in such a way as to prevent at the same time a Russian break-out into the eastern Mediterranean basin and the "life-line" to the Middle East. Much the same reasons prompted Churchill's angry protest against General Eisenhower's decision in the last days of the German war to swing south and cut up the remaining German armies, instead of driving on to Berlin before the Red Army could reach that coveted goal.

In both cases Churchill was overruled by President Roosevelt and the United States High Command—but not without leaving his mark upon the sum total of Anglo-American strategy.

Finally, our vision of what the war was about was beclouded by the enigma of our other great ally, the Soviet Union. So long as the war was on, the ultimate position of Russia troubled us far less than it troubled Britain. We did not pretend to understand Russia. Until a few months before Pearl Harbor, she had appeared to have cast her lot against the civilized world in a gangster alliance with Nazi Germany. Then suddenly she had become the most powerful stumbling block in Adolf Hitler's path. Once Pearl Harbor came, the only thing that seemed to matter was that the Red Army miraculously continued to kill Germans. For most Americans, the only worry about Russia was that she might be defeated or make a separate peace.

As the war against Germany drew toward a clearly foreseeable victory, our military and naval leaders began to think in terms of getting Russian help against Japan. President Roosevelt, misled by faulty intelligence, almost certainly had no idea at the time of the Yalta Conference in February 1945 how close Japan was to the end of its rope. He had been told by our High Command that the invasion of Honshu would cost 500,000 American casualties. In order to save lives and shorten the war, he paid what now seems an exorbitant price for the promise of Russian assistance. This price was the scrapping of much of our moral position in the war through the abandonment of some of the basic principles of a just peace to which we had pledged ourselves in the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration. In order to assure ourselves of Soviet intervention in the Far East, we tore up the pledges against annexation and against "territorial changes that do not conform to the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned." We went in for connivance in an old-fashioned victor's peace with its spoils of conquest, spheres of influence, and power politics. Our military leaders were well satisfied with the Yalta deal. But that was where much of our later trouble began, both in Europe and in Asia. It is only fair to add, however, that the Russians had the physical power in the Far East and in Eastern Europe to take pretty much what they wanted, with or without an agreement, and that Yalta did set certain limits to their expansion.

President Roosevelt was not happy with Yalta. What he might have done to recapture some of the moral ground lost—had he lived—will forever remain a matter of conjecture. What happened after his death is a matter of history.

Germany surrendered May 8, 1945. On July 17, 1945, President Truman met Generalissimo Stalin at Potsdam. By this time, the Japanese fleet had been destroyed, the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa captured, and the Japanese Home Islands isolated. Stalin informed Truman that he had, sometime previous to their meeting, received a request from Japan to negotiate for peace on its behalf. On July 26, the Big Three issued a formal proclamation, advising Japan of the terms upon which she might surrender.

It was clear that Soviet help against Japan, so urgently required and so dearly purchased six months earlier, was now scarcely needed. But the bargain had been made. President Truman sealed it on August 2, when he signed the Potsdam Agreement.

Four days later, the first atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima. On August 8, the Soviet Union declared war upon Japan, and six days afterwards, Japan surrendered.

Mr. Byrnes has reported that during the Potsdam Conference President Truman told Premier Stalin about the atomic bomb. Opinions vary as to whether he did this in such a manner as to convey the full significance of the disclosure. The fact is, however, that the two bombs were dropped in circumstances which could suggest that at least part of the purpose was to bring about surrender before Russia could rightfully claim any part in the victory. It was almost as if we said: "All right, we have been had. We've made a bad bargain, and we'll stick to it. But by all that's holy, we will let the world know that we have been cheated."

This, of course, did not regain any of the moral ground lost nor improve our relations with the Soviet Union. Any bargain which, though made in good faith, turns out to have been based on false assumptions, produces resentment and a sense of guilt on both sides. Any action taken by either side out of resentment only deepens the sense of guilt of the other and widens the cleavage.

Shortly after V-J Day, we had a rude awakening. We woke up to find that we had won the war of survival, but that we were still up to our necks in a world revolution. And we still did not understand the revolution. We half expected that people throughout the world would so admire our tremendous industrial and military contribution to victory that they would say: "Yes, sir! The Americans have the system. Let's remodel ourselves in the American image."

But gradually we came to realize that nothing of the sort was happening. People didn't seem in the least interested in adopting our system of free-enterprise democracy. Most of them couldn't afford it—couldn't even afford to think about it. They were too busy wondering where they would get tomorrow's breakfast, or a pair of shoes, or a few lumps of coal. Throughout Western Europe and even in the British Isles, people were turning to the instruments of public power—to the agencies of government—to solve their hopelessly tangled problems. The whole concept of a society based upon property rights and individual profit-seeking initiative seemed to be crumbling before the mass onslaught of elemental human needs.

Much to our surprise, we saw Western Europe moving into socialism—a socialism determined to preserve political freedom in the Western sense, but ready in the economic sphere to accept the bankruptcy of free-enterprise capitalism. This brought us squarely up against the question:

Would a socialist or semi-socialist Europe become a threat to the continued existence of a free-enterprise system in our own country? And if so, would we wish to use our great economic resources to arrest the manifest trend? And finally, could we, even with our great resources, arrest it if we so desired?

These questions posed by the social-economic revolution became confused in our minds by another and more pressing problem arising immediately after V-J Day. This was the problem of mounting tension between Russia and the United States. Once the United Nations machinery had been erected, there was a widespread feeling that the definite means for the maintenance of peace had been found. No sooner had the war ended than we discovered that peace had to be made before it could be maintained, and that peace had not been made by the mere cessation of hostilities.

The drafting of the peace treaties had been entrusted to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the so-called Big Five. During his incumbency as Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes devoted most of his time and energy to this task. At the very first meeting of the Council, in September 1945, it became apparent that there existed between the Soviet Union and the West not only wide differences of opinion and purpose but also wide disagreement as to the precise meaning of the understandings reached at Yalta and Potsdam. Instead of attempting to reconcile these differences in an over-all understanding, the Foreign Ministers adopted a curious course. They proceeded to avoid the central over-all problems and to deal with those less important matters upon which agreement seemed easiest to attain. Thus, they spent over a year working out the peace treaties for Italy, Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, without ever coming to grips with the problems of Germany and Austria. This method of working from the periphery toward the center had a number of unfortunate consequences.

The first result was the rapid deterioration of the whole European economy. This was due largely to the complete failure of the Potsdam plan for the quadripartite government of Germany and the continued shelving of that pressing problem while the satellite treaties were being negotiated. As a consequence, Germany—once the economic hub of a prosperous continent—became an economic plague center, and recovery throughout Europe was delayed and impeded. This in turn affected Africa, Asia, and even the Western Hemisphere.

The second result—closely related to the first—was that political unrest throughout Europe was increased by the protraction of human suffering and discontent.

And finally, the failure to come to grips with the central over-all problem of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationships caused those relationships themselves to deteriorate and to make any solution of any problem anywhere in the world increasingly difficult. To cite just one example: the stalemate in Korea and the division of that unhappy country into two watertight compartments, against the will of the Korean people and against every precept of economics or common sense, came about as the direct result of unresolved U.S.-U.S.S.R. tensions.

It was not until December 1946 that the Council of Foreign Ministers finally finished the satellite treaties and turned its attention to the central problem of making the peace. Even then, it did no more than draft an agenda for a meeting to be held at Moscow in March 1947.

The situation in the Far East was equally discouraging. Indonesia and Indo-China seethed with revolt. The new British Labor Government was struggling with the thorny problems of granting independence to

Burma, Ceylon, and a divided India. Recovery throughout the Asiatic continent was delayed and impeded by every kind of shortage, especially of shipping and consumer goods formerly supplied by Japan. Questions were being raised about our highly press-agented "success" in managing the Japanese occupation. An apparently hopeless stalemate in Korea deprived the Asiatics of a normal exportable surplus of food. The industries of Manchuria were either working for the Soviet Union or not working at all. China was ravaged by civil war and a runaway inflation. In a report published only a few days before he became Secretary of State, General Marshall himself had set forth with admirable clarity the complete failure of our own efforts, first to support the Central Government of Chiang Kai-shek and later to bring about a peaceful settlement between it and the Chinese Communists.

These are the broad outlines of the picture which Mr. Marshall inherited when he stepped into the former Chiefs of Staff Building, recently remodeled as the new Department of State.

The era of drifting and peripheral horse-trading had ended. The time had come for meeting the central issues of the peace settlement.

2. BACKGROUND OF U.S.-U.S.S.R. RELATIONS

Since so much of the problem inherited by Mr. Marshall was that of straightening out the tangle of misunderstanding between ourselves and the Soviet Union, it may be useful to recall a few high-spots of relevant recent history.

The Soviet Union has existed for less than a generation. It came into being as the result of a revolution which took Russia out of World War I, thereby making it more difficult for the Western Allies to achieve victory over Germany and Austria. Quite naturally, this aroused Western hostility. Furthermore, the Soviet Union came into existence as the result of a successful conspiracy against the most reactionary and oppressive form of that type of so-called capitalistic society which had emerged in varying forms and degrees out of medieval European feudalism. Although Czarist Russia had been a backward and none too popular member of the Western family of nations, it *had* been a member of the family. The Kerensky Revolution might have made Russia a more popular member of the family. But the Kerensky Government's overthrow by violence in favor of extreme Bolshevism aroused widespread anxiety and resentment. The Bolshevik Revolution appeared as a threat not only to established law and order, but to the whole ethical and religious structure of Western society. It directly challenged the economic foundations upon which that society rested. Thus, the Soviet Union acquired at birth the determined hostility of the Western world. It was hated because it had left the Allies in the lurch. It was feared because its doctrine of world revolution threatened the Western world's basic structure of belief and behavior.

It is, therefore, not surprising that British, French, Japanese, and United States armed forces should have been employed in an unsuccessful attempt to aid the overthrow of the early Bolshevik regime. Nor that diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union should have been long withheld and at length grudgingly given. Nor is it surprising that Western enmity should have added fuel to the flames of communist hostility already nourished by the Marx-Lenin doctrine that communism and capitalism could not peacefully coexist in the same world.

A second factor worth bearing in mind is that Russia as a *nation* suffered the loss of important territory—in East Asia as the result of the Russo-Japanese War, and in Europe as the result of World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution. In the Far East, Russia had in 1905 lost control over Manchuria and Korea, and had ceded certain island territory to Japan. When the Soviet Union was born in 1918, Russia was again considerably reduced in size by the loss of Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, and parts of Rumania. Thus, the new Soviet state fell heir to a Russian nationalist revisionism quite similar to the revisionist sentiment in France after it had lost Alsace-Lorraine.

These were some of the early ingredients of trouble between the Soviet Union and the West.

During the first fifteen years of the Soviet's existence, the tension slowly decreased. President Roosevelt's recognition in 1933 probably marked the high point of this favorable development. But with the advent of Hitler, with Italian aggression against Ethiopia, and with the Spanish Civil War, a new deterioration of relations set in. From 1935 to 1938, Western diplomacy stultified itself by increasing appeasement of fascist aggression, while Soviet diplomacy, on the whole, stood firmly for collective security and resistance to fascism. An essential part of the Western policy of appeasement was the attempt to turn Nazi aggression eastward against the Soviet Union. The betrayal of Czechoslovakia by the West brought this period to its climax.

To admit these facts of history is not to overlook or condone the subversive revolutionary activities carried on throughout the world by the Comintern, nor, above all, the cynical pact made by the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany in 1939. These were Moscow's own contributions toward a state of mutual distrust and suspicion which continued in submerged form even after Nazi Germany turned upon the Soviet Union. During the period of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet Union did very well for itself in satisfying Russian nationalist sentiment. It reacquired a large part of Poland, the three Baltic states, a slice of Rumania, and several important pieces of Finland. Captured Nazi documents show that German fear of Russian territorial ambitions had much to do with Hitler's decision to fight a two-front war.

Be that as it may, once Russia was attacked, the latent antagonisms between the Nazi-forged anti-Nazi Coalition were obscured, only to reappear once the war of survival had been won. The wartime policies of military expediency, the dubious premises upon which the Yalta deal was made, and the lack of precision in the understandings reached during the war reawakened mutual suspicion and hostility.

An added factor making for strain in U.S.-U.S.S.R. postwar relations was the greatly changed balance of world power. Germany, Japan, and Italy had been eliminated. China was in the throes of a civil war and the beginnings of runaway inflation. France had lost much of its power and prestige. Great Britain was impoverished and faced a drastic reorganization of its Empire.

The Soviet Union itself came out of the war with greatly increased prestige; but it had suffered huge losses of manpower and the almost total devastation of most of its western territories.

Only the United States had emerged from the struggle stronger than ever before. Our lands and cities were unravaged. Our manpower and productive capacity had increased enormously while the resources of most other nations had been seriously impaired. We were far ahead of other nations in the development of air-power. Our Navy was more powerful than all the combined fleets of the world. We were the sole possessors of the atomic bomb. While most of the other peoples of the earth were scrabbling for the bare necessities of life, our people had jobs, food, clothes, money, and things to buy with money. It soon became clear that we alone possessed the resources to get the world economy off dead center and started toward recovery.

The United Nations structure for the maintenance of peace had been erected upon the assumption of "great-power co-operation," with Great Britain, France, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States recognized as the five great powers. Actually, there were, for the moment, only two great powers. Actually, the peace of the world was confided into the hands of Washington and Moscow.

In the first few months of peace, no one seemed less aware of the power and responsibility which had devolved upon the United States than the people of the United States and their Government.

The immediate postwar policy of the Soviet Union was one of nationalistic expansion combined with revolutionary penetration. Both were designed to take the fullest possible advantage of the wartime agreements.

Throughout the Continent of Europe, and especially in those countries which had been occupied by the enemy, the Communist Parties had gained enormously in prestige and influence. In part this was due to the reflected glory of the Red Army; but in large measure it was because, throughout occupied Europe, communists had been the spearhead of the resistance and its most disciplined element. Just as Russia's temporary alliance with Nazi Germany was for a time obliterated by the superb performance of the Red Army against the Hitlerites, so the Communist Parties of Europe redeemed earlier sabotage of the war effort by their later courageous and effective contribution. In addition, the collapse of the European middle class, the absence of any clear-cut pro-democratic war policy on the part of Britain and America, plus the various Allied compromises of expediency, made it all the easier for communism to become the symbol of liberation for a large part of the European population. Thus, the tools for a Soviet policy of expansion and penetration were ready to hand.

At Potsdam, the Soviet Union obtained agreement for the annexation of the northern half of East Prussia and made final its reacquisition of eastern Poland. The Finnish peace treaty gave Russia Petsamo in the north of Finland and Karelian territory in the south. The Rumanian treaty returned Bessarabia to the Soviet Union and ceded North Bukovina, which had never been Russian. Revolutionary pressures were exerted in Rumania, Poland, and throughout the Balkans.

In 1946, an attempt at nationalistic expansion into Iran was blocked by prompt appeal to the United Nations. But the Western powers were able to do little more than protest against the continuing campaigns of penetration in the various Central European and Balkan countries. The protests lost much of their force because they were based upon the interpretation of a more or less meaningless promise of "free elections" obtained from Stalin at Yalta. What were "free elections" in a country like Rumania, where no such elections had ever been held? What, for that matter, was "freedom"? What was "democracy"? The Big Three had used these words in their wartime agreements, but the Big Three had left them undefined.

The same sort of trouble developed in the Security Council and in the United Nations Assembly. The United States put forward a proposal for international control of atomic energy. The Soviet Union countered with a proposal for international disarmament. Both were lost in the confusion of a debate which had little to do with the merits of either proposition. More and more, the United Nations became merely a forum for recrimination—a healthy safety valve, to be sure, but not a functioning, constructive force.

The more Western policy became obsessed with the necessity of containing Soviet expansion, the more negative became its effect, and the greater became the vacuum into which Soviet pressure could penetrate.

On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill made his famous speech at Fulton, Missouri, with President Truman sitting by his side and apparently beaming approval. Shorn of its characteristic embellishments, the speech amounted to this: The world is divided into capitalist and communist blocs. To check the expansion of the communist bloc, the English-speaking peoples—a sort of latter-day "master race"—must sooner or later form a union. They should immediately contract a military alliance and co-ordinate their military establishments. They must (shades of the man with the little mustache!) lead "Christian civilization" in an anti-communistic crusade. They must hold on to the secret of the atomic bomb. Only thus, said Mr. Churchill, could a probable war be averted, because the Soviet Union respects strength and would probably come to terms with a powerful and determined Anglo-American alliance. What Churchill was really saying was that the United States must underwrite the British Empire—at the very moment when Britain itself had repudiated Mr. Churchill's old-fashioned imperialism.

This speech was immediately disavowed by the British Labor Government. It was widely criticized here and abroad. There was considerable speculation as to whether, by his apparent sponsorship, the President

had meant to convey his agreement or approval. Any such intention was denied, but the curious circumstances under which the speech had been made remained a part of history. A year later the impact of Mr. Churchill's philosophy upon the Truman Administration was to become manifest. At the time, it was considered an unfortunately disturbing factor in the Administration's then current effort to obtain Congressional approval for the British loan.

Toward the end of 1946, a long-germinating precarious situation began to come to a head at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Sensing that the British might not much longer be able to maintain their somewhat dubious position in Greece and that we were not prepared to take it over, the Kremlin renewed the ancient Russian pressures upon Turkey for concessions in the control of the Dardanelles, and upon Greece, via convenient Bulgarian and Yugoslav demands for frontier revisions. This brought from us a naval demonstration in the eastern Mediterranean and the beginnings of a policy which was soon to develop into the so-called Truman Doctrine.

It was at this point that General Marshall stepped upon the scene.

The fact that Mr. Truman was, at this time, still trying to think primarily in terms of reconciliation rather than in terms of what was soon to be called a "cold war" emerges from the following passage in his message on the State of the Union, delivered on January 7, 1947:

> The delay in arriving at the first peace settlements is due partly to the difficulty of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on the terms of settlement. Whatever differences there may have been between us and the Soviet Union, however, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the basic interests of both nations lie in the early making of a peace under which the peoples of all countries may return, as free men and women, to the essential tasks of production and reconstruction. The major concern of each of us should be the promotion of collective security, not the advancement of individual security.
>
> Our policy toward the Soviet Union is guided by the same principles which will determine our policies toward all nations. We seek only to uphold the principles of international justice which have been embodied in the charter of the United Nations.
>
> We must now get on with the peace settlements. . . .

3. BIPARTISANISM

It remains now to mention one other legacy of doubtful value to which the new Secretary of State fell heir. This was the concept of what had come to be called a bipartisan foreign policy. The practice had originated in the successful efforts made by Secretary Hull and the then Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to work closely with a small group of legislative leaders in the formulation of wartime foreign policy. Out of this informal effort, there developed a close working relationship, especially with three Senators—Connally (D) of Texas, Austin (R) of Vermont, and Vandenberg (R) of Michigan. Senator Connally was, at the time, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Vandenberg became its senior Republican member, after Austin resigned to become United States delegate to the United Nations. During the wartime election campaign of 1944, Governor Dewey delegated his adviser, John Foster Dulles, to consult with the Roosevelt Administration on foreign affairs in order to prevent foreign policy from becoming a campaign issue. This was when the term "bipartisan foreign policy" became current. Later, President Roosevelt appointed a bipartisan committee to represent the United States at the San Francisco Conference.

Under the Truman Administration, the practice was continued and amplified. Senator Austin and Mr. Dulles played a leading part in the United Nations. Senators Connally and Vandenberg accompanied Mr. Byrnes to most of the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers. They continued to serve, with their respective majority and minority roles reversed, after the Republicans gained control of Congress in the election of 1946. From this point on, until Mr. Byrnes' resignation, two Republicans—Senator Vandenberg and Mr. Dulles—exercised an influence upon the making of foreign policy almost as great as that of the Secretary of State.

The virtue of this arrangement—especially in wartime, or when a President has lost control of Congress—is clear. It makes for smoother co-operation. Its defect is also clear. It leads to compromise rather than decision—to halfway measures and a fluctuating course rather than to the firm pursuit of clearly defined aims.

During most of his thirteen years in the White House, President Roosevelt acted as his own Secretary of State. It was he who made important policy decisions, who took action, who explained his decisions and actions to the people of the United States and often to the people of the world. To say this is not to belittle the services rendered by Secretary Hull, for it was Hull who often supplied the tenacity with which Roosevelt's ideas were carried through in the weary grind of daily routine operations. Nor does the statement that President Roosevelt provided the strategy of foreign policy detract from the merit of such men as Sumner Welles, Edward Stettinius, and especially Dean Acheson, who reduced ideas to practical programs and carried the burden of getting Congressional support for their adoption.

The fact remains that from 1933 to 1945 our Ship of State was commanded and navigated by one of those natural helmsmen, whose genius consists not so much in the knowledge of charts and tide-tables as in the ability to sense a shift in the wind or smell the presence of unseen and uncharted shoals.

From Franklin D. Roosevelt's death in April 1945 to the end of 1946, President Truman endeavored less to shape United States foreign policy than conscientiously to hold it to the course laid by his predecessor. This proved to be difficult, partly because the international scene shifted rapidly and partly because Mr. Roosevelt's course of action had been very largely a series of improvisations to meet circumstances as they arose.

After the San Francisco Conference, at which the United Nations came into being, President Truman appointed James F. Byrnes as his Secretary of State. In making this move, it may or may not have been the President's intention to re-establish a greater degree of

independence for the Secretary of State. The fact is that Mr. Byrnes did become a more independent originator of policy than either Mr. Hull or Mr. Stettinius. He did not, however, change the traditional method of proceeding by instinct, negotiation, and improvisation rather than according to any predetermined plan. Moreover, Secretary Byrnes developed the habit of carrying the State Department around the world in his brief case, from one international conference to another, frequently leaving his associates in Washington in the dark as to developments of which they learned only through the press.

The appointment of General Marshall as Secretary of State was clearly an effort on the part of the President to effect a change—not so much from one policy to another, as from a method of making policy day by day "on the cables," as dictated by events, to a method of meeting events in accordance with a preconceived plan of action.

The military mind is accustomed to orderly procedure. First, certain broad aims must be established. Second, immediate objectives or concrete steppingstones along the way toward these aims must be selected. And finally, procedures toward the accomplishment of the immediate objectives must be worked out and put into effect. Thus, a consistent planned course of action is evolved. The same principles can be applied to the planning of peacetime foreign policy.

Once broad aims are clarified, it becomes necessary to assess realistically the extent and limits of the effective power available for their realization. Failure to base plans upon an accurate estimate of the contending forces invites disaster. As Chief of Staff, General Marshall had shown himself a past master at realistic appraisal. As Secretary of State, he now faced the infinitely more difficult problem of evaluating conflicting forces in a field where force is not measured merely in terms of production, transportation, and fire-power, but also in terms of food, fuel, and shelter and, above all, in terms of ideas and conflicting human aspirations.

CHAPTER TWO

Military Posture

As might be expected, the new Secretary of State devoted most of his first month in office to a necessary reorganization of the top echelons in the Department and to obtaining for himself a thorough briefing for the forthcoming Moscow Conference. One of his first acts was to invite Mr. John Foster Dulles to accompany him on this mission.

On February 10, Mr. Dulles made a speech in Chicago which varied considerably in spirit from President Truman's conciliatory State of the Union message. Mr. Dulles warned that any attempt to "appease" the Soviet Union might bring dire consequences—possibly another war. "There is risk that we may provoke war," he said, "by a retreat which would cause Soviet leaders to push on recklessly. The greatest danger of war is from Soviet miscalculations." In another passage he said: "I believe that Soviet dynamism will keep within tolerable bounds; but that will be because it encounters strength rather than mushiness. . . . Peace lies not in compromising but in invigorating our historic policies."

At about this time we had been indulging in a little expansive dynamism of our own, demanding sole trusteeship and the right to exclude others from the former Japanese Mandated Islands in the Pacific. Many people abroad, and in this country as well, felt that, by making such a demand, we were undermining the principle of international trusteeship which we ourselves had sponsored. It was almost a foregone conclusion that the Russians would object and raise their favorite cry of "American imperialism." Surprisingly enough—and almost as if to prove Mr. Dulles' contention—the Soviet Union backed our demand wholeheartedly on the ground that we were entitled to this reward for our greater sacrifices in the Pacific war. Actually, the incident showed—although it was not so interpreted—that there was at least one cynical arrangement by which we should have no trouble whatsoever in getting along with the Soviet Union; namely, a basis of "You let me do as I like in my back yard, and I'll let you do as you like in yours." This, however, was something quite different from containing Russia by inducing a respect for what Mr. Dulles called our "invigorated historic policies."

Before Mr. Marshall left for Moscow, he let it become known that he considered the growing economic crisis in Greece a very serious matter and one with which we would have to deal in some manner to be determined by the President. The British had by this time definitely stated that they could not continue their support of the Greeks beyond March 31. This was about all the public knew of the impending bombshell.

1. THE BAYLOR SPEECH

President Truman's now famous message to Congress enunciating what has since been called the Truman Doctrine was delivered on March 12. Six days earlier, the President had made an important but little-noted speech at Baylor University on the subject of foreign economic policy. (For full text see Appendix, page 46.) His main theme on this occasion was that our abandonment of political isolationism meant also the abandonment of economic isolationism. "We are," he said, "the giant of the economic world. Whether we like it or not, the future pattern of economic relations depends upon us. The world is waiting and watching to see what we shall do." The President then discussed the need for

freeing world trade from artificial barriers and restrictions and spoke hopefully of the new International Trade Organization, whose Preparatory Commission was soon to meet at Geneva, Switzerland.

Having asserted that the future pattern of world economic relations rested in our hands, the President then proceeded to outline what he thought that pattern should be. The relevent paragraphs warrant careful study. Briefly, what the President said was this: Political freedom is bound up with freedom of individual enterprise; that pattern of international trade which promotes individual enterprise and leaves the direction of the international movement of goods and services to private individual initiative is the pattern which leads to peace; that pattern of international trade in which governments direct or control the flow of goods and services between nations is the pattern which leads to war. Therefore, we, the economic giant, are going to use our power to set a world pattern of free-enterprise capitalism.

Mr. Truman was not merely reaffirming the American belief in the American system as the best system for America. He made it quite clear that he believed that the whole world should adopt the American system, first, because it was the best system and, second, because the American system could survive in America only if it became the world system. This was an unequivocal challenge not merely to those governments or peoples who believed in the Marxist doctrine but also to the far greater number of nations which had come either to believe in or to accept as necessary some form of national economic planning and some degree of government control over their respective economies. The challenge —though little noticed or understood at the time in this country—was very much noted abroad and formed an important part of the background against which the Truman Doctrine of March 12 was interpreted.

2. THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

The March 12 message is too important to paraphrase. It should be read carefully by any student of this period in our history. (See Appendix, page 47.) The President asked Congress for $400,000,000 to be spent in assisting Greece and Turkey to "maintain their national integrity." He described both countries as being in great danger unless they were given immediate aid to bolster their economies and their military establishments. In addition to funds, the President asked Congress "to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey" and to provide "for the instruction and training of Greek and Turkish personnel." This was the concrete proposal. The President said that he was "fully aware of the broad implications involved" and proceeded to speak of them at length. The following passage is quoted verbatim:

> One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.
>
> To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free people to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.
>
> The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.
>
> At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.
>
> One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guaranties of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and freedom from political oppression.
>
> The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections and the suppression of personal freedoms.
>
> I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

The President ended his message with these words:

> This is a serious course upon which we embark.
>
> I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious.
>
> The United States contributed $341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace.
>
> The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than one-tenth of 1 per cent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.
>
> The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died.
>
> We must keep that hope alive.
>
> The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.
>
> If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.
>
> Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.
>
> I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

The March 12 message seemed to me at the time—and still seems—an ill-considered, unwise, and ambiguous document—a document calculated to arouse fear and aggressive hatreds rather than one designed first to inform the Congress and the people and then to persuade them to adopt a course determined by reason and understanding.

First of all the Truman Doctrine was the lineal descendant of our policy of expediency toward Franco, Pétain, Badoglio and King George of Greece. The proposal involved an undertaking on our part to determine wherever and whenever in the world any "free" people might be in danger of having a totalitarian regime forced upon it by "the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority." The President mentioned Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria as recent examples of where this had happened, and Greece and Turkey as examples of where it would happen unless we intervened.

But what about Spain, Portugal, and Argentina? Was Franco less a dictator than Tito? Was Perón's Argentine Government less totalitarian than the newly installed Government of Poland? Was the President talking about *all* totalitarian regimes, or only about a certain variety of totalitarian regime imposed by a certain kind of minority? Was this a call to arms in defense of all human freedom against all forms of tyranny? Or was it merely a call to arms against communist tyranny imposed by minorities which we considered to be inspired or supported by the Soviet Union? If the President meant to announce a Churchillian policy of restoration or of stopping Soviet expansion, and only that, why did he not say so?

Second, if we were to commit ourselves to a policy of stopping Soviet expansion, why pretend that we were acting in Greece and Turkey to help suffering peoples, or to preserve the freedom of peoples whose freedom was threatened? The Greeks had suffered no more than the people of Spain; nor would we ease their suffering by bolstering up the rickety, corrupt, and anti-democratic Government which was largely responsible for their troubles. And, if we were concerned about freedom, the people of Turkey had never in their history been a free people. They had been living, quite prosperously, under a slightly streamlined dictatorship which had skillfully played both ends against the middle. When the chips were down in the war of survival, the Turks sat back and sold their chromium to the Nazis or to us—whichever would bid the highest price. Whom were we trying to deceive with fine moral phrases? The world? The Russians? Or ourselves?

Third, if the President meant that we were to embark upon stopping Soviet expansion, just what did this mean?

Did it mean that we were out to stop the spread of the communist ideology in all parts of the world by supporting anyone who opposed it? Did it mean once more reversing our policy in China and again throwing our weight behind forces which we ourselves had just characterized as corrupt and reactionary?

Or did it mean merely that we intended to stop the Soviet Union from setting up so-called friendly governments—communist or non-communist—around its borders? And, if we meant the latter, did we mean merely to stop the creation of *more* such friendly governments, or also to challenge the existence of those already created?

These were questions which the Congress and the people had a right to ask and have answered. Obviously, the President was not talking about just $400,000,000. He was talking about the first step in a program which would cost billions of dollars—and perhaps millions of lives. If so, the people had a right to know just what that program might be.

And finally, what about power? What about the relation of our effective power to our aim? Were we to tackle this thing alone or with help? And, if with help, whose help? And at what price?

If we proposed to take on the job of stopping Soviet expansion—not through the United Nations but by ourselves—upon whom could we count in the event of a showdown? Upon France, where the communists had recently polled a plurality? Upon a Britain which had repudiated Churchill and was now in the throes of an economic crisis which had helped to precipitate our political crisis? Upon China, torn by a civil war?

The President declared the situation to be so urgent that we dared not wait for the United Nations to handle it. Yet the United Nations had managed to handle the Soviet threat to Iran, compelling the withdrawal of Soviet troops which were actually in that country. What was so urgent that we must act alone, without consultation, without knowing how far our first step would take us, and in such a way as to undermine the very structure of peace which we had been struggling to erect? Were there any facts we did not know? If so, we had a right to know them. . . .

These were some of the questions which seemed to me appropriate at the time. Many of them were subsequently asked in Congress. Few of them were answered. Senator Vandenberg came to the rescue of the Administration with an amendment which at least made our action in Greece and Turkey subject to United Nations disapproval. With this and certain other limitations and safeguards, Congress approved the grant of $400,000,000. But the debate clearly showed that the final overwhelming vote in favor of the specific authority by no means constituted an acceptance of the over-all Truman Doctrine. Actually, the nation-wide debate and the action of Congress indicated both a widespread disapproval of the Truman Doctrine and a reluctant recognition that a public disavowal of the Chief Executive might, at that moment, have fatal consequences. Thus, while approving limited aid to Greece and Turkey, Congress and the people made it plain that they were reluctant to embark upon a world-wide crusade against communism, or to undertake single-handed a geopolitical struggle against the Soviet Union. They rejected the idea that, in disregard of the United Nations, this country should appoint itself the world's judge and the world's policeman.

Unfortunately, the President's original proposal not only confused the minds of most Americans and of many people abroad; it also opened a Pandora's box of ugly emotions. Here at home it won loud acclaim from the extreme Russia-haters, red-baiters, and reactionaries of all sorts, while evoking protest from a strange mixture of idealistic progressives and cynical, irreconcilable isolationists. Worst of all, it alienated the great majority of middle-of-the-road Americans, whose common sense warned them against hasty abandonment of the United

Nations and of the hope of reconciling our differences with the Soviet Union.

Abroad, the result was much the same. The Soviet Union and its followers in various countries interpreted the Truman Doctrine as a declaration of ideological war. The ultra-conservative, anti-democratic elements in the various countries rejoiced and climbed on our band-wagon. The great mass of patient, suffering peoples shuddered with fear as they felt pushed nearer and nearer to a forced choice between what appeared to them as the rival imperialisms of East and West.

Whatever our next move might be, it would take time to undo the damage which had been done.

One may wonder how this strange and ill-advised pronouncement ever came to be uttered. Apparently, it came about as follows:

The State Department had for some time been receiving alarming reports from the Greek Government and from its own observers on the spot. The British had for months been telling us that they could not afford to continue pouring money into the maintenance of their position in the eastern Mediterranean. The President and Secretary Marshall had become convinced that, if the Moscow Conference on Germany was to succeed, the Russians would have to be given some sort of concrete evidence that their days of pushing against what Mr. Dulles had called "mushiness" were over. General Marshall felt that such evidence could best be given by assuming what he is reported to have described as a "military posture."

The problem was laid before a small group of Congressional leaders by the President and his advisers, with a proposal that the United States take over the British position in Greece and Turkey. After listening to the story, Senator Vandenberg is reported to have said: "All right, Mr. President, if that's what you want, there's only one way you can get it. That is to make a personal appearance before Congress and scare the hell out of the country."

The attribution and the quotation may be inaccurate, but it is reasonably certain that this is about what actually took place. The message of March 12 was deliberately drawn to "scare the hell out of the country," in order to obtain the desired Congressional action.

Economic aid to Greece, and perhaps even to Turkey, might have been constructive, if presented in an entirely different context of planned reconstruction. Because of the military, political, and ideological context in which the proposal for economic aid was presented, the Truman Doctrine brought the precariously balanced structure of peace to its moment of greatest jeopardy.

From the point of view of the Kremlin, the Baylor speech and the March 12 message, taken together, could hardly be understood as anything less than a deliberate challenge. The timing was such as to produce the worst possible effect. When the President delivered his message to Congress, the Moscow Conference had barely begun and Secretary Marshall had only just met his colleagues in the Council of Foreign Ministers. Since the debate over the Truman proposal lasted well into May, the impact upon the Moscow Conference was chiefly that of the original unmodified Truman proposal.

The result was less a demonstration of "military posture" than one of highly emotional confusion. The world could not help but wonder whether or not Winston Churchill, rather than Harry S Truman, had succeeded President Roosevelt as the architect of United States foreign policy.

While the debate raged in Washington Mr. Marshall proceeded calmly with the agenda of the Moscow Conference as if nothing had occurred to change the context in which the discussion of the German and Austrian peace treaties was to take place.

CHAPTER THREE

Britain and the United States

BEFORE WE PROCEED to examine the German problem and the Moscow Conference of March-April 1947, it may be useful to consider briefly the state of Anglo-American relations at that time, since these bear significantly upon the further development of our own foreign policy.

The Churchill influence upon our wartime and immediate postwar policy has already been noted. It is important to understand as well the later impact of the British Labor victory, and also the reverse—namely, our own influence upon the early policy of the Labor Government.

The British overturn of August 1945 had an unsettling influence not only upon the British representation at the then current Potsdam Conference but also upon the new and untried American negotiators. This may well have had something to do with the tragic mistakes made at Potsdam, which we shall discuss presently. A more lasting consequence of the Labor victory was the aggravation of American apprehensions concerning the world-wide trend toward socialism. These apprehensions became manifest in the early months of 1946, when the British Government applied for an American loan. They were responsible in part for the niggardly attitude of the American negotiators and for the inclusion of conditions which were later to become troublesome.

While fear of "helping a socialist government" adversely influenced American conservatives, American liberal opinion was alienated by other factors. The new Labor Government had not yet broken clearly with the foreign policy of its predecessor. The decision to free India, Burma, and Ceylon had not yet been taken, nor

had British troops been evacuated from Egypt. The problem of Palestine was acute, and here in America there had been some sharp criticism of British restrictions of Jewish immigration. These criticisms were deeply resented by Mr. Bevin and many of his associates. It was felt in Britain that the agitation of American Jews was partly responsible for the critical situation in Palestine and that the United States had no right to criticize unless it was willing to accept a share of the responsibility for finding a solution.

In this none-too-happy atmosphere, negotiations were undertaken for a loan to tide Britain over her period of reconversion. Matters were not helped by Mr. Churchill's coming to this country at just that time to put forward the idea of an Anglo-American alliance against the Soviet Union.

The economic facts confronting the two Governments were very simple. The prewar United Kingdom had been a wealthy nation. It had paid for its large imports of food, raw materials, and foreign goods partly out of its own exports, partly out of shipping and other services, and partly out of the interest and dividends it received from its very substantial foreign investments. When the war came, Britain had to spend its capital in order to survive until American Lend-Lease aid could be mobilized. In other words, the British Government had to take over the foreign investments of its nationals and sell them abroad to pay for planes and tanks and guns, as well as food and raw materials. From that moment, Britain's whole status changed. From that moment, the United Kingdom had no appreciable income from capital and would have to pay for its imports by what it could currently produce and sell to other nations.

The realization of this completely changed status and of its consequences was delayed and obscured by the operation of Lend-Lease during the next four and a half years.

Almost immediately after V-J Day, President Truman summarily shut off Lend-Lease—without any consultation with our former allies and without any explanation to the American people that some method would have to be devised to help carry our friends over the period of reconversion. While we were gaily flinging off our mild wartime rationing, the British Government was faced overnight with the necessity of imposing even greater austerity and of undertaking an immediate drastic reorganization of the whole United Kingdom economy. It would have to increase its exports as much as possible and close the remaining gap by decreasing its purchases abroad to the absolute minimum. To reconvert to peace production and at the same time make these drastic readjustments would obviously take time—especially with a people and an industrial machine exhausted by six years of war. That was why the British came to us for a loan—to tide over the period of reconversion and readjustment.

In arranging the amount and terms of this loan, both sides miscalculated. We, as most lenders will, tried to hold down the amount of the loan and to exact such terms as we thought would best aid world recovery. Britain, as most borrowers in need will do, agreed to the best terms she could get, even though they made her task of reorganization difficult and precarious. Had greater wisdom prevailed on both sides of the table, much subsequent trouble could have been avoided. The British knew—and said at the time—that the amount of $3,500,000,000 was insufficient for the purpose. But our negotiators believed that Congress would refuse to appropriate more because—supposedly—the American people would not stand for it. And so we built a bridge three-quarters of the way across the river—which is no bridge at all.

Furthermore, in order to promote *our* idea of what would best serve the interests of world recovery, we insisted upon attaching conditions to the loan which came very close to wrecking the British economy altogether. We insisted upon the free convertibility of the pound sterling as of July 15, 1947, and upon certain anti-discrimination clauses designed to fit into the pattern of freer multilateral trade which we were attempting to promote throughout the world. The chief trouble about these conditions was that they ignored the realities of the British position and were, therefore, impossible of fulfillment. Whether the anti-discrimination clauses were wise in themselves, or justly drawn even as long-run objectives, is another matter. The simple fact is that we unwisely insisted and the British unwisely agreed to a contract which could only lead to mutual disappointment and recrimination.

Unfortunately, this was not all. The loan was granted in the spring of 1946. By the last quarter of that year, Britain had already shown great progress. By hard work, exports had been increased to over 110 per cent of prewar volume—over 125 per cent in money value. Imports were being rigidly controlled and curtailed. The gap left by the missing income from foreign investments was being closed. And then, two things happened.

Britain was hit by the worst winter in modern history; and price control ended in the United States. The weather reduced British production and cut down the painfully built-up exports, while at the same time increasing the need for imports. The irresponsible termination of price controls in the United States caused a rapid rise in prices which cut down by more than 25 per cent the purchasing power of Britain's borrowed dollars in the American market.

The slim margin by which it had been calculated that the loan might be sufficient disappeared almost overnight. As early as March 1947, when Mr. Marshall was setting out for Moscow, it should have been evident to both the British and American Governments that some remedial action would have to be taken. Neither Government would face the issue. Nothing was done until some months later, when almost the last drop of British dollars had been drained away.

There were, I think, three psychological factors which detracted from the normal health of Anglo-American relations and which were largely responsible for the mistakes and failures of Anglo-American policy at this time.

First, there was British preoccupation with the maintenance of the *political* status quo. This had been the key to Mr. Churchill's wartime policy, deriving its major impetus, not from ideological considerations as such, but

from a pragmatic determination to preserve the British Empire. It took some time for the Labor Government to effect the transition from Mr. Churchill's "I did not become the King's first minister in order to preside over the liquidation of His Majesty's Empire" to a policy of gradually converting the Empire into an expanding Commonwealth of free nations.

Second, there was American preoccupation with the maintenance of the *economic* status quo. This was the key to that American foreign policy which began to emerge when Mr. Roosevelt shifted in 1942 from "Dr. New Deal to Dr. Win-the-War," became more clearly defined after Mr. Roosevelt's death, and blossomed into full flower when Mr. Truman, having lost the Congressional elections of 1946, took more and more counsel of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—especially Admiral Leahy—and of his "bipartisan" conservative advisers.

The paths of these two trends crossed at just about the time we are now discussing. That is to say, Britain began to develop the beginnings of a forward-looking policy at just about the time when we came down off the fence and began to look backward in earnest.

The third psychological factor might be characterized as an Anglo-American conspiracy in self-deception. Both we and the British were living in an illusion created by the war. We were living in an illusion of equal partnership. Neither we nor the British fully realized the fact that World War II had economically bled Britain white, much as World War I had physically bled France white. Britain still thought of itself—and we still thought of Britain—as one of the three or four great powers in the world. The fact was that, for the time being, Britain had become a small nation carried on in part by the momentum of its great past, in part by the loyalty of the Dominion peoples, and in part by its own indomitable courage. Whatever might be one's hopes for Britain's future return to a position of pre-eminence, the Britain of early 1947 was "keeping up to the Joneses"—trying to maintain itself at a level beyond its reach and seeking to carry commitments beyond its strength. This was our fault as much as it was Britain's.

The concept of equal partnership had not always been an illusion. Morally it was justified in 1941. Britain had held the fort alone while we made up our minds and mobilized our strength. Had it not been for British courage and British sacrifice, we should have fought a very different and more costly war—a war from which we might not have emerged as the strongest and most fortunate nation on this earth. But the fact remains that our wartime fifty-fifty partnership with Britain came about, not as the result of equal power deployed in a joint endeavor, but as the result of the earlier and more dangerous employment of relatively small British power and the later and safer employment of far greater power by the United States. There was nothing wrong with the translation of these contributions into a fifty-fifty management of our combined war effort. The difficulty arose after victory had been won.

Because they had purchased at enormous sacrifice a position beyond their actual power, the British were slow to realize that with their diminished power this position had become untenable. And we, because we were reluctant to assume responsibility commensurate with our vastly increased power, continued to expect the British to carry commitments beyond their means which we desired to see maintained.

Both Germany and Palestine serve to illustrate the point. In Germany, Britain and the United States together were responsible for over 40,000,000 Germans, living in an area which contained that nation's chief raw material and industrial resources but which could not supply itself with foodstuffs. To make the area self-supporting would require several years of intensive effort and a considerable capital investment. Feeding the population, maintaining armies of occupation, and rehabilitating the area would cost well over a billion dollars a year. Because we marched into Germany as fifty-fifty partners in victory, we maintained the fifty-fifty basis in post-surrender management. Britain was long unwilling to face the fact that the commitment involved exceeded her power—which meant that she must recede from a position of equality, even though she had vital commercial interests at stake in the Ruhr. And we were unwilling to face the fact that Britain's diminished power placed a greater burden upon us—which meant that we must assume more than half of the cost. It was not until a short time ago that this situation was realistically adjusted.

Similarly in Palestine, we, no less than the British, have wanted Western protection of the Middle East oil fields to be maintained. This is a matter quite apart from the Arab-Jewish problem. Here, too, the commitment was clearly beyond British postwar power. Here, too, vital commercial interests were involved, for us as well as Britain. Yet this did not cause us to show any desire to share the burdens and responsibilities. Nor were the British any too anxious to have us do so.

Both examples illustrate how the British failed to realize that the false front, which they themselves maintained, stood in the way of greater American understanding and greater willingness to assume a larger part of the burden. They show equally how we in turn failed to make allowances for the fact that, just because the British had been carrying a burden beyond their capacity, they were desperately tired and unable to perform according to their usual high standard.

These elements are important to bear in mind as we pursue the main thread of our story.

In our dealings with Germany, the British and we developed a number of procedural differences in our two zones of occupation, but we also had one major difference in basic approach to the German problem. The British Labor Government wanted to nationalize the Ruhr coal mines and perhaps later the steel industry. Some of the Colonel Blimps in British Military Government did not share this aim. Our predilection being for the maintenance of free-enterprise capitalism, we officially favored breaking up the big German monopolies rather than socializing them. But trust-busting, or decartelization, as it came to be called in occupation jargon, was subject to the same limitations that we had discovered in our own country. It ran counter to technological development and to the emotional attitudes of most of the men who were supposed to enforce it.

This major divergence in Anglo-American aims remained largely academic in the chaotic conditions which existed in Germany up to the time of the Moscow Conference. It was obscured by the more dramatic differences with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it was a latent factor of important disagreement and one which was closely related to the over-all problem raised by the anti-discrimination clauses in the British loan, the Truman speech at Baylor University, and the Geneva negotiations for an international trade agreement.

CHAPTER FOUR

Deadlock Over Germany*

1. BACKGROUND

WHAT HAPPENED—or failed to happen—at the Moscow Conference of March-April 1947 cannot be discussed without a considerable amount of background information. It is difficult quickly to summarize the many and complex factors which combine to create this central problem of the European peace settlement.

Perhaps the most useful approach would be: a first-hand report of how things looked in Germany at the time when Secretary Marshall inherited the problem; next, a brief summary of how the condition of Germany affected the rest of Europe and the world; and finally, an analysis of how this state of affairs came about.

Here, then, is the picture as of early January 1947.

It is not quite two years since the Allied Armies crossed the Vistula and the Rhine—one year and eight months since Hitler's Germany surrendered and ceased to exist. What was once the German nation, before the annexation of Austria, is now partitioned into six pieces. One piece has been annexed by Russia. A much larger and more important part has been annexed by Poland. And the remaining rump, lying roughly between the Oder and the old western frontier, has been cut up into four separate zones of occupation.

As a result of this partition, the economic life of Germany is paralyzed. The parts annexed to Russia and Poland, as well as the Soviet zone of occupation, are working to produce reparations for Poland and the Soviet Union. The French zone is similarly being milked by France, though on a much smaller scale. The British and American zones are living on subsidy to the extent of half a billion dollars a year paid out of the pockets of British and American taxpayers. At this moment, they are in the course of economic unification—a process which will cost several billion dollars before the two zones alone can become self-supporting.

Between the Anglo-American area and the French zone there is but little exchange of food, raw materials, or manufactured goods. Between eastern Germany and the western zones there is practically no natural commerce at all, no movement of people to and fro, no exchange even of information. It is more difficult for a German to get from Leipzig to Munich or Hamburg than for a British subject to go from Montreal to Calcutta.

Eastern Germany, which used to supply the food for itself and for a large part of western Germany as well, is now exporting all its foodstuffs to the East, except for a bare subsistence ration retained at home. Its industries are working for Russia; but they are gradually running down, because of war damage, removals of plant equipment, lack of effective manpower, and absence of parts and raw materials formerly derived from the West.

Western Germany is in even worse condition. Never self-sufficient in food and now deprived of the normal surplus from the East, it lives on French leavings and Anglo-American charity. Disease and death from malnutrition are frequent, hunger edema prevalent, infant mortality high. Industry is at a low level of production—some plants at a total standstill and few operating at more than a fraction of normal capacity. In part this is due to war damage, but even more to shortage of manpower and the low productivity of available skilled labor. Most of all, it is due to shortage of coal.

The great Ruhr coal fields, capable of producing something like 130,000,000 tons per annum, are turning out less than half of that amount. Most of this is needed to run the railroads and public utilities, to supply the armies of occupation, and for export to the coal-hungry countries of Western Europe. Only a trickle is reaching German industry—not enough to make steel for even the most needed construction and repair.

Throughout all of Germany, consumers' goods are practically unobtainable. Foodstuffs (apart from rationed items), clothing, household utensils, furniture, or even the simplest hand tools are not to be found anywhere except in limited quantities and at fantastic prices on the black market. Those who have goods refuse to sell them for currency, because even the most simple-minded citizen knows that the German currency is inflated and intrinsically worthless. Cigarettes—at a dollar per cigarette—have become the accepted medium of exchange. Farmers hoard their produce, hungry hordes of gleaners invade their fields, and those who work for wages can buy nothing for their money except the scant allowance of food called for by their ration cards.

Millions are homeless. But scarcely a new house has been built in Germany since the surrender. Even window

* A large part of this chapter is a condensation of parts of *Germany—Bridge or Battleground,* J. P. Warburg, Harcourt Brace & Company, 1947.

glass is practically unobtainable. Families are crowded together in available housing, with a whole family frequently compressed into a single room. Many are still living in cellars. Here and there a windowbox with blooming geraniums indicates where someone lives in the still habitable portion of a ruined building.

To make matters worse, some thirteen million Germans are in the process of being expelled from the lands annexed by Poland and Russia, from the Sudetenland, and from parts of Hungary. These "expellees"—preponderantly old men, women, and children—have no place to go except into the already overcrowded homes in the rump of Germany.

And—to cap the climax—as the occupying powers have begun to bring in the families of troops and officials stationed in Germany, more and more of the better housing facilities have been taken over to serve their needs. Often as many as four or five German families are evicted to make room for one Allied household.

The Germany of 1947 is an economic desert. Not because it was planned that way, but because the four occupying powers failed to carry out their agreed plan. This plan—the Potsdam Agreement—called for treating Germany as an economic unit, instead of cutting it up into four separate water-tight compartments. We shall consider presently how and why this plan miscarried.

For the moment, we are concerned with an appraisal of what has happened and what it means. From this point of view, it seems fair to say that Allied occupation set out to accomplish three immediate objectives, only one of which it has so far accomplished. It set out to disarm, to demilitarize, and to democratize Germany.

Disarmament has been accomplished. Except for German police operating under Allied supervision, not a single German legally possesses firearms of any sort—not even a shotgun to kill rabbits. The Wehrmacht, the SS, the SA, and the Gestapo have ceased to exist. German ships are banned from the seas, and German airplanes from the skies.

As for demilitarization, very little has been done. War damage to German industry is not nearly so great as one might suppose from a casual inspection of the ruined cities of the Ruhr. Bombing could temporarily put out of action a steel mill or a huge synthetic plant for the manufacture of oil or rubber. But such damage was more often to easily repaired structures than to vital machinery. Since the surrender, a few shipyards and war plants have been destroyed. But the planned process of destruction or removal of war potential has proceeded at a snail's pace, because of Allied bickering and because of the realization that this program was in direct conflict with the immediate and pressing problems of rehabilitation.

Little, too, has been accomplished in the far more important field of demilitarizing the mind and spirit of the German people. The Allies have learned that it is difficult to teach democracy to men struggling for a bare existence—particularly when the four occupying powers have not reached any agreement on what this democracy is that they desire to teach.

The political vacuum in Germany is almost as complete as the economic vacuum, and closely related to it.

So much for the condition of Germany. And now for a quick contemporary appraisal of the effects of that condition upon the rest of Europe.

Germany—the chronic troublemaker of Europe—had also been the hub of the whole European economy. Geography, geology, and technology combined to bring this about. German rivers and railways are the gateway to the heart of the Continent. German coal fields are the sole producers of surplus coal in Western Europe. The German people were—and are still, even in defeat—the largest single compact mass of skilled labor on the Continent. These three elements combine to make Germany a major factor in Europe's productive capacity as well as a major market-place for the raw materials and goods produced by other nations. Before Hitler came to power, Germany ranked third—after the United States and Britain—in total world trade.

It is clear to the new Secretary of State that, while it is neither necessary nor desirable that Germany should ever regain the position of preponderant economic strength which she acquired through the deliberate overexpansion of her heavy industries, it is nevertheless true that, unless Germany does regain a large measure of economic health, there can be no European recovery. He sees that the failure to recognize this unpalatable but nonetheless inescapable fact has been the cause of much of the world's postwar trouble.

Perhaps Mr. Marshall recalls how, in 1941, when Nazi bombs were raining upon Britain, Anthony Eden, then Foreign Secretary, had the vision and the courage to make a declaration of British policy after Germany should have been defeated. "Our conditions for peace with Germany," he said, "will be designed to prevent a repetition of Germany's misdeeds. But, while these military measures must be taken, it is not part of our purpose to cause Germany . . . to collapse economically. I say that, not out of any love for Germany, but because a starving and a bankrupt Germany in the midst of Europe would poison all of us, who are her neighbors. That is not sentiment; it is common sense."

And here is what General Marshall sees six years later—a Germany which is starving and bankrupt; her neighbors on all sides frightened and demanding a voice in what shall be done in the future. They are frightened not only of a rebuilt Germany but also of living next door to a moral morass and an economic desert—a plague-center, which has come into being in place of an area which once supplied them with much of what they needed and bought from them much of what they produced. And this applies not only to Germany's small neighbors. French reconstruction is delayed and imperiled by lack of German coal. The same thing is even more true of Italy. The British, after seven years of privation, are still compelled to remain on wartime rations. And even we—remote and fortunate—are becoming aware that a coal strike or a shipping strike in this country may mean the death of cold and hungry thousands across the sea.

The economic collapse of Germany, and especially the cutting off of German coal, may turn out to be the worst physical disaster that has befallen Western Europe.

More serious still is the effect of all this upon the

prospects for lasting peace. Not only is reconstruction being delayed, misery protracted, and the seed of unrest sown, but confidence in the whole planned structure of a great-power peace is being undermined. If the four-power failure in Germany continues, people throughout the world will begin to lose what faith they had in the ability of the great powers to reach and carry out agreements—especially in the more troublesome parts of the world.

This is about how the picture must have been unfolded to General Marshall in his pre-conference briefing by his associates in the Department of State. No doubt he wanted to know just how such a catastrophic state of affairs had come about. Perhaps you, too, would like an abbreviated version of the story.

2. REASONS FOR FAILURE

The reasons for the failure were to be found in the historical development of Allied policy toward Germany and especially in the major blunders made at the Potsdam Conference. The failure was not attributable to faulty execution of policy but to policy itself.

In August 1941, before the United States entered the war, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill issued the first definition of Allied policy toward the Axis powers, once these should have been defeated. They renounced any desire for territorial or other aggrandizement, expressed the wish that there should be "no territorial changes that do not correspond to the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned," and in general set forth the broad principles of a just rather than a vengeful peace. Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the eight principles of this Atlantic Charter were embodied in a declaration signed by all the United Nations. The United Nations Declaration was never revoked or modified.

Apart from announcing their determination to bring about the "unconditional surrender" of the Axis powers (at Casablanca in January 1943), the Allied leaders made no further major joint pronouncements of policy toward Germany until Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill met at Yalta in February 1945. But before we consider what was done at Yalta, it is necessary to fill in a few rapid strokes of background.

In September 1944, Roosevelt and Churchill met at one of their joint staff war councils at Quebec. The then United States Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, placed before this meeting a plan for the post-surrender treatment of Germany. This "Morgenthau Plan" was an extremely drastic proposal for the "deindustrialization" of Germany; it set out to destroy or remove from that country all industrial plant and equipment capable of being used for war production. The plan provided that Germany should become primarily an agricultural nation with only the so-called light, or consumer-goods, industries continuing to operate. The plan even went so far as to propose that all equipment should be removed from the Ruhr coal mines, "and the mines closed."

Both the War and State Departments had been working on quite different plans for the treatment of Germany. They were based upon the conviction that what makes a nation a threat to peace is not the possession of a war potential, but the will to use it. The Secretaries of War and State took sharp issue with the Morgenthau proposal, pointing out, among other things, that—as shown by our own remarkable conversion from peace to war production—any industry is potentially a war industry. The experts of the Foreign Economic Administration stated, moreover, that the Morgenthau Plan was based on erroneous assumptions of fact, particularly as to the availability in Germany of sufficient arable land to make "pastoralization" practicable. The verbal battle raged in Washington throughout the winter of 1944-45. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff finally adopted a compromise plan that endeavored to find a middle ground between Mr. Morgenthau, who wished to destroy or remove all heavy industry, and the War and State Departments, who thought that German industry should be strictly controlled, but that actual destruction of productive capacity, other than that for direct armament production, would seriously impede the rehabilitation of Europe as a whole.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff compromise (JCS 1067) was presented by General Eisenhower to the European Advisory Council in London. It was opposed before the same body by the representatives of the Department of State and the Foreign Economic Administration. Thus, instead of taking a constructive lead toward the shaping of coalition policy, the United States merely provided its allies with a spectacle of internal dissension and an excuse for postponing once more the necessity for reaching agreement.

This was the background against which the Big Three met at Yalta three months before the German surrender. The communiqué which they issued showed clearly, by what it did not say, that the Big Three were far from seeing eye to eye in matters concerning the post-surrender treatment of Germany. They did, however, reach and announce several important decisions:

1. They fixed the Russo-Polish boundary approximately along the so-called Curzon Line, and promised that Poland should be "compensated by substantial accessions of territory in the North and West." This meant that Roosevelt and Churchill had in effect allowed Stalin to persuade them to abandon two important principles of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Declaration: namely, the renunciation of territorial aggrandizement and of "territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned."
2. They confirmed their decision—because Roosevelt supported Stalin against Churchill in regard to this—to divide Germany into separate zones of occupation co-ordinated and controlled through an Allied Control Council in Berlin. (Churchill fought for the joint occupation of Germany as a whole.)
3. They agreed — because Roosevelt here supported Churchill against Stalin—that France should be invited to take over a zone of occupation and to participate as a fourth member of the Control Council.

4. They determined the broad principles of denazification, demilitarization, and disarmament, and decided to "eliminate *or control* [my italics] all German industry that could be used for military production." Thus they adopted the Joint Chiefs' watered-down version of the Morgenthau Plan.

Finally, the Big Three expressed the determination to bring all war criminals to justice and "exact reparations in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans." This vague language merely indicated that no real agreement on reparations had been possible. The Russians apparently demanded $10,000,000,000 in reparations and have since claimed that President Roosevelt tentatively agreed to that figure.

Meanwhile, as the Allied Armies pressed on into Germany, there was still no joint directive to govern the four commanders. JCS 1067 was issued to General Eisenhower in April and became binding upon his United States forces, but not upon the British and French armies under his command. (This was not known at the time, because the JCS directive remained a "top secret" document until several months after the Potsdam Agreement.) There was in fact no agreed policy or directive for the converging armies of occupation until the Potsdam Agreement was signed on August 2, 1945, almost three months after the German surrender. The absence of any such agreement during the first three months of occupation complicated the later problems of quadripartite government, because it permitted divergent trends and policies to become firmly established in the various zones.

Within this framework of predetermined decisions and lack of over-all policy, the conferees at Potsdam sought to produce a practical operating directive. Of the original Big Three only Stalin remained. Roosevelt was dead and Churchill was supplanted in the middle of the conference by Attlee. Given the uncertainties and contradictions in American policy, as expressed in JCS 1067, the political overturn in Britain, and the purposeful determination of Stalin, the new leaders of Britain and America faced a difficult task. On the whole, so far as the operating directive was concerned, the conferees produced a reasonably good document, setting forth procedures for disarmament, demilitarization, and denazification; but in dealing with the broader aspects of European policy, they made two very serious and far-reaching blunders.

First: The British and American delegations allowed themselves to become parties to a Polish-Russian land-grab in eastern Germany that went far beyond any reasonable interpretation of what had been agreed to at Yalta. Under the Yalta formula of "compensating" Poland for the loss of her eastern territories, one might have expected her to receive the industrial area of Upper Silesia with its rich mineral deposits and its partly Polish population, and perhaps East Prussia for strategic reasons, even though East Prussia had never been anything but German. But the Potsdam conferees established the German-Polish frontier at the Oder-Neisse Line, taking away from Germany not only Upper Silesia and East Prussia, but most of Pomerania and Lower Silesia as well as important parts of Brandenburg. All these territories, containing some nine million Germans and producing food for about seventeen million—or one-quarter of the whole German population—were awarded to Poland, except for the upper half of East Prussia, which was awarded to Russia for no better reason than that Stalin demanded it.

It is true that these awards were made subject to the final determination of the peace settlement, but this did not deter the Russians and Poles from proceeding immediately to drive out the German populations, thus greatly prejudicing any chance of later rectification.

Second: While the British and American delegations insisted on the inclusion of France in the four-power management of Germany, as provided by the Yalta Declaration and the Potsdam Agreement, they neglected to obtain the French signature to the Potsdam Agreement itself, thus leaving the French in a position where they were not bound by the terms of the agreement and yet were in a position to veto their execution.

These two blunders are very largely responsible for the dangerous deterioration of the position in Germany and the consequent threat to the whole structure of peace through big-power co-operation.

The immediate result of the two great blunders made at Potsdam was to fortify that section of French opinion which favored the annexation of all German territory west of the Rhine plus the political and economic separation from Germany of the Ruhr industrial area. There were two reasons for this: first, the very simple reaction that, if Poland and Russia were going to grab territory in the east, why not France in the west? And, second, the feeling that the amputation of the eastern territories would in effect create the conditions precedent to another German invasion of France. Therefore, the French argued, if a new German revisionism was to be created and if population pressures were to be piled up in the rump of Germany, then France must protect itself by holding the Rhine frontier and by denying Germany the use of the Ruhr arsenal.

In order to enforce these demands, the French proceeded to veto in the Allied Control Council every move which might lead to the treatment of Germany as a political or economic whole and thus lead to the reestablishment of a German nation. They refused to allow free interzonal trade and economic unification. They even vetoed a proposal to allow the German trade unions to organize on a national basis, and another to issue uniform postage stamps.

The result of these obstructive tactics was the frustration of the whole Potsdam design for quadripartite management, and the division of Germany into four separate compartments, with the consequent deterioration of the country as a whole and the severe straining of the four-power coalition.

It would appear that three basic fallacies found their way into four-power planning with regard to Germany long before the German surrender. These fallacies, along with the two major blunders made at Potsdam, constitute the heart of the difficulty.

The first fallacy was the basic assumption that it would be the proper function of the victorious Allies to

remake Germany, re-educate the German people, and fit the new Germany into a world organized for peace. Actually the regeneration of the German people could come about only as the result of their own repentance and resurgent will toward decency and freedom under law; it could not be imposed from without. We could only create a climate in which regeneration *could* take place, meanwhile making new aggression impossible.

Even if this were not true—even if it were possible for a victorious nation to impose regeneration upon the vanquished—the theory would break down when the victor is not one nation but a coalition of nations.

This brings us to the second fallacy: namely, the division of Germany into arbitrary zones of occupation. Since it was the purpose of the victorious coalition not merely to render Germany harmless but to undertake as well the social, economic, and political reorganization and reorientation of the German people, the creation of separate zones of occupation must be recognized as a well-nigh fatal error.

Given the combination of the two fallacies, it was almost inevitable that each of the four occupying powers would try to remake a piece of Germany in its own image, and that, instead of becoming the great laboratory for the reconciliation of divergent aims and ideals, Germany would tend to become a buffer, if not a battleground.

The third fallacy was the basic thesis of the Morgenthau Plan, which crept into JCS 1067 and the Potsdam Agreement, even though the Plan itself was rejected. This was the thesis that one can render an aggressive nation peaceful and law-abiding merely by seeing to it that no weapons ever come within its reach, even though this may also involve turning back the clock several centuries and reducing the living standards of a whole continent. The fundamental absurdity of this type of thinking would have become more apparent had the original Morgenthau proposal been adopted. Had the Ruhr mines really been dismantled and closed down, as Mr. Morganthau proposed, it would soon have been universally recognized that the "pastoralization" of Germany would disrupt the entire European economy and create explosive discontent in almost every Continental country.

Until the autumn of 1946, the initiative concerning Germany's future had been allowed to rest almost entirely with the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, with France. The Russians knew what they wanted and took it. The French knew what they did not want and obstructed it. Neither Britain nor the United States had a clear policy with regard to Germany. Both vacillated between sympathy and irritation toward Russian and French stubbornness.

In April 1946, Mr. Byrnes had put forward a proposal for a long-term four-power treaty of mutual assistance to prevent renewed German aggression. This would have been at least a guarantee of continued American participation in European affairs. But neither this nor the Secretary's patient perseverance in driving toward the settlement of the peripheral problems of Europe constituted an attack upon the central problem—what to do with Germany.

On July 10, Mr. Molotov again seized the initiative. He placed the Soviet Union on record as opposing any French annexations of German territory, favoring the early creation of an anti-fascist central German Government, and insisting upon the carrying out of the Potsdam Agreement. In taking this stand, the Soviet Foreign Minister antagonized French opinion and embarrassed the powerful French Communist Party; but he also struck a shrewd blow on behalf of Soviet prestige among the German people. In German eyes, the Soviet Union had now become the champion of German unity and the defender of German soil against annexation in the west.

To a certain extent the effect of this declaration was nullified by the reluctance of the Soviet authorities to merge their zone economically with those of the Western powers. The Soviet Union had readjusted its original policy when it became evident in the winter of 1945-46 that French obstructionism would continue. Instead of taking plant and equipment for reparations account, as per Potsdam, it switched to leaving the plants in Germany and taking out a large part of their current production. The Russians had, in effect, said to Britain and to us: "If you are going to let the French sabotage the Potsdam Agreement, *we* can get along very nicely without it. We have the only zone which produces more than it needs, and we can make excellent use of the surplus. You can make up deficits in your zones as long as you like."

As a matter of fact, this was painfully true. Continuation of the zonal barriers meant that, while Russia was taking out millions of dollars at one end of Germany, Britain and the United States were compelled to pour their own money in at the other end—to the tune of $500,000,000 a year.

In July 1946, Mr. Byrnes made one more effort to achieve economic unification without facing the basic issues. He offered an economic merger of the American zone—without political merger—to all of the three other powers, or to any of them. Britain alone accepted the proposal. The Soviet Union ignored it, and France made a counterproposal which amounted to polite rejection. On September 6, Mr. Byrnes moved at last toward a basic solution.

Speaking at Stuttgart in the American zone to a primarily German audience, the Secretary of State publicly declared that the Potsdam Agreement for the four-power government of Germany had so far been a failure. Although he seemed to criticize the Allied Control Council, Mr. Byrnes was well aware that this failure had been due to the absence of effective four-power policy; and that this, in turn, had been caused by the two Potsdam blunders and by our own slowness in making clear where we stood. With these facts in mind, Mr. Byrnes addressed himself to the rectification of the two Potsdam blunders and the clarification of United States policy.

The Secretary sought to put an end to French obstructionism by defining for the first time the United States position with regard to Germany's western frontier; and he placed his Government on record as insisting upon a partial readjustment of the Polish annexations in the east.

Tacitly admitting that it had become impossible to adhere to the Atlantic Charter pledge of no annexations, Mr. Byrnes conceded that the Russians should retain the northern half of East Prussia, that the Poles should retain some, but not all, of the eastern provinces, and that France should be permitted to annex the Saar coal basin. On the other hand, he firmly insisted that the Rhineland and the Ruhr should remain a part of Germany.

In taking this position, Mr. Byrnes recognized that Ruhr coal is the heart of the German economy, without which it would be impossible to create a peaceful and reasonably prosperous German nation. For security, Mr. Byrnes placed his reliance upon over-all controls of the whole German economy, rather than upon any device of artificial political or economic separation of the Ruhr.

Regarding revision of the eastern frontier, Mr. Byrnes was less specific, confining himself to a general insistence that this settlement had been made subject to the determination of a peace conference and could not be considered final. The clear implication was that some territory should be returned to Germany. Unfortunately, Mr. Byrnes did not say *what* territory.

Having thus moved toward clarifying at least in part *what* Germany the United States wanted to see recreated, Mr. Byrnes proceeded to discuss *what kind* of Germany he envisaged, politically and economically.

On the political side, Mr. Byrnes insisted that the Potsdam provisions for treating Germany as a whole be put into effect forthwith. He seconded the motion, previously made in July by Mr. Molotov, that a central government be established and a constitution drafted at the earliest possible date. The language in this section of his speech was regrettably vague. Some commentators, notably Russian, criticized it as advocating a weak federal government, while others, mostly American, lamented that it meant the abandonment of the federal principle in favor of an overstrong central government. Speaking at Paris on October 3, 1946, Mr. Byrnes clarified this point, stating that the United States hoped to see a central government established on the federal principle by the states.

The ambiguity of his references to the gradual withdrawal of large occupation armies gave rise to a further interpretation—probably unjust—that Mr. Byrnes thought the time had come when complete political power could safely be turned over to the Germans.

In defining United States economic policy, Mr. Byrnes reaffirmed four basic principles which had been agreed to at Potsdam by Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. These were:

1. That Germany is to be treated as an economic entity;
2. That the German economy is to be permanently demilitarized—partly by the removal of war plants, and partly by the limitation and control of industries which create a war potential;
3. That reparations are to be taken in physical removal of designated plants and not out of current production; and
4. That the result of demilitarization and reparations should be so calculated as to leave a German economy capable of supporting a peaceful German nation on at least an average West European standard of living.

Perhaps the most important statement made by Mr. Byrnes was this: "It is not in the interest of the German people or in the interest of world peace that Germany should become a pawn or partner in a military struggle for power between the East and the West."

This statement—no doubt made in deep seriousness and sincerity—was almost entirely overlooked by commentators here and abroad. The Stuttgart speech was hailed or condemned, according to the individual commentator's point of view, as a move in a diplomatic struggle with Russia for the control of Germany. There were two major reasons for this.

The first reason was the ambiguity of Mr. Byrnes' proposals, especially with regard to the eastern frontier. Instead of specifying that he had in mind leaving the coal and industry of Upper Silesia to Poland and returning to Germany only a part of the agricultural territory, Mr. Byrnes left himself open to the interpretation—immediately made by the Poles—that he proposed to give Germany back its eastern arsenal.

The second was the unfortunate stage-management of the speech, which had the effect of making it appear to most observers as merely a maneuver in a struggle of power politics. The American press so interpreted it. In Britain, the speech received mildly favorable comment. In France, it caused consternation—and in Poland, an outburst of anti-American demonstrations.

It was not until September 16 that Mr. Molotov took cognizance of the speech at all—and then in characteristic fashion. He addressed a memorandum to the Polish Information Bureau stating that, in Russia's view, the Potsdam annexations must remain final because the Western powers had acquiesced in the expulsion of the Germans from these areas. Treating the provision for ratification by the peace conference as merely "a formal aspect of the problem," he maintained that the Potsdam decision "cannot be reversed, for the facts prove it is impossible now to do so." That was the Russian answer to Mr. Byrnes' final effort. It left the basic German tangle unchanged, for, without a return to Germany of some of its breadbasket, the whole Byrnes proposal could not be logically sustained.

The Council of Foreign Ministers' meeting in December 1946 did nothing to alter the picture. It merely fixed the date for the Moscow meeting. That was where Secretary Marshall came in.

3. THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

Mr. Marshall and his delegation spent a little over six weeks in Moscow. The net result was utter and complete failure to reach any sort of compromise or agreement on either Germany or Austria. There was, however, one important and constructive achievement. Whereas previous conferences on Germany had merely skirted or evaded the issues to such an extent that none of the four

participants had ever clearly and precisely defined its position, this conference did produce a more or less precise understanding of what the major disagreements were. This was in large measure due to Mr. Marshall's own clarity in presenting the United States' point of view in a series of admirably precise statements and his tenacious insistence upon like precision from the other three Foreign Ministers.

The issues were reported to the American people by the Secretary of State upon his return. (See Appendix, page 49.) After first explaining the over-all importance of German coal in the whole European recovery picture, with particular emphasis upon French requirements, the Secretary listed the major points of disagreement with regard to Germany and Austria.

The obstacles to agreement on Germany were: first, as to the nature and power of a new central German government; second, as to the nature and limits of a unified German economy; third, as to reparations; fourth, as to boundaries; and fifth, as to what nations should participate in the making of the German settlement.

In most of these matters, there had been substantial agreement between Britain and the United States. The French position remained different from that of the Anglo-Americans in that the French continued to demand decentralization amounting to partition, with particular emphasis on the separation of the Ruhr, and special consideration for France in the allocation of Ruhr coal. Britain and the United States were prepared to grant the French demand to annex the Saar. Russia rejected it.

The Soviet representatives had demanded: first, a more highly centralized German government than contemplated by the United States and Britain, with greater participation by labor and political organizations as such; second, the nullification of the Anglo-American bizonal merger and agreement as to continuing reparations out of production as a pre-condition to economic unification; third, the freezing of the German frontiers as fixed at Potsdam; fourth, reparations for the Soviet Union in the amount of $10,000,000,000; and fifth, the exclusion from the peace negotiations of countries which did not actually participate in the fighting against Germany.

Failing to reach agreement on any of these issues, Mr. Marshall reported that he had tried to secure at least the adoption of Mr. Byrnes' four-power pact to guarantee continued demilitarization of Germany. The Russians, however, had attached to this treaty a series of amendments by which the amended treaty would have settled in their favor practically all the major matters of contention.

The report on Austria was equally discouraging. The chief difficulties here were again reparations and, even more, the question of which former German assets in Austria were properly subject to Soviet seizure under the Potsdam Agreement. The Western Allies sought to exclude Austrian assets seized by the Germans under duress; the Russians insisted upon including them, which would have given the Soviet Union permanent control over the economic life of Austria.

Perhaps the most basic point of disagreement between the Soviet Union and the Western powers was that involved in an apparently real misunderstanding as to what reparations had been agreed upon at Yalta. The Russians insisted that they had obtained agreement in principle to payment of $10,000,000,000 from Germany. They clung to this demand, even though it must have become clear to them that it could never have been the intention of either Mr. Roosevelt or Mr. Churchill that reparations to Russia should be paid out of a continuing Anglo-American subsidy. It is my own opinion that, in meeting this position, the Anglo-American negotiators at Moscow showed very little resourcefulness or imagination. There was, it seems to me, room for a compromise proposal—one which would have provided that Russia should receive reparations whenever the Anglo-American subsidies were no longer necessary and past subsidies should have been repaid. Mr. Marshall did put forward a counterproposal which tended slightly in this direction, but its scope was too limited to make it of any value in bridging the gap.

In concluding his report, Secretary Marshall expressed the view that "we must not compromise on great principles in order to achieve agreement for agreement's sake. Also, we must sincerely try to understand the point of view of those with whom we differ."

He revealed to the American people that in his private talk with Generalissimo Stalin the latter had expressed the view that "these were only the first skirmishes and brushes of reconnaissance forces" and that "after people had exhausted themselves in dispute, they then recognized the necessity of compromise . . . that compromises were possible on all the main questions . . . it was necessary to have patience and not become pessimistic."

To this statement Secretary Marshall reported his own reaction. "I sincerely hope," he said, "that the Generalissimo is correct in the view he expressed and that it implies a greater spirit of co-operation by the Soviet delegation in future conferences. But we cannot ignore the factor of time involved here. The recovery of Europe has been far slower than had been expected. Disintegrating forces are becoming evident. The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate. So I believe that action cannot await compromise through exhaustion. New issues arise daily. Whatever action is necessary to meet these pressing problems must be taken without delay."

In his clear, clipped summary, the Secretary confined himself to an orderly factual presentation. He showed little effect of the prolonged and trying acrimony which had pervaded the Moscow discussions. Only once did he refer to the tactics employed by his chief adversary.

"At Moscow," he said, "propaganda appeals to passion and prejudice appeared to take the place of reason and understanding. Charges were made by the Soviet delegation and interpretation given to Potsdam and other agreements, which varied completely from the facts as factually known by the American delegation. There was naturally much uncertainty regarding the real intention or motives of the various proposals submitted or of the objections taken to the proposals. This," he philosophically concluded, "is inevitable in any international negotiation."

The real intentions and motives were, I think, not entirely obscure. From the Soviet point of view, Mr. Truman had on March 12 adopted the Churchill formula and declared ideological and political war. Whatever might have been the Kremlin's intentions with regard to Germany when the Moscow Conference opened on March 10, two days later Germany had become merely one of many battle fronts upon which this cold war would have to be fought. Undoubtedly, the Russians figured that time would be on their side and that, if European recovery were sufficiently delayed, the confidently expected collapse of the whole Western capitalistic system would solve their problem. The Russians had been difficult precisely because they wanted to be difficult and to delay a solution. Meanwhile, they sought to use the Conference as another convenient sounding-board for their propaganda to Germany and to other parts of the world.

Where Mr. Marshall failed was in sticking too closely to the agenda on Germany and Austria, instead of using the Conference as an opportunity to explore the possibilities of reaching an over-all understanding with the Soviet Union. Mr. Marshall did precisely what Mr. Byrnes should have done and failed to do in 1946; that is, he tried to grapple with what had originally been the central problem of the European peace. But the trouble was that Germany was no longer the key log in the log jam. A settlement in Germany had become dependent upon a world-wide understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States.

CHAPTER FIVE

Return to Reason

1. THE ACHESON SPEECH

THE SHOCK of the Truman pronouncement and the subsequent failure of the Moscow Conference left the whole world in a state of acute anxiety. The two giants—Russia and the United States—seemed headed toward a collision which neither wanted yet neither seemed able to avoid—a collision in which even the most innocent bystanders would quite obviously be maimed if not destroyed.

And then, suddenly, a ray of light and hope cut through the somber darkness. On May 8, at the little-known town of Cleveland, Mississippi, Dean Acheson, then Undersecretary of State, delivered an address on "The Requirements of Reconstruction" before an organization known as the Delta Council. This speech marked what might have been a major turning point in United States foreign policy. (See Appendix, page 52.)

Mr. Acheson presented what he called "the basic facts of life with which we are primarily concerned today in the conduct of foreign relations."

He outlined, first of all, the staggering disparity which had come about between production in the United States and that of the rest of the world. Three factors had caused this, he said: the devastation and dislocation of war; unforeseen disasters in the shape of abnormal winters, droughts, and floods; and the fact that the two great workshops of Europe and Asia—Germany and Japan—were held idle by the absence of peace settlements.

The Undersecretary then outlined the postwar relief efforts of the Administration through the various international agencies. He pointed out that mere relief could not solve the problem of unbalanced world production. He showed that in 1947 the United States would export about $16,000,000,000 worth of goods—four times its prewar export and about one-twelfth of its huge 1947 production. At the same time, he pointed out that United States imports were running at only about half the total of exports, leaving an export surplus of $8,000,000,000. "How," Mr. Acheson asked, "are foreigners going to get the United States dollars to cover this huge difference? And how are they going to get the dollars to cover a likely difference of nearly the same amount next year?"

Having pointed out these "facts of life," Mr. Acheson translated them into a program of necessary action.

First, he said, we must increase our imports to the maximum extent. To make this possible we must reduce our tariffs. That was why the Geneva Conference must succeed in establishing an International Trade Organization and in working out reciprocal agreements for the reduction of barriers to trade.

Second, we must undertake further emergency financing of foreign purchases and of foreign reconstruction.

Third, "Since world demand exceeds our ability to supply, we must concentrate our emergency assistance in areas where it will be most effective in building world political and economic stability, in promoting human freedom and democratic institutions, in fostering liberal trade policies, and in strengthening the authority of the United Nations." (I shall comment on this paragraph in a moment.)

Fourth, Acheson said, we must push ahead with the reconstruction of Germany and Japan—if necessary even without four-power agreement.

And finally, "We must give our Government certain executive powers over the domestic sale, transportation, and exportation of a limited list of commodities."

This speech contained more sound sense than any previous utterance on postwar foreign policy by an American official. Nevertheless, it contained one serious flaw.

In his third proposal—namely, that for applying our aid selectively—Mr. Acheson said that we would have to concentrate our efforts in areas where it would be

deemed most effective according to five standards of judgment: 1. In creating world political stability; 2. In creating world economic stability; 3. In promoting human freedom and democratic institutions; 4. In fostering liberal trading policies; and 5. In strengthening the authority of the United Nations.

Certainly there could be no quarrel with concentrating our aid where it would best promote world economic stability, nor where it would strengthen the United Nations. But such phrases as "creating political stability," "promoting human freedom and democratic institutions," and "fostering liberal trading policies" were unfortunate reminders of the Truman message and the Truman speech at Baylor University. The succeeding paragraph, which I shall quote, suggested that, in spite of his truly constructive contribution, Mr. Acheson was still only clarifying, amplifying, and improving—but not completely rejecting—the Truman Doctrine. The paragraph reads as follows:

> This [proposal for selective concentration of effort] is merely common sense and sound practice. It is in keeping with the policy announced by President Truman on March 12 on aid to Greece and Turkey. Free peoples who are seeking to preserve their independence and democratic institutions and human freedoms against totalitarian pressures, either internal or external, will receive top priority for American reconstruction aid. This is no more than frank recognition, as President Truman said, "that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples by direct or indirect aggression undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."

The Moscow Conference had clearly shown—if it had not been sufficiently demonstrated before—that "human freedom" and "democratic institutions" were subjective terms. In a discussion between Washington and Moscow, they either meant nothing whatsoever, or else they meant one thing to Moscow and quite another to Washington. A declaration by the United States that it would give priority in economic assistance on the basis of these terms could only mean that we would aid those countries which conformed to our idea of what the terms meant. In other words, that we would use our preponderant economic strength to enforce *our* concept of "human freedom" and *our* concept of "democratic institutions."

The same thing is true of the phrase "liberal trading policies," which harks back to the President's speech at Baylor University. It meant that we would aid only those countries which conformed, or promised in future to conform, to our interpretation of what constituted liberal trade policies. According to Mr. Truman, this implied leaving the direction of international trade in the hands of private individual initiative. It ruled out countries in which governments directed or controlled the flow of trade. It is almost certain that Mr. Acheson did not mean to rule out Britain or France or other non-communist countries where the government did control or direct the flow of trade and would necessarily continue to do so for some time. He probably considered this in the nature of a temporary disease or aberration. But this is not what he said.

It was the same old trouble of not wanting to call a spade a spade. Both Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson, in this one passage, were really saying that we would help those countries which would side with us against the Soviet Union, and that we would not help countries which sided with the Soviet Union against us.

In spite of these remnants of the Administration's earlier confused thinking, the Acheson speech, taken as a whole, represented a great step forward in American foreign policy. It was immediately so interpreted in most of Europe. Curiously enough, it was scarcely noticed in the American press until after the European reaction aroused a belated realization of its importance. The entire world breathed a sigh of relief. The unfortunate passage upon which I have commented went almost unnoticed in the general rejoicing over the change of over-all emphasis from emotional anti-Soviet crusading to a common-sense approach to economic reconstruction.

Unfortunately, the original Truman Doctrine was still kept in the forefront of the news by the continuing debate in Congress until the Greek aid bill was finally passed and signed by the President on May 22.

The anti-communist Truman Doctrine produced two important results in Europe. On May 7, the French Government of Premier Ramadier dropped the Communist Ministers from the Cabinet. On June 1, the de Gasperi Government in Italy followed suit. This ended in both countries the postwar united front which had grown out of the resistance movements.

Meanwhile, there had been a healthy reaction in England against the Truman Doctrine and its Churchillian implications—a reaction which clearly showed that Britain would not willingly accept a role of dependence upon the United States and would seek rather to steer an independent middle course between the United States and the Soviet Union.

After his return from Moscow, Secretary Marshall was kept busy reorganizing the Department. Robert A. Lovett replaced Dean Acheson as Undersecretary. A planning board was set up under the leadership of the Russian expert, George Kennan.

At this time, Latin-American affairs also came in for some attention. The long-pending wrangle over Argentine policy was liquidated by the resignation of both Assistant Secretary Braden and Ambassador Messersmith. This seemed to indicate a friendlier United States attitude toward the neo-fascist Government of Perón. The veteran Norman Armour returned as Assistant Secretary. And the President asked Congress to pass a bill providing for military collaboration with the other countries of this hemisphere. The standardization of training, equipment, and organization of the armed services of the American Republics had long been a pet project of our military leaders. It seemed to rest upon the strange assumption that we could count upon the Latin-American Republics as friends, irrespective of whether they had democratic, semi-fascist, or fascist governments. Our previous policy had rested upon the pronouncement by Secretary Hull in April 1944 that "we have moved from an easy tolerance of evil institutions to the realization that free governments and Nazi or fascist governments cannot exist together in this world." Apparently we had now changed our minds.

Another sign of ill omen was the re-emergence as an influence in foreign policy of former President Herbert Hoover. Mr. Truman had asked him, in the preceding winter, to go abroad and present his views on the European food situation and on the problem of Germany. Now Mr. Hoover blossomed forth with a letter to Congressman Taber, putting forward a proposal that, failing immediate agreement with the Soviet Union, the United States and other friendly nations should proceed to make a separate peace with both Germany and Japan. (Appendix, page 54.) Mr. Hoover did not indulge in subjective terms like "freedom" and "democracy." He got down to brass tacks, stating in so many words that what the United States ought to do was to make the world safe for laissez-faire capitalism. The trouble with Europe, according to Mr. Hoover, was that "in reaching for Utopia" virtually every country had embraced some form of "collectivism," and that shortened hours of work and "loss of initiative in the managerial class" were retarding recovery. This meant, in effect, the same thing as Mr. Churchill's Fulton speech—namely, backing a return to power of European conservatism, both as a thing to be desired in itself and as a way of combatting the Soviet Union. Moreover, Mr. Hoover proclaimed the thesis that we should help get Europe back upon its feet only if it was not too expensive—a thesis reminiscent of his pre-Pearl Harbor isolationism.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin had remained strangely silent—though not inactive. Its verbal response to the Truman utterances had been made in the intransigence displayed at the Moscow Conference. But other wheels were in motion, and now things began to happen in Hungary. Using the established techniques of communist penetration, a so-called reactionary plot was discovered, the elected middle-of-the-road Government was forced to resign, and a new "democratic" regime installed. Whatever the case against the Nagy Government, the ruthless and extra-constitutional tactics employed by the Hungarian Communists led President Truman to make one of his ill-timed little outbursts of unconsidered emotion. His denunciation of the Hungarian coup as "a terrible outrage" was an unhappy example of what a well-known commentator had called the Truman habit of first shaking his fist, then shaking his finger, and finally ending up by shaking his head. Nevertheless, the Presidential outburst stole the banner headlines of June 6 from a far more important pronouncement made on the preceding day by his Secretary of State.

2. MARSHALL AT HARVARD

Speaking at Harvard University on June 5, Mr. Marshall took up where Mr. Acheson had left off a month earlier. (See Appendix, page 55.) He outlined the precarious state of affairs in Europe and the various factors which had delayed recovery. He emphasized especially the danger arising from shortage of consumer goods—particularly those needed as an incentive to work—and lack of confidence in the various currencies, which caused farmers to withhold their food production from normal channels.

The truth of the matter is [he said] that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products—principally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help, or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character.

The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies, the continuing value of which is not open to question.

Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace.

Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative.

Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full co-operation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.

An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.

The Marshall speech was immediately acclaimed here at home and throughout Western Europe. It seemed to denote a definite change toward a positive policy of promoting reconstruction and recovery everywhere, as against a negative policy dictated by fear of Soviet expansion. This impression was strengthened a week later by a speech delivered at Ottawa by President Truman, the important passages of which were:

At this critical point in history, we of the United States are deeply conscious of our responsibilities to the world. We know that in this trying period, between a war that is over and a peace that is not yet secure, the destitute and the oppressed of the earth look chiefly to us for sustenance and support until they can again face life with self-confidence and self-reliance.

We are keenly aware that much depends upon the internal strength, the economic stability, and the moral stamina of the United States. We face the challenge with determination and confidence.

Free men everywhere know that the purpose of the United States is to restore the world to health and to re-establish conditions in which the common people of the earth can work out their salvation by their own efforts.

We seek a peaceful world, a prosperous world, a free world, a world of good neighbors, living on terms of equality and mutual respect, as Canada and the United States have lived for generations.

We intend to expend our energies and invest our substance in promoting world recovery by assisting those who are able and willing to make their maximum contributions to the same cause.

We intend to support those who are determined to govern themselves in their own way, and who honor the right of others to do likewise.

We intend to aid those who seek to live at peace with their neighbors, without coercing or being coerced, without intimidating or being intimidated.

We intend to uphold those who respect the dignity of the individual, who guarantee him equal treatment under law, and who allow him the widest possible liberty to work out his own destiny and achieve success to the limit of his capacity.

We intend to co-operate actively and loyally with all who honestly seek, as we do, to build a better world in which mankind can live in peace and prosperity.

Certainly this was a very much milder tone than the March 12 message.

The Administration seemed to have recognized two basic misconceptions in its earlier policy. It seemed to have learned:

First, that the real threat to peace was not the communist idea but the existence of conditions which make men in distress turn to any remedy which offers apparent relief from intolerable fear, want, and oppression.

And second, that an idea cannot be stopped by physical force nor at any physical frontier, no matter how strongly fortified.

If it was true that these lessons had been learned—and this was by no means certain—it seemed of the utmost importance that the drastic change be encouragingly recognized both here and abroad. Here is the essence of a contemporary broadcast made in the hope of contributing toward that realization.

"On March 12, President Truman, in his now famous message to Congress, proposed one foreign policy. More recently, the Secretary of State has put forward another and quite different proposal. Whereas the Truman Doctrine apparently abandoned the concept of One World and blew the bugle for a political and perhaps military struggle between East and West, Secretary Marshall has now announced a program of planned United States aid to *all* of Europe including Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. To quote his own words: 'Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.'

"Unfortunately, it will take time to undo the damage done by the earlier proposal and to recapture at home and abroad the confidence and support which the new program deserves and needs in order to succeed.

"Not only the Russians but people throughout the world must be brought to realize that the Truman Doctrine is dead; that the question now before the house is the Marshall program; and that the Marshall program is basically different in objective as well as in approach. The existing climate of tension and confusion has obscured our dramatic change of direction.

"It is, of course, quite possible that we may see another sudden reversal and a return to the original ideological or geopolitical emphasis. Such a regression might come about either through failure on the part of Soviet leadership to appreciate and trust the change of heart which has occurred here—or through failure on the part of our Government to stand by the principles which it has now affirmed.

"Whatever the future may hold, the fact is that the Truman Doctrine was proposed and debated in such a way as to produce heat rather than light. What we need now is the opposite kind of study and discussion.

"We have come to a moment of history rather like that which preceded the great Lend-Lease debate of early 1941, when Britain stood alone against the rising tide of Nazi conquest.

"Then we held in our hands the power which, if used, could save the world from conquest and oppression; and which, if withheld, could doom the world to slavery. Today we hold in our hands the power which, if used, can start the world on the road to economic recovery and peace; and which, if withheld, can doom the world to protracted misery and perhaps to extinction.

"There is another point of similarity. Then as now, Russia was the great unknown factor. We had to make, and did make, our Lend-Lease decision without knowing what Russia's final position in the war would be.

"The same thing is true today.

"The greatest virtue of the Marshall program—apart from its basic soundness and common-sense approach—is that by its very nature it is a co-operative program. Instead of single-handed hit-or-miss action in various parts of the world, it requires first of all a careful appraisal of the world's economic needs and resources, by those who need help and those who are able to supply it. This means that the peoples of Europe must assess their needs, establish priorities, and come to us with the result of their calculations. It means that we in turn must find out which of these needs we can supply out of surplus, which we can supply only if we produce more than we are now producing, and which we can supply only if we produce more and also consume less ourselves.

"That is where the new foreign policy involves a new domestic policy. To be effective, the Marshall program must include a careful appraisal of our national resources, of our productive capacity, and of the possibilities of increasing and redirecting a part of our productive efforts. This implies some degree of over-all economic planning and control, similar to though not as rigid and far-reaching as that which we used so successfully to win the war.

"Some of our extreme conservatives will view this prospect with alarm. It is useful to remember that these same ultra-conservatives objected to any sort of planning and control to save this nation from disaster in 1933 and again in 1941.

"The Marshall program will also greatly affect our fiscal policy. It will cost a lot of money—perhaps as much as six or seven billion dollars a year for a period of years. But we are now spending almost twice that amount each year on our military and naval budgets. These can certainly be reduced once peace is more firmly established. And even if, over the next ten years, we should spend as much as seventy billion dollars to reactivate world recovery and establish peace—which is unlikely—this huge sum would be only a fraction of what we should lose in the major depression which would follow a European collapse—only a pittance compared to what we should lose and spend in fighting another war.

"Some of our right-wing economizers and isolationists will not like spending all this money. They will scream that we are overexporting—that we are squandering our heritage on foreigners whose fate does not concern us—that, if saving the world costs too much, we had better save ourselves—forgetting that we cannot save ourselves except by helping the world to save itself. Again, these are the same voices uttering the same arguments by which they wrecked the peace after World War I, brought on the Great Depression, and thus sowed the seeds of World War II.

"Yet even from a purely selfish, nationalistic point of view, the six or seven billion dollars a year, which we shall be called upon to lend-lease for peace, will be the hottest kind of hot money if we fail to spend it. It will burn the hide off our own hands. Holding on to it means deliberately shutting off our export markets and thus deliberately creating unemployment and reduced production here at home. Holding on to it means denying to the world its only available means of getting back upon its feet. And, unless the world does get back upon its feet soon, there will be little chance of preserving human freedom anywhere—or of building an enduring peace.

"For the first time since V-J Day we, the American people, face a clearly drawn basic issue. Here it is:

"It took courage to put forward the Marshall program. Shall we make good on the promise? Shall we use our great strength to lead the world toward recovery and peace?

"Or shall we disavow the Marshall promise—as once we disavowed the Wilson promise—and, by attempting to hoard our power, render it as useless as a miser's gold?

"The Russians cannot change this issue.

"They too have a decision to make. But their decision cannot now affect our decision any more than it could in early 1941. Now as then it can only make our task infinitely easier or vastly more difficult.

"The sooner we realize this—and the sooner the Russians realize it—the better."

That was my perhaps overoptimistic interpretation at the time. . . .

The Russian decision was not long delayed.

3. MOLOTOV'S WALKOUT

The British Government acted promptly to bring about a European conference which would consider how Europe should take the initiative in applying for the aid suggested by Mr. Marshall. Messrs. Bevin and Bidault met in Paris and invited Mr. Molotov to join them in order to discuss preliminary plans. But on June 19, before the Russian reply was received, Mr. Bevin delivered a defiant speech in Parliament in which he bluntly declared that Britain would go ahead with or without the Soviet Union—and, if necessary, against it—to bring about some degree of European unity. Referring to the recent Moscow Conference, he said that he would "not be a party to holding up the economic recovery of Europe by the mess of procedure, terms of reference, or all the paraphernalia which may go with it." And then he added belligerently: "If there is to be a conflict of ideologies, I shall regret it, but if it is forced upon us we must face it."

The first Soviet reply was received the following day, in the form of a Tass dispatch saying that Mr. Molotov was studying the Anglo-French invitation, but that the Soviet Government had insufficient information about the amount of United States aid which might be expected, or "about the conditions of the credits or the relation of the United Nations to this question." Nevertheless, on June 26, Mr. Molotov arrived in Paris with a delegation of 89 assistants.

Six days later, Mr. Molotov departed in anger, leaving a stunned world to realize that it was now actually split into two openly hostile camps.

When Mr. Molotov arrived, he encountered an atmosphere of take-it-or-leave-it on the part of Mr. Bevin and of highly nervous anxiety on the part of Mr. Bidault. The latter faced certain trouble with the strong French Communist Party in the event of his failure to reach agreement with Moscow. Bevin and Bidault had already prepared procedural suggestions including the appointment of several committees. They approached the matter from the point of view of producing an over-all European balance sheet by means of which the combined needs of the various countries would be balanced against their combined resources and the ultimate deficit presented to the United States. The reasons for this procedure were: first, that it seemed to be what Mr. Marshall had indicated; second, that there seemed to be no other way to base an application to the United States upon already functioning mutual aid and self-help; and third, that a piecemeal, country-by-country appeal for aid would almost certainly run afoul of political considerations in the American Congress.

Mr. Molotov's position boiled down to this:

First: The Anglo-French proposal constituted an infringement upon national sovereignty and an inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of the European nations. The needs of each nation should, therefore, be separately ascertained.

Second: There should be a distinction between former Allied, neutral, and enemy states. Those countries which had suffered German occupation and which had aided the Allied cause should receive first priority.

Third: The German problem must be treated as an entirely separate matter and by the Council of Foreign Ministers. It should not come before this conference.

Mr. Bidault tried hard to induce Mr. Molotov to consider a compromise proposal and to reassure him that the Anglo-French plan would not permit the invasion of the sovereign rights of the participating nations. Mr. Molotov's reply was merely to repeat his objections and to add a surly warning that the Anglo-French plan would divide Europe, would bring the recipients of American aid under American domination, and would have "nothing in common with the real interests of the peoples of Europe."

Mr. Bevin denounced Mr. Molotov's objections as "based on a complete travesty of the facts and a complete misrepresentation of everything the British Government had submitted." He and Mr. Bidault declared that they now intended immediately to go ahead with the proposed plan without Soviet participation. Mr. Molotov departed.

The next day Britain and France issued an invitation to twenty-two European nations, omitting only Spain and the Soviet Union.

For a short time after Mr. Molotov's departure, it looked as if at least some of the so-called Russian satellites might accept and attend the Conference. The Czechs and Poles had already expressed great interest. Finland, too, seemed anxious to participate. On July 8, Foreign Minister Masaryk of Czechoslovakia announced that his country would be represented at Paris. This was tactlessly hailed in the West as a break with the Soviet Union. Two days later, the Czech Government reversed its position.

On July 12, the Conference convened with sixteen nations participating: Britain, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg, Eire, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. The nations which had declined were: the Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Finland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Albania.

It would seem to have been quite possible for Mr. Molotov to have chosen a different course of action. He did not have to force a division of Europe into two hostile camps, thus creating the very "Western Bloc" which the Soviet Union had seemed rightly anxious to avoid; he could have sought to reach some modification of the proposal, instead of merely denouncing it and going home. Had he done so, he would either have obtained an acceptable compromise or, failing that, remained in a position to obstruct a program which he considered undesirable. As a matter of fact, he could have accepted almost any compromise—or even the original proposal—and have confidently relied upon the American Congress to repudiate it. I say this because I, for one, can scarcely believe that a Congress deliberately inflamed with hostility by Mr. Truman would have voted funds for any plan which included aid to the Soviet Union. This was the very great risk which Mr. Marshall had so courageously taken. Mr. Molotov's departure from Paris probably saved the United States from re-enacting the tragic repudiation of Wilson in 1919.

Even after he had left the Conference himself, it would still have been possible for Mr. Molotov to cause serious embarrassment to Mr. Marshall if he had encouraged Poland and Czechoslovakia to participate in the plan and to apply for a share of American aid. It seems very doubtful that Congress would have passed a plan which involved beneficiaries belonging to the Soviet orbit. Thus, Mr. Molotov had, and missed, a chance of proving to the world that the Marshall Plan —though intended by its author as a definite departure from the anti-Soviet Truman Doctrine—could actually obtain Congressional approval only if it were turned back into the Truman Doctrine. Mr. Molotov flatly assumed and asserted that the Marshall Plan was still in effect an anti-Soviet proposal. In making this assumption, he absolved Mr. Marshall of the dangerously difficult task of getting Congress to prove the contrary. Some of Mr. Marshall's own associates in the Department heaved an almost audible sigh of relief.

Why did Mr. Molotov take Mr. Marshall off the hook? Why did he do the very thing which would make it practically certain that the Marshall Plan could become a reality?

There were probably several reasons. To begin with, it is not hard to understand that Mr. Molotov was irritated by the proprietory, take-it-or-leave-it attitude of Mr. Bevin. This would scarcely have determined so far-reaching a decision, but it may well have influenced the abrupt manner in which it was taken.

More important—the plan as presented would have made every participating country open its books and lay its economic cards on the table. This was probably something that the Soviet Union did not wish to do—partly out of a sense of weakness and false national pride, partly because the Kremlin may not yet have been ready to take its own people fully into its confidence, and partly because the Kremlin considered secrecy about economic affairs a necessary part of military security.

Finally, it is by no means certain that it ever occurred to Mr. Molotov that the course he chose to follow was the one action needed to make the dreaded Marshall Plan a reality. In spite of all their elaborate intelligence-gathering machinery, the Russians are apparently not very good at evaluating the mass of information they receive, nor particularly adept at understanding the psychology of Western peoples. The same thing is very likely true of us in reverse.

Over and above all these possible explanations for what seems a serious tactical blunder on the part of Mr. Molotov, there is, of course, the overriding consideration of the context in which the Marshall proposal was put forward. No responsible American official had ever explicitly repudiated the Truman Doctrine, nor the Baylor speech, nor Mr. Acheson's theory of selectivity. The only specific evidence of repudiation of an anti-Soviet policy had been Mr. Marshall's one sentence: "Our policy is not directed against any country or doctrine. . . ." I happen to have believed at the time, and still believe, that Mr. Marshall meant what he said, and that he did not say more, simply because a Secretary of State does not explicitly repudiate his President. But, as

against this one sentence spoken by the Secretary of State, there must have been thousands upon thousands of words transmitted to Moscow reporting the hostile utterances of Senators and Congressmen, of Cabinet officials and/or irresponsible private citizens of prominence. Mr. Molotov's assumption—no matter how untrue or how unfortunate—was not an unnatural assumption for a naturally suspicious man to make.

And so the short chapter in United States foreign policy which one might call "Return to Reason" ended with the Soviet Union walking out and slamming the door.

CHAPTER SIX

The Period of Deployment

MR. MOLOTOV'S WALKOUT ended the slim chance that the Marshall Plan might become a true European Recovery Program and made certain that, if it materialized at all, it would be merely a plan to promote the recovery of Western Europe. Mr. Molotov's walkout likewise made it certain that anti-communism would be the chief motivation for a possible Congressional acceptance of a plan to promote Western European recovery. Finally, the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and of the countries of Eastern Europe meant that any hope of reaching an understanding on Germany and Austria at the next meeting of the Foreign Ministers in November had vanished.

The world was now clearly entering upon a period during which no basic decisions could be reached until each side had deployed its full strength and had an opportunity to appraise the fully deployed strength of the other.

A straight chronological treatment of this period would be confusing. It will better serve our purpose to consider separately first the development of Western deployment and then the unfolding of Eastern strategy and strength. It is no accident that military terms most readily serve to describe this phase of recent history.

1. DEPLOYMENT OF THE WEST

A. THREE TRUTHS IGNORED

Immediately after the departure of the Soviet Foreign Minister, the sixteen Western nations set about working out their proposal to the United States. Their frame of reference was to develop and document a four-year plan for their own economic recovery, based upon the maximum of self-help on the part of each participant, the maximum of mutual aid among the participants, and a final appeal to the United States for help in meeting gradually diminishing deficits.

In starting out upon this task, the sixteen nations immediately became acutely conscious of three facts which stood in contradiction to their terms of reference.

First: It was apparent that, no matter what the political situation, Western Europe simply did not exist as an economic entity with which a realistic plan might deal. All of Europe was one trading community—one economic entity—in which the Eastern countries habitually supplied food and raw materials while the Western nations absorbed the Eastern surplus raw products, providing manufactured articles in return. Any plan for West European recovery would, therefore, have to presuppose at least some exchange of goods and services across the line which now was drawn from Stettin in the north to Trieste in the south. Unless it did presuppose such trade, a West European plan would show a recurring annual deficit so large that it would be quite unrealistic to assume that the United States would care to meet it.

Second: It was equally apparent that any plan numbering Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, and the Netherlands among its sixteen participants would have to be a plan not merely for Western Europe but for large parts of Africa and Asia as well. As a matter of fact, one of the first moves made by the conferees was to lay down the principle that the countries possessing empires or colonies must be considered as units including such non-European possessions. Without such an assumption, it was clear that the ultimate deficits would reach impossible proportions.

Third: The conferees were forced to recognize that any figures they might arrive at would in the last analysis be meaningless unless prices in the United States were going to be held at a reasonably stable level. The European nations needed not just money, but goods of all sorts, the largest part of which they would have to purchase in the United States. Since the over-all plan had to be expressed in dollars, it would have to rest upon the assumption that the purchasing power of the borrowed dollars would not decline appreciably during the life of the planned program.

These three considerations should have been of immediate and important significance to the men who were shaping American policy on this side of the water. They led inescapably to three conclusions:

1. The Marshall Plan must be accompanied by an American political policy designed not only to make trade across the so-called Iron Curtain possible but to stimulate it to the maximum extent. This would require a considerable campaign of public education, especially in view of the fact that anti-communism had so far supplied most of the fuel to keep Mr. Marshall's pot boiling.

2. The question of United States aid to Asia and other parts of the world could not be simply brushed aside on the theory of "first things first." Parts of Asia and Africa were inextricably involved in any plan for

Western Europe. As such, they were part of the first things that came first. Unless this were foreseen and diligently explained to the American people, the economically irrelevant but politically explosive question of China would be sure to arise and confuse the issue.

3. Finally, any American program designed to make the Marshall promise a reality must be accompanied by a program of effective domestic inflation controls. This again required a carefully thought-out program of action and a campaign of education to support such action—especially in view of the approaching election.

Unfortunately, it took months before the United States Government came to draw these conclusions. By that time the fat was in the Congressional fire. In part, this was because the conclusions were politically unpalatable. In part, it was due to other developments which took place while the West European plan was being shaped—developments which demanded immediate attention and action.

B. SLOW MOTION IN WASHINGTON

The first of these events was the British sterling crisis. Not only were Britain's borrowed dollars running out, for reasons already discussed (i.e., the severe winter and the American price rise), but July 15, 1947, was the day upon which Britain had promised to lift currency controls and make the pound sterling freely convertible. No sooner had the British fulfilled this promise than a run started on sterling which drained the British Treasury of almost its last foreign exchange resources. It was not until August 20 that, by agreement with the United States Government, exchange controls were finally reimposed. But in the meantime a severe shock had been administered not only to Britain but to the entire West European economy. Mr. Lewis W. Douglas, our Ambassador in Britain, had been warning of just such a development for months.

Moreover, it was plainly evident to Mr. Douglas—and for that matter to any reasonably intelligent observer—that some of the Western European countries would need stopgap aid in substantial amounts long before the long-range Marshall Plan could become a reality. Here again, Washington was almost incredibly slow to react. The danger signals were flying in July, warning that a widespread drought might finish what the abnormal winter had begun in destroying the 1947 crops. Yet it was not until September 3, long after the worst fears were realized, that Undersecretary of State Lovett publicly recognized the growing crisis and told the American people, "It is later than we think."

One reason for the delay was that Congress was in recess, several of its committees were traveling in Europe to acquire firsthand information, and both the President and the Secretary of State were in Brazil attending the Western Hemisphere Conference. Mr. Marshall arrived back in Washington by plane on September 3, having told the Latin-American countries that the United States recovery plan did not at present include economic assistance for any nations outside of Western Europe. On September 10, the Secretary endorsed Mr. Lovett's statement on the European crisis and announced that the facts and figures concerning interim aid would be ready for the Congressional committees *by the end of October*. On the same day, President Truman, boarding the battleship *Missouri* for a leisurely trip home, let it be known that, in his judgment, there was "nothing on the horizon to require a quick return to the United States."

I was in Europe at the time—a Europe which realized that it would literally starve and freeze to death in the coming winter unless American aid were quickly forthcoming. I can only say that it was both difficult and embarrassing for an American to explain that it was lack of understanding rather than apathy which caused this unbelievable slow-motion performance.

On September 29, the President finally announced that France, Italy, and Austria would need interim aid amounting to $580,000,000 to see them through until March 31, 1948, by which time the recovery program would presumably be in action. He said that he "was writing"—not telegraphing—the chairmen of the various Congressional committees asking them to call their committees in October. Meantime, a Citizens Committee for the Voluntary Conservation of Food was appointed and the famous meatless Tuesdays and poultryless Thursdays were put into effect. The President evoked the impression of a man, reluctantly aroused from slumber, shooting in a leisurely manner at a charging elephant with a bean-shooter.

The New York *Herald Tribune* observed that Mr. Truman had "apparently elected to sit tight and hope for a miracle which would relieve him of the necessity of making a decision that might prove politically unpopular." The New York *Times* commented more sedately: "The Marshall Plan, temporary aid, food conservation and price controls cannot be more than dreams without popular support and understanding. These cannot be enlisted without courage, conviction and leadership which, it appears, are not to be had from President Truman."

It was not until October 23 that the President finally made up his mind to call an extraordinary session of Congress. (See Appendix, page 66.) He issued the call for November 17. In doing so, he provided one agreeable surprise—he grasped the nettle of domestic inflation controls at the same time that he finally came down off the fence on the necessity for quick Congressional action. Unfortunately, the value of this politically courageous decision was impaired by another one of those ill-considered press conference remarks made a few days earlier. The President, when asked whether he was considering rationing and price controls, had characterized these two primary means for controlling inflation as "methods of a police state."

The special session convened on November 17. In his message on the opening day (Appendix, page 76), President Truman stated a forthright case for granting $597,000,000 of interim aid to France, Italy, and Austria. He coupled this request with a plea for extensive powers to the Executive with which to control the rising inflation in this country. Among other powers, such as that to control exports, speculation on the commodity exchanges, transportation and shipping facilities,

he asked for the power to apply, if necessary, the very methods he had condemned as "the methods of a police state"—namely, price controls, allocation, and rationing of scarce commodities.

The proposals were debated for just over a month. The Interim Aid Bill passed both Houses, in spite of a determined effort by a Republican group to earmark a substantial amount of the proposed funds for China. This group was egged on by former Ambassador Bullitt, Governor Dewey of New York, and the powerful Luce publications. At the last moment before the adjournment, on December 19, the same attack was renewed—this time successfully—on the Appropriations Bill, with the result that the total amount of interim aid was cut down to $540,000,000, with $18,000,000 earmarked for China. Thus $75,000,000 was cut off the appropriation for Europe. One of the three chickens had come home to roost.

The second chicken—failure to prepare public opinion for the need for inflation controls—likewise came home to roost in the shape of an emasculated Anti-Inflation Bill, sponsored by the Republicans under the leadership of Senator Taft. It provided the President with none of the essential powers for which he had asked.

The third omission—namely, that of failing to make Congress and the public realize that the whole Marshall program depended upon a political policy designed to stimulate rather than prevent trading with the Soviet orbit—remained to be faced in 1948.

C. THE SIXTEEN NATION REPORT

While these developments were taking place on the more immediate problem of winter aid, the Paris Conference labored over the long-range proposal. Toward the end of August, a first draft was taking shape. This showed a total deficit for the four-year program of something over $28,000,000,000. Undersecretaries Clayton and Lovett and Messrs. Kennan and Bonesteel of the State Department flew to Paris post-haste on the twenty-ninth, in order to make it clear that no such amount could be considered. They criticized the proposal as merely a compilation of "shopping lists" and insisted on a much greater emphasis upon self-help and mutual aid.

The plan was restudied and revised, the total figure being reduced to about $22,000,000,000. Mr. Clayton once more criticized the revised plan as showing insufficient co-operation among the participants, insufficient facts as to the individual nations, and a lack of provision for the convertibility of currencies and the reduction of trade barriers. The heaviest emphasis was upon the last of these criticisms. Having just come from the International Trade Conference at Geneva, where he had successfully engineered the completion of an international trade charter and the adoption of much of the United States program of "liberal trade policies," Mr. Clayton now wished to see these same policies incorporated in the recovery plan. His reasoning was much like that which had forced the fatal convertibility and nondiscrimination clauses into the British Loan Agreement of 1945.

With the British experience fresh in their minds, the European conferees were aghast. They did not wish to make the mistake, which Britain had made, of agreeing under duress to do the impossible. Yet they also did not wish to antagonize the United States or delay the completion of the plan. The result was a somewhat tongue-in-cheek agreement on the part of thirteen nations to "study the possibilities of a customs union."

The episode is important because it illustrates one of the dangerous continuing contradictions in United States policy: namely, the contradiction between wanting to see the whole economy of Western Europe carefully planned out for a number of years, while at the same time strongly objecting to any evidence of government planning or control of the economies of the individual nations. This is not only a confusion of long-range objectives with emergency *ad hoc* programs. It is an assertion of a predilection for laissez-faire economics together with an admission that laissez-faire economics cannot do the job with which the world is now faced.

The report of the sixteen nations was finally signed on September 20 and sent off. The experts of the sixteen nations were then invited to Washington and thoroughly cross-examined by an inter-departmental committee.

Within the next month, the report was published in full, along with the reports of three major committees appointed in June by the President to assess our own resources and the feasibility of carrying out a European Recovery Program. All four documents deserve careful study in the original. They form the basis of the plan finally proposed to Congress by President Truman in his message of December 19—the last day of the special session.

Briefly, the Sixteen Nation Report (Appendix, page 58) recorded the determination of the signatories to make every effort to raise their own production of vital goods during the next four years. Grain and cereal production was to reach the prewar level by 1951. Sugar and potatoes were to be greatly increased over prewar, with some increases in fats and oil. Coal was to reach a figure a third higher than 1947, electricity 40 per cent higher, steel 80 per cent higher, which would be 20 per cent above 1938. Oil refining was to reach two and a half times above the prewar level. The Report set forth various means for mutual help and the relaxing of trade barriers. It stated frankly that, without large supplies of food, fuel, raw material, and capital equipment from the American continent, "the whole plan will be in jeopardy." The combined deficit of the sixteen nations, plus western Germany, over the four-year period was estimated at $22,440,000,000, a small part of which might be obtained from sources other than the United States.

The sixteen nations formally stressed that the goals set in their proposal could not possibly be met unless there were trade between Eastern and Western Europe. They also stated that the soundness of their calculations depended upon a stable price level in the United States.

The Krug Committee Report (Appendix, page 62) assessed the resources of the United States and found that we were well able to render the required aid.

The Committee of Economic Experts (Appendix,

page 67) stressed the danger of inflation and the need for controlling it, while stating that our refusal to aid Europe would mean industrial paralysis in this country.

The Harriman Committee (Appendix, page 69) recommended in favor of the Marshall program, warned against attaching any conditions against socialization, but placed a heavy emphasis upon anti-communism as the chief reason for undertaking the program. It also pointed out that certain items requested by the European nations could not be met in full. The most important of these reservations implicitly raised the question whether the American steel industry was actually doing its utmost to increase production or holding back in order to protect its high price and profit structure.

Besides these basic documents, there are several others which merit careful study. Particularly:

Secretary Marshall's statement to the Congressional committees of November 10 (Appendix, page 73)

The National Association of Manufacturers' release of November 10, which demanded, among other things, a ban against socialization (Appendix, page 76)

President Truman's message of November 17 (Appendix, page 76)

Senator Taft's rebuttal of November 17 (Appendix, page 79)

President Truman's message of December 19, proposing the four-year program (Appendix, page 85)

The President's message of December 19 combined the European report with the recommendations of those who had studied it and co-ordinated it with our domestic picture. It cut down certain specific items and reduced the four-year figure to $17,000,000,000, chiefly by eliminating the European request for $3,000,000,000 to stabilize currencies.

Thus ended the period of deployment of American power in the year 1947. The big battles in Congress still remained to be fought. Until they were won or lost, neither we nor the Russians would know what effective power the United States could muster for the struggle.

2. DEPLOYMENT IN THE EAST

The parallel deployment in the East was doubtless attended by discussions and debates in the Politburo closely resembling our own deliberations. Unfortunately, unlike ours, they were held in secrecy. We can, therefore, only guess at what happened. Prior to March 12, 1947, two major points of view were very likely represented. The one would be the orthodox Marxist-Leninist view that a conflict with the chief exponent and bulwark of "capitalist imperialism" was unavoidable; this would lead to the truculent intransigence typified by Mr. Molotov. The other view, sometimes publicly expressed by Stalin, would be that the socialist U.S.S.R. and the capitalist U.S.A. could live peacefully in the same world; this would lead to a policy of conciliation.

In the constant clash of these viewpoints, one may be sure that there was frequent speculation as to what might be the real intentions of the United States, much as we were speculating about the real intentions of the Soviet Union. Conjectures about the United States would very likely be confused by Russian inability to distinguish between official statements of American policy by responsible statesmen and unofficial pronouncements by irresponsible former statesmen, would-be statesmen, or private groups. Moreover, American intentions would be appraised through the eyes of men accustomed to purposeful deviousness and conspiracy rather than to straightforward expression of diverse opinion.

The effect of the Truman Doctrine upon the Politburo must obviously have been to strengthen the hands of the irreconcilables and to weaken the arguments of the moderates. Subsequent events clearly show that this is what actually happened. Before the Marshall speech of June 5 was ever made, the Politburo had almost certainly decided upon a plan of counteraction. There seems no doubt whatsoever that the subsequent and very different approach by Secretary Marshall was taken by the Kremlin as merely a more skillful implementation of the Truman Doctrine. This may have been partly because no clear disavowal of the Truman Doctrine had accompanied the Marshall program; perhaps even more because the Russians had by this time made up and closed their minds.

Be that as it may, Mr. Molotov went into action. The Moscow Conference on Germany was wrecked. Trade negotiations with Britain were broken off. A Hungarian coup was engineered. The Paris Conference was left talking to itself about Western Europe instead of concerning itself with all of Europe. Increasing pressure was exerted within Austria, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, and even Czechoslovakia. Finally, at the Assembly of the United Nations in September, Mr. Vishinsky launched into protracted vitriolic denunciation and abuse of the Western powers and especially of the United States.

The economic aspects of what was soon to develop into the Molotov Plan began to assume shape and substance, in the form of bilateral trade treaties between the Soviet Union and the various countries in the Soviet orbit. The details of these treaties were carefully kept secret, but enough information leaked out to show that some of them at least were very far from satisfactory to the smaller countries.

On October 5 the formation of the "Cominform" was announced (Appendix, page 60). This was to be a permanent co-ordinating committee of the Communist Parties of the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia plus the Communist Parties of France and Italy. The activities of these nine Communist Parties were already only too well co-ordinated. Most of them were dominated by men trained in Moscow. Clearly, more was intended than mere co-ordination. One sentence in the Manifesto provided an interesting clue. "The main danger for the working class at this moment," it said, "lies in the underestimation of its own strength and the overestimation of the force of the imperialist camp." This was an expression of fear. The Marshall Plan—seen by Moscow as a logical development of the Truman Doctrine—had struck a far more jumpy nerve than the original Truman pronouncement. It is important to understand why.

The Truman Doctrine was belligerent, but it was couched in confused ideological and political terms. If it raised any clear rallying-cry, it seemed to make the maintenance of political freedoms, as understood by the West, the cardinal issue. This did not in the least frighten the Kremlin. If the cold war was to be fought over this issue, the Politburo probably felt no serious apprehensions, especially so long as the United States continued to stultify its position by coddling Franco, Salazar, and the Latin-American dictatorships.

The economic approach of the far less belligerent Marshall Plan was quite another matter.

The Russians were well aware that the great issue in most of Europe—both East and West—was not, in 1947, an ideological issue. Men with reasonably full bellies might someday in the future worry about political forms and freedoms. But at this moment, the burning question was one of food, fuel, clothing, shelter, and opportunity to earn a living. As soon as the United States began talking in these terms, the Kremlin sensed a real danger. The declaration issued at Warsaw on October 5 was, in effect, a declaration of war against the Marshall Plan.

General Andrei Zhdanov, one of the nine men of the Politburo, presided at the Warsaw meeting, where he delivered an 18,000-word report to the assembled communist leaders. Speaking of the Marshall Plan, he is reported to have said: "The Soviet Union will make every effort to see that this plan is not realized." Zhdanov then presented Molotov's alternative to the Marshall Plan. It appeared to be something like this: "Through bilateral barter agreements with the Soviet Union, any European country can obtain what it needs without recourse to American dollar loans." "Treaties with the U.S.S.R. constitute agreements of reciprocal advantage for both parties," Mr. Zhdanov is reported to have said. "They never contain anything which could injure the sovereignty of the contracting parties." He contrasted this proposal with "the unjust agreements based on the inequality of rights which the U.S. is concluding and preparing. Thus," he concluded, "the U.S.S.R. clearly shows the way in which Europe can find a way out of its difficult economic situation."

The great weakness in this Molotov Plan—which no amount of propaganda could conceal—was that the U.S.S.R. could not possibly supply the requirements of the various European countries, especially their need for machines, railway equipment, and other capital goods. The United States could and would supply most of these requirements if it carried through the Marshall Plan. That was what the Kremlin was afraid of. And so the Kremlin set out to distract the United States from its course by trying to provoke Washington into an irrelevant propaganda battle, by dragging ideological herrings across the path of the great American debate, and by alternately sabotaging and helping recovery in the West European countries.

President Truman at once indignantly repudiated the charge that the United States had embarked upon a policy of "imperialism and enslavement." He endorsed Undersecretary Lovett's declaration that the nations represented in the Cominform were "trying to prevent, if they can, the economic recovery of Europe." From the point of view of world opinion, this was not a skillful reply.

In order to maintain that the Kremlin was trying to sabotage European recovery, it was necessary to show that the Kremlin's alternative, the Molotov Plan, could not bring about European recovery. No attempt was made to do this. Furthermore, it seemed unwise to tell the six Eastern nations that we considered them wholly identified with what we believed to be the destructive Russian purpose—first, because it was quite obvious that two of them at least (the Czechs and Poles) had no desire to sabotage European recovery; and second, because the success of our own program was dependent upon East-West trade in Europe.

The Molotov Plan was also dependent upon East-West trade, and the Kremlin proceeded very quickly to demonstrate that it was fully aware of the fact. Whereas our inclination was to write off and ostracize the peoples in the Soviet orbit, Moscow took the opposite tack with regard to the Western European nations. Using its only available surplus products, grain and lumber, as bait, it offered trade treaties to both Britain and France. The French negotiations were later broken off, but the Anglo-Soviet treaty was concluded before the end of the year. Perhaps more important, Poland was permitted to export substantial quantities of coal to the Western nations.

In one other respect, the Cominform declarations also showed the Kremlin to be more realistic than Washington. Whereas we were still very uncertain as to whether the middle-of-the-road socialists in Western Europe were our friends or our enemies, no such uncertainty troubled Moscow. The Communist Party leaders denounced Attlee, Blum, Saragat, and Schumacher as traitors to the working class and tools of capitalist imperialism. The attack upon the Western socialist leaders was even more violent than the denunciation of the United States. This should have given pause to those Americans who were clamoring for conditioning American aid upon agreement by the European beneficiaries to halt socialization.

Finally, while we were making somewhat empty unilateral pronouncements of our determination that Italy must remain "a free and democratic nation"—while we were ruefully viewing the wreckage of our ill-advised adventure in Greece—the communists proceeded to inspire the setting up of a revolutionary provisional government in that country. With this move, civil war began in earnest and the danger loomed that Greece might become another Spain. The move in Greece was no doubt part of a long-range Soviet scheme to create a Balkan federation in which Yugoslavia would play the key role.

3. EFFECT ON EUROPE

The effect on Europe of the twofold deployment of the rival powers was immediately noticeable in a number of ways.

The unfolding of the American potential gave heart to all of Western Europe excepting only the faithful followers of Moscow. The mere hope of American aid

broke the paralysis of despair. Tired and hungry people went to work with renewed vigor. Production mounted, especially in the British Isles.

In France and Italy, this favorable result was temporarily checked in November by the outbreak of a wave of strikes and demonstrations. These were without doubt inspired by the communist leadership of the trade unions. To say this is not, however, to say that the communist trade union leaders were acting simply on orders from Moscow or to serve Moscow's purposes. High prices, black markets, scarcity of consumer goods and hoarding of food by farmers had brought about conditions in which any trade union leadership would have had to seek relief for the wage earners. The situation was made to order for anyone who could see political profit in causing trouble. Both the communists and the extreme conservatives seized the opportunity.

The assurance of stopgap aid, for the winter months at least, enabled the French and Italian Governments to take a firm stand, to break the strikes, and to begin to tackle the underlying economic problems which had caused them.

On the debit side of the ledger, the anti-communist spirit of the developing American program encouraged the resurgence of the reactionary forces in both countries, led to severe repressive measures, and caused a dangerous weakening of the moderate democratic socialists. In Italy, the de Gasperi Government became a coalition of the Center with the Right. In France, Ramadier and then Schuman managed to maintain a Center Government, precariously balanced between the communists on one side and the reawakened reaction on the other. General de Gaulle re-emerged upon the political scene as the leader of the Right eager to assume power. De Gaulle demanded new elections and a new constitution. He began talking of a "strong state," of abolishing trade unions and political parties, and in other ways sounded strongly reminiscent of Benito Mussolini in the early days of Italian fascism.

The twofold deployment of rival power produced more or less the same effect throughout all of Europe—namely, to force people everywhere more and more into one of the two extreme political positions. Not only was Europe split down the middle, but every country, every city, and every rural community was similarly affected. The ordinary man, who sees most things in varying shades of gray, was increasingly compelled to make a choice in terms of black or white, and increasingly unhappy at the prospect.

4. THE LONDON CONFERENCE

In this atmosphere of mounting tension between East and West, the Council of Foreign Ministers met at London on November 25, in order to make one more half-hearted attempt to reach agreement on Germany and Austria. The conference lasted for three futile weeks and adjourned without even fixing a date for another meeting.

Before leaving for London, Mr. Marshall made an important general pronouncement of policy. This was at Chicago on November 18. Here again is a document which should be read in full. (Appendix, page 81.) The Secretary once more explained the crisis of production in Europe and the American interest in helping to overcome it. He sought to dispel any idea that the American program rested upon imperial design, aggressive purpose, or desire to provoke a third world war. To prove this, he cited the record of history. He reaffirmed that "this Government is willing to co-operate with every nation that pledges a generous effort to the common cause of European recovery." Concerning the Soviet Union, he said:

> Unfortunately, it has become apparent that the third great power which contributed so much to the common victory evidently does not share that purpose. For reasons that are still obscure, it is endeavoring apparently to prolong the present unsatisfactory state of affairs indefinitely. If this purpose prevails, obviously the prosperous European community we knew before the war cannot be re-established within the foreseeable future.
>
> This [said Mr. Marshall] brings me to an important conclusion. It is this divergence of purpose concerning the future of Europe which is the cause of many of the present differences between the United States and Soviet Russia. The divergence is not due to any direct clash between the national interests of these powers. It is my belief that if Europe is restored as a solvent and vigorous community, this issue will have been decided and the disturbing conflict between ourselves and the Soviets, in so far as Europe is concerned, will lessen.

"The place to begin," said the Secretary, "is Europe."

One is struck by the circular nature of this analysis. It would have seemed more logical to say that the place to begin was with an over-all U.S.-U.S.S.R. conference, since "the divergence of purpose" between the two great powers did not exist merely in Europe, but just as much in Asia and other parts of the world. One must bear in mind, however, that Secretary Marshall was about to attend a four-power conference on Germany and Austria, to which he had been committed since April, and that, in these circumstances, he could not very well say that there was no use talking about any single European problem—or the whole European problem—until an over-all understanding had been reached with the Soviet Union.

The London Conference was merely a dreary repetition of the earlier failure at Moscow. Mr. Molotov used it, as he had used previous conferences, as a sounding board for Soviet propaganda. He told the peoples of Europe that the heart of the Marshall Plan was the rebuilding of western Germany as an arsenal; and, in the same breath, he told the Germans that only the Soviet Union wanted to see Germany reunited as a strong, happy, and prosperous nation. The same old arguments over the same old disagreements on boundaries, reparations, and the nature of the new German state led to the same dead-end as before. A slight gleam of hope emerged with regard to an Austrian settlement, but by this time adjournment had become inevitable.

The Secretary flew home and on the very night of his arrival—December 19—broadcast his report to the American people. (Appendix, page 84.) Once more Mr. Marshall clearly and patiently outlined the major points upon which it had been impossible to reach agreement. In conclusion, the Secretary made a number of highly significant statements:

It finally became clear that we could make no progress at this time—that there was no apparent wish to reach a settlement, but only an interest in making more and more speeches intended for another audience. So I suggested we adjourn. No real ground was lost or gained at this meeting, except that the outlines of the problems and the obstacles are much clearer. We cannot look forward to a united Germany at this time. We must do the best we can in the area where our influence can be felt.

After outlining the difficulties to be surmounted in reaching a German settlement, the Secretary said that there was "another and more fundamental reason for the frustration we have encountered. As the result of the war," he said, "a political vacuum has been created and, until this vacuum has been filled by the restoration of a healthy European community, it does not appear possible that paper agreements can assure a lasting peace. Agreements between sovereign states are generally the reflection and not the cause of genuine settlements."

And then came the most important passage:

The Soviet Union has recognized the situation in its frank declaration of hostility and opposition to the European Recovery Program. [Note that Mr. Marshall is now talking about opposition to our program—not opposition to European recovery.]

The success of such a program would necessarily mean the establishment of a balance, in which the sixteen Western nations, who have bound their hopes and efforts together, would be rehabilitated, strong in forms of government which guarantee true freedom, opportunity to the individual, and protection against the terror of government tyranny.

The issue is really clear-cut and I fear there can be no settlement until the coming months demonstrate whether or not the civilization of Western Europe will prove vigorous enough to rise above the destructive effects of the war and restore a healthy society. Officials of the Soviet Union and leaders of the Communist parties openly predict that this restoration will not take place. We, on the other hand, are confident in the rehabilitation of Western European civilization with its freedoms. Until the result of this struggle becomes clearly apparent, there will continue to be very real difficulty to resolve even on paper agreed terms for a treaty of peace.

Mr. Marshall had now stated what he had refrained from stating a month earlier. There was no dog chasing his tail about this analysis. Nor was there any repetition of the dangerous confusion between Soviet opposition to *our* program for European recovery and Soviet opposition to European recovery as such. Implicitly, also, the Secretary seemed to recognize that there was a vast difference between communist policy in Eastern Europe and communist policy in the West. This distinction had so far apparently eluded our Government. We had adopted the cliché that all communists want chaos because chaos produces communism. We had until now ignored the fact that Soviet leadership had learned that chaos in Europe could quite easily lead to fascism.

Anyone who wandered about behind the so-called Iron Curtain in 1947 could hardly fail to realize: First, that recovery in Eastern Europe had, on the whole, been at least as rapid as in the West—especially in Finland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Second, that, far from obstructing recovery in these countries, the Communist Parties had, for the most part, led the way. And, third, that the prestige of the communists in Eastern Europe rested far more upon pragmatic than upon ideological grounds. The communists were the ones who had broken up the feudal estates and carried out land reform in these primarily agricultural countries—a basic measure desired for years but never accomplished by non-communist liberals. The communists had led the way in working out the various two-year, three-year, or five-year plans for economic rehabilitation, with which the majority of non-communists were in substantial agreement. The communists commanded the respect of Eastern Europeans precisely because they had brought order out of the postwar chaos—even though it was a ruthless order enforced by varying degrees of terror.

This was the cardinal fact with which a realistic American program would have to reckon—a fact which had become obscured by the obstructive tactics of the communists in the Western countries.

In other words, we were not entering into a struggle with the U.S.S.R. for and against European recovery. We were entering into a competition with the U.S.S.R. to see which one of us could best promote recovery in its half of a divided Europe.

What sort of competition was it to be? In the answer to that question lay the future of Europe and, very likely, the future of mankind upon this planet.

There are two ways of trying to win a race. One is to run faster than your opponent. The other is to trip him up or knock him over the head. If the two giants were now about to vie with each other in constructive effort, the world had little to fear from their competition. It would then be in the nature of things that the two great powers would sooner or later find themselves cooperating rather than competing. But if the two great powers were about to spend their energies primarily in trying to frustrate each other's efforts, the clearly foreseeable result would be failure—and perhaps war.

One final note on Germany: The failure of the London Conference made it certain that Britain and the United States would now proceed to organize "Bizonia" as an integral part of that Western Europe in which the Marshall Plan was to operate. This raised four important questions to be answered in 1948.

First: Would France join her zone to Bizonia? Or would she hold off because of her objections to an even partially unified Germany?

Second: What were the Anglo-American intentions concerning the Ruhr? Were the Ruhr industries to be turned back to the Germans? And, if so, to what Germans? Were they to be socialized, or were they to be turned over to German "free enterprise"? These questions about the Ruhr were closely related to the question of future French attitude. If the Ruhr were to be "internationalized," the French would probably join in the unification of Western Germany. But political "internationalization" involved a number of dangerous pitfalls of which the British and Americans seemed well aware. My own studies led me, over a year ago, to propose a solution of the Ruhr problem which still seems to me to meet both sides of the dilemma. This was the creation of a Ruhr Coal Authority—somewhat like our TVA—which would have the power to allocate Ruhr coal to the various countries of Europe, including Germany, on the

basis of their respective peaceful requirements. Such an Authority might and should eventually develop into a European Coal Authority, with power to allocate all European coal to the various users. Even if limited at the outset to the allocation of Ruhr coal, the Authority would thereby automatically control the level of steel production and other heavy industry in Germany and most of the other Western European countries. Thus the French would be protected against the rehabilitation of the "Ruhr arsenal" and at the same time the pitfalls of political internationalization would be avoided.

Third: A very tricky and immediate question was left for Britain and the United States in effecting the economic unification of their zones without, in fact, creating so much of a political entity in Western Germany as to block the road to eventual unification with the East. Even without committing the ultimate folly of slamming the door by making a separate peace and creating a definite West German sovereignty, the Western Allies faced the danger of playing into Russian hands by making it appear to the Germans that they—rather than the Soviet Union—were responsible for keeping Germany divided.

This question led to the fourth and last: Would the Soviet Union itself slam the door on eventual unification by trying to oust the Western Allies from Berlin, on the grounds that their action in western Germany had violated the Potsdam Agreement and rendered the Allied Control Commission useless and obsolete? And, if the Russians did thus turn the facts upside down and undertake such a move, would they, in the face of Allied refusal to leave, try to carry it out by such sanctions as shutting off power and light from the Allied Sectors of the German capital?

These four questions composed a dangerous pile of dry tinder in the heart of the European Continent.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Where Do We Go From Here?

1. TAKING STOCK

To summarize briefly, Secretary Marshall's first year in office was a year in which the collapse of the wartime coalition was officially acknowledged—a year which split the world into two camps, one led by the Soviet Union and one by the United States. This had a profound effect upon all international relationships, upon the United Nations, and upon affairs within all nations.

The year 1947 was also noteworthy for a pronounced change in British foreign policy, which might be described both as a withdrawal from former commitments associated with traditional British imperialism and as a step forward toward a more enlightened colonial policy and the building of a stronger British Commonwealth. The outstanding features of this change were: the freeing of India, Burma, and Ceylon; the withdrawal from Egypt and the concentration of British Middle Eastern power in Tanganyika; and the yielding up of the British Mandate over Palestine. The turning over of the Palestinian problem to the United Nations led to the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state —a solution which, for once, brought the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. into agreement. Early in 1947, British foreign policy veered away from the Truman Doctrine toward a middle course between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., and then shifted back, after Mr. Molotov's walkout, to one of increasing solidarity with the Marshall Plan.

The United Nations had a difficult and trying year. The Security Council's work was frustrated by Soviet vetoes, especially with regard to the action recommended by the Balkan Commission in the case of Greece. At the meeting of the General Assembly on September 17, Secretary Marshall offered a program for a more effective United Nations. (Appendix, page 56.) He asked the Assembly to act on three important stalemates —Greece, Korea, and Palestine. He referred to the need for pushing on with atomic control and disarmament, suggested that the Assembly consider a modification of the veto power in the Security Council, and set up an Interim Committee on Peace and Security to sit continuously. This Committee (known as the Little Assembly) was created over the protest of the Soviet Union. A Korean Commission was appointed, likewise over Soviet protest. The only concrete accomplishment was on the Palestinian question—and this, while settled in theory, remained to be worked out in practice.

One other important matter, which can be noted only briefly here, was the completion at Geneva of a draft charter for the International Trade Organization. This was submitted to the Havana Conference in November. This charter—a sort of constitution for world trade—merits careful study (for full text, see Appendix, page 91).

During 1947, United States policy moved through three stages. The first marked the abandonment of a policy of drifting along in the hope of somehow finding a *modus vivendi* with the Soviet Union, in favor of a policy of quasi-military containment of the Soviet Union. The second was a somewhat tentative attempt to shift from negative anti-communism (or anti-Sovietism) to a positive program of promoting world economic recovery. The third stage, arising chiefly from failure to "unsell" the Truman Doctrine here and abroad, was a reluctant retreat to a policy of promoting recovery in only those countries which would take a stand with us against the Soviet Union.

During the same period, the Soviet Union shifted from its immediate postwar policy of "pushing against mushiness" in order to wring the last drop of advantage

out of the wartime agreements, to a policy of blocking what it conceived to be a U.S.-led anti-Soviet crusade. It did not accept the bona fides of Mr. Marshall's attempted shift to a positive policy of co-operative reconstruction. On the contrary, it saw in the projected Marshall Plan an even greater threat than that implied in the earlier Truman Doctrine. The Kremlin thereupon likewise shifted to a third phase, in which the negative impulse to block or distract the American effort was paralleled by the Molotov Plan to promote recovery, especially in those countries which would side with the Soviet Union against the United States. The Kremlin, however, did not confine the Molotov Plan to aiding only the countries in the Soviet orbit.

Let us try now to appraise the relative potential of the two rival recovery plans.

The Marshall Plan was the plan of a nation which wanted to preserve its own peace and prosperity and which was in the process of recognizing that prosperity as well as peace had become indivisible. It was the plan of a nation which enjoyed the highest living standard in the world, was currently the source of something like two-thirds of the world's total production, and was momentarily the sole possessor of atomic weapons. The Marshall Plan was the expression of an enlightened self-interest on the part of the strongest nation on the earth in the economic recovery of the rest of the world.

The Molotov Plan was the plan of a nation acutely conscious of its economic weakness and anxious to strengthen itself without prejudice to its national pride. It was the plan of a war-ravaged nation with a very low living standard, determined to improve it by extracting reparations from its former enemies or making deals with anyone wherever a deal could profitably be made. It was less the expression of self-interest in the recovery of others than the expression of a desire to meet immediate and pressing needs.

The Marshall Plan, besides being the product of enlightened self-interest, was also the product of fear. The fear was of two kinds—fear that the Soviet Union's nationalistic expansionism might become a threat to peace, and fear that the mere existence of communism in large areas of the world might be a threat to "freedom, democracy, and prosperity" everywhere. In simpler terms, it was fear for the maintenance of the American status quo.

The Molotov Plan was likewise partially the product of fear, but fear of almost the reverse nature. This fear was also twofold—fear that the United States might use its preponderant economic power to form an anti-Soviet coalition, and fear that the United States might use its preponderant military power to start an atomic war to prevent revolutionary change. In simpler terms, it was a fear lest Russia's status quo be perpetuated.

The techniques of the two plans varied, as might be expected. The Molotov Plan relied upon bilateral government-to-government bargaining in order to derive the maximum advantage for the U.S.S.R. out of the relatively limited surplus resources which could be squeezed out of the hard-pressed Soviet economy. The Marshall Plan relied upon an over-all multilateral approach in order to accomplish the most with the least sacrifice and also in order to promote those "liberal trade policies" which we considered essential as a protection for free enterprise.

It is apparent that neither the Marshall Plan nor the Molotov Plan can succeed if an insurmountable barrier to trade is erected between the two areas in which the respective plans operate. The Russians realize this and are seeking to push their bilateral trade agreements into the Marshall Plan area. The Western European nations associated in the Marshall Plan realize it. The United States has not yet clearly grasped this fact and is still emotionally unready to extend aid across the Iron Curtain. This is not because the Russians are wiser than we.

The economic advantage in a competitive promotion of recovery is all on our side. To a very large extent we are dealing with surplus production not needed in this country. We have practically no difficulty in obtaining necessities from other parts of the world. Our problem is to maintain our high level of productivity and our high living standard. We are, therefore, not compelled by our own necessities to favor any one nation or group of nations. We have freedom of action. The U.S.S.R., on the other hand, needs machinery, railroad equipment, and all sorts of capital goods in order to get back on its feet. It can create an exportable surplus of a few foodstuffs and raw materials by holding down domestic consumption. It must use this surplus where it can get capital goods. It cannot afford to use it elsewhere. That is why the Molotov Plan did not exclude trade with Western Europe.

With these facts in mind, let us now re-examine the basic hypothesis upon which our Government has been operating.

The apparent view of the United States Government in early 1947 was expressed in the famous article in the July number of *Foreign Affairs* by "Mr. X." This essay was widely attributed to, and never repudiated by, George Kennan, the chief planner of the Department of State. Its thesis—undoubtedly developed much earlier—was that the primary cause of Russian expansionism was the need of a dictatorial regime to concentrate the attention of the oppressed Russian people upon an external enemy. Only thus—so ran the thesis—could a regime of terrorism, originally created to stamp out internal opposition to the revolution, maintain itself in power. It followed, according to this view, that since such expansionism grows by what it feeds upon, the Soviet Union must be "contained" before its expansionism could reach dimensions which would cause a war. It followed further that, if Soviet expansionism were contained, there would be a strong possibility that the dictatorial regime would mellow or perhaps crumble and be overthrown. This was the belief which clearly underlay the thinking of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of those State Department officials who drafted the Truman message of March 12, 1947.

With all due respect to these gentlemen and their intimate knowledge of Russian affairs, this thesis seems far too simple. It omits, for one thing, the possibility that Soviet policy may also have been influenced to a large extent by an actual fear—ridiculous as this may seem to us—of attack by the United States. It omits

any consideration of the fact that, in a world in which national sovereignty is the supreme authority and in which power has become concentrated in only two centers of super-power, there is a natural tendency toward mutual hostility between those two centers—quite irrespective of the nature or intentions of either. Finally, the Kennan thesis, while recognizing the oppositeness inherent in the nature of the United States and the U.S.S.R., tends to regard this oppositeness as irreconcilable, until such time as a contained U.S.S.R. changes its nature and becomes what we should consider "more democratic." It omits the possibility that we, too, may have to revise some of our ideas.

This analysis led quite naturally to an American policy of holding firmly to what Mr. Dulles called "our invigorated principles" and keeping the Soviet Union in check until it changed its principles. Such a policy must presuppose: first, that we are able to contain Soviet expansion by peaceful means; second, that, if Soviet expansion is checked, the present regime will grow more "democratic" or fall; and, third, that, if the present regime falls, the Russian people will turn out to have convictions and predilections so like our own that a reconciliation will be possible.

The first supposition—that we could contain the Soviet Union by peaceful means—can neither be proved nor disproved until it is too late. The second supposition—that containment would cause the Soviet regime to mellow or fall—seems to rest upon the belief that there is a strong latent resistance to the present regime among the Russian people—of which, so far as I know, there is very little evidence. And the third supposition implies a belief that, if the Russian people were free to choose any form of government, they would choose a form which approximated the Western concept of democracy. This seems to me contrary to contemporary evidence as well as to past history.

Like most revolutions, the Bolshevik Revolution was chiefly concerned with achieving a more equitable distribution of the material benefits of society. It was not—like our Revolution—primarily concerned with establishing self-government and the political freedoms. The Russian people threw out the Czar's management because it had oppressed and exploited them—they wanted to be governed more justly—they had not reached the point of wanting to govern themselves. The Russian ideal of "democracy" is still that of a society in which everyone shares more or less equally in the material benefits. This is an ideal typical of a people accustomed through long generations to a low standard of living, while seeing its rulers living in luxury.

Our ideal of "democracy" is that of a society in which each individual has an equal voice in the management, rather than an equal share in the benefits. This is an ideal typical of a fluid society and of a people accustomed to relatively easy access to a high standard of living.

The two ideals are not antithetical. Neither can alone produce the perfect freedom. Both are included in Aristotle's definition: "Freedom is to govern and be governed." We have so far emphasized the first half of that definition. The Russians have emphasized the second. Or, if you prefer Lincoln to Aristotle, both the Russian ideal and the American ideal are included in the perfect democracy, defined as "Government of the people, by the people, and for the people." We have so far stressed "by the people." The Russians have stressed "for the people."

These national ideals, or emphases, will change only when the conditions change out of which they grew. If our system continues to produce booms and busts, if it continues periodically to expose the majority of the people to hardship and insecurity, if it continues increasingly to freeze the strata in our society so that access to wealth is no longer open except to the privileged few—then we shall again face a rising demand for more economic or social democracy. In the last great depression we saw how the majority of people were willing to sacrifice some of the fetishes of political "freedom" in order to obtain economic security and greater social justice. But with a return of prosperity, we have reverted to our traditional emphasis. It would probably take not one but several more major depressions to make us permanently change our emphasis from political to economic democracy.

In the same way, it will take many years of economic security and a relatively high living standard to make the Russian people change their emphasis from the economic to the political ideal. If there is any present threat to the Soviet regime, it is not likely to be found in a latent revolt against political oppression, but rather in dissatisfaction with a management which fails to raise the living standards of the worker and peasant.

But so long as the Russian people believe that there is any threat to the security of the Russian nation, there is little chance that they will revolt against a management which holds down their living standard in order to build up and protect the national security. So long as American policy lends any reality to the claim of the Soviet regime that the U.S.S.R. is in danger, American policy is in fact protecting the regime against whatever domestic trouble might otherwise be in store for it.

2. A NEW APPROACH

Let us now consider a somewhat different theory than that upon which our Government has been proceeding. Let us consider the theory that the Russians have a long-range aim of creating a communist world, but that—unlike Hitler—they have no time schedule and no fixed objectives which they are determined to gain, if necessary by force of arms. Let us consider the theory that Soviet aggressiveness derives in large measure from fear and feeds upon fear. This does not necessarily make Russia any less dangerous, but it alters our approach to the danger. It would make our policy aim at removing the causes of Russian fear, in so far as it lies within our power to do so without taking foolish risks with our own security.

The two major Soviet fears with which we have to deal are: fear of war with the United States; and fear that we may use our economic power to force our kind of economic system upon so much of the world as to isolate and encircle the Soviet Union. This would post-

pone into infinity the realization of the still powerful Russian dream of an eventual world revolution. We may consider the mere existence of such a dream dangerous. But we should be wise to recognize that a totally frustrated dream would be far more dangerous at this moment. For a suddenly frustrated deep-seated aspiration can become a grim and irrational determination.

As to Russian fear of war, we know that we do not *want* to make war upon the Soviet Union. But we must realize that we have in the past year conveyed the impression, not only to the Russians, but to many Europeans and Asiatics that we think we may *have* to fight the Soviet Union. Many Frenchmen think—and many Czechs, too—that our German policy is primarily designed to create a bulwark against Russia in Central Europe. Many Asiatics think that our policy in Japan, Korea, and China is shaped to the same sort of purpose in Asia. Our Latin-American policy, our huge military expenditures, our sole possession of the atomic bomb, and our continued stock-piling add to this impression. To brush all this aside as the figment of Russian propaganda is to fool no one except perhaps ourselves.

The truth of the matter is that while we are trying sincerely to avoid a clash with the Soviet Union, we are, at the same time, taking out all sorts of insurance against possible failure to do so. Our policy in Germany is not *designed* to create a bulwark against Russia—which would be foolish in any case—but it is influenced by the consideration that we may have to fight Russia. So is our policy in Japan, China, Korea, Greece, Turkey, and Latin America.

This is a very dangerous business. It is doubly dangerous because the Soviet Union is playing precisely the same game. Never mind who started it. The important thing to realize is that this two-sided policy of taking out insurance against war is the road to war. What constitutes insurance for us is a threat to the Soviet Union. What constitutes insurance to the Soviet Union is a threat to us.

Moreover, most of this insurance business is a very silly business. If we ever do fight the Soviet Union, most of our mutual provocations will have insured neither of us against anything. In an atomic and bacteriological war, fought largely by air across the polar region, what good will it have done us to have armed Señor Perón? What good will it have done the Russians to have insisted upon pushing out their frontier into Central Europe? The Red Army is not going to land in Argentina, and we shall be swept out of Europe overnight. We are both of us taking out insurance against the *last* war—not against the next one. But, by taking out these useless, expired policies, we each lend reality to the distrust and fear of the other.

The proposal to establish universal military service in this country is another one of these useless but highly dangerous attempts at insurance. It is useless because it would train millions of young men in the techniques of fighting the *last* war. It is dangerous, not only because it is provocative, but because it would train the young men of this nation to think in terms of war rather than in terms of peace and to accustom themselves to obedience to authoritarian command rather than to the independent spirit of free citizenship. Universal service to the nation in forestry camps, road-building, irrigation and flood-control projects, or—better yet—in special scientific or technological training, including disaster control, is one thing. Universal military training under Army discipline is quite another.

I am not suggesting that we should be so foolish as to disarm ourselves unilaterally. We did that once, with disastrous results. We must remain strong in scientific research, in polar aviation, and wherever strength would count in an atomic war, until we can bring about universal disarmament. But I am suggesting that we make it much clearer than we have to date that we *desire* to disarm, and that we look to the United Nations to take over the job of policing the world at the earliest possible moment. I am suggesting that we stop thinking in strategic terms which are now meaningless. And, above all, I would like to suggest that we, as citizens, think more about how to prevent the next war and less about what we shall do if war comes. The greatest danger of an atomic war is the widespread acceptance of its inevitability.

We have able military and naval leaders. It is their business always to be prepared for the worst, until the day comes when all the nations lay down their arms. But it is not the business of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to guide our policy in trying to make a lasting peace. Their thinking must not be allowed to shape the thinking of the American people. The American people must learn to think for peace if they want peace.

So much for the military aspect. What can we do to allay Soviet fear of what we might do with our great economic power? This fear rests, I believe, upon considerably more than the fertile imagination of a dictatorial regime trying to maintain itself in power. It rests upon the conviction that the United States is determined to maintain an economic system which must lead either to imperial exploitation (and ultimate war) or to collapse. We are perhaps more concerned with a different and more reasonable version of this fear, which affects most of the peoples of Europe and Asia. This version, which one finds articulately expressed by Western Europeans, runs as follows.

The United States is determined to preserve its own free-enterprise economy. It believes that it can preserve its free-enterprise economy only in a preponderantly free-enterprise world. It will, therefore, use its great economic power to bludgeon the other peoples of the world into a return to laissez-faire capitalism.

Not only our extreme conservatives, like Senator Taft, or Mr. Hoover, or the National Association of Manufacturers, supply the evidence for this fear. One frequently hears the most liberal Republican aspirant for the Presidency, Mr. Harold Stassen, quoted. But the most complete documentation was supplied by President Truman himself in his speech in March 1947 at Baylor University. It was not until December 1947 that an authoritative American voice gave any assurance to the contrary. Then Secretary Marshall, addressing the Pilgrim Society at London, declared that Britain's decision to adopt some degree of socialism would not affect American friendship or American aid. But this was

not a general statement. It was not enough to offset what had gone before.*

Apart from official policy, we, as a nation, are at present making the dangerous mistake of meeting communist fanaticism with a doctrinaire fanaticism of our own. One becomes acutely aware of this in talking to almost any thinking person in Europe or Asia. Traveling about outside this country, one encounters everywhere a resentment—directed at us almost as much as against the Soviet Union—a resentment at being forced to choose between the undesirable and the impossible, at having to line up on the side of either communist dictatorship or free-enterprise laissez-faire.

Most Americans do not realize that our alternative *is* impossible outside of our own hemisphere—that people cannot re-establish private capitalism in countries where private capital has been dispersed or destroyed. Nor do most Americans realize that the majority of Europeans have reached the conviction that a certain amount of government planning and control over a nation's economy is to be desired, even though it may restrict the free initiative of the individual.

The fear that we may try to tie strings to our aid which would force people, against their own judgment and will, back into a system they have discarded, is not a fear one finds only in the Soviet orbit. One finds it everywhere abroad, except among the tenacious remnants of the former economic power groups. Coupled with this fear, one finds a resentment at being told what to do by even the most benevolent outsider.

We have the power to help and guide the world in the direction in which the masses of mankind desire to move. We do not have the power to reverse the direction.

On this ground, at least, we can kill two birds with one stone. We can, to some extent, put Russian fears to rest and at the same time vastly improve our relations with the non-communist world.

There is another reason why we should be wise to abandon our present doctrinaire tendency. Intolerance and coercion are an integral part of the present Soviet system. They act as a foreign body when introduced into the philosophy of life upon which this nation was founded—a foreign body which could poison our whole system and rob it of its power.

The burning issue of our time is economic rather than political. Food, fuel, and shoes are, for the moment, more important than political freedoms. But there is a moral issue, which will someday become more important as the economic crisis subsides. If the great moral issue of our time is belief in the Rights of Man—and especially the right of man freely to choose the form of society in which he wants to live—then we cannot effectively fight for that issue and at the same time peddle our own form of society as the only road to salvation. In doing so, we stultify our case and throw away our greatest power of attraction. For our greatest power of attraction in the ideological competition which seems likely to follow the present economic competition with the Soviet Union is our traditional belief—imperfectly fulfilled though it be—in the great propositions laid down in our Declaration of Independence.

3. GETTING DOWN TO CASES

The change of policy here suggested requires, first of all, an unequivocal statement of our changed position—a statement which the world will understand as a final repudiation of the Truman Doctrine and as meaning that we have now realistically assessed the trend of world affairs and are moving purposefully to meet the economic crisis, confident in our own strength, firm in our convictions, but neither intolerant of disagreement nor frightened by diversity of opinion.

Next, the suggested change of policy requires the recognition that—whether we like it or not—we shall have to transact a large part of our foreign trade with governments rather than with private firms or individuals. It suggests further that we may have to channel through our own Government a considerable portion of our commercial dealings with other countries. There is no doubt that this would have certain implications for our domestic economy. But these carry no further than the implications already inherent in our European Recovery Program. To carry out that program we must in any case permit our Government to plan and control certain sectors of our economy. We may not like moving in this direction. We may not like admitting that there can be no world-wide restoration of "free enterprise" and that, even in our own country, private initiative may be somewhat further restricted. Nevertheless, these are some of the facts of life we have to face. We cannot turn back the clock.

So much for our broad approach to foreign policy. It may work or it may not. But we have little to lose in trying it. Once we change our basic analysis and seek to understand and allay the fears of others, rather than acting out of our own fear, we may find that we can sit down and profitably discuss a number of problems with the men in the Kremlin.

4. POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A NEW APPROACH

First, we might agree rather quickly that both of us wished to promote, rather than obstruct, East-West trade in Europe. This would mean more of a change for us than for the Russians. It might mean, for instance, that we would act favorably upon a Polish application for a loan to buy American coal-mining machinery, provided that we believed granting such a loan would make a substantial amount of additional coal available for Western Europe. There would be good reason for this belief, because Poland is already exporting large quantities of coal to both Eastern and Western European countries. We might send raw cotton or manufacturing equipment to Czechoslovakia on a similar arrangement, or oil-drilling machinery to Rumania.

* A more general statement was made in the State Department's seventeen-volume report to Congress on political conditions in Western Europe, released on January 14, 1948. This report described the democratic socialists of Western Europe as "among the strongest bulwarks against Communism."

Eventually—after we had seen how these trial transactions worked—we might find it possible to win public approval for offering assistance to the Soviet Union itself, provided the Soviet Union would meet us with a more reasonable attitude toward, let us say, reparations from Germany and Austria.

Assuming that we had not already committed the supreme blunder of making a separate peace, a solution of the reparations tangle would be a first long step toward arriving at a sensible settlement in Germany and Austria. If we could complete this process, we should have solved the central problem of the European peace. The withdrawal of American opposition to the socialization of the German monopolies would remove another big stumbling block. It would then remain for the Russians to remove some of the other obstacles, by modifying their present attitude toward frontiers and the nature of the government to be established in Germany.

With the relaxation of U.S.-U.S.S.R. tension, we might reasonably expect a similar gradual breaking up of the log jam in other parts of the world and in the United Nations.

This is not to say that we should expect miracles to happen. The problem of China would, for example, still remain a complicated and difficult affair. But the mere fact that we could address ourselves to its intrinsic nature without the overriding consideration of a possible conflict with the Soviet Union would make its solution infinitely easier. Relieved of our anti-communist obsession, we could follow that policy in China which General Marshall recommended before he became Secretary of State and which we have not since then followed—namely, a policy of withholding aid until the non-communist liberal elements come into power. We could shed our allegiance to the corrupt and reactionary Nanking leadership and, by backing long-overdue reforms, gradually break the monopoly on reform now held by the Communists. This would remove the chief cause of the civil conflict, even though it might not immediately cause all hostilities to cease.

The Korean deadlock is almost entirely the product of U.S.-U.S.S.R. tension. With fear and suspicion reduced on both sides, it should not be too difficult to bring about an orderly evacuation and an independent Korean state.

The relaxation of U.S.-U.S.S.R. tensions would not solve the Japanese problem, but it would alter for the better the relations between General MacArthur's Headquarters and the Far Eastern Commission. It would make Japanese occupation policy more of an Allied policy and less of a United States monopoly than it now is. Furthermore, once we got rid of our fear of democratic socialism, we should find it infinitely easier to deal with the reconstruction of a peaceful Japanese economy. This, in turn, would stimulate recovery throughout the Far East.

In a general way, the same factors might beneficially affect a settlement in the oil-rich Middle East, and the closely related Mediterranean area.

Perhaps the most important result of a different approach to the Soviet Union would be felt in the functioning of the United Nations. At the present time, the operations of the Security Council are frustrated by the battle of votes and vetoes. The General Assembly has become a forum for the ventilation of mutual recrimination. And the work of most of the Commissions and Subcommissions of the United Nations is wasted because the Soviet Union refuses to participate in them altogether.

Worst of all, the United States, which holds by far the greatest military and economic power, is moving more and more toward the exercise of that power *outside of rather than through the United Nations.* We started to move outside of the United Nations when we intervened in Greece and Turkey. We have acted unilaterally in China. We recently issued a single-handed pronouncement on the maintenance of Italian freedom. We have shown no inclination to channel our developing recovery plan through the United Nations machinery. The reasons for this are obvious, but if this process continues, the United Nations will follow the League of Nations into impotence and oblivion.

All these difficulties and frustrations flow directly from two sources—the imperfect basic concept of the United Nations, and the growing tension between its two most powerful members.

The imperfections in the early concept of the United Nations can be cured only if the United Nations Charter is recognized as being merely a first step toward the creation of a World Government of limited powers. There can never be lasting peace in a world in which the highest authority rests in the sovereign nation-state. There can be peace only when there exists a supra-national authority, created by the united peoples of the world, commanding the direct allegiance of the peoples of the world, and responsive to their will. Too many of those who recognize the need for a supra-national authority tend to lose themselves in specific schemes for this or that particular form of organization. The important thing is not the form but the substance of world government. Once people throughout the world are awakened to the need, the necessary forms and devices will be found. Until they are awakened to the need, the conflicting advocacy of various plans and schemes only tends to create confusion.

Throughout history, a world composed of sovereign nation-states has followed the same pattern. It has tried to align itself in an ever-shifting balance of power in such a way that no nation, or group of nations, could at any time safely assume that a resort to force would be successful. Wars have occurred periodically whenever this balance has broken down—whenever some nation, or group of nations, has thought that it could successfully impose its will by force upon other nations. With the scientific and technological developments of recent years, the number of powers or power-groups composing this precarious balance has constantly diminished. After World War I, Austria-Hungary disappeared and Russia and Germany went into temporary eclipse, leaving as power centers only Great Britain, France, the United States, and Japan. Since this war we have, for the first time, a world reduced, for the moment at least, to only two real focal points of power.

There lies the real heart of our trouble with the

Soviet Union. Unless the concept of national sovereignty is superseded by the idea of World Government, the two great centers of power will always tend to come into conflict—no matter what their respective characteristics. Only the establishment of a supranational authority representing all the peoples of all the nations, great and small, can finally remove the danger that, sooner or later, one or the other of the two great powers will think it can safely risk a resort to arbitrary force.

But—and here is the vicious circle in which we are caught—the United Nations cannot develop into World Government unless both the United States and the Soviet Union wish it to do so. So far, neither has declared any such desire. The British and all the Commonwealth Dominions have declared for World Government. So have France, Italy, China, and a number of Latin-American Republics. There is no doubt that many other nations would do likewise if they thought that there were the slightest chance of any such development. But we have not declared that our ultimate aim is to see the United Nations develop into a World Government. We have been so preoccupied with our fear of Russia that we have concerned ourselves much too little with the future of the United Nations.

One can hardly expect the Soviet Union to make the first move. So long as Moscow does not control a majority in the United Nations, so long as Moscow fears us, and so long as we do usually carry a majority with us, the Soviet Union is not likely to take an affirmative attitude toward making the United Nations into a far more powerful organization.

We alone are in a position to break the vicious circle. It is our move. It is up to us to declare that we are willing ultimately to subordinate our great power to the will of the united peoples of the world. It is up to us to remove the causes of Soviet fear and distrust, wherever we can safely do so. It is up to us to refrain from unilateral acts and declarations.

Nor must we—if we do these things—expect to encounter immediate warm appreciation from the Soviet Union, any more than we should expect gratitude from the beneficiaries under our recovery program. We shall be acting for the sake of our own homes, our own children, and our own "life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness." We shall be acting out of wise self-interest; and wise self-interest demands that we help men to save their self-respect as well as their lives and livelihood.

5. SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE

The changes suggested in our broad approach to foreign policy are difficult to undertake because they imply a basic re-examination of our present largely emotional attitude. This applies to us as a people even more than to our Government. The difficulty is greatly magnified by the fact that the Russians, for one reason or another, seem almost deliberately determined to be disagreeable.

We have had in Moscow a fairly long succession of officials, journalists, scientists, and engineers, many of whom went there with friendly feeling toward the Soviet Union. Almost to a man—or woman—they have come back puzzled and disappointed at the seemingly impenetrable wall of official unfriendliness they have encountered. Even the individual Soviet citizen, jovial and hospitable though he may be, seems coldly inhibited in his approach to a man-to-man discussion of the misunderstandings between his country and ours.

There is, moreover, no getting around the fact that, in official dealings, the Russians are often just plain ornery. Their representatives, usually limited to their instructions, have a tiresome way of repeating over and over again what they have said before, with little if any regard to whatever evidence or counter-arguments may have been brought forward by others. They give the impression of disregarding not only contrary opinion but also such facts as may be inconvenient. The effect upon even the most patient of men is to provoke a feeling of irritation and hopelessness.

There is no easy answer to this difficulty. It lies deeper than the ordinary rudeness of insecurity—deeper than the chip-on-the-shoulder aggressiveness of the Johnny-come-lately in international society. It cannot be cured quickly by mere patience and friendliness, because both are too often interpreted as weakness.

And yet, there is no alternative to maintaining an attitude of patience and friendliness, because if we, too, get ornery the result will be either a worse deadlock than we have today and an accelerated drift toward each of us becoming a garrison state* or else war—the kind of war in which one man could carry in a suitcase the means of destroying or poisoning the entire population of a great city.

It is truly a time which requires a difficult formula of statesmanship, for it demands courage tempered by wisdom, determination conditioned by respect for the rights of others, and strength made gentle by a sense of responsibility for mankind.

A terrible burden rests upon our public servants. A single word spoken carelessly or in anger by a responsible official may have fateful consequences. The more our public servants feel behind them the pressures of prejudice and fear, the greater will be their temptation to yield to irritation and weariness. The more they feel behind them the calm confidence of an informed people, the greater will be their serenity and effectiveness. If they are to be patient in the face of impatience, tolerant in the face of intolerance, and wise in the face of unwisdom, we, too, must learn patience, tolerance, and restraint.

Time is ticking fast. But—if we set our minds to it—there is still time enough for us to do what is necessary.

6. THE JOB IN HAND

The immediate job in hand consists of two parts, neither of which can succeed without the other.

The first part, which we have been discussing, consists in bringing about a reorientation of our broad

*Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are already spending something like a third of their national budgets on military and scientific preparedness.

approach to U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationships, to the United Nations, and to the over-all context in which the European Recovery Program is to operate.

The second part is to get the European Recovery Program and effective inflation controls passed by Congress. To do this, we must overcome several dangers.

First, there is the danger that we shall again be penny-wise and pound-foolish as we were in cutting down the loan to Britain. Here we encounter a combination of hostile elements. There is the Taft-Hoover school of "Let's save Europe if it doesn't cost too much." A variant of this theme reads: "How do we know that Europe can be saved—that it isn't already past saving?" In 1940 and 1941, these same men were taking much the same view of Lend-Lease. "How do we know," they said then, "that Hitler hasn't already won the war?" Then there is the penny-pinching school of Congressman Taber of New York, Chairman of the powerful House Appropriations Committee. Taber and his followers object to all Government expenditures on principle. They are fortified at present by the desire on the part of the majority of Congressmen to reduce taxes. These elements form a powerful combination.

Second, there is the danger that Congress may sabotage our own four-year program by refusing to treat it as a four-year program, appropriating only from year to year without giving any assurance that we will do the whole job. Here the economizers are joined by a number of Senators and Congressmen who visited Europe for a few weeks last summer and came back convinced that Europe needs our help, but not convinced that, even with our help, Europe would save itself, unless more or less forced by us to do so. If this view prevails, we should prevent the European countries from pursuing a planned course of reconstruction, and our whole recovery program would turn into a continuing relief operation.

Third, there is the danger—already discussed—that we may balk at taking those measures of allocation, rationing, and price control without which we shall be unable to prevent a runaway inflation. Here the politicians of both parties are playing ducks and drakes with the people of the United States—and with the destiny of the world. Republicans blame Democrats and Democrats blame Republicans for having let prices and wages get out of control. Each side protests a desire to take remedial action and accuses the other of playing politics. In November 1947, President Truman finally came, with obvious reluctance, to the conclusion which should have been apparent much earlier, that drastic anti-inflation measures were a necessity for the domestic welfare of the American people, quite apart from any need to extend aid to Europe. But his Cabinet is apparently divided on this issue and it will take more than the half-hearted attempts made to date to persuade a recalcitrant Republican Congress.

Every American wage earner, every American housewife, knows the result of past irresponsibility in dealing with this issue. Yet the politicians, in their infinite wisdom, keep telling each other that the American people won't stand for rationing, won't stand for allocation of scarce commodities, won't stand for price controls. Here is a real opportunity for the ordinary citizen to set Congress on the right path, to make Congress realize that it is not actually considering the supposed prejudices of the American people but merely the known prejudices of certain powerful big-business lobbies like the National Association of Manufacturers.

Failure to enact the minimum program finally requested by President Truman would not only wreck the European Recovery Program but our own economy as well. It might easily produce that final collapse of Western capitalism which the Marxists have so long predicted and which they so badly need to prove their case.

Finally, there is the danger that the European Recovery Program will be perverted from its purpose of promoting economic recovery by political excursions, political strings, and political purposes—in other words, that the ERP will revert back into an anti-communist or anti-Soviet crusade. This danger looms on both sides of the aisle in the two Houses of Congress. To avert it, we need a new aproach by the Administration, by its bipartisan team of policy-makers, by the leaders and aspirants of both parties, and—most of all—by the American people.

How can this be brought about in the short time that remains? What can the average citizen do to help?

The average citizen can, first of all, try to understand the problems with which his Government is confronted. To do this he needs to have someone put together the important events of recent history and to sketch in the background against which these events occurred. This attempt to do just that may have fallen short in many ways. But the main thing, it seems to me, is that we should at least make the effort to help one another understand what we are up against.

Given access to the facts about a problem, most Americans are quite capable of coming to their own conclusions. The question of what to do about those conclusions then arises. The first thing most of us like to do is to test them out on somebody else. That is not difficult. But then, supposing that our conclusions survive the test of discussion—perhaps modified to some extent—what then?

It may be trite to say, "Write your Senators and Congressmen." But it still remains the best answer. That is the way our system works—or should work. And, at this particular moment, a curious accident of history gives us an unusual chance to make it work.

When I say accident, I am not referring to the political derailment of Mr. Henry Wallace. I am referring to an unforeseen and very important change which has taken place in the machinery by which United States foreign policy is made.

Under our Constitution, the Upper House of Congress was given power and responsibility in foreign affairs by the provision which required that any treaty proposed by the Executive be ratified by a two-thirds majority of the Senate. Throughout our history, the Lower House has consequently played a minor part in foreign policy. But, under our Constitution, the Lower House was given the power of the purse—it alone may

originate bills for the appropriation of taxpayers' money. The accident which has happened almost imperceptibly during recent years is that the making of American foreign policy has become very largely dependent upon the granting of vast appropriations of public funds. At this moment, there can be no effective United States foreign policy without substantial continuing appropriations, and these cannot be obtained unless the House of Representatives is willing to grant them. Thus, the Lower House has fallen into a role never intended for it by the founding fathers, a role to which it is new and unaccustomed.

Whether this be good or bad in itself is debatable. But one consequence of this accident may be of considerable benefit at this particular moment in our history. The average citizen has been given a greater direct leverage upon the conduct of this nation's foreign relations than he has ever had before.

A Congressman has a relatively small constituency in which even a small number of votes may be decisive. He lives in his district and, except in some of our big cities, is relatively accessible. Most Congressmen are personally acquainted with a considerable number of their constituents. In a sense never true before, there is now a direct line from every citizen to someone who is actually going to help make the far-reaching decisions which are going to be made, one way or another, in this year of decision. There is not only a direct line to the center of decision—there is someone on the other end *who must listen*. For, by another accident of history, we are in an election year.

Take, for example, the case of Congressman Walter Judd of Minnesota, a former missionary in China. Congressman Judd spearheaded the drive in the Lower House to force Secretary Marshall, against his own judgment, to include $18,000,000 for China in the Interim Aid Bill passed last December. The drive succeeded not only in forcing the Secretary of State to aid the Nanking Government, which he had condemned, but reduced winter aid to France, Italy, and Austria below the minimum considered absolutely essential. A similar drive, only on a much larger scale, will be made against the European Recovery Program—probably by the same forces—Governor Dewey, the Luce publications, ex-Ambassador Bullitt, and the Congressional group under Mr. Judd's leadership. The people of the 5th Congressional District in Minnesota have a responsibility for their Representative, and he has a responsibility toward them. Do they want him to oppose the Chinese policy which Secretary Marshall recommended after long and careful study on the spot? Do they want their Congressman to lend himself to the machinations of an East Coast pressure group whose motives are, to say the least, more consistent with the discarded Truman Doctrine than with the Administration's present policy? If they don't, they have the means at their disposal to do something about it.

The same thing is true of the comparatively small number of up-state New Yorkers who will this year either re-elect or fail to re-elect Congressman John Taber. As Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Mr. Taber is one of the key figures in Congress. If the people of Auburn, New York, approve of Mr. Taber's super-economy, well and good. If they do not, they owe it to the nation and to the world to instruct their Representative, and—if he fails to follow their instructions—to defeat him at the polls.

The future of the world lies largely in the hands of this nation. The hands of this nation—which are its public servants—will carry their great burden of responsibility safely across the narrow bridge which leads to peace, only if they are guided and upheld by the strong and firm voice of the American people.

If we believe in "Government by the people"—here is our chance to prove it.

To sum up once more:

There is a world economic crisis and a world political crisis. In dealing with the first, through the Marshall Plan, we are on the road to peace. In dealing with the second, through the Truman Doctrine, we are on the road to war. The basic premises of our political policy require re-examination.

APPENDIX

I

Excerpts from President Truman's Address at Baylor University

ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY
MAR. 6, 1947

THERE IS ONE thing that the Americans value even more than peace. It is freedom. Freedom of worship—freedom of speech—and freedom of enterprise. It must be true that the first two of these freedoms are related to the third. For, throughout history, freedom of worship and freedom of speech have been most frequently enjoyed in those societies that have accorded a considerable measure of freedom to individual enterprise.

Freedom has flourished where power has been dispersed. It has languished where power has been too highly centralized. So our international trade organization, devotion to freedom of enterprise, in the United States, has deeper roots than a desire to protect the profits of ownership. It is part and parcel of what we call American.

The pattern of international trade that is most conducive to freedom of enterprise is one in which the major decisions are made, not by Governments, but by private buyers and sellers, under conditions of active competition, and with proper safeguards against the establishment of monopolies and cartels.

Under such a system buyers make their purchases and sellers make their sales at whatever time and place and in whatever quantities they choose, relying for guidance on whatever prices the market may afford. Goods move from country to country in response to economic opportunities.

Governments may impose tariffs, but they do not dictate the quantity of trade, the sources of imports, or the destination of exports. Individual transactions are a matter of private choice.

This is the essence of free enterprise.

The pattern of trade that is least conducive to freedom of enterprise is one in which decisions are made by governments. Under such a system the quantity of purchases and sales, the sources of imports and the destination of exports are dictated by public officials.

In some cases trade may be conducted by the state. In others part or all of it may be left in private hands. But, even so, the trader is not free. Governments make all the important choices and he adjusts himself to them as best he can.

This was the pattern of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Unless we act, and act decisively, it will be the pattern of the next century.

Everywhere on earth the nations are under economic pressure. Countries that were devastated by the war are seeking to reconstruct their industries. Their need to import, in the months that lie ahead, will exceed their capacity to export. And so they feel that imports must be rigidly controlled.

Countries that have lagged in their development are seeking to industrialize. In order that new industries may be established, they, too, feel that competing imports must be rigidly controlled.

Nor is this all. The products of some countries are in great demand. But buyers outside their borders do not hold the money of these countries in quantities large enough to enable them to pay for the goods they want. And they find these moneys difficult to earn.

Importing countries, when they make their purchases, therefore seek to discriminate against countries whose currencies they do not possess. Here, again, they feel that imports must be rigidly controlled.

One way to cut down on imports is by curtailing the freedom of traders to use foreign money to pay for imported goods. But recourse to this device is now limited by the terms of the British Loan Agreement and by the rules of the International Monetary Fund. Another way to cut down on imports is by raising tariffs.

But if controls over trade are really to be tight tariffs are not enough. Even more drastic measures can be used. Quotas can be imposed on imports, product by product, country by country, and month by month. Importers can be forbidden to buy abroad without obtaining licenses. Those who buy more than is permitted can be fined or jailed. Everything that comes into a country can be kept within the limits determined by a central plan.

This is regimentation. And this is the direction in which much of the world is headed at the present time.

If this trend is not reversed the Government of the United States will be under pressure, sooner or later, to use these same devices to fight for markets and for raw materials. And if the Government were to yield to this pressure it would shortly find itself in the business of allocating foreign goods among importers and foreign markets among exporters and telling every trader what he could buy or sell, and how much, and when, and where.

This is precisely what we have been trying to get away from, as rapidly as possible, ever since the war. It is not the American way. It is not the way to peace.

Fortunately, an alternative has been offered to the world in the charter of the International Trade Organization that is to be considered at Geneva in the coming month. The charter would limit the present freedom of Governments to impose detailed administrative regulations on their foreign trade.

The International Trade Organization would require its member nations to confine such controls to exceptional cases, in the immediate future, and to abandon them entirely as soon as they can be abandoned.

The trade-agreement negotiations that will accompany the considerations of the charter should enable countries that are now in difficulty to work their way out of it by affording them readier access to the markets of the world. This program is designed to restore and preserve a trading system that is consistent with continuing freedom of enterprise in every country that chooses freedom for its own economy. It is a program that will serve the interests of other nations as well as those of the United States.

If these negotiations are to be successful we ourselves must make the same commitments that we ask of all the other nations of the world. We must be prepared to make concessions if we are to obtain concessions from the others in return. If these negotiations should fail our hope of an early restoration of an international order in which private trade can flourish would be lost. I say again, they must not fail.

The program that we have been discussing will make our foreign trade larger than it otherwise would be. This means that exports will be larger. It also means that imports will be larger.

Many people, it is true, are afraid of imports. They are afraid because they have assumed that we cannot take more products from abroad unless we produce just that much less at home.

This is not the case. The size of our market is not forever fixed. It is smaller when we attempt to isolate ourselves from any other countries in the world. It is larger when we have a thriving foreign trade.

Our imports were down to a billion dollars in 1932; they were up to five billion in 1946. But no one would contend that 1932 was a better year than 1946 for selling goods, or making profits, or finding jobs.

Business is poor when markets are small. Business is good when markets are big. It is the purpose of the coming negotiations to lower existing barriers to trade so that markets, everywhere, may grow.

I said to the Congress, when it last considered the extension of the Trade Agreement Act, and I now reiterate, that domestic interests will be safeguarded in this process by expanding trade. But there still are those who sincerely fear that the trade agreement negotiations will prove disastrous to the interests of particular producing groups.

I am sure that their misgivings are not well founded. The situation briefly is this:

(1) The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act has been on the books since 1934. It has been administered with painstaking care and strict impartiality. Some thirty agreements with other countries have been made. And trade has grown, to the great benefit of our economy.

(2) This Government does not intend, in the coming negotiations, to eliminate tariffs or to establish free trade. All that is contemplated is the reduction of tariffs, the removal of discriminations, and the achievement, not of free trade, but of freer trade.

(3) In the process of negotiations tariffs will not be cut across the board. Action will be selective; some rates may be cut substantially, others moderately, and others not at all.

(4) In return for these concessions we shall seek and obtain concessions from other countries to benefit our export trade.

(5) Millions of Americans—on farms, in factories, on the railroads, in export and import businesses, in shipping, aviation, banking and insurance, in wholesale establishments and in retail stores—depend upon foreign trade for some portion of their livelihood. If we are to protect the interests of these people, in their investments and their employment, we must see to it that our trade does not decline.

Take one of these groups as an example: We exported in 1946 over $3,000,000,000 worth of agricultural products alone, mostly grain, cotton, tobacco, dairy products and eggs. If we should lose a substantial part of this foreign market the incomes of over 6,000,000 farm families would be materially reduced and their buying power for the products of our factories greatly curtailed.

(6) There is no intention to sacrifice one group to the benefit of another group. Negotiations will be directed toward obtaining larger markets, both foreign and domestic, for the benefit of all.

(7) No tariff rate will be reduced until an exhaustive study has been made, until every person who wishes a hearing has been heard, and careful consideration has been given to his case.

(8) In every future agreement there will be a clause that permits this Government—or any other Government—to modify or withdraw a concession, if it should result, or threaten to result, in serious injury to a domestic industry. This is now required by the Executive Order which I issued on Feb. 25, following extensive conferences between officials in the Department of State and the majority leaders in the Senate.

All these points—the history of the trade-agreement operations, the way in which negotiations are conducted, the protection afforded by the safeguarding clause—should provide assurance, if assurance is needed, that domestic interests will not be injured.

The policy of reducing barriers to trade is a settled policy of this Government. It is embodied in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, fathered and administered for many years by Cordell Hull. It is reflected in the charter of the International Trade Organization. It is one of the cornerstones of our plans for peace. It is a policy from which we cannot—and must not—turn aside.

To those among us—and there are still a few—who would seek to undermine this policy for partisan advantage and go back to the period of high tariffs and economic isolation I can only say this: Times have changed. Our position in the world has changed. The temper of our people has changed. The slogans of 1930 or of 1896 are sadly out of date. Isolationism, after two world wars, is a confession of mental and moral bankruptcy.

Happily, our foreign economic policy does not now rest upon a base of narrow partisanship. Leaders in both parties have expressed their faith in its essential purposes. Here, as elsewhere in our foreign relations, I shall welcome a continuation of bipartisan support.

Our people are united. They have come to a realization of their responsibilities. They are ready to assume their role of leadership. They are determined upon an international order in which peace and freedom shall endure.

Peace and freedom are not easily achieved. They cannot be attained by force. They come from mutual understanding and cooperation, from a willingness to deal fairly with every friendly nation in all matters—political and economic. Let us resolve to continue to do just that, now and in the future.

If other nations of the world will do the same, we can reach the goals of permanent peace and world freedom.

II

President Truman's Message to Congress

The "TRUMAN DOCTRINE"

MAR. 12, 1947

MR. PRESIDENT, Mr. Speaker, members of the Congress of the United States:

The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress.

The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.

One aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey.

The United States has received from the Greek government an urgent appeal for financial and economic assistance. Preliminary reports from the American economic mission now in Greece and reports from the American Ambassador in Greece corroborate the statement of the Greek government that assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation.

I do not believe that the American people and the Congress wish to turn a deaf ear to the appeal of the Greek government.

Greece is not a rich country. Lack of sufficient natural resources has always forced the Greek people to work hard to make both ends meet. Since 1940 this industrious and peace-loving country has suffered invasion, four years of cruel enemy occupation and bitter internal strife.

When forces of liberation entered Greece they found that the retreating Germans had destroyed virtually all the railways, roads, port facilities, communications and merchant marine. More than a thousand villages had been burned. Eighty-five per cent of the children were tubercular. Livestock, poultry and draft animals had almost disappeared. Inflation had wiped out practically all savings.

As a result of these tragic conditions, a militant minority, exploiting human want and misery, was able to create political chaos which, until now, has made economic recovery impossible.

Greece is today without funds to finance the importation of those goods which are essential to bare subsistence. Under these circumstances the people of Greece cannot make progress in solving their problems of reconstruction. Greece is in desperate need of financial and economic assistance to enable it to resume purchases of food, clothing, fuel and seeds. These are indispensable for the subsistence of its people and are obtainable only from abroad. Greece must have help to import the goods necessary to restore internal order and security so essential for economic and political recovery.

The Greek government has also asked for the assistance of experienced American administrators, economists and technicians to insure that the financial and other aid given to Greece shall be used effectively in creating a stable and self-sustaining economy and in improving its public administration.

The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority at a number of points, particularly along the northern boundaries. A commission appointed by the United Nations Security Council is at present investigating disturbed conditions in northern Greece on the one hand and Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the other.

Meanwhile, the Greek government is unable to cope with the situation. The Greek army is small and poorly equipped. It needs supplies and equipment if it is to restore the authority of the government throughout Greek territory.

Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-supporting and self-respecting democracy.

The United States must supply that assistance. We have already extended to Greece certain types of relief and economic aid but these are inadequate.

There is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn.

No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government.

The British government, which has been helping Greece, can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece.

We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring imme-

diate action, and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.

It is important to note that the Greek government has asked for our aid in utilizing effectively the financial and other assistance we may give to Greece, and in improving its public administration. It is of the utmost importance that we supervise the use of any funds made available to Greece, in such a manner that each dollar spent will count toward making Greece self-supporting, and will help to build an economy in which a healthy democracy can flourish.

No government is perfect. One of the chief virtues of a democracy, however, is that its defects are always visible and under democratic processes can be pointed out and corrected. The government of Greece is not perfect. Nevertheless it represents 80 per cent of the members of the Greek Parliament who were chosen in an election last year. Foreign observers, including 692 Americans, considered this election to be a fair expression of the views of the Greek people.

The Greek government has been operating in an atmosphere of chaos and extremism. It has made mistakes. The extension of aid by this country does not mean that the United States condones everything that the Greek government has done or will do. We have condemned in the past, and we condemn now, extremist measures of the Right or the Left. We have in the past advised tolerance, and we advise tolerance now.

Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention.

The future of Turkey as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving people of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war the United States and Great Britain furnished Turkey with material aid. Nevertheless, Turkey now needs our support.

Since the war, Turkey has sought financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity.

That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East.

The British government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey.

As in the case of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the United States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that help.

I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall discuss these implications with you at this time.

One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.

To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free people to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.

The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will. The government of the United States has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation in violation of the Yalta agreement, in Poland, Romania and Bulgaria. I must also state that in a number of other countries there have been similar developments.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guaranties of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot allow changes in the status quo in violation of the charter of the United Nations by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom the United States will be giving effect to the principles of the charter of the United Nations.

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their independence while they repair the damages of war.

It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which have struggled so long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and independence.

Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East.

We must take immediate and resolute action.

I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of $400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948. In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the $350,000,000 which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war.

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.

Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized.

If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On this subject the executive and the legislative branches of the government must work together.

This is a serious course upon which we embark.

I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious.

The United States contributed $341,000,000,000 toward winning World War II. This is an investment in world freedom and world peace.

The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than one-tenth of 1 per cent of this investment. It is only common sense that

we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died.

We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.

I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

III

Secretary Marshall's Radio Report to the Nation

ON THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE
APR. 28, 1947

TONIGHT I hope to make clearly understandable the fundamental nature of the issues discussed at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers.

This conference dealt with the very heart of the peace for which we are struggling. It dealt with the vital center of Europe—Germany and Austria—an area of large and skilled population, of great resources and industrial plants, an area which has twice in recent times brought the world to the brink of disaster.

In the Moscow negotiations all the disagreements which were so evident during the conferences regarding the Italian and Balkan treaties came into sharp focus and remained, in effect, unsolved.

Problems which bear directly on the future of our civilization cannot be disposed of by general talk or vague formulae—by what Lincoln called "pernicious abstractions."

They require concrete solutions for definite and extremely complicated questions—questions which have to do with boundaries, with power to prevent military aggression, with people who have bitter memories, with the production and control of things which are essential to the lives of millions of people.

You have been kept well informed by the press and radio of the daily activities of the council, and much of what I have to say may seem repetitious. But the extremely complicated nature of the three major issues we considered makes it appear desirable for me to report in some detail the problems as I saw them in my meetings at the conference table.

There was a reasonable possibility, we had hoped a probability, of completing in Moscow a peace treaty for Austria and a four-power pact to bind together our four governments to guarantee the demilitarization of Germany. As for the German peace treaty and related but more current German problems, we had hoped to reach agreement on a directive for the guidance of our deputies in their work preparatory to the next conference.

In a statement such as this it is not practicable to discuss the numerous issues which continued in disagreement at the conference. It will suffice, I think, to call attention to the fundamental problems whose solution would probably lead to the quick adjustment of many other differences.

It is important to the understanding of the conference that the complex character of the problems should be understood, together with their immediate effect on the people of Europe in the coming months. To cite a single example, more coal is most urgently needed throughout Europe for factories, for utilities, for railroads, and for the people in their homes. More coal for Allied countries cannot be mined and delivered until the damaged mines, mine machinery, railroad communications and like facilities are rehabilitated. This rehabilitation, however, depends on more steel, and more steel depends in turn on more coal for steel making. Therefore, and this is the point to be kept in mind, while the necessary rehabilitation is in progress, less coal would be available in the immediate future for the neighboring Allied states.

But less coal means less employment for labor, and a consequent delay in the production of goods for export to bring money for the purchase of food and necessities. Therefore, the delay necessary to permit rehabilitation of the mines so vitally affects France that the settlement of this matter has become for her a critical issue. All neighboring states and Great Britain and the Soviet Union are directly affected in various ways since coal is required for German production of goods for export sufficient to enable her to buy the necessary imports of foods, et cetera, for much of which the United States is now providing the funds.

Moreover, in the background of this coal issue which is directly related to steel production, is the important consideration of the build-up of heavy industry in Germany, which could later again become a threat to the peace of the world. I cite this single example to illustrate the complications which are involved in these negotiations.

The Allied control council in Berlin presented a detailed report of the many problems concerned with the political, military, economic and financial situation under the present military government of Germany. In connection with these matters, the ministers considered the form and scope of the provisional political organization for Germany, and the procedure to be followed in the preparation of the German peace treaty.

The German negotiations involved not only the security of Europe and the world, but the prosperity of all of Europe. While our mission was to consider the terms of a treaty to operate over a long term of years, we were faced with immediate issues which vitally concerned the impoverished and suffering people of Europe who are crying for help, for coal, for food and for most of the necessities of life, and the majority of whom are bitterly disposed toward the Germany that brought about this disastrous situation. The issues also vitally concern the people of Britain and the United States who cannot continue to pour out hundreds of millions of dollars for Germany because current measures were not being taken to terminate expeditiously the necessity for such appropriations.

The critical and fundamental German problems to which I shall confine myself are: (a) the limits to the powers of the central government; (b) the character of the economic system and its relation to all of Europe; (c) the character and extent of reparations; (d) the boundaries for the German state; and (e) the manner in which all Allied states at war with Germany are represented in the drafting and confirmation of the treaty.

All the members of the council of foreign ministers are in apparent agreement as to the establishment of a German state on a self-supporting, democratic basis, with limitations imposed to prevent the re-establishment of military power.

This issue of the degree of centralization of the further German state is of greatest importance. Excessive concentration of power is peculiarly dangerous in a country like Germany which has no strong traditions regarding the rights of the individual and the rights of the community to control the exercise of governmental power. The Soviet Union appears to favor a strong central government. The United States and United Kingdom are opposed to such a government, because they think it could be too readily converted to the domination of a regime similar to the Nazis. They favor a central government of carefully limited powers, all other powers being reserved to the states, or laender as they are called in Germany. The French are willing to agree only to very limited responsibilities for the central government. They fear a repetition of the seizure of power over the whole of Germany carried out by the Hitler regime in 1933.

Under ordinary circumstances there are always strong and differing points of view regarding the character of a governmental reorganization. In this case there are great and justifiable fears regarding the resurrection of German military power and concern over expressed or concealed desires for quite other reasons.

Regarding the character of the German economic system and its relation to all of Europe, the disagreements are even more serious and difficult of adjustment. German economy at the present time is crippled by the fact that there is no unity of action, and the rehabilitation of Germany to the point where she is self-supporting demands immediate decision.

There is a declared agreement in the desire for economic unity in Germany, but when it comes to the actual terms to regulate such unity there are wide and

critical differences. One of the most serious difficulties encountered in the effort to secure economic unity has been the fact that the Soviet-occupied zone has operated practically without regard to the other zones and has made few if any reports of what has been occurring in that zone. There has been little or no disposition to proceed on a basis of reciprocity and there has been a refusal to disclose the availability of foodstuffs, and the degree or character of reparations taken out of this zone.

This unwillingness of the Soviet authorities to co-operate in establishing a balanced economy for Germany as agreed upon at Potsdam has been the most serious check on the development of a self-supporting Germany, and a Germany capable of providing coal and other necessities for the neighboring states who have always been dependent on Germany for these items. After long and futile efforts to secure a working accord in this matter, the British and American zones were combined for the improvement of the economic situation, meaning the free movement of excess supplies or produce available in one zone to another where there is a shortage. Our continuing invitation to the French and Soviets to join in the arrangement still exists. This merger is bitterly attacked by the Soviet authorities as a breach of the Potsdam agreement and as a first step toward the dismemberment of Germany, ignoring the plain fact that their refusal to carry out that agreement was the sole cause of the merger. It is difficult to regard their attacks as anything but propaganda designed to divert attention from the Soviet failure to implement the economic unity agreed upon at Potsdam. Certainly some progress toward economic unity in Germany is better than none.

The character of the control over the Ruhr industrial center, the greatest concentration of coal and heavy industries in Europe, continues a matter of debate. It cannot be decided merely for the purpose of reaching an agreement. Vitally important considerations and future consequences are involved.

The question of reparations is of critical importance as it affects almost every other question under discussion. This issue naturally makes a tremendous appeal to the people of the allied states who suffered the terrors of German military occupation and the destruction of their cities and villages.

The results of the Versailles treaty of 1919 regarding payment of reparations on a basis of dollars, and the difficulties encountered by the Reparations Commission appointed after Yalta in agreeing upon the dollar evaluation of reparations in kind convinced President Truman and his advisers considering the question at Potsdam that some other basis for determining reparations should be adopted if endless friction and bitterness were to be avoided in future years. They succeeded in getting agreement to the principle of reparations to be rendered out of capital assets—that is, the transfer of German plants, machinery, et cetera, to the allied powers concerned.

It developed at the Moscow conference that the Soviet officials flatly disagreed with President Truman's and Mr. Byrnes' understanding of the written terms of this agreement. The British have much the same view of this matter as the United States.

We believe that no reparations from current production were contemplated by the Potsdam agreement. The Soviets strongly oppose this view. They hold that the previous discussions and agreements at Yalta authorize the taking of billions of dollars in reparations out of current production. This would mean that a substantial portion of the daily production of German factories would be levied on for reparations payments, which in turn would mean that the recovery of Germany sufficiently to be self-supporting would be long delayed. It would also mean that the plan and the hope of our government, that Germany's economic recovery by the end of three years would permit the termination of American appropriations for the support of the German inhabitants of our zone, could not be realized.

The issue is one of great complications, for which agreement must be found in order to administer Germany as an economic whole as the four powers claim that they wish to do.

There is, however, general agreement among the Allies that the matter of the factories and equipment to be removed from Germany as reparations should be re-examined. They recognize the fact that a too drastic reduction in Germany's industrial set-up will not only make it difficult for Germany to become self-supporting, but will retard the economic recovery of Europe. The United States has indicated that it would be willing to study the possibility of a limited amount of reparations from current production to compensate for plants, previously scheduled to be removed as reparations to various allied countries, which it now appears should be left in Germany; it being understood that deliveries from current production are not to increase the financial burden of the occupying powers or to retard the repayment to them of the advances they have made to keep the German economy from collapsing. The Soviet government has made no response to this suggestion.

The issue regarding boundaries to be established for Germany presents a serious disagreement and another example of complete disagreement as to the meaning of the pronouncement on this subject by the heads of the three powers. In the rapid advance of the Soviet armies in the final phase of the war, millions of Germans in eastern Germany fled to the Oder River. The Soviet armies, prior to Potsdam, had placed Poles in charge of this area largely evacuated by the German population. That was the situation that confronted President Truman at Potsdam. Under the existing circumstances, the President accepted the situation for the time being with the agreed three-power statement, "the heads of government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement."

The Soviet foreign minister now states that a final agreement on the frontier between Germany and Poland was reached at Potsdam and the expression I have just quoted merely referred to the formal confirmation of the already agreed upon frontier at the peace settlement, thus leaving only technical delimitation to be considered.

The United States Government recognized the commitment made at Yalta to give fair compensation to Poland in the west for the territory east of the Curzon line incorporated into the Soviet Union. But the perpetuation of the present temporary line between Germany and Poland would deprive Germany of territory which before the war provided more than a fifth of the foodstuffs on which the German population depended. It is clear that in any event Germany will be obliged to support, within much restricted boundaries, not only her pre-war population but a considerable number of Germans from Eastern Europe. To a certain extent this situation is unavoidable, but we must not agree to its aggravation. We do not want Poland to be left with less resources than she had before the war. She is entitled to more, but it will not help Poland to give her frontiers which will probably create difficulties for her in the future. Wherever the frontiers are drawn, they should not constitute barriers to trade and commerce upon which the well-being of Europe is dependent. We must look toward a future where a democratic Poland and a democratic Germany will be good neighbors.

There is disagreement regarding the manner in which the Allied powers at war with Germany are to participate in the drafting and confirmation of the German peace treaty. There are fifty-one states involved. Of these, in addition to the four principal Allied powers, eighteen were directly engaged in the fighting, some, of course, to a much greater extent than others. It is the position of the United States that all Allied states at war with Germany should be given an opportunity to participate to some degree in the drafting and in the making of the peace treaty, but we recognize that there would be very practical difficulties if not impossibilities in attempting to draft a treaty with fifty-one nations participating equally at all stages. Therefore, the United States government has endeavored to secure agreement on a method which involves two different procedures, depending on whether or not the state concerned actually participated in the fighting. But all would have an opportunity to present their views and rebut other views, and all would sit in the peace conference to adopt a treaty.

It is difficult to get the agreement of the countries that have suffered the horrors of German occupation and were involved in heavy losses in hard fighting to accept participation in the determination of the treaty terms by countries who suffered no losses in men or material and were remote from the fighting. The United States, however, regards it as imperative

that all the states who were at war with Germany should have some voice in the settlement imposed on Germany.

The proposal for the four-power pact was advanced by the United States government a year ago. It was our hope that the prompt acceptance of this simple pact, insuring in advance of the detailed German peace settlement that the United States would actively co-operate to prevent the rearmament of Germany, would eliminate fears as to the future and would facilitate the making of a peace suitable to Europe's present and future needs. It was our hope that such a commitment by the United States would relieve the fear of the other European powers that the United States would repeat its actions following the first World War, insisting on various terms for the peace settlement and then withdrawing from a position of any responsibility for their enforcement. It was thought that the compact of the four powers to guarantee the continued demilitarization of Germany would reassure the world that we were in complete accord in our intention to secure the peace of Europe.

However, the Soviet government met our proposition with a series of amendments which would have completely changed the character of the pact, making it in effect a complicated peace treaty, and including in the amendments most of the points regarding the German problem concerning which there was, as I have pointed out, serious disagreement. I was forced to the conclusion by this procedure that the Soviet government either did not desire such a pact or was following a course calculated to delay any immediate prospect of its adoption. Whether or not an agreement can finally be reached remains to be seen, but the United States, I think, should adhere to its present position and insist that the pact be kept simple and confined to its one basic purpose—to keep Germany incapable of waging war.

The negotiations regarding the Austrian treaty resulted in agreement on all but a few points, but these were basic and of fundamental importance. The Soviet Union favors and the other governments oppose the payment of reparations and the cession of Carinthia to Yugoslavia.

But the Soviet government attached much more importance to its demand that the German assets in Austria which are to be hers by the terms of the Potsdam agreement should include those assets which the other three powers consider to have been taken from Austria and the citizens of the United Nations by force or duress by Hitler and his Nazi government following the taking over of Austria by military force in March, 1938. The Soviet government refused to consider the word duress, which in the opinion of the other three powers would be the critical basis for determining what property, that is, business, factories, land, forests, et cetera, was truly German property and not the result of seizures by terroristic procedure, intimidation, fake business acquisition, and so forth. The Soviet Union also refused to consider any process of mediation to settle the disputes that are bound to arise in such circumstances, nor would they clearly agree to have such property as they receive as German assets subject to Austrian law in the same manner as other foreign investments are subject to Austrian law.

The acceptance of the Soviet position would mean that such a large portion of Austrian economy would be removed from her legal control that Austrian chances of surviving as an independent self-supporting state would be dubious. She would in effect be but a puppet state.

All efforts to find a compromise solution were unavailing. The United States, in my opinion, could not commit itself to a treaty which involved such manifest injustices and, what is equally important, would create an Austria so weak and helpless as to be the source of great danger in the future. In the final session of the conference it was agreed to appoint a commission to meet in Vienna May 12 to reconsider our disagreements and to have a committee of experts examine into the question of the German assets in Austria. Certainly prompt action on the Austrian treaty is necessary to fulfill our commitment to recognize Austria as a free and independent state and to relieve her from the burdens of occupation.

Complicated as these issues are there runs through them a pattern as to the character and control of central Europe to be established. The Foreign Ministers agreed that their task was to lay the foundations of a central government for Germany, to bring about the economic unity of Germany essential for its own existence as well as for European recovery, to establish workable boundaries and to set up a guaranteed control through a four-power treaty. Austria was to be promptly relieved of occupation burdens and treated as a liberated and independent country.

Agreement was made impossible at Moscow because, in our view, the Soviet Union insisted upon proposals which would have established in Germany a centralized government, adapted to the seizure of absolute control of a country which would be doomed economically through inadequate area and excessive population, and would be mortgaged to turn over a large part of its production as reparations, principally to the Soviet Union. In another form the same mortgage upon Austria was claimed by the Soviet delegation.

Such a plan, in the opinion of the United States delegation, not only involved indefinite American subsidy, but could result only in a deteriorating economic life in Germany and Europe and the inevitable emergence of dictatorship and strife.

Freedom of information for which our government stands inevitably involves appeals to public opinion. But at Moscow propaganda appeals to passion and prejudice appeared to take the place of appeals to reason and understanding. Charges were made by the Soviet delegation and interpretation given the Potsdam and other agreements, which varied completely from the facts as understood or as factually known by the American delegation.

There was naturally much uncertainty regarding the real intention or motives of the various proposals submitted or of the objections taken to the proposals. This is inevitable in any international negotiation.

However, despite the disagreements referred to and the difficulties encountered, possibly greater progress toward final settlement was made than is realized.

The critical differences were for the first time brought into the light and now stand clearly defined so that future negotiations can start with a knowledge of exactly what the issues are that must be settled. The deputies now understand the precise views of each government on the various issues discussed. With that they can possibly resolve some differences and surely can further clarify the problems by a studied presentation of the state of agreement and disagreement. That is the best that can be hoped for in the next few months. It marks some progress, however painfully slow. These issues are matters of vast importance to the lives of the people of Europe and to the future course of world history. We must not compromise on great principles in order to achieve agreement for agreement's sake. Also, we must sincerely try to understand the point of view of those with whom we differ.

In this connection, I think it proper to refer to a portion of a statement made to me by Generalissimo Stalin. He said with reference to the conference, that these were only the first skirmishes and brushes of reconnaissance forces on this question. Differences had occurred in the past on other questions, and as a rule, after people had exhausted themselves in dispute they then recognized the necessity of compromise. It was possible that no great success would be achieved at this session, but he thought that compromises were possible on all the main questions, including demilitarization, political structure of Germany, reparations and economic unity. It was necessary to have patience and not become pessimistic.

I sincerely hope that the Generalissimo is correct in the view he expressed and that it implies a greater spirit of co-operation by the Soviet delegation in future conferences. But we cannot ignore the factor of time involved here. The recovery of Europe has been far slower than had been expected. Disintegrating forces are becoming evident. The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate. So I believe that action cannot await compromise through exhaustion. New issues arise daily. Whatever action is possible to meet these pressing problems must be taken without delay.

Finally, I should comment on one aspect of the matter which is of transcendent importance to all our people. While I did not have the benefit, as did Mr. Byrnes, of the presence of the two leading members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I did have the invaluable assistance of Mr. Dulles, a distinguished representative of the Republican party as well as a recognized specialist in foreign relations and in the processes of international negotiations and treaty-making. As a matter of fact, the bi-partisan character of the American atti-

tude in the present conduct of foreign affairs was clearly indicated by the strong and successful leadership displayed in the Senate during the period of this conference by Senators Vandenberg and Connally in the debate over a development of our foreign policy of momentous importance to the American people. The fact that there was such evident unity of purpose in Washington was of incalculable assistance to me in Moscow.

The state of the world today and the position of the United States make mandatory, in my opinion, a unity of action on the part of the American people. It is for that reason that I have gone into such lengthy detail in reporting my views on the conference.

IV

Undersecretary Acheson's Speech at Cleveland, Miss.

THE REQUIREMENTS OF RECONSTRUCTION
MAY 8, 1947

YOU WHO live and work in this rich agricultural region, whose daily lives are concerned with the growth and marketing of cotton and corn and other agricultural products, must derive a certain satisfaction from the fact that the greatest affairs of state never get very far from the soil.

When Secretary of State Marshall returned from the recent meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow he did not talk to us about ideologies or armies. He talked about food and fuel and their relation to industrial production, and the relation of industrial production to the organization of Europe, and the relation of the organization of Europe to the peace of the world.

The devastation of war has brought us back to elementals, to the point where we see clearly how short is the distance from food and fuel either to peace or to anarchy.

Here are some of the basic facts of life with which we are primarily concerned today in the conduct of foreign relations:

The first is that most of the countries of Europe and Asia are today in a state of physical destruction or economic dislocation, or both. Planned, scientific destruction of the enemy's resources carried out by both sides during the war has left factories destroyed, fields impoverished and without fertilizer or machinery to get them back to shape, transportation systems wrecked, populations scattered and on the borderline of starvation, and long-established business and trading connections disrupted.

Another grim fact of international life is that two of the greatest workshops of Europe and Asia—Germany and Japan—upon whose production Europe and Asia were to an important degree dependent before the war, have hardly been able even to begin the process of reconstruction because of the lack of a peace settlement. As we have seen, recent efforts at Moscow to make progress towards a settlement for Germany and Austria have ended with little accomplishment. Meanwhile, political instability in some degree retards revival in nearly every country of Europe and Asia.

A third factor is that unforeseen disasters—what the lawyers call "acts of God"—have occurred to the crops of Europe. For two successive years unusually severe droughts have cut down food production. And during the past winter storms and floods and excessive cold unprecedented in recent years have swept northern Europe and England with enormous damage to agricultural and fuel production. These disasters have slowed down the already slow pace of reconstruction, have impeded recovery of exports, and have obliged many countries to draw down irreplaceable reserves of gold and foreign exchange, which had been earmarked for the importation of reconstruction materials, for the purchase of food and fuel for subsistence.

The accumulation of these grim developments has produced a disparity between production in the United States and production in the rest of the world that is staggering in its proportions. The United States has been spared physical destruction during the war. Moreover, we have been favored with unusually bountiful agricultural crops in recent years. Production in this country is today running at the annual rate of 210 billion dollars.

Responding to this highly abnormal relationship between production in the United States and production in the rest of the world, the United States Government has already authorized and is carrying out an extensive program of relief and reconstruction. We have contributed nearly 3 billion dollars to foreign relief. We have taken the lead in the organization of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund, and have subscribed to these two institutions to the extent of almost 6 billion dollars. We have increased the capacity of the Export-Import Bank to make loans abroad by almost 3 billion dollars. We have made a direct loan of 3¾ billion dollars to Great Britain. We are proposing this year to contribute a half billion dollars for relief and reconstruction in the Philippines, and a billion dollars to relief in occupied areas. The President's recommendations for aid to Greece and Turkey to the extent of 400 million dollars and for post-UNRRA relief to the extent of 350 million dollars are still under consideration by Congress. And there are a few other smaller items.

These measures of relief and reconstruction have been only in part suggested by humanitarianism. Your Congress has authorized and your Government is carrying out a policy of relief and reconstruction today chiefly as a matter of national self-interest. For it is generally agreed that until the various countries of the world get on their feet and become self-supporting there can be no political or economic stability in the world and no lasting peace or prosperity for any of us. Without outside aid, the process of recovery in many countries would take so long as to give rise to hopelessness and despair. In these conditions freedom and democracy and the independence of nations could not long survive, for hopeless and hungry people often resort to desperate measures. The war will not be over until the people of the world can again feed and clothe themselves and face the future with some degree of confidence.

The contribution of the United States towards world livelihood and reconstruction is best measured today not in terms of money but in terms of the commodities which we ship abroad. It is commodities—food, clothing, coal, steel, machinery—that the world needs, and it is commodities that we must concentrate our attention upon.

Our exports of goods and services to the rest of the world during the current year, 1947, are estimated to total 16 billion dollars, an all-time peace-time high. Before the war our exports of goods and services fluctuated around 4 billion dollars annually.

It is difficult to imagine 16 billion dollars' worth of commodities. This represents one month's work for each man and woman in the United States, one month's output from every farm, factory, and mine.

Let me give you another indication of the extent of our exports. The volume of commodities now moving out of east coast and Gulf ports of the United States is twice as great as the peak volume which moved out of those ports during the war when we were transporting and supplying not only our own huge armies abroad but a tremendous volume of lend-lease supplies.

Our exports this year are perhaps the maximum, in quantity, that is likely to be exported abroad in the next few years. At the same time these exports are probably the minimum that we should make available to the world.

It is extremely difficult under present circumstances to increase the volume of our exports further. For in this country, too, there is a great demand for commodities, and foreign customers must compete with American customers. The character and composition of our exports will probably change, with lesser quantities of food, fuel, and raw materials being exported and increased amounts of steel, machinery, and other manufactured products going abroad. But the total volume of exports is not likely to increase substantially until the world gets soundly on its feet and a genuine world prosperity may carry a healthy multilateral trade to higher levels.

In return for the commodities and services which we expect to furnish the world this year, we estimate that we will receive commodities and services from abroad to the value of about 8 billion dollars. This is just about half as much as we are exporting. This volume of imports is equal to about two weeks' work of all the factories, farms, mines, and laborers of the United States, and consists largely of

things which are not produced in this country in sufficient quantity. We wish that the imports were larger, but the war-devastated world is just not able to supply more.

The difference between the value of the goods and services which foreign countries must buy from the United States this year and the value of the goods and services they are able to supply to us this year will therefore amount to the huge sum of about 8 billion dollars.

How are foreigners going to get the U.S. dollars necessary to cover this huge difference? And how are they going to get the U.S. dollars to cover a likely difference of nearly the same amount next year? These are some of the most important questions in international relations today.

Of this year's difference between imports and exports, more than 5 billion dollars is being financed by loans and grants-in-aid from the United States Government through such instruments as direct relief, the Export-Import Bank, the International Bank, the International Fund, and the loan to Great Britain. Funds for this purpose have already been authorized by Congress. The remainder of this year's deficit will be covered by private investments, remittances of American citizens abroad, and by drawing down the extremely limited foreign reserves of gold and foreign exchange.

But what of next year, and the year after that? Continued political instability and "acts of God" are retarding recovery to a greater degree than had been anticipated. The extreme need of foreign countries for American products is likely, therefore, to continue undiminished in 1948, while the capacity of foreign countries to pay in commodities will probably be only slightly increased. Under existing authorizations, considerable sums will be available to offset next year's deficit. But these funds will taper off rapidly during the latter part of 1948. The need, however, will decline very little if at all.

This is not a bright picture. But we must face up to the facts on the rate of world recovery. It has been widely overlooked that after the first World War it was only in 1925 that the world arrived at the 1914 level of economic activity. And World War II was many times more destructive than World War I. In the late war nations planned on a vast scale and executed with new and tremendously improved weapons the destruction of the enemy's economic resources, with enormous success. Recovery will therefore be correspondingly slow.

One more thing to be considered is that as great as is our supply of commodities and services to the world during the current year, it is still far short of what the people of the world need if they are to eat enough to maintain their physical strength and at the same time carry on essential measures of reconstruction and become self-supporting. This will be true until the other workshops and granaries of the world are back in full production.

What do these facts of international life mean for the United States and for United States foreign policy?

They mean first that we in the United States must take as large a volume of imports as possible from abroad in order that the financial gap between what the world needs and what it can pay for can be narrowed. There is no charity involved in this. It is simply common sense and good business. We are today obliged from considerations of self-interest and humanitarianism to finance a huge deficit in the world's budget. The only sound way to end this deficit financing is by accepting increased quantities of goods from abroad. There can never be any stability or security in the world for any of us until foreign countries are able to pay in commodities and services for what they need to import and to finance their equipment needs from more normal sources of investment.

Today in Geneva our negotiators are meeting with representatives of 17 other countries in an effort to negotiate a mutual reduction in trade barriers and an agreement upon fair rules to govern international trade. This is one of the ways in which we are attemping to face up to the realities of international life. The Geneva conference must succeed. The International Trade Organization must be established.

The Geneva conference must succeed not only because of the emergency supply and financial situation that exists today, but also because our position as the world's greatest producer and creditor nation demands that for a long period to come we accept an ever larger volume of imports. When the process of reconversion at home is completed, we are going to find ourselves far more dependent upon exports than before the war to maintain levels of business activity to which our economy has become accustomed.

The facts of international life also mean that the United States is going to have to undertake further emergency financing of foreign purchases if foreign countries are to continue to buy in 1948 and 1949 the commodities which they need to sustain life and at the same time rebuild their economies. Requests for further United States aid may reach us through the International Bank, or through the Export-Import Bank, or they may be of a type which existing national and international institutions are not equipped to handle and therefore may be made directly through diplomatic channels. But we know now that further financing, beyond existing authorizations, is going to be needed. No other country is able to bridge the gap in commodities or dollars.

This leads directly to a third imperative for our foreign policy. Since world demand exceeds our ability to supply, we are going to have to concentrate our emergency assistance in areas where it will be most effective in building world political and economic stability, in promoting human freedom and democratic institutions, in fostering liberal trading policies, and in strengthening the authority of the United Nations.

This is merely common sense and sound practice. It is in keeping with the policy announced by President Truman in his special message to Congress on March 12 on aid to Greece and Turkey. Free peoples who are seeking to preserve their independence and democratic institutions and human freedoms against totalitarian pressures, either internal or external, will receive top priority for American reconstruction aid. This is no more than frank recognition, as President Truman said, "that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States."

The fourth thing we must do in the present situation is to push ahead with the reconstruction of those two great workshops of Europe and Asia—Germany and Japan—upon which the ultimate recovery of the two continents so largely depends. This is what Secretary Marshall meant when he reported to the nation on April 28 that action on behalf of European recovery cannot await "compromise through exhaustion," and that we must take whatever action is possible immediately, even without full Four Power agreement, to effect a larger measure of European, including German, recovery. European recovery cannot be complete until the various parts of Europe's economy are working together in a harmonious whole. And the achievement of a coordinated European economy remains a fundamental objective of our foreign policy.

Finally, in order to carry out an economical and effective policy of relief and reconstruction along the foregoing lines, your Government is going to need the extension by Congress of certain executive powers over the domestic sale, transportation, and exportation of a limited list of commodities. Such controls have been in effect during the war and are still in effect under the President's war powers, but are due to expire June 30th of this year. It is vitally important that these controls be renewed. It is commodities that are needed in critical areas abroad, not just money. It is wheat and coal and steel that are urgently required to stave off economic collapse, not just dollar credits.

Your Government must therefore be able to insure equitable distribution of supplies as between the domestic economy and the export demand. This requires the extension of allocation powers with respect to a limited list of commodities certified by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce as critical to the foreign economic policy of the United States. Powers to assign priorities directly to producing firms will be necessary for a still more restricted list of items. At the same time, a continuation of export controls is required in order to direct exports where we want them to go and to cut down unnecessary and undesirable foreign buying in the domestic market.

Power to assign priorities on transportation is also needed. This power is needed in order to insure the efficient use of transportation facilities, particularly freight cars. Without such authority it

will be difficult to move bulky export commodities such as coal and grain in the required quantities.

Finally, certain legislation which would enable the Maritime Commission to insure maximum availability and efficient use of shipping is required in order to insure the success of our export programs with respect to bulky items such as coal and grain.

Legislative proposals of this nature have been presented to Congress, or will be presented in the near future. It is of the greatest importance to the foreign economic policy of this country, and thus to the security and well-being of the nation, that these powers be granted.

There is a story going the rounds about a man who, after listening to an extended lecture on the grave financial and economic difficulties of northern Europe and Great Britain, remarked, "And, just think, all the trouble was caused by a blizzard."

I think we will all agree that something more than a blizzard has caused Europe's current difficulties. But last winter's blizzard did show up the extremely narrow margins of human and national subsistence which prevail in the world today, margins so narrow that a blizzard can threaten populations with starvation and nations with bankruptcy and loss of independence.

Not only do human beings and nations exist in narrow economic margins, but also human dignity, human freedom, and democratic institutions.

It is one of the principal aims of our foreign policy today to use our economic and financial resources to widen these margins. It is necessary if we are to preserve our own freedoms and our own democratic institutions. It is necessary for our national security. And it is our duty and our privilege as human beings.

V

Mr. Hoover's Letter to Mr. Taber

ON THE PEACE TREATIES AND RECOVERY

MAY 26, 1947

New York, New York

Honorable John Taber
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Taber:

I have your request for a memorandum of my views upon the recommendation of the War Department of $725,000,000 for food and collateral relief requirements for Germany, Japan and Korea for the next fiscal year.

You have also requested that I should furnish you a memorandum upon the causes of these continuing demands upon us, measures which might ameliorate these demands upon our taxpayers and generally upon our foreign relief and reconstuction policies. I shall, as you requested, attend the committee hearing on Tuesday to give any further information they desire.

For clarity, I have throughout this text numbered my specific recommendations.

(1) As matters stand, this appropriation of $725,000,000 should be made. In addition to this proposed American appropriation, the British are also to contribute their share of bi-zonal relief in Germany. These enormous sums are inescapable for the next year unless millions of people under our flags are to die of starvation. They are about the same as during the present fiscal year, and this year's experience demonstrates how near starvation is in these countries.

Surely, we must take steps to bring these burdens upon our taxpayers to an end.

We are now providing relief for the third year after the war.

The delay by Russia in making peace with Germany and Japan, together with the Allied policies of reparations and industrial demilitarization, have paralyzed the industrial productivity of these countries. They are unable to make substantial exports and are not contributing, as they otherwise could, to their own support.

General Marshall, in Moscow, ably urged the immediate necessity for Russia and France to comply with the Potsdam agreement, which provided for economic unification of the four zones; for the revision of the plant transfers for reparations; and the revision of so-called "levels of industry." Meanwhile, Russia and France are taking industrial exports from their zones which, under the Potsdam agreement, would contribute to paying the food bill in the American and British zones. Thus we are paying reparations. We are shipping fertilizers for relief which could be supplied from the French zone. We are supplying France with Ruhr coal which could be used for the manufacturing of exports in Germany with which to pay for food.

(2) In view of the Russian refusal of General Marshall's able presentation at Moscow, and the continued violation of the Potsdam agreement to unify German economy in both Russia and France, we are surely no longer bound by that agreement as to reparations and industrial policies.

In the bi-zonal area of Germany, after two years since V-E Day, the agricultural production is about 75 per cent of pre-war and the industrial production is only at 33 per cent of 1936, and exports are only 3 per cent. In Japan there has been about 80 per cent recovery in agricultural production, but industrial production is only 30 per cent of pre-war, with exports about 4 per cent.

To understand the situation in the German area, we might visualize what would happen if the present policies were imposed on the United States. Suppose America were divided into four zones with little interchange of economic life or food surpluses, with an obligation to tear down and ship abroad 25 per cent of our peace-production plants, and with a restricted "level of industry" which would destroy 60 per cent of our possible export trade. Then add to this the failure even to designate the plants that are to be removed, so that all initiative to operate the remaining plants is destroyed by uncertainty as to whom the victims will be. Suppose also we were not allowed to produce oil and were limited in fertilizer production. Without relief from some humanitarian country, millions of our people would die.

Unless these are revolutionary changes in our policies as to Germany and Japan, the burdens upon our taxpayers are not likely to lessen and are more likely to increase. There are three alternatives before us in our occupied territories: to wash our hands of the whole business and then let the conquered countries drag the whole world to final chaos; or, for humanitarian reasons, merely to carry these people on a food subsistence level, hoping for improvement in the attitudes of other nations; or to act at once to free ourselves from their hindrances as far as possible.

(3) The time has come when we should issue a last call to Russia and France to comply with the Potsdam agreement. If they do not at once respond, we and the British should immediately take the steps to set up the economy of the bi-zonal areas so as to restore their industrial production and exports.

(4) An effort should be made to consolidate the French zone (except the Saar) into the bi-zonal area. In this we have a right to expect French cooperation in view of the great sacrifices the American people are now making on behalf of France.

(5) In any event, we should immediately carry out the present project of a temporary centralized German government over the American and British zones subject to our military direction. We might even contemplate a separate peace with this Government if the next conference of Foreign Ministers does not succeed in more constructive policies.

(6) If we are to secure adequate exports with which they can pay for food, it is urgent that we at once revise the reparations and industrial demilitarization policies imposed upon these zones by various Allied agreements. These latter policies are identical in Japan, where they must likewise be revised.

(7) We should, in our German zones and in Japan, suspend the whole concept of "levels of industry," placing restrictions upon only a few specified industries, such as shipping and aviation.

(8) We should at once abolish for good the destruction or removal of all industrial plants which can make peacetime goods or services. The heavy burden now borne by our taxpayers is ample proof of the folly of these policies. It is an illusion that there are any consequential reparations to be had by removal of peacetime industrial plants. The buildings, foundations, water, electrical and other connections in such plants have no value for removal. All that is removable of any use are machines, all second-hand and many obsolete. The cost of tearing them out, shipping them to some area where there is neither skilled

labor nor skilled management, and of building new foundations, buildings and connections, leaves even these values comparatively trivial. We should allow the removal of equipment from such munitions factories which cannot be converted into peacetime production. We should assess by independent engineers the actual value to any proposed recipient of peacetime plants, deducting the cost of dismantling, and then call upon Germany or Japan to pay such a sum over the years and to retain the plants. With such action, the uncertainties which now paralyze German and Japanese initiative would quickly revive many industries and gradually provide exports to pay for their food. The drain upon our taxpayers would gradually disappear. Unless this is done, Germany and Japan will not be self-supporting in our time.

Such policies have no practical relation to the demilitarization of either Germany or Japan. I assume we are not going to make the major mistake of Versailles of leaving these countries the nuclei of militarism by granting them any armies or navies. It seems generally agreed that we will absolutely disarm these peoples so that they shall not again be able to engage in aggressions; that this disarmament will embrace destruction of all military arms, fortifications and arms factories; that they will have no army, no navy, and no air force; that they will retain only a constabulary in which no previous officer may be employed; that no militarist officials can hold public office; that this disarmament must be continued for a generation or two, until they have lost the "know-how" of war, and the descent of militarism through birth. We have already offered to join in guarantees which will make these prohibitions effective.

(9) With such a policy of demilitarization, the chains on production and export of peace-purpose goods should be removed and a simple check maintained to assure that industry does no evil.

The situation in Japan is not complicated by zonal occupation of other armies, and we are more free to act. Also the United States is paying the entire food bill. The world has had the service of a great administrator in General MacArthur, under whose guidance the Japanese have adopted a constitution approved by us; they have freely elected a Government and are determined upon democratic processes.

(10) We should at once summon the peace conference with Japan and make a peace with her by as many nations as wish to adhere.

Such policies as I have outlined are of a vast importance to the nations outside of Germany and Japan. The whole world is suffering from delay in restoration of productivity. The whole world is an interlocked economy, and paralysis in two great centers of production is a world disaster. There is greater opportunity to speed recovery in the world by such action as I outline than by any amount of gifts and loans from the United States.

There has been announced an American policy of defending the frontiers of western civilization. The most vital of these frontiers are Germany and Japan. If they are lost, all Europe and the Far East are lost.

The reasons for continuous obstruction by Russia to every effort which would restore production have at least some expression in the Russian press as a method by which the United States can be bled white by relief measures. We should wait no longer. Russia will not make war about it.

(11) The problems of relief I have been discussing are involved in a much wider action. That is the coordination of all aid which we are extending for relief and reconstruction abroad. The resources of the United States are not unlimited, and we are carrying over 90 per cent of these burdens. In the two years since the war the United States has spent upwards of fourteen billions in free relief, Government loans or loans from agencies dependent upon the United States for their survival. Already we are practically committed to five billions during the next fiscal year. These activities are divided among five or six such agencies directed from Washington that are extending aid to a score of nations. Their policies are not coordinated so as to secure cooperation among nations which would save large sums to the American taxpayers and would produce more rapid restoration of recovery abroad. The purpose of these activities is to save life and restore productivity. The restoration of production in the world is of mutual interest to all nations. I have in this memorandum cited instances of a lack of cooperation among nations. To state it bluntly, we cannot get such cooperation unless there is coordination of our own organization at home so as to make American aid to other nations conditional upon their cooperation to the common end. I am talking about the American taxpayer, about mutual economic action, and not about dollar diplomacy.

Yours faithfully,
HERBERT HOOVER.

VI

Secretary Marshall's Address at Harvard

THE "MARSHALL PLAN"
JUNE 5, 1947

I NEED not tell you, gentlemen, that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisement of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.

In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy. For the past ten years conditions have been highly abnormal.

The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Longstanding commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies and shipping companies disappeared, through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization or by simple destruction.

In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems, the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than had been foreseen.

There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out.

The farmer or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, therefore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization. Meanwhile, people in the cities are short of food and fuel. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down.

The truth of the matter is that Europe's

requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products—principally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help, or face economic, social and political deterioration of a very grave character.

The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their products for currencies, the continuing value of which is not open to question.

Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace.

Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative.

Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all European nations.

An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight, and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.

VII

Secretary Marshall's Address to the United Nations Assembly

SEPT. 17, 1947

MR. PRESIDENT—Fellow Delegates: I have been asked by the President of the United States to extend to you the cordial greetings of the Government and people of the United States, as well as his own warm personal welcome. We are happy to have you with us in this country. We trust that your stay will be productive of the far-reaching results which the peoples of all countries expect from this gathering.

Our point of departure for the deliberations of this Assembly might well be the annual report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization. It is a noteworthy document. It records realistically the progress and development of the United Nations, and its failures. It reflects the diligent efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff to expedite the rapidly growing volume of United Nations business.

The situation we face today may be summarized by the statement that more than two years after the end of the war the fruits of peace and victory are still beyond our grasp. Men look anxiously toward the future, wondering whether a new and more terrible conflict will engulf them. We have not yet succeeded in establishing a basis for peace with Germany and Japan, nor have we restored Austria as an independent state. Reconstruction lags everywhere; the basic requirements of life are scarce; there is desperate need throughout great areas. The complex economic machinery which was thrown out of joint by the war has not yet been put back into running order. In place of peace, liberty, and economic security, we find menace, repression, and dire want.

A supreme effort is required from us all if we are to succeed in breaking through the vicious circles of deepening political and economic crisis. That is why the United States has placed on the agenda of this Assembly the question of threats to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece.

The history of the Greek case in the United Nations is well known in this Assembly. You are aware that the Security Council last December adopted a resolution establishing an investigating commission to inquire into the situation along the northern frontier of Greece and report the facts to the Security Council. You know that that commission and its subsidiary group, by large majorities, have attributed the disturbances principally to the illegal assistance and support furnished by Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, to guerrilla forces fighting against the Greek Government. The extent or effectiveness of such assistance to the Greek guerrillas is not the point at issue here. It is a universally accepted principle of international law that for one nation to arm or otherwise assist rebellious forces against another government is a hostile and aggressive act. Not only has this principle been upheld in a number of famous cases in international law, but it has also found expression in international agreements. The majority of the members of the Security Council have recorded their support of this principle by their action in this case. One permanent member of the Security Council, however, has three times vetoed the efforts of the Council to deal with the situation.

This Assembly cannot stand by as a mere spectator while a Member of the United Nations is endangered by attacks from abroad. If the United Nations should fail to protect the integrity of one small state, the security of all small states would be placed in jeopardy. The inability of the Security Council to take effective action in this case passes a grave responsibility to the General Assembly. I am confident that the General Assembly will not fail to meet this responsibility. It must do so if the Organization is to carry out its fundamental purposes.

The United States Delegation will therefore submit to the Assembly a resolution which will contain a finding of responsibility; call upon Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to cease and desist from rendering further assistance or support to the guerrillas in Greece; establish a commission to assist in the implementation of these recommendations and to investigate the facts with regard to compliance therewith; and make other appropriate recommendations to the states concerned.

The General Assembly is also faced with the problem of Palestine. The Government of the United States intends to do everything within its power at this session of the General Assembly to assist in finding a solution for this difficult problem which has stirred up such violent passions and which is now resulting in the shedding of blood and in great mental and moral anguish. The solution will require of each of us courage and resolution. It will also require restraint.

The Special Committee on Palestine is to be highly commended for its contribution to the solution of this problem. Although the members of this Committee were not able to agree unanimously upon a number of important issues, including that of partition, they have been able to find the basis for agreement on 11 recommendations to this Assembly. Their achievement in reaching unanimity on so many points represents definite progress.

We realize that, whatever the solution recommended by the General Assembly, it cannot be ideally satisfactory to either of

the two great peoples primarily concerned. While the final decision of this Assembly must properly await the detailed consideration of the report, the Government of the United States gives great weight not only to the recommendations which have met with the unanimous approval of the Special Committee but also to those which have been approved by the majority of that Committee.

I turn now to the question of the independence of Korea. At Cairo in December 1943, the United States, the United Kingdom, and China joined in declaring that in due course Korea should become free and independent. This multilateral pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 and subscribed to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics when it entered the war against Japan. In Moscow in December of 1945, the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, and the United States concluded an agreement designed to bring about the independence of Korea. This agreement was later adhered to by the Government of China. It provided for the establishment of a Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commission to meet in Korea and, through consultations with Korean democratic parties and social organizations, to decide on methods for establishing a provisional Korean government. The Joint Commission was then to consult with that provisional government on methods of giving aid and assistance to Korea, any agreement reached being submitted for approval to the four powers adhering to the Moscow Agreement.

For about two years the United States Government has been trying to reach agreement with the Soviet Government, through the Joint Commission and otherwise, on methods of implementing the Moscow Agreement and thus bringing about the independence of Korea. The United States representatives have insisted that any settlement of the Korean problem must in no way infringe the fundamental democratic right of freedom of opinion. That is still the position of my Government. Today the independence of Korea is no further advanced than it was two years ago. Korea remains divided at the 38th parallel with Soviet forces in the industrial north and United States forces in the agricultural south. There is little or no exchange of goods or services between the two zones. Korea's economy is thus crippled.

The Korean people, not former enemies but a people liberated from 40 years of Japanese oppression, are still not free. This situation must not be allowed to continue indefinitely. In an effort to make progress the United States Government recently made certain proposals designed to achieve the purposes of the Moscow Agreement and requested the powers adhering to that Agreement to join in discussion of these proposals. China and the United Kingdom agreed to this procedure. The Soviet Government did not. Furthermore, the United States and Soviet Delegations to the Joint Commission have not even been able to agree on a joint report on the status of their deliberations. It appears evident that further attempts to solve the Korean problem by means of bilateral negotiations will only serve to delay the establishment of an independent, united Korea.

It is therefore the intention of the United States Government to present the problem of Korean independence to this session of the General Assembly. Although we shall be prepared to submit suggestions as to how the early attainment of Korean independence might be effected, we believe that this is a matter which now requires the impartial judgment of the other members. We do not wish to have the inability of two powers to reach agreement delay any further the urgent and rightful claims of the Korean people to independence.

For the achievement of international security, and the well-being of the peoples of the world, it is necessary that the United Nations press forward on many fronts. Among these the control of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction has perhaps the highest priority if we are to remove the specter of a war of annihilation.

The preponderant majority of the Atomic Energy Commission has made real progress in spelling out in detail the functions and powers of an international control agency which would provide a framework for effective atomic energy control. Two nations, however, have been unwilling to join the majority in the conclusions reached. This is a disturbing and ominous fact. In dealing with the facts presented by the advent of atomic energy, the majority has devised a system of control, which, while it is bold and daring, is, in our view, essential for security against atomic warfare. The minority has evidently been unwilling to face these same facts realistically. The mandate of the General Assembly remains unfulfilled. Failure to agree on a system of control which can provide security against atomic warfare will inevitably retard the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy for the benefits of the peoples of the world and will accelerate an atomic-armaments race.

The initial offer made by the United States on June 14, 1946, by which this country would give up its present advantage in exchange for an effective system of control, has found most gratifying acceptance by the majority of the nations represented on the Commission. They have worked earnestly together to hammer out specific proposals whereby such a system could be put into effect. All have made important contributions to the end product. The majority is convinced that its proposals provide the only adequate basis for effective control.

Since the United States realizes fully the consequences of failure to attain effective international control, we shall continue our efforts in the Atomic Energy Commission to carry forward our work along the lines of the majority views. We must state frankly, however, that, in the absence of unanimous agreement on the essential functions and powers which the majority has concluded must be given to the international agency, there will necessarily be limitations on the extent to which the remaining aspects of the problem can be worked out in detail. If the minority persists in refusing to join with the majority, the Atomic Energy Commission may soon be faced with the conclusion that it is unable to complete the task assigned it under its terms of reference laid down in the General Assembly resolution of January 24, 1946.

The United States also recognizes the importance of regulating conventional armaments. We regret that much more progress has not been made in this field. From this rostrum it is very easy to pay lip service to the sincere aspirations of all peoples for the limitation and reduction of armed forces. This is a serious matter which should not be the subject of demagogic appeals and irresponsible propaganda. I say frankly to the General Assembly that it is the conviction of my Government that a workable system for the regulation of armaments cannot be put into operation until conditions of international confidence prevail. We have consistently and repeatedly made it clear that the regulation of armaments presupposes enough international understanding to make possible the settlement of peace terms with Germany and Japan, the implementation of agreements putting military forces and facilities at the disposal of the Security Council, and an international arrangement for the control of atomic energy.

Nevertheless, we believe it is important not to delay the formulation of a system of arms regulation for implementation when conditions permit. The Security Council has accepted a logical plan of work for the Commission for Conventional Armaments. We believe that the Commission should proceed vigorously to develop a system for the regulation of armaments in the businesslike manner outlined in its plan of work.

The effective operation of the United Nations Security Council is one of the crucial conditions for the maintenance of international security. The exercise of the veto power in the Security Council has the closest bearing on the success and the vitality of the United Nations.

In the past the United States has been reluctant to encourage proposals for changes in the system of voting in the Security Council. Having accepted the Charter provisions on this subject and having joined with other permanent members at San Francisco in a statement of general attitude toward the question of permanent-member unanimity, we wished to permit full opportunity for practical testing. We were always fully aware that the successful operation of the rule of unanimity would require the exercise of restraint by the permanent members, and we so expressed ourselves at San Francisco.

It is our hope that, despite our experience to date, such restraint will be practiced in the future by the permanent members. The abuse of the right of unanimity

has prevented the Security Council from fulfilling its true functions. That has been especially true in cases arising under chapter VI and in the admission of new members.

The Government of the United States has come to the conclusion that the only practicable method for improving this situation is a liberalization of the voting procedure in the Council.

The United States would be willing to accept, by whatever means may be appropriate, the elimination of the unanimity requirement with respect to matters arising under chapter VI of the Charter, and such matters as applications for membership.

We recognize that this is a matter of significance and complexity for the United Nations. We consider that the problem of how to achieve the objective of liberalization of the Security Council voting procedure deserves careful study. Consequently, we shall propose that this matter be referred to a special committee for study and report to the next session of the Assembly. Measures should be pressed concurrently in the Security Council to bring about improvements within the existing provisions of the Charter, through amendments to the rules of procedure or other feasible means.

The scope and complexity of the problems on the agenda of this Assembly have given rise to the question whether the General Assembly can adequately discharge its responsibilities in its regular, annual sessions. There is a limit to the number of items which can receive thorough consideration during the few weeks in which this body meets. There would seem to be a definite need for constant attention to the work of the Assembly in order to deal with continuing problems. Occasional special sessions are not enough. The General Assembly has a definite and continuing responsibility, under articles 11 and 14 of the Charter, in the broad field of political security and the preservation of friendly relations among nations. In our fast-moving world an annual review of developments in this field is not sufficient.

The facilities of the General Assembly must be developed to meet this need. I am therefore proposing, today, that this Assembly proceed at this session to create a standing committee of the General Assembly, which might be known as the Interim Committee on Peace and Security, to serve until the beginning of its third regular session next September. The Committee would not, of course, impinge on matters which are the primary responsibility of the Security Council or of special commissions, but subject to that it might consider situations and disputes impairing friendly relations brought to its attention by member states or by the Security Council pursuant to articles 11 and 14 of the Charter and report to the Assembly or to the Security Council thereon; recommend to the members the calling of special sessions of the General Assembly when necessary; and might report at the next regular session on the desirability of establishing such a committee on a permanent basis.

In our opinion, every member of the United Nations should be seated on this body.

The creation of the Interim Committee will make the facilities of the General Assembly continually available during this next year to all its members. It will strengthen the machinery for peaceful settlement and place the responsibility for such settlement broadly upon all the members of the United Nations. Without infringing on the jurisdiction of the Security Council, it will provide an unsurpassed opportunity for continuing study, after the adjournment of this Assembly, of the problems with which the United Nations must contend if it is to succeed.

The attitude of the United States toward the whole range of problems before the United Nations is founded on a very genuine desire to perfect the Organization so as to safeguard the security of states and the well-being of their peoples.

These aims can be accomplished only if the untapped resources of the United Nations are brought to bear with full effect through the General Assembly and in other organs. The Assembly cannot dodge its responsibilities; it must organize itself effectively, not as an agency of intermittent action but on a continuous basis. It is for us, the members of the Assembly, to construct a record of achievement in dealing with crucial problems which will buttress the authority of the Organization and enable it to fulfil its promise to all peoples.

The large powers bear special responsibilities because of their strength and resources. While these responsibilities bring with them special advantages, the Great Powers must recognize that restraint is an essential companion of power and privilege. The United Nations will never endure if there is insistence on privilege to the point of frustration of the collective will. In this spirit we have indicated our own willingness to accept a modification of our special voting rights in the Security Council. In the same spirit we appeal to the other permanent members of the Security Council, in this and in all matters, to use their privileged position to promote the attainment of the purposes of the Organization.

The Government of the United States believes that the surest foundation for permanent peace lies in the extension of the benefits and the restraints of the rule of law to all peoples and to all governments. This is the heart of the Charter and of the structure of the United Nations. It is the best hope of mankind.

VIII

Report of the Sixteen Nations at Paris

SEPT. 23, 1947

THE OFFICIAL summary of the report of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation is as follows:—

1. The report is designed primarily as a close and careful analysis of the maladjustments which have resulted from the war and as an examination of what the participating countries can do for themselves and for each other to work towards a lasting solution.

2. The scale of the destruction and dislocation of the second world war was greater than that of the first. Agricultural and industrial production was severely reduced, traditional sources of food and raw material supply were cut off, so that when the war was over the devastated countries had to start again almost from the beginning. Thanks to the great efforts of the European countries themselves and to the generous assistance of the United States, other countries, and Unrra, recovery proceeded fast. But it was not maintained in the winter of 1946-47, and the European economy suffered a serious setback. Coal continued in short supply, and the lack of it curtailed industrial production. Food and other commodities remained scarce, and the prices of food and primary products rose. The foreign exchange resources of the participating countries had, therefore, to be drawn upon heavily. An exceptionally severe winter was followed by a long drought and intensified these difficulties, so that by the summer of 1947 the earlier hope of a quick recovery had receded.

3. As the work of the Committee of Cooperation was proceeding, the foreign exchange crisis continued to gather momentum. A number of countries had to impose further import restrictions, except for the purchase of cereals, coal, and other essential supplies. Action on similar lines is likely to become necessary in the near future in most of the participating countries. The early recovery is now halted and the crisis is deepening. The circumstances in which the report has been drawn up give it the character of an initial report. To deal with any amendments which appear desirable it may be necessary to publish supplementary reports which take account of the development of the international economic situation.

RECOVERY PROGRAMME

4. The purpose of the report is to formulate an economic recovery programme for the participating countries which is aimed at putting Europe on its feet by the end of 1951. This recovery programme is based upon four lines of action:

(i) A strong production effort by each of the participating countries;

(ii) The creation of internal financial stability;

(iii) The maximum cooperation between the participating countries;

(iv) A solution of the problem of the participating countries' trading deficit with the American continent, particularly by exports.

5. The participating countries are normally dependent on a large volume of imports—raw materials, feeding-stuffs, and in certain cases food—from the rest of the world. Traditionally these were paid for partly by export of goods and services and partly by income from oversea investments. Because of the dislocation caused by the

war import needs are temporarily larger than normal, investment earnings have been reduced, and exports have not yet been able to attain the level to redress the balance. The problem before the participating countries and the basic aim of the recovery programme is thus to revive and expand their production, so as to eliminate abnormal demand on the outside world and produce for export the increased volume of goods required to pay for the imports the participating countries will continue to need.

SELF-HELP

6. The report assumes a high degree of self-help by the countries concerned and mutual help between them. In order to ascertain what could be achieved technical committees were set up to make a special examination of agriculture, fuel and power, steel, timber, and transport, together with the related industries, such as agricultural and mining machinery, and the general problem of man-power. The recovery programme is designed to achieve the following total results by 1951:

(i) Restoration of pre-war bread grain and other cereal production, with large increases above pre-war in sugar and potatoes, some increases in oils and fats, and as fast an expansion in livestock products as supplies of feeding-stuffs will allow.

(ii) Increase of coal output to 584,000,000 tons—*i.e.*, 145,000,000 tons above the 1947 level (an increase of one-third) and 30,000,000 tons above the 1938 level.

(iii) Expansion of electricity output by nearly 70,000,000,000 kwh., or 40 per cent above 1947 and a growth of generating capacity by 25,000,000 kw., or two-thirds above pre-war.

(iv) Development of oil refining capacity in terms of crude oil throughout by 17,000,000 tons to two and a half times the pre-war level.

(v) Increase of crude steel production by 80 per cent above 1947 to a level of 55,000,000 tons, or 10,000,000 tons (20 per cent) above 1938.

(vi) Expansion of inland transport facilities to carry a 25 per cent greater load in 1951 than in 1938.

(vii) Restoration of pre-war merchant fleets of the participating countries by 1951.

(viii) Supply from European production of most of the capital equipment needed for these expansions.

PRODUCTION TARGETS

The various countries have undertaken to use all their efforts to develop their national production in order to achieve these targets. Of particular importance are the French and Italian grain production programmes, which aim at recovering pre-war levels by 1951, and the United Kingdom coal production programme, which is designed to exceed the pre-war level by 1951. These production programmes, taken as a whole, represent an expansion of output similar in general scale to that achieved by the United States in the mobilization years 1940-44. This production effort provides the foundation for a sound and workable European economy.

7. The creation of internal financial stability in certain countries is a necessary condition for the accomplishment of their production programmes and undertakings have been given by the countries concerned to apply all necessary measures to lead to the rapid achievement of this stability. The quick success of stabilization will to a very large extent depend on adequate foreign assistance being available during the period when stabilization is being achieved. No precise calculation can be made of the amount required without examining the position of each of the countries concerned at the time when stabilization is undertaken. But from such estimates as can be made the amount likely to be required would be of the order of $3,000,000,000.

8. The maximum use will be made by the participating countries of their own raw material resources, man-power, and productive capacity. This process will be stimulated by measures to be taken to secure progressive relaxation of import restrictions to improve payment arrangements between the various countries and to transfer surplus labor. An announcement has already been made about the setting up of a customs union study group, which will make a first report within three months of its being convened. The French Government has stated that it is ready to commence negotiations with all European Governments who wish to enter a customs union with France and whose national economies are capable of being combined with the French economy in such a way as to make a viable unit. The Italian Government has associated itself with this declaration.

COMMON PLANNING

9. Apart from mutual help designed to increase supplies of scarce commodities and to increase the flow of trade between the participating countries, agreement has been achieved on collective action on special problems as follows:

(i) A series of projects is being developed for common planning of the exploitation of new sources of electric power. The plan selected by the committee provides for the erection of a series of power plants to exploit the hydroelectric resources of the Alps, certain German lignite deposits, and Italian reserves of geothermic energy. This work involves the cooperative development of resources cutting across frontiers, and the decisions are being taken without regard to national frontiers. The common planning required is now proceeding.

(ii) Encouragement of the standardization of mining and electrical supplies and freight cars.

(iii) Examination of the possibility of securing the more efficient use of freight cars by pooling arrangements and by international study of the flows of traffic.

(iv) Arrangements for the interchange of information by the steel producing countries about their programmes of modernization and extension, so that each country may take account of plans made by the others.

10. Arrangements have been made for continuing the work of mutual help and consultation begun in Paris both through the United Nations machinery and in other ways. A joint organization charged with the task of reviewing progress made in the execution of the programmes is also contemplated.

REQUIREMENTS FROM U.S.

11. The report shows that even after taking full account of the supplies which they can produce for themselves and which they can hope to obtain from the rest of the world, the participating countries will require large quantities of food, fuel, raw materials, and capital equipment from the American continent. Without this flow of goods the whole recovery programme will be in jeopardy. The requirements stated take account of the supplies likely to be available. They do not represent extravagant importing. Food consumption at the end of the period will be less than the pre-war level and the estimates are framed on the basis that in many countries restrictions on consumption of food, clothing, and gasoline (for non-essential purposes) will continue to be necessary.

12. The scale of the problem is shown by the combined deficit of the participating countries and Western Germany with the American continent, which is given in the following tables. The size of the deficit is to a large extent attributable to lack of supplies formerly available from Eastern Europe, South-East Asia, and other non-European sources. It may be possible to meet part of the deficit through the International Bank for Development and Reconstruction, private investment and credit operations, and, for a few countries, by the use of their limited available assets.

(Thousand million dollars)

—	1948	1949	1950	1951	Total
U.S.A. ..	5.64	4.27	3.28	2.62	15.81
Rest of American continent ..	1.94	1.82	1.30	0.91	5.97
	7.58	6.09	4.58	3.53	21.78
Deficit of dependent territories	0.46	0.26	0.07	—0.13	0.66
Total ..	8.04	6.35	4.65	3.40	22.44

THE INTERNATIONAL BANK

Estimated imports from the American continent include equipment as well as commodities such as food and coal. If imports of equipment, other than agricultural machinery and coal-mining machinery, to which special considerations apply, were financed by loans from the International Bank or by other credit operations, the deficit remaining to be dealt with could be reduced as follows:

(Thousand million dollars)

—	1948	1949	1950	1951	Total
Deficit as shown in above table	8.04	6.35	4.65	3.40	22.44
Less equipment assumed to be financed by International Bank, &c. ..	0.92	0.89	0.70	0.60	3.11
Total ..	7.12	5.46	3.95	2.80	19.33

13. The need for an intense effort to expand exports from the participating countries to the rest of the world is recognized throughout the report as essential to help reduce the deficit over the four-year period. Given favorable world conditions, it is estimated that the participating countries and Western Germany at the end of the period will have a substantial surplus in their trading account with non-participating countries other than those of the American continent. For the year 1951 this is tentatively estimated as $1,800,000,000 and for the four-year period at $2,810,000,000. Only if there is a sufficient flow of dollars to the rest of the world to enable the participating countries to earn dollars, or their equivalent, for this surplus, will it be possible to offset this surplus against the dollar deficit with the American continent.

14. The report emphasizes that while the first element of the recovery programme must be to increase European production, it will be impossible to right the problem unless market conditions in the American continent allow both Europe and other parts of the world to sell goods there in increasing quantities. The maladjustment between the productive power and resources of the American continent and the participating countries is due to many causes and cannot be righted by European action alone. The purpose of the report is to submit proposals for the necessary restorative action on the European side by production, stabilization, and cooperation between the participating countries, but this cannot complete the task. The report concludes with the following phrases:

CALAMITOUS RESULTS

"The problem which the Committee of Cooperation has been working to solve in Paris is the aftermath of the war. The committee now submits its proposal for the necessary restorative action on the European side by production, stabilization and cooperation between the participating countries, as well as by measures to stimulate the free flow of goods and services. These proposals are reinforced by definite and specific undertakings by each of the countries concerned. But these undertakings can be successfully carried out only with the assurance of a continued flow of goods from the American continent; if that flow should cease the results would be calamitous. Europe's dollar resources are running low. One country after another has already been forced by lack of dollars to cut down vital imports of food and raw materials from the American continent. If nothing is done a catastrophe will develop as stocks become exhausted. If too little is done, and if it is done too late, it will be impossible to provide the momentum needed to get the programme under way. Life in Europe will become increasingly unstable and uncertain; industries will grind to a gradual halt for lack of materials and fuel, and the food supply of Europe will diminish and begin to disappear.

"In these circumstances the participating nations have welcomed the opportunity to prepare and present to the United States a statement of their plans and requirements. Through meetings between representatives of the United States and of the participating nations, the details of that statement can be filled in and the means of recovery more precisely defined.

THE MEANS OF RECOVERY

"In the last analysis the external means of recovery can in largest measure come only from the United States, which has by its assistance in the last two years already rescued Europe from collapse and chaos. Unfortunately the size of the problem has proved greater than was expected; the disruption caused by the war was more far-reaching and the obstacles to recovery more formidable than was realized even six months ago. This report contains, it is believed, a realistic appreciation of the solution. In it the participating countries have set out the facts as they see them and on the basis of those facts have formulated a recovery programme. Their programme is based upon the fullest use of their existing productive capacity. In drawing it up they have sought to reduce their needs from the American continent to the minimum consistent with its achievement. The American people, through their Government and their Congress, will consider this programme and determine whether the means can be found for supplying those needs. On their decision will depend whether Europe can achieve economic stability and thereby be enabled to make her full contribution to the welfare of the world."

IX
The Cominform Documents

OCT. 5, 1947

COMMUNIQUE

At the end of September in Poland took place an informational conference with the participation of the following Communist parties: Communist party, Yugoslavia – Comrades Edvard Kardelj [Yugoslav Vice-Premier] and Milovan Djilas [Yugoslavian Minister Without Portfolio]; Bulgarian Workers party (Communist)—Comrades Vulko Chervenkov and V. Poptomov; Communist party Rumania—Comrades [George] Gheorghiu-Dej [Ana] Pauker; Hungarian Communist party—Comrades M. Farkash and Jozsef Revai; Polish Workers party – Comrades [Vice Premier Wladyslaw] Gomulka and H. Minc; All-Union Communist party (Bolshevik of the Soviet Union)—Comrades [Andrei] A. Zhdanov and [Georgi M.] Malenkov; Communist party of France—[Jacques] Duclos and [Etienne] Fajon; Communist party of Czechoslovakia – R. Slansky and S. Bashtovansky; and the Communist party of Italy—Comrades [Luigi] Longo and [Eugenio] Reale.

Members of the conference heard information reports about the activity of the Central Committees of the parties represented from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union, France, Czechoslovakia, and Italy.

Having exchanged viewpoints on these reports, the members of the conference decided to discuss the question of the international situation and the question of exchange of experience and coordination of activity of Communist parties represented at the conference.

A report on the international situation was made by Zhdanov. Members of the conference exchanged viewpoints on the report, fully coordinated their views on the present international situation and the tasks issuing from it and unanimously accepted a declaration on the question of the international situation.

A report on the exchange of experience and coordination of activity of Communist parties was made by Comrade Gomulka.

On this question, the conference, having in view the negative phenomena produced by the absence of contact between parties represented at the conference and taking into consideration the necessity for mutual exchange and experience, has decided to create an Information Bureau.

The Information Bureau will consist of the representatives of the Central Committees of the above mentioned parties.

The tasks of the Information Bureau consist in the organization of an exchange of experience between parties and, in case of necessity, in coordination of their activity on the basis of mutual agreement.

It has been decided that the Information Bureau will publish a printed organ. The city of Belgrade (Yugoslavia) has been decided as the location for the Information Bureau and the editorial board of its organ.

RESOLUTION

The conference states that the absence of connections between Communist parties who have taken part in this conference is in the present situation a serious shortcoming. Experience has shown that such division between Communist parties is incorrect and harmful. The requirement for an exchange of experience and voluntary coordination of actions of the separate parties has become particularly necessary now in conditions of the complicated post-war international situation and when the disunity of Communist parties may lead to damage for the working class.

Because of this, members of the conference agreed on the following:

First, to set up an Information Bureau of representatives of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian Workers party (of Communists) of Rumania, the Hungarian Communist party, the Polish Workers party, the All-Union Communist party (bolshevik), the Communist party of France, the Communist party of Czechoslovakia, Communist party of Italy.

Second, the task given to the Information Bureau is to organize and exchange experience and, in case of necessity, coordinate the activity of Communist parties on foundations of mutual agreement.

Third, the Information Bureau will have in it representatives of the Central Committees—two from each Central Com-

mittee. Delegations of the Central Committees must be appointed and replaced by the Central Committees.

Fourth, the Information Bureau is to have printed an organ—fortnightly and, later on, weekly. The organ is to be published in French and Russian and, if possible, in other languages.

Fifth, the Information Bureau is to be in Belgrade.

MANIFESTO

Representatives of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian Workers party (Communist), the Rumanian Communist party, the Hungarian Communist party, the Polish Workers party, the International Communist party (Bolshevik), the French Communist party, the Czechoslovak Communist party, the Italian Communist party, after exchanging opinions on the subject of the international situation, resolved the following declaration:

In the international situation brought about by the second World War and in the period that followed fundamental changes took place.

The characteristic aspect of these changes is a new balance of political forces interplaying in the world arena, a shift in the relationship between states which were the victors in the second World War, their revaluation.

As long as the war lasted the Allied states fighting against Germany and Japan marched in step and were one. Nevertheless, in the Allies' camp already during the war there existed differences regarding the aims of the war as well as the objectives of postwar and world organization. The Soviet Union and the democratic countries believed that the main objective of the war was the rebuilding and strengthening of democracy in Europe, the liquidation of fascism and the prevention of a possible aggression on the behalf of Germany, that its further aim was an achievement of an all around and lasting cooperation between the nations of Europe.

The United States of America and with them England placed as their war aim a different goal—the elimination of competition on the world market (Germany and Japan) and the consolidation of their dominant position. This difference in the definition of war aims and post-war objectives has begun to deepen in the post-war period.

Two opposite political lines have crystallized: on the one extreme the U.S.S.R. and the democratic countries aim at whittling down imperialism and the strengthening of democracy. On the other side the United States of America and England aim at the strengthening of imperialism and choking democracy. Because the U.S.S.R. and the democratic countries stand in the way of fulfilling imperialistic plans aiming at world domination and crushing democratic movements, a campaign against the Soviet Union and the countries of the new democracy was undertaken, a campaign fed also by a threat of a new war on the part of the most sanguine imperialist politicians of the United States and England.

In this way there arose two camps—the camp of imperialism and anti-democratic forces, whose chief aim is an establishment of a world-wide American imperialists' hegemony and the crushing of democracy; and an anti-imperialistic democratic camp whose chief aim is the elimination of imperialism, the strengthening of democracy and the liquidation of the remnants of fascism.

The battle of the two opposite camps—capitalistic and anti-imperialistic—is waged amid conditions of a further sharpening of the universal crisis of capitalism, a weakening of the forces of capitalism and a strengthening of the forces of socialism and democracy.

Because of the above, the imperialistic camp and its directing force, the United States of America show a growing aggressive activity. The activity evolved at the same time in all spheres—in the sphere of military and strategic activities, economic expansion and ideological warfare. The Truman-Marshall plan is only a farce, a European branch of the general world plan of political expansion being realized by the United States of America in all parts of the world. The plan of the economic and political subjugation of Europe through American imperialism is complemented by plans for the economic and political subjugation of China, Indonesia and South America. The aggressors of yesterday—the capitalist tycoons of Germany and Japan—are being prepared by the United States of America for a new role—as tools of the imperialistic policy in Europe and Asia of the United States of America.

The arsenal of tactical weapons used by the imperialistic camp is further very complex. It combines direct threats of force, blackmail and intimidation, all sorts of political tricks and economic pressure, bribery, the using for its own ends of conflicting interests and disagreements with the aim of strengthening its position, and all that is camouflaged by a mask of liberalism and pacifism in order to deceive and befuddle people not too dexterous in politics.

A separate place in this arsenal is reserved for the treasonable policy of the Rightist Socialists of the kind of [Leon] Blum in France, [Prime Minister] Attlee and [Foreign Secretary] Bevin in Britain, [Socialist Leader Dr. Kurt] Schumacher in Germany, [President Dr. Karl] Renner and [Vice Premier Adolf] Schaerf in Austria, [Giuseppe] Saragat in Italy, and so on, who aim at hiding the true face of imperialism behind the mask of democracy and Socialist phraseology while in reality they serve as faithful toadies of the imperialists, bringing within the ranks of labor dissension and disruption and poisoning its conscience. It is not an accident that the imperialistic British foreign policy has found in the person of Bevin its most consistent and arduous spokesman.

In these conditions the anti-imperialistic democratic camp has to close its ranks and draw up and agree on a common platform to work out its tactics against the chief forces of the imperialist camp, against American imperialism, against its English and French allies, against the Right-Wing Socialists above all in England and France.

To frustrate those imperialistic plans of aggression we need the efforts of all democratic and anti-imperialistic forces in Europe.

The Right-Wing Socialists are the traitors in this common cause. With the exception of those countries of new democracy where the Communists and Socialists, together with other progressive parties have formed a common bloc in the face of imperialism, the Socialists in most other countries, and especially the French Socialists and the British Laborites—[French Premier Paul] Ramadieur, M. Blum, Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin—facilitate by their servile placidity the fulfillment of American capitalistic aims, encouraging it to blackmail, and pushing their own countries on the road to vassal-like dependence on the United States of America.

In this situation the Communist parties are faced with a particularly important problem. They must grasp in their hands the banner of national independence and sovereignty in their own countries. If the Communist parties stand fast on their outposts, if they refuse to be intimidated and blackmailed, if they courageously guard over the democracy, national sovereignty, independence and self determination of their countries, if they know how to fight against attempts at the economic and political subjugation of their countries and place themselves at the head of all the forces ready to defend the cause of national honor and independence, then and then only no plans to subjugate the countries of Europe and Asia can succeed.

The above is one of the fundamental aims of the Communist parties.

One should realize that between the imperialist desire to unleash a new war and the possibility of organizing a war, there exists a tremendous distance.

The nations of the world do not want war. The forces who align themselves with peace are so numerous and powerful that if they defend hard and without flinching the cause of peace, if they show perseverance and grit then the plans of the aggressors are doomed to bankruptcy.

We should not forget that the imperialist agents, through their clatter regarding the danger of war, try to intimidate vacillators and weaklings and thus gain through blackmail concessions for the aggressor.

The main danger for the working class at this moment lies in the underestimation of its own strength and overestimation of the force of the imperialist camp.

In the same way as the appeasement policy of Munich led to Hitler's aggression, today concessions to the United States of America and the imperialist camp may cause its instigators to grow even more shameless and aggressive.

In consequence the Communist parties should place themselves in the vanguard of the Opposition against the imperialistic plans of expansion and aggression in all its manifestations whether in the sphere of state administration, politics, economics or

ideology and they should at the same time unite and coordinate their efforts on the basis of a common anti-imperialist and democratic platform as well as gather around themselves all democratic and patriotic forces in their respective nations.

X

Summary of the Krug Committee's Report

ON U. S. CAPACITY TO GIVE AID
OCT. 18, 1947

THE CURRENT high levels of production and consumption in the United States are creating, in a number of specific and important areas of our economy, certain difficult supply impacts that must be faced. They are also aggravating generally the urgent need for extending our programs for the conservation, development and expansion of the nation's resources. Even though foreign aid exports in general are a small proportion of our domestic production or requirements and their drain upon our resources relatively minor, they point up the need for finding solutions to several important supply problems and emphasize the importance of broadening our conservation practices and building up our stockpiles of strategic minerals.

CURRENT HIGH LEVELS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

The economy of this country is today operating at highest peacetime levels, and, in many activities, is exceeding its wartime peaks. The production and transportation equipment of the nation is being utilized as fully as ever before in peacetime, and, in general, its raw material resources are being put to use at rates that exceed past peacetime records. This unprecedented economic activity has resulted in the attainment of a gross national product, or total value of final goods and services produced or in process, of $204 billion in 1946 and a rate of $225 billion annually for the first six months of 1947.

The broad concept of our national resources underlying this study has necessarily been broken down for the purposes of appraisal into particular components that relate to the commodities which are most likely to be required for foreign aid, together with their related physical resources, and to those national resources which are fundamental contributing factors in our productive process though not themselves exported—man-power, electric power and transportation facilities.

As might be anticipated from the current high level of the gross national product, most of the industries and occupations of our economy are functioning at unusually high rates, and the strain upon our facilities and drain on our resources are generally manifest. The studies of the problems of supply for the various commodities and the reviews of the contributing factors uniformly reveal that the prevailing characteristic of the current economy is one of tautness.

To be sure, there are instances of surpluses in capacity, and the availability of a number of commodities could be assured or increased through more appropriate distribution. And, in many cases, production could be maintained and even increased with minor adjustments of capacity or the breaking of specific bottlenecks. But the most serious shortages require complex adjustments in the supply of equipment and materials that are themselves difficult to provide.

Not only is our production at levels that, in many instances, are nearing the capacity of our facilities, but most of our exhaustible resources are being utilized at peak levels. In those cases where the reserves of these resources are vast there is of course, no cause for concern in current levels of extraction, but there are a number of resources which are being depleted at rates that cannot properly be disregarded.

This high utilization of its industrial and agricultural productive capacity is taxing the nation's plants and facilities. With a minimum of material and market controls, this situation of itself creates problems that require adjustment. The production of many of our products is depending upon the proven flexibility of our economic system and the ingenuity of our technologists in bridging gaps or breaking bottlenecks by providing substitutes and taking other measures to overcome shortages.

The heavy impacts upon our key industries and the drain upon our natural resources resulting from these production levels are pointing upon some of the major problems of our national well-being and security:

These high levels of employment and activity cannot be maintained without comprehensive programs for expanding, developing and replenishing our basic resources, adding materially to our productive capacity in key industries, and where domestic supplies are inadequate, through importing raw materials.

EXPORTS AND IMPACTS

The supply difficulties and danger spots are not, however, generally attributable to exports. Total exports are only a fraction of our gross national product. The studies of specific commodities also reveal that, in most instances, exports are not a large claimant for the current high levels of production and indeed, are not relatively as large as before the war.

They also show that most of the supply problems are short-run problems that will tend to diminish throughout the five years under study both because increases in some of our domestic capacities are being undertaken and because the foreign aid needs for many critical commodities can be expected to taper off sharply as production abroad gets under way.

The fact is that, with our production and employment, capital investment and personal consumption, at the highest levels ever reached in times of peace, we are suffering from the unaccustomed inconveniences of a sudden and unprepared for high-employment economy. This condition is owing far more to the pressures of internal demands than to exports. The study of electric power, as one of the contributing factors to the productivity of our economy, tends to confirm the observation that current levels of domestic production and consumption, rather than exports, are taxing our facilities. The power used in the manufacture or supply of the things that we export is an insignificant factor in the current and prospective stringencies in the power supply.

The underlying studies also show that the problems created by the impact of a possible foreign aid program upon the economy of the United States are of two sorts.

Most immediately, there are the *supply impacts:* the problems of obtaining adequate supplies of the commodities which are not currently being produced in sufficient quantities to satisfy all demands. To meet these problems, it will be necessary either to increase production through expanding capacity or utilizing existing capacity more intensively, or to divert consumption from less essential domestic and foreign uses to more essential ones.

There are also *resource impacts:* the problems of preventing the combined domestic and foreign drain on our natural resources from depleting them at uneconomic or unsafe rates. These can be met either by restricting production, and so running into conflict with the requirements of sound economic policy, both domestic and foreign, or by adopting conservation practices which will permit maximum rates of production to be attained with safety.

SUPPLY IMPACTS

Supply impacts are chiefly those which affect the volume of production and consumption and the level of prices and employment for particular commodities. Under present conditions of high levels of economic activity, any increase in demand, whether domestic or foreign, is likely to be felt in commodity markets to an exaggerated degree. The commodity studies show, however, that the number of specific supply problems likely to result from a program of foreign aid is relatively small, and that still fewer are likely to be quantitatively important.

Though many items are in scarce supply in the United States, chiefly as the result of the war and the extraordinarily high level of domestic demand, the only serious problems of supply to be anticipated in connection with a foreign aid program will be those which are related to shortages that are world-wide in character and that result chiefly from the wartime destruction or devastation of productive facilities.

These major world shortages consist of foods, especially cereals, and more particularly wheat, the staple of diet in the western world; fertilizers, especially nitrogen fertilizers, which can produce the greatest immediate increase in crop yields;

coal, which is needed to activate industrial plants of all kinds, including notably those producing nitrogen fertilizers and steel; steel, which is basic to all reconstruction programs; and mechanical equipment, with special emphasis on farm machinery, freight cars and mining machinery.

The small number of key commodities simplifies the problem, but their basic and interrelated character complicates it. For example, maximum effort to relieve current food deficiencies abroad interferes to some extent with the aim of restoring foreign economies to a self-supporting basis. At current high prices United States farmers are eager to increase output, and their strong competition for available supplies of nitrogen fertilizers and farm machinery increases the difficulty of satisfying export demands for these goods.

Similarly, foreign demands for coal and steel compete with those for mechanical equipment. The need to effect a reconciliation among these and other competing demands, many of which are relatively inessential, poses the central problems of supply, so far as the foreign aid program is concerned.

These key items do not exhaust the list of requirements for foreign aid. Year after year, the list of exports from the United States contains larger or smaller quantities of nearly every movable goods which we produce, and it is probable that foreign countries will need to import exceptionally large amounts of many of our goods during the period of reconstruction. But this enumeration is designed to focus attention upon the commodities which, because they present the greatest problems, merit the greatest attention. Moreover, it is believed that, if effort and ingenuity are concentrated upon making considerably larger supplies of those key commodities available, other shortages will progressively diminish in severity as the aided countries return to a self-supporting basis.

Wheat: In terms of volume and cost, for it is the cheapest effective source of the calories needed to meet basic food deficiencies in foreign lands, wheat is by far the most important item of American food production in relation to foreign needs.

Export of foods other than grains are important, but many of them are ordinarily too expensive in terms of cost per calorie to be substituted for wheat in large quantities in meeting demands. It is generally agreed that European countries must concentrate on eliminating their basic calorie deficiencies in order that workers will have the incentive and strength to produce increased quantities of coal and other industrial requisites so essential in any program of economic rehabilitation.

Our current production of wheat is vastly in excess of our domestic food requirements. The wheat crop of 1947 was 1,400 million bushels, compared with 1,156 million for 1946, and the ten-year average (1936-45) of 890 million bushels. Of almost 19 million long tons of food exported by the United States in the twelve months ended June 30, 1947, cereals made up 80 per cent by weight, and exports of wheat alone (including flour) amounted to 10½ million long tons, or nearly 400 million bushels. These exports did not significantly reduce domestic use of grain products for human food, although additional grain could have been converted into meat and milk.

For 1948 and the following years the problem is to assure maximum wheat production for as long as it is needed to meet world shortages. According to the Department of Agriculture, the production goals that have been set are designed to encourage maximum wheat production and exports next year. Similarly high goals should be set in the years thereafter if the world wheat shortage continues.

But whether such goals can be met will depend upon weather. Wheat yields are extremely variable from year to year. Our large wheat crops during the past six years have been due in part to unusually favorable weather. Weather has also been partly responsible for the current high level of wheat acreage, since favorable moisture conditions have permitted plantings on land normally submarginal for wheat. With average weather, yields certainly and acreage probably would decline from present levels. With dry weather in the Great Plains material reductions in wheat acreage would be expected.

The immediate problem is securing the wheat for shipments during the current crop year. This supply problem again is largely a result of the weather, both here and abroad. To be sure, the 1947 wheat crop in the United States exceeds the highest previous record by more than 200 million bushels and would ordinarily have permitted a substantial increase in exports over last year, with a corresponding improvement in the food situation of importing countries.

However, adverse weather has resulted in a short corn crop in this country and in a drastic reduction in bread grain production in Europe. There is, consequently, an extremely serious wheat supply problem for the current crop year. The short corn crop means that exports of corn and other coarse grain during the rest of this fiscal year will be small and that relatively large amounts of domestic wheat will be fed to livestock, thereby reducing quantities available for export.

The reduced bread grain production in Europe means that European food imports would have to be increased by the equivalent of 200 million bushels of grain, even to maintain the low consumption levels of 1946-1947.

Exportable supplies of grain and other foods in countries other than the United States are expected to be somewhat larger than last year, but not sufficient to offset the decline in European production. The supply problem is also affected by the level to which our carry-over stocks may safely be drawn down at the end of the fiscal year. If 1948 wheat crop prospects, as of next spring, are very good, carry-over stocks might again be brought down to the level of July, 1947. If 1948 wheat prospects are relatively poor, it would be desirable to carry larger stocks into 1948-49.

From the standpoint of world food needs in 1947-48, it would be desirable for the United States to export much more wheat than the 1946-47 total of roughly 400,000,000 bushels. However, our ability to increase wheat exports above this level will depend to a considerable extent upon our ability to hold wheat feeding of livestock below the levels that now seem probable.

While price and rationing problems are not covered within the scope of this report, the supply problem in this instance is materially affected by price factors. The rate of wheat feeding will be influenced by the relative prices of wheat and feed grains, particularly corn, and also by the relative prices of wheat and livestock products. Government action to reduce wheat feeding by means of direct limitation orders could not be taken without additional legislation.

Possible types of action to assure maximum supplies of wheat for export would include food conservation programs, measures designed to reduce consumption (and hence prices) of other grains and livestock products, efforts among farmers, feed dealers and feeders to limit the use of wheat for feed, programs to limit use of wheat and coarse grains by industrial users, such as the brewers and distillers, and measures to encourage freer movement of wheat from farms.

In addition to these possibilities for increasing the availability of wheat for export to meet European needs, consideration should be given to supplementing wheat exports by exporting other foods, particularly those in long supply, to make up any discrepancy in wheat exports. To the extent that the substitution of other foods for wheat is practicable, it would tend to lessen the price impact resulting from maximum wheat exports.

In summary, wheat is a key item in any foreign aid program. We can continue to supply large quantities of wheat for foreign aid without substantial reduction of food supplies in this country or undue drain on our soil resources, assuming average weather and our continued ability to plant in the Great Plains. The immediate problem, however, is meeting European requirements in the current crop year when adverse weather has reduced American corn supplies and European grain production; the competition of the heavier European demands with our substitution of wheat for corn results in complex price impacts.

The success of measures to assure equitable distribution of food supplies in this country and to minimize price effects will therefore determine the extent of our current exports and the levels of future exports if adverse weather condition are encountered.

Nitrogen Fertilizers: The current low level of food production in many countries is owing, in part, to the inadequacy of current fertilizer supplies and to accumulated deficiencies of fertilizer applications during the war. Of the three essential

plant nutrients—nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium—the first is used to obtain immediate increases in food production. Fertilizer phosphate and potash are necessary to the long-run preservation of the fertility of the soil but are not as effective for securing immediate crop increases. Therefore nitrogen is the most important fertilizer production and supply problem. Europe and North Africa possess ample reserves of the two other fertilizer minerals, and it is probable that production of these two fertilizers can gradually be brought into balance with European needs, if mining machinery, coal and other supplies can be made available.

While United States production of nitrogen (including the output of ordnance plants) has increased threefold since before the war, domestic consumption of nitrogen fertilizers has more than doubled. Most of the increase in consumption has occurred in agriculture, but the demands of industry for nitrogen are not relatively greater than before the war.

Although European production of nitrogen is almost back at pre-war levels, total production abroad is still considerably below capacity, owing chiefly to an insufficiency of coal and electric power, and world needs for nitrogen are greater than before the war.

CURRENT SHIPMENTS SMALL

With the exception of the nitrogen being produced in Army ordnance plants and exported to occupied areas, relatively small quantities of nitrogen are currently being shipped from this country and even these quantities are secured only through the use of priority powers.

Unless special measures are taken, American nitrogen capacity will expand only enough to keep pace with domestic requirements.

Considering transportation and cost, it appears desirable to export nitrogen for increased food production abroad rather than to continue to ship the much greater tonnages of equivalent food from the United States. The most effective means of increasing our nitrogen exports include the stimulation of fuller utilization of plant capacity, the curtailment of industrial use of nitrogen and the diversion of fertilizers from domestic to foreign markets. Greater production from Government plants could probably be secured, but at higher cost until the plants are consolidated for efficient operation.

It is understood, however, that considerable nitrogen capacity is currently unutilized in Western Europe, primarily for lack of coal. The gains to be made from full utilization of this capacity, by making coal supplies available, may be much greater than those which can reasonably be expected from the actions necessary to increase exports of nitrogen from the United States.

In summary, the foreign aid program should be designed to increase production of nitrogen by employing unused capacity in Europe and elsewhere to help to meet the current world food shortage and to minimize imports of food to aided countries. To this end coal and industrial equipment shipments for nitrogen fertilizer production should be given high priority.

Coal. Although reconstruction requirements make European coal needs greater than prewar levels, coal production in Europe is currently about 25 per cent below prewar rates. Western Europe could probably use about 100 million tons of coal per year in excess of current production, and sufficient coal supplies are essential to close the vicious circle of dragging agricultural and industrial output.

Since the foreign aid program is to achieve reconstruction, the current imports of coal from the United States should decline rapidly as reconstruction is effected. There is no area of the economy, moreover, where the need for developing sound and durable relationships between European regions is greater than in the case of coal.

Eastern European coal, particularly Polish coal, is essential to the integrated development of a reasonably balanced European economy. Assuming an effective "self-help and mutual-aid" program, the current coal supply crisis can be expected to be relatively short-lived, the years 1947 and 1948 representing the peak in demand for coal from the United States.

At current production rates the total hard and soft coal produced in the United States in 1947 will approximate 660 million tons, or about 4 per cent below the peak of 684 million tons reached during the war. Production is currently being limited by the lack of adequate supply of coal cars on the railroads. Coal is not stored at the mines, and when transportation facilities are inadequate for shipment of all available coal, production is curtailed.

COAL OUTPUT MUST RISE

Total consumption of coal in the United States and Canada for 1947 is estimated at 627 million tons. If production were not limited by the lack of coal cars, it is believed that coal could be produced in amounts sufficient to meet this level of United States and Canadian requirements and in addition an amount equal to the coal-loading capacity of United States port facilities. Coal loading for export reached a record monthly peak of about 5 million tons in August, 1947. Under average conditions a somewhat lower loading rate may be expected. Capacity shipments from our ports would be sufficient to meet the most essential foreign demands.

Price problems are a factor in the coal situation, as in wheat. There are many grades of coal, and handling costs for overseas shipment are a large part of the final cost, and are the same per ton regardless of quality. Foreign purchasers, therefore, often find it advantageous to pay premium prices to acquire the better coals, thus making procurement by American buyers more difficult and expensive. Procurement procedure for a foreign aid program should be such as to assure effective utilization of high-grade coals and minimum impact on domestic prices.

Since the domestic requirements and the export demands will remain heavy at least during the next year, production must be higher than it was during 1947 to meet the total demand.

As coal cars are the current bottleneck to production, every effort must be made to increase the availability of new coal cars and to improve the utilization of existing equipment.

In summary, the problem of producing enough coal to meet our own requirements and those for export is not a coal resource problem but primarily a transportation problem. We must make most effective use of available transportation equipment and arrange for the procurement of coal for foreign aid under procedures that will minimize the impact on the domestic market.

Steel. Steel presents, in many ways, the most troublesome problem of all. Neither time nor facilities have been available for a fully adequate appraisal of the worldwide steel problem and the importance of steel in the world economy dictates that such an appraisal should be made. It is clear, however, that, at present, there is a crippling shortage of steel in all foreign countries striving to recover from the effects of war. This shortage is the result primarily of the removal, destruction or incapacitation of foreign iron and steelmaking plants, and of the exceptionally high level of requirements to replace losses or to meet backlogs accumulated during the war. Existing iron and steelmaking plants in foreign countries are incapacitated chiefly because of shortages of war materials, especially coking coal.

Foreign aid requirements for steel products compete importantly with our domestic demands and with the demands of South America and other developing areas.

The accumulation of backlogs for both producers' and consumers' goods and the effects of population growth have raised domestic steel consumption to the highest peacetime levels.

In most of the studies of specific commodities, the shortage of steel or steel products is indicated to be one of the bottlenecks to maintaining or increasing production.

Not only is this the case with such heavy users as the industrial and farm machinery and vehicle industries, where sheet metal, transmission chains and castings are steel components in short supply, but also in petroleum, where steel tubing, casing and pipe lines are needed; in fertilizers and other chemicals, where pressure tank cars and containers are problems; in coal where production levels are dependent upon the availability of open-top cars now in short supply; in transportation where facilities for shipping wheat and other commodities are similarly below current requirements.

The present situation contrasts with that in 1940, a year when heavy foreign demand did not face competition from a fully employed economy in the United States. Rated capacity in the industry was increased from 81,000,000 tons of steel ingots in 1940 to 95,000,000 tons in 1945 and

is down to 91,000,000 tons in 1947 owing to dismantling of older facilities. It is estimated that approximately 85,000,000 tons of steel ingots will be produced from this capacity in 1947. Exports of steel mill products as such will amount to approximately 6,600,000 tons, compared with 8,000,000 tons in 1940.

Production of finished steel mill products was 46,000,000 tons in 1940 and will be about 63,000,000 tons in 1947; exports were about 17 per cent of production in 1940 and will be 10.5 per cent this year. Furthermore, while other categories have increased, exports of sheet and strip, the items in tightest supply, have not increased above the pre-war (1937) rate, relative to output.

To increase the current level of exports of iron and steel mill products without reducing domestic consumption will necessitate the breaking of certain domestic bottlenecks, particularly the shortage of steel sheet. Additional sheet and strip capacity is being installed by the steel industry and is becoming available in increasing quantities. Programs already planned extend to the end of 1948.

A considerable portion of the most urgent foreign demand, however, is for various kinds of ingots and rough shapes for which adequate finishing capacity is available in the United States. The basic limiting factor to exports, therefore, is not finishing capacity but ingot production, which in 1947 will total some six million tons less than rated capacity. Everything possible should be done to bring this unused capacity into production promptly.

For the most part, this gap between output and capacity reflects the shortage of raw materials, namely, steel scrap and pig iron. While a continued high rate of industrial production should provide sufficient industrial scrap to produce 85 million tons of ingots, the additional quantities of scrap required for increased output will be difficult to obtain.

Pig iron productive capacity of 64.7 million tons is being used at only about 90 per cent of capacity, leaving 6.2 million tons of unused capacity. A number of furnaces built by the Government are not being used at all, because of such problems as local shortages of coke, lack of blowers and poor furnace condition. Certain privately owned furnaces are likewise hampered by local coke shortages, while others are operating below capacity because of the poor quality of coke available and similar factors, including high costs of production in some cases.

Energetic efforts by industry with appropriate government encouragement and assistance will ease these raw material shortages. The most promising possibilities, in addition to prompt return of industrial scrap, exist in the accelerated scrapping of remaining war surplus materials and the organization of systematic collection of obsolescent scrap. Another possibility is in the extension of the high pressure and oxygen techniques to increase output of pig iron from existing capacity. Solution of the scrap and pig iron problems would permit an increase in our ingot output to a level closer to rated capacity than at present.

From an examination of past relationships between steel production and the national economy—a conservative basis for analysis in the abnormal postwar period—it would appear that, if the current high level of economic activity continues, the present capacity of the iron and steel industry in the United States, even if fully utilized, will be inadequate to meet the demands placed upon it.

NEW TECHNIQUES MAY HELP

Increasing the capacity of the steel industry by the construction of additional new facilities, however, would not be effective unless raw materials are available in adequate quantities to make such new facilities fully productive. Moreover, such construction would require the use of steel that is critically needed currently both here and abroad. Careful consideration must, therefore, be given to every possible alternative for making maximum amounts of steel available and to assure its use for the most critical needs. The investment of steel in the increases of needed new steel capacity should be properly timed and geared to the availability of raw materials and to the supplying of other critical requirements for available steel.

It may be possible that pig iron and ingot capacity can be increased by new technological means as a substitute for the construction of new blast and steel furnaces. The technical practicability of the use of oxygen-enriched air in the open hearth process has already been demonstrated and indicates considerable increases in production per furnace.

It appears that the reduction in costs would justify the additional capital investment in oxygen-making equipment and the solving of the several production problems entailed in its use. As regards finishing capacity, the need for increases will depend upon the types of products in demand. Continued European requirements for steel will depend to a considerable extent upon the speed with which foreign steel facilities can be brought into production.

Every effort should be directed to accelerate this development. Export controls may be effective in channeling steel exports to assistance areas. In addition, however, government-industry cooperation will be needed to channel domestic steel supplies to assure their most effective use in our economy.

In summary, maintenance of substantial European demands for American steel will aggravate a serious domestic supply situation. Industry and government cooperation is needed to make raw materials, including scrap, available and otherwise to assure full utilization of existing capacity. Continued consideration must be given to increasing domestic capacity for future needs in such a manner as to minimize the effect of taking steel from current critical uses. In the light of the world steel shortage, supplies made available for export should be channeled to the most important uses and, through government-industry cooperation, supplies should be assured for essential needs here at home. Foreign-aid requirements should be carefully screened and procurement for export should be organized to reduce the impact on domestic supplies and prices to a minimum.

Industrial Equipment. In order to provide for the rehabilitation of the European economy, certain items of industrial equipment will be needed. Many items of such equipment are readily available for export and will have little or no effect upon our domestic economy. There are particular types of equipment, however, that are especially needed abroad and are also in heavy demand at home, and for which productive capacity is limited.

Production of industrial machinery and vehicles in the United States reached a total of over 18 billion dollars in 1944, held to substantially the same rate during the first half of 1945 and dropped precipitously thereafter. Production in June, 1946, however, was at the annual rate of 13 billion dollars. Exports of industrial machinery, not including vehicles, accounted for nearly 7 per cent of production in 1937, and a slight increase to about 8 per cent is expected in 1947. Europe's share of our industrial machinery exports has declined from an average of about 30 per cent in 1936 to 1938 to about 26 per cent in the first six months of this year. The major increase in exports of these products has been the 10 per cent greater shipments to Latin America.

One of the most important items of possible foreign aid requirements for industrial equipment is freight cars, especially open tops, for the transport of coal. It is understood that, despite the relatively low output, coal is being stored at the mines in Europe for lack of inland transport facilities. In this country the coal car shortage is a major limiting factor in production. Mining machinery, including rubber conveyor belts, is another serious shortage that limits output per worker both in the coal mines of Europe and in the phosphate and potash mines of North Africa and Europe.

These and similar items of equipment are needed to assist in breaking some of the more serious bottlenecks in European recovery.

To the extent that they make coal and fertilizer available, they will permit the tapering off of outside aid in the form of these essentials and the food and steel products that are creating the greatest supply problems in this country and the world generally.

To a considerable extent, the problem of making these items of equipment available both for export and for domestic demands is a result of the tight steel situation. The impact of these and other exports containing steel upon our domestic steel capacity, however, does not need separate consideration here, as the amount of steel in such products has been included in the estimates of requirements for domestic industry.

In addition to securing steel, however, the supply of industrial equipment for

foreign aid will require industry-Government cooperation to maintain fullest utilization of productive capacity and to assure that the most pressing demands are given first priority. Attention given to the breaking of individual bottlenecks in the production of machinery and equipment permits the evaluation of the impact of a specific action on other programs and is more often than not effective in solving a whole series of production problems.

In view of the high levels of domestic demand and the importance of foreign requirements for industrial machinery for rehabilitation, foreign aid exports should be carefully evaluated and channeled so that every item of scarce equipment is put to work promptly and effectively in reconstruction.

In summary, supply problems on machinery and equipment items, unlike the other supply problems, are capable of less precise evaluation in the absence of definite requirements.

Moreover, their solution is likely to be brought about by more careful attention to individual problems to assure the supply of specific items necessary for a coordinated reconstruction program. The impact of these exports will be lessened in many instances by a solution of the steel bottlenecks.

Undoubtedly, the list of European requirements will specify the amounts and kinds of these and other items required and will reveal other urgent needs which may present short-run supply difficulties. Such requirements may have important impacts upon particular industries or plants but cannot present any generalized problems of supply for the country as a whole.

For the most part, the supply impacts of the foreign aid program can be reduced by providing for its sound administration. They call for the effective organization of the purchasing procedures for foreign aid exports to create the minimum impact on the domestic economy and to assure the proper channeling of commodities in short supply to those uses where they will be most effective in the rehabilitation of the European economy, assuming maximum "self-help and mutual aid." Cooperative arrangement with the countries receiving assistance will be necessary to assure that foreign aid purchases do not compete with each other and otherwise unduly aggravate domestic market conditions. Government-industry cooperation will be needed both for breaking domestic production and supply bottlenecks and for proper channeling of exports.

XI

Report to the Nation by President Truman

NEED FOR CALLING SPECIAL SESSION

OCT. 24, 1947

My Fellow Countrymen:

I have called the Congress to meet on Nov. 17 to consider the problems of high prices at home and emergency aid abroad.

These are questions of vital importance to all of us. I want to talk to you frankly tonight about both of these problems.

Since V-J Day we have moved steadfastly toward two goals. We have sought peace and prosperity—prosperity for all our people, peace for all the world.

As we measure our progress toward these goals and chart the course ahead we find that recent events have raised new and dangerous obstacles in our path.

Our domestic prosperity is endangered by the threat of inflation. The peace of the world is endangered by hunger and cold in other lands.

These obstacles must be overcome by prompt and courageous action. Legislation by the Congress is essential. The need is too pressing—the results of delay too grave —for Congressional action to wait until the next regular session in January.

Let me speak first about our domestic prosperity.

In many ways we are now more prosperous than we have ever been. More workers have jobs—and at better wages—than at any time in the past.

Farmers are receiving a greater share of our national income than they have in many years. Manufacturers and retailers are enjoying record business and record earnings. We are producing more goods for civilian use than ever before in history.

But these signs of prosperity do not tell the whole story. Although production is high, prices are shooting up.

Although nearly every one is employed, many people cannot afford essential items. Although national income has reached a new high, the buying power of many people is shrinking.

A few figures—and they are startling figures—show how the cost of living is going up.

Since the middle of 1946 this is what has happened:

Clothing prices have gone up 18 per cent; household furnishings have gone up 18 per cent; food has gone up 40 per cent. The average for all items is up 23 per cent. And the cost of living is still climbing. In the last three months it has climbed at a rate of 16 per cent a year.

Wholesale prices are also increasing. Since the middle of 1946, textiles have gone up 30 per cent; metals, up 35 per cent, and building materials, up 41 per cent. These increases in wholesale prices affect every industry and trade, and they will eventually be reflected in retail prices.

For some of our people the increased cost of living has been offset by increased incomes. But for most of our people, increases in income are falling behind increases in the cost of living.

Millions of families of low or moderate income are already victims of inflation. These families are using up savings, they are mortgaging their future by going into debt. They are doing without things they should have.

I know the worries of the breadwinner whose earnings cannot keep up with the high cost of living. I know of the difficulties of the housewife who tries to stretch the family income to pay for groceries and clothes and rent. I know how hard it is to skimp and save, and do without.

When so many people are not sharing fairly in prosperity the road is being paved for a recession or a depression.

None of us can afford to overlook this danger. Farmers will remember how they suffered after 1920 because price inflation was followed by a collapse. Business men and bankers will recall how they suffered after 1929 because wild speculation was followed by the depression. Even those who are prosperous today are prospective victims of inflation tomorrow.

Inflation must be stopped before it is too late.

It is within our power to stop it. Our economy is basically sound. It has been immensely strengthened in recent years. The average buying power of our people today is 40 per cent higher than it was in 1929. But we are losing some of this gain as rising prices pull away from incomes. We can prevent further loss, and can even go on to new gains, if we use our economic strength wisely.

The major cause of high prices in this country is the great demand among our own people for available goods. An attempt has been made to place the blame upon our foreign aid program, but this is not borne out by the facts. During the war we learned that we could improve our standard of living with less than 60 per cent of our output available for civilian use. At present, even with current exports to all countries, a far greater per cent of our production is available for civilian use. With sound policies, we can protect our own standard of living and carry on a substantial foreign aid program at the same time.

We now have—and will continue to have —enough food and clothing and other goods in the United States to meet our needs. But excessively high prices mean that these goods are not being distributed wisely and fairly. High prices ration the essentials of life by squeezing out the less fortunate of our citizens. We can meet this problem only by bringing prices into line with the incomes of our people.

In our free-enterprise system we place major reliance upon voluntary action by business men, farmers, workers and consumers. That is why I have repeatedly urged voluntary price reductions.

But the responsibility of government extends beyond aiding voluntary action. The government must respond to the needs of the people.

The American people now have a compelling need for protection from the dangers of price inflation and the rising cost of living. They recognize this need and are asking for the protection to which they are entitled. The government must assume a larger share of the responsibility for putting an end to excessive prices and the hardships and dangers which accompany them. For this purpose, prompt enactment by the Congress of comprehensive legislation is necessary.

This, then, is one reason why I am calling the Congress into session on Nov. 17. When it meets I shall recommend a

program for dealing with inflation, high prices and the high cost of living. Adequate measures, enacted in time, are necessary to correct the present situation.

Let me turn now to the other reason for calling the Congress into session. This is the problem of hunger and cold and human suffering abroad. It is the problem of men and women and children who look to us for help at this crucial time.

We are following a definite and clear foreign policy. That policy has been, is now, and shall be to assist free men and free nations to recover from the devastation of war, to stand on their own feet, to help one another and to contribute their full share to a stable and lasting peace. We follow that policy for the purpose of securing the peace and well-being of the world. It is nonsense to say that we seek dominance over any other nation. We believe in freedom, and we are doing all we can to support free men and free governments throughout the world.

In furtherance of this foreign policy, we now have under consideration the part which the United States should play in aiding a long-range recovery program for western Europe. This plan presents great hope for economic security and peace in that vital part of the world. It will take some time to complete the consideration of this plan and to make all the important decisions required for putting it into effect.

However, a period of crisis is now at hand. The perils of hunger and cold in Europe make this winter a decisive time in history. All the progress of reconstruction and all the promise of future plans are endangered. If European nations are to continue their recovery, they must get through this winter without being crippled by economic paralysis and resulting chaos.

In advance of our decision on the long-range European recovery plan, we must help some nations through this immediate crisis. The most imminent danger exists in France and in Italy. If the economies of these countries collapse and the people succumb to totalitarian pressures, there will be no opportunity for them or for us to look forward to their recovery so essential to world peace.

Their first need is food. Exceedingly bad weather this year has caused the worst crops in western Europe in a generation. Crop failures in France—the worst in 100 years—and in Italy make it necessary for those countries to import half the grain they need to live on during the coming months.

The other major shortage is fuel. Fuel supplies were depleted by last year's severe winter. War damage to railroads and the reduced efficiency of miners laboring on an inadequate diet have prevented the rebuilding of fuel stocks.

The financial reserves of France and Italy have been nearly exhausted by the cost of their imports since the end of the war. Rising prices in the United States and in other countries where they must buy have further reduced the purchasing power of their remaining funds. They now face the coming winter without sufficient resources to pay for essential food and fuel.

The figures tell the story.

France can meet her minimum needs, with present funds, until the end of December, but she will enter the new year without funds to pay for essential imports. The French will need $357,000,000 to carry them until March 31, 1948.

Italy will not be able even to get through the rest of this year. Italy must have $142,000,000 to carry her until Dec. 31 and an additional sum of $143,000,000 to get through the first quarter of 1948.

Serious difficulties have also been encountered in the occupied areas—Germany, Japan and Korea. Additional funds will have to be appropriated this year in order for us to maintain our position in these areas.

It can readily be seen that Congressional action to meet these needs cannot be delayed until January.

My action in convening the Congress on Nov. 17 in no way reduces the necessity for pressing forward with our voluntary food-saving program. Dollars appropriated by the Congress cannot feed hungry people if there is no food for the dollars to buy. There will not be enough food unless we, the people of the United States, save vast quantities of grain. I am deeply gratified at the splendid response of the American people to our national food-saving program. It is an earnest effort to meet the needs of humanity.

Even with the proposed aid from this country, the people of Europe this winter will be on short rations. They will be cold, and they will be without many necessities. But our emergency aid will be definite assurance of the continuing support of this nation for the free peoples of Europe.

The two problems I have been discussing with you tonight—high prices at home and hunger and cold abroad—present a challenge to the American people.

We could choose the course of inaction. We could wait until depression caught up with us, until our living standards sank, and our people tramped the streets looking for jobs. Other democratic nations would lose hope and become easy victims of totalitarian aggression. That would be the course of defeatism and cowardice.

Our other course is to take timely and forthright action. If we do this we can halt the spiral of inflation at home, relieve hunger and cold abroad and help our friendly neighbors become self-governing once again.

I know that it is the heartfelt wish of the American people that action be taken which will overcome the obstacles to peace and prosperity confronting this nation.

It is within our power to lead the world to peace and plenty.

With resolution and united effort we shall achieve our goal.

XII

Summary of Economic Advisers' Report

ON EFFECT OF FOREIGN AID ON U.S.

NOV. 1, 1947

SCOPE AND PURPOSE

THE principal questions considered in the report are the extent of the burdens that would be imposed on the economy of the United States by providing further foreign aid during the next few years and the capacity of the economy to support those burdens. Since a companion report prepared under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior deals with national resources and physical capacities, the Council of Economic Advisers centers its attention upon the effect of exports, financed in part with Government funds, upon domestic production, consumption, and prices.

Burdens are measured first in terms of goods made available abroad and withdrawn from domestic consumers, and second in terms of price effects; then these price impacts are looked at in their relation to the general functioning of the domestic economy; and then the effect on Government finance and the tax structure is examined.

THE IMPACT OF PAST AID

The effect of the export surplus to date is highly relevant to an inquiry into the general impact of a new foreign aid program because, at the levels of new foreign aid under discussion, the export surplus in the future will be lower than it has been in the recent past, while our total domestic output of goods and services will probably be higher in future years.

The size of the export surplus furnishes a general measure of impact, since it represents the excess of goods and services sent abroad over the goods and services that we import. In 1946 total exports were 15.3 billion dollars and the export surplus was 8.1 billion dollars. In the second quarter of 1947 total exports reached a peak annual rate of 21 billion dollars, imports were about 8 billion dollars, and the export surplus rose to an annual rate of 13 billion dollars, but in the third quarter exports declined to an annual rate of 18.3 billion dollars, and the export surplus to 10.3 billion dollars.

Since the end of the war Government financial aid to European countries has financed about four-fifths of their excess of purchases from us in 1946 and nearly all of it in the second quarter of 1947. The large part of the export surplus financed through our foreign aid program has reflected economic conditions in Europe and the depletion of their buying resources. Since the end of the war the Government has financed about one-third of our exports to the world as a whole, and about two-thirds of our total export sur-

plus. The impact of aid has therefore, been substantially less than that of the total export surplus.

EFFECT OF PAST AID ON DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION

The size of the export surplus to date has naturally decreased the amount of goods available for domestic consumption. But it has not, in view of the tremendous increase in American productive capacity during and since the war, prevented the American consumer from enjoying a general standard of living far above any pre-war level. Actual domestic consumption of most significant items is now far higher than before the war. For example, per capita consumption of meat has risen from 125 pounds a year in the pre-war period to an estimated 155 pounds for 1947. Such shortages of goods as we experience reflect unparalleled levels of domestic demand based on high national income.

EFFECTS ON PRICE LEVEL TO DATE

The high foreign demand has added to the inflationary pressure on prices, but the much larger domestic demand has been the principal cause of the upward pressure. Prices remained stable during the second quarter of 1947, when the export surplus reached its peak. In the third quarter of this year, although the export demand has been diminishing, it has played an important part in the increases in grain prices, due to high foreign demand for wheat in the face of adverse crop developments. Grain price increases have spread to livestock and other food products. But even for food, the sharp rise stemmed largely from the exceptionally high domestic demand. Looking at the economy generally, price inflation has been caused mainly by domestic factors, but shortages of specific commodities present different problems, as will be shown later.

THE GENERAL IMPACT OF A NEW FOREIGN AID PROGRAM

In the absence of a new foreign aid program, it is likely that our export surplus would sink to an annual rate of 4 to 5 billion dollars by next year, contrasted with the 13-billion-dollar annual rate in the second quarter of 1947 and an estimated current annual rate of about 10 billion dollars. Assuming that our imports remain at approximately the current level of about 8 billion dollars a year, our total exports during next year would sink to an annual rate of 13 billion dollars or less, compared to an annual rate of 21 billion dollars in the second quarter of 1947 and an estimated current annual rate of about 18 billion dollars. The major reductions would occur in our exports to Europe.

While this rapid reduction in exports would probably not inflict serious short-run damage on our own economy, substantial problems of readjustment would be generated. Moreover, the industrial paralysis which could be expected to result in some other countries would have repercussions of major proportions upon our own economy and upon world stability.

The report assumes for illustrative purposes a foreign aid figure based upon the Paris Conference Report which would reach a maximum annual rate of 8 billion dollars during the first year, including about 1 billion dollars already authorized, and which would produce a maximum export surplus of about 12 billion dollars a year. This would mean total exports at a peak of not more than 20 billion dollars a year, assuming 8 billion dollars of imports. Since these levels are lower than those reached during the second quarter of 1947 and would decline appreciably from year to year, it follows that the export surplus resulting from any future foreign aid program will at no time equal, and for most of the time will be substantially less, than levels which have been reached during the current year.

In view of the long-run prospect for increasing American output if maximum employment and production are maintained, these facts lead to the conclusion that the general impact of a new foreign aid program of the assumed size upon the American economy could be sustained because a larger impact has already been sustained. The report stresses, however, that problems raised by specific commodities in relatively short supply could distort or overturn this generally optimistic picture if not dealt with effectively.

THE PROBLEM OF SPECIFIC COMMODITIES

Food, steel, industrial and agricultural machinery, coal, and fertilizer are items of key significance because foreign demand for these goods is especially urgent whereas they are in relatively short supply in this country.

THE IMPACT OF THE GRAIN SHORTAGE

The food situation is the most serious. The problem stems from a very short corn crop at home, coinciding with a bad crop year for food grains in Europe. Although the domestic wheat crop was at a record level, adverse corn crop developments and high meat prices have provided incentives for feeding large amounts of wheat to livestock.

Exports of wheat will need to be maintained at recent levels. At the same time, the domestic demand both for grains and for meat, poultry, and other food continues to be very high despite record prices. Food price increases have already become serious, and further food price increases would decrease the value of each dollar of foreign aid extended, work additional hardships upon American families of low or moderate income, and threaten an inflationary price-wage spiral which could adversely affect the whole economy.

If wheat exports continue at the levels set by foreign need, and if the domestic demand for food remains at or near its post-war level, conservation and other measures to regulate use and hold prices in check will be needed in this country. With such measures to maintain healthful nutritional standards, the supply here would be adequate to serve nutritional and other needs satisfactorily although not luxuriously.

STEEL AND STEEL PRODUCTS

Our total production of rolled steel products during the first half of 1947 was at an annual rate of more than 62 million short tons, contrasted with less than 35 million tons in 1939. Although exports rose from about 2½ million tons in 1939 to an annual rate of 6½ million tons in the first half of 1947, the amount of steel available for domestic consumption is much higher than before the war. But owing to the enormous increase in our steel-using industry, the relative steel shortage is of serious proportions and there is not much prospect of large increase in production in the short run.

The chief danger here is that this supply situation may be translated into further increases in the price of steel and steel products which would give an additional inflationary impetus to the whole economy. High domestic and foreign demand for industrial and agricultural machinery is closely connected with the steel problem.

The general conclusion regarding steel as well as food is this: Whether the domestic situation worsens considerably or progresses satisfactorily depends upon the use of vigorous, affirmative measures to assure distribution to the most urgent uses and to prevent a spiraling of prices.

COAL AND FERTILIZER

In the case of coal and fertilizer, for which there is a large foreign need to quicken the process of economic restoration, the domestic economy can well afford to continue or even increase shipments of these commodities. Domestic shortages are not serious (for coal, the problem is mainly one of transportation), while shipments abroad will lessen the demand for other imports by hastening the revival of production in Europe.

FISCAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID

Foreign aid to date has been financed with revenues derived from taxation and not through increasing the national debt. This policy should continue so long as our own economy continues to operate at high levels and under inflationary pressure. Even had there been a smaller foreign aid program in the past, and even without a new foreign aid program, it would be undesirable to reduce the level of taxes while such pressures exist. On the other hand, from the budgetary standpoint, a new foreign aid program should not call for increased taxes. Further, since the general impact of a new foreign aid program would be less than the recent impact of foreign aid, such a new program would not increase inflationary pressures above recent levels, and therefore would not call for still higher taxes as an anti-inflationary measure. The amount of exports financed with Government aid has ranged between 2 and 3 per cent of our gross national product, and will be less in the future, and our general financial

capacity to support such a program cannot be questioned.

SOME LONG-RANGE IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN AID

To the extent that aid is provided through loans, these can be repaid only through restoration of the export trade of other countries. This will expose American industry to added competition, a test which must be faced. Some outright gifts to meet emergency demands, however, will more rapidly qualify these countries for loans from the International Bank and private sources and more rapidly restore a well-balanced world trade.

In the longer run, the economic restoration of Europe will benefit our own economy by enabling us to obtain more goods by advantageous trade. On the other hand, a cessation of foreign aid would force an economic reorientation of Europe which would be detrimental to our economy.

SOFTENING THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN AID

A new foreign aid program will have a severe or a moderate impact on our economy depending upon the domestic measures we adopt. These measures involve both the administration of foreign aid and related questions of domestic economic policy.

The seriously inflationary consequences that would result from mismanagement of the situation in such commodities as food and steel require selective distribution to the most necessary domestic and foreign uses. The two types of uses are interrelated, because the demand in both cases takes place at the same strategic spots in the American market. The consequences can be dealt with effectively only through careful coordination of all measures undertaken.

The relative shortages of specific commodities require export controls, allocations for domestic use, discouragement of misuse or excessive use, efficient transportation and distribution, and the curbing of speculation and hoarding of goods.

The general inflationary threat resulting from the combined impact of foreign and domestic demand requires the continuance of tax revenues at present levels, maximum economy in Government expenditures, stimulation of saving, and the enlargement and aggressive use of measures to control dangerous expansion of credit.

The proposal for new foreign aid requires that we face with greater wisdom and courage than ever before the dangers to our whole economy that are now revealing themselves in the form of relative shortages and inflationary pressures at strategic spots in the economy. The foreign aid program compels us to face certain domestic problems squarely, but remedial and preventive measures available to us are adequate if we have the courage to use them.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT

Two weeks ago I made public the report on National Resources and Foreign Aid prepared under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior. At that time I noted that a second report in the series on foreign aid would soon be made by the Council of Economic Advisers. This report has now been completed and submitted to me under the title "The Impact of the Foreign Aid Program Upon the Domestic Economy."

Secretary Krug reported that on the whole our national resources, if intelligently utilized, are physically sufficient to support a considerable foreign-aid program, while preserving the national security and the American standard of living. The report of the Council of Economic Advisers moves on from this point to present an economic analysis of the effect that a foreign-aid program of substantial size would have on agricultural and industrial production in the United States, on domestic consumption and prices on Government finance and the tax structure.

The Council of Economic Advisers reaches the conclusion that the American economy can sustain the general impact of a new foreign-aid program and that there is no question of our general financial capacity to support such a program. At the same time the Council stresses the fact that we must deal promptly and effectively with problems raised by key commodities—wheat, steel, certain items of industrial and agricultural machinery, coal and fertilizer.

The materials contained in both Secretary Krug's report and the Council's report have been made available in advance to the committee of nineteen private citizens working under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Commerce. That committee, after studying these analyses of domestic effects and the Paris Conference's presentation of European needs, will submit its conclusions and recommendations as to the limits within which we may wisely and safely extend assistance to foreign countries. Aided by these reports and other pertinent material, I shall make recommendations to the Congress concerning a program of foreign assistance.

XIII

Summary of Harriman Committee's Report

ON FOREIGN AID
NOV. 8, 1947

I. PRINCIPLES

THE President's Committee on Foreign Aid was asked to determine the limits within which the United States could safely and wisely extend aid to Western Europe. It has approached this assignment in a spirit of realism.

We believe that the future of Western Europe lies very much in its own hands. No amount of outside aid, however generous, can by itself restore to health the economies of the sixteen nations which met at Paris in July. Except in Western Germany, where the United States has direct governmental responsibility, the success of any aid program depends ultimately on hard work and straight thinking by the people and the Governments of the European nations themselves.

The sixteen nations, and Western Germany, comprise over 275,000,000 men and women. They possess great agricultural and industrial resources. Even at its present depressed state, the production of this area is vastly greater than any aid which this country can provide. Such aid must be viewed not as a means of supporting Europe, but as a spark which can fire the engine.

The committee is also aware that the volume of aid required from the United States is of such proportions that it will place a substantial burden on the people of the United States. For all its resources, the United States is no limitless cornucopia. The population of this country represents something less than 7 per cent of the population of the world. This country has heavy responsibilities at home as well as in Europe, in Asia and in our own hemisphere. The aid which we give represents, to be sure, only a small fraction of our total production. But at the present time there is no slack in the American economy and every shipment abroad of scarce goods—especially food which Europe must have—adds to the inflationary pressure at home.

The committee regards as nonsense the idea which prevails to a considerable degree in this country and abroad, that we need to export our goods and services as free gifts, to insure our own prosperity. On the contrary, we are convinced that the immediate economic danger to the United States is inflation, which means, among other things a shortage of goods in relation to demand. We believe that our goal should be to bring about a condition where exports from this country are more nearly balanced by a return flow from abroad of services and materials essential to our own economy. We also believe that the European nations desire to achieve such equilibrium in the interests of their self-respect and prosperity. To make this equilibrium possible should be a major objective of any program of aid.

The interest of the United States in Europe, however, cannot be measured simply in economic terms. It is also strategic and political. We all know that we are faced in the world today with two conflicting ideologies. One is a system in which individual rights and liberties are maintained. The opposing system is one where iron discipline by the state ruthlessly stamps out individual liberties and obliterates all opposition.

Our position in the world has been based for at least a century on the existence in Europe of a number of strong states committed by tradition and inclination to the democratic concept. The formulation of the Paris report is the most recent demonstration that these nations desire to maintain this concept. But de-

sire is not enough. The democratic system must provide the bare necessities of life now and quickly rekindle the hope that by hard work a higher standard of living is attainable. If these countries by democratic means do not attain an improvement in their affairs they may be driven to turn in the opposite direction. Therein lies the strength of the Communist tactic: it wins by default when misery and chaos are great enough. Therefore the countries of Western Europe must be restored to a position where they may retain full faith in the validity of their traditional approaches to world affairs and again exert their full influence and authority in international life.

II. POLICIES

The success of any program for aid which may be adopted will depend on the policies which this country and the European nations pursue. It should be made a condition of continued assistance under such a plan that the participating countries take all practicable steps to achieve the production and monetary goals which they have set for themselves in the Paris report. Failure to make genuine efforts to accomplish these results would call for cessation of further assistance.

However, aid from this country should not be conditioned on the methods used to reach these goals, so long as they are consistent with basic democratic principles. Continued adherence to such principles is an essential condition to continued aid but this condition should not require adherence to any form of economic organization or the abandonment of plans adopted in and carried out in a free and democratic way. While this Committee firmly believes that the American system of free enterprise is the best method of obtaining high productivity, it does not believe that any foreign-aid program should be used as a means of requiring other countries to adopt it. The imposition of any such conditions would constitute an unwarranted interference with the internal affairs of friendly nations.

The goals which the European governments have set for themselves and with which our Government may legitimately concern itself are conditioned by the nature of the European economic problem. The reasons for the inability of Western Europe to balance its accounts with the rest of the world at the present time are generally understood and are ably analyzed in the CEEC (Committee for European Economic Co-operation), Western Europe is cut off from the food and supplies which flowed from Eastern Europe before the war. Foreign investments and shipping revenues have been lost. The costs of essential food and raw material imports have risen and are still rising.

To overcome these disadvantages European production must expand well above pre-war levels; yet in important industries, especially coal mining, and important areas, especially Germany, it is lagging badly. It is the judgment of all competent observers that these troubles flow from an acute shortage of working capital and from the serious disintegration of organized economic life rather than from wartime physical destruction. Working capital in the form of fuel, raw materials, and food, is needed to sustain Europe until its production is built up. Some capital equipment is needed to further the rehabilitation of industry. An effective restoration of the purchasing power of money is essential to the resumption of ordered economic life.

The Paris report cannot be praised too highly for its emphasis on this point. It clearly states that European production can expand only as currencies and exchange rates are stabilized, as budgets are balanced, and as trade barriers are reduced. Post-war experience has abundantly proved that if money demand is vastly in excess of the supply of goods, the effects of "repressed inflation" are almost as bad as the disease itself. Germany is merely the most horrible example of an attempt to restore economic life without giving people a money they can trust. In this situation, the rapid spread of black markets undermines the respect for law. Normal monetary incentives cease to operate. The worker has no just reward for his labor and the farmer refuses to sell his produce. Resources are dissipated. Trade degenerates to barter. Controls tend to become self-perpetuating.

Achievement of monetary stability would allow a gradual restoration of normal incentives and a gradual return to a system where individuals and enterprises, both public and private, can operate in markets. It would also allow the stabilization of exchange rates, which is all but impossible so long as inflation proceeds apace. It is obvious that this situation makes balance of payments problems that much more difficult. The Committee believes that in the near future some adjustment of exchange rates must be made. The prelude to that is internal monetary reform.

The Paris report rightly emphasizes the need for scaling down restrictions on trade between countries. But the reduction of tariffs is of little moment if exchange controls and other controls have to be maintained indefinitely. Whatever one's attitude toward planning and free enterprise may be, there is all but universal agreement that true economic recovery depends on releasing the energies of individuals and cutting down on time-consuming regulation of production and distribution.

III. NEEDS AND CAPACITIES

In emphasizing these points, the Committee is simply making explicit the principles that are imbedded in the Paris report. It does not wish to imply that confidence in currencies can be restored without increased production abroad combined with substantial injections of American aid. It believes that the need for holding inflation in check in this country and in Europe bears directly on the magnitude of the aid we can and should extend.

The Committee found little evidence that the goals set at Paris to restore standards of living were excessive in terms of basic necessities. Even if all the estimates submitted at Paris were to go through as planned, Europeans would not be eating as well in 1951 as they ate in 1938. If food were available, it would pay to meet these estimates in full in the interest of political stability. This is especially true in the case of Western Germany, where more food is essential to secure more coal production and the revival of an economy now obviously on dead center.

The Committee, however, is not convinced that the participating nations at Paris were wholly realistic in their plans for capital expansion. On the first point, it is obvious that if Europe is to be revived and made self-supporting—if our aid program is not to degenerate into just another relief program—the European nations will have to rehabilitate their capital plant. But it cannot be too strongly stated that the process of investment and capital formation imposes a severe strain on the country undertaking it. It means the introduction of money income into the economy, with no comparable output of consumer goods to sop up this purchasing power. This process is highly inflationary. To the degree that capital goods are sent to Europe from the United States, it is true, the strain is transferred from European economies to our own. Nevertheless, the secondary effects of large capital programs should not be overlooked.

At the present time, gross investment in the United States is running at about 17 per cent of total national product at the height of a boom. Some of the European nations have attempted to exceed this rate. It seems unlikely that European nations can prudently afford to sustain capital formation on as large a scale as they have planned. What this means, in effect, is that housing programs and capital development may have to be slowed down until European recovery is much more advanced than at present.

In addition the program written at Paris may have to be modified by a shift in the amounts going to the separate countries. As this shift is made, we believe that the amount of aid allotted to Germany may have to be higher than was set at Paris. This committee wishes to state emphatically that the overwhelming interest of the United States is to prevent the resurgence of an aggressive Germany. The fears of neighboring nations are thoroughly understandable. On the other hand, it is generally admitted that the revival of Ruhr coal output, along with the increase in British coal output, is the crux of the problem of getting Western Europe back on its feet. Apparent savings to the American taxpayer, accomplished by spending too little money on Germany, have thus far been more than offset by the consequent deterioration of the general European economic situation.

The final determining factor in the size of a prudent program is the availability of commodities in this country. The Committee has canvassed such availability in detail. At the Paris Conference, it was concluded that the Western Hemisphere simply did not have the food resources to supply all of the estimated needs. As

against estimated need for 35 million tons of grain, the Paris Conference conceded that 25 million tons was the maximum which could be obtained from the outside world with about 9 million tons coming from the United States. In 1947, the United States will probably export some 15 million tons of grain with about 9 million tons going to Europe. In view, however, of the poor American corn crop and the lack of fall rains, only a most favorable crop year in 1948 would make any such performance possible.

With a number of other commodities, the situation is only a little less stringent. Steel and the steel-making materials, especially scrap, are in particularly short supply in the United States. Because it is a basic industrial material, the effects of this shortage are pervasive. Coal exports at a high rate are possible, though they are imposing a strain on the United States transportation system and there may be a few shortages in the coming winter. The margin between supply and demand of petroleum products is very narrow in this country. The European countries do not expect to import this commodity from the United States in volume, but the shortage, like that of steel products, is world-wide. There is little likelihood that these requirements set forth at Paris can be met.

The situation is much the same in regard to most of the items of machinery and equipment the European nations need. In the middle of an agricultural boom, the demand of American farmers for farm machinery is well beyond the capacity of the industry. As to mining machinery, coal output is at a high rate and American mine operators are buying as much machinery as they can obtain. Heavy electrical equipment of all kinds is perhaps the tightest industrial item of all. The story is much the same for certain of the basic raw materials.

These remarks do not imply that the United States can do little toward the rehabilitation of Europe. European governments and private firms have placed large orders in the United States for industrial equipment. A voluntary food conservation program has been initiated to make food available for export. In spite of shortages here, manufacturers of automobiles and farm machinery are voluntarily maintaining exports. If funds were available to finance European purchases and if European requirements were known in detail, exports could at least be maintained and in many cases stepped up. In over-all terms, a foreign aid program would not even require the maintenance of present rates of exports. The conclusion that does emerge from the examination of particular markets for particular commodities is that supply will be a limiting factor in many cases and that many European requirements cannot be met in full.

IV. THE MAGNITUDE OF AMERICAN AID

On the basis of revised estimates of European imports and exports, the Committee calculates that the cost of the European aid program to the Government of the United States would be about $5.75 billions for the first year, and between $12 and $17 billions for the whole program here suggested.

These figures are not comparable to those contained in the Paris report. The latter are estimates of the deficit the participating European countries would incur in their trade with the Western Hemisphere. They measure the margin by which the European countries expect their payments in dollars for goods and services imported from the Western Hemisphere to exceed their receipt in dollars.

The Paris estimates of imports have had to be revised downward, mainly on the grounds of unavailability of goods. To the extent of this revision the estimated cost of the program was also reduced. At the same time it was necessary, on grounds of realism, to revise downward the European estimates of exports and to modify the figures in a number of other ways which increase the cost. The result was an estimate by the Committee that the balance of payments deficit would be $1 billion to $1.5 billions lower in the first year and possibly as much as $5 billions lower for the whole plan than that contained in the Paris program.

The Committee's estimate of the cost to the United States Government is a smaller figure than the foreign trade deficit. First, a deduction must be made for the part of the program that can be financed through the International Bank. Second, there may be private financing. Third, a large part of the European deficit with the American Continent is with countries other than the United States. In its own interest, the United States will probably have to supply funds to cover a part of this deficit but we should not have to finance it in full. When allowance is made for these deductions, the resulting figures are those given above for the cost to the United States Treasury.

It is helpful to compare the figure for the cost to the United States Government with what the United States has been doing for Europe in the past. Before the run on sterling in July the annual rate of withdrawals on the British loan was about $2.6 billions. In addition, in the first half of 1947, the rate of withdrawal on other European aid programs—relief, UNRRA and special grants—was about $2 billions. In 1947 the United States assumed only half of the cost of German occupation, but in 1948 it seems likely that it will have to assume the whole burden, amounting to about $1 billion.

When all these factors are taken into account the program of aid proposed for 1948 proves to be a moderate increase on what the United States has in the recent past been spending in Europe and what will probably have to be expended in Germany in any case. In addition the program calls for increased lending operations by the International Bank.

Looking to the years beyond calendar 1948, the Committee emphasizes that any estimates are altogether speculative. The American people have an understandable interest in trying to ascertain the drain on their resources in the future. But it is totally impossible, and indeed unwise, to attempt to calculate this with accuracy. The Paris conference suggested that the total European foreign exchange deficit for the four-year period 1948-51 would be about $22 billions. The Committee's estimates range from $17 to $23 billions. When deductions are made for various types of financing, the range of possible appropriations would be $12 to $17 billions. But the Committee cannot emphasize too strongly that any aid extended to Europe must be on a year-to-year basis. It must be subject to constant vigilant review of the Congress.

V. FINANCE AND ADMINISTRATION

Even to carry out a prudent program in 1948 entails the execution of certain fundamental policies on the part of the United States Government and the most careful administration. The Committee believes that any aid to Europe offered by the United States should be financed out of taxes, not out of borrowing. The maintenance of a surplus in the United States Treasury is a necessity in this inflationary period.

A foreign aid program will require means to make available goods that are in short supply. Voluntary measures should be relied upon wherever possible. If and when they are not, the Government will probably require authority to set priorities in order to insure the availability for export of limited amounts of the items most critically needed. It might also have to issue limited orders to control consumption of critical materials such as those still in effect for tin. Especially in the field of food it might be necessary to use the device of requiring that limited quantities be set aside for export.

It must be emphasized that these suggestions apply only to the foreign-aid program and not to the broad problem of inflation. The committee is convinced that inflation is a serious deterrent to the stability of the American economy, but any consideration of a program to control inflation would have been beyond its competence and its terms of reference.

The Committee is convinced that the administration of the program is of primary importance because it will be necessary, for reasons given above, to adjust the program as it goes forward. To insure unity of administration, it is recommended that a new independent agency be set up in the Federal Government. The head of this agency should be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. A board of directors should be appointed, representing the departments of Government concerned with the program, including the Secretary of State and such other persons as the Congress may see fit to add.

The head of the new organization should be chairman of this board, which should have power only to establish and adjust general policies within the framework of Congressional action.

The operating decisions should be made

by the head of the new organization, but it will be necessary for him to work out effective means for cooperation with the State Department concerning these major decisions which have an important bearing on the foreign policy of the United States.

The closest possible relations should be maintained between the new organization and the Congress. This is a question to be solved by the Congress, but we suggest it might be done by a special joint committee created for this purpose, as in the case of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The new organization must have a chief representative in Europe, reporting directly to the head of that organization, and responsible to him, to deal with the continuing committee set up by the participating countries, and also to coordinate the activities of the various local representatives of the organization in those countries. In addition, representatives will be needed in the different countries. They will have to report to and be under the direct control of the head of the new organization. But they should keep the Ambassadors in the respective countries informed of their communications. In all cases where there is necessity for taking up important matters with Governments, it should be done by the Ambassador to the end that there will be only one diplomatic representative of the United States in these countries. Due to the need for flexibility in the program, the Committee recommends that the corporate form of organization be given careful consideration.

VI. SUMMARY

The basic conclusions of the President's Committee on Foreign Aid may be summarized as follows:

1. The hope of Western Europe depends primarily on the industry and straight thinking of its own people.

2. The United States has a vital interest —humanitarian, economic, strategic and political—in helping the participating countries to achieve economic recovery.

3. The aid which the United States gives will impose definite sacrifice on this country.

4. The magnitude of Western Europe's deficit with the American Continent in 1948 will be of the order of $7 billions, but when all possibilities of financing are taken into consideration, the approximate

AVAILABLE SUPPLY, U. S. CONSUMPTION, AND AMOUNT FOR EXPORT OF SELECTED COMMODITIES, 1948

Commodity	Unit	1948 Potential Production	1948 Imports	Available Supply	Estimated U. S. Consumption	Available for Export Actual	% of Prod.	†Current Rate of Exports (1947) Actual	% of Prod.
Textiles									
Raw cotton	Mil. bales	11.5‡	.2	11.7	9.5§	2.2	18.8	3.5	29.7
Linters	1,000 bales	1,230	100	1,330	1,250	80	6.5	60	4.9
Cotton cloth	Mil. sq. yds	11,118	30	11,148	10,148	1,000	9.0	900	8.1
Rayon fiber	Mil. lbs	1,075	50	1,125	1,080	45	4.2	45	4.2
*Rayon fabric	Mil. yds	2,035	3	2,033	1,798	240	11.8	240	11.8
Cotton tire cord	1,000 lbs	290,000	0	290,000	184,000	106,000	36.6	13,000	4.5
*Rayon tire cord	1,000 lbs	210,000	0	210,000	191,000	19,000	9.0	19,000	9.0
*Hard cordage, rope & twine	Mil. lbs	505	56	561	555	6	1.2	3.6	.7
*Raw jute and butts	Long tons	0	95,000	95,000	95,000	0	0	0	0
*Burlap and jute bags	Mil. lbs	500	40	540	520	20	4.0	20	4.0
Lumber	Mil. bd. ft								
Pulp and Paper		35,500	1,200	36,700	35,700	1,000	2.8	1,000	2.8
*Total paper and board	1,000 short tons	21,800	4,080	25,860	25,195	665	3.0	355	1.6
*Total paper products	1,000 short tons	12,000	10	12,010	11,760	250	2.1	120	1.0
*Total wood pulp	1,000 short tons	12,500	2,200	14,700	14,510	190	1.5	135	1.1
Leather									
*Sole, welting & offal, bovine	1,000 lbs	380,000	5,150	385,150	377,900	7,250	1.9	5,250	1.3
*Upper and lining	1,000 sq. ft	1,315,000	16,000	1,331,000	1,285,400	45,600	3.5	47,850	3.6
*Glove and garment	1,000 sq. ft	430,000	1,750	431,750	421,750	10,000	2.3	12,125	2.8
Leather manufactures									
Boots and shoes	1,000 prs	475,000	3,000	478,000	471,000	7,000	1.5	7,200	1.5
Rubber									
Pass. car tires	1,000 units	70,059	0	70,059	61,425	8,634	12.3	1,698	2.4
Truck-bus tires	1,000 units	15,803	0	15,803	10,675	5,128	32.4	1,693	10.7
*Conveyor belting	1,000 lbs	50,000	0	50,000	50,000	0	0	6,600	12.9

*Indicates commodities where domestic demand will exceed supply regardless of exports.
†Based on first 6 months. ‡1946-47 crop. §Assuming this level of mill consumption.

POTENTIAL GROSS SUPPLY OF DOLLARS UNDER EXISTING LOAN AND GIFT PROGRAMS

(In Millions of Dollars)

	Available or Potentially Available	Funds Drawn Through July, 1947	Unutilized
United States Government Lending:			
Export-Import Bank loans	$3,500	$1,820	c$1,680
Lend-lease "pipeline" credits	1,500	1,350	d150
Surplus property credits	1,150	950	200
Ship sales credits	330	160	170
Loan to United Kingdom	3,750	a3,350	400
Monetary Stabilization credits	295	b8	287
RFC loan to the Philippines	70	70	0
Total	$10,595	$7,708	$2,887
United States Government Relief and Special Aid:			
UNRRA	$2,700	$2,700	.....
Post-UNRRA	332	.....	g332
Relief in occupied areas	1,600	e1,000	h600
Greek-Turkish aid	400	.....	i400
Philippine aid program	635	f125	510
International Refugee Organization	71	.....	71
Total	$5,738	$3,825	$1,913
International Bank	j$3,266	$250	l$3,016
International Fund	k3,406	86	13,320

a Through Aug. 31, 1947. b Through March 31, 1947. c About $400 of this was already committed to non-European countries by the end of July, 1947. d All but $8 or $9 million of this is required to meet unpaid bills for goods already procured. e Estimated. f $100 million made available in surplus materials. g Appropriations for fiscal year ending June 30, 1948, as accepted by Congress and including an allowance for China. h More than half of this is earmarked for Asia. i Over 60 per cent of this is earmarked for military purposes. j This is considered to be the probable ceiling on World Bank dollar loans. The bank has about one-half of a billion dollars available to make loans at the present time. In addition, the bank can sell its own debentures in the American capital market to raise further funds. However, the market will probably not absorb debentures which would carry the total volume of debentures plus initial contributions over the limit of the United States capital and other dollar subscriptions. Although the total authorized lending power of the bank is $8.2 billions in various currencies, dollar loans are the only ones which can be used to purchase materials and equipment in substantial quantities for reconstruction purposes at the present time. k United States quota of $2,750 million plus gold paid in by other countries through June 30, 1947. l These funds are usable only as specified in the Articles of Agreement under which the International Bank and Monetary Fund were established. The entire amount cannot be made available in the immediate future, nor can it be made available solely to Europe.

need for appropriations past and future to cover the calendar year of 1948 may be on the order of 5.75 billion dollars.

5. The extension of such aid, now or in the future, calls for anti-inflationary fiscal policies on the part of this country, and a new agency to administer the aid extended.

As a final word, both on the magnitude of the program recommended, and on the policies outlined, it is well to bear in mind that success depends on giving way neither to over-optimism or to undue pessimism. It is one thing to propose a program, it is another to see it through. The immediate months and indeed years ahead are not apt to be easy either for this country or for the European nations. It is not wise to underestimate the steepness of the climb.

By the same token, however, it is essential to maintain perspective. The years following World War I were years of intense dislocation and dissolution both at home and abroad. Yet, by 1924, Europe, which seemed totally disorganized in 1919, was well on its way to recovery. Even more in point would seem to be the wartime experience of this nation and other democracies. In 1940, it seemed inevitable that a large part of what we call Western civilization was irreparably lost. In late 1941, following Pearl Harbor, the fortunes of this nation were at an all-time ebb. Yet four years later, complete victory had been gained, American arms stood triumphant in the East and in the West, and it was obvious that the United States had entered into a new period of power, prestige, and responsibility, The following years have contained many disappointments. Wartime alliances have melted away. Yet it is safe to say that at no time in history has there been more need for Western Europe and the United States to stand firmly together. And who will say that, if we apply to the making of the peace the same spirit which triumphed in the war, we may not see an equally dramatic vindication of the ideals and principles of free men everywhere?

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT

Text of a statement by President Truman, released by the White House together with the report of his Committee on Foreign Aid:

Last June I appointed a committee of nineteen distinguished private citizens to determine the facts concerning the kinds and amounts of our resources available for economic assistance to foreign countries, and to advise me on the limits within which, in the opinion of the committee, the United States might safely and wisely plan to extend such aid.

I asked the Secretary of Commerce to serve as chairman of the committee. The members of the committee were drawn from the ranks of American business, finance, labor, agriculture, educational and research institutions.

During the intervening months, the members of this committee of private citizens have been diligently studying the many aspects of this complicated problem, particularly as it relates to western Europe. They have carefully examined the analysis, by a committee of Government officials under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, of the adequacy of our national resources to support a foreign aid program; the analysis by the Council of Economic Advisers of the impact of a substantial aid program upon our national economy; the report of the representatives of the sixteen nations who met in Paris, and other data available from various sources.

This committee has now submitted to me its report, European recovery and American aid. The report contains a careful discussion of the problem of European recovery and our interest therein; the requirements of the countries involved; the supplies available; the size of an effective aid program and the feasibility of its being met; the problems of finance and administration; and the effects of a foreign aid program on our own economy.

In addition, the committee's report contains detailed discussions of problems presented by specific commodities, food, raw materials, and manufactured goods that are needed.

The members of the committee have fulfilled their task without partisanship, and with no other purpose than to further the best interest of their country, and to aid in securing the peace and well-being of the world. I am deeply grateful to each member of the committee for putting aside so many other pressing duties in order to bring this difficult assignment to completion in so short a period.

The committee's report should prove of great help in the prompt formulation of a program of sound assistance to western Europe. I commend this report to the careful attention of members of the Congress, officials of the executive branch, and all citizens concerned for our country's welfare.

XIV

Secretary Marshall's Statement to Congressional Committees

ON EUROPEAN AID
NOV. 10, 1947

THE Congress in the coming session will be called upon to make decisions which, although less spectacular and dramatic, will be no less important for the future of our country and the world than those of the war years. Your responsibilities as members of the committees directly concerned with our foreign relations are accordingly very great.

It appears unnecessary to elaborate for you on the somber picture of the world situation. You all, I am sure, are fully aware of its gravity and the immense responsibility which the course of events has placed upon our country.

The President will lay before the Congress the program of his administration for aid to Europe. My duty as Secretary of State is to present the reasons for this program; the reasons why I profoundly believe that the vital interest of the United States is directly involved.

In concentrating upon the problem of aid to Europe I do not ignore the fact that there are other areas of the world beset by economic problems of tremendous gravity. But the very magnitude of the world problem as a whole requires a careful direction of our assistance to the critical areas where it can be most immediately effective.

The need for our assistance in the European area is real and it is urgent. The report of the sixteen nations represented on the Committee of European Economic Cooperation sets this forth, I think, in a convincing manner.

As a result of the war, the European community which for centuries had been one of the most productive and indeed creative portions of the inhabited world was left prostrate. This area, despite its diversity of national cultures and its series of internecine conflicts and wars, nonetheless enjoys a common heritage and a common civilization.

The war ended with the armies of the major allies meeting in the heart of this community. The policies of three of them have been directed to the restoration of that European community. It is now clear that only one power, the Soviet Union, does not for its own reasons share this aim.

We have become involved in two wars which have had their origins in the European Continent. The free peoples of Europe have fought two wars to prevent the forcible domination of their community by a single great power. Such domination would have inevitably menaced the stability and security of the world. To deny today our interest in their abilty to defend their own heritage would be to disclaim the efforts and sacrifices of two generations of Americans. We wish to see this community restored as one of the pillars of world security; in a position to renew its contribution to the advancement of mankind and to the development of a world order based on law and respect for the individual.

The record of the endeavors of the United States Government to bring about a restoration of the whole of that European community is clear for all who wish to see. We must face the fact, however, that despite our efforts, not all of the European nations have been left free to take their place in the community of which they form a natural part.

Thus the geographic scope of our recovery program is limited to those nations which are free to act in accordance with their national traditions and their own estimates of their national interests. If there is any doubt as to this situation, a glance at the present map of the European Continent will provide the answer.

The present line of division in Europe is roughly the line upon which the Anglo-

American armies coming from the west met those of the Soviet Union coming from the East. To the west of that line the nations of the continental European community have been grappling with the vast and difficult problem resulting from the war in conformity with their own national traditions without pressure or menace from the United States or Great Britain.

Developments in the European countries to the east of that line bear the unmistakable imprint of an alien hand. All the nations of Europe, sixteen in number, which were in a position to exercise free choice, gave a prompt and energetic response to the simple suggestion made at Harvard on June 5, last, and thereby an impressive demonstration of the continuing vitality of European civilization.

It would be well, therefore, to deal briefly with what the area encompassed by those sixteen nations plus western Germany has meant to us and has meant to the world. This community before the war accounted for nearly one-half of the world's trade. They owned nearly two-thirds of the world's shipping. Their industrial production in terms of the basic commodities of coal, steel and chemicals was before the war slightly greater than that of the United States. Their economy was highly integrated, each part depending upon the efficient working of the other.

I think that the figures cited will indicate the importance, even from a purely economic point of view, of the sixteen nations who have joined together to develop a program for their mutual recovery. Their response to our suggestion of June 5 was a remarkable cooperative effort in a post-war world in which that element has hitherto been distressingly lacking.

Congress will wish to go into the objectives and the details of the European recovery program at some length, but I feel that a brief summary of the tentative conclusions we have reached may serve the useful purpose of making clear the distinction between the long-range recovery program and the stop-gap program, which we refer to as interim aid.

The Committee of European Economic Cooperation, meeting in Paris, produced a recovery program extending over four years. After the most careful checking, with the assistance of experts drawn from many governmental agencies, we have concluded that the Paris report correctly identifies the courses of action necessary to produce recovery and indicates an approximate order of magnitude of the cost for the full four-year program.

On the basis of present indications, the estimated cost to our treasury of this program may be of the order of magnitude of $16,000,000,000 to $20,000,000,000. We feel, however, that the uncertainties of weather and crops, supply availabilities, prices, etc., inject a degree of assumption which makes the total cost impossible to forecast with accuracy at this time. I therefore will not recommend to the President that the Congress appropriate for the full four-year period.

I feel, however, that we can estimate with reasonable accuracy and assurance the sum required for the first stage of the recovery program, which will cover a fifteen-month period from April 1, 1948, to June 30, 1949.

Our tentative estimate of the cost, subject to final checks in the light of the Harriman report is something under $1,500,000,000 for the last three months of the fiscal year 1948 and somewhat less than $6,000,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1949. The findings contained in the Krug report, the Nourse report, and the Harriman report, together with the studies made by our interdepartmental committees, make it clear that a program in this order of magnitude can be safely undertaken by this country. I shall therefore recommend to the President that the United States support the European recovery program and that an amount be appropriated for the fifteen-month period ending June 30, 1949.

It is of cardinal importance that an able and effective United States administration manage the funds which may be made available by the Congress. How best to achieve this and the other essential elements of an organizational and administrative structure for the program of aid to European recovery is a matter which the Congress will wish to examine with great care. There are several important principles which I believe should determine the nature of this organization:

A. The operation of this program will in many ways define and express the foreign policy of the United States in the eyes of the European countries and the world. Therefore, the operation must fully accord with the foreign policy of the President as expressed through the Secretary of State.

B. The organization, if it is to afford successful and dynamic management to the complex recovery program, must be granted the widest practicable flexibility both in its operations and in the use of the funds placed at its disposal. The program of United States support will achieve its objective only if it is kept responsive to changing situations and varying supply conditions.

C. Full use should be made of the existing governmental agencies in carrying out those parts of the program which fall within the scope of their present activities. The Departments of Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, Interior, the national military establishment and other agencies are well equipped to perform many of the necessary functions. The National Advisory Council and other competent interdepartmental agencies will have important parts to play.

D. Strong central administrative direction is essential in a complex and varied program of this kind. There must be a high degree of integration in our operation, both in the United States and overseas. Unity of command, rather than diffusion of authority and responsibility is required.

The President will submit to the Congress his recommendations concerning the administration of the European recovery program.

There will be important functions for the United States to perform in Europe. Much of this work will be negotiation with governments of a nature constituting essentially an extension of the conduct of the entire relationship of the United States with the participating countries. Such matters are now handled through our embassies and legations and clearly should continue to be.

There will be certain additional functions arising directly out of the operating program, such as screening of specific import requirements, arrangements for furnishing technical assistance and other similar specialized activities which will require the appointment of qualified men who can devote their full attention to such matters. These men in their dealings with participating governments should work through our ambassadors because it is essential to maintain a single channel of responsibility for United States negotiations with other governments.

For general co-ordination of the operations in Europe and for central representation in the continuing European organization which the participating countries have decided to establish, consideration should be given to the designation of a special United States representative for the European recovery program, with ambassadorial rank, appointed by the President with the advice of the Department of State and the National Advisory Council.

In practice it is felt that, where need is clearly demonstrated and where repayment cannot reasonably be expected, imports of supplies which are quickly consumed, such as food, fertilizer, and fuel, of indispensable items of capital equipment for immediate replacement and repair, and of essential raw materials should be financed by means of grants.

Loans should be made to cover imports of capital equipment and raw materials which will directly produce the means of repayment and where such repayment can reasonably be expected. At the same time every encouragement should be given to early initiation of private financing so as to eliminate as far as possible the necessity for direct assistance from the United States government. Use should also be made of the resources of the International Bank whenever in the opinion of the bank the necessary and appropriate conditions for loans can be met.

It is obvious that the basic responsibility for European recovery rests on the European countries themselves. However, this Government must have assurance that the aid it provides is effectively utilized for the achievement of European recovery as rapidly as possible.

It is contemplated that, to this end, bilateral agreements will be negotiated between the United States and each of the countries participating in the recovery program, setting forth the reciprocal undertaking relating to American assistance. These agreements will vary in form and content as between countries, depending upon the nature of the aid to be furnished

and the conditions deemed important in each case.

The commitments should include undertakings to adopt monetary, fiscal and other measures to maintain stability in price and cost structures; to develop production to reach targets set by the participating countries and in particular, to increase the production of coal and basic foods; and to cooperate in reducing barriers to trade and promoting increased interchange of goods and services. Many other points and more detailed provisions to be covered in the agreements will be presented and discussed during the hearings.

Assistance to Europe will, to a considerable extent, take the form of commodities. The proposal to be submitted to the Congress contemplates the use of funds provided under the program for purchases outside the United States of commodities not readily available in sufficient quantities in this country. This policy will tend to protect our home economy against inflationary price movements which might result from concentrated buying in our markets. It seems clearly in our interest that the greatest possible amount of these supplies be obtained for Europe from other countries. Such countries should be encouraged to contribute directly as much as they can to the recovery program through grants-in-aid or by extending credits for exports to Europe.

I have so far confined my remarks to the European recovery program itself. But the economic effects of this program will extend far beyond the boundaries of the sixteen countries involved. It is in one important sense a world recovery program. The delay in European recovery has created serious problems for many countries which normally supply the European market with raw materials and other commodities.

Where Europe's trade with the rest of the world would normally have been balanced by an equivalent exchange of goods and services, the low level of European production and the limited availability of exports has drastically reduced such payment possibilities.

Furthermore, the habitual triangular trade patterns have almost disappeared, whereby Europe met its deficit for goods obtained from the Western Hemisphere by means of balances obtained from other parts of the world. Similar patterns of triangular trade used to provide certain other countries in the Western Hemisphere with balances from Europe which were used to purchase goods in the American market.

With the breakdown of these trade patterns, supplying countries, to a substantial degree, have had to accept nonconvertible currency or extend credit in order to sell in the European market. Neither of these procedures has given them dollars with which to purchase in the American market. The net result has been that trade continued around the world in large part on the basis of American grants or credits which made dollars available to other countries to meet their import requirements. The diminishing supply of dollars is restricting trade everywhere.

The European recovery program will be quickly reflected in other countries, if the important element of flexibility in purchasing is provided. To the extent that supplies for Europe are procured from nonparticipating countries for dollars, the trade position of these countries with the United States will be improved. In this way we feel that the problems of the other Western Hemisphere countries can be met through a combination of the European recovery program purchases and normal Export-Import Bank transactions.

More important in a fundamental sense, with increases in production in Europe such as those contemplated in the Paris report, exports from Europe will increase, and the necessity for the various supplying countries to accumulate nonconvertible currencies or to extend credit will diminish. Just as the progress of each individual country among the sixteen will affect the progress of the others, so the recovery of Europe will inevitably be a significant link in a chain reaction creating or maintaining economic activity in other countries.

The situation in China continues to cause us deep concern. The civil war has spread and increased in intensity. The Chinese Communists by force of arms seek control of wide areas of China.

The United States and all other world powers recognize the National Government as the sole legal government of China. Only the Government and people of China can solve their fundamental problems and regain for China its rightful role as a major stabilizing influence in the Far East. Nevertheless we can be of help and, in the light of our long and uninterrupted record of friendship and international cooperation with China, we should extend to the Government and its people certain economic aid and assistance. A definite proposal is under preparation for early submission.

I do not have to tell you that this foreign economic program of the United States seeks no special advantage and pursues no sinister purpose. It is a program of construction, production and recovery. It menaces no one. It is designed specifically to bring to an end in the shortest possible time the dependence of these countries upon aid from the United States. We wish to see them self-supporting.

This is certainly not the program of a country seeking to exercise domination or to influence unduly any foreign country. The nations and political groups which have now declared their opposition to the program apparently wish to block for their own reasons the revival of Western Europe.

I have gone at some length into the major features of the long-range plan for European reconstruction and the part that the United States can prudently and wisely contribute because I fully realize that the speedy and adequate consideration of the interim aid program which will be the first item of business presented to you cannot be dealt with by the Congress without understanding its relationship to the program of long-range reconstruction of Europe.

I would, however, urge upon you the necessity of a speedy decision in regard to the interim aid program. What is immediately needed is aid to maintain the status quo in food and in the material necessary to keep the wheels turning and people at work.

It will do little good to discuss the merits of a recovery program for Europe if in the meantime political and economic conditions have deteriorated to a point where such a program could not possibly succeed. The problem of overseas payment has become particularly acute in the case of Austria, France and Italy. It is clear that the people of these countries in the absence of immediate assistance will, during the next few months, begin to suffer from a lack of food and other necessities of life and the whole economic and social life of the people will be seriously affected. Within a short time these countries will have exhausted all of the dollar resources which they can muster to maintain the flow of essential supplies.

Austria, whose economy is carrying the weight of a military occupation of four powers, has been able to survive in recent months largely through the assistance rendered to her under the United States foreign relief program. These funds will be exhausted shortly after the beginning of the year.

The dollar resources of France will permit her to procure essential food and fuel from abroad only until the end of December. Because of her rapidly dwindling reserves, she took steps at the end of August to reduce sharply the placement of contracts for most other imports.

Italy's financial situation is even more serious than that of Austria or France. Last June the Italian Government took steps to eliminate the purchase of most of the raw materials and supplies which she required for the operation of her economy. The United States foreign relief program has been able to provide food and coal until the present time. Funds are not in sight, however, beyond the first of December to maintain the flow of these necessary commodities.

In order to meet this emergency, I recommend that you give immediate and urgent consideration to a bill authorizing the appropriation of sufficient funds to provide the supplies necessary to permit the people of these three countries to continue to eat, to work and to survive the winter. This is not a recovery program. It is designed to help provide the essentials of existence to the people of these three countries.

To accomplish this purpose it is recommended that the Congress authorize an appropriation of $597,000,000. Of this amount Austria needs $42,000,000. France needs $328,000,000 and Italy needs $227,000,000. These funds should be sufficient to meet the situation until March 31, 1948, before which time we hope that some decision may have been taken by the Congress regarding a broad recovery program.

In the absence of a recovery program

the problem of maintaining existing levels in Europe rapidly becomes more complex after March 31. Additional countries will by that time practically have exhausted their dollar resources, and the cumulative effect of the uncertainties as to the future and the continued low levels of production and consumption will have serious consequences throughout Europe.

The program of interim aid would be concentrated largely on such items as food, fuel, fertilizer, fibers, seeds and medical supplies. With such resources as they can make available, the countries should be able themselves to procure other imports needed to prevent economic deterioration. The program should be sufficiently flexible to take account of such changes in requirements and availabilities as may occur.

Interim aid should be given to these countries under agreement to make efficient use of the commodities which we would supply. The bilateral agreements would also require that the local currency equivalent of the value of the commodities which we supply would be used only for such purposes as we and the recipient country might agree. They should also include a provision that the receiving government make known to its people the purpose and source of our supplies, and that it would make available full information concerning their distribution and use.

The operation of a program of the type which is proposed can be handled expeditiously by existing agencies of the Government. The procedures and machinery which are being used in the current relief program have been set up in accordance with the relief bill enacted last summer.

The urgency of the situation is so great that I recommend that no new agency be set up to handle this interim program. The time required to organize such an agency, to hire personnel and establish new procedures would defeat its very purpose. Whatever agency might be created to administer the long-term European recovery program could, of course, take over the operation of interim aid as soon as it comes into existence.

There is one further element with respect to interim needs. It is my understanding that the Department of the Army will be presenting certain additional requirements for funds for occupied areas above the present appropriations available for this purpose during the current fiscal year. I am told that these will be on the general order of $500,000,000 of which slightly more than $300,000,000 will be for additional requirements in Western Germany.

I have endeavored to present in broad outline the long-range European recovery program and, in somewhat more detail, the interim aid program. The proposals will be presented in full to your respective committees.

In considering them I know you are aware of the momentous importance to the world of your decisions. While we are dealing at the moment with the drab though vital facts of economic life, they carry with them fateful consequences.

The automatic success of the program cannot be guaranteed. The imponderables are many. The risks are real. They are, however, risks which have been carefully calculated, and I believe the chances of success are good. There is convincing evidence that the peoples of Western Europe want to preserve their free society and the heritage we share with them. To make that choice conclusive they need our assistance. It is in the American tradition to help. In helping them we will be helping ourselves—because in the large sense our national interests coincide with those of a free and prosperous Europe.

We must not fail to meet this inspiring challenge. We must not permit the free community of Europe to be extinguished. Should this occur it would be a tragedy for the world. It would impose incalculable burdens upon this country and force serious readjustments in our traditional way of life. One of our important freedoms —freedom of choice in both domestic and foreign affairs would be drastically curtailed.

Whether we like it or not, we find ourselves, our nation, in a world position of vast responsibility. We can act for our own good by acting for the world's good.

XV

Conditions of Aid Suggested by National Association of Manufacturers

NOV. 10, 1947

1. That the participating nations evidence their intent to stabilize their currencies, balance their budgets and place their fiscal policies on a sound basis.

2. That the countries take and enforce adequate measures to insure maximum domestic production.

3. That the countries work toward a restoration of free international payments.

4. That the countries make reasonable use of their own realizable gold and foreign exchange assets.

5. That the countries refrain from reexporting products received under the United States aid program, and from exporting identical products produced domestically.

6. That existing state enterprises in the participating countries should have a widespread measure of autonomy and not be subject to detailed political control.

BAN ON NATIONALIZATION

7. That during the period of economic aid the participating countries should not undertake any further nationalization projects, or initiate projects which have the effect of destroying or impairing private competitive enterprise, and thus retard their economic progress.

8. That in so far as practicable, United States aid should be extended to private competitive enterprises in the foreign countries instead of to governments or their agencies.

9. That commodities and products advanced under the aid program should be produced in the recipient country or within the United States, except in instances where procurement elsewhere would be economically advantageous to the United States.

10. That countries participating in the program must accord non-discriminatory treatment to United States business men and investigators, and also accord to representatives of the United States press freedom to visit their countries and report their observations.

11. That the extension of economic relief should be scheduled on a basis of ability to fulfill performance stipulation.

XVI

President Truman's Message to Congress

PROPOSING FOREIGN AID AND INFLATION CONTROLS

NOV. 17, 1947

MR. PRESIDENT, Mr. Speaker, members of the Eightieth Congress:

The Congress has been convened to consider two problems of major concern to the citizens of the United States and to the peoples of the world. The future of the free nations of Europe hangs in the balance. The future of our own economy is in jeopardy.

The action which you take will be written large in the history of this nation and of the world.

The Secretary of State and other representatives of the executive branch have appeared before committees of Congress during the past week to present the facts regarding the necessity for immediate assistance by the United States to certain European countries. Austria, France and Italy have nearly exhausted their financial resources. They must be helped if their peoples are to survive the coming winter, and if their political and economic systems are not to disintegrate.

Exceedingly bad weather has brought on crop failures and fuel shortages and has caused intense suffering. The food and fuel stocks of these countries are now near the vanishing point. Their peoples are in a dangerously weakened condition, due to years of short rations. Additional medical supplies and facilities are urgently necessary.

Austria needs $42,000,000, Italy needs $227,000,000 and France needs $328,000,000 to buy food, fuel and other essential goods during the next four and one half months. Detailed information has been presented to your committees concerning these needs and the purposes for which funds to be appropriated by the Congress would be spent.

Additional funds will also be required to maintain our position in occupied countries.

Emergency assistance by itself will not solve European problems. Emergency aid is no substitute for a long-range recovery program, but it is a vital prerequisite to

such a program. If the Western European nations should collapse this winter, as a result of our failure to bridge the gap between their resources and their needs, there would be no chance for them—or for us—to look forward to their economic recovery. The providing of interim aid will give us time to plan our part in an economic recovery program and it will give the peoples of Europe the strength to hold out until such a program begins.

I will shortly submit to the Congress recommendations concerning the long-range European recovery program. This program is the result of the combined efforts of thoughtful men of two continents whose concern has been the most effective manner in which sixteen European nations, western Germany and the United States can work together for European recovery, world prosperity and lasting peace.

It is a tribute to the strength of our democracy that we are able to make so great a contribution to the freedom and welfare of other nations and other peoples. This nation is strong both in material resources and in the spirit of its people. Our economic strength, born of our system of free institutions, has contributed to raising the standard of living the world over. Our moral strength, resulting from our faith in human rights, is the inspiration of free men everywhere.

I refer to the strength of this nation with humility, for it is an awe-inspiring truth that the manner in which we exert our strength now, and in the future, will have a decisive effect on the course of civilization.

There is a truth whose significance grows with the experience of each passing day. The American people are becoming more and more deeply aware of their world position. They are learning that great responsibility goes with great power.

Our people know that our influence in the world gives us an opportunity—unmatched in history—to conduct ourselves in such a manner that men and women of all the world can move out of the shadows of fear and war and into the light of freedom and peace.

We must make the most of that opportunity. For we have learned, by the costly lesson of two world wars, that what happens beyond our shores determines how we live our own lives. We have learned that, if we want to live in freedom and security, we must work with all the world for freedom and security.

Human misery and chaos lead to strife and conquest.

Hunger and poverty tempt the strong to prey upon the weak.

Twice within this generation we have had to take up arms against nations whose leaders, misled by the hope of easy conquest, sought to dominate the world.

We are convinced that the best way to prevent future wars is to work for the independence and well-being of all nations. This conviction guides our present efforts, and will guide our future decisions. We have participated fully and gladly in the growth of the United Nations and we seek now to strengthen and improve it. We are assisting free nations who have sought our aid in maintaining their independence. We have contributed large sums to help rebuild countries devastated by war. We have taken the lead in breaking down barriers to world trade.

In our efforts, however, to achieve the conditions of peace for all the world, we have encountered unforeseen and unwelcome obstacles.

We have found that not all nations seem to share our aims or approve our methods. We regret the differences which have arisen and the criticisms so loudly expressed. Yet we cannot afford and we do not intend, to let current differences with some nations deter our efforts to cooperate in friendly fashion and to assist other nations who, like us, cherish freedom and seek to promote the peace and stability of the world.

The actions of this Government must be of a stature to match the dignity and influence of the United States in world affairs. The prompt provision by the Congress for interim aid will be convincing proof to all nations of our sincere determination to support the freedom-loving countries of western Europe in their endeavors to remain free and to become fully self-supporting once again.

If that action is followed by the enactment of the long-range European recovery program, this Congress will have written a noble page in world annals.

I have spoken of the economic and moral strength of the United States and of the way in which we must use that strength if we are to build a world community of free, strong and independent nations.

The strength of the United States is not due to chance. It is due to the wise decisions and bold actions taken by free and courageous men throughout the history of our democracy.

The time is at hand for new decisions and new actions of equal wisdom.

On several occasions during the past year I have reported to the Congress and to the nation on our general economic situation. These reports have told of new high levels of production and employment. Farmers are producing 37 per cent more than in 1929. Industry is producing 65 per cent more. In terms of actual purchasing power, the average income of individuals, after taxes, has risen 39 per cent. The rapid growth of our post-war economic activity has exceeded expectations and has revealed anew the potentialities of our economy.

In each of my reports, however, I have had to warn of dangers which lay ahead.

Today, inflation stands as an ominous threat to the prosperity we have achieved. We can no longer treat inflation—with spiraling prices and living costs—as some vague condition we may encounter in the future. We already have an alarming degree of inflation. And even more alarming, it is getting worse.

Since the middle of 1946, fuel has gone up 13 per cent; clothing prices have gone up 19 per cent; retail food prices have gone up 40 per cent. The average for all cost of living items has risen 23 per cent.

The housewife who goes to buy food today must spend $10 to buy what $7 bought a year and a half ago.

The cost of living is still climbing. In the past four months it has risen at a rate of 16 per cent a year.

Wholesale prices are rising, too. They affect every industry and trade, and they are soon translated into retail prices.

Since the middle of 1946, wholesale textile prices have gone up 32 per cent; metals have gone up 36 per cent; building materials have gone up 42 per cent. Wholesale prices on the average have gone up 40 per cent.

The harsh effects of price inflation are clear. They are felt by wage earners, farmers and business men. Wage earners are finding that bigger pay checks this year buy less than smaller pay checks bought last year. Despite generalities about high farm prices the income of many farm families cannot keep up with the rising costs of the things they buy. Small business men are being squeezed by rising costs. Even those who are well off are asking, "How long can it last? When is the break coming?"

In addition, price inflation threatens our entire program of foreign aid. We cannot abandon foreign aid, nor can we abandon our own people to the ravages of unchecked inflation.

We cannot allow the strength of this nation to be wasted and our people's confidence in our free institutions to be shaken by an economic catastrophe. We shall be inviting that catastrophe unless we take steps now to halt runaway prices.

Our immediate approach to the problems of high prices and inflation should consist of three types of measures: one, to relieve monetary pressures; two, to channel scarce goods into the most essential uses; three, to deal directly with specific high prices.

The way to reduce monetary pressure is by restraining the excessive use of credit. At a time when the economy is already producing at capacity, a further expansion of credit simply gives people more dollars to use in bidding up the prices of goods.

Consumer credit is increasing at a disturbing rate. The amount outstanding has risen from $6,500,000,000 in 1945 to more than $11,000,000,000 today. Even more rapid expansion is under way now, because the controls on consumer credit exercised by the Federal Reserve System expired Nov. 1. These credit controls should be restored. Also, some restraint should be placed on inflationary bank credit.

Legislation is required, moreover, to prevent excessive speculation on the commodity exchanges.

Another effective weapon against inflation is increased savings by the public. Every dollar that is saved instead of spent is a dollar fighting against inflation. In order to encourage additional savings, the Government should intensify its vigorous efforts to sell savings bonds.

The second part of the program to curb

inflation is to secure the most efficient use of scarce goods and otherwise channel their flow so as to relieve inflationary pressures. Grain, for example, is too badly needed to permit wasteful feeding to livestock. Steel, as another example, is too scarce to be used for non-essential purposes.

Legislation is required to authorize the allocation of scarce commodities which basically affect the cost of living, or basically affect industrial production. In these limited areas inventory control powers are also needed.

Authority to allocate transportation services should be extended.

In addition, existing export controls should be continued and strengthened. Goods that we cannot wisely export must be kept here, and the shipments we make must go where they are needed most. Profiteering in exports must be prevented.

The measures which I have already discussed will, when taken together, aid substantially in relieving inflationary pressures. For large segments of the economy, they should be adequate to meet the requirements of the present situation. However, there are limited areas of acute danger in which these measures cannot be regarded as guaranteeing adequate protection.

For example, present forecasts indicate that we are likely to have less grain and meat next year than we have this year. The pressure on the prices of these foods would then become increasingly great. If these pressures are permitted to bring further sharp increases in food prices, they may well set off a chain reaction that would spread throughout the economy. It is surely better to take timely action to check adverse forces at particular trouble spots than to wait until general inflation has become so serious as to require drastic controls over the whole economic life.

Therefore, we need a third group of measures to combat inflation. Legislation should be enacted, authorizing the Government to impose price ceilings on vital commodities in short supply that basically affect the cost of living. Basic elements in the cost of living are food, clothing, fuel and rent. In addition, the legislation should be broad enough to authorize price ceilings on those vital commodities in short supply that basically affect industrial production. This will enable us to stamp out profiteering and speculation in these important areas.

This does not mean that price ceilings should be imposed on all items within the classes I have mentioned. For example, price ceilings would not be necessary for staple food and clothing items not in short supply or for any delicacies or luxuries. The same principle of selective treatment would apply to industrial items. This selective treatment of a relatively few danger spots is very different from over-all wartime price controls.

Even should the shortages of a few commodities at the consumer level remain serious for a time, I believe that the fair distribution of such commodities can be largely accomplished without consumer rationing. But no one can foretell exactly how serious some shortages may become next year. With serious shortages, a free market works cruel hardships on countless families and puts an unbearable pressure on prices. I therefore recommend that authority be granted, as a preparedness measure, to ration basic cost of living items on a highly selective basis.

Adequate protection from high prices and under distribution can be assured only by establishing authority for price ceilings and rationing in the fields of critical importance. It takes several months to set up an organization and make the administrative arrangements necessary to put price control and rationing into effect. Thus, the only prudent course is to establish the authority at this time so the necessary preparations can be started. If we fail to prepare, and disaster results from our unpreparedness, we shall have gambled with our national safety—and lost.

If the Government imposes price ceilings covering a specific area of production, it should in all fairness have the authority, in that same area, to prevent wage increases which will make it impossible to maintain the price ceilings. This authority should be granted, although I believe that there would be few occasions for its use.

I am confident that, if the cost of living can be brought and held in reasonable relationship to the incomes of the people, wage adjustments through collective bargaining will be consistent with productivity and will avoid an inflationary round of wage increases.

Next to food, the most important element in the cost of living is rent. Under the modified rent control law, rents are rising at the rate of about 1 per cent a month. A 12 per cent annual increase in rents imposes an intolerable strain upon the family budget. The Rent Control Law should be extended and the weaknesses in the present law should be corrected.

I am well aware that some of my proposals are drastic measures. No one regrets more than I the necessity for considering their use. But if we face the facts squarely, it is apparent that no other methods can safely be counted upon to protect our people from the dangers of excessively high prices and ruinous inflation.

The American people want adequate protection from these dangers and they are entitled to it. It should not be denied them. Nor should they be misled with half measures.

Even with the authority to impose price ceilings, the Government will intensify its efforts to obtain voluntary action. Wherever voluntary action will do the job there will be no necessity to impose the Government's authority. But the very existence of these powers should have a salutary effect. They will demonstrate to each of our citizens the importance of carefully weighing each step that might lead to higher prices. They will support expanded and more specific efforts to obtain voluntary action by business men, labor leaders, farmers, and consumers to hold prices down.

All the actions I have described are essential to a fair and effective anti-inflation program. I look upon them as short-run insurance against the impairment of our prosperity and the threat to our future development.

We should all ponder the following questions:

What would it avail the farmer, in the long run, if farm prices should go substantially higher only to be followed by a disaster such as occurred after the first World War?

What would it avail the worker, in the long run, to obtain inflationary wage increases, if they were followed by a repetition of the bitter experience when 15,000,000 workers were out of jobs?

What would it avail the businessman to have record-breaking profits soar even higher, if they were followed by a depression which would imperil our whole system of enterprise?

The program which I have outlined is one designed to meet the existing emergencies of inflation and exorbitant price levels. It is an emergency program which should be adopted to protect our standard of living for the immediate present and to make possible economic security in the future.

But a program designed to meet a crisis cannot by itself be a program designed to build for the future. We must also make plans to prevent future difficulty of the same nature.

Our long-range programs must stress ever-increasing production.

To accomplish this for agriculture, we need a comprehensive farm program. We shall need programs to increase the use of farm products by industry and consumers in this country when other countries become more nearly self-sufficient. Long-range national measures will be needed to protect the farm population against ruinous deflation in farm production and prices.

To expand industrial output, we need a long-range program to overcome basic shortages in capacity and equipment. To provide markets for increased output of farm and factory, we shall need long-range programs to raise the standard of living, particularly for families of low income.

But the first step toward this progress in the future is to deal with the critical present. We must win the battle against inflation, so that our long-range efforts may start from high levels of prosperity and not from the depths of a depression.

In summary, the immediate anti-inflation program that I recommend calls for the following legislative action:

1. To restore consumer credit controls and to restrain the creation of inflationary bank credit.

2. To authorize the regulation of speculative trading on the commodity exchanges.

3. To extend and strengthen export controls.

4. To extend authority to allocate transportation facilities and equipment.

5. To authorize measures which will induce the marketing of livestock and poultry of weights and grades that represent the most efficient utilization of grain.

6. To enable the Department of Agriculture to expand its program of encouraging conservation practices in this country, and to authorize measures designed to increase the production of foods in foreign countries.

7. To authorize allocation and inventory control of scarce commodities which basically affect the cost of living or industrial production.

8. To extend and strengthen rent control.

9. To authorize consumer rationing on products in short supply which basically affect the cost of living.

10. To authorize price ceilings on products in short supply which basically affect the cost of living or industrial production, and to authorize such wage ceilings as are essential to maintain the necessary price ceilings.

If we neglect our economic ills at home, if we fail to halt the march of inflation, we may bring on a depression from which our economic system, as we know it, might not recover. And if we turn our backs on nations still struggling to recover from the agony of war, not yet able to stand on their own feet, we may lose for all time the chance to obtain a world of free peoples that can live in enduring peace.

The freedom that we cherish in our own economy and the freedom that we enjoy in the world today are both at stake.

I have recommended interim aid for certain western European countries and a program to curb inflation in the United States. I regard the measures which I have presented to you as vital and essential to the welfare of this nation.

When the American people have faced decisions of such magnitude in the past, they have taken the right course.

I am confident that the Congress, guided by the will of the people, will take the right course on this occasion.

XVII

Senator Taft's Attack on Truman Proposals

NOV. 17, 1947

TODAY the President of the United States demanded that Congress, and the people, turn the clock backward. He advocates a return to the days of war, of the OPA, of the War Labor Board and the War Production Board.

He demands power in his individual discretion to fix prices or not to fix prices, to fix wages or not to fix wages, to prevent purchases by the housewife unless she gets ration stamps from some new Federal board, to dictate to every farmer where he shall sell the products of his farm and at what prices and to regulate the details of every business, control its inventories, regulate its acquisition of raw materials and direct the disposition of its finished products.

He wants price control against the producer, wage control against the working man, rationing against the housewife and the restaurant, every kind of control over the business man.

It means the setting up of a Federal bureau with literally hundreds of thousands of employes, and agents prying into the daily lives of millions of people. We know this is what it would mean because we saw it happen here. Such a proposal is not progress, nor is it liberalism. It is reaction and a step to a completely totalitarian nation.

Evidently under this Administration we can never return to a state of peace. We still have war taxes. We have a war budget. Now we are to have war controls.

Most of our Presidents have regarded war and its incidence as the worst calamity that people could suffer, except the loss of its liberty. But the present Administration for domestic policy reasons is so eager to retain the incidence of war that one can only doubt that whether there is a real will to peace.

The President represents that these powers will be sparingly used only with relation to vital commodities in short supply which basically affect the cost of living, or basically affect industrial production.

Everything, he says, is to be done on a highly selected basis. If there is one thing which the OPA certainly learned, it is that you can't do price control partially.

Why, the President ended controls himself on the ground that you could not control some prices unless you controlled all. All important commodities are interrelated. If you ration and fix the price of meat, everybody rushes out to buy chickens and eggs.

Controls immediately must be established over them. And who is to determine what are vital commodities and whether they affect the cost of living? Of course all commodities affect the cost of living. That definition alone includes 90 per cent of all commodities. No—the President is only trying to sugarcoat the pill. This is the OPA. This is the police state condemned by the President himself only a month ago. This is the end of economic freedom.

Certainly prices are too high. Unreasonable increases in wages may be requested. Certainly more food is being consumed in this country than necessary. But if we can't meet problems of that kind within our system of free competition and incentive then we must regiment prices, wages and rationing forever.

Apart from theory there are three practical objections to adopting a police state. First, it chokes production instead of increasing it, and what we want is more production to give people what they need at reasonable prices.

We saw under the OPA controls how many important products disappeared from the market. The housewife couldn't buy any butter, any meat, any soap, any canned goods. No man could find a white shirt or a new suit. There was no leather because of the black-market slaughtering of beef, and no shoes. There wasn't any lumber or building materials. And none of them came back until we got rid of OPA.

The English have complete price control and rationing, and they haven't got enough to live on. They have no incentive to get production. Men don't work longer hours, because there isn't anything to buy with the money that they could earn. Surely with that example before us, we don't want to socialize and regiment America.

In the second place nobody knows enough to do the job of control as well as it is done by natural economic law. There are probably a billion transactions a day in this country and no one knows how to fix prices and conditions to govern those sales.

I saw the little man who struggled with the problem in the OPA bureaus. They created books and books of regulations, and had to amend them daily. If their rules fitted the east, they didn't fit the west or the south.

And there was no relief from their bungling and their injustice. Certainly this Administration has shown no evidence of ability to do the job. Look at the mess made of the voluntary food saving program to carry out a simple and highly desirable purpose. Meatless Tuesdays and chickenless and eggless Thursdays never did make any sense, because everyone ate chickens and eggs on Tuesday and meat on Thursdays, leaving them exactly where they were.

Last Thursday morning on the dining car the steward told us that, while he could not serve eggs, he would substitute wheat cakes on every order. So to save wheat for Europe the travelers ate wheatcakes in America. What difference would it have made if the Government had had legal power to enforce its decree? The compulsory plan would have been the same fool plan, and just as ineffective.

The reason this country has a surplus of food to ship in such tremendous amount is that we have pursued a system based on liberty. If we go back to Government restrictions, there won't be any surplus to ship abroad, and we will be subject to the same paralysis of initiative which exists in Europe and in England today.

According to the President's own statement, the average income of individuals after taxes has risen 39 per cent since 1929 in terms of actual purchasing power. The average man is therefore 39 per cent better off than he was at the high point of prosperity eighteen years ago.

The average workman is better off today than he was in 1939 just before the war in spite of the high prices, because his wages have gone up 110 while the cost of living has only gone up about 65 per cent.

Nearly half the families in the country have two workers in the family, and those families are better off than they were before the war. Unfortunately there are still a large number of families whose

wages or fixed income has lagged behind the increase in prices.

We have to do everything therefore that we can to get prices down or increase their income, but we don't need to surrender liberty to keep this country on an even keel.

What emergency except a political emergency justifies making the President an economic dictator with power to run the lives of every business man, farmer, working man and housewife?

This high price condition is no accident. It has obviously resulted from the policies of the Administration which has controlled this Government for the last fifteen years and throughout the war. Prices are high because demand is greater than the supply.

Although the supply is tremendously increased over pre-war, the money available for spending has increased still more. The war was financed on inflation with a deficit of $50,000,000,000 a year for three or four years. The money created then and saved by the people is coming into the market today to buy goods.

Under lend-lease we distributed dollars around the world, and now those dollars are coming back from South America and elsewhere to buy goods that are insufficient for our own needs. Through the Bretton Woods Fund and Bank and the British loan we have distributed more dollars to be spent here.

At the same time we have kept Government expenses and taxes many times higher than they were before the war. The Administration has resisted any attempt to cut expenses, or to cut taxes. Every cent the Government spends puts more money into the buyer's side of the market.

The huge tax burden from this expense, amounting to about $40,000,000,000 a year—plus $12,000,000,000 of state and local taxes—30 per cent of the national income altogether—is a burden on millions of taxpayers. A lot of the taxes, however, are passed on into the cost of manufactured products. When you buy a pair of shoes you help pay the taxes of the farmer who raises the cattle, the livestock dealer, the packer, the leather processor, the shoe manufacturer and the shoe retailer. Probably 25 per cent of what you pay for your shoes is made up of taxes, and the same is true of many other articles.

Probably the most important cause of high prices is the tremendous volume of export buying. True, we have an exceptional income here at home in the United States, but the income of our people is practically balanced by our production.

When we impose on top of this balance $20,000,000,000 of foreign money, of foreign buying, we can hardly be surprised that a great increase in demand outruns our supply and forces prices up. This year we are exporting at the rate of $20,000,000,000 a year and importing at the rate of $9,000,000,000. That means that $11,000,000,000 of market demand are coming from abroad with no goods to balance them. About half of it is balanced by taxes, but the other half is pure inflation.

The President recommends that we extend and strengthen export controls. Why, he has had power to control exports right along, only he hasn't exercised it in any effective way. He has permitted the world to come in with the dollars we gave them, and bid up the price of our goods.

Of course we have to export to Europe to prevent starvation and chaos. Everybody agrees on that. There isn't any substantial difference about the necessity of doing something at once to carry Italy and France through the winter, through a short-range emergency program.

From the point of view of checking communism, this program is essential, but it is more or less useless unless we also change our policy in Germany and our policy in China. Secretary Marshall's efforts to re-establish the economy of Western Europe with American dollars is completely hopeless as long as he continues in Germany to destroy the industrial plants which alone can make Germany self-supporting. It means that Western Europe can become self-supporting.

Secretary Marshall is apparently uninterested in saving China from the Communists at a very reasonable cost, while he advocates the spending of billions for Western Europe. It is most unfortunate that there is not a word of encouragement in this message for those who are fighting against communism in China without ammunition and with their backs to the wall.

People seem to feel that we cannot check exports without causing hardship and starvation, but as a matter of fact of some $20,000,000,000 of exports, of goods and services, in 1947, only about 40 per cent go to Europe—$12,000,000,000 goes to every other section of the world, North America, South America, Asia and Africa.

Surely we should ration the rest of the world on steel, grain and oil before we even consider rationing our own people.

Today the Russian Government has an active commission here buying American goods and paying gold for them, which is better than credit, but just as inflationary. Much of what Russia is buying is heavy machinery, good for the manufacture of munitions.

Why does the President grant export licenses for goods of this kind and permit the Russians to come in and spend their money for them when steel and various types of machinery are insufficient for our own needs?

I have pointed out that the tremendous exports are one of the main causes of high prices here today. They can be cut down. In fact, if they continue at the present volume they present a threat to the whole economy, because they cannot possibly be maintained indefinitely when the world returns to normal.

In 1929 we built up a false export trade based on private credit. When it became apparent that the loans were not to be repaid, all lending stopped and the sudden unemployment which resulted here contributed heavily to the depression of 1932. Now we are repeating the experiment with Government funds instead of private funds.

We have been aiding Europe at the rate of about $5,000,000,000 a year of Government grants, loans and other aid. I think we can maintain that rate if we cut down on other exports and other Government expense without further serious effect on prices, and certainly without any need for setting up police state controls.

But I can't see any reason for increasing the rate of the very generous contributions we have been making. No nation has ever been so generous or made such tremendous effort to export as we have during the past two years.

We cannot endanger our whole economy and our whole liberty by trying to increase that five billion rate to the $8,000,000,000 a year requested by the foreign nations at Paris.

European Socialists do not seem to realize that if we are to continue a program for any length of time it must be based on a continuation of the liberty which has brought it about. But while temporarily we might increase our output by government restrictions, in the end we would soon be subject to the same paralysis of initiative which exists in England and in Europe today. In other words, Europe has to take the limitations which are inherent in a free system if they want the benefits produced by it.

We have shipped more food and other assistance out of this country than any other nation has ever done before in the history of the world. We cannot stretch that liberality too far, or there will be nothing to ship. We cannot ship so much that under a free system it will lead to a period of boom and bust.

In short, the way to hold prices down is for the Government to spend less money and reduce taxes, to limit exports and to hold the Marshall plan within a reasonable figure, and to control the growth of private credit. The Marshall plan is not primarily to relieve hardship and starvation. Our whole contribution for food, fuel and fertilizer under this plan will probably not be more than $2,500,000,000 a year.

The rest of the assistance requested is desirable, but much of it is not essential, certainly not worth the establishment of another OPA and a police state in this country.

Apparently the President thinks that we cannot adopt his version of the Marshall plan without police state controls and another OPA. I said last week in New York that the President was asking for two completely inconsistent policies at the same time. I said that if we wanted the $8,000,000,000 European form of the Marshall plan and all the exports we have, we cannot have lower prices. If we want lower prices, we have to give up that kind of Marshall plan.

If the Marshall plan is essential for the preservation of Europe and the world, then perhaps we can even stand higher prices more than we can stand a complete relapse to a Fascist regimentation of every individual in the United States.

But I believe very strongly that we can adopt a modified Marshall plan probably with more benefit to the countries concerned than if we are too lavish with our dollars, and I believe that we can hold prices at reasonable amounts with such a modified plan, if we cut other expenses and taxes, control credits and limit exports.

Surely, the American people do not desire a return to the days of OPA. They know that the controls won't work. They remember the shortages and the black markets. In time of war a morale develops which makes it possible to maintain some control, but in time of peace controls in this country are certain to fail. They will not hold real prices down, if we permit other conditions to go on forcing prices up.

We can't advocate higher wages with any promise that there will be no higher prices, as the President did just after the end of the war.

The American people don't like to be regimented, and they don't like to be ordered around by Federal officials. Our experience with Prohibition and with OPA both prove that vast black-market operations develop which the Federal Government itself is unable to control. Morals are broken down because it pays money to be a criminal.

Surely, the President's memory must be short. It was the President's own decontrol board which took off the controls on dairy products and grains in 1946. It was the President himself who took off controls on meat just before the 1946 election. It was the President himself who took off almost all other controls.

Can he sincerely believe that the Government could now enforce the controls he is asking for more successfully than they were controlling prices at that time? Does he think they can enforce the controls without a vast army of enforcement agents? Or even with such an army?

The President's adoption of his police-state program represents the final surrender to the left wing. The President himself indicated clearly within a month his disapproval of price control. What has happened since? The growing importance of the Marshall plan?

But three committees of eminent men examined that plan and found that we could safely undertake it, or the essential part of it, without serious danger to this country. While some mild forms of allocation were suggested none of the committees thought a complete price control, wage control, rationing system was necessary. Only Leon Henderson and his crowd, and the Political Action Committee of the CIO, advocated this program now adopted by the President.

There has been no change of conditions since the President's opinion a month ago except the conditions of political strategy.

From a Republican political standpoint it might be better for the Congress to give the President the power which he demands. It could only result in failure and a revolt of public opinion against any man who is trying to enforce the law.

I have had Republicans say to me that we should swallow our views and pass these measures for our political advantage, so that chaos and confusion will redound to our advantage in November, 1948. But it seems to me that the issue is far deeper than any political issue.

We stand at the crossroads today between a free America and a planned economy. This is the last stand of the planners who think they know how to run the people's affairs better than the people can know themselves.

If this effort succeeds in time of peace, there will never be a time when an emergency cannot be summoned up to justify the continuation of powers of this kind. It was only a month ago that the President himself said that consumer rationing and price controls were police-state methods. That is the issue today, not only in America, but throughout the world.

This country is the great bulwark of a free life, and from that freedom has developed the greatest and most productive country in the world and the country where the people are better off than any other country in the world. Shall we abandon that philosophy and that program for the police-state methods which have brought the rest of the world as seekers for charity to our door?

XVIII

Secretary Marshall's Address at Chicago

ON LONDON CONFERENCE
ON GERMANY
NOV. 18, 1947

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, I believe, have a sound understanding of the basic principles and objectives of our foreign policy. These have been expressed on many occasions by responsible officials of this Government, beginning with the President. They are understandable, I believe, to you all because they have their origin in the American conscience and in the deeply rooted traditions of our people. No American, I am sure, questions the desirability of this country promoting wherever it can the right of people to govern themselves and the rule of impartial law as against the exercise of arbitrary power. These principles require no elaboration. But, true as they are, such generalities do not always serve to clarify for our people the current problems with which we are now faced. They do not in themselves answer the question, "What is it all about?" They do not in themselves provide an answer as to why at almost every turn we find ourselves in disagreement with another power with whom we were so recently allied in the common cause. I shall tonight confine myself to the problems relating to one area of the world which at the moment are occupying the attention of the Administration and the Congress and with which in another aspect I will be dealing at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers which opens in London November 25. That is the related problem of the revival of the European community and the peace settlements with Germany and Austria. I shall try to avoid oversimplification on the one hand and bewildering detail on the other.

In my statement before the committees of Congress on November 10, I laid great stress on the entity known as Europe and its importance to the world and to the United States in particular. So important to the understanding of our present problem is the meaning of the European community that at the expense of repetition I will restate it. Europe, or what through centuries has been known as Europe, is a community of nations which despite racial and religious differences, commercial rivalries, and sporadic internecine wars has developed governmental procedures and an advanced civilization. We are a part of that civilization. Our national traditions—the foundation on which our entire civilization rests—find their counterpart, if not their origin, in some part of this European community.

Europe is a natural grouping of states designed by geography and history to function as a community if it is to function well. Because of the character of its people, the nations comprising the European community function harmoniously and effectively only if they are permitted to operate of their own free will. The logic of history would appear to dictate the necessity of this community drawing closer together not only for its own survival but for the stability, prosperity, and peace of the entire world.

Due to the Nazi attempt to subjugate the entire European community, Europe was plunged into a great war. The central question that arose at the end of this war was, in effect, what was to be the future of this European community. Was it to be restored to a position of stability so it could work out its own problem, or was it to be kept in a state of permanent dependency and eventual absorption into a system alien to its traditions and civilization?

It is generally recognized that the major responsibility for finally crushing nazism devolved upon three powers, none of which can be strictly classed as a continental European state. The efforts of two of these powers have been consistently directed, since the military victory, toward the restoration of the European community to its former status. They have been so directed partly out of compassion but primarily, I think, because they recognized the historical fact that a revived, revitalized Europe is necessary to a peaceful and prosperous world order.

FORMER EUROPEAN POSITION

For centuries Europe occupied a preeminent position and exercised a dominant

influence in international affairs. Before the recent war it was one of the two highly industrialized areas on earth and enjoyed a correspondingly high standard of living. Today Europe is devastated and dispirited, but once it regains strength and confidence it will draw on its store of resources, energies, skills, and spiritual qualities and again make major contributions to world progress. This is the goal of those who are genuinely devoted to the cause of European recovery.

Unfortunately, it has become apparent that the third great power which contributed so much to the common victory evidently does not share that purpose. For reasons that are still obscure, it is endeavoring apparently to prolong the present unsatisfactory state of affairs indefinitely. If this purpose prevails, obviously the prosperous European community we knew before the war cannot be reestablished within the foreseeable future.

This brings me to an important conclusion. It is this divergence of purpose concerning the future of Europe which is the cause of many of the present differences between the United States and Soviet Russia. The divergence is not due to any direct clash between the national interests of these powers.

It is my belief that if Europe is restored as a solvent and vigorous community, this issue will have been decided, and the disturbing conflict between ourselves and the Soviets, in so far as Europe is concerned, will lessen.

It seems evident that, as regards European recovery, the enlightened self-interest of the United States coincides with the best interest of Europe itself and of all those who desire to see conflicts of whatever nature resolved so that the world can devote its full attention and energy to the progressive improvement of the well-being of mankind. The place to begin that process is Europe.

I have referred to the fact that Europe formerly stood as a strong and constructive element of the world's economy and political order. Its trade, both among the European countries themselves and with other regions, was a major factor in the international exchange of commodities and services and was a direct stimulus to productivity throughout the world. The stabilizing influence which Europe as a concert of independent nations exercised on the remainder of the world was a basic factor in assuring the security of our own nations—a fact which we acknowledged by twice committing our total resources to the preservation of the integrity of the continental community, free of single-power domination.

The near collapse of Europe has left weakness where once there was strength and has created in effect a political and economic vacuum. It is certainly not our purpose to exploit the situation by filling the vacuum with American power. The map of Europe today bears witness to our true intentions. West of the line where the Allied armies met, nations in their own way are grappling with their postwar problems, each in accordance with its distinctive institutions and traditions, free of external pressure. The proposals of the United States to assist in the recovery of the nations that responded to the suggestion of June 5 has no purpose other than to restore Europe as a self-supporting community of states and to terminate as speedily as possible dependence upon us for aid. It is unfortunate that only 16 European states felt free to participate in the Paris conference on economic cooperation. This Government is willing to cooperate with every nation that pledges a generous effort to the common cause of European recovery.

We are now intimately working to this end with governments of varied political complexions—some constitutional monarchies and some republics, both with Socialist ministers, some controlled by conservative elements and some constituted of coalitions. This is a fact that everyone can see, and it should dispel completely the propagandistic assertions that we seek to impose the American pattern on others.

Much has been said about the various freedoms, about democracy, about the right of people and of nations to determine for themselves without restraint the forms of government they desire. Much has also been said regarding the desire of the United States Government to influence other nations to follow what we believe we follow with constantly increasing success—that is a philosophy of government dedicated to the freedom and welfare of the individual. That is our earnest desire. It is certainly not imperialistic, and it does not indicate a passion for war.

We realize that we cannot expect the same conceptions to be held by all countries. Different races, different traditions, different histories and rates of development lead to different results, but on fundamentals I think we find a general agreement among peoples the world around.

OUR INTEREST IN EUROPEAN RESTORATION

If the United States entertained any idea of extending American influence or domination over Europe, our policy would not be directed toward ending European dependency upon this country but toward perpetuating that relationship. The clarity of the record and of our intentions, however, has not prevented Soviet officials and Communist groups elsewhere from waging with increasing venom a calculated campaign of vilification and distortion of American motives in foreign affairs. These opponents of recovery charge the United States with imperialist design, aggressive purposes, and finally with a desire to provoke a third world war.

I wish to state emphatically that there is no truth whatsoever in these charges, and I add that those who make them are fully aware of this fact.

What is the record? We have annexed no territory. We have not used the greatest military power and military resources ever assembled to acquire for the United States a special privileged position, either political or economic. Furthermore, since the close of hostilities the United States and Great Britain have voluntarily reduced the area of their sovereignty in the world. Colonial areas and dependent people have been assisted to achieve full independence. New countries have emerged from under the U. S. and British flags to take their place as members of the United Nations.

While the western democracies have been reducing the area of their sovereignty, one country has taken the opposite road. The Soviet Union has in effect considerably expanded her frontiers. Since 1939 she has *de facto* annexed territory comprising an area of more than 280,000 square miles, with a population of some 22 million people.

The American proposal for assistance to Europe is directed toward production, construction, and recovery. It is a genuinely cooperative undertaking, which is being worked out in an atmosphere of mutual trust and with careful regard for the sovereignty of nations. Indeed, this joint endeavor by the United States and 16 European states is a clear and convincing demonstration of cooperation freely given to achieve the common good. As such it perfectly reflects one of the basic precepts of democracy.

This Government recognizes that elements of uncertainty are involved in so vast and complex an undertaking. But we believe that the promise of success more than justifies the risks. We are completely convinced that the risks of *not* attempting to restore Europe are far greater than those involved in taking positive action as now proposed. We recognize that our people will be called upon to share their goods still in short supply and will have to forego filling a portion of their own requirements until the greater needs of Europe have been met. This is a direct contradiction of the allegation that we are seeking to dump surplus goods in Europe in order to avoid the depressing effects of over-supply. This particular charge of "dumping" must have a strange sound to those Europeans now desperately seeking the very essentials of life. And it must sound equally odd to Americans who are standing with money in hand impatient to buy goods which we are sending to Europe to meet a more urgent need. But such is the breath of propaganda.

COMMENTS REGARDING PROPAGANDA

I should like in this connection to make a few comments regarding propaganda in general and particularly with regard to the debates and procedure of the United Nations Assembly. It seems desirable to analyze the situation somewhat and clear up some of the issues prior to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in London.

During the meeting of the United Nations Assembly there was a great deal said, with considerable vituperation, regarding the attitude of the Government and people of the United States toward the Soviet Union, along with the direct accusation that a war spirit was being fomented by our press and by distinguished citizens

who were named. A portion of this, the major portion I assume, was intended for pure propaganda purposes. But I also assume that there may have been some genuine feeling that the purposes of this Government and the attitude of most of the American press were definitely hostile to the Soviet Union. As a responsible official of the United States Government I would like to see more restraint than is sometimes exhibited in discussions of international issues.

But as regards the critical attitude recently manifested in this country toward the Soviet Union, I should like to distinguish between this effect and its cause. To determine that cause it is necessary to go back at least as far as the summer of 1945, immediately following the German surrender. At that time I think it was a fact that the people of the United States had as high a regard, or I might better put it, appreciation, for the Soviet people and their sacrifices, and for the Soviet Army and its leaders, as they held for any other people in the world. But today, only two years later, we are charged with a definite hostility toward the Soviet Union and its people, which constitutes a complete change in our attitude since the summer of 1945.

I recognize this effect. I would not characterize it as hostile. But the important question is, "What produced this tremendous change in our national feeling and attitude?" The truth as I see it is that from the termination of hostilities down to the present time the Soviet Government has consistently followed a course which was bound to arouse the resentment of our people.

Just what the purpose of this remarkable procedure has been, particularly during 1946, I have been at a loss to determine. So many of the actions of that Government were provocative without any other evident purpose. I have endeavored to find at least a partial explanation in the historical characteristics of the Russian Government and its officials through a long period of years and not solely related to the present regime. While some light can thus be cast on the problem, it does not, even in a small way, explain why a government should proceed with apparent deliberation to destroy the invaluable asset of high regard and good-will which is possessed in the attitude of the American people and why it should deliberately provoke such animosities as are evident at this time.

The people of this country are God-fearing people. They have been very patient in their attitude towards misrepresentation of their actions and motives when their only purpose has been to help the other fellow. Today our people have been virtually driven into a state of active resentment, and, having been goaded to this point, they are accused of having lighted and stoked this great fire of public resentment. This last is propaganda, yes, of the most brazen and contemptuous character. But since it affects the very stability of the world, it is time to call a halt to such inflammatory practices.

I am not pessimistic regarding the progress made by the United Nations during the recent Assembly meeting. The fact that the world has a forum for free debate is in itself a hopeful portent for the future. The fact that debates have sometimes included more of vituperation or diatribe than of logic or adherence to the facts was unfortunate but in the long run, I think, merely incidental and an always present possibility in any democratic debate. The organization did pass through a serious struggle, but I think it emerged without loss of potential strength. The question now is, where do we go from here, which leads me to the coming Conference of Foreign Ministers in London.

PROBLEM OF GERMAN RESTORATION

The problem of restoring the European community inevitably raises in acute form the problem of Germany. The restoration of Europe involves the restoration of Germany. Without a revival of German production there can be no revival of Europe's economy. But we must be very careful to see that a revived Germany could not again threaten the European community.

I am not speaking of the revival of Germany in a military sense. There can be no question of the absolute necessity of keeping Germany disarmed and demilitarized. Today Germany is completely disarmed. Measures have been proposed by the United States and supported by the United Kingdom and France to insure the continued demilitarization of Germany for 40 years. Thus far the Soviet Union has, in effect, rejected that proposal by wholesale amendments of its purpose, but the offer still stands.

The revival of German militarism, however, is not the only important factor involved in the relationship of Germany to a restored Europe. There is an imperative necessity for safeguards to insure that the economic power of Germany shall not be used by a future German Government as a weapon for the furtherance of exclusively German policies. This poses admittedly a complicated and difficult problem. An attempt artificially to limit German peacetime economy could easily prevent the essential revival of German production to an extent that would render impossible the economic revival of Europe.

The answer to the problem would appear to relate primarily to the future role and functioning of the great industrial complex in the Ruhr. The United States believes that safeguards must be set up to insure that the resources and industrial potential of the Ruhr, particularly in respect to coal and steel, should not be left under the exclusive control of any future German Government but should be used for the benefit of the European community as a whole.

The charge has frequently been made that the United States in its policy has sought to give priority or intends to give priority to restoration of Germany ahead of those of the other countries of Europe. The truth is that far from having been accorded a preference over any Allied country, German recovery has lagged so far behind that of the other countries of Europe as to retard the whole effort for European recovery. At the present time industrial production in western Germany is less than one-half that of prewar. The food supplies are seriously below the minimum requirement for health and efficiency, and German foreign trade is only a small fraction of its former dimension. In fairness to the American taxpayer, who has been contributing hundreds of millions of dollars annually to support the people in the American zone, Germany must be made self-supporting as quickly as possible. With safeguards against any revival of German militarism and with measures to assure the utilization of the basic products of the Ruhr for the good of the European community as a whole, I believe that Europe and the world will be adequately protected against the danger of future German domination. In these circumstances it should be possible to proceed to the establishment of a provisional central authority in a federated German state and to the final framing of a peace settlement. We shall earnestly endeavor at the Conference in London to make progress along these lines.

CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS

Now I have tried to give you a picture of certain of our major international problems. These are not the only problems with which we are dealing. There are other areas of the world in which we face situations of immense complexity and gravity. But what I have told you this evening may give you a better idea of the character of our international problems as a whole and of our approach to them.

We are aware of the seriousness and extent of the campaign which is being directed against us as one of the bulwarks of Western civilization. We are not blind to any of the forms which this attack assumes. And we do not propose to stand by and watch the disintegration of the international community to which we belong.

But at the same time we are aware of our strength and of the fact that there is great need in many countries for our help and our friendship; we can afford to discount the alarms and excursions intended to distract us, and to proceed with calm determination along the path which our traditions have defined.

I will approach this Conference in London with an open mind and will seek only for a sound basis for agreement. I will seek to avoid statements for mere popular or propaganda effect, no matter what the provocation. It is my purpose to concentrate solely on finding an acceptable basis of agreement to terminate the present tragic stalemate and to speed the advent of a new era of peace and hope for Europe and the world.

XIX

Secretary Marshall's Report to the Nation

ON THE FAILURE OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE

DEC. 19, 1947

THE result of the recent meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London was disappointing. I realized that the many lengthy statements and the frequent and fundamental disagreements were very confusing to the general public.

Also, the continuous accusations against the good faith, the integrity and the purposes of the governments of the Western powers, particularly the United States, necessarily added greatly to the confusion. This was, as a matter of fact, one of the purposes of these attacks.

I anticipated great difficulty in reaching a comprehensive agreement, but I did have a hope that we might take three or four fundamental decisions which would permit immediate action by the four powers to alleviate the situation in Germany this winter and greatly improve the prospects for all of Europe. That we failed to reach any such agreements is the greatest disappointment.

The United States delegation went to London with an open mind, as I had stated we would in Chicago but we went with a strong determination to bring to an end the division of Germany which has existed since the German capitulation. We were also determined that any agreement reached at London should be a genuine workable agreement, and not one which would immediately involve obstruction and frustration in the Allied Control Council when it came to be put into effect in Germany.

I shall review only briefly the interminable discussions during the weeks of debate at London. To us it was but a dreary repetition of what had been said and re-said at the Moscow Conference. I shall endeavor, however, to point out the main issues on which the conference deadlocked and give you my estimate of the underlying reasons.

The basic issue, as we saw it before the opening of the London Conference, was whether or not the Allies could agree among themselves to reunite Germany.

The issue in regard to the Austrian treaty was even simpler and had already emerged clearly at the Moscow Conference.

Because the two main issues which I have outlined would be the controlling factors in our discussions, three of the delegations had agreed that the Austrian treaty should be considered first, and the economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany as an economic whole should come second. We felt that this order was logical and necessary if we were to debate with any prospect of success the remaining items on our agenda. The Soviet delegation held a different view and insisted that questions on the preparation of a German peace treaty should be given precedence over the questions regarding immediate economic unity for Germany.

In order to get the conference started, it was finally agreed to accept the Soviet request that the preparation of a German peace treaty should be item two on the agenda. As a result, with the exception of one day of discussion of Austria and the Austrian treaty, it was not until after ten days of meetings that the conference really reached the heart of the German question. These first ten meetings were devoted to futile and somewhat unreal discussion of the mechanisms for the preparation of an eventual German peace treaty before the question of whether or not there was to be a united Germany had even been considered. There was one question, however, of real substance during this phase of the discussion which had a direct application not only to a German peace treaty but also to the immediate situation in Germany. This was the question of the present and future frontiers of the German state. No serious consideration of a peace treaty could be undertaken without first considering what was to be the area of the future German state. Three delegations had already expressed their agreement that the area of the Saar should be separated from Germany and integrated into French economy. Mr. Molotov refused to commit his government on this point.

On this vital matter of frontiers, three delegations agreed to the establishment of a frontier commission or commissions to make an expert study of any proposed changes from the prewar frontiers. Mr. Molotov refused to agree. It was impossible for me to reconcile his urgent insistence upon the necessity of expediting the preparation for a German peace treaty with his categoric refusal to agree to the appointment of boundary commissions which three delegations considered to be an absolutely essential first step in any serious preparation for a future German peace settlement.

Many other questions concerning the actual preparation of any peace treaty were discussed without agreement.

It was during this stage of the debate that Mr. Molotov insisted that the four powers should agree upon the immediate establishment of a German central government. Although the United States had been, I believe the first of the four occupying countries to suggest at Moscow the desirability for the earliest possible establishment of a German provisional central government, it was obvious that until the division of Germany had been healed and conditions created for German political and economic unity, any central government would be a sham and not a reality. This view was shared by the other Western delegations but to Mr. Molotov it was completely unacceptable. This was the first clear evidence of his purpose to utilize the meeting as an opportunity for propaganda declarations which would be pleasant to German ears.

After several days of consideration by the deputies the Austrian treaty was again brought to the conference table on Dec. 4. The sole issue discussed was the determination of what were the true German assets in eastern Austria to which the Soviet Union was fully entitled by the Potsdam agreement. This had been the stumbling block in reaching final agreement on the treaty draft, and it was an issue which would determine whether or not Austria would be under such complete economic domination by the Soviet Union that it would be virtually a vassal state.

The French had endeavored to break the impasse by submitting a compromise proposal, but this was categorically refused by the Soviet delegate. In the last hour of the final session of the conference Mr. Molotov indicated an apparent willingness to accept a percentage reduction in the Soviet claims, without specifying the actual amount involved in his proposal. The matter was immediately referred to the deputies and I was informed just prior to my departure from England that the Soviet government would submit later a detailed proposition.

It was not until the tenth meeting that the conference finally came to the heart of the problem—to a consideration of the harsh realities of the existing situation in Germany.

Several more days were to elapse, however, before the council really came to grips with these realities. Discussions of procedure—of what document to discuss—again intervened to delay our work. However, on Monday, Dec. 8, the procedural issues were resolved and the council began the consideration of the fundamental issues which eventually led to the adjournment of the session without agreement.

I shall endeavor to indicate briefly what those issues were without reciting the involved and prolonged discussions over individual items.

The general issue was simple. It was whether or not Germany was to continue divided or whether the Allies could agree to recreate a unified Germany. Unless this could be achieved, all other questions relating to Germany would remain academic.

What then were the particular obstacles to the achievement of German economic and political unity?

The United States delegation considered that there were certain fundamental decisions which the four occupying powers should take if German unity was to be achieved. These were:

1. The elimination of the artificial zonal barriers to permit free movement of persons, ideas and goods throughout the whole territory of Germany.

2. The relinquishment by the occupying powers of ownership of properties in Germany seized under the guise of reparations without four-power agreement.

3. A currency reform involving the introduction of new and sound currency for all Germany.

4. A definite determination of the economic burdens which Germany would be called upon to bear in the future, that is, the costs of occupation, repayment of

sums advanced by the occupying powers and reparations.

5. An over-all export-import plan for all of Germany.

When these basic measures had been put into effect by the occupying powers, then the establishment under proper safeguards of a provisional government for all Germany should be undertaken.

Reparations soon emerged as a key issue. For the benefit of those not fully familiar with past negotiations on this subject I wish to explain that a definite agreement had been concluded two years ago at Potsdam that reparations payments would be made by the transfer of surplus capital assets, that is, factories, machinery, and assets abroad, and not by payments from time to time out of the daily output of German production. One reason for this decision was to avoid an issue that would continue through the years between Germany and the Allies and between the Allies themselves concerning her ability to pay and the actual value of payments which had been made in goods. Also, it was clearly evident that for many years Germany would be involved in a desperate struggle to build up sufficient foreign trade to pay for the food and other items on which she will be dependent from outside sources. The best example of this phase of the situation that I can give is the present necessity for Great Britain and the United States to pay out some 700 millions a year to provide the food and other items to prevent starvation and rather complete disintegration of that portion of Germany occupied by our forces.

In other words reparations from current production—that is, exports of day-to-day German production with no return—could be made only if the countries at present supplying Germany—notably the United States—foot the bill. We put in and the Russians take out. This economic truth, however, is only one aspect of Soviet reparation claims. In the eastern zone of Germany the Soviet Union has been taking reparations from current production and has also, under the guise of reparations, seized vast holdings and formed them into a gigantic trust embracing a substantial part of the industry of that zone. This has resulted in a type of monopolistic strangle hold over the economic and political life of eastern Germany which makes the region little more than a dependent province of the Soviet Union. A very strong reason, in my opinion, for our failure to agree at London was the Soviet determination not to relax in any way its hold on eastern Germany. Acceptance of their claims for reparations from current production from the western zones would extend that strangle hold over the future economic life of all Germany.

The Soviet position was nowhere more clearly indicated than by Mr Molotov's categoric refusal to furnish the Council of Foreign Ministers with information concerning the reparations already taken from the eastern zone or indeed any information at all concerning the situation there, until full agreements had been reached. In effect we were to tell them what has occurred in the western zones, which we had already done, and they tell us nothing. That refusal to provide information absolutely essential for decisions as to the organization of German unity would by itself have made any agreement impossible. A remarkable illustration of the Soviet position in this matter was their carping criticism of the economic procedure in our zones which are freely published for the world to read, while virtually in the same breath blandly refusing to provide any data at all concerning their zone.

It finally became clear that we could make no progress at this time—that there was no apparent will to reach a settlement but only an interest in making more and more speeches intended for another audience. So I suggested that we adjourn. No real ground was lost or gained at the meeting, except that the outlines of the problems and the obstacles are much clearer. We cannot look forward to a unified Germany at this time. We must do the best we can in the area where our influence can be felt.

All must recognize that the difficulties to be overcome are immense. The problems concerned with the treaty settlements for Italy and the satellite countries were simple by comparison since none of those countries were divided into zones of occupation and all of them had an existing form of government. Germany by contrast is sub-divided into four pieces—four zones. No trace of national government remains.

There is another and I think even more fundamental reason for the frustration we have encountered in our endeavor to reach a realistic agreement for a peace settlement. In the war struggle Europe was in a large measure shattered. As a result a political vacuum was created and until this vacuum has been filled by the restoration of a healthy European community, it does not appear possible that paper agreements can assure a lasting peace. Agreements between sovereign states are generally the reflection and not the cause of genuine settlements.

It is for this very reason, I think, that we encountered such complete opposition to almost every proposal the Western powers agreed upon. The Soviet Union has recognized the situation in its frank declaration of hostility and opposition to the European recovery program. The success of such a program would necessarily mean the establishment of a balance in which the sixteen Western nations, who have bound their hopes and efforts together, would be rehabilitated, strong in forms of government which guarantee true freedom, opportunity to the individual, and protection against the terror of governmental tyranny.

The issue is really clear-cut and I fear there can be no settlement until the coming months demonstrate whether or not the civilization of western Europe will prove vigorous enough to rise above the destructive effects of the war and restore a healthy society. Officials of the Soviet Union and leaders of the Communist parties openly predict that this restoration will not take place. We on the other hand are confident in the rehabilitation of western European civilization with its freedoms.

Now, until the result of this struggle becomes clearly apparent, there will continue to be a very real difficulty to resolve even on paper agreed terms for a treaty of peace. The situation must be stabilized. Western nations at the very least must be firmly established on a basis of government and freedoms that will preserve all that has been gained in the past centuries by these nations and all that their co-operation promises for the future.

XX

President Truman's Message to Congress

RECOMMENDING EUROPEAN RECOVERY PLAN

DEC. 19, 1947

To the Congress of the United States:

A principal concern of the people of the United States is the creation of conditions of enduring peace throughout the world. In company with other peace-loving nations, the United States is striving to insure that there will never be a World War III. In the words of the charter of the United States, we are "determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

We seek lasting peace in a world where freedom and justice are secure and where there is equal opportunity for the economic well-being of all peoples.

To this end, the United States played a leading role in the founding of the United Nations. We have supported that organization at all times to the best of our ability, and we have advanced a number of proposals for increasing its effectiveness in maintaining peace and security and in establishing the economic, social and moral foundations of peace.

We are working in the United Nations towards the elimination and control of armaments and, in a step without precedent or parallel, have offered to place our most powerful weapon under international control, provided that other nations agree to effective and enforceable safeguards against its use for destructive purposes.

The United States, in the conviction that a prerequisite to peace in the future is the just settlement of past differences, has labored to obtain fair and workable treaties of peace for former enemy states so that they may resume their places in the family of nations.

The United States has taken the lead in world-wide efforts to promote industrial and agricultural reconstruction and a revival of world commerce, for we know that enduring peace must be based upon increased production and an expanding flow of goods and materials among nations for the benefit of all.

Since the surrender of the Axis powers we have provided more than $15 billion in the forms of grants and loans for aid to victims of the war, to prevent starvation, disease and suffering; to aid in the restoration of transportation and communications and to assist in rebuilding war-devastated economies. This assistance has averted stark tragedy and has aided progress towards recovery in many areas of the world.

In these and many other ways the people of the United States have abundantly demonstrated their desire for world peace and the freedom and well-being of all nations.

We must now make a grave and significant decision relating to our further efforts to create the conditions of peace. We must decide whether or not we will complete the job of helping the free nations of Europe to recover from the devastation of the war. Our decision will determine in large part the future of the people of that continent. It will also determine in large part whether the free nations of the world can look forward with hope to a peaceful and prosperous future as independent states or whether they must live in poverty and in fear of selfish totalitarian aggression.

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN EUROPEAN RECOVERY

It is of vital importance to the United States that European recovery be continued to ultimate success. The American tradition of extending a helping hand to people in distress, our concern for the building of a healthy world economy which can make possible ever-increasing standards of living for our people and our overwhelming concern for the maintenance of a civilization of free men and free institutions, all combine to give us this great interest in European recovery.

The people of the United States have shown, by generous contributions since the end of hostilities, their great sympathy and concern for the many millions in Europe who underwent the trials of war and enemy occupation. Our sympathy is undiminished, but we know that we cannot give relief indefinitely, and so we seek practical measures which will eliminate Europe's need for further relief.

Considered in terms of our own economy, European recovery is essential. The last two decades have taught us the bitter lesson that no economy, not even one so strong as our own, can remain healthy and prosperous in a world of poverty and want.

In the past the flow of raw materials and manufactured products between western Europe, Latin America, Canada and the United States has integrated these areas in a great trading system. In the same manner Far Eastern exports to the United States have helped pay for the goods shipped from Europe to the Far East. Europe is thus an essential part of a world trading network. The failure to revive fully this vast trading system, which has begun to function again since the end of the war, would result in economic deterioration throughout the world. The United States, in common with other nations, would suffer.

Our deepest concern with European recovery, however, is that it is essential to the maintenance of the civilization in which the American way of life is rooted. It is the only assurance of the continued independence and integrity of a group of nations who constitute a bulwark for the principles of freedom, justice and the dignity of the individual.

The economic plight in which Europe now finds itself has intensified a political struggle between those who wish to remain free men living under the rule of law and those who would use economic distress as a pretext for the establishment of a totalitarian state.

The next few years can determine whether the free countries of Europe will be able to preserve their heritage of freedom. If Europe fails to recover, the peoples of these countries might be driven to the philosophy of despair—the philosophy which contends that their basic wants can be met only by the surrender of their basic rights to totalitarian control.

Such a turn of events would constitute a shattering blow to peace and stability in the world. It might well compel us to modify our own economic system and to forego, for the sake of our own security, the enjoyment of many of our freedoms and privileges.

It is for these reasons that the United States has so vital an interest in strengthening the belief of the people of Europe that freedom from fear and want will be achieved under free and democratic governments.

ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM

The end of the fighting in Europe left that continent physically devastated and its economy temporarily paralyzed. The immediate problem was to prevent widespread starvation and disease and to make a start toward economic recovery. In the first year and a half after V-E day, the people of western Europe, by their own diligent efforts and with the aid of the United States and other nations, made remarkable progress toward these objectives.

At the beginning of 1947, however, they were still short of the goal of economic recovery. Their difficulties were greatly increased during the present year, chiefly by a bitter winter followed by floods and droughts, which cut western Europe's grain crop to the lowest figure in generations and hampered production of many other products.

Nevertheless, it was clear by last spring that Europe had achieved sufficient political and economic stability to make possible an over-all plan for recovery.

European recovery is essentially a problem for the nations of Europe. It was therefore apparent that it could not be solved, even with outside aid, unless the European nations themselves would find a joint solution and accept joint responsibility for its execution. Such a co-operative plan would serve to release the full productive resources of Europe and provide a proper basis for measuring the need and effectiveness of further aid from outside Europe, and in particular from the United States.

These considerations led to the suggestion by the Secretary of State on June 5, 1947, that further help from the United States should be given only after the countries of Europe had agreed upon their basic requirements and the steps which they would take in order to give proper effect to additional aid from us.

In response to this suggestion, representatives of sixteen European nations assembled in Paris in July, at the invitation of the British and French governments, to draw up a co-operative program of European recovery. They formed a committee of European economic co-operation. The countries represented were: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Although western Germany was not formally represented on the committee, its requirements, as well as its ability to contribute to European economic recovery were considered by the committee.

THE RECOVERY PROGRAM PROPOSED BY THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The report of the European committee was transmitted to the government of the United States late in September. The report describes the present economic situation of Europe and the extent to which the participating countries can solve their problem by individual and joint efforts. After taking into account these recovery efforts, the report estimates the extent to which the sixteen countries will be unable to pay for the imports they must have.

The report points out that the peoples of western Europe depend for their support upon international trade. It has been possible for some 270,000,000 occupying this relatively small area, to enjoy a good standard of living only by manufacturing imported raw materials and exporting the finished products to the rest of the world. They must also import foodstuffs in large volume, for there is not enough farmland in western Europe to support its population, even with intensive cultivation and with favorable weather. They cannot produce adequate amounts of cotton, oil and other raw materials. Unless these deficiencies are met by imports, the productive centers of Europe can function only at low efficiency, if at all.

In the past these necessary imports were paid for by exports from Europe, by the performance of services such as shipping and banking, and by income from capital investments abroad. All these elements of international trade were so badly disrupted by the war that the people of western Europe have been unable to produce in their own countries, or to purchase elsewhere, the goods essential to their livelihood. Shortages of raw materials, productive capacity and exportable commodities have set up vicious circles of increasing

scarcities and lowered standards of living.

The economic recovery of western European countries depends on breaking through these vicious circles by increasing production to a point where exports and services can pay for the imports they must have to live. The basic problem in making Europe self-supporting is to increase European production.

The sixteen nations presented in their report a recovery program designed to enable them, and western Germany, to become economically self-supporting within a period of four years and thereafter to maintain a reasonable minimum standard of living for their people without special help from others. The program rests upon four basic points:

(1) A strong production effort by each of the participating countries.

(2) Creation of internal financial stability by each country.

(3) Maximum and continuing co-operation among the participating countries.

(4) A solution of the problem of the participating countries trading deficit with the American continents, particularly by increasing European exports.

The nations represented on the European committee agreed at Paris to do everything in their power to achieve these four aims. They agreed to take definite measures leading to financial, economic and monetary stability, the reduction of trade barriers, the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons within Europe and a joint effort to use their common resources to the best advantage.

These agreements are a source of great encouragement. When the representatives of sixteen sovereign nations, with diverse peoples, histories and institutions, jointly determine to achieve closer economic ties among themselves and to break away from the self-defeating actions of narrow nationalism, the obstacles in the way of recovery appear less formidable.

The report takes into account the productive capacities of the participating nations and their ability to obtain supplies from other parts of the world. It also takes into account the possibilities of obtaining funds through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, through private investment and, in some instances, by the sale of existing foreign assets. The participating countries recognized that some commodities, particularly food, will remain scarce for years to come, and the diet they have set as their goal for 1951 is less adequate in most cases than their pre-war diet. The report assumes that many countries will continue restrictions on the distribution of shortage items such as food, clothing and fuel.

When all these factors had been considered the European committee concluded that there will still be a requirement for large quantities of food, fuel, raw materials and capital equipment for which the financial resources of the participating countries will be inadequate.

With successful execution of the European recovery program, this requirement will diminish in each of the four years ahead, and the committee anticipated that by 1952 Europe could again meet its needs without special aid.

APPRAISAL OF THE EUROPEAN PROBLEM

The problem of economic recovery in Western Europe is basically of the character described in the report of the sixteen nations. A successful European recovery program will depend upon two essentials. The first is that each nation separately and all the nations together should take vigorous action to help themselves. The second essential is that sufficient outside aid should be made available to provide the margin of victory for the recovery program.

The necessary imports which the sixteen countries cannot finance without assistance constitute only a small proportion, in terms of value, of their total national production —some 5 per cent over the four years of the program. Those imports, however, are of crucial importance in generating recovery. They represent the difference between ever-deepening stagnation and progressive improvement.

Most of the necessary outside aid, if it is to come at all, must come from the United States. It is a simple fact that we are the only nation with sufficient economic strength to bridge the temporary gap between minimum European needs and war-diminished European resources.

We expect that other countries which have it within their power will also give what assistance they can to Europe. Canada, for example, has been lending assistance to Europe fully as great in proportion to its capacity as that which we have given. We also expect that international institutions, particularly the International Bank, will provide such assistance as they can within their charters. But the fact remains—only the United States can provide the bulk of the aid needed by Europe over the next four years.

It is necessarily a complex and difficult task to determine the extent and nature of this aid.

In some respects, the situation has changed significantly since the report of the sixteen countries was completed. Some of these changes have been unfavorable, including price increases in the United States and other countries where Europe makes purchases, a serious drought in Europe, and aggressive activities by Communists and Communist-inspired groups aimed directly at the prevention of European recovery.

There have also been favorable changes. In the last few months coal production in the Ruhr district of western Germany has increased from 230,000 tons a day to 290,000 tons a day. Similarly, coal production in the United Kingdom has risen markedly in recent weeks. Iron and steel production has correspondingly increased.

Such increases in production which lie at the heart of industrial recovery are of far-reaching importance.

Further changes in the situation, now unpredictable, are to be expected as European recovery progresses.

All our plans and actions must be founded on the fact that the situation we are dealing with is flexible and not fixed, and we must be prepared to make adjustments whenever necessary.

Weather conditions will largely determine whether agricultural goals can be met.

Political events in Europe and in the rest of the world cannot be accurately foreseen. We must not be blind to the fact that the Communists have announced determined opposition to any effort to help Europe get back on its feet. There will unquestionably be further incitements to strike, not for the purpose of redressing the legitimate grievances of particular groups, but for the purpose of bringing chaos in the hope that it will pave the way for totalitarian control.

On the other hand, if confidence and optimisim are reestablished soon, the spark they provide can kindle united efforts to a degree which would substantially accelerate the progress of European recovery.

Despite these many imponderables, the dimensions of the necessary assistance by the United States can now be determined within reasonable limits. We can evaluate the probable success of a bold concept of assistance to the European economy. We can determine the principles upon which American aid should be based. We can estimate the probable magnitude of the assistance required and judge whether we can, safely and wisely, provide that assistance.

Extensive consideration has been given to these problems. Congressional committees and individual members of the Congress have studied them at home and abroad during the recent Congressional recess. The report of the European nations has been carefully analayzed by officials of our government. Committees of the executive branch and a group of distinguished private citizens have given their best thought to the relationship between Europe's needs and our resources.

PROGRAM FOR UNITED STATES AID

In the light of all these factors, an integrated program for United States aid to European recovery has been prepared for submission to the Congress.

In developing this program, certain basic considerations have been kept in mind:

First, the program is designed to make genuine recovery possible within a definite period of time, and not merely to continue relief indefinitely.

Second, the program is designed to insure that the funds and goods which we furnish will be used most effectively for European recovery.

Third, the program is designed to minimize the financial cost to the United States, but at the same time to avoid imposing on the European countries crushing financial burdens which they could not carry in the long run.

Fourth, the program is designed with due regard for conserving the physical resources of the United States and minimizing the impact on our economy of furnishing aid to Europe.

Fifth, the program is designed to be consistent with other international relationships and responsibilities of the United States.

Sixth, the administration of the program is designed to carry out wisely and efficiently this great enterprise of our foreign policy.

I shall discuss each of these basic considerations in turn.

RECOVERY—NOT RELIEF

The program is designed to assist the participating European countries in obtaining imports essential to genuine economic recovery which they cannot finance from their own resources. It is based on the expectation that with this assistance European recovery can be substantially completed in about four years.

The aid which will be required from the United States for the first fifteen months, from April 1, 1948 to June 30, 1949, is now estimated at $6.8 billion.

These funds represent careful estimates of the cost of the goods and services which will be required during this period to start Europe on the road to genuine economic recovery. The European requirements as they were stated in the Paris report have been closely reviewed and scaled downward, where they appeared to include nonessentials or where limited supplies will prevent their full satisfaction.

The requirements of the remaining three years of the program are more difficult to estimate now, but they are expected to decrease year by year as progress is made toward recovery. Obviously, price changes, weather and crop conditions and other unpredictable factors will influence the overall cost of our aid. Nevertheless, the inherent nature of this enterprise and the long-range planning necessary to put it into effect on both sides of the Atlantic require that this government indicate its plans for the duration and the general magnitude of the program, without committing itself to specific amounts in future years. The best estimates we can now make indicate that appropriations of about $10.2 billion will be required for the last three years.

I recommend that legislation providing for United States aid in support of the European recovery program authorize the appropriation of $17 billion from April 1, 1948, to June 30, 1952. Appropriation for the period from April 1, 1948, to June 30, 1949, should be made in time for the program to be put into effect by April 1, 1948. Appropriations for the latter years should be considered subsequently by the Congress on an annual basis.

The funds we make available will enable the countries of Europe to purchase goods which will achieve two purposes—to lift the standard of living in Europe closer to a decent level, and at the same time to enlarge European capacity for production. Our funds will enable them to import grain for current consumption, and fertilizer and agricultural machinery to increase their food production. They will import fuel for current use, and mining machinery to increase their coal output. In addition, they will obtain raw materials, such as cotton, for current production, and some manufacturing and transportation equipment to increase their productive capacity.

The industrial goods we supply will be primarily to relieve critical shortages at a few strategic points which are now curtailing the great productive powers of Europe's industrial system.

The fundamental objective of further United States aid to European countries is to help them achieve economic self-support and to contribute their full share to a peaceful and prosperous world. Our aid must be adequate to this end. If we provide only half-heartedly and half-way help, our efforts will be dissipated and the chances for political economic stability in Europe are likely to be lost.

INSURING PROPER USE OF UNITED STATES AID

A second basic consideration with regard to this program is the means by which we can insure that our aid will be used to achieve its real purposes—that our goods and our dollars will contribute most effectively to European recovery. Appropriate agreements among the participating countries and with the United States are essential to this end.

At the Paris conference the European nations pledged themselves to take specific individual and co-operative actions to accomplish genuine recovery. While modification or amplification of these pledges may prove desirable, mutual understandings of this nature are essential. They will give unity of purpose and effective coordination to the endeavors of the peoples of the sixteen nations.

In addition, each of the countries receiving aid will be expected to enter into an agreement with the United States affirming the pledges which it has given to the other participating countries, and making additional commitments.

Under these agreements, each country would pledge itself to take the following actions, except where they are inapplicable to the country concerned:

(1) To promote increased industrial and agricultural production in order to enable the participating country to become independent of abnormal outside economic assistance.

(2) To take financial and monetary measures necessary to stabilize its currency, establish or maintain a proper rate of exchange, and generally to restore or maintain confidence in its monetary system.

(3) To co-operate with other participating countries to reduce barriers to trade among themselves and with other countries and to stimulate an increasing interchange of goods and services.

(4) To make efficient use, within the framework of a joint program for European recovery, of the resources of the participating country, and to take the necessary steps to assure efficient use in the interest of European economic recovery of all goods and services made available through United States aid.

(5) To stimulate the production of specified raw materials, as may be mutually agreed upon, and to facilitate the procurement of such raw materials by the United States for stockpiling purposes from the excess above the reasonable domestic usage and commercial port requirements of the source country.

(6) To deposit in a special account the local currency equivalent of aid furnished in the form of grants, to be used only in a manner mutually agreed between the two governments.

(7) To publish domestically and to furnish to the United States appropriate information concerning the use made of our aid and the progress made under the agreements with other participating countries and with the United States.

The United States will, of course, retain the right to determine whether aid to any country is to be continued if our previous assistance has not been used effectively.

FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

A third basic consideration in formulating the program of United States aid relates to the financial arrangements under which our aid is to be provided.

One of the problems in achieving the greatest benefit from United States aid is the extent to which funds should be made available in the form of grants as contrasted with loans. It is clear that we should require repayment to the extent that it is feasible and consistent with the objectives of the program, in order that no unnecessary burden be imposed upon the people of the United States.

It is equally clear that we should not require repayment where it would impose paralyzing financial obligations on the people of Europe and thus defeat the basic purpose of making Europe self-supporting.

Recovery for Europe will not be achieved until its people are able to pay for their necessary imports with foreign exchange obtained through the export of goods and services. If they were to have additional burdens to bear in the form of interest and amortization payments in future years, they would have to plan for an even higher level of exports to meet these obligations. This would necessarily increase the requirements of the recovery program, and delay the achievement of economic stability.

It is also important that an increasing portion of the financial needs of Europe be met by dollar loans from the International Bank and by the revival of private financing. This prospect would be seriously jeopardized if the United States, as part of the recovery program, were to impose all that the traffic will bear in the form of debt obligations.

I recommend that our aid should be extended partly in the form of grants and partly in the form of loans, depending primarily upon the capacity of each country to make repayments, and the effect of additional international debt upon the accomplishment of genuine recovery. No grants should be made to countries able to pay cash for all imports or to repay loans.

At a later date it may prove desirable to make available to some of the European

countries special loans to assist them in attaining monetary stability. I am not now requesting authorization for such loans, since it is not possible at this time to determine when or to what extent such loans should be made.

As economic conditions in Europe improve and political conditions become more stable, private financing can be expected to play an increasingly important role. The recommended program of United States aid includes provisions to encourage private financing and investments.

IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY

A fourth basic consideration is the effect of further aid for Europe upon the physical resources of the United States and upon our economy.

The essential import requirements of the 270 million people of western Europe cover a wide range of products. Many of these requirements can be met by the United States and other countries without substantial difficulty. However, a number of the commodities which are most essential to European recovery are the same commodities for which there is an unsatisfied demand in the United States.

Sharing these commodities with the people of Europe will require some self-denial by the people of the United States. I believe that our people recognize the vital importance of our aid program and are prepared to share their goods to insure its success.

While the burden of our people should not be ignored or minimized, neither should it be exaggerated. The program of aid to Europe which I am recommending is well within our capacity to undertake.

Its total cost, though large, will be only about 5 per cent of the cost of our effort in the recent war. It will cost less than 3 per cent of our national income during the life of the program.

As an investment toward the peace and security of the world and toward the realization of hope and confidence in a better way of life for the future, this cost is small, indeed.

A committee under the chairmanship of the Secretary of the Interior was appointed last summer to study the effect of a foreign-aid program upon the natural resources of our country. Its study has shown that our resources can safely meet the demands of a program such as I am now recommending. Such demands could not, however, be supplied indefinitely. Our program of aid to Europe recognizes this fact.

Our exports to Europe will decrease during the succeeding years of the program as trade is revived along realistic patterns which will make available from other sources an increasing share of Europe's requirements.

Actually, our position with respect to some raw materials of which we have inadequate domestic resources will be improved, since, under our program of aid to Europe, an increased amount of these materials will be made available to us.

During recent months the Council of Economic Advisers made an intensive study of the impact of foreign aid on our domestic economy.

The council concluded that a program of the size now contemplated is well within our productive capacity and need not produce a dangerous strain on our economy.

At the same time, a group of distinguished private citizens under the chairmanship of the Secretary of Commerce considered the extent and nature of foreign aid which the United States can and should provide. The conclusion of this group was that a program of the scope I am recommending is a proper, wise and necessary use of United States resources.

The reports submitted to me by the Council of Economic Advisers and the committees under the chairmanship of the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Commerce all emphasized that specific measures should be taken to prevent our foreign aid program from imposing unnecessary burdens on our economy.

If the United States were to supply from its own production all the essential commodities needed to meet European requirements, unnecessary scarcities and unnecessary inflationary pressures would be created within our economy. It is far wiser to assist in financing the procurement of certain of these commodities from other countries, particularly the other food-producing countries in the Western Hemisphere. The funds we make available to aid European recovery therefore should not be restricted to purchases within the United States.

Under the proposed program of aid to Europe, the total exports to the whole world from this country during the next year are expected to be no greater than our total exports during the past twelve months.

This level of exports will nevertheless have an important impact on our markets. The measures I have already proposed to the Congress to fight general domestic inflation will be useful, as well, in cushioning the impact of the European aid program.

The effect of aid to Europe upon our economy, as well as its financial cost, will be significantly affected by the arrangements we make for meeting shipping requirements.

The interest of the United States will be served best by permitting the sale or temporary transfer of some of our warbuilt merchant ships to the European countries. Because of world steel shortages, the sale or temporary transfer of ships should be linked with a reduction or deferment of the projected shipbuilding schedules of the participating countries. These arrangements should be consistent with their long-range merchant marine requirements. They should also be consistent with our long-range objectives of maintaining an adequate merchant marine and shipbuilding industry for the United States.

Making these vessels available to the European countries will materially reduce the cost of United States aid both by lowering shipping costs and by reducing the use of scarce materials for new ship construction overseas.

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS

A fifth basic consideration is the relationship of our aid to the European recovery program to other international questions.

I have already mentioned that the requirements and resources of western Germany were included in the considerations of the sixteen countries at Paris. Our program of United States aid also includes western Germany.

The productive capacity of the highly industrialized areas of western Germany can contribute substantially to the general co-operative effort required for European recovery. It is essential that this productive capacity be effectively utilized, and it is especially important that the coal production of the Ruhr continue to increase rapidly.

Every precaution must, of course, be taken against a resurgence of military power in Germany. The United States has made clear on many occasions its determination that Germany shall never again threaten to dominate Europe or endanger the peace of the world. The inclusion of western Germany in the European recovery program will not weaken this determination.

As an occupying power in western Germany, the United States has a responsibility to provide minimum essentials necessary to prevent disease and unrest. Separate appropriations will be requested for this purpose for the period through June 30, 1949.

Above this minimum level, amounts needed to assist in the rehabilitation of western Germany are included in the overall estimates for aid to European recovery.

Another significant area of the world which has been considered in developing the recovery program is eastern Europe. A number of the governments of eastern Europe which were invited to participate in the work of the Paris conference on economic co-operation chose not to do so. Their failure to join in the concerted effort for recovery makes this effort more difficult and will undoubtedly prolong their own economic difficulties.

This should not, however, prevent the restoration of trade between eastern and western Europe to the mutual advantage of both areas. Both the report of the sixteen nations and the program now submitted to the Congress are based on the belief that over the next few years the normal pattern of trade between eastern and western Europe will be gradually restored. As the restoration of trade is achieved, the abnormal demands on the Western Hemisphere, particularly for food and fuel, should diminish.

The relationship between this program and the United Nations deserves special emphasis because of the central importance in our foreign policy of support of the United Nations. Our support of European recovery is in full accord with our support of the United Nations.

The success of the United Nations depends upon the independent strength of its members and their determination and

ability to adhere to the ideals and principles embodied in the Charter. The purposes of the European recovery program are in complete harmony with the purposes of the Charter—to insure a peaceful world through the joint efforts of free nations. Attempts by any nation to prevent or sabotage European recovery for selfish ends are clearly contrary to these purposes.

It is not feasible to carry out the recovery program exclusively through the United Nations. Five of the participating countries are not yet members of the United Nations. Furthermore, some European members are not participating in the program.

We expect, however, that the greatest practicable use will be made of the facilities of the United Nations and its related agencies in the execution of the program. This view is shared by all the participating countries.

Our intention to undertake a program of aid for European recovery does not signify any lessening of our interest in other areas of the world. Instead, it is the means by which we can make the quickest and most effective contribution to the general improvement of economic conditions throughout the world. The workshops of Europe, with their great reservoir of skilled workers, must produce the goods to support peoples of many other nations.

I wish to make especially clear that our concentration on the task in western Europe at this time will not lessen our long-established interest in economic co-operation with our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. We are first of all a member of an American community of nations, in which co-operative action, similar to that which the European nations are now undertaking, is required to increase production, to promote financial stability, and to remove barriers to trade.

Fortunately, we in the Americas are further advanced along this road, but we must not overlook any opportunity to make additional progress. The European recovery program will require procurement of supplies in many nations of this hemisphere. This will act as a stimulant to production and business activity and promote the reestablishment of world trade upon which the prosperity of all of us depends.

While our present efforts must be devoted primarily to western Europe, as the most important area in the world at this time for the future of peace, we also have a special concern for the war-torn areas of Asia. In Japan and Korea, the United States has supplied extensive aid to support life and commence reconstruction. Since the war's end, we have provided China with varied and important assistance which has aided that nation substantially.

The United States should continue to do all it appropriately can to assist in the restoration of economic stability as a basis for recovery in the Far East. Extensive study has been given during the last few months to the means by which we might best aid in meeting the special needs for relief and rehabilitation in China. I expect to make recommendations on that subject to the Congress during its next session.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

I have set forth several basic considerations which should govern our aid to the recovery of Europe. One further consideration which vitally affects all the others is the necessity for effective administrative arrangements adapted to the particular requirements of the program. If the work to be done is not well organized and managed, the benefits of our aid could be largely dissipated.

The administration of our aid will involve the performance of several major functions. The needs of the participating countries must be reviewed in close co-operation with them. Continued relationships must be maintained with the United Nations and with an organization of the participating nations.

The requirements for each commodity or service under the program must be carefully evaluated in relation to United States supplies and domestic needs and to the resources of other nations which can help. Decisions must be reached as to the best means of supplying aid and the conditions of aid for each country. Assistance must be given to facilitate the procurement, transportation and efficient use of goods. A constant review must be maintained over the use of our aid and the execution of agreements. The results of the program must be evaluated and reported to all concerned—the President, the Congress and the people.

While these activities are complex, they are not comparable in magnitude or in character to our war-time supply activities. Under this program, most of the operations can be carried out through private channels and existing government agencies.

Nevertheless, the scope and importance of the program warrant the creation of a new organization to provide central direction and leadership. I therefore recommend the establishment of a new and separate agency, the Economic Co-operation Administration, for this purpose. It should be headed by an administrator, appointed by the President and directly responsible to him. The administrator should be subject to confirmation by the Senate.

The Economic Co-operation Administration will sponsor the European aid requirements as they are reviewed and adjusted, with other governmental agencies, to form a practical program in the light of available supplies and capacities. The Economic Co-operation Administration will be responsible for initiating the approved program project by project and nation by nation and for regulations as to supervision, co-operative assistance and other policy matters which will guide the program at every point. In keeping with the importance and nature of its task, the new agency should have flexibility in the determination of operating methods, the use of funds and the hiring of key personnel.

The relationship of the Economic Co-operation Administration to the existing governmental establishment is of crucial importance. In the determination of programs for the several countries, the assessment of individual projects and many other matters involving our activities abroad, the Economic Co-operation Administration must work closely with the Department of State. Similarly, on many actions affecting our domestic economy, the Administration must work with, rather than supplant, existing agencies.

For example, the Department of Agriculture should be relied upon for any required government action in the procurement and allocation of certain other commodities in short supply, and for continued administration of export controls. The facilities of these agencies will in some cases need to be strengthened, but no major changes in governmental organization to perform important domestic functions will be required.

Under these circumstances, I expect that the Economic Co-operation Administration will need only a small staff. No vast new agency or corporation is needed to perform functions for which government facilities now exist.

It is essential to realize that this program is much more than a commercial operation. It represents a major segment of our foreign policy. Day in and day out its operations will affect and be affected by foreign policy judgments. We shall be dealing with a number of countries in which there are complex and widely varying economic and political situations. This program will affect our relationships with them in matters far beyond the outline of the program itself. Its administration must therefore be fully responsive to our foreign policy. The administrator must be subject to the direction of the Secretary of State on decisions and actions affecting our foreign policy.

The United States activities in Europe under the program will constitute essentially an extension of our present relationships with the participating countries. In order to maintain unity of United States representation abroad, our ambassador in each country must retain responsibility for all matters requiring contracts with the government to which he is accredited, including operations under this program. Some additional personnel technically qualified to perform specialized functions arising out of the program, should be placed in the embassies to represent and carry out the responsibilties of the Economic Co-operation Administration abroad.

In addition, I recommend that provision be made for a special United States representative for the European recovery program. He would represent the United States at any continuing organization of the participating countries, and he would exercise general co-ordination of our operations in Europe under the program. He should be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Senate, and have ambassadorial rank. Because of the joint interest of the Secretary of State and the administrator in his activities, the special representative must serve both as the President may direct. The activities of this representative in promoting mutual self-help among the European nations will be of the utmost importance in achieving the success of the European recovery program.

BASIS FOR TRUMAN AID REQUEST

This step-by-step table shows how President Truman arrived at $17,000,000,000 as the estimated United States outlay under the Marshall plan for European recovery. Where two figures are shown, the lower figure represents the cost if prices drop, the higher figure represents the sum if prices hold at about present levels:

1. Deficit of the sixteen European nations and Germany with the entire Western Hemisphere	$19,400,000,000 to $22,100,000,000
2. Add Deficit of combined United States and British occupation zones of Germany in trade with other European countries	+$600,000,000
3. Total cost	$20,000,000,000 to $22,700,000,000
4. Subtract: Financing provided by International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, private loans, unspent credits, aid from other Western Hemisphere countries, etc.	−$4,100,000,000
5. Total needed from United States Treasury	$15,900,000,000 to $18,600,000,000
6. Subtract: Separate appropriation being asked by the Army to combat "disease and unrest" in Germany through June, 1949	−$800,000,000
7. Total needs for Marshall plan	$15,100,000,000 to $17,800,000,000
8. Authorization asked of Congress	$17,000,000,000

The administrative arrangements I have described are in keeping with the character of the job to be done and will provide the most efficient and economical means for its performance.

CONCLUSION

In proposing that the Congress enact a program of aid to Europe, I am proposing that this nation contribute to world peace and to its own security by assisting in the recovery of sixteen countries which, like the United States, are devoted to the preservation of free institutions and enduring peace among nations.

It is my belief that United States support of the European recovery program will enable the free nations of Europe to devote their great energies to the reconstruction of their economies. On this depend the restoration of a decent standard of living for their peoples, the development of a sound world economy, and continued support for the ideals of individual liberty and justice.

In providing aid to Europe we must share more than goods and funds. We must give our moral support to those nations in their struggle to rekindle the fires of hope and strengthen the will of their peoples to overcome their adversities. We must develop a feeling of teamwork in our common cause of combating the suspicions, prejudices and fabrications which undermine co-operative effort, both at home and abroad.

This joint undertaking of the United States and a group of European nations, in devotion to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, is proof that free men can effectively join together to defend their free institutions against totalitarian pressures, and to promote better standards of life for all their peoples.

I have been heartened by the widespread support which the citizens of the United States have given to the concept underlying the proposed aid to European recovery. Workers, farmers, business men and other major groups have all given evidence of their confidence in its noble purpose and have shown their willingness to give it full support.

I know that the members of Congress have already given much thoughtful consideration to the grave issues now before us. I know what the Congress will, as it should, consider with great care the legislation necessary to put the program into effect. This consideration should proceed as rapidly as possible in order that the program may become effective by April 1, 1948. It is for this reason that I am presenting my recommendations to the Congress now, rather than awaiting its reconvening in January.

I recommend this program of United States support for European recovery to the Congress in full confidence of its wisdom and necessity as a major step in our nation's quest for a just and lasting peace.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

The White House, Dec. 19, 1947.

XXI

A Constitution for World Trade

Summary of the Geneva draft of a charter for an International Trade Organization

THE countries of the United Nations will meet in a conference on World Trade and Employment at Habana, Cuba, on November 21, 1947, to perfect and recommend to their governments a charter for an International Trade Organization. On this occasion the Economic and Social Council will submit to the Conference for its consideration the draft of a charter completed at Geneva in August by a Preparatory Committee of 17 countries. The results of the Geneva meeting, which include the signing of the general agreement on tariffs and trade, are of historic significance. They represent the greatest step ever taken toward the establishment, by mutual agreement between governments, of the rules which nations will follow in their conduct of world trade and commerce. The essentials of the Geneva draft charter are here summarized to acquaint the American people with this project which was originally proposed by the United States in December 1945.

1. TARIFFS AND PREFERENCES

Members of the ITO must carry out negotiations directed toward the substantial reduction of tariffs. But if, through unforeseen developments, a particular reduction should increase imports so sharply as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers, a member may suspend its operation in whole or in part.

Reductions in tariffs will operate to reduce or eliminate margins of preference. Aside from the preferences that may survive negotiation, each member must grant every other member equal treatment for its trade. No new preferences can be created. No existing preferences can be increased. An exception is made, however, for new preferential arrangements which are incidental to the establishment of a customs union.

2. INVISIBLE TARIFFS

Members must not nullify tariff cuts by employing restrictive methods of customs administration, by imposing discriminatory internal taxes or regulations, or by resorting to other hidden forms of protection. In the case of motion pictures the only restriction allowed is a requirement that a certain fraction of screen time must be devoted to the exhibition of domestic films. Such quotas are made negotiable and may thus be reduced through international agreement. Remaining screen time may not be allocated among foreign films but must be kept open to free competition.

3. QUOTA SYSTEMS

As a general rule quantitative limitations on exports and imports are forbidden. But this rule is qualified by a number of necessary exceptions. Quotas may be used until 1951 in distributing products in short supply, in maintaining price controls, and in liquidating government surpluses and war industries. They may be used temporarily to relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs and other essential goods. They may be used permanently to enforce standards for the classification and grading of commodities. Import quotas on agricultural and fisheries products may also be employed to supplement domestic production and marketing controls and surplus disposal programs if such quotas do not reduce the share of imports in the domestic market.

More important is a final exception which permits a member to employ import quotas to the extent necessary to forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop, a serious decline in its monetary reserves or, in the case of a member with very low monetary reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its reserves. Under this provision a member can select imports on the ground of essentiality. But it cannot completely exclude any class of goods. It must avoid unnecessary damage to the interests of other members. It must seek to restore equilibrium in its balance of payments on a sound and lasting basis and to assure an economic employment of pro-

ductive resources. It must consult with the ITO concerning the effect of its restrictions on other countries, the causes of its monetary difficulties, and the ways in which they may be overcome. It must relax its quotas as its monetary position improves and eliminate them entirely when its difficulties disappear.

Any member may complain that another has failed to satisfy these conditions. If the ITO finds that the complaint is justified, it must recommend that the restrictions in question be withdrawn or modified. If the offending member does not comply with its recommendation, the ITO may then authorize other members to impose higher tariffs, quotas, or other restrictions on its trade. In all of its decisions in such cases the ITO must accept as conclusive the determinations of the International Monetary Fund as to the financial questions that are involved.

Where quotas are permitted they must be administered without discrimination. But there are also necessary exceptions to this rule. In the main these exceptions are designed to make the provisions of the charter consistent with the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. The most important of them permits a member to discriminate in using quotas if it can thereby increase its total imports and safeguard its monetary reserves. But, in doing so, the member must satisfy strict criteria and, after March 1952, it must also obtain the prior approval of the ITO. The ITO may, at any time, order a member to discontinue discriminations that are inconsistent with these provisions and, whenever it finds that there is no longer a wide-spread disequilibrium in international trade, may completely suspend the operation of this exception to the general rule.

4. EXCHANGE CONTROLS

Since quantitative restrictions and exchange controls may be employed alternatively to affect the flow of trade, it is important that the rules that govern these two devices be laid down and administered with such consistency that it will be impossible, by resorting to one of them, to escape from the rules that govern the other. Accordingly, the charter provides that members shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the charter nor, by trade action, the intent of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Members of the ITO who do not belong to the fund are required to join it or, failing this, to enter into a special exchange agreement with the ITO. Any such agreement would be established and administered in collaboration with the Fund.

5. STATE TRADING

The rules that regulate state trading enterprises parallel those that govern public control of private trade. A member maintaining a state monopoly must declare the margin that it will add when it sells an imported product in its domestic market. It must negotiate with respect to the height of this margin in the same way in which members negotiate with respect to tariffs. It must satisfy the full domestic demand at the resulting price, imposing no other limit on the quantity it buys. It must act in a manner that is consistent with the general principle of most-favored-nation treatment, buying and selling on the basis of commercial considerations and affording the enterprises of other members adequate opportunity, in accordance with customary business practice, to compete for participation in its purchases and sales.

6. SUBSIDIES

If a member pays any subsidy that increases exports or reduces imports, it must inform the ITO and must be prepared to discuss the possibility of limiting the subsidy at the request of any member who may be harmed. Direct subsidization of exports is forbidden, after two years, unless it is incidental to a stabilization plan that maintains domestic prices at a level that is sometimes above and sometimes below the level of prices in world markets, or unless it is permitted under an intergovernmental commodity agreement, or unless it is authorized by the ITO.

7. RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES

Every member agrees to take all possible measures, by legislation or otherwise, to ensure, within its jurisdiction, that commercial enterprises, whether private or public, do not engage in practices which restrain competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic control in international trade, whenever such practices interfere with the expansion of production or trade or the achievement of any other objective of the charter. Upon complaint by a member the ITO will make an investigation, hold hearings, and, if it finds that the practices in question have such an effect, will request the members concerned to take every possible remedial action and may recommend remedial measures to be carried out in accordance with their respective laws and procedures.

8. COMMODITY AGREEMENTS

Members agree substantially to limit their present freedom to enter into intergovernmental commodity agreements. Such agreements will be confined, in general, to primary commodities. They must be open to participation on equal terms by any member of the ITO. And they must be accompanied at every stage by full publicity. Agreements which regulate production, exports, imports, or prices are confined, moreover, to commodities produced under strictly specified conditions and to periods of burdensome surplus and wide-spread distress. They must be limited in duration and subject to periodic review. They must afford consuming countries and producing countries an equal voice. They must assure the availability of adequate supplies. They must provide increasing opportunities for satisfying world requirements from economic sources. And each country participating in such an agreement must adopt a program of economic adjustment designed to make a continuation of the agreement unnecessary. These rules do not prohibit commodity agreements; they do not promote them. They are designed to safeguard the interests of consumers, to force adjustment to changing conditions, and to facilitate the early restoration of free markets.

9. EMPLOYMENT

Each member agrees to take action designed to achieve and maintain full and productive employment and large and steadily growing demand within its own territory through measures appropriate to its political, economic, and social institutions. The nature of the action to be taken by any member is for it alone to choose. No member is asked to guarantee that its efforts will succeed; the commitment is simply that such efforts will be made. This commitment was taken by the Congress of the United States when it passed the Employment Act of 1946. And full employment, as the term is used in the charter, is defined in the words of that law.

Certain countries have been reluctant to enter into a freer trading system because they fear that such a system would make it more difficult for them to maintain their domestic employment programs. This might happen, for instance, if there were a persistent maladjustment in which one or more countries bought too little abroad and invested too little abroad in relation to their exports while others produced and sold too little abroad to balance their accounts. In such a situation the charter provides that all of the members concerned shall take action designed to correct the maladjustment. But the particular measures that are to be adopted by any member are for it alone to decide.

Adherence to liberal commercial policies would also be rendered difficult if a major trading country were to fall into a depression which would involve a serious or abrupt decline in its demand for imported goods. In this case, as in others, a member may ask to be relieved of certain obligations that it has assumed under the charter on the ground that the benefits accruing to it have been nullified or impaired. And the ITO, in considering this complaint, is directed to have regard to the need of members to take action to safeguard their economies against deflationary pressure.

10. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Each member agrees to develop the resources of its own territory, to raise standards of productivity, and to cooperate with others, through international agencies, in promoting general economic development. Members exporting facilities required for development agree to impose no unreasonable impediments to their exportation, and members importing them agree to take no unreasonable action injurious to the interests of those who provide them. Upon request the ITO may advise any member concerning its plans and programs for development and aid the member in obtaining technical advice and assistance.

Each of the less developed countries will make its own decisions as to the industries it wishes to promote. Where public assistance is required, it will be free to subsidize new industries. And where it has not included a commodity in a trade agreement, it will be free to impose new tariffs or raise existing ones. But in those cases in which a member desires to use some method of protection that it has promised not to use, that is, where it wishes to impose an import quota or to change the tariff status of a commodity to which the provisions of a trade agreement may apply, it must first obtain the permission of the ITO. In such cases ITO will consult with those members whose trade would be affected and, with their agreement, may grant the developing country a limited release from the obligations that it had previously assumed. The charter thus establishes a new principle in international affairs: that import quotas are not to be employed, without international sanction, for the development of infant industries.

11. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT

The ITO has, among its purposes, encouragement of the international flow of capital for productive investment, and it is authorized to promote the elaboration and adoption of a general agreement or statement of principles as to the conduct, practices, and treatment of foreign investment. Members agree, subject to certain safeguards, to provide the widest opportunities for investment and the greatest security for existing and future investments. A member may exclude new investments from any or all sources. It may continue discriminatory measures already in effect. But in adopting future measures, it must treat one member as well as it treats another and foreign investors as well as it treats its own. It must not so change its rules as to discriminate against any investment once the investment has been made. If a member requires a transfer of ownership from foreign nationals to its own nationals, it must provide for the payment of just consideration. If it takes into public ownership the property of a foreign national, it must make just compensation. More definite provisions on the adequacy, promptness, and transferability of payment should be included in the future investment code. The present draft is to be regarded not as the final expression of international agreement on the treatment of private investment but as a foundation on which such agreement can be built.

12. STRUCTURE OF THE ITO

The ITO will have, as the basis of its organization, a conference of member states. Continuing administration of its affairs will be in the hands of an executive board of 15 to 18 members, a director general, and a staff. Certain functions will be delegated to a tariff committee, composed of member states who have already carried out negotiations for the reduction of barriers to trade, and to a small number of specialized commissions composed of technical experts. In financing the operation of the agency, no member can be required to contribute more than a third of the total cost.

The method of voting in the conference remains to be determined. The present draft of the charter presents four alternatives: unit voting, light-weighted voting, heavy-weighted voting, and a compromise proposal under which decisions on certain issues would require majorities in both a unit vote and a weighted vote. The composition of the executive board is likewise unsettled. But any one of the alternatives presented in the present draft would assure a permanent seat to the United States.

13. FUNCTIONS OF THE ITO

It will be the function of the ITO, through consultation among its members, to carry out the substantive provisions of the charter. In addition to this the agency will serve as an international center for information on matters affecting trade and as a source of advice and assistance to member governments. It will undertake to improve trade statistics. It will collect, analyze and publish data on exports, imports, balances of payments, prices, subsidies, customs regulations, and national commercial policies; on treaties and other agreements affecting trade; on conventions, laws, and procedures relating to restrictive business practices; on commodity problems and the operation of commodity agreements. It will develop and recommend standards for the grading of commodities, for commercial terms, for documentation, for tariff valuation, and for the simplification of procedures that act as obstacles to trade. It may draft modern international conventions and standard provisions for commercial treaties and recommend the conclusion of new agreements or the modification or termination of old agreements on commercial policy, restrictive business practices, commodities, economic development, and international investment.

14. DISPUTES AND ENFORCEMENT

The executive board of the ITO will interpret the provisions of the charter, handing down rulings in the case of a dispute or, with the consent of the parties concerned, referring it to arbitration upon such terms as may be agreed. Members may appeal the rulings of the board to the conference and, on legal questions, may require the conference to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice.

If the ITO determines, upon complaint, that a member has not lived up to its obligations under the charter, it may release the complaining member or members from corresponding obligations so that the balance of interest between the parties to the dispute may be restored. The offending member may thus be faced with higher tariffs, quotas, or other restrictions on its trade. This prospective loss of benefits should serve as a powerful deterrent to noncompliance. But the ITO will have the power to place such limits on retaliation that it cannot degenerate into economic war.

15. RELATIONS WITH NONMEMBERS

The rules that are to govern the relations between members and nonmembers of the ITO are still to be determined. The present draft contains three alternatives. The first of these permits a member having heavy trade with nonmembers to suspend the application of any provision of the charter, requires it thereupon to afford other members an opportunity for consultation, and permits it, in the absence of agreement, to withdraw from the Organization. The other two alternatives forbid members to extend to nonmembers the benefits provided under the charter, unless specifically permitted to do so by the ITO. It is the purpose of the latter provisions to make membership attractive and nonmembership unattractive by confining the benefits of the charter to countries that are willing to accept its obligations.

The broad promise of this charter for our times is clear. We need no longer accept the choice of economic anarchy, on the one hand, or the creation, on the other hand, of a super state to enforce the directives of "economic planning" on a world scale. The 17 countries which met at Geneva conduct three quarters of the world's trade; they have outlined and reached general agreement on a concrete and realistic alternative; and they have done this by the democratic method of free discussion and mutual consideration of common problems. At the Habana conference, their conclusions will be put before a wider international forum to perfect an instrument which all peace-loving nations can in due course adopt as their constitution for world trade.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JAMES P. WARBURG entered public life in 1933 as a member of President Roosevelt's "Original Brain Trust" and as Financial Adviser of the United States Delegation to the world Economic Conference at London. After graduating from Harvard, he served in World War I as a lieutenant (j.g.) in the U. S. Naval Flying Corps and then engaged in banking—in Washington and Boston banks—and, finally, became Vice Chairman of the Bank of the Manhattan Company. President Roosevelt drew on this financial experience when he made Mr. Warburg one of his unofficial advisers.

During World War II Mr. Warburg was a deputy director of O. W. I., in charge of psychological warfare policy in the European Theater. Since then he has traveled, as newspaper correspondent and free lance writer, through western and central Europe, on both sides of the "iron curtain," and in all zones of occupied Germany. In 1947 he was United States delegate at the Far East Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Warburg's home is in New York. *Put Yourself in Marshall's Place* is his fifteenth book. Except for three books of verse, his previous work has dealt with economic and foreign affairs.

Put Yourself in Marshall's Place

by JAMES P. WARBURG

THIS BOOK presents the problems General Marshall inherited when he became Secretary of State, what he has done about them in his first year in office, and what he is trying to do now. It enables the reader to share his burden, to help him find the difficult road to peace. Thus it becomes a primer for American citizens on the world crisis, and provides a constructive suggestion for a new approach. It gives the average puzzled citizen a telescoped factual background to the over-all international situation, especially with respect to US-USSR relations. It re-examines the current fears and prejudices which today influence policy directly or indirectly. Anyone who reads this book cannot fail to feel a sense of personal responsibility for the decisions which will be made one way or another in the next few months; and a realization that the average citizen is *not* powerless to do something about these decisions.

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R E V I E W C O P Y

PUT YOURSELF IN MARSHALL'S PLACE

by

James P. Warburg

For Immediate Release

June 22, 1960

Dear Mr. Welch:

I enclose a copy of Mr. Murrow's reaction to Dr. Adler's request.

Mr. Murrow further states that it "pleasures him greatly" to be asked to join with Mr. Welch in any undertaking, but Mr. Murrow cannot endorse books without being obliged to endorse cigarettes, or drinking liquor, or some other product deleterious to human welfare.

Both Mr. and Mrs. Murrow cherish the hope that they may see Mr. and Mrs. Welch again after Mr. Murrow returns from the political conventions.

As ever yours,

Mr. Joseph N. Welch
Box 215
Harwichport, Massachusetts

FF:gw
encl

August 25, 1959

Dear Mr. Welch:

Your very nice note arrived just before Mr. Murrow left for Sweden. He asked me to tell you that he and Mrs. Murrow will be in London about October 1st. They will be staying at the Connaught and hope very much that there will be an opportunity to see you and Mrs. Welch.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Joseph N. Welch
Box 215
Harwichport, Massachusetts

gw

JOSEPH N. WELCH
BOX 215
HARWICHPORT, MASSACHUSETTS

Dear Mr Murrow

Gosh,, how we would have loved seeing you.

We too are about to go abroad for 3 weeks or so. Mr Preminger has invited us to attend premieres of "Anatomy" in Paris, London, West Berlin & perhaps Milan.

London opening is (I think Oct 1,):

Just a faint hope on my part. We might see you

Much luck Joe Welch

Joseph Welch

August 11, 1959

Dear Mr. Welch:

The thought that I shall probably leave this country without seeing you again distresses me. We are sailing on August 25 and I would propose myself for a brief visit to you and Mrs. Welch if that were physically possible, but it isn't. The pressure of last-minute arrangements is, as usual, too great to permit my doing what I would like to do. If the opportunity affords, and I am sure it will, I will send you an occasional epistle during the year. Meanwhile, please accept my affectionate regards.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Joseph N. Welch
Box 215
Harwichport, Mass.

Dear Mr Murrow

There is no nicer pair of words than "my friend" especially when used by you in speaking of me.

On Tuesday I shall see Miss Renwick and thank her too. She is indeed a sweet and lovely person. and with great talent as well.

You are much in my thoughts as you begin the rest of your 2 here long wished you might have. I can even remember saying you should do it and discounting your answer that you really might

You have a truly great place in the world. And you have very great responsibilities. a pause and a gathering of strength is surely indicated

My only fear is that you will make too many compromises and end by doing too much work

I hope not

Sincerely
Joe Welch

Welch

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BLAIR L. PERRY
JEFFREY O'CONNELL

JOHN M. MAGUIRE, COUNSEL

60 STATE STREET, BOSTON 9

June 25, 1959

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
CBS-TV
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Yesterday I sent to you a copy of a Federal Court Opinion concerning Mr. St. Clair of this office. This was an error on my part. Mr. Welch asked me on the telephone to send the Opinion to Mr. Murrow. He was referring to another gentleman by the same name in Boston. But to my mind you are "Mr. Murrow" and the other person did not enter my mind at any moment, - even while typing the note to you enclosing the Opinion.

Therefore, if it is not too troublesome, will you please return the Opinion to me? And I regret any confusion I may have caused you.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Gertrude E. Casale

(Mrs.) Gertrude E. Casale
Secretary to J. N. Welch

JRL A-P 11, — — 4 *

Welch.

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JAMES A. BRINK
JOHN KIMBALL, JR.

BLAIR L. PERRY
JEFFREY O'CONNELL

JOHN M. MAGUIRE, COUNSEL

60 STATE STREET, BOSTON 9

June 24, 1959

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Mr. Welch wanted me to send this to you. *

Sincerely,

Gertrude E. Casale

(Mrs.) Gertrude E. Casale
Secretary to Joseph N. Welch

119 Fed. Sup. 242.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

CIVIL ACTION NO. 51-1250

CAPE COD FOOD PRODUCTS, INC.

v.

NATIONAL CRANBERRY ASSOCIATION, et als

OPINION

March 1, 1954

WYZANSKI, J.

The Jury having rendered a verdict for Plaintiff in the sum of $175,000 single damages, on a complaint alleging violation of Section 2 of The Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 2, Plaintiff's counsel moves for the assessment of a reasonable attorney's fee pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Sec. 15.

The evidence before me bearing upon an attorney's fee is as follows. This is a private anti-trust suit which was not preceded by a public or even another private suit in the same industry. Plaintiff's Chief Counsel, James D. Saint Clair, Esq., in his thoroughness of preparation, economy of effort, choice of emphasis, quality of examination and cross-examination, presentation of argument, analysis of the law, courtesy to parties, witnesses, opposing counsel, and the

Court, and that indefinable distinction which breathes excellence, can stand comparison with any lawyer who has appeared before me in the last dozen years. The success that he achieved, while founded on the merit of Plaintiff's case, was by no means inevitable. In hands less gifted and with a lawyer less persuasive to a Jury, Plaintiff's cause might well have gone a-gley. Here as in earlier cases, Plaintiff's counsel has shown that despite his relative youth and his short career at the Bar, he is quite capable of holding his own against the most experienced advocates of our profession. With becoming deference to his seniors, but with unflinching courage in examining witnesses, in meeting opposing arguments, and in resisting what he regarded as unsound rulings from the Bench, Plaintiff's counsel set a model not likely to be surpassed.

In a statement filed with the Court, Plaintiff's counsel says that he and other senior partners of his firm devoted three hundred sixty-six hours to the preparation of this case, and their associates devoted two hundred thirty-one hours to this case.

In assaying the foregoing evidence, I have in mind principles laid down in cases directly in point, and in others that are cognate.

In Anti-Trust cases the fees have often run substantially over one-third of the single damages recovered. STRAUS v. VICTOR TALKING MACHINE CO., 2nd Cir., 297 FED. 791, ($23,894.71

single damages allowed after appeal. Attorney's fees reduced from $35,000. to $30,000;) RANKIN COMPANY v. ASSOCIATED BILL POSTERS OF U.S. etc., 2nd Cir., 42 F. 2d 152 (single damages slightly over $101,000., counsel fees $50,000;) EMICH MOTORS CORP. V. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., 7th Cir., 181 F. 2d, ($412,000. single damages, $250,000. counsel fees;) AMERICAN CAN CO. v. BRUCE'S JOICES, 5th Cir., 190 F. 2d, 73($60,000. single damages, $40,000. counsel fees;) MILWAUKEE TOWNE CORP. v. LOEW'S INC., 7th Cir. 190 F. 2d 73, ($313,858.10 single damages, counsel fees reduced from $225,000. to $75,000;) TWENTIETH CENTURY-FOX FILM CORP. v. BROOKSIDE THEATRE CORP., 8th Cir., 194 F. 2d 846,($375,000. single damages, $100,000. counsel fees.) See Homer Clark, THE TREBLE DAMAGE BONANZA: NEW DOCTRINES OF DAMAGES IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST SUITS, 52 Michigan Law Review, 363, 411-413. In listing the matter which appears in paranthesis this Court has not intended to intimate that the sound method of computing a reasonable fee requires the Court to consider only single damages, rather than treble damages. Ordinarily, of course, in so far as the amount of a party's recovery is one of the factors to be taken into account in establishing a fair fee. Reference is made to the total amount in issue between the parties, or to the total amount recovered by one of them.

Other relevant cases have arisen under the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act. HUTCHINSON v. WILLIAM C. BARRY, INC., D. Mass., 50 F. Supp. 292 (single damages $160.95, counsel fees $100.);

AUCDIN v. MYSTIC WASTE CO., D. Mass. 55 F. Supp. 672, ($1290.17 single damages, counsel fees $300); GILBERT v. THIERRY, D. Mass., 58 F. Supp. 235, (on actual overcharges totalling $45. Counsel fees of $75 allowed); KALWAR v. McKINNON, 1st Cir., 152 F. 2d 263 (on actual overcharges totalling $45 counsel fees of $74 in the District Court and an additional $25 in the Court of Appeals).

Under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 70, authorizing the assessment of counsel fees in patent litigation, awards of $30,000 in the District Court, and an additional $2500 in the Court of Appeals were allowed where, disregarding penalties, normal damages of $113,507.50 were recovered. RUSSELL BOX CO. v. GRANT PAPER BOX CO., 1st Cir., 203 F. 2d 177, affirming GRANT PAPER BOX CO. v. RUSSELL BOX CO., D. Mass., 106 F. Supp. 616.

In an action for the infringment of copyright where Plaintiffs' damages were assessed at $5000, though Defendant realized profits of only $890.16, counsel fees awarded pursuant to 17 U.S.. Sec. 116 were $2000 in the District Court, and an additional $500 in the Court of Appeals. F. W. WOOLWORTH CO. v. CONTEMPORARY ARTS, 1st Cir., 193 F. 2d 162.

Reference was made at the Bar to the fact that under statutes permitting Indians to sue the United States, Congress customarily sets a maximum for attorney's allowances at 10% of the

recovery. Such situations, however, reflect peculiar tenderness toward The United States as Defendant, and wards of The United States as Plaintiffs. Moreover these situations indicate that when Congress wished to limit awards mathematically, it knew how to do so. And finally if a 10% figure were to be used it should be applied to the total damages recovered. That is $525,000.

The limitation of $25. an hour which is said to be applied to senior counsel in cases before administrative tribunals like The Securities Exchange Commission and The Interstate Commerce Commission must be read in the light of the regulatory system and the type of public interest there involved.

Likewise, amounts allowed to Trustees, Receivers, Counsel, and Committees in corporate reorganization matters reflect the position of the applicants for fees as court appointees, serving the public interest and often allegedly acting as representatives of persons who will usually be called on to make substantial financial sacrifices as a consequence of the reorganization. See HUTCHINSON v WILLIAM C. BARRY INC., D. Mass., 50 F. Supp. 292, 298; BOYNTON v TARBELL, 272 MASS. 142, 172 N.E. 340.

The analogies cited in the last six paragraphs, while they have some pertinence, almost all require less variety and rarity of skill than the instant case demanded and received. It is doubtful whether any

type of legal work requires a higher degree of professional competence and native ability than the presentation to a Jury of complicated economic questions. This is especially true where the parties are not public agencies, but private persons having no unusual investigatory or other aids. Absence of such investigatory assistance is a special handicap where, as here, Plaintiff's counsel did not have the benefit of previous litigation by The United States, resulting in a judgment, which constitutes for injured individuals, prima facie evidence, in accordance with 15 U.S.C. Sec. 16.

In HUTCHINSON, I explained at length what seemed to me the relevant policy considerations which must governawards of counsel fees in this type of case.

My conclusion was that a losing Defendant must pay what it would be reasonable for counsel to charge a victorious Plaintiff. The rate is the free market price, the figure which a willing, successful client would pay a willing, successful lawyer. Sometimes the figure may seem high. But so far as price is determined by unique excellence and by social usefulness, the advocate is especially worthy of large recompense. His brevity may reflect extraordinary gifts and thus in itself be indicative of merit. See WHISTLER v. RUSKIN, cited in PENNELL, THE ART OF WHISTLER, (Modern Library, N. Y. 1928) p. 64. And his simplicity of presentation may be a proof not of the problem's lack of difficulty, but rather of his unmatched native quality. See GIOTTO, (G. VASARI, EMIN-

ENT PAINTERS, SCULPTORS, and ARCHITECTS, BLASHFIELD-HOPKINS, Ed., N. Y. 1926 Vol. 1, p. 61).

Unless excellence in the trial lawyer is properly recompensed, the best men will not spend their time in court and thus there will dry up the most essential sources of an independent bar.

Only two countervailing arguments have been advanced (implicitly rather than explicitly, to be sure) by opposing counsel in the case at bar. The first is that the time spent by Plaintiff's counsel in preparation amounted to a total of only 597 hours, and second that Plaintiff's Chief Counsel has been at the bar only slightly less than seven years. But the very economy of counsel's methods and his youth are perhaps the most significant hall marks of an outstanding talent.

I allow, in addition to disbursements of $856.85, a reasonable attorney's fee of $35,000 without prejudice to these being increased by further services in appellate courts.

Welch, Joe N.

May 4, 1959

Mr. Joseph N. Welch
Box 215
Harwichport, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Welch:

I am most eager to hear all about your experience in the strange world of movies. I will be here until round about the first of July, should you be passing through.

My respects to Mrs. Welch, please.

Sincerely yours,

ERM:skh

JOSEPH N. WELCH
BOX 215
HARWICHPORT, MASSACHUSETTS

Dear Ed Murrow

I just listened to your Thursday evening broadcast. Your reference to Arthur Godfrey seemed to me just right. Agree, in Boston called to say the same thing.

Making a movie is hard work. More accurately helping in a small way to make a movie is hard. But I have heard Agres say "I think it was the most rewarding experience of my life"

Its good to have her feel that way

Regards to Mrs. Murrow and to Casey.

Sincerely
Joe Welch

Welch, J. N.

The Mather Inn

"The Inn of Gracious Hospitality"

PHONE HUdson 6-4466

ISHPEMING, MICHIGAN

April 6, 1959

Dear Ed:

I valued your note of March 20th.

Agnes and I have found this an exciting adventure, as we hoped we would. It is hard work too.

So far we have no regrets. On the contrary, our present judgment is that we are glad we did it.

Sincerely,

J. N. Welch

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

FACILITIES FOR BANQUETS AND CONVENTIONS, HUNTING, FISHING, SKIING, VACATIONING

Welch, J. N.

March 20, 1959

Dear Mr. Welch:

A brief epistle to say how sorry I am that I missed you when last you were in New York, and to wish you much luck in the new venture.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. J. N. Welch
Hale and Dorr
60 State Street
Boston 9, Massachusetts

ERM:jmi

HALE AND DORR
COUNSELLORS AT LAW

DUDLEY H. DORR
ROGER D. SWAIM
REGINALD HEBER SMITH
GEORGE W. WIGHTMAN
JOSEPH N. WELCH
VIRGIL C. BRINK
DANIEL L. BROWN
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ANTHONY BRAYTON
CARLTON W. CHAMBERLIN

JOHN CHRISTOFORO
JOHN E. LAURSEN
NORMAN B. ASHER

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FREDERICK G. FISHER, JR.

JAMES A. BRINK
JOHN KIMBALL, JR.

BLAIR L. PERRY
ROBERT L. MEADE
JEFFREY O'CONNELL

TELEPHONE HUBBARD 2-3300
CABLE ADDRESS "HAFIS"

JOHN M. MAGUIRE, COUNSEL

60 STATE STREET, BOSTON 9

January 26, 1959.

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Thanks for yours of January 20th with enclosure.

It was a great delight to Mrs. Welch and me to be a guest in your home. Not the least of our pleasure was in seeing Casey again. We think he has a great way with him. Mrs. Welch has seen your letter, smiled when reading it, and returns your greetings both to you and Mrs. Murrow.

One thing I liked was the red dress. I am a sucker for a red dress.

Sincerely,

J. N. Welch

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York City 22.

Gosh! Some of my letters get transcribed, sent to Cape and finally signed and mailed in tortoise time. J

Welch, Jos.

January 20, 1959

Dear Mr. Welch:

(1) Mrs. Murrow and I were delighted that you and Mrs. Welch honoured our humble abode by your presence the other evening. I regret that my fatigue was so apparent. That does not often happen.

(2) Having viewed your "memorandum to Mr. Borge" I hasten to send you this small but tangible stipend.

(3) I think the Welch, Birkett, Blum conversation will be what Harry Truman is wont to call "a dinger". I am not sure what the word means, but it is, I am sure, a superlative. Thank you again, and please convey my warmest greetings to Mrs. Welch.

Sincerely yours,

KRM:skh

Mr. Joseph N. Welch
Box 215
Harwichport, Mass.

Welch, Joe

December 17, 1958

Mr. Joseph N. Welch
Box 215
Harwichport, Mass.

Dear Mr. Welch:

The seventh it is. I trust Mrs. Welch will be with you. Would you prefer to dine with us at home, or shall we go out and mingle with the lower class of people? Is there anyone you would like to see that evening? If so, please command me.

As ever yours,

ERM:skh

JOSEPH N. WELCH
BOX 215
HARWICHPORT, MASSACHUSETTS

Dec 11, 1958

Dear Mr Morrow

answering your flattering question:—

Probably on the evening of Jan 7. I have agreed to do something at a Judge Medina affair on Jan 8 and will probably* come down a day earlier.

Sincerely
Joe Welch

* Snowy roads, perils of air travel ancient joints (my own - not N.Y. joints) general lassitude and cussedness all have a bearing on "probably"
Jr

Welch, Joseph

November 25, 1958

Dear Mr. Welch:

Hereafter, I shall make no effort to compete with you in either intellect or alliteration.

As Mr. Churchill would say: "Pray advise me when your presence may be expected in the city". I hanker to have you spend an evening with us, if you can spare the time.

As ever yours,

ERM:skh

Mr. Joseph N. Welch
Box 215
Harwichport, Mass.

EDWARD R. MURROW
485 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, N.Y.

November 18, 1958

Dear Mr. Welch:

Thank you for your note. When may we expect to see you in this city of steam, scurry and scamper again?

As ever yours,

Ed

ERM:skh

In January
JNW

Mr. Joseph N. Welch
Box 215
Harwichport, Mass.

Welch, Joseph N.

November 18, 1958

Dear Mr. Welch:

Thank you for your note. When may we expect to see you in this city of steam, scurry and scamper again?

As ever yours,

ERM:skh

Mr. Joseph N. Welch
Box 215
Harwichport, Mass.

JOSEPH N. WELCH
BOX 215
HARWICHPORT, MASSACHUSETTS

Sent tomorrow

My Secretary has had two hospitalizations & two operations this summer. My correspondence has therefore suffered.

I think your letter of Aug 20 is long since obsolete but it seems not to have been acknowledged for which I now apologize.

I have not seen all your recent programs but have seen some & as you know I'm a sucker for anything you do. This may surprise you but one favorite is the news each night.

This requires no acknowledgment

Sincerely Joe Welch

Conf. W.
Welch, J.N.

July 21, 1958

Mr. J.N. Welch
Hale and Dorr
Counsellors at Law
60 State Street
Boston 9, Mass.

Dear Mr. Welch:

We are back from the West Coast and I am now trying to decide whether to go to the Middle East. Will write again as soon as possible. Meantime, I hope you are having an enjoyable summer.

As ever yours,

ERM:skh

hold

HALE AND DORR
COUNSELLORS AT LAW
60 STATE STREET
BOSTON 9

TELEPHONE HUbbard 2-3300

June 16, 1958

VEC
note

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Where do you get such language as "Perhaps you will permit me to write you again"?

Actually, I will watch the mail with eagerness in July, hoping that you will write me again.

Sincerely,

J. N. Welch

J. N. Welch

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

June 12, 1958

Dear Mr. Welch:

Grinnell was hectic but most stimulating. I was much impressed although fear that I failed to impress the students greatly. The language of the citation was gracious and exaggerated.

Your gracious invitation to visit you at Harwichport is most tempting and I trust you will permit me to delay giving you a definite answer. I must go to the West Coast early in July to see my mother briefly and after that I may or may not have to go to Europe. Perhaps you will permit me to write you again about the middle of July.

I am most eager to hear about the TV project.

Sincerely,

Mr. J.N. Welch
Hale and Dorr
Counsellors at Law
60 State Street
Boston 9, Massachusetts

fc

HALE AND DORR
COUNSELLORS AT LAW

TELEPHONE HUBBARD 2-3300
CABLE ADDRESS "HAFIS"

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EARLE C. COOLEY
ROBERT L. MEADE
BLAIR L. PERRY

JOHN M. MAGUIRE, COUNSEL

60 STATE STREET, BOSTON 9

May 27, 1958

Dear Mr. Murrow:

The Grinnell College paper informs me that you are to take your Honorary Degree at commencement time.

I am confident that I said I would surely be there on that occasion. If I didn't say it to you, I thought it to myself. But Agnes and I are moving to The Cape at just the wrong time for me to be in attendance, and with sadness I am forced to say I shall not be there.

I somewhat suspect that every honorary degree which involves making a speech is truly an earned degree. It follows that I think it is useless to say formally that I hope you have a good time in Grinnell. You will, however, find it a good college with lots of stimulating and interesting people, and as I contemplate signing this letter, I grow more and more sad.

Is there, I wonder, the faintest possibility that you and Mrs. Murrow, and Casey as well, could sometime fly up to Harwichport for a weekend with us? It must be too much to hope for on our part, since I know what your life is like, and what attractive invitations you must constantly have for such limited time as you have for pure fun. But it remains true that we love the place we have on the tight little harbor of Harwichport, and think it a little special. It would indeed be special if it were to be graced by a visit from you and Mrs. Murrow.

In addition, and by way of a teaser, I have a feeble little idea about a television program. But the "out" about that is that it involves

The undersigned,

J. N. Welch

J. N. Welch
(gcc)

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue, New York

Welch, Joseph

TO:

JOSEPH N. WELCH BOX 215 HARWICHPORT MASS.

SUGGEST DINNER INFORMALLY EIGHT THIRTY WEDNESDAY JANUARY 7 AT 580 PARK REGARDS

ED MURROW

514-70

Welch, Joseph

HALE AND DORR
COUNSELLORS AT LAW

TELEPHONE HUbbard 2-3300
CABLE ADDRESS "HAFIS"

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JOHN A. DOLAN
FREDERICK G. FISHER, JR.

REMSEN M. KINNE, III
ROBERT J. RICHARDS

60 STATE STREET, BOSTON 9

February 7, 1957

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Thank you for your note of sympathy, which came in during my absence.

It will delight me, Sir, to have lunch with you when we can arrange it. There is every indication I will be in New York more or less during the next couple of months, and I shall try to make a date with you.

Sincerely,

Joe

J. N. Welch

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Welch, Joseph

HALE AND DORR
COUNSELLORS AT LAW

DUDLEY H. DORR
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REMSEN M. KINNE, III
ROBERT J. RICHARDS

TELEPHONE HUBBARD 2-3300

CABLE ADDRESS "HAFIS"

60 STATE STREET, BOSTON 9

January 23, 1957

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Mr. Welch is absent from the office due to the recent passing of Mrs. Welch.

You will, I am sure, hear from him upon his return. I communicated to him the contents of your letter of January 16th.

Sincerely,

Gertrude E. Casale

(Mrs.) Gertrude E. Casale
Secretary to J. N. Welch

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Welch, Joe

January 16, 1957

Dear Mr. Welch:

I was deeply grieved to learn upon my return from Burma that Mrs. Welch had died. This is an occasion when people who work with words recognize that they are useless.

I trust that I may have the pleasure of your company at lunch or dinner when next you are in New York.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Joseph N. Welch
60 State Street
Boston, Massachusetts

rh

Sixty State Street

January 9, 1957

Dear Mr. Murrow:

While you might have thought the gift of a ruler quite an ordinary gesture on your part, it seemed to me a very happy one indeed. That, no doubt, was due to the inscription. Thank you, Sir.

With so busy a life as you lead, you may not have learned that Mrs. Welch died just before Christmas. It had been inevitable for many weeks, but I think that did not mitigate the blow.

Sincerely,

Joe Welch

J. N. Welch

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting Company
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

HALE AND DORR
COUNSELLORS AT LAW
60 STATE STREET
BOSTON 9

TELEPHONE HUBBARD 2-3300

February 21, 1951

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I am looking at what Mr. Friendly would call a check for Five Hundred Fish. Thank you, Sir.

I hope to be in New York on February 25th through the morning of February 28th, and that I get to see you or Mr. Friendly, or both, so that each of us can help the other be indignant about what I have recently been reading in the papers.

Sincerely,

Joe

J. N. Welch

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
CBS News
485 Madison Avenue
New York City 22.

5-C-12

June 30, 1955

Enclosed you will find, on several hand-typed, smudge-stained sheets, the correspondence I had with CounterAttack which I promised you the other evening. I assume that if you are able to pursue the matter, you will find the bottom of CBS' involvement and, I am enclosing only my reply over at CBS, you I assume that, January 15, 19 including the last of

Dear Teddy:

I have been beating the bushes and I can't find any affirmative indication as to your being in any sense blacklisted in this shop. I will pursue my inquiries and come the autumn we shall find an opportunity to put this matter to the test in the manner I suggested to you earlier.

As ever yours,

Mr. Theodore H. White
239 Central Park West
New York 24, New York

rh

I want points about the stuff herewith:

a) On now as kind of namby-pamby. I wrote a fight or threaten legal action to know how they operate, possi a story on just what they are was simply attended to set down, their specific charges.

b) Although they replied with rather cold courtesy, they never did send a later explanation as they promised.

c) The reply of a year ago stands today with one slight amendment: On page 3, Item 4, I replied to them that I couldn't remember a specific testimonial luncheon to me by the IPR. [illegible] was quite true. Harry and I have since been [illegible] and I assumed that it is true that in 1946 Ned Carter of the IPR threw a luncheon in my honor. Ned Carter -- may his soul rest in peace -- was a dear old man. I [illegible] enough time to give a luncheon in [illegible] by the way, nor do I think that the IPR was ever taken over by the Communists. [illegible] this out [illegible] yes, I [illegible] luncheon with Ned Carter and so that. They were so many luncheons, speeches, testimonials in the early years [illegible]

THEODORE H. WHITE

239 CENTRAL PARK WEST, NEW YORK 24, NEW YORK

REPLY TO MY LETTER OF [redacted] 4/29/54
COPY COPY COPY COPY

COUNTERATTACK THE NEWSLETTER OF FACTS TO COMBAT COMMUNISM, 55 WEST 42nd Street, New York 36, New York, Longacre 3-4608

Mr. Theodore H. White,
239 Central Park West,
New York 24, New York.

May 14, 1954

Dear Mr. White:

This is simply to acknowledge receipt of your letter of April 29, 1954.

Due to an unusually heavy workload here, I have not had an opportunity to acknowledge your letter before.

Our present rushed condition is due to the departure of Frank McNamara, our editor, to assume the job of National Director of the Veterans of Foreign Wars Un-American Activities Commission. Under the circumstances, I have not had a chance to check the points you raise in detail and compare them with the documentation used in our issue of January 15. We will do so at the very earliest opportunity and I will write you at greater length as soon as possible afterwards.

Cordially Yours,

Arthur E. Cullen,
Vice-President.

****

NOTE: The subsequent letter promised by Cullen was never sent to me and, presumably, never written.

White, Theodore

THEODORE H. WHITE 168 EAST 64 STREET NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

Tuesday. Feb. 17, 1959

Dear Ed:

Have just finished the day's quota of pages and will be strolling home in a few minutes, passing your apartment house, and thought I would drop this note off as I pass.

The day's headlines on Murrow have been moiling around in me as I tried to work and distracting me. And so, though we celebrate our friendship on more substantial things than letters, I thought perhaps I ought to write this note and tell you how much diminished, personally, I feel by your absence from the air for a year.

Not that I think it is a bad thing for you. I think your statement was good; it was solid, and smacks of honesty; and I take it at face-value with all the reasons you gave. It is a wise, a sound thing for you to do at this stage of life. You will come out richer. But I know, having been through this, that after a few weeks or a few months there will be those days of doubt, those days of wondering whether it was or was not the proper thing to do. When you leave an office where you have been happy, you never know until quite a while after how much you miss the companionship and presence of the people you work with day after day. All I want to say is that I live around the corner and there I am; that ever so often I've wanted to call up and say come on over and shoot the breeze; and have known you were so busy that any hour of quiet anybody took from you was an imposition. I suppose you've chosen some private decompression chamber of your own for the next few weeks; but when you come out of it, call me up and let's spend a few hours together and I'll introduce you to the society of the Non-Organization Men.

It would be embarassing for me to write here what I think you have meant to television, to American culture, to the common good of this country. Which is why I am so eager to accept at face value the thought that this is simply a one-year rest, and then on to battle again.

Affectionately,

Teddy

Teddy White

Acad.. by phone

(not included in Griffin Index) White, Theodore

THEODORE H. WHITE 168 EAST 64 STREET NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

3-C-49

May 14, 1957

Dear Ed:

Lest my last letter disturbed you: (attached)

Barnes checked in yesterday with a very kind letter. The gist of it was that after a series of high-level conferences (do people in TV ever have any low-level conferences?) the powers at CBS had wiped out the concept of a major interview program of the kind we had discussed. And that he had been silent all this time because the whole concept was under debate and had not wanted to write until he could say yea or nay definitely.

So my feelings are soothed, and there's no need for you to burden yourself with any private investigation for me.

I'm out here on Fire Island (telephone Number: Fire Island 4-5899M) and will stay here until about August when this novel should be finished. No sane man ever quit a job to write a novel; but now that the opportunity is here I should use it. In August, I should be back in town working on the book project I discussed with you (if I can raise the dough); or making myself available to anyone who wants to use some hard-working, high-priced talent.

Bestest to you and Janet.

Sincerely, Teddy

Teddy White.

You'd be surprised how nicely the evening broadcast sounds out here on the island, away from the disturbance of the city where I can enjoy radio. You come in loud, clear, and eloquently.

THEODORE H. WHITE 168 EAST 64 STREET NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

May 9, 1957

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System,
485 Madison Avenue,
New York City

Dear Ed:

Here's just a brief note to tell you I'm estivating (is that the word?) at Fire Island for the rest of the summer. I've got to finish this book fast in order to finance myself for the adventures of the fall. The address will be: Theodore H. White, Fair Harbour, Fire Island, New York. I'll have a phone in a few days and will passit on to your secretary when I know the number.

If,ultimately, you ever find out what happened in Mr. Barnes' shop, drop me a note and let me call you to hear the report-- I shall be coming into town during the summer on odd and unpredictable days, whenever the going at the typewriter gets too rough, and would like, out of curiosity, to find out what happened.

There is, of course, another reason for writing this note: it would be too embarassing to say to you personally how much your kindness and thoughtfulness in the past few months has meant to me. I'm sure, in a few months, I will be thoroughly re-established -- but your own helpfulness will be one of the pleasant thoughts of this period when I look back.

Bestest,
Teddy

Teddy White.

THEODORE H. WHITE

239 CENTRAL PARK WEST, NEW YORK 24, NEW YORK

March 24, 1955

Dr. Ed Murrow,
Columbia Broadcasting System,
New York.

Dear Ed:

Enclosed you will find, on several hand-typed, smudge-stained sheets, the correspondence I had with CounterAttack which I promised you the other evening. I assume that if you are able to pursue the matter, you will find the CounterAttack blast at the bottom of CBS' worries and , therefore, you should have my reply. I am enclosing only my reply to them and their response to me, for I assume that, over at CBS, you have a file of CounterAttack including the blast of January 15, 1954 against me.

I want to make a couple of points about the stuff herewith:

a) On re-reading my reply it strikes me now as kind of namby-pamby. I wrote it to them, however, not to pick a fight or threaten legal action but in the hope that I might get to know how they operate, possibly meet their personnel and write a story on just what they are up to and their techniques. My reply was simply intended to set down, factually, the data refuting each of their specific charges.

b) Although they replied with rather cold courtesy, they never did send a later explanation of their action as they promised

c) The reply of a year ago stands today with one slight amendment: On page 2, Item 4, I replied to them that I couldn't remember a specific testimonial luncheon to me by the IPR ---- which was quite true. Nancy and I have since been unpacking our cases and our old letters and files and I learned that it is true that in 1946 Ned Carter of the IPR threw a luncheon in my honor. Ned Carter-- may his soul rest in peace-- was a dear old man, I was deeply fond of him, am still fond of his memory and it is a pleasant thought that he thought enough of me to give a luncheon in my honor. Old Ned was never a Commie in any way, nor do I think that the IPR was ever taken over by the Communists. I point this out simply for the sake of testimony because today I would testify, yes, I did have a luncheon with Ned Carter and so what. There were so many luncheons, speeches, banquets, broadcasts in the busy year 1946 of so many kinds that I feel I can be excused a slip in memory.

It was great seeing you the other night. I wish New York were arranged so that people who like each other could see each other more often. We watched the show after dinner with heightened pleasure and, like all the Murrow shows, it was grand. Take care and don't work too hard and let's try to make contact when I have less melancholy matters to discuss. Bestest.

Teddy

Teddy

certain decency requires that you list them all; and report what they said.

2. Yes, I did speak at the Independent Citizens Committee of Arts, etc. But the transcript of that evening's remarks should be available to you. If you examine them, you should note that my remarks were in the nature of a eulogy of the heroism of the soldiers of Chiang K'ai-shek.

3. You say I sponsored a dinner for the Hollywood Ten. That is totally untrue-- so untrue as to be a pure product of imagination. The records again should help you correct this statement. I lived in Europe continuously from June, 1948 to October 1953. That case developed while I was overseas. I know nothing of it except from my recollection of old news dispatches. I was never approached, do not know who the men are, never took any part in their defence and was not, repeat, not a sponsor. If any letterhead or statement bearing my name in their defence appears in your files I would appreciate having a photostat of it. For then I could sue whoever it was who so violently and without permision made free of my name and abused my reputation.

4. I have lunched with members of the Institute of Pacific Relations many times. I have been a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I cannot remember a specific "testimonial luncheon". The Institute of Pacific Relations carried on its membership roles the names of practically every student of the Far East as well as some of the most distinguished names in American public life and industry. There is no doubt that the Communists penetrated the Institute, trying to take it over. They did not succeed. You cannot charge membership in the Institute as evidence of taint of subversion.

5. I shall not debate Thunder Out of China with you. But if you mention the Daily Workers Comment, you should note that their review called the book "anti-Communist". If the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy or Amerasia used the book as a premium it was done without my knowledge. There is no law I know of to prevent them from buying books and using them as bait.

6. You quote correctly from Mr. Chambers, but Mr. Chambers was in error. I never at any moment signed any round-robin letter against Mr. Chambers when we worked at TIME. I was never even asked to. If necessary, I am willing to testify to that effect under oath of law. If such a letter can be produced with my signature I shall make out a check for all my royalties from my current book and donate it to your favorite charity.

7. On my relations with Time Inc. You say I was fired. I left Time Incorporated in July of 1946. I quit after a series of discussions with Henry Luce which made it obvious we were too far in disagreement to continue working together. But it was I who made the final break. On

THEODORE H. WHITE

239 CENTRAL PARK WEST, NEW YORK 24, NEW YORK

COPY COPY COPY COPY COPY

April 24, 1954

The Editors of CounterAttack,
55 West 42n Street,
New York 16 New York.

Gentlemen:

I have only now, after much traveling and long delay received from a friend of mine a copy of your attack on myself in your issue of January 15th. Had a copy been sent to me directly I would have answered you at once.

Let me say at once that I seek neither apology nor retraction from you. As a journalist myself, I know how easily error creeps into the public record; and, for the purpose of this letter, I assume that what you have presented here is an attack based on error and misinformation rather than out of malice. Whether or not you correct your records is a matter of conscience. I feel that it is my primary duty only to set you straight, for thereafter a repetition of these statements can be interpreted only as malice.

It is obvious that you and I represent fundamentally divergent political views. In our form of democracy I must respect and protect your right to express your views as much as it is incumbent on you to protect those with whom you disagree .

The following points are, therefore, corrections of fact or omission which should be in your files if you desire to re-Open attack on me in any honest form.

1. Committee For a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. I was never a member; nor a sponsor; nor lent my name to any of its committees. The dinner to which you refer did take place at the Hotel Roosevelt. And I did speak. It occurred only a few months after I had returned from the war and before I thoroughly understood the purposes and control of that Committee.

The fundamental fact that you leave out is that the principal speaker of that evening meeting was Senator Tobey of New Hampshire. I was asked to appear for a few minutes on a program with that distinguished Senator whom I had never met; and, wanting to meet him, I accepted the invitation.

I make this statemat with no slightest intent to injure Senator Tobey's reputation whom you must consider, as I do, a Republican of highest integrity. Yet if you list the speakers at that meeting a

239 CENTRAL PARK WEST, NEW YORK 24, NEW YORK

he personnel records of Time, the separation was recorded as "separation by mutual agreement". Mr. Luce wrote me a most courteous note on my departure. We have since enjoyed friendly relations. I consider him a distinguished American. I cannot bring myself to believe that he said what you quote him as saying.

8. Mr. Burnham's review is the expression of his opinion. He did not like my book. I did not like his review. In our country that's the way liberty operates and we can boh go on talking.

9. You claim I wrote exclusive dispatches for the Daily Compass as Chief Correspondent for the Overseas News Agency. This is not true. The Daily Compass was one among several score clients of theOverseas News Agency (among others: The New York Times, the Buffalo Courier-Journal, the Louisville Courier-Journal, the Milwaukee Journal, the Washington Post, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch etc, etc). I was never asked to and never did write an exclusive dispatch for them. (the Compass) Your error is partially excusable forthe Compass did, without our permission, slug some of the Agency's dispatches as "exclusive". The mangling and distortion of the Overseas News Agency copy by the Compass was so flagrant that ultimately it led to a breach, and the cutting off of our news copy from them.

I present these facts hoping that if you attempt again to trace the difference between my point of view and yours, you will do so with accurate information.

This difference between us is deep and real. As a foreign correspondent, I have seen more of Communism in power and action than, I think, anyone on your staff. I know, far better than you, how wicked, dangerous and malevolent it is. I know its tactics and cruelties. I believe the only strategy of our defence is twofold-- the first being the preservation of our material strength, by arms, the second being the preservation of our spiritual strength, which is liberty. It is my profound belief that Communism thrives in an atmosphere of suspiciion and fear, of rumor and lie. I believe thatyou, inadvertently, may be playing directly into the hands of the Communists and weakening our entire fiber of resistance to the threat.

Should you ever find yourself in need of material about me, I can assure you of my whole-hearted cooperation. You need only call to check whatever you wish to say.

Sincerely Yours,

Theodore H. White

See Publications
Counterattack

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COUNTERATTACK
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REGISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE

55 WEST 42 STREET, NEW YORK 36, N. Y. LONGACRE 3-460

January 15, 1954
Vol. 8, No. 3

Dear Subscriber:

"CHINA EXPERT" NOW PRESCRIBES DANGEROUS US POLICIES.

THEODORE WHITE is the author of the recently published book "Fire In The Ashes: Europe in Mid-Century" (William Sloane Associates.$5). WHITE was head of the Time magazine China Bureau during the years 1939-45.

The Book of the Month Club made WHITE's book its selection for Nov, 1953. EDWARD R MURROW featured WHITE...and plugged his book...on his nation-wide "Person to Person" TV show (NBC). The NY Times and NY Herald Tribune gave WHITE's book the full page-one treatment in its Sunday book review sections. The Saturday Review raved about it. It has been praised highly by CHARLES SEYMOUR, former Pres of Yale Univ, Columbia U's Prof HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, RAYMOND GRAM SWING and many others.

Obviously this is a very important book...or so these critics and publicists will have the world believe. Now here is WHITE's background on the subject of Communism.

Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, speaker (with AGNES SMEDLEY, the late Soviet spy; ALBERT E KAHN, leading pro-Soviet propagandist; HUGH DEANE, CP fronter and Far Eastern "expert" for the defunct Communoid "Daily Compass"; former OSS Sgt and Army Capt GEORGE S WUCHINICK, who recently refused to tell Senate Internal Security subcommittee if he was a Communist Party member, and former Congressman HUGH DE LACY, who has been identified as a Communist Party (CP) member.

Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, speaker, radio show.

Testimonial Dinner for the Hollywood Ten, sponsor.

Insitiute of Pacific Relations, honored by testimonial luncheon.

WHITE co-authored "Thunder Out of China" with ANNALEE JACOBY. Both the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy and "Amerasia" magazine (the office of which was used for photographing and storing stolen U S secret documents) offered this book as a premium to prospective subscribers. Amerasia praised the book as "required reading" for anyone who (in 1946) wanted to understand current events in China. The Daily Worker also praised the book, as did JOHN K FAIRBANK, LAWRENCE K ROSINGER, and EDGAR SNOW, "China experts" who have been identified as Communists (FAIRBANK and SNOW deny the charge, ROSINGER has taken refuge in the Fifth Amendment).

WHITE also edited "The Stilwell Papers" (1948), another book which was slanted on the question of China. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, cited as subversive by the Dept of Justice, distributed this book and sent out special literature promoting it.

WHITTAKER CHAMBERS has cast some light on the role WHITE played at Time magazine. In his book "Witness", CHAMBERS described what happened when he became editor of Time's foreign news section and started telling the truth about the Kremlin gangsters. A group of Time foreign correspondents who were

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Chester Williams

FROM.....

From Chester Williams

CHESTER S. WILLIAMS
431 EAST 20TH STREET
NEW YORK 10, N. Y.
GRAMERCY 3-3306

March 26, 1965

Mrs. Edward R. Murrow,
New York Hospital
New York City

Dear Janet:

I was so happy to see the notice in the paper that Ed had entered the hospital for a check up since we had been told by one of his doctors that he was suffering a brain disorder.

We hope it is true that he will be out soon on his own steam. We saw you on the recent TV program and hoped you were not facing a period of uncertainty.

I'm writing to you at the hospital in hopes that you will let us know whether and when we can see Ed.

Also I'm enclosing an announcement of our TV-radio series. It begins April 5 on the subject: "What's a 'modest but adequate' family budget?" What I'd prize more than anything else is to present Ed on our program, which as you know is practically the "secret TV channel" -- of N.Y. City-- channel 31, on a program called "Personal Message to Teen-agers" from Edward R. Murrow.

But, in any case, do let us know where we may reach you when Ed leaves the hospital.

I'm also enclosing a copy of our current issue of BETTER TIMES with a story about the social workers in SELMA, including Jack and Joyce.

These are certainly critical days which remind me of the 1930s. We both send our love and our hope of seeing Ed and you when he may be able to spend an evening with old friends.

Sincerely,

Chet

Williams, Chester S.

9503 La Jolla Farms Road
La Jolla, California
April 23, 1964

Dear Chet,

Ed was delighted to hear from you and has asked me to reply to your letter. He is recovering from a bout of pneumonia, and doesn't feel up to much.

We both hope that you are enjoying your new job. The Community Council is lucky to have you working for them and I am sure that you will like it much more than you would have working in Phoenix.

Ed too has been giving educational television a good deal of thought, but he has no idea what he will be doing next -- he is really too unwell to consider anything.

We move back to Washington next week. I hope that during the summer we will have the good fortune to see you and Elizabeth.

Sincerely yours,

(Mrs. Edward R. Murrow)

Mr. Chester S. Williams
431 East 20th Street
New York 10
New York

CHESTER S. WILLIAMS
431 EAST 20TH STREET
NEW YORK 10, N. Y.
GRAMERCY 3-3306

April 12, 1964

Dear Ed:

Good to hear you expect to be back in these parts soon. We'll hope to have a chance to kick things around again.

The enclosed will let you know what I'm up to currently.

Interesting that you should raise the point about educational TV since it just happens that I delved into it a few months ago to decide whether a spot in the educational station in Pheonix would be my cup of tea. I decided not to go in by that door, at least. In general, the shoestring financing seems the main frustration. It seems obviously the most important channel for adult education, and I see no reason why institutional advertising shouldn't be tapped to pay a good part of the bill. Indeed, many of the legitimate commercials of substantial industry are educational--or could be helpful in enlightening listeners on rapidly changing technology and what it portends for human relations.

Elizabeth joins in sending our fond good wishes to you and Janet.

Cordially,

Chet

Williams, Chester S.

9503 La Jolla Farms Road
La Jolla, California
March 23, 1964

Dear Chet:

Belated thanks for yours of February 26. We have taken a house here in La Jolla and will remain here at least until the end of April. I don't know what I am going to do, because that will be determined in large part by what I am able to do. I have had a flock of offers from publishers, but presently have no appetite to write a book.

Deeply distressed to hear of your accident, but happy to hear of your recovery.

What do you know about educational television and its prospects?

As ever yours,

Edward R. Murrow

Mr. Chester S. Williams
431 East 20th Street
New York 10
New York.

ERM:apa

CHESTER S. WILLIAMS
431 EAST 20TH STREET
NEW YORK 10, N. Y.
GRAMERCY 3-3306

February 26, 1964

Dear Ed and Janet:

Elizabeth and I have thought of you often and hope that this finds you rested and renewed in vitality. I'm sending this to the farm, assuming that with the arrival of spring weather you will return there.

Your old dream of withdrawing from high-pressure activity for a year or two to indulge in reading and reflection is now within reach, and I hope you take advantage of it. As one who paved the way for a new media of reporting and set a standard "to which the wise and honest" can repair, you owe it to the rising generation to tell the story of that heroic and successful struggle in detail. It is also the story of the end of an era. Few can illuminate its meaning and portent with greater insight than you.

If I could lend a hand in such an enterprise, I'd be delighted to explore it with you. I'm doing some free lance writing and consulting at the moment. The arrangement by which I was to have taken over the direction of Freedom House foundered when its founder-director changed his mind on his retirement plans. So since November I have been unconnected.

We have been exploring the possibilities of retiring ultimately in Arizona. The climate there seems most helpful to Elizabeth's acute sinus trouble. A recent visit suggested that the likelihood of finding a full-time job of real interest is rather remote in that area. Perhaps the time has come to develop that second career which can be pursued without the dismal prospects of being retired at a set age. I've always thought that writing would be it. Maybe the time has come to make the transition. I have no illusions about the difficulties in breaking in when one's writing craft has been exercized largely in organizational and institutional connections. But I have no wish to re-enter the rat race of industrial public relations. The financial independence gained in that enterprise was about the only rewarding result of a decade in it.

Incidently, I spent almost 3 months in a body cast from neck to navel this year. I slipped on a floor I was refinishing in Jack's house and broke a fusion of over 50 years standing. Fortunately, the shoulder mended well and at a slightly improved angle.

It would be a delight to get together again when you are in these parts. Meanwhile, all our best wishes.

Sincerely,

Chet

Chet Williams

November 23, 1960

Dear Chet:

Belated thanks to you and Elizabeth for the flowers.

I'm back in the office a few hours a day, and we must meet soon.

As ever yours,

Mr. Chester Williams
Messrs. Gaynor & Ducas
400 Madison Avenue
New York City, New York

m

NEW YORK

Chester Williams

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PLAZA 5-5750

October 31, 1960

Mr. Edward R. Murrow,
Columbia Broadcasting System,
485 Madison Ave.,
New York, N.Y.

Dear Ed:

The copy of your note of October 10 to Mr. Kiliper reached me the other day when I returned from a business trip. It was forwarded by the American Cancer Society.

Since our talk, I have made further notes and will send you my thoughts on the proposed book shortly. Perhaps we can get together after the election subsides to discuss both the book and the other plans you have in mind.

Sincerely,

Chet

Chester S. Williams

Williams, Chester

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April 10, 1959

Mr. Ed Murrow
CBS
485 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

In checking when I got back to the office I find that I did send you a copy of the report on the Freedom House Patterson Memorial Conference. But as you indicated, you have been overly-protected against exposure to first hand sources. So here's another copy.

It was delightful to see you planning the long-postponed withdrawal from schedule pontifications. I know you are going to enjoy every minute of it.

Do let us know when you can come out to Huntington with Janet and Casey.

Best wishes,

Sincerely,

Chet

Chester S. Williams

CSW:ps

Enc.

"ONE NATION INDIVISIBLE"

An American Dialogue on Race Relations and the Law

Robert P. Patterson Memorial Conference

Report by Oliver Allen
and Chester S. Williams

Published by
FREEDOM HOUSE
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New York 18, N. Y.

Twenty-five cents a copy — 100 copies $15.00

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INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Last September's angry events in Little Rock brusquely dramatized—and severely complicated—a major crisis of human relations in the United States. Suddenly the nation became aware, to its dismay, that the desegregation of the public schools of the United States, which the Supreme Court ruled must take place "with all deliberate speed" following its famous decision of May 17, 1954, was not going to come about as peacefully as earlier events had led many to expect. Race relations seemed at a strangely explosive impasse as an irresistible force of law met an immovable object of social customs built up over generations. Beclouded by misunderstandings and aggravated by bitterness on all sides, the dilemma was revealed anew as infinitely complex and profound. But the dilemma had to be faced and ways out of it sought, for the U. S. in the 20th century plainly could not afford any more Little Rocks.

To try to find pathways out of the crisis, an unusual conference was held last January 17-19 at Arden House in Harriman, N. Y. There a group of 38 distinguished educators, political leaders, authors, businessmen, lawyers and other public-spirited citizens of both races from 10 states in North and South met for a series of off-the-record discussions. They had experienced and grappled personally with the problem of race relations. They had real differences of opinion and met to probe their differences. The main thing they had in common was an overwhelming desire to find a constructive solution to the problem at hand. Given assurance that their remarks would not be attributed to them personally in any way, they spoke freely and with candor.

The conference was held in the name and the spirit of the late Robert P. Patterson, who in his many roles, including service as Secretary of War, personified devotion to country above party in time of national emergency. A grant made avail-

able to Freedom House by the Fund for the Republic was earmarked for this program.

This report attempts to sum up the flavor and content of the discussions as recorded in nearly 500 pages of transcript, and to provide the highlights of what turned out to be some very valuable and characteristically American dialogue. It is released by the Robert Patterson Memorial Committee of Freedom House and includes the names of those conferees who have agreed to make public their participation.

The Conference Committee earnestly hopes that this report will encourage other Americans, with honest differences of opinion, to have recourse to the democratic process of discussion in a search for alternatives to the current national debacle.

New York, April 18, 1958

I. BACKGROUND TO A CRISIS

One plain but alarming fact stands out in any consideration of America's racial dilemma. It is a fact on which all reasonable men are likely to agree, however reluctantly. The fact is, simply, that the race problem in the United States is not of merely local but of world-wide significance, and that on its reasonable solution our safety in the world may depend. It was on this note of somewhat disturbing unity that the Patterson Memorial Conference got under way.

The United States is in the throes of a social revolution which the whole world is watching. Caused by the powerful and unremitting pressure of one race to win for itself a measure of equality and recognition from another, the upheaval was given new impetus by the 1954 Supreme Court decision, a decision which highlighted and intensified the dislocations already under way. Today Americans are forced to deal at home with complex, emotionally-charged issues of human relations while countering unprecedented dangers from abroad, and what they do about the domestic problem strongly influences their capacity to meet the foreign threat.

"The best minds in the South," said one participant, "aren't working on the real problems of the world now. They are all preoccupied with this problem. They aren't thinking about foreign affairs, world policies, the strategy of the free world. They aren't thinking about freedom. They are just thinking about their own problem; they are thinking about nothing else."

"In our resistance to ruthless and cynical world communism," observed another leader, "we are engaged in the greatest struggle any nation or people has ever entered. And in part, it is a struggle for the minds of a majority of the world's population. This majority still uncommitted, is a non-white majority. There is no doubt about the extent to which our country is measured in the minds of these people in terms of its attitudes and practices regarding race.

"I believe that the world press showed that nothing raised our standing in Asia, the Middle East, even in Latin America and parts

of Europe, more than the announcement of the Supreme Court decision on the public schools, a decision which was hailed in the press in India. Conversely, I can't think of anything in recent years which has done us so much harm as the publicity about the tragic events in Little Rock—publicity which was exploited by the communists all over the world with telling effect."

A note of anxiety began to recur early in the discussions as conferees outlined the divisive, disruptive character of the problem and its effect on the people of the South.

"I am much disturbed by the situation as it now exists," said one Southerner, "and as it is developing throughout the South, because I think it could lead to dire consequences for the whole nation."

"Some of the best informed and most thoughtful people," said another, "feel that if this thing goes on, it will destroy this nation."

"Many of the women have a strong conviction," said a woman panelist, "that the law must be respected. They are greatly concerned about what the resistance to the Supreme Court decision has done to the young people in their attitude toward the law."

"In my community," reported a Southerner, "I saw many of our people transformed into individuals carrying loaded guns in their pockets. We did not know when serious violence might break out."

"You all cannot imagine how baffled we are," said another. "We do not see the next steps. We don't see the light on the path ahead at all. We don't know what to do."

But others looked beyond the pessimism and saw a hopeful outcome.

"It's true that the Little Rock experience was very costly to the country internationally," said a participant. "But it may prove to have a real constructive value internally. The question is, what might have been done to avoid the tragedy in Little Rock, and what can we do in our communities to prevent a repetition of it?"

Changing Patterns of Race Relations

Before essaying any actual roads to a solution of the problem, the two roundtable groups into which the conference was divided devoted several hours to developing a factual basis for further discussion. Several of the members were nationally recognized

experts who supplied background information from their studies. Many others gave revealing testimony from their own personal experience.

A measure of agreement soon became apparent here, too, as everyone recognized that racial problems are hardly the exclusive property of one region or one country.

> "Wherever two or more races are in contact with each other," someone remarked, "you have problems of race relations. That's true clear across the United States and all around the world. It's true in India. . . . We have had some of the most dramatic instances of racial feeling and racial discrimination among the colored people themselves. Now it's true that these problems take different forms in different parts of the country, but by and large these are differences in detail rather than in the fundamental nature of the problems.
>
> "Some of the issues we are discussing may go back beyond the murky mists of history. Some of them may be things that none of us feel we can understand. It seems to me that one of the things all of us can do is to suggest that we earn the right to have a view about such matters at a distance by doing what we can about the problems in our own neighborhoods; in this way we can develop some of the compassion that is needed to get at some of these questions."
>
> A Northerner echoed this by saying, "The discrimination practised in some of the Northern cities provides no basis for any feeling of a monopoly of moral virtue above the Mason-Dixon line."

Although the race situation in the U. S. has changed many times over the years, the history of race relations has had an oddly predictable course as it has swung back and forth like a pendulum.

> "Several times in our history," recalled one panel member, "We have seen a rigid, highly emotional hardening of white attitudes following a period of toleration—the hardening caused by a fear that drastic changes otherwise will occur. Up until the 1830's, for instance, it was perfectly proper for a white Southerner, a leader, to attack slavery as an evil and undesirable thing which must in time pass. As late as 1832 William Gaston, a justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court, in a commencement address made an all-out attack on slavery and was widely applauded in the state, because there was no real likelihood that anything would be done about slavery, and as long as there wasn't any, the free Negro population was growing slowly and had some place in the community.
>
> "Then came the abolitionist movement and the outbreak of slave insurrections and you had the rigid hardening of the slave codes.

This lasted right into the Civil War itself, and there was no change until it was broken up by force. Then you had the same thing happening again with respect not to slavery but to suffrage. As soon as federal troops were withdrawn in the 70's you had a quick period of violence through the Klan; that didn't eliminate Negro voting but did cut it down to a manageable level.

"With no real prospect of liberal Negro control, in the 90's you had the rise of the populist movement, which was able to carry many of the Southern states in the elections. Then, all of a sudden, the opportunity was open for large-scale Negro voting coupled with lower class white voting, and this gave suppressed economic groups, white and Negro together, a chance to participate in state governments. The result again was a rigid freezing with the rise of new organizations like the North Carolina Red Shirt Movement, and you had a series of acts, such as literacy tests and the 'grandfather clause' which stamped out Negro voting, which had become quite common by then. It took the depression to break that pattern as it had taken the Civil War to break the previous one.

During the '30's and '40's admission of Negroes to institutions of higher education and other softenings around the edge were tolerated without much excitement. After all, the basic structure was not being challenged. Then came the Supreme Court decision, producing the current wave of rigidity."

New Social and Economic Pressures

Throughout the United States vast social changes are taking place which affect the racial picture. As Southern whites and Negroes move to the North and Northern industry expands into the South—to name two current and simultaneous changes—new pressures are brought to bear on the political and economic scene. There are, so to speak, Southern communities in the North and Northern communities in the South and these two have had their effect on such matters as housing, employment and education. Often these social dislocations have a far greater effect on racial patterns and practices than do the most widely heralded court cases.

Among the trends the conference noted were these:

1. **Negroes moving.** As Negroes move to other parts of the U. S. they affect the color balance wherever they go.

"And the Negro will continue his pressure for release from the harsh and cruel aspects of segregation," said a Southern leader. "While I would like to think that the Negro is happier in my home town—individually—than he would be in Chicago in a strange environment, I am sure that he has one advantage in Chicago, and that is that a legal segregation must be lifted from him, and he no longer walks in the darkness of that handicap."

2. Shortage of skilled labor in the South. With Negro labor moving out and industry moving in there is more and more of a deficit in the human resource needed for the South's economic development.

"The real thing the South has is people," commented a Southern observer. "But we seem to be very eager to get rid of them. Many people with whom I have talked have been somewhat startled and concerned that most Southern people seem to think that this was a very fine thing, that one way to solve the race problem is to let the Negroes go and have our labor pool depleted rather than try to educate them and make them a skilled resource."

3. Rural-urban migration. In 1900 only 15 out of every 100 Americans lived in urban centers. By 1950 the ratio had become 50-50.

"Studies were done in Mississippi in population changes," reported a panelist, "the assumption being that everybody was getting on the Illinois Central and taking off for Chicago. Instead, Negro farmers were moving from one part of Mississippi to another part which had a very small Negro population, and going into the cities.

"The same thing is happening in Jackson, Mississippi that is happening in Washington, D. C. The white people are going into the suburbs, and the Negroes are moving into the central cities."

4. New urban problems. Radical changes in the racial composition of cities like Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit and New York are creating tensions and such interrelated problems as overcrowded housing, unemployment, greater need for social welfare agencies and increased strain on both medical facilities and schools. These conditions are complicated by loss of tax revenues as the middle class migrates out of these cities to the suburbs.

"Chicago is probably one of the hottest cities in the country in terms of the race picture," said one authority. "The St. Lawrence

Seaway plan is opening up a boom there, and they figure two million more people in Chicago in the years ahead.

"A very substantial number of these people will be Negro families. Chicago's residential development is peculiar. It has been spotty, and already there has been a spotting of Negro families outside of the so-called Black Belt. There is a shortage of housing, and this makes for a great deal of antagonism.

"This kind of thing swamps the public housing programs. It swamps any neighborhood that offers reasonably cheap rents, and where white and Negro families both are just on that borderline where they almost have their feet out of the muck."

5. **Overcharging.** The urban housing shortage works special hardships on Negroes, Puerto Ricans and other minorities, who are usually charged more for less.

"They see the pressures of population moving in on them before they can get the money for the next rental payment."

6. **Pressure of Negro middle class.** As more Negroes move into the skilled, professional and business fields, new pressure is exerted for access to better housing, public services, and educational opportunities everywhere.

"We have a situation in Atlanta that is a little different from anybody's in the world. We have developments of the suburban type for Negroes in Atlanta and the result is that Atlanta probably has the best housing among Negro people anywhere in the world. We have been able to develop whole suburban areas with Negro capital and federal capital, with the result that we have a showplace right now for any visitor who comes in."

7. **"Panic" selling.** Racial changes in neighborhoods through property sales are occurring both in the North and the South, with the initial resistance usually greater in the North. It is hard to tell whether the resistance is caused more by racial feelings or by fear of property devaluation. In the latter instance a curious corollary is that often, after the first sale, competition among Negro buyers forces real estate prices up.

"While you might have panic selling in Northern areas when a Negro family moves into a community," observed a participant, "in the South I think you are likely to find that the values of houses increase when a Negro family moves in. The man who sells his house

first might sell it at a nominal figure, but the man next door who has an opportunity to sell his house to a Negro family immediately doubles or at least vastly increases the price of his house, and pretty nearly gets it.

"Then you get all this wholesale selling, because everybody in the community finds he can get a little more for his house than he thought it was worth. And meanwhile he can move to suburbia."

8. Discrimination in hiring. Many of the new textile mills in the South have maintained the segregation customs of their new communities, though International Harvester and Firestone have been cited as encouraging exceptions to the practice. In the North, though there is much silent discrimination, there is also an increased demand for genuinely skilled Negro labor.

"One trouble is that in the professional fields Negro education has only recently been producing men at the graduate level who can fill responsible posts in large numbers. And then when employers go out to look for people of this sort, rosters and employment agencies break down. There doesn't seem to be any way of locating the right people."

"I think," replied someone, "that the problem is not one of employment, but underemployment. I think there are a good many Negroes who could do a good deal more than they have a chance to do."

"The American people," added another, "have made a tremendous mistake, both in the North and the South, in not trying to discover—and discover early—the folks who have brains, children with talent. Find this talent! The country needs it. There's a lot of talent among Negroes that is just—well, we haven't discovered it, and where we have discovered it there's very often a lack of motivation, and there is also a lack of finances to enable these youngsters to go on."

9. Increased Negro purchasing power. Especially in the South, Negro economic advancement has had a marked effect on commercial establishments which are forced to question certain segregation practices in order to attract the Negroes' patronage.

10. The varied picture in education. The racial make-up of both Northern and Southern school districts is highly complex, as revealed by the following series of roundtable remarks:

"Statistically, this may interest you," remarked a school expert. "There are some 9000 school districts in the 17 states affected by the

Supreme Court decision. But only 3008 have pupils of both races. So in only one third of the school districts affected is there now a problem of desegregation.

"I think the general impression, looking from the North down at the South, is that there is a considerable intermixture of races. But it is really quite spotty from area to area. There are four counties in Georgia without any Negro school children, and I think there are 13 counties in Tennessee without any Negro residents."

"And 6000 districts have only one race?" asked another panelist.

"In 6000 districts the school children are either all white or all Negro."

Asked another, "Would you define 'district' a little more clearly? In Florida you have huge school districts, in Kentucky tiny ones."

"There's no way to define a school district by size. The jurisdiction can be for just one school, or a county school system or a city system. In Missouri nearly every school is a district unto itself with its own school board."

"Have these districts been gerrymandered?"

"A few recently, perhaps, but not necessarily. In the cities, at least, the districts have grown up around housing areas. It's perfectly normal to have a Negro school in a Negro residential district."

"What is the situation in the 3000 mixed districts?"

"Since 1954, 762 have desegregated in practice or policy. Of these, all but 15 are in the border states or Texas. None are in the 'deep South' where about 60 percent of your Negro children of school age live."

"All this would indicate," observed another, "that there is a great deal more segregation in housing in the South than we have been told."

"As for population," the school expert added, "the total school attendance in the 9000 districts is about 9 million whites and 2.7 million Negroes. Of this total of nearly 12 million children only about 2 million white children and 375,000 Negro children are in what could be called integrated situations. Most of the Negro children live in the cities of Baltimore, St. Louis, Washington, Louisville, Kansas City and so forth—the large cities of the border states. Texas has 841 school districts with children of both races and of these just 123 have been desegregated."

New Attitudes Among White and Negro

Out of the factors noted above and out of the 1954 Supreme Court decision have come new attitudes toward the racial situation on the part of both whites and Negroes.

1. Segregation vs. exclusion. In the South, with fairly stable neighborhood arrangements, the focus is on segregation in the schools, but in the more geographically fluid North the focus is on housing and property exclusiveness.

"Just recently," said a Northerner, "I read an article that said we are headed for a great deal of racial tension in the North as a result of the housing pattern, and that what is happening in the South is just a dress rehearsal. Personally I do not quite agree. I think Northern communities can absorb a rather considerable increase in their Negro populations, and while there will be some tension and difficulty, and I don't mean to say there won't be, I don't see the element of terror or of real pressure. You get exclusive clubs, exclusive social life, churches, Bronxville, et cetera—but it isn't segregation as a concept."

"If somebody gets hit, though," replied a Southerner, "it doesn't make any difference what hit him, whether it's a piece of lead pipe or a brick. Like the business in Levittown, Pa.—it doesn't matter what the reason behind it is, whether it's exclusiveness or racism, when the guy gets hit."

"I think it does," said the Northerner.

"Not to him."

"Yes, to him too. In Levittown the police were basically committed to the proposition of law and order. The Negro who went in maybe felt he was getting the rough edge of things, but in the long run he felt that the weight of the thing was on his side."

2. World-wide color consciousness. What is happening in the United States is only an echo of the rise of non-white peoples all over the world.

"The American Negroes," observed a New Yorker, "are sharing in this world-wide color consciousness. The whites are a minority of the two and one-half billion people on this planet. We shouldn't forget that."

"There has been a shift in the white South's position," added someone else, "into a definite minority psychology. The white South

thought of itself as a majority, and it did a very effective job of persuading the North for a long time. The realization recently by the Southern whites that they could no longer identify themselves with the nationwide majority came as something of a shock, and I think this precipitated a change. A majority can permit difference of opinion and dissent but a minority finds it more difficult. The South's realization of its minority status has produced a tightening of the lines, demands for unity and the crushing of dissent."

3. Young people's feelings. A large proportion of younger people, especially those with a college education, have shown a readiness to break with custom and adopt more liberal viewpoints. This is true of both races and further complicates regional attitudes.

"Of all the polls that have been conducted on campuses," observed one expert, "almost all show that the attitude of college students and even of high school students is different from that of the generations before them."

"One reason might be," replied someone, "that the parents are not the product of modern schools. They didn't come out of the new type of school, if they came out of school at all."

4. Fears and frustrations. Economic and racial dislocations have sharpened the hatreds and bitterness already present in some of the poorer elements of the population.

"People who haven't been able to make a living for 120 years in those hillsides in East Tennessee—they are the ones who made most of the trouble at Clinton," said a resident of the South. "It was a perfect spot for them to come together and try to get back at all their frustrations."

"I hope," replied a Northerner, "that all of us saw that news item recently about the five boys who were arrested in Queens, N. Y.—a borough of New York City—for trying to steal money from a church in order to build up an organization to save the Nordic race. If any of us have any traces of holier-than-thou feeling about the North, it would be good for us to reconsider."

II. THE 1954 DECISION

For all its tremendous impact, the Supreme Court's decision of May 17, 1954, which ruled against racial segregation in the public schools of the United States, is misunderstood throughout much of the nation. Of those who have some knowledge of it—and a surprising percentage of Americans have never heard of it at all—many think that it is a political edict requiring immediate integration of the races in all public schools everywhere. Others—and this includes a large proportion of the educated white South—believe that because the 1954 decision was a reversal of a ruling which had been accepted for more than 50 years, and because the Court is politically appointed and could conceivably change its mind again, the 1954 ruling will somehow go away if nobody pays much attention to it. Out of these two misconceptions has come much of the South's defiance and intransigeance of the past four years.

The conference was particularly fortunate, therefore, in being able to hear from an experienced and well-informed lawyer, who gave a reasoned explanation of what the decision means.

> "A particular decision," he noted, "decides only the particular case that is before the Court. But if this decision results in a new interpretation of the Constitution, the Court's resulting interpretation is immediately binding on all the lower federal courts, and indeed on all the state courts as well. In order to produce a similar decision on a different set of circumstances another suit may have to be brought in the courts. But when this happens the federal court concerned would ordinarily follow the Supreme Court's judgment in disposing of that suit. Thus the many suits that have been brought in other states since the basic decision in 1954 have all come out the same way as the 1954 one, because all those courts were bound by the oath of the judges to obey the Constitution of the United States. And what the Constitution says is what the Supreme Court says that it says."

Beyond the basic ruling, however, there is the question of how the decision is to be enforced. A year after its original decision

the Supreme Court decreed that the specific formulas for compliance were to be adjudicated by the lower federal courts, and that compliance should take place "with all deliberate speed." Each new interpretation from a district court has therefore been given much attention.

> "The most recent interpretation," continued the lawyer, "was written by Judge Richard R. Rives for the U. S. Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit, sitting in New Orleans on December 27, 1957. Judge Rives said that although the Supreme Court forbade discrimination against entrants to public schools on the grounds of race, it did not require that anybody go to any particular school, or that schools should combine the races.
>
> "The problem, therefore, is whether a particular student seeking entrance to a public school is denied entrance upon grounds of race; I think that's a fair interpretation of the decision."

Judge Rives' decision was significant in that it reversed the judgment of a federal district court that had ordered systemwide desegregation without a full hearing of local communities' plans for compliance. The conference had before it a report on the Rives ruling, including the language he quoted from another court to support his opinion that "only racially *discriminatory* segregation in the public schools is forbidden."

> The Supreme Court's rulings, Judge Rives went on, "do not compel the mixing of the different races in the public schools. . . . The order of the court is simply that no child shall be denied admission to a school on the basis of race or color. Indeed, just so a child is not through any form of compulsion or pressure required to stay in a certain school, or denied transfer to another school, because of his race or color, the school heads may allow the pupil, whether white or Negro, to go to the same school as he would have attended in the absence of the ruling of the Supreme Court. . . ."

The decision's immediate effects

In the heat of today's controversy it is often forgotten that the nation's first reaction to the 1954 decision was favorable, and even in the South it was not received with violent antagonism. Feelings of resignation—that the decision "was bound to come sooner or later"—were mingled with those of relief—that it finally had settled the question—and of cautious compliance—"we can

live with this." It was only as time went on that the spirit of resistance rose and antagonistic attitudes crystallized.

> "My first reaction to it," said a Southern observer, "was: this is good. I felt we had to do something to improve our prestige abroad. There was no immediate outcry from the people. But finally there was a delayed explosion. The violent reaction began among the poorer people and gradually the feeling spread until it embraced the most 'aristocratic.' It reached a peak when the President sent troops to Little Rock."

> "If somehow we could reestablish the kind of understanding," offered another man from the South, "that we seemed to have immediately after the Supreme Court decision in some of the public statements to the press, even from the politicians—if there could be some reminder that that frame of mind did exist—then I think there might be some kind of moving forward in this situation."

As attitudes hardened in the months after the decision, segments of the Southern population made known their various feelings.

1. **Politicians.** For many office holders the Court's ruling was a great stroke of good fortune—an issue they could ride indefinitely.

> "It is a beautiful train to ride," said one who is involved in political life. "The hysteria that comes when race feeling is involved is just the easiest thing in the world to ride. The politician who does this plays on all those elements that are ignoble in human life—envy and suspicion and misunderstanding."

2. **The press.** Newspapers in the South were never particularly favorable to the decision, and even those originally neutral have in the intervening years come out against desegregation. In 1954 only 12 of the South's 30 leading dailies could be counted as not strongly opposed to compliance. Since then the number has dropped to nine.

3. **Business leaders.** While they may have strong private feelings against desegregation, Southern businessmen as a group have a vested interest in peaceful economic development. Those who have been working to lure Northern capital into the South have a special fear of disorder.

A Southern industrialist is quoted in Harry Ashmore's book, *An Epitaph for Dixie*: "My God, if the Klan starts riding again and kicking Nigras around, my company couldn't borrow fifty cents in Wall Street. And nobody in his right mind would build a plant in a town where people are throwing dynamite at each other. What we've been selling is peace and order—telling 'em that what we've got down here is stability."

4. Rural populations. Back country people had a reason all their own for objecting to desegregation.

"What a lot of people fail to understand," said one who knows the country folk, "is that in the South, and especially in the rural communities, the school is a social center, very definitely. It is often said that the Negro has no desire to invade the purely social life of the white people. But in the case of the rural schools you can't get away from the social side of it."

5. The clergy. A number of Southern ministers, especially in the rural areas, denounce the Supreme Court's ruling as contrary to what they claim is the Bible's approval of segregation. A preponderant number of the clergy—perhaps the majority—believe in desegregation but are afraid to speak out. A growing minority is outspokenly against segregation. Its ranks have been strengthened greatly by the recent joint statement of 80 Atlanta ministers urging obedience to the law. But the clergy's influence among laymen is problematical.

"The ministers are beginning to realize," said one panelist, "that they have not educated their people. When you get what we call a church court assembled—that's an assembly of both ministers and laymen in the Presbyterian church—a curious thing happens to these laymen. When they are away from home at the church court they will vote for the right thing. But when they go home, back to their own congregation, they wouldn't dare vote the same way."

6. Diehard organizations. Since 1954 more than 50 segregationist organizations have been formed in the South. Of these the most powerful have been the White Citizens' Councils (in some states they have other titles like Patriots or States Rightists), and in the Northern mind they are associated with the most rabid stand. Several moderate Southerners at the conference reported that this view was oversimplified.

"I am not a member of the Citizens' Council, or the Patriots, or any of these groups, but I would like to call attention to the fact that despite a very explosive situation there have been very few acts of violence. Had it not been for the Citizens' Councils, made up of some good men, some good citizens, some believers in peace among the others, there would have been in the South the other extreme, the Ku Klux Klan. At any rate, their role has not been completely that of agitator. They have held down some trouble, I think."

"I agree, with reservations," said another moderate. "I think you have to distinguish between Citizens' Councils. They are part of the Southern scene, and they are free to advocate what they believe in, and where they link it to a nonviolent approach I find little fault in it. . . . Now in my state they don't seem to work out that way. They've been pretty much on the side of violence."

"I think it would be unrealistic, though," observed a third, "not to recognize that the White Citizens' Councils are made up of very sophisticated people. The white sheets and terror of the Klan aren't effective any more, and they know that, but there are other methods that are equally effective, if not more effective in the long run. It's more effective, for example, to bring economic pressure."

7. **Traditionalists.** Many older white people in the South experienced a kind of shock at the sudden overturning of a legal principle which had stood strongly for more than 50 years.

"My generation, rightly or wrongly," observed one panel member, "was brought up to believe that 'separate but equal' was the law of the land. We thought it was a part of the Constitution of the United States. Of course we had received ample warning. The Supreme Court's decisions leading up to the 1954 one had given us notice, but notice wasn't taken by many people, and actually the Court's ruling came as a terrific psychological shock to the masses of people.

"These people believe that they live in a government based on consent, and they are outraged that this decision, which changes the whole social pattern of life, was made in court by persons whom they have not chosen."

Given this viewpoint, it has not been difficult for traditionalists to argue that the Court—whose decisions never affected them so profoundly in the past—had somehow exceeded its authority and was exercising power that properly belonged to the legislative branch.

"I wonder how much of a threat," asked one Southern panelist on behalf of these protagonists, "is posed to our liberties by a situation,

not just this particular decision, but any decision which allows nine men to interpret the Constitution in the light of political and social theories that are their own? Haven't we set up a dictatorship of the judiciary? And what is to prevent there coming a time when, by some strange freak—I'm confident it will never happen—when there shall be nine men, or five men, of entirely different social views to change it again?"

"The 1954 decision was consistent with the whole course of Supreme Court history," replied a Northern lawyer, "in that the Court has always taken the view that in interpreting the Constitution of the United States it was never bound—as it considers itself bound in most other fields—by mere precedent, because the problem is to interpret the Constitution correctly. If an error was made by an earlier Court, it ought to be corrected."

8. The Negroes. The group most directly affected by the 1954 decision, the Southern Negroes, received it with apprehension and a sense of caution. It gave them a new sense of status and a feeling of confidence in due process of law and led many to expect an early deliverance from the stigma of "second class citizenship." But few of them outside the border states have moved to take advantage of their new legal status.

The decision's long-term effects

Of the many repercussions of the 1954 decision, two big problems stand out in bold relief. The conferees agreed that these problems are of far greater consequence than any others, and that their seeming insolubility forms the core of today's racial distress.

1. The breakdown of communication. The upsetting of old customs and old relationships produced a climate of suspicion and distrust which has largely throttled communication not only between whites and Negroes but also among whites themselves and among Negroes. There is a disinclination to sit down and talk about ways out of the morass. Many at the conference gave eloquent testimony to this calamity.

"The thing that troubles me most in my part of the South is that communication between the two races has broken down almost entirely at the level of the most intelligent and thoughtful leadership of both groups."

"We had this business of communication all worked out in the South, and then it got disrupted. In slavery times there was lots of communication: the slave said what the white man wanted him to say. It worked perfectly. It seems to me that now for the first time the Southern white man is seeing the Negro as an equal, and this is a new kind of communication."

"I don't think in my lifetime there has ever been as little communication between responsible leaders of the two races as there is now. In my part of the South there is increasing mistrust and dislike and concealed resentment. I hear things said on both sides that wouldn't have been said a few years ago."

"This isn't entirely a white problem. The Negro leader, North or South; the Negro leader from the North going South; the Negro leader in the South; all have problems of communication with the mass of Negroes, and this is especially true when you go into the smaller towns, the towns with a population of 10,000 or so."

"They taught me an expression in Georgia, something that Negroes use. They say someone is 'talking at the big gate.' You see, down from the big house is the big gate. When he gets there he is likely to say what he really thinks; he wouldn't say it when he's up talking to the resident of the big house. I discovered in the South that there was a very great deal of that. The communication has been about what the majority group wanted to talk about.

"Now something has happened, the Negroes aren't talking at all, and we have got to find out whether Negroes are thinking a lot differently and acting differently from the way they did before."

"In the South in the old days there was a sense of humor. The situation was miserable, but the white man and the Negro could laugh with each other as they discussed it, each with a certain understanding of the other's position, yet the white man never completely understanding the Negro. I think one of the greatest fallacies about the South is that we Southerners say we understand the Negro. I don't think we do.

"All that sense of humor has gone now. There is a grimness. Nobody is laughing any more."

2. The silence of the moderates. The reasonable, cautious, liberal-minded people of the community have been afraid to speak up. The loudest voices have been those of the extremists, on the one hand saying "Now!" and on the other "Never!"

"Most of the people whom you would ordinarily think of as providing leadership in the community have been rendered speechless by the fact that the extremists have taken over."

"This thing has deteriorated. We have come to a situation where extremism is in control on both sides. We are at a complete impasse. Not only is there no communication, but the minute a person gives evidence that he has taken one side or another, he becomes the focus of attack."

"From what I have heard I gather that the tendency to extremism has characterized both sides, both races, and that the breakdown in communication has been caused by a hardening, an intensification, of feeling in both directions.

"It is worth noting, however," commented a religious leader, "that extremes are measured not only in terms of position but in terms of process. When we think of the NAACP as one of the extremes, it seems to me we leave out of account the fact that they are proceeding by due process, while the others are proceeding by nullification. As we press for justice we must not allow those who use due process to be arbitrarily considered as extremists."

III. "ALL DELIBERATE SPEED"

Before reasonable men can come to a meeting of minds on **what** can be done about the present crisis, the conference found the question of **how soon** must generally be faced. From Southern leaders, both moderate and conservative, comes a repeated and fervent plea for more time. Only if we are given more time, they say, can we even begin to talk about a solution. That the plea is largely a defensive move among the diehards even the moderates do not deny, but the latter have good reasons of their own for calling for time as they do. Sharp and bitter incidents have occurred in the past four years, and the moderates know that far too often such incidents aid the extremists. Theoretically therefore anything which calms the waters should help. One way to achieve calm, they reason, is to slow everything down. Because there is a widespread belief through the South that a "timetable exists for desegregation and that it is preordained (without regard for local conditions) by the federal government in concert with the NAACP, the plea for time is generally directed Northward.

"If you continue putting on force," said one Southerner, "and if you keep on saying 'you must do it now,' the time could very well come in several states of the South when they will close down their public school systems. And then, as far as losing face in international affairs is concerned, we will really have lost it."

"I am convinced," said another, "that if we try to move too rapidly with the school problem—and I'm dealing at this moment only with the schools, not with areas like transportation where there has been a surprising change in segregation patterns—we will have violence in the deep South. We will have it even with federal troops. We had only minor incidents at Little Rock—no deaths, no bloodshed —but I am convinced that in areas of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina and some other states you would confront a much more violent situation.

"It takes a long time," observed a third, "to develop the desire in people for schooling. I am thinking about these millions of little children who need the schooling, and the interest of our country in giving it to them. But if we are going to protect the interests of this

present generation of Negro children, and many of our white children, we must somehow find a way to slow down. I think our Supreme Court may have been wiser than it knew when it used the term 'deliberate speed.' We must put more emphasis on the deliberate than on the speed. Now, I think if we can find a way to stay the impending danger so that these young folks will get their schooling, we can then perhaps relieve the tension."

"The Supreme Court was right in its decision," observed a Southern woman, "and the South is going to have to find a way of accepting this. It was a decision which had to be made some time. The Negro would not have been given these rights for many years without federal action. But I feel also that no matter when this decision came it was bound to be too early for the South, both Negro and white. Unless you are living side by side with the Negro and the white Southerner I do not see how you can understand the situation—it only takes a little time away from it for it to grow dim."

The appeal for time gives rise to two difficult questions: if time is given, how will it be used? And even if there is some agreement to grant more time, who has the power to grant it?

How is the time to be used?

Almost four years have passed since the Supreme Court handed down its decision, and in those four years only some seven hundred out of three thousand school districts have been desegregated. This has caused even some moderate Southerners to wonder who would actually benefit from any granting of time, and how such time would be used.

"I am willing to admit that time may be needed in Arkansas, after what they have been through," said a conferee, "but in Virginia the plea for time troubles me. What is going to be the result of more time in a state like Virginia? The past three years have been used in Virginia to drive the moderates underground. As everyone knows, there isn't a single school district thus far in the entire state complying with the Court's ruling. The time has been used to create a totalitarian atmosphere. It has been used to silence all questions with smears. . . . If more time can be used by moderates to reestablish communications, to create understanding, then, fine! But the question haunts me."

The most reasoned spelling out of how the time was to be used came from one who had observed racial disorder at first hand.

"As one advocate of time concession," he remarked, "I would say that it is purely to suspend for a little while further federal government pressures, because official pressures exacerbate the problem of discussion at the local level. And the local community is one place where you can really make progress, if a discussion in which change is advocated doesn't put you on the side of those advocating force from outside the community and outside the state."

But he was challenged by a participant who wanted a further definition of the "pressures" to be suspended.

"There has been no legislative pressure from Washington," said the questioner. "There has been no executive pressure. I presume you mean court pressure?"

"Well," came the reply, "I mean a gesture of understanding of the difficulties which beset the South. I see no reason for those outside the South objecting to that kind of plea in good faith by the moderates, by those who believe in justice and equality and the elimination of segregation; because ultimately this must be done. I think it's the clearing of the atmosphere, really, that we are pleading for. But coupled with that we would hope for the suspension of too much coercion, sweepingly applied."

"If there is going to be time," remarked someone else, "the time should be used to enable those moderates who are willing to act to begin to devise strategies for action in a variety of local communities which will recreate the possibility of negotiation."

Because the role of the federal government is inextricably involved in any consideration of how much time there is and how much can be granted, two comments from persons who had witnessed the Little Rock crisis last fall were meaningful.

"Not enough attention," said one, "has been directed to the policies of the federal government, or more properly to the lack of them. It is a vast distance from the Supreme Court decision of May, 1954, which was moderate and actually gradualistic in its practical application, to the final resort to armed force by the President in Little Rock three years later. And it is a distance that spans a critical void, for while some of the Southern political leaders were, by design or default, paving the way for massive resistance, the federal government took no single, constructive step in recognition of a worsening situation.

"The consequences are now evident. When the inevitable direct challenge came, there was no plan to meet it. The attempts at conciliation were bound to be futile since the situation had already deteriorated to the point where compromise was impossible."

"I am inclined to think," said the other when asked what lessons could be learned from the Little Rock disturbance, "that perhaps if the federal court had used its marshals to enforce the order of the court, which is usually done in cases when the federal court issues an injunction, perhaps the ardor of those disturbers would have been cooled. They should have been brought down to the federal court by the marshal and fined. You know, not a person has yet been charged with violating the injunction of the court."

A further comment came from a border state resident:

"I think it would be of service," he said, "in moving toward a reasonable approach, to keep in mind, when we speak of moderation and time and the things we are going to compromise on, that a lot of moderation went into the Supreme Court decision, and a lot of moderation and compromise goes into individual cases as they come up.

"I don't think of this decision or the effort to implement it as extreme. It is itself a compromise, and it seems to me that we must keep that before the people when we talk to them. Otherwise we may find ourselves compromising until nothing substantial is left."

Who can grant more time?

Throughout the discussions of time and how it was to be used ran an undercurrent of questioning: if time is to be given, who can give it, and how? Can the processes of history and the demands of great bodies of public opinion really be slowed down or ameliorated? If so, by whom?

"The roots of these pressures," said a Negro participant, "are in people's minds and hearts and aspirations. They are not faucets that can be turned on and off. There is an awakening of Negroes in the South to the values of our way of life, to concepts that were not familiar to them before. And the pressures arise oftentimes because these things are in the air. Events develop out of decisions of individuals. Rosa Parks' decision not to move to the rear of the bus in Montgomery was a spontaneous one. You cannot control that kind of decision. I'm afraid there isn't enough appreciation of this fact; there is a tendency to assume that somebody or some organization can turn these pressures on and off."

"I think one of the most appalling things in the South today," remarked a woman participant, "is how little the white Southerners understand the movement in the hearts of the Negro Southerners. They want to believe—and they do believe in a majority of cases—that this is something imposed from the outside, that other forces are

bringing this in, stirring up trouble; but, as someone has told us, the thing that's moving in the hearts of people in Montgomery is the same thing that's moving in the hearts of people in Mandalay today."

"The most the NAACP can do," said a Northener, "is to say in a particular place 'We will' or 'We will not' press a particular suit at this time. But they can't even control this, because a parent may decide that he's tired of waiting, for one reason or another—inferior teaching, or because the child, he feels, is getting wrong attitudes or has too narrow a racial approach to things—he may decide he doesn't want his child to go to the Negro school any more, so he's willing to force the issue of attendance in the white school. And then the organizations have no choice, because they can't let this person down. They have to move."

Perhaps the only releasing of pressure that could be effected in any way is the kind the federal government can grant, as pointed out by the spokesman above who asked for "a gesture of understanding." But even this careful and thoughtful a plea must take into consideration the pressures that are constantly brought to bear on the federal government itself. They are pressures which cannot and should not be ignored.

"I'm troubled about one thing," said a Northerner. "Almost nothing has been said about Northern sentiment, Northern agitators. A great many advances in the South have been brought about by Northern agitation. It required Northern agitation to get some action on the poll tax, didn't it? Lynching! Lynching was an evil from 1865 to 1915, and I don't think it was stamped out until the Northern agitation became very vehement.

"I would be all for removing pressures on the South—that is, Northern pressures on the South—but I think Northern pressures on the South will have to be replaced by some Southern pressures for action, or else the old agitation will spring up spontaneously. It can't be governed."

In a lighter vein another Northerner echoed him.

"I'd like to know what is meant by that plea for more time. Does it mean that for the next six months, a year, two years, Northern citizens and Northern newspapers should not publically criticize the present government of Virginia? If these people think that I should refrain from criticizing Mr. Byrd and the State of Virginia they can jump in the lake. I hope that when they talk about easing of pressure they don't mean that I am going to keep my big mouth shut for three years, because I'm not going to do that."

IV. COMMON GROUND

Despite many differences of view on specific points, the participants in the Patterson Memorial Conference discovered that on some of the larger issues they were very much in agreement. This in itself was an encouraging sign, one that gives hope for the future of the racial situation in America. For if moderate men and women of both races can get together and evoke such a large area of unanimity there is reason to believe that others of reasonable disposition and outlook in both North and South can do the same, with results of positive value.

First of all there was a basic, if not directly stated, agreement on some fundamental values which bear on the problem:

A. What is inevitable. Two powerful forces are at work in the nation, both impossible to deny and both capable of producing strong feelings and dramatic, sometimes catastrophic events.

1. The rise of the Negro people. The demand of Negroes in both North and South for better schooling, better housing and greater economic opportunity cannot be pushed aside.

2. The conservative resistance. Southern feelings of rigidity against school desegregation and Northern fears of housing devaluation strike deep. Although it is the extremists who try to exploit these emotions, many cautious but fearful moderates bow to them in times of stress and crisis.

B. What is mandatory. In the face of strong popular feelings and crosscurrents, certain fundamental American ideals and standards must be maintained and reaffirmed.

1. Respect for the law. Because we live in a government of law, not of men, we must at all times protect the principle of due process.

2. Education for all. The right of every American child to receive the best possible schooling at public expense is not only a

cornerstone of our social system but a necessary guarantee of our future safety.

"We must have training," said a Southerner. "We must educate the people. It's compulsory upon all of us in America. We must raise the standard of all the Negro people throughout the South. We have got to do it as a matter of safety, as protection for ourselves; for health; and for the generations of minds that will develop future cultural ideals."

3. Equality of opportunity. Of all the rights to be protected, this is the most valuable and critical.

"The concept of equality of opportunity," said a prominent lawyer at the conference, "while it is not specifically a constitutional principle, it is at the very root of the American notion that there shall be unlimited opportunity for American citizens and those in the United States who are not citizens. Our people should be allowed to realize the fullest reach to which their effort and energy and capacity may entitle them.

"If anybody were to say to any American, 'You tell me what you think the most basic principle is,' he would undoubtedly answer equality of opportunity."

4. No coercion. Moral and social judgments imposed under a bayonet are not very effective.

"Here in the element of morality," said one speaker, "I think you find the core of the problem. For no problem is ever settled until it is settled right. We'd better accept that as a background for all of our thinking."

5. Sense of responsibility on both sides. Not only must whites allow the Negro to make his way toward his rightful place in society but they must help the Negro to live up to the new responsibilities this requires.

"I do feel that the white people have overprotected the colored people," remarked a panelist from the South. "It's a definite fault on the part of the whites to protect the Negroes as you would a child, and the Negroes to look for that rather than to seek responsibility."

"There has to be trust in a person," said a Northerner. "There has to be an element of personal trust before the Negro who, after all, has been engaged in a very severe, now almost century-old fight for survival, will have trust in return."

6. Clarity of national policy. With the possibility of new

racial crises always present it is imperative that there be firmer, clearer leadership from Washington. It was significant that no one at the conference seriously disputed the indictment made by one Southern moderate.

> "I recognize that I am a partisan," he said, "but I think we have had a bankruptcy of leadership in the last three years in this respect which is perfectly appalling. The President of the United States has done nothing to make it easier for moderates to rally the forces of decency."

C. What is misunderstood. The conferees were eager to work toward dispelling the many misunderstandings which needlessly hamstring so many efforts toward racial harmony.

1. The Supreme Court's decision will not go away.

> "I think it would be astonishing," said a Southerner, "to most Northerners to realize how many people you talk with throughout the South who feel that this is a momentary unhappiness, a sort of affliction that is either going to be repealed or, by their lack of approval of it, is going to be modified so greatly that they will not have to comply."

2. The crisis is not a creature of the North.

> "The white South," said a panel member, "has a misconception that the NAACP has come in and stirred up perfectly happy, contented, nice colored people. They don't resent their own colored people, and I don't think they would resent local leadership asking and getting done what should be done, but they do resent outsiders."

3. Nor is complete integration necessarily the goal.

> "I think that the white South has not been touched in a communication of what the Negro really wants. I recall one very eminent Negro saying once that he didn't want to be with anybody—he simply didn't want to be locked out because of his color. How can we communicate to the South that the Negro merely wants the same simple human dignities? We feel in our community that the real demand among the Negroes is for the removal of the stigma of inequality."
>
> "It's sometimes difficult to say what the Negro wants," said a Negro panelist, "in the sense of being with white people, except to say that he does not want to be, per se, with anybody. He wants the opportunity. He wants the right."
>
> "As I understand the situation," said another Negro, "it seems to me that we would be very much helped if we thought of the word

'desegregation' rather than 'integration.' I think they are two different concepts, and bearing this in mind makes it much easier to understand, really, what I conceive to be the Court's decision; that is, that it is to avoid any discrimination on account of race. It is not a forcing of anything. It is an elimination of artificial barriers."

D. What our assets are. Not all the forces at work are negative, destructive ones.

1. Economic progress in the South. The need for trained manpower and for industrial and commercial expansion throughout the South helps break down racial barriers.

"You can't industrialize and keep segregation," said a conferee. "After you get beyond a certain point you can't perpetuate this thing. If you have an expanding community and expanding job opportunities, and people recognize this as a central factor in their prosperity, then there is more incentive to pass legislation. Here is a whole new market, and the entrepreneurs don't want to get caught in the radical squeeze."

"The Firestone company," reported another, "granted desegregation as a result of court action. They had wanted to give in, but a majority in the white union of the rubber workers did not want certain Negroes to get positions that their skill entitled them to. So they went to court, and under the court's ruling a plan was worked out between management and the union that permitted the progress of these Negroes, and it was all done quietly."

2. Countrywide distaste for violence. The American instinct for fair play limits the effectiveness of extremists.

"Whatever people feel about the social patterns in Little Rock," said one who had observed that scene, "its citizens are people who believe in law and order. The violence that was done, the first threats that were made, the political results that were finally brought about, were by a well-organized minority predominantly from outside the city."

3. Flexibility of the Court's decree. The elastic but gently insistent "all deliberate speed" formula allows for an infinite number of solutions to an almost infinite number of problems.

"I always had the feeling," commented a panel member, "that the white South was disturbed over the high school situation much more than over the grammar school situation, and I have once or twice proposed that we go back to separate high schools on the basis of sex in the hope that that would give the South some feeling of,

maybe, escape on this social angle of the situation. At least it is one way out."

4. Past accomplishments. The number of victories already won point the way to future gains. Principally, these consist of the desegregating of institutions of higher education and the opening of public facilities such as transportation and park services.

Using these values as a fromework the conference went on to tackle the core of the problem: what can be done. Two steps were recognized as having paramount importance: an immediate resumption of communication and a return of the moderates in the South to the center of the stage.

Building A Bridge of Communication

The prime task ahead is the restoration of bridges of understanding—between the two races and among the members of each race.

Quite early in the conference someone identified the key to restoring communications. It is to be content with small steps, and to find issues other than racial ones on which to start talking.

"It has been obvious," he said, "that if you say your objective is to integrate or to resist integration, either statement tends to feed the fire of the extremist. So you have to express your objective in a way that will mitigate rather than increase tension.

"Now, if you are out to achieve a complex objective, the way to begin is to fiind a series of possible sub-objectives toward which to work. You have to bite off chunks of this thing and find a way to make those chunks practicable.

"One way is to express the issue locally—get it focused on local communities. Another way is to express it economically. Another would be religiously."

"In my humble judgment," said another panelist, "we shall or shall not make progress in solving our racial problems to the extent that we are able to get the two groups to sit down together, consciously sitting down together to work on some common problems. Maybe they would not be racial problems to begin with; but the very fact psychologically of Negroes and whites sitting down together to work on common problems would, I believe, go a long way toward

building up that climate in which they could then begin to work on some of the more explosive and difficult questions."

"I don't think it's fair," observed a Northerner, "to ask people to sacrifice just for the good of humanity. I do know that most advances in civil rights—the larger ones—have been tied into something bigger that was a real concern, economically or materially."

Several panelists suggested that because extremists invariably "go to the limit" in any controversy, it is important in any attempt at opening up avenues of communication to keep from discussing ultimate aims.

"It seems to me that a Southerner can keep his beliefs," said one panelist from the South, "and still realize that in our kind of society our formal constitutional structure must deal with each citizen with an even hand. We are a procedural country, not a country of objectives, and the procedure is supposed to open up a maximum number of objectives."

"There is a serious difficulty in arriving at understanding in the South," said another, "due to the fact that every organization operating there is dedicated to achieving one particular goal. There are so many interracial groups saying, 'Come, let us reason together as reasonable men of good will and find some way that we can to arrive at integration with as little trouble as possible,' and to a lot of people that's doubletalk for saying, 'Come, let us reason together as reasonable men and find some way that we can cut our throats.'

"Now I haven't heard it expressed before, but I would hope there could be an organization that would say, 'Come, let us reason together and discuss our problems and not set a goal. Let's see where our discussion leads us.'"

The following dialogue was highly illuminating (both participants are Southerners):

A. "Why can't we approach this problem in this way: instead of getting groups together to talk about any phase of this integration question, why can't we get groups to talk together about whatever community problems there are that are not related to race in any way, and thereby begin to build up mutual confidence in the status of people as individuals and in their integrity and in their intellgence?"

B: "I don't thnk you can sit down and calmly discuss . . ."

A: "Juvenile delinquency?"

B: ". . . juvenile delinquency, when the house is on fire. And I

don't think that analogy is overdrawn. In this racial business the house is on fire, and I think we need to discuss it."

A: "Don't you think, if everybody came to realize the house was on fire, that sooner or later somebody would try to take a little water and put it on the fire, even though what they had really come together to do was to make bricks out of straw? The very fact that people were willing to meet together would be an indication that they were willing to do something about the fire."

Organizations already in existence can be models for others.

"The Southern Regional Council is not an action group," reported one who knows that body. "It's a communication group. It's a bridge. It attempts to get local people together so that they can sit around a table, Negro and white—it's interracial in all its activities. It is made up of some of the finest people in the South. It does a great deal of work without fanfare, because that's the only way it can do it."

In some cases, local groups working on completely non-racial matters have been valuable in maintaining links between the races.

"Let me take an example," said a Southerner. "Our city is in as unhappy a situation as any that I know of. But one of the few agencies that has existed and which has provided some measure of communication has been a small interracial committee working on an entirely different problem. It is the local committee sponsoring the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis drive."

Restoring the Moderates

Once a bridge of communication has been reestablished in a community it may be possible to pursue the second and greater goal: restoring the reasonable, moderate citizens to the center of the stage.

First of all, what is a moderate?

"I wonder whether we could say," offered one panel member, "that a moderate is a man who in human problems seeks for a constructive outcome, and is willing to make reasonable compromises."

"Let me add to that," said another. "I would say that a moderate is one who is willing to admit that there are two sides to the question, and is willing also to sit down and discuss the other side with someone who believes the other side."

"He's not so damn sure he's right," added a third.

Moderates must begin to organize at the local, community level, and they must seek out other moderates.

"You have to know your community," remarked someone. "You must know where in the community there are people who have some influence, and you must include every kind of influence. And I would emphasize that the first thing in each community is to make an analysis of what that community presently is, and where there are people who, speaking together, could move the community off dead center."

"There is a tendency," said another, "for people who adopt a moderate position to bring other people with them—people of status and substantial wealth. I think we should take advantage of this tendency. If these people of status occupy a greater position in the community than the extremists, that should have an effect."

There must be strong leadership within the local group.

"It takes both the devoted groups who support each other locally," observed a Northerner, "and a leader who is dynamic and has a sense of direction to help orient those groups."

"The moderates can often be gotten together," added a Southerner, "but the leadership too often is missing. As soon as it appears, the followers often appear."

Initial leadership often comes from women.

"I am a firm believer," said one, "that it's going to take the women to do it because they have more time. Their convictions are stronger, and their livelihood is a little safer."

Local groups of moderates must formulate plans of action so that they will know exactly what to do when and if a crisis occurs.

"What I have been working on in my community," reported one community leader, "is at getting agreement among the citizens who are responsible for policy—the mayor of the town, the chairman of the school board, the men who are going to make the public decisions later—getting agreement among them as to what they are going to do when the crisis arises. When the crisis does come they can get things rolling and appeal to the people in the interests of a policy that has been previously formulated."

Constant vigilance must be exercised against outsiders and extremists.

"It occurs to me," observed someone, "why North Carolina hasn't had any incidents. They were able to keep out the Kaspers and the Griffiths. I think no matter how much preparation you make, if at the last week or the last day or the last minute you let people like that come in—the crusading segregationists—why, they can upset the apple cart. The day Kasper came into Winston-Salem the community was prepared for him and they kept him moving."

But the moderates in Little Rock—or most of them—thought they had laid all the proper groundwork and taken all the necessary precausions. What went wrong?

"The moderates thought they had reached everyone," said someone who had studied the situation, "but there were too many people left outside. The moderate leadership overestimated their own importance. Virgil Blossom carried out a plan that I think most of us, if we had looked at it in advance, would have thought was pretty good. He carefully identified about 200 targets in the power structure of the city, and he thought that he was working with them. And yet, when the chips were down it turned out there were any number of really important centers of power which had not been included. They were not quite as visible or quite as far up on the social prestige scale, but they were operationally effective and they had not been brought in. The plan was not adequate. The wisdom was not sufficient. Maybe the Little Rock moderates were wise, but they were not wise enough."

If moderates are looking for a rallying point they will find none better than the church. But religious leaders have not thus far done as much as could be hoped.

"In Atlanta," reported a panelist, "there is a rather large interracial church—the Unitarian Church—which has not suffered at all during this whole period, and goes right along every Sunday and every weekday."

"I found in Little Rock," said someone who was more critical of what the churches have done, "that the churches should have begun five or ten years earlier. They had not done so. And when one pastor preached his sermon—a very mild sermon—in support of the school board plan three or four months ahead of the integration date, a considerable proportion of his congregation withdrew, or threatened to withdraw, and his board immediately concluded: 'we haven't done our home work.' They are going to do it now."

In both North and South, men of good will can promote the cause of moderation by giving emphasis to the constructive deeds

being done. Many participants in the conference were surprised to learn of the great progress being made in Atlanta and hoped more notice could be taken of it.

"The question is," said someone, "how can you take the emphasis off Little Rock and put it on Atlanta? How can you put it on the efforts of a decent community to redress the situation? If you could solve this, you would bring about a major revolution."

"I think it would help the South to get a new image of itself," observed someone else. "There are many traditions in the South. There is a tradition of violence and a tradition of good will. The tradition of violence makes news, but I think it's very important for isolated Southerners to be aware that the other tradition is still in effect too. It would be very constructive to have an awareness not only in the South but in the North that these things are taking place —the judge who does this, the constructive things that are happening every day."

"Most of the people here probably agree," added a third participant, "that the greatest single influence in the South is the church, and that the church has very few outlets in terms of news or comment. I think if liaison could be made or strengthened between church groups in the North and those in the South, then by repercussion it would almost certainly have a beneficial effect on the South. It would indicate that we up here are not unfair, not given to patting ourselves on the back all the time, but anxious to cooperate with men of good will, whoever they may be, everywhere."

As the conference concluded, two statements were made which deserve special attention. The first was by a man in public life:

"I think you should know that the preachers have fought hard to lead our people correctly in this, and when a Virginia politician says, 'Oh yes, the preachers are against us, but the people are with us,' the fact remains that he took the preachers into account.

"So you come to the injunction that the minister makes as he gives you these three rules. They happen to be my own.

"First, seek a nonviolent solution to the problem. That's got to be presented in every community.

"Second, don't seal the lips of the minister. The extremists would like to. They believe in applying economic, social and political pressure to the ministers; but they bottle up the truth when they do it.

"Finally, do justice in specific situations."

The other statement was by a thoughtful woman who has come to know the South well:

> "The time has come, it seems to me, for tender hearts and tough minds. Too often in the past some of our very constructive groups have had the tender hearts but have lacked the tough minds. Our demagogues and our politicians have had the tough minds.
>
> "A tender heart today without intelligence has no meaning and less effectiveness. A tough mind without the tender heart will overlook the very crucial emotional points upon which this question, it seems to me, is going to be resolved in the South. It will be resolved not by statistics alone, not by knowledge alone of the head, but by knowledge of the heart. If we can combine a feeling of humanity with the tough thinking that is required for, indeed, our very survival, then this conference will perhaps be a springboard, not to outer space, but to inner freedom."

PARTICIPANTS

Several who participated in the Arden House sessions requested that their names be withheld, because in the present climate prevailing in the South "they may be quoted out of context" or "comments by others might be identified with them" thus distorting their true positions.

The authorized list of participants includes:

Buford Boone, Editor, Tuscaloosa News, Alabama; Dr. Lyman Bryson, Columbia University, New York; Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, Under Secretary, United Nations, New York; Father Francis J. Burkley, New Orleans, Louisiana; Dr. Harry J. Carman, Dean Emeritus, Columbia College, New York; Dr. Rufus Early Clement, President, Atlanta University, Georgia; George Field, Executive Secretary, Freedom House, New York; Dr. Luther Hilton Foster, President, Tuskegee Institute, Alabama; Dr. Frank S. Horne, Director, Commission on Intergroup Relations, New York City; Mrs. Katherine Gauss Jackson, Editor, Harpers Magazine, New York; Dan Mabry Lacy, American Book Publishers Council, New York; Charles Livermore, Executive Director, State Commission Against Discrimination, New York; Rev. Charles Wesley Lowry, Foundation for Religious Action, Washington, D. C.; Edward John Meeman, Editor, Memphis Press-Scimitar, Tennessee; Col. Francis Pickens Miller, civic and religious leader, Charlottesville, Virginia.

Also Rev. Claud D. Nelson, National Council of Churches, New York; Dr. Allan Nevins, historian, New York; Virgilia Peterson, author and critic, New York; Elizabeth M. Riley, publisher, New York; Dr. Dean Rusk, President, Rockefeller Foundation, New York; Dr. James Russell, National Education Association, Washington, D. C.; Whitney North Seymour, attorney, New York; Mrs. Elder Shearon, civic leader, Memphis, Tennessee; J. K. Shepherd, business and civic leader, Little Rock, Arkansas; Dr. George N. Shuster, President, Hunter College, New York; Mrs. Caroline K. Simon, attorney, New York; Mark Starr, Education Director, International Ladies Garment Workers Union, New York; Wilma Dykeman Stokely and James Stokely, authors, Tennessee; Rex Stout, author, Brewster, New York; Mrs. Dorothy Tilly, Southern Regional Council, Atlanta, Georgia; Robert Penn Warren, author, Yale University, Connecticut; Dr. C. Vann Woodward, author and historian, Johns Hopkins University, Maryland; and the authors of this report.

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W. W. Waymack
Robert M. Weitman
William L. White
Roy Wilkins

February 13, 1959

Dear Chet:

What a thoughtful guy you are to send me the note from the Atlanta Biltmore. Give me a shout on the 'phone at your convenience and let's lunch. It is much too long since we met.

As ever yours,

Mr. Chester S. Williams
431 East 20th Street
New York 10, N.Y.



ATLANTA, GEORGIA

Va.

Jan. 26, 1959

Dear Ed:

Remember 1930? I couldn't resist after your great show on Virginia dropping you a note from this hotel.

I had dinner tonight in the Empire Room. The headwaiter Mr. Brown - said to me as I left - "Your faces is familiar - when did I see you last?" I replied, "Not in December 1930?" He said, "I was here!" I said "Ed Murrow and I were here with a convention of student leaders."

His face lighted up and he leaned close to whisper - "Yes, I remember - the first time Negro students ever came in the front door of the Biltmore! No trouble!"

It's been a long time...
Hope you'll have lunch with
me at the Overseas Press Club
sometime in February.

Jack - my youngest, oldest
and only - is marrying a
Birmingham, Alabama girl
next Saturday night. Her
father, an engineer, said when
he saw Ralph Bunche's name
on the invitation list - "Wonder
if he'll come? If he does, he'll
have to sit in the balcony -
and I'll sit with him."

Times change.

Best -

Bert

SIN

March 23, 1956

Dear Chet:

Many thanks for taking time to write as fully as you did on March 14. The reaction to the piece has, on the whole, been favorable. I very much fear that an explosion is inevitable.

I am off to Florida for two weeks and will call you when I get back.

As ever yours,

Mr. Chester Williams
World Information
608 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York

rh

My new address
WORLD INFORMATION
608 Fifth Ave.
New York, N.Y.

Ci- 5- 8734

March 14, 1956

Dear Ed:

While the reactions of myself and guests to your Arab-Israel program are still fresh, let me give you the highlights - such as they may be worth.

Our guests included: two specialists in the Middle East from the UN Secretariat, an Egyptian Secretariat Member who was associated with Nasser on his welfare program, George Denny, an Air Force officer, and an editor who served USIS in the Middle East during and shortly after the war.

As you can guess, the reactions were quite varied. Those who had no particular background or experience in the area felt that your program was very fairly balanced and surprisingly "pro-Egyptian". Those who looked at it through first-hand knowledge of the area and the Palestine problem felt in varying degrees that it was "loaded" in favor of Israel.

This struck me as an interesting contrast - one that emphasizes that everyone reads into what he sees or hears what he already knows and feels about the subject. To those who felt very pro-Israel every second devoted to Egypt seemed like a minute and every minute allocated to Israel seemed like a second. Those who knew the most about the situation were most keenly aware of things left out - and considered the selectivity a deliberate distortion.

For example, the Egyptian and two or three of the "old hands" in our living room felt that the selection of refugees who vented their antagonism toward the U.S. was designed to prejudice Americans against them. Others didn't take it that way. Everybody seemed to agree that the Israeli side was invested with emotional content while the Egyptian side was rather coldly intellectual and factual.

The discussion went on vigorously for two hours after the program. I would summarize it like this: in terms of the realities and facts known to people who have experienced and studied them, the editing was quite "loaded" on the Israeli side; while in terms of this program in comparison with other TV and mass media treatment of the issues was strikingly balanced and in effect challenging to many Zionist claims. We felt that Nasser made a good impression compared to Ben Gurion - created an image that would be hard to distort into "devil".

I had expected to see and hear an interesting series of contrasting answers by Nasser and Ben Gurion on the same questions - after what you had told me. So I was somewhat surprised that Ben Gurion didn't deal with some of the crucial questions which were put so bluntly to Nasser. I dare say that an even more exciting and enlightening program could be made from the scraps on the cutting-room floor than was made with the material you selected. But on balance it was a very interesting and useful performance. I had the feeling that Smith's bold reporting and editorializing on Sunday, March 4, put you under heavy pressures.

I would appreciate the return of the papers I lent you - if it is not too much trouble. Best to you and yours.

Clet

William Chester

October 26, 1953

MEMO ON INTERPRETATION OF WORLD TRADE PICTURE

News pegs

Administration reports on foreign economic policy, particularly the Committee headed by Randall, will be made early in 1954. Recommendations will affect new legislation.

Capehart Committee will also be reporting from the Senate.

Group led by Coleman is getting tooled up for public education effort on practical measures to substitute trade for aid.

Conflicting interests will come to sharp focus in the emerging debate involving protectionist bloc, export needs of grain farmers, elements of labor on both sides, and increasing activities of Soviet trade missions.

Issue of U. S. leadership in organizing a workable trading pattern to keep united and to strengthen the non-Communist world may become the key to the foreign policy debates of 1954 and 1956.

Background understandings needed

How multilateral, circular world trade works - how it worked under British organization before World War I, and works after a fashion today with U. S. foreign aid bridging a big gap.

What World War II did to the trading patterns in Europe and Asia.

What trade means to certain free countries such as Britain, Scandinavian states, Japan, etc., and how their dependence on trade to live affects our foreign policy objectives.

What the Stalin-Malenkov policy shift to economic pressure, exploiting lack of free world trade organization, means to us. How the program is supposed to work to weaken and divide the Western coalition.

Kinds of obstacles to trade that complicate the policy of substituting trade for aid.

How trade affects people personally - housewife, worker and farmer in field relying on considerable export market, or threatened with competition from imports, government procurement of essentials for defense, steel or auto importer of components.

How WORLD INFORMATION could contribute to a projected program

Provide background data and analysis.

Liaison with committees involved and specialists, pin-pointing emphasis in up-coming reports and recommendations.

Consult on program-planning - offering suggestions and checking on treatment.

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CHESTER S. WILLIAMS
HERBERT HARRIS

see Ciu

October 6, 1953

Mon. 10/26
3:00

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

You may recall my reference to plans I was exploring last spring to develop a research and liaison service for certain firms and organizations in need of a better bridge to international agencies and the diplomatic as well as technical specialists. Herbert Harris - a former assistant to Hoffman and later to Harriman in ECA - and I found enough interest and an initial client to justify setting up our shop this fall.

It occurs to me that we may be in a position to take on a special project or two for you. The coming to a head of the world trade issues - on which we are working in another connection - calls for the kind of dramatic interpretation you give such difficult issues.

You are no doubt familiar with Harris' work in this field at Fortune Magazine, UN World and currently for Nation's Business. We have in mind an approach to the world trade story that may be of interest to one or another of your sponsors.

Perhaps we can arrange to get together in the near future to explore the possibilities.

Best wishes,

Cordially,

Chet

Chester S. Williams

CSW:dew

Williams, Chester S.

Chester S. Williams
431 East 20th Street
New York 10, N. Y.

December 2, 1952

Dear Ed:

Elizabeth and I thought your atomic piece with the whiplash ending was terrific. You are holding up to a very high standard - even over-shooting it at times. Congratulations on the renewed sponsorship of Alcoa.

It was good to get a glimse of you the other day at the Century Club; sorry I didn't get a chance to say "hello".

You may get an inquiry about me in connection with an application for a position on which I gave your name as one of the references. I had particularly in mind your knowledge of my survey in Britain in 1942, and the preliminary work I did for you on "CBS Reviews thePress".

I resigned from the U.S. Mission last April to undertake a survey and planning job regarding the world affairs councils program which the Ford Fund for Adult Education was trying to realize through the FPA. The plans were adopted and a half million in additional grants were made by the Fund, but I declined the post of director under prevailing circumstances obstructing the realization of the plans. I let go of the job I had in prospect for the fall when I thought the FPA reorganization commitments gave real promise. So now I have to pursue new leads. Two look somewhat hopeful at the moment - both large corporations in the international field. But it does take time.

Meanwhile a few consultant opportunities have come my way. I'll give you a ring soon as it might be very helpful to have your suggestions. Any short-term work that might be done on a fee basis would interest me because I want to be in a position to wait for the opportunity that really appeals to me.

Give our best wishes to Janet.

As Always,

Chet

Telephone: GRammercy 3 - 3306

P.S. Jack is a sophmore at Miami Univ. in Oxford, Ohio. How time marches on

December 19, 1951

Dear Chet:

Many thanks for yours of December 6. As a matter of fact I was in Paris when that issue of Colliers hit the stands and a considerable number of my friends took me to task for it and they were of course entirely justified. I offer no excuses but expect that it was a case where a number of reasonably responsible people were "sold" individually on what turned out to be an irresponsible project. You will I am sure be glad to know that my latest report indicates that the project to publish the thing in book form has been abandoned. Bob Sherwood, Joe Barnes, and myself all did what hatchet work we could to prevent the book from coming out.

Thanks again for writing with your usual wisdom and frankness. I shall hope to see you when you return; meanwhile best of luck.

As ever yours,

Mr. Chester S. Williams
Hotel Astoria
131, Avenue des Champs-Elysees
Paris (8e) France

UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Hotel Astoria
131, Avenue des Champs-Elysées
Paris (8e) France

December 6, 1951

Dear Ed:

This is a personal letter.

Shortly before we left for Paris, I saw the Colliers' special edition in which you, Bob Sherwood and others collaborated in picturing a third world war. It struck me at the time as a highly dubious and perplexing effort, but not until we got to Paris did I realize what a terrific propaganda blunder it was in the light of the overall world situation. I have a hunch that you, too, were surprised at how it looked when the sensational pictures and text were put together.

I understand that arrangements are now being made to publish it in pamphlet form in French and other foreign languages for mass circulation. This I would regard as a major disaster for our country. If Colliers did circulate the editorial under the title, "The Unwanted War", without the sensational pictures and fantastic crystal-gazing, it might do some good, because this part has been almost universally lost.

I don't know what you can do about it, though it would seem a bit frustrating not to be able to prevent one's name from being used in an expanded publication effort which threatens such a disadvantage to one's own country.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter written by a very shrewd observer who is the head of a large international organization here, who has spent 35 years in Europe, and part of this time in Eastern Europe and Russia. I do not

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

quote his name because he has given me permission only to send you the contents of a private letter he has sent to his office in New York. I also enclose a statement which some representatives of other organizations have, in one way or another, used in reporting back to their headquarters in New York. These are just two of many, many indications of a similar reaction.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

Chet

Chester S. Williams

P.S. Feel free to pass this on to Bob Sherwood or any of the others ~~whom~~ you think may be interested. CSW

Since dictating this I have learned that the further promotion plans have been reconsidered - I hope this means "abandoned."

Statement by the Head of an International Organization of Great Reputation

- -

"Altho most folks at home may be surprised to learn it, one of the minor scandals around the U.N. Assembly here is the unbelievably inept October 27th issue of "Collier's", devoted to a future war with Russia. From here it is difficult to understand how authoritative writers or even the magazine itself could have perpetrated such a woeful error. The "big names" make most European readers think it was government-inspired. And altho we hoped its effect in Europe would gradually subside after the first shock, the thing goes on and on, engaging the attention of journalists and politicians and propagandists more today, than when the issue first appeared, and may plague the U. S. Delegation right thru to the end of the Assembly.

"To the Communists it was a gift from the gods; As a result of the sober, constructive disarmament proposals of the Big Three, Soviet Russia was facing a dilemma: either this suggestion must be taken seriously and met half-way, or else it must be attacked with scorn and ridicule. Vishinsky tried that in his first speech, altho his second was in a less belligerent tone. Of course he quoted "Collier's". He brought it in again on Saturday last. "L'Humanite", the Paris Communist paper, reproduced a large part of the contents. It is an ideal means of enlisting sympathy for the Communist position, from millions who are otherwise flatly opposed to communism. A Swiss weekly reports that it has been reproduced and widely distributed in Soviet Russia. To most Europeans, including the Soviet government, this appears to be an attempt to frighten with propaganda such propaganda masters as the Communists. We know very well that the Soviet leaders are impressed by acts, and not words. The incident can be used to obscure the disarmament issue, almost completely. It can seriously undermine not only the belief in U. S. Delegates' genuine desire for disarmament, but confidence in the responsibility of our country, at a time when the free world expects sober and mature leadership.

"Not only in the Communist press, but in papers of all other parties, much ink has been spilled over this number of "Collier's". It is called "dangerous naivete", "a major psychological error", "blasphemous trifling with the fate of millions". Our friends point out that its simple optimism is dangerous for us. How many crushing defeats in history have been the result of over-confidence in the attacker? Further, there is no more reason to believe, as "Collier's" hints, that world-welfare and peace would be completely assured by World War III, than they were by the other two. And despite the fact that most people here know that one weekly magazine does not represent either the general opinion or the government of our

country, many of them wonder if this issue does not reveal the thinking of a certain minority, who, perhaps subconsciously, would prefer such a terrible climax as against a prolonged state of international tension.

"Just suppose a magazine like that had been published in Moscow, with the roles reversed, of course - what a storm of indignation and fear it would arouse, not only in the United States, but all over the world! "Collier's" has done our country, the United Nations and the world peace in general, a great disservice.

"This note about an apparently minor matter is not written because I feel that anything much can be done about it. There is a report current here, that the contents of the publication in question are to be republished in book form, and not only in America, but also in France. This would be compounding the error. We all trust this will not be done, and the American NGO delegates here hope to discuss it with a "Collier's" editor, now in Paris. Of course any possible editorial comment in the American press indicating unhappiness about this "Collier's" issue would help counteract its baneful effect. No American here thinks that there was anything but good intention behind this number of "Collier's". Its effect in Europe has been to weaken confidence in American leadership, to frighten our friends rather than our enemies, thus weakening our capacity for collective action, and to obscure the real issue of preventing war by practical cooperation."

Americans in Paris, where the General Assembly of UN is in session, are confronted on every hand by critical questions about the special issue of Collier's visualizing the "war we do not want". This sensational publication has stirred up a hornet's nest here, just when the United States has taken the initiative in a proposal for disarmament.

Now we learn that the contents of this publication are to be republished in paper book form, not only for mass circulation in the United States, but also in France and other countries. The editors and collaborators no doubt assumed that this dramatic presentation would help and not harm the cause of the free world. But from here the good intentions seem to have misfired. The promoters of this sensational document, while hoping to influence the Kremlin against starting the "war we do not want", have played right into the hands of the Communists.

We have watched the French press and talked with leaders from many countries in the free world. The reaction is close to unanimous: this Collier tour de force has produced exactly the opposite effect of that proclaimed and intended.

It has shaken confidence in American stability and responsibility in the midst of great tension. Despite efforts to convince Europeans that the publication was in no way a reflection of an official position, the majority believe the publication was officially inspired. This is due to the fact that Robert Sherwood

and others who had high governmental positions during the war collaborated in its production. People here find it difficult to believe that such men would not have consulted their government on the desirability of releasing such a bomb-shell on the eve of the most critical United Nations meeting in its history.

The format, the blazing, provocative pictures, and the attempt to write history before it happens, put the whole enterprise in the category of the fantasia publications. The editorial on The Unwanted War, explaining its purpose and rejecting the inevitability of the war which was depicted in lurid colors, was almost universally overlooked. It has been received by the press and public opinion as the most blatant warmongering, reflecting a dangerous irresponsibility in the country which has been relied upon for sober and careful leadership.

It seems to have played into the hands of European Communists as no other act since the war. It has given the Communist propaganda machine a theme by which to relate itself to public apprehensions aroused by the entire non-Communist and anti-Communist press.

We feel that the editors and writers for this journalistic effort have fallen into a fundamental error in their assumption that the way to influence the isolated men in the Kremlin is by lurid, sensational words and pictures. Sober and responsible leaders of the free world have been patiently pursuing the thesis that the Soviet leaders are impressed by acts rather than words.

Our objective is to build strength and an unshakable unity of the free nations.

The Soviet propagandists have hoped that they could stymie the building of real economic and defensive strength, and split the unity of the free. Thus they could maintain their preponderance of might and use it to expand their empire by pressures both from without and from within free countries.

Now, what was the effect of the Collier flight into the unknown future, picturing a third world war as if it had happened? The effect was to shake confidence in American leadership and thus make more difficult the task of building strength cooperatively. The effect was to frighten our friends, not our enemies. The effect was to weaken our capacity for collective action. The effect was to divert attention from plans to prevent war by practical cooperation.

As individuals, not in any sense speaking for the American organizations which have designated us as observers at the United Nations, we concur in this analysis of the effect of the special Collier issue, and express the hope that the publishers will not persist in compounding the error by further exploiting this dangerous sensationalism at this critical time.

Ed:

Sorry I forgot to give you this with the other material. It is, of course, a prepublication draft. I think you will find it a useful reference.

Chet

NEW YORK LOS ANGELES

GAYNOR & DUCAS, INC.
ADVERTISING • PUBLIC RELATIONS
400 MADISON AVENUE • NEW YORK 17, N.Y.

CHESTER S. WILLIAMS PLaza 5-5750

Revised
9-14-60

Murrow -
Chapter 1 of a new book by Dr. Herman Kahn "On Thermonuclear War" to be published by Princeton Univ. Press in December this year.

ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL STRATEGIES

Introduction

On July 16, 1960 the world entered the sixteenth year of the nuclear era. Yet we are increasingly aware that after living with nuclear bombs for fifteen years we still have a great deal to learn about the possible effects of a nuclear war. We have even more to learn about conducting international relations in a world in which force tends to be both increasingly more available and increasingly more dangerous to use, and therefore in practice increasingly unusable. As a result of this continuous secular change in the basic structure of the international situation, foreign and defense policies formulated early in the nuclear era badly need review and reformulation.

In considering these basic foreign and defense policies it is desirable to distinguish many different military postures and the corresponding possible strategies for both the United States and the Soviet Union. This treatment of thermonuclear warfare will mostly concern itself with four typical possible postures, which I will call Finite Deterrence, Counterforce as Insurance, Preattack Mobilization Base, and Credible First Strike Capability, respectively. I will discuss the possibilities and implications of these postures from the point of view of the Soviet Union and the United States. While there is no reason why the two most powerful nations should have similar views, I will not initially dwell on possible asymmetries, deferring discussion of the separate national problems. A number of typical basic postures (important concepts underlined for emphasis) are listed in Chart 1, roughly in order of increasing ability to wage general war.

Chart 1*

ALTERNATIVE NATIONAL POSTURES

1. Internal Police Force plus "World Government"

2. Minimum Deterrence plus Limited War plus Arms Control

3. Add insurance to the Minimum Deterrent:

   a. for reliability (Finite Deterrence)

   b. against unreliability (Counterforce as Insurance)

   c. against a change in policy (Preattack Mobilization Base)

4. Add Credible First Strike Capability

5. "Splendid" First Strike and no Limited War Capability

6. Dreams

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*I am indebted to Richard B. Foster of Stanford Research Institute for the suggestion to make a list of this sort. He has used a somewhat different breakdown in some unpublished investigations on the actual strategic views held by U.S. decision makers.

Probably the most valuable thing that the Executive Office could do to improve over-all defense planning would be to select one of these postures and the corresponding strategies, or possibly some clearly defined alternative not on the list, and let the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State know its decision. The decision could then be debated at the proper level, and it would not be necessary to conduct a philosophical debate at the staff level, on what business the Department of Defense should be in every time somebody brought up a technical question on Air Defense, Command and Control, and so on. National debates should be conducted at the national level where feasibility, desirability, and possible consequences can be discussed responsibly and from proper points of view. It is not possible to do this even at the level of a senior but technical advisory group attached to Departments or even to the Executive Office, much less at lower staff levels. Advisory groups and agency and departmental staffs should be mainly concerned with implementing the general policy and reporting back to their superiors on cost, performance, and feasibility. In actual practice the great national debate on what business the Department of Defense should be in often occurs at the advisory group or relatively low staff levels, and important projects whose approval or disapproval may set crucial constraints on over-all policy are approved or rejected on the basis of some very narrow and parochial views of what this over-all national policy ought to be; sometimes the effects on over-all national policy are not even examined. All of this could be eliminated if the big decisions were consciously formulated, debated, and then decided at the proper level rather than treated as a number of fragmented issues to be treated on an ad hoc basis.

In this first chapter I will consider the postures in Chart 1 from an over-all point of view, deferring details to later chapters. In this discussion I will define certain widely used terms in a manner that disagrees with some (but not all) usage. In general, I feel it is better to do this than to invent some completely new word or term, and I will normally continue this practice throughout the book. One of the most important things which could be done to facilitate discussion of defense problems would be to create a vocabulary that is both small enough and simple enough to be learned, precise enough to communicate, and large enough so that all of the important ideas that are contending can be comfortably and easily described. One of my major objectives in writing this book is to facilitate the creation of such a vocabulary.

1. Internal Police Force plus "World Government"

There seems to be little point in discussing the view that finds a solution in a totally disarmed world. Neither our own emotional desires nor the fact that there are many earnest proponents for this policy should sway us toward a position that ignores some of the basic realities. It has probably always been impractical to imagine a completely disarmed world, and the introduction of the thermonuclear bomb has added a special dimension to this impracticality. Given the large nuclear stockpiles in the Soviet Union, the United States, and the British Isles, it would be child's play for one of these nations to hide completely hundreds of these bombs. Even if some caches were found, one could not be sure that these were not decoys to allay suspicions, and yet there would be a great loathness to cancel the agreement just because "a few malcontents had conspired against the peace." The violator would then have an incredible advantage if the agreement ever

broke down and the arms race started again. This surely means that even if all nations should one day agree to total nuclear disarmament, we must presume that there would be the hiding of some nuclear weapons or components as a hedge against the other side doing so. An international arrangement for banishing war through disarmament will not call for total disarmament but will almost undoubtedly include provisions for enforcement that cannot be successfully overturned by a small, hidden force. Otherwise, it would be hopelessly unstable. Even if the problem of what we may call the "clandestine cache" were solvable, the writer still is of the belief that one could not disarm the world totally and expect it to remain disarmed. But the problem of the clandestine nuclear cache in itself makes total disarmament especially infeasible.

While total disarmament can be ruled out as an immediate possibility, one can conceive of some sort of international authority which might have a monopoly of war-making capability. Such a postulated international authority would have to have enough power to be able to overwhelm any nation that had reserved hidden destructive potential. An international agency with a near-monopoly of force might come from any of the following possibilities (listed in order of apparent probability rather than desirability): (1) a Soviet or U.S. dominated world arising most likely out of war; (2) some other kind of postwar organization; (3) an S.U.-U.S. combination which is in effect a world government, though it may not openly be called that; (4) some of the NATO nations and China added to the above combination as influential, if not equal partners; (5) the Haves against the Have Nots, most likely without exploitation, but with stringent arms control in which authority and responsibility are roughly proportioned to military and

economic development and, perhaps, with aid to underdeveloped nations; (6) a sort of World Federal state where power is proportioned to sovereignty and population as in the U.S. Congress. However, it is most doubtful in the absence of a crisis or war that a world government can be set up in the next decade. There are to date no serious proposals along such lines[1] unless the concept (occasionally advocated by Khrushchev) of Soviet-U.S. get-togethers to settle all problems be considered in such a light. Certainly the official suggestions occasionally put out by the Soviet and U.S. governments are not to be taken seriously as possible solutions.

While it may seem high time to spell out practical proposals for world government, no such attempt will be made in this book. In fact, I will not even discuss any "impractical" suggestions. While this writer believes that even a poor world government might be preferable to an uncontrolled arms race, I also believe that the practical difficulties are so large that it is a digression to dwell on such possibilities as a possible solution for the problems of the sixties. And the problems of the sixties are important! About the only way "world government" and other long-run considerations

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[1]The most serious recent attempt to describe a possible world government is given in the book, World Peace Through World Law (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1958), by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn. One problem with proposals such as those in the Clark-Sohn book is the same problem that many of the white colonists in Africa have in trying to deal with African independence movements. If independence is granted, they are not sufficiently protected from the new government; if only limited sovereignty is granted the nonwhite population gets to be very unhappy at the attempt to maintain the unsatisfactory status quo. It is worth noting in this connection that it is easier to be a hero than a saint. It really would not be difficult to find thousands of Westerners willing to give up their lives for a world government of a satisfactory sort but one would find very few willing to accept Chinese or Indian standards of living or any appreciable risk of their occurring, for either themselves or their families. Similarly, the underdeveloped nations are going to resent any real or fancied hindrances to their working out their salvation.

affect the kind of analysis done here is the avoidance of otherwise desirable short-term measures that might seriously hinder or foreclose desirable long-term possibilities. Even this modest ambition toward shaping the seventies is difficult to realize because there are controversies over where we want to be at that time, as well as how to get there. This book will concentrate on the problem of how to get there. This seeming unconcern for long-term objectives will distress some readers, but some of our immediate problems must be understood more clearly than in the past if we are to control the direction in which we are going. It is the hallmark of the amateur and dilettante that he has almost no interest in how to get to his particular utopia. Perhaps this is because the practical job of finding a path may be more difficult than the job of designing the goal.[2] Let us consider, then, some of the practical military alternatives that we face in the 1960-1975 time period.

2. Minimum Deterrence plus Limited War plus Arms Control

This view, or the modest variant of it called Finite Deterrence, is probably the most widely held view in the West of what is a desirable and feasible strategic posture. Among the adherents to this position can be found most intellectuals interested in military affairs, staff people in

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[2]One of my "amateur" friends has pointed out that "It is the hallmark of the expert professional that he doesn't care where he is going as long as he proceeds competently." This seems to be a reasonable charge against this book, but I still believe that the limited focus of this book is valuable. Of those readers who are most interested in long-term goals, very few will have ever seen much discussion of the military problem as a "military problem" or the interactions of military calculations, or the lack of them, with policy. Some of these readers will deny the existence of such interactions. Just as it would do the "militarists" some good to be exposed to utopian thinking, it will do the "utopians" even more good to be exposed to some military thinking.

the federal government, civilians who seek to qualify as "military experts" (including scientists and technicians), many military planners in the three services, and the vast majority of foreign and domestic lay analysts. What, then, is meant by Minimum Deterrence?

The notion is dramatic: It is that no nation whose decision makers are sane would attack another nation which was armed with a sufficiently large number of thermonuclear bombs. Thus all a nation that is so armed has to worry about is insanity, irresponsibility, accident, and miscalculation. Even such a sober expert as General Maxwell Taylor expressed this view as follows:

> The avoidance of deliberate general atomic war should not be too difficult since its unremunerative character must be clear to the potential adversaries. Although actual stockpile sizes are closely guarded secrets, a nation need only feel reasonably sure that an opponent has some high-yield weapons, no matter how indefinite their exact number, to be impressed with the possible consequences of attacking him.[3]

The above was written in 1956 but is quoted in a book he published in 1959. It is only fair to add that General Taylor's views have changed and, as expressed in the book, now show much more concern with the problem of deterring general war than this quotation would indicate. He also mentions that it was very difficult for him to change his views and take the problem of deterrence seriously. It is even more difficult for laymen who do not have access to the same information to achieve this feat.

In general, the believers in Minimum Deterrence seem to view the deterrence of a rational enemy as almost a simple philosophical consequence of the <u>existence</u> of thermonuclear bombs. They argue that the decision to

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[3] Maxwell D. Taylor, <u>The Uncertain Trumpet</u>, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1959, p. 184.

initiate thermonuclear war is such a momentous one--the risks are so great--that it is unlikely that such a decision will be affected by the relatively minor details of each side's military posture. One is tempted to call this "the layman's view," since people holding it show only the slightest interest in such matters as the status of the alert forces, holes in the warning networks, the range of the bombers, reliability of missiles, the degree of protection offered by current arrangements for hardening, dispersal, and concealment, and the multitude of other questions that bother sober students of the problem of retaliation. Nevertheless, the Minimum Deterrence view is held by such a surprisingly large number of experts that it may be gratuitously insulting to call it a layman's view.

An extreme form of the Minimum Deterrence theory is the view that the current strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union, if used, will automatically result in world annihilation or at least mutual homicide. In 1955, fifty-two Nobel laureates signed a statement (the Mainau Declaration) which included the following: "All nations must come to the decision to renounce force as a final resort of policy. If they are not prepared to do this they will cease to exist." There is a beautiful simplicity about this statement. It does not differentiate between attacker and defender, belligerent and neutral, Northern and Southern Hemisphere, but simply says all nations. It does not talk about degree of damage but simply says cease to exist.

Everybody recognizes that statements such as the above are sometimes no more than rhetoric. If this were all there is to it one would not worry. But belief follows language as much as the other way round. Contemporary phrases, used by both experts and laymen in describing war, expressions like

"balance of terror," "thermonuclear stalemate," "suicidal war," "mutual annihilation," "inescapable end of civilization," "destruction of all life," "end of history," "live together or die together," and "nobody wins a suicide pact," indicate a widespread inclination to believe that thermonuclear war would eventuate in mutual annihilation as the result of almost any plausible turn of military events. The view of the phrasemakers is reinforced by the use of deterrence analogies, such as two people on a single keg of dynamite--each with a button, two scorpions in a bottle, two heads on a single chopping block, or the bee that dies when it stings.

Popular literature has picked up the idea of ultimacy. An example is Neville Shute's interesting but badly researched book On the Beach, which presumes and describes the total extinction of humanity as a result of all-encompassing and inescapable atmospheric radioactivity coming from a thermonuclear war. Many shorter pieces have been written along similar lines. Western (but not Soviet) reviewers and critics have almost uniformly taken the theme of world destruction seriously. These Westerners and their readers do not consider it a fantastic notion that nuclear war would mean the inevitable end of the world! The world annihilation possibility is considered to be a sober and accurate appraisal of the destructive power of existing weapons systems.

Not all agree, of course. In fact, some "diehards" are tempted to dismiss such a statement as the Mainau Declaration as an extremist expression of some left wing or radical scientists. This is too strong a denial. A cursory examination of the names of the signers indicates that this hypothesis does not seem tenable for a majority of them. The Nobel laureates who authored the "cease to exist" statement probably had more than rhetoric

and literature in mind. Many of them had either made calculations or seen calculations (or at least thought they had) which indicated to them that world annihilation or some practical equivalent was a reasonably sober estimate of the results of nuclear war. Most of the signers would be willing to go before a technical audience with a defense of the "end of history" position as a sober estimate--and the believers in recovery and recuperation would often have some difficulty in documenting their side of the case. It is important to realize that there are "experts" who believe in world annihilation and who hold strongly to this view, experts who can and will argue their position vehemently, quantitatively, and often persuasively.

The automatic mutual-annihilation view is not unique to the West. As discussed in Lecture III, Malenkov publicly introduced it to the Soviet Union several years ago, apparently arguing in the now-classical fashion that with nuclear war entailing the end of civilization, the capitalists would not attack; the Soviet Union, he said, could afford to reduce investment in heavy industry and military products and concentrate on consumer goods. A different view seems to have been held by Khrushchev and the Soviet military. They agreed that war would be horrible, but at the same time they argued that this was no reason for the Soviet Union to drop its guard; given sufficient preparations only the capitalists would be destroyed. With some important modifications their views seem to have prevailed.

Why do reasonably sober and knowledgeable people hold some version of this view of automatic mutual annihilation? In this first lecture, I will try to describe some of the data and calculations that have given rise to these cataclysmic expectations and explain why it is that the situation is not, at least for the immediate future, as they describe it.

A thermonuclear war is quite likely to be an unprecedented catastrophe for the defender. Depending on the military course of events, it may or may not be an unprecedented catastrophe for the attacker, and for some neutrals as well. But an "unprecedented" catastrophe can be a far cry from an "unlimited" one. Most important of all, sober study shows that the limits on the magnitude of the catastrophe seem to be closely dependent on what kinds of preparations have been made, and on how the war is started and fought.

While the notions in the above paragraph may strike some readers as being obvious, I must repeat that they are by no means so. The very existence of the irreconcilable group predicting total catastrophe is proof. One can divide military thinkers into two classes: those who believe that any war would result in no less than mutual annihilation, and those who feel this is not necessarily so or even that it is in all likelihood wrong. The latter group is probably correct, at least for the military capabilities that are likely to be available in the next decade or so. Yet on the whole they have not done very much "homework" to prove their point. The total disaster group has done a great deal of homework. This could mean that the first group is likely for a time to win many an argument on this question.

The concept of mutual homicide, sure and certain, has in many ways been peculiarly comforting to those holding it. It makes plausible the conviction that when governments are informed of the terrible consequences of a nuclear war they will realize there could be no victors. There would be no sense to such a war. Would a sane leader ever start such a cataclysm? Of course not. The expected violence of war would deter him. Those who hold this comforting concept may even get angry at anyone who ventures to

assay estimates of the precise degree of risk a "successful" attacker might actually face.

The mutual homicide theory yields other comforts. If one grants that each side will utterly destroy the other, one must also grant that expensive preparations to reduce casualties, lessen damage, and facilitate postwar recuperation are useless. Can we not spare ourselves the financial burden of such preparations? The "logic" has sometimes been carried further, some arguing that modern weapons are so enormously destructive that only a few are needed to deter the enemy. Therefore, the argument goes, war can be deterred with much smaller forces than in the past; in any case we certainly do not need more.

The view from this plateau is attractive to many groups who are determined on disarmament and certain types of arms control. For them, the Minimum Deterrence notion implies a certain kind of automatic stability which makes it safe to be casual about both agreements and possible violations. One must concede that the very concept of Minimum Deterrence implies that the two nations involved have in effect signed a reliable nonaggression treaty with their populations as hostage to insure adherence to this treaty; the only strategic problem that seems to be left is an accidental or unauthorized violation of this nonaggression "treaty." It is such possibilities that are the subject of arms control negotiations.

The mutual annihilation view is also comforting to many idealistic individuals, particularly to those who have an intrinsic abhorrence of any use of force. The bizarreness of a war in which both sides expect to get annihilated confirms their intuition that this whole business of military preparations is silly, a stupid and dangerous game which we ought to

discourage nations--our own country, at least--from playing. At the same time these idealists can afford to scoff at attempts to reduce casualties from, say, 100 million to 50 million Americans, reflecting that the situation is hopeless anyway and that preparations are silly, and that the only Respectable Cause is the total elimination of war. They regard programs other than their own as foolish or sinister and designed to cause people discomfort by making it sound plausible that there really is a national security problem toward the relief of which considerable amounts of money, energy, and intelligence need to be allocated.

Among those who take the view that Minimum Deterrence is a desirable, feasible, or the only possible strategic goal are many who nevertheless seek to add a Limited War Capability. They recognize that <u>even if the United States and the Soviet Union cannot wage all-out war against each other this does not mean that the role of force will be entirely eliminated</u>. There may still be many disputes between the two nations--disputes which may tempt one side to use force on a small scale. If the only counter the other nation has is to commit suicide by starting a thermonuclear war, that nation most likely will not act. Therefore, one needs Limited War capabilities to meet limited provocations. Those who adhere to the Minimum Deterrence theory often feel that the "nonaggression treaty" of mutual deterrence is so binding and so stable it is impossible to provoke the other side to violate it by anything less than an all-out attack. Seen in this perspective, cannot one safely use the most extreme forms of violence in a limited war?

We must expand on this point. Some of those who feel strongly that it is easy to make deterrence reliable suggest using the threat of limited or controlled nuclear retaliation to "regulate" Soviet behavior. An extreme

form of this notion might go as follows: If the Soviets threaten to take over Berlin, the U.S. could threaten to blow up a major Soviet city in retaliation, perhaps after warning the inhabitants to evacuate it. In their anger and distress the Soviets would then blow up one U.S. city in exchange. We would be enraged in turn, but because we would want to stop the tit-for-tat exchange, we would call a halt after warning the Soviets that any similar aggressions in the future would also result in a city exchange. However angry both of us would be, we would not start an all-out war, according to this argument, because suicide is not a rational way of expressing one's anger. It would be in the interests of both to stop the exchange at this point. By then, from the Soviet point of view, the taking of Berlin would seem unprofitable, since the loss of the Soviet city would appear more costly than the value of Berlin plus the destruction of a U.S. city. We have gained through making it clear to the Soviets that similar future actions would be equally unprofitable. On the other hand, by destroying a U.S. city the Soviets have made it clear that we should not use controlled thermonuclear retaliation as a casual tactic. While the whole idea sounds bizarre, concepts like this are bound to be a logical consequence of a world in which all-out war has been made to seem rationally infeasible, but one in which we feel it is necessary to punish or limit the other side's provocations. The timid or sober may feel that Minimum Deterrence might be strained to the breaking point by such acts; for them there must be caution on the types and levels of violence to accompany limited war or limited provocations.

3. Three Kinds of Insurance

The next view of what could result in a satisfactory strategic capability adds several kinds of "insurance" to the simple Minimum Deterrence

position.[4] There are at least three kinds of insurance which a survival-conscious person might wish to add, the first being Insurance for Reliability. We will label the view that worries about the details of obtaining a "punishing" retaliation, but does not want any more strategic capability than this, the Finite Deterrence strategy.[5] In many ways and with some inconsistencies this is the official U.S. view. The believers in Finite Deterrence do not quite accept the idea that reliable deterrence can be obtained simply by stocking thermonuclear bombs and having a weapon system which could deliver these bombs in peacetime. They notice that when the problem of retaliation is studied, rather than asserted, it is difficult to retaliate effectively; since the enemy can do many things to prevent, hinder, or negate retaliation. Evaluation of the effectiveness of retaliation must bear in mind that the Russians can strike at a time and with tactics of their choosing. We will strike back, no doubt, but with a damaged and not fully coordinated force which must conduct its operations in the postattack environment. The Soviets may use blackmail threats to intimidate our post-attack tactics. Under these conditions the Russian Defense System is likely to be alerted. Indeed, if the strike has been preceded by a tense period, their active defense forces would long since have been augmented, and their cities may be at least partially evacuated.

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[4]The addition is meant in terms of the capability of the force that is being procured; the entire force may be redesigned to get some appropriately modified version of the original capability (possibly at a reduced level) and the new insurance one.

[5]Originally Minimum Deterrence and Finite Deterrence meant the same thing. The word "Minimum" was coined by some Polaris enthusiasts who argued we needed very little to deter the Soviets. Because the word "Minimum" carried a connotation of gambling with the nation's security for budgetary reasons, it was changed to "Finite" (which had the connotation of wanting enough and no more and also suggested that the opponents wanted an infinite or at least an unreasonable amount).

Any of the considerations referred to by the italicized words can change the effectiveness of a retaliatory strike by an order of magnitude. Yet almost all of them are ignored in most discussions of the effectiveness of our deterrent force. Sometimes they are even relegated to the position of unimportant "technical details." They are far more than this. The possibilities indicated by the italicized words will be discussed at some length in Lecture II. I only want to mention here that the believer in Finite Deterrence is somewhat aware of these problems; he wants to have ready more than the bare minimum force that <u>might</u> be able to retaliate effectively (the Minimum Deterrence position). The advocate of Finite Deterrence wants enough forces to cover <u>all</u> contingencies. He may even want mixed forces, considering it may be possible for a clever enemy to discover an unexpected countermeasure against a single kind of force no matter how large. Thus he may well want different types of missiles, bombers, strategic submarines, aircraft carriers, and so forth. In addition, sober advocates of Finite Deterrence wish to have the various weapons systems so deployed and operated that they will have a guaranteed capability, even in a crisis in which the enemy has taken extraordinary measures to negate the capability. They want these forces dispersed, protected, and alert; the arrangements for command, control, and communications must be able to withstand degradation by both peacetime and wartime tactics of the enemy. These sober believers in Finite Deterrence tend to insist on an objective capability as opposed to one that is only "psychological." And even those believers in Finite Deterrence who would be satisfied with a facade yearn for an impressive-looking facade. One might characterize the Finite Deterrence position as an expert version of the Minimum Deterrence position, held by an expert who wants to look good to other experts.

The notion of Finite Deterrence is therefore not as dramatic as the notion of Minimum Deterrence. The believer in Finite Deterrence is willing to concede that it takes some effort to guarantee Mutual Homicide, that it is not automatic. However, the notion of Finite Deterrence is still dramatic, since most followers of this doctrine believe that the advent of thermonuclear bombs has changed the character of an all-out war in such a way that if both opponents are prepared the old-fashioned distinctions between victory, stalemate, and defeat no longer have much meaning. It was once believed that if one country had forces twice as large as those of another country, the first country was the stronger. Those who believe in Finite Deterrence challenge this view. Sometimes they rest their case on this idea: the only purpose of strategic forces is to deter rather than to fight; once one has the ability to damage, seriously, say, 10 or 20 enemy cities, this is enough force to deter, and therefore enough force. More often, backers of Finite Deterrence take a more extreme position. They argue that you can do no more than kill somebody once; to overkill by a factor of ten is no more desirable than overkilling by a factor of two--it is simply a waste of effort. They also usually argue that with some thought it should be easy to design strategic systems that can overkill, even in retaliation. Once we procure the limited (i.e., finite) forces required to do this job we have enough strategic forces and do not need any more--no matter what the enemy does.

In the year 1960 I believe that even adherents to an extreme Minimum Deterrence position tended to agree, under pressure, that the nation should buy whatever insurance is needed to make retaliation at least "look" potentially reliable and effective. In this sense, the orthodox Minimum

Deterrence school is no longer as respectable as might once have been inferred from the remarks of the most enthusiastic proponents of a defense built solely around small Minuteman and Polaris systems. Most of the more sober analysts have come to talk about Finite Deterrence, by which they mean having a generous adequacy for deterrence, but that is all they want for the general war. Specifically, they often tend to be against any counterforce capability (the word "counterforce" includes not only an active counterforce that can destroy or damage the enemy's force on the ground, but also other methods of countering the opponent's force, such as Active Defense and Passive Defense).[6]

Some believers in Finite Deterrence are against counterforce as a useless diversion of forces; others would not even be interested in having any counterforce even if it were free, because they consider it destabilizing. They notice that there is at least one circumstance in which an enemy is likely to attack even if he is worried about the retaliatory destruction that he will suffer. This circumstance occurs when he believes his attack is pre-emptive, that by striking first he is only forestalling an attack being launched on him. Most believers in Finite Deterrence are so convinced

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[6]The word "counterforce" is usually used to apply to an ability to destroy the enemy on the ground. It is true that the best counter against an unprotected SAC base is a bomb on the base. But the best counter against a hidden missile may be a shelter; the best counter against a bomber carrying many bombs may be active defense; the best counter against the enemy destroying our cities may be the use of retaliatory threats; the best counter against fallout-type attacks is shelters plus anticontamination. I will use the term counterforce to cover all of the above--to include anything which might counter the use or effectiveness of the enemy's force. While many of my colleagues object to my generalizing the definition in this manner, the new definition has the important virtue of discouraging parochial attitudes. It emphasizes that any method of countering the enemy's force may be useful, and that the allocation between the different methods should be made by objective considerations and not by slogans or outworn doctrine.

of the efficacy of their deterrence that they believe such an idea could only arise as a result of miscalculation, since no rational man could order an attack against an enemy who has made at least moderate preparations to ward it off. However, they recognize that if both forces are in a condition of super alert it may be easy to have such a misunderstanding. Or equally likely, there is the problem that Thomas Schelling of Harvard (and RAND) has called "the reciprocal fear of surprise attack," where each side imputes to the other aggressive intentions and misreads purely defensive preparations as being offensive. There are unfortunately many postures possible in which a disastrous train of self-confirming actions and counteractions could be set into motion. In order to prevent this from occurring, some believers in Finite Deterrence think it is important for us to disabuse ourselves of the idea that there can be any circumstance in which it makes sense to attack the Soviet Union, and they want us to adopt a posture which makes it clear to the Soviets that we are so disabused. As part of this posture we should make as few preparations as possible to alleviate the effects of the war or protect ourselves from a Soviet retaliatory strike. This will convince the Soviets that we do not intend to attack them except in retaliation; they will then be able to relax and not be trigger-happy. As one (partial) adherent to Finite Deterrence, Oskar Morgenstern, expressed it in his book, The Question of National Defense, "In order to preserve a nuclear stalemate under conditions of nuclear plenty it is necessary for both sides to possess invulnerable retaliatory forces. ...it is in the interest of the United States for Russia to have an invulnerable retaliatory force and vice versa."[7]

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[7] New York, Random House, 1959, pp. 74, 76.

Many who accept the Finite Deterrence view have another reason for not defending or protecting anything but the retaliatory capability; they see no need for programs to protect people and property, because they think it isn't feasible to protect either people or property. These people often argue that it does not matter whether one dies immediately from blast, heat, or radiation, or dies later from the effects of radioactivity, disease, or starvation--as long as one is going to die! And they go on to assert that modern war is so horrible that everyone or almost everyone will be killed immediately or will eventually be destroyed by one of the after-effects.

A surprisingly large number of official military experts and planners seem to hold views, at least unconsciously, which are really a variation of the Finite Deterrence view that the only purpose of the strategic forces is to deter. This is illustrated by the following apocryphal quotation:

Chart 2

ONE PROFESSIONAL'S VIEW OF HIS PROFESSION

> "If these buttons are ever pressed, they have completely failed in their purpose! The equipment is useful only if it is not used."
>
> --General Aphorism

Even though the above statement may be intended to be rhetoric rather than policy, it is far from being innocuous. If one were to deduce the beliefs of some policy makers from the decisions they make, he would find that in a rather high percentage of cases the planners seem to care less about what happens after the buttons are pressed than they do about looking "presentable" before the event. They show slight interest in maintaining an appreciable operational capability on the second day of the war; if deterrence should fail, they, as well as many scientists, could not be less

interested in the details of what happens--so long as the retaliatory strike is launched.

It is my contention that failure to launch an effective retaliatory attack is only the first of many possible failures. Even if one retaliates successfully, there can ensue significant and meaningful failures. These will occur one after another if the attitude exemplified in the last quotation becomes too universal in either the making or executing of policy. And even Deterrence-only advocates should realize that there are subtle but important differences between a posture whose main purpose is to be a facade which impresses the enemy, and one which is supposed to have an objective capability.

Insurance Against Unreliability. Some of the preponents of Finite Deterrence do not have an antipathy toward all forms of counterforce. They are willing to insure against unreliability. That is, even though deterrence has been made as reliable as they think it can be made, they realize that it may still fail; for example, from accident, human irrationality, miscalculation, or unauthorized behavior. Given this nonzero probability of a war, they find it difficult not to go through the motions of doing "something" to mitigate its effects. Even totally convinced "mutual annihilation" decision makers may be unwilling to admit openly that there are no preparations to alleviate the consequences of a war. It is difficult for any government to look at its people and say in effect, "We can no longer protect you in a war. We have no answer to blackmail except a counter-blackmail threat, and we have no preparations to deal with accidental war except trying to make it so dreadful that everybody will be careful in advance."

A facade of being able to alleviate may also be useful in international relations. It reassures one's allies about one's resolve and induces uncertainty and (hopefully) fear in the enemy. Even if it were true that both sides in the cold war conflict were unwilling to risk a thermonuclear war over any issue that could arise between them, it would weaken their diplomatic strength to admit this openly since the admitting power would be conceding that the other power could always get its way by staking a little more.

Some decision makers who accept the Finite Deterrence view are willing to pay for insurance against unreliability for more than political or psychological reasons. Even those who hold that war means mutual annihilation are sometimes willing for us to act beyond their beliefs--or fears. While this is inconsistent, it is not necessarily irrational. They understand that paper calculations can be wrong and are willing to hedge against this possibility. Sometimes these decision makers are making a distinction that (rather surprisingly) is not usually made. They may distinguish, for example, between 100 million dead and 50 million dead, and argue that the latter state is better than the former. They may distinguish between war damage which sets the economy of a country back fifty years or only ten years. Actually, when one examines the possible effects of a thermonuclear war carefully, one notices that there are indeed many postwar states that should be distinguished. If most people do not or cannot distinguish among these states it is because the gradations occur as a result of a totally bizarre circumstance--a thermonuclear war. The mind recoils from thinking hard about that; one prefers to believe it will never happen. If asked, "How does a country look on the day of the war?" the only answer a reasonable person can give is "awful." It takes an act of iron will or an unpleasant

degree of detachment or callousness to go about the task of distinguishing among the possible degrees of awfulness.

But surely one can ask a more specific question. For example, "How does a country look five or ten years after the close of war, as a function of three variables: (1) the preparations made before the war, (2) the way the war started, and (3) the course of military events?" Both very sensitive and very callous individuals should be able to distinguish (and choose, perhaps) between a country which survives a war with, say, 150 million people and a gross national product (GNP) of $300 billion a year, and a nation which emerges with only 50 million people and a GNP of $10 billion a year. The former would be the richest and the fourth largest nation in the world and one which would be able to restore a reasonable facsimile of prewar society; the latter would be a pitiful remnant that would contain few traces of the prewar way of life. When one asks this kind of question and examines the circumstances and possible outcomes of a future war in some detail, it appears that it is useful and necessary to make many distinctions among the results of thermonuclear war. The following figures illustrate some distinctions which one may wish to make at the outset of his deliberations in this field.

Chart 3

TRAGIC BUT DISTINGUISHABLE POSTWAR STATES

Dead	Time Needed for Economic Recuperation
2,000,000	1 year
5,000,000	2 years
10,000,000	5 years
20,000,000	10 years
40,000,000	20 years
80,000,000	50 years
160,000,000	100 years

Will the survivors envy the dead?

Here I have tried to make the point that if we have a posture which might result in 40 million dead in a general war, and as a result of poor planning, apathy, or other causes, we deteriorate from this posture and a war occurs with 80 million dead, we have suffered an additional disaster, an unnecessary additional disaster that is almost as bad as the original disaster. If on the contrary by spending a few billion dollars, or by being more competent or lucky, we can cut the number of dead from 40 million to 20 million, we have done something vastly worth doing! The survivors will not dance in the streets or congratulate each other if there have been 20 million men, women, and children killed; yet it would have been a worthwhile achievement to limit casualties to this number. It is very difficult to get this point across to laymen or experts with enough intensity to move them to action. The average citizen has a dour attitude toward planners who say that if we do thus and so it will not be 40 million dead--it will be 20 million dead. Somehow the impression is left that the planner said that there will be only 20 million dead. To him is often attributed the idea that this will be a tolerable or even, astonishingly enough, a desirable state!

The rate of economic recuperation, like the number of lives saved, is also of extreme importance. Very few Americans can get interested in spending money or energy on preparations which, even if they worked, would result in preindustrial living standards for the survivors of a war. As will be explained later, our analysis indicates that if a country is moderately well prepared to use the assets which survive there is unlikely to be a critical level of damage to production. A properly prepared country is not "killed" by the destruction of even a major fraction of its wealth; it is more likely

to be set back a given number of years in its economic growth. While recuperation times may range all the way from one to a hundred years, even the latter is far different from the "end of history."

Perhaps the most important item on the table of "distinguishable states" is not the numbers of dead or the number of years it takes for economic recuperation; rather, it is the question at the bottom: "Will the survivors envy the dead?" It is in some sense true that one may never recuperate from a thermonuclear war. The world may be permanently (i.e., for perhaps 10,000 years) more hostile to human life as a result of such a war. Therefore, if the question "Can we restore the prewar conditions of life?" is asked, the answer must be "No!" But there are other relevant questions to be asked. For example: "How much more hostile will the environment be? Will it be so hostile that we or our descendants would prefer being dead than alive?" Perhaps even more pertinent is this question, "How happy or normal a life can the survivors and their descendants hope to have?" Despite a widespread belief to the contrary, objective studies indicate that even though the amount of human tragedy would be greatly increased in the postwar world, the increase would not preclude normal and happy lives for the majority of survivors and their descendants.

My colleagues and I came to this conclusion rather reluctantly; not because we did not want to believe it, but because it is too hard to believe. Thermonuclear bombs are so destructive, and destructive in so many ways, that it is difficult to imagine that there would be anything left after their large-scale use. One of my tasks with The RAND Corporation was to serve as project leader for a study of the possibilities for alleviating the consequences of a thermonuclear war. That study was made as quantitatively and objectively as we could make it with the resources,

information, and intellectual tools available to us. We concluded that for at least the next decade or so, any picture of total world annihilation appears to be wrong, irrespective of the military course of events.[8] Equally important, the picture of total disaster is likely to be wrong even for the two antagonists. Barring an extraordinary course for the war, or that most of the technical uncertainties turn out to lie at the disastrous end of the spectrum, one and maybe both of the antagonists should be able to restore a reasonable semblance of prewar conditions quite rapidly. Typical estimates run between one and ten years for a reasonably successful and well-prepared attacker and a somewhat longer time for the defender, depending mainly on the tactics of the attacker and the preparations of the defender. In the RAND study we tried to avoid using optimistic assumptions. With the exceptions to be noted, we used what were in our judgment the best values available, or we used slightly pessimistic ones. We believe that the situation is likely to be better than we indicate, rather than worse, though the latter possibility cannot be ruled out.

Exactly what is it that one must believe if he is to be convinced that it is worth while to buy Counterforce as Insurance? Listed in Chart 4 are eight phases of a thermonuclear war. If our decision makers are to justify the expense (and possible risk of strategic destabilization) that would be incurred in trying to acquire a capability for alleviating the consequences of a war, they must believe that they can successfully negotiate each and every one of these phases, or that there is a reasonable chance that they can negotiate each of these phases.

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[8] Report on a Study of Non-Military Defense, The RAND Corporation, R-322-RC, July 1, 1958.

Chart 4

A COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF A THERMONUCLEAR WAR

Includes the Analysis of:

1. Various time-phased programs for deterrence and defense and their possible impact on us, our allies, and others.

2. Wartime performance with different preattack and attack conditions.

3. Acute fallout problems.

4. Survival and patch-up.

5. Maintenance of economic momentum.

6. Long-term recuperation.

7. Postwar medical problems.

8. Genetic problems.

I repeat: To survive a war it is necessary to negotiate all eight stages. If there is a catastrophic failure in any one of them, there will be little value in being able to cope with the other seven. Differences among exponents of the different strategic views can often be traced to the different estimates they make on the difficulty of negotiating one or more of these eight stages. While all of them present difficulties, most civilian military experts seem to consider the last six the critical ones. Nevertheless, most discussions among "classical" military experts concentrate on the first two. To get a sober and balanced view of the problem, one must examine all eight.

As an example of the necessity to be concerned about the last six phases, it might be appropriate to quote from testimony before the 1959 Johnson subcommittee on military preparedness during the hearings on the Berlin crisis (italics mine).

> Mr. Weisl: General White, I hate to keep you here so long, but there are some matters that we feel ought to be in the record to make it complete.
>
> On March 9 of this year Dr. Libby, a Commissioner of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, in a public speech stated as follows:
>
>> "Now the fallout we fear in the case of a nuclear attack on this country, or in any other country for that matter, is the local fallout, and this arises solely from bombs which hit the surface."
>
> Then I go on to what I consider the important quote:
>
>> "But in any case, the area covered can amount to several thousand square miles at such an intensity that it would be hazardous to life to stay out in the open for more than an hour, and the density would be high enough so that farmland in this area would be ruined for something like 40 years for anything except the culture of feed for beef cattle, or possibly swine, because of the strontium-90 that would be taken into any other kind of farm product."

I don't know whether it is fair to ask you whether you agree with that or not, but at least that is the statement of a responsible member of the Atomic Energy Commission.

General White: I think there are other responsible scientists, though, who do not agree. I think Dr. Edward Teller is one such. While I agree that fallout is a terrific hazard and one that we don't know as much about as I hope we are going to know, and it is certainly a consideration in atomic war, I don't think that every horror story should be accepted 100 per cent.

Mr. Weisl: I do agree that every horror story should not be accepted, but coming from a responsible member of the AEC, whose duty is to look into these problems, one must take account of it and not look upon it, at least I wouldn't look upon it, as solely a horror story.

Senator Symington: If the counsel will yield, Dr. Teller has opposed those who believe that strontium-90 and cesium-137 will be too damaging from the standpoint of current testing. If there is anything he has said from the standpoint of strontium-90 in answer to Dr. Libby, on the premise of an all-out war, with nuclear surface blasts, I wish you would put it in the record at this point.

General White: I think the only thing I can say is I am sure there is disagreement among scientists as to the exact effects. I can't go beyond that.[9]

It is clear that if "farmland in this area would be ruined for something like 40 years," recuperation will be difficult. In that case we had better abandon Counterforce as Insurance and retreat to the Finite Deterrence position. However, we are going to consider the strontium-90 problem quantitatively below and will come up with some different results. The only point to be made now is that those waging a modern war are going to be as much concerned with bone cancer, leukemia, and genetic malformations as they are with the range of a B-52 or the accuracy of an Atlas missile. Senior military advisors in particular will increasingly be forced to deal

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[9]United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings before the Preparedness Investigating Committee, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., March 1959 (Part 1), pp. 132-133.

with what would have once been called "nonmilitary" problems. They will need to be armed with documented studies rather than opinions.

Once one accepts the idea that deterrence is not absolutely reliable and that it would be possible to survive a war, then he may be willing to buy insurance--to spend money on preparations to decrease the number of fatalities and injuries, limit damage, facilitate recuperation, and to get the best military result possible--at least "to prevail"[10] in some meaningful sense if you cannot win.

Insurance Against a Change in Policy. One of the things which I will try to make clear in Lectures II and III is that the military problem really is complicated and that it is impossible for fallible human beings to predict ahead of time exactly what capabilities they will wish or need. This does not mean, of course, that one has to buy everything. Resources may not be as limited as some of the more budget-minded people think, but they are still quite limited. However, it does mean that whenever it is cheap to do so (and sometimes when it is moderately expensive), we should be willing to hedge against changes in our desires. The fact that it is expensive to buy and maintain a complete spectrum of military capabilities in being does not mean that we should not have what might be called "mobilization bases" for a complete spectrum of adequate military capabilities. The government,

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[10] The word "prevail" is much used in official statements. It is a carefully chosen word that shows that the user is trying to do the best he can even though he is aware that many deny the old-fashioned distinction between victory and defeat. Because its use is ambiguous, the reader does not know whether the author is serious about his goal or is just making a meaningless concession to old-fashioned thinking; it probably does more harm than good to set it up as a goal. It would be better to use the old-fashioned concept of victory, as denoting the one who writes the peace treaty, while at the same time making explicit that victory can be costly.

relying on current doctrine, current military capabilities, its estimates of the capabilities and intentions of potential enemies, or some aspects of the political situation, might be satisfied with current allocations for national defense. But it should still be willing to hedge against the possibility that circumstances may so change that the reluctance to spend money will also change, either increasing or decreasing. This hedging can be accomplished by spending a relatively small amount on advance planning and physical preparations. We will then be in a position where we can make the most rapid and effective use of larger funds if they become available, or we will be able to get the most value out of a smaller military budget if it seems desirable to cut back on expenditures.

There are many different kinds of programs that come under the heading "Hedging Against a Change in Policy." It is obvious that there is need for very broad research and development programs. While research is not cheap, it is far from true that research is so expensive that it can be afforded only on clearly needful items. The opposite is true. The penalty for not having researched on an item that turns out to be useful is so great that we must have an extremely broad program to be certain that all the things that could conceivably be useful will in fact be investigated. Development is somewhat more expensive than research. As a result, we cannot afford to have quite as broad a menu. But even here we should <u>develop</u> many more items than we actually <u>procure</u>. We may also procure some systems in part, even if we do not feel they are absolutely needful. Requirements can change. For example, many people today feel that in the ballistic missile age <u>air defense</u> is obsolete. As I will try to explain later, this is by no means true. But even if it were true that air defense should be termed obsolete

because it might be unable to guarantee protection against Soviet missiles, we might still be willing to have a "base" for air defense because we may be able to discover an answer to the missile threat or we may later decide we want air defense against countries like China--or ultimately even smaller countries. We may find it easy to protect against small bomber forces, which could be very lethal if they had a free ride--very much more lethal, indeed, than any small missile forces these same countries might procure. (Of course, such an air defense system might look quite different from our current one.)

Similarly, while it might be our policy at a given moment to fight limited wars with atomic weapons, we may still be glad to have a large reserve force armed with conventional high-explosive equipment. After all, it is relatively cheap to keep up such reserves, and we recognize that we might change our minds--as we did in Korea. The existence of such a force could enable us to fight a war which otherwise we would have to lose by default, simply because we were unwilling to use nuclear weapons when the occasion actually arose.

There is a special type of mobilization base which I will call a Preattack Mobilization Base. This can be extremely important. It is a capability for being able to improve rapidly our ability to fight or to threaten to fight either a limited or a general war. It includes preparations for putting in adequate civil defense programs. It also includes the procurement of very long lead time items for our strategic air defense and air offense, so that by just spending money rapidly we could bring all of these capabilities up to an adequate level. There is a very broad spectrum of preparations possible here. One kind of preparation would be useful only if a situation occurred in which substantial tactical warning (hours)

was available; another set of preparations would be most useful in situations in which we had strategic warning--days, weeks or even months. And still another set of preparations could be made to improve our ability to compensate for a possible deterioration in the international situation or an increase in our standards for an acceptable level of defense. I will defer to Lecture II discussion of the role that a Preattack Mobilization Base might play in deterring and correcting provocations or providing extra insurance against a failure of deterrence. I will only make here the obvious point that what might be called the Finite Deterrence function of the strategic force is too important to depend on warning. There should always be an adequate capability in-being to deter a surprise attack.

There are large resources available for defense if it becomes necessary to use them. Many economists have estimated that the United States could allocate between 40 and 50 per cent of its gross national product to military purposes for some years without subjecting individual citizens to any appreciable physical hardships. (Postattack living standards would be adequate by almost any reasonable standard. The situation would be much like World War II where we spent, at peak about 43 per cent of our GNP on military products, and we could still buy phonograph records even if we couldn't buy phonographs.) In fact, if we make allowances for current unutilized resources, the country should be somewhat better off than in World War II. Such spending would undoubtedly leave a very unpleasant post-crisis legacy of debt, economic dislocation, some inflation, and so on. But if it ever came to a serious question of choosing between such spending and a high risk of national defeat, I think there is no question that the United States would choose to spend between $200 and $300 billion annually on national security--rather than face the alternative. We are

actually spending today about one-fifth of this potential. Clearly there is an enormous amount of fat which could be converted into muscle if we felt that circumstances warranted this step. The problem is, "Could we move fast enough?" Whether we could would depend not only on how critical the military situation was, but also on our stop-gap military preparations, on our ability to recognize that circumstances have changed, on our resolve, and on the preparations already made for such an expansion. It would be most important that the physical plant and equipment of the Department of Defense (including installations) be such that it could be used as an existing base for a higher capability.

4. Credible First Strike Capability

The next position on Chart 1, that there are circumstances in which a nation may wish to have a Credible First Strike Capability, may seem to many Americans like a possibility for the Soviets--but not for us. One sees many statements to the effect that "We will never strike first." In the context in which the remark is usually made (a "dastardly" surprise attack out of the blue against an unprepared enemy), this position is undoubtedly correct. Such a capability would not be worth much to the United States. However, we have many treaties and other obligations. There is the obligation to come to the aid of NATO nations if they are attacked. It is generally supposed that this aid includes the use of our SAC against the Soviet heartland, even if the Soviets attack Europe but not the United States. From a technical point of view this means that in this instance we would strike first! The agonizing decision to start an all-out thermonuclear war would we ours. Surely there is a serious question whether we would live up to our treaty obligations under such circumstances.

That this doubt is plausible can be seen in the response of Christian Herter to a question by Senator Morse on the occasion of the hearings on his nomination: (italics mine) "I cannot conceive of any President involving us in an all-out nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly we are in danger of all-out devastation ourselves, or that actual moves have been made toward devastating ourselves."[11]

A thermonuclear balance of terror is equivalent to the signing of a nonaggression treaty which states that neither the Soviets nor the Americans will initiate an all-out attack, no matter how provoking the other side may become. Sometimes people do not understand the full implications of this figurative nonaggression treaty. Let me illustrate what it can mean if we accept absolutely the notion that there is no provocation that would cause us to strike the Soviets other than an immediately impending or an actual Soviet attack on the United States. Imagine that the Soviets have taken a very drastic action against our allies in Europe. Let the action be as extreme or as shocking as the reader's imagination permits. Suppose, for example, that the Soviets have dropped bombs on London, Berlin, Rome, Paris and Bonn but have made no detectable preparations for attacking the United States and our retaliatory force looks good enough to deter them from such an attack. As far as we can tell they have done this horrible deed simply

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[11] Hearings on the Nomination of Christian A. Herter to be Secretary of State, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 9-10. Whether he means it or not, Khrushchev speaks a different language. On January 14, 1960, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet, he said: "I am emphasizing once more that we already possess so many nuclear weapons, both atomic and hydrogen, and the necessary rockets for sending these weapons to the territory of a potential aggressor, that should any madman launch an attack on our state or on other Socialist states we would be able literally to wipe the country or countries which attack us off the face of the earth" (italics mine). New York Times, January 15, 1960.

to demonstrate their strength and resolve. Suppose also that there is a device which restrains the President of the U.S. from acting for about twenty-four hours. It is probably true that if the President were not restrained he would order an attack on the Soviet Union (even if he had previously bought either the Minimum Deterrence or Finite Deterrence positions that no sane decision maker initiates a thermonuclear war against an enemy who can retaliate). However, we have assumed the existence of a 24-hour device which forces him to stop and think and make his decision in cold blood. The President would presumably call together his advisors during this time. Most of the advisers would probably urge strongly that the United States fulfill its obligations by striking the Soviet Union. (After all, you have to draw a line somewhere, and the Soviets have obviously more than crossed this line.) Now let us further suppose that the President is also told by his advisers that even though we will kill almost every Russian civilian, we will not be able to destroy all of the Soviet strategic forces, and that these surviving Soviet forces will (by radiation or strontium-90 or something else) kill every American in their retaliatory blow--all 180 million of us.

Is it not difficult to believe that under these hypothetical circumstances any President of the United States would initiate a thermonuclear war by all-out retaliation against the Soviets with the Strategic Air Command? Few would contend that there is any plausible public policy which would justify ending life for everyone! It should be clear that our retaliation would not restore Europe; we could only succeed in further destroying it either as a by-product of our actions or because the surviving Soviet forces would subsequently destroy Europe as well as the United States. I am not saying that the United States would stand idly by. We would clearly

declare war on the Soviets. We would make all kinds of limited military moves. We would go into a crash mobilization on at least the hundred-billion-dollars-a-year level. But there is one thing that we almost certainly would not do: We would not launch an all-out attack on Soviet cities.

There were two important caveats in the situation described: 180 million Americans would be killed, and the President would have twenty-four hours to think about his response. Let us consider these in turn. If 180 million dead is too high a price to pay for punishing the Soviets for their aggression, what price would we be willing to pay? This is a hard and unpleasant question. I have discussed this question with many Americans, and after about fifteen minutes of discussion their estimates of an acceptable price generally fall between 10 and 60 million clustering toward the upper number. (Their first reaction, incidentally, is usually that the U.S. would never be deterred from living up to its obligations by fear of a Soviet counterblow--an attitude that invariably disappears after some minutes of reflection.) The way one seems to arrive at the upper limit of 60 million is rather interesting. He takes one-third of a country's population; in other words, somewhat less than half. No American that I have spoken to who was at all serious about the matter believed that any U.S. action, limited or unlimited, would be justified--no matter what our commitments were--if more than half of our population would be killed in retaliation.

The 24-hour delay is a more subtle device. It is the equivalent of asking, "Can the Soviets force the President to act in cold blood and full knowledge, rather than in the immediate anger of the moment?" This depends not only on the time he has to learn and ponder the effects that would flow from his actions (and I will describe many circumstances in which this time

for reflection would occur), but also on how deeply and seriously the President and his advisers have thought about the problem in advance. This latter, in turn, would depend on whether there had been any tense situations or crises which forced the President and the people to face the concept that war is something which can happen, rather than something that is reliably deterred by some declaratory policy that never need be acted upon. (The effects of the war are usually considered irrelevant to one's declaratory policy, since it is assumed that the declarations will deter the war.)

Let me give an example of a crisis that the Soviets could precipitate that would, by forcing both the Europeans and the Americans to face the possibility of a war seriously, give the effect of a 24-hour waiting period. Assume that both the United States and the Soviet Union could reliably annihilate each other in a retaliatory blow so that there was no special advantage in one side hitting the other first. Assume also that the Europeans had bought their own independent nuclear deterrents because they assess such a balance of terror as extremely dangerous to themselves. As De Gaulle explained in a press conference in November 1959: "Who can say that if the occasion arises the two, while each deciding not to launch its missiles at the main enemy so that it should itself be spared, will not crush the others? It is possible to imagine that on some awful day Western Europe should be wiped out from Moscow and Central Europe from Washington. And who can even say that the two rivals, after I know not what political and social upheaval, will not unite?"[12] However, because they are so close to the Soviet Union, the independent European nuclear deterrent is so vulnerable to a Soviet strike it can't retaliate effectively. Small in size

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[12] New York Times, November 11, 1959.

because of economy and relative technological backwardness, it is not large enough to destroy the Soviet Union if it goes first. The European deterrent, in summary, can only inflict about as much damage on the Soviet Union as the Soviets suffered in World War II. Therefore, the Soviets can threaten the Europeans with a disarming attack if they go first and with an annihilating retaliation if the Europeans go first, accepting whatever damage the Europeans do on their first strike. They are willing to run the risk of a European first strike because they feel that under these conditions the risk is very small, smaller perhaps than the risk of an accidental war caused by the proliferation of nuclear systems. The Soviets then deliver the following ultimatum: unless the Europeans disarm themselves in 30 days (they have no other demands), the Soviets will proceed to disarm them by force. They could make this demand after some incident, say, after a nuclear missile had been fired accidentally (or by intentional Soviet sabotage) at Soviet territory.

The Soviets might couple their disarming ultimatum with another one that would make specific their immediate goals. They could announce that from then on, Europe, Asia, and Africa would be considered as being in the Soviet sphere of interest; further, they would be willing to respect the Western Hemisphere, Australia, and maybe the British Isles and Japan as being in the American sphere of interest; and they would say they were suggesting this method of organizing humanity in order to head-off an uncontrolled arms race which had already resulted in an incident that could have touched off a cataclysm. The Soviets would claim to be willing to accept responsibility for their area and they would hold the United States accountable for its area.

While the above will strike most people as being closer to paranoia than to analysis, it is still worthwhile to observe that the basic assumption of a firm belief on both sides of a reliable balance of terror is not unreasonable. Given this belief, it is most unlikely that even a Soviet ultimatum as provoking as the above would result in an attack by the United States! Given the time available, the U.S. would feel compelled to ponder the results of an attack before ordering one. We might even feel it was possible to negotiate the Soviet demands. The Europeans would also be unlikely to start hostilities. They would be more likely to do the opposite and take off alert whatever forces they have on alert to reduce the possibility of accident or sabotage. Having another European missile shot at the Soviets would now clearly bring intolerable consequences.

The Soviet ultimatum in this instance duplicates most of the pressures of the original hypothetical 24-hour delay situation. While some British and American readers may consider such a Soviet ultimatum even more improbable than the hypothetical situation just outlined, I suspect that a number of continental Europeans find it all too plausible. It is most important that we be able to convince our continental allies that the U.S. posture is such that the Soviets really would find it too dangerous to give such an ultimatum, and that if they did the U.S. would be able to take some corrective action that would not result in most of the Northern Hemisphere being wiped out or in a situation such as De Gaulle described in his press conference. I will discuss some of the possibilities in Lecture II.

It should now be clear what I mean by a Credible First Strike Capability. Credibility does not involve the question "Do we or the Soviets have the capability to hurt the other side on a first strike?" It is well known that this capability exists and in all likelihood will continue to exist.

Credibility depends on being willing to accept the other side's retaliatory blow. It depends on the harm he can do, not the harm we can do. It depends as much on air defense and civil defense as on air offense. It depends on will as well as capability. It depends on the provocation and on the state of our mind when the provocation occurs. One should also note that being able to use a Credible First Strike Capability to influence Soviet or European behavior depends not only on our will, but also on Soviet and European estimates of our will. Serious problems may be created for us if either of them does not believe in our willingness to attack under certain kinds of provocation.

Let us consider some European estimates first. I have discussed with many Europeans the question of how many casualties an American decision maker or planner would be willing to envisage and still be willing to see this country live up to its obligations. Their estimates, perhaps not surprisingly, range much lower than the estimates of Americans, that is, roughly 2 to 20 million (clustering toward the lower numbers). In fact, one distinguished European expert thought that the U.S. would be deterred from retaliating with SAC against a major Soviet aggression in Europe by a Soviet threat to destroy five or ten empty U.S. cities.[13]

Will the Soviets find the threat of U.S. retaliation credible? I have not asked any Soviet citizens, so I lack the advantage of any introspection by Russians. But we do know that their formal writings strongly emphasize

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[13] After observing, in passing, that the case for more civil defense was "perhaps best put eighteen months ago in a study by The RAND Corporation," the London Times of January 4, 1960 editorialized, "No amount of money or concrete could guarantee to prevent the deaths of some millions of city-dwellers from blast and heat, and it is just as difficult to imagine an American President willing to risk deaths of five million Americans as of fifty million."

that decision makers should be able to control their emotions. The Soviets do not believe in cutting off their noses to spite their faces; they write and seem to believe that one should not be provoked into self-destructive behavior. They probably would assume that we do likewise. One would not think that the Soviets could believe that the U.S. would willingly commit suicide. In fact, I would conjecture that they would feel fairly certain about this matter. They could easily underestimate our resolve. We might easily be irrationally determined to resist the Soviets. We have no tradition in the United States of controlling our emotions. We have tended to emphasize the opposite notion (e.g., "Give me liberty or give me death"). A Soviet underestimation of U.S. resolve could create the worst of all situations--one in which we had not made preparations for the failure of deterrence because we knew we had enough resolve, but the Soviets didn't believe it so they went ahead and provoked us and we were forced to initiate a war in retaliation, a war in which we were not prepared to do anything more than kill Russians.[14] But it seems likely that unless we institute remedial measures, the Soviets may estimate that we will be deterred, and they will be right in their estimate. It should be realized that a very low additional probability of war might not deter the Soviets. It is not as if there were no probability at all of war and their action had created this probability. It would be much more reasonable to say that just the existence of the U.S.-S.U. rivalry means that somehow there is always a probability of war of, say, one in fifty every year, and that if the Soviet

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[14] Nathan Leites points out to me that a convinced Communist might be perfectly willing to believe that the cold-hearted capitalist ruling class would be willing to lose 60 million or so of the "lower" classes; but even this ideological estimator would probably feel safe from an attack if a Soviet retaliation could kill many more than 60 million Americans.

action increased this by, in any one year, 50 per cent--from the assumed .02 to .03--that this might not be, for many reasons, as deterring as raising the probability from zero to .01. As the engineer would put it, the increased probability of war must dominate "the noise level" to be deterring. This is particularly true if the Soviets believe that their action would either decrease the long-run probability of war or increase markedly their chance of coming out of such a war very much better than if they had not improved their position. In addition, if the Soviets were not to risk all by a single attempt but tested our resolve more gradually by instigating a series of crises, then without running excessive risks they could probably find out experimentally a great deal about our reactions to extreme provocations. No matter what our declared policy might be, our actual policy could be probed. Most important of all, it is difficult to believe in the absence of adequate measures for air defense and civil defense that the Europeans will have faith in our declared policy when it is strained. The Soviets may be able to make their gains more easily by working on the will and resolve of the Europeans than by working on ours. We must convince the Europeans as well as the Russians of our resolve if we are to prevent appeasement or an undue degree of accommodation.

Here again is a summary of the situation:

Chart 3

TRAGIC BUT DISTINGUISHABLE POSTWAR STATES

Dead	Time Needed for Economic Recuperation
2,000,000	1 year
5,000,000	2 years
10,000,000	5 years
20,000,000	10 years
40,000,000	20 years
80,000,000	50 years
160,000,000	100 years

Will the survivors envy the dead?

The first three lines in this chart indicate circumstances under which some Europeans still believe in U.S. "retaliation." The next two lines show circumstances in which most Americans seem to believe in it, and the last two lines indicate states in which neither Europeans nor Americans (nor presumably the Soviets) would believe that the use of our Strategic Air Command against the Soviet Union is credible--no matter what the Soviets did in Europe--providing they gave U.S. decision makers time to ponder seriously on the consequences of a war.

Unclassified published estimates of the casualties that the United States would suffer in a nuclear war generally run around 50 to 80 million. If these estimates are relevant (which at this writing is doubtful since they generally assume a Soviet surprise attack on an unalert United States), we are already deterred from living up to our alliance obligations. If these casualty estimates are not relevant, then we ought to make relevant estimates for now and the future.

The critical point is whether the Soviets and the Europeans believe that we can keep our casualties to a level we would find acceptable, whatever that level may be. In such an eventuality the Soviets would be deterred from such provocative acts as a ground attack on Europe, Hitler-type blackmail threats, or evacuation of their cities and presentation to us of an ultimatum. But if they do not believe that we can keep casualties to a level we would find acceptable, the Soviets may feel safe in undertaking these extremely provocative adventures; or at least the Europeans may believe that the Soviets will feel safe, and this in itself creates an extremely dangerous negotiating situation--one in which the possibility of extreme pressure and blackmail will always be in the background, if not the foreground.

The situation is actually worse than the mere estimate of the casualties or economic damage is likely to indicate. The most crucial and difficult question is the one asked at the bottom of the chart: "Will the survivors envy the dead?" Unless the President believes that the postwar world will be worth living in, he will in all likelihood be deterred from living up to our alliance obligations. We must give some attention to the conditions of postwar life, to the full impact of a thermonuclear war as indicated on Chart 4 below (the chart first appeared on page 29).

Chart 4

A COMPLETE DESCRIPTION OF A THERMONUCLEAR WAR

Includes the Analysis of:

1. Various time-phased programs for deterrence and defense and their possible impact on us, our allies, and others.
2. Wartime performance with different preattack and attack conditions.
3. Acute fallout problems.
4. Survival and patch-up.
5. Maintenance of economic momentum.
6. Long-term recuperation.
7. Postwar medical problems.
8. Genetic problems.

As has already been explained, one does not have to be trying to achieve a Credible First Strike Capability to be interested in trying to cope with the eight phases of a thermonuclear war. Even if one believes in mutual annihilation, he may still be willing to endorse Counterforce as Insurance Capability (the insurance against unreliability discussed in the previous section). This is because a reasonable person generally knows that his beliefs can be wrong. Many will agree, therefore, that some portion of the defense budget should be allocated to Counterforce as Insurance and to other measures designed to alleviate the consequences of a war. Because paper calculations can be misleading, it is rational to have even an inconsistent program which hedges against this possibility.

There is, however, a difference between Counterforce as Insurance and Credible First Strike Capabilities. In the case of the latter we do not say that there is a modest probability that the mutual annihilation theory

is wrong; instead, we require that there be a very high probability that it is wrong. In short, the time has come when we must believe that our programs are very likely to be successful under wartime and postwar conditions.

When this has been said, it is still important to know (abstractly, we hope) that a war in which the U.S. made the first strike would result in more favorable conditions for us than would the wars that are generally considered. And even here we are more interested in deterrence than in striking first! We are more deeply interested in what the Soviets will conclude when they ask themselves, "If we try this very provoking act, will the United States strike us?" than in speculating on what could happen to us if we should actually strike them. It is quite possible that the Soviets may conclude when contemplating action that their risks are too high (even though the fact may be that we have already concluded that we would not actually dare to initiate the war). It is for such reasons that even a facade may be invaluable. Everyone knows that there is an enormous difference between a probability and a certainty.

5. Splendid First Strike and no Limited War Capability

It is difficult for most people to believe that any nation would initiate a thermonuclear war against an opponent capable of retaliation no matter what capabilities it had and no matter how much it was provoked; nevertheless, there are many military planners who oppose having limited war capabilities to handle modest provocations. They say this is a diversion of our resources from more important and essential central war capabilities. They seem to feel that our strategic force can be so effective in Soviet eyes that they would not dare to provoke us in even a minor way. They also believe that if the Soviets did provoke us we should then hit them

at "a time and place of our choosing," thereby punishing the Soviets for their provocation. This is, roughly speaking, the massive retaliation theory as enunciated by former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. While a Credible First Strike Capability to correct or avenge a limited but major aggression also involves massive retaliation, the distinction is that it is massive retaliation over major issues--not minor ones. It should also be clear that if the terror in the "balance of terror" intensifies, the line between major and minor issues will shift so that the level of provocation we will accept without triggering SAC will increase.

I believe that anyone who studies even superficially the effects of thermonuclear war will inevitably reach certain conclusions. Chief among these is the idea that even if one could launch a very successful first strike, the net damage, if only from the backlash (i.e., the fallout on the U.S. and the world from the bombs dropped on Russia, not to speak of the Russian people who would be killed), would make it unreasonable to make such a strike on a minor issue. Is it not true that if we were to launch such a war it would not be over the minor issue bothering us but really because we had decided to engage in a form of preventive war? In the real world we would have to worry about far more than just the backlash from our blow; we would have to worry about Soviet retaliatory action. For such practical reasons alone, not to speak of vitally important moral and political ones, the notion of having a "Splendid" First Strike Capability seems fanciful to me.

6. Dreams

If a "Splendid" First Strike Capability seems in the light of facts and reason to be fanciful, it is no less strange than many of the ideas

which make the rounds in Washington or in European capitals. In such places one finds consideration given to very implausible notions. One of these is a conflict in which a thermonuclear blow is followed by a three-year war of production accompanied by the kind of mobilization we had in World War II. Another is the notion that the enemy can go ahead and strike us first but that our defenses would keep us essentially untouched, and that we in turn can strike back and then survey the situation. There is the fervid belief in the possibility of a "leakproof" active defense system. There is the concept of a long drawn-out conflict, a "broken backed war," waged with conventional weapons because both sides have simultaneously used up all their nuclear weapons. There is the claim that in a thermonuclear war it is important to keep the sea lanes open. And there is the quaint idea that the main purpose of civil defense is to support a thermonuclear war effort with men and materials. Or the equally quaint notion that after a massive interchange of thermonuclear bombs the major objective of the U.S. Army forces in the United States will not be civilian recuperation but to move to a (destroyed) port of embarkation for movement overseas. While all of these views are most implausible, they can be found in various types of official and semiofficial statements.

Where do such ideas come from? They generally result, it can be assumed, from doctrinal lags or from position papers which primarily reflect a very narrow departmental interest or which are the result of log-rolling compromises between several partisan departments of the government. We are fortunate that on the whole these views are no longer taken seriously even by many of the decision makers who sign the papers. Unfortunately, this does not prevent the papers themselves from influencing public opinion and policy to an important extent.

It should be noted that those who are convinced of the efficacy of Minimum or Finite Deterrence tend to believe that the Counterforce as Insurance, the Credible First Strike Capability, and the "Splendid" First Strike Capability views are as fanciful as the dream capabilities mentioned above. If anything, they find them more dangerously fanciful because so many people take them seriously. In this book only the following strategic positions will be considered seriously: Finite Deterrence, Counterforce as Insurance, Preattack Mobilization Base, and Credible First Strike Capability--all with varying degrees of Arms Control and Limited War Capability. The burden of my discussion will be on the nature, feasibility, and problems associated with each of the above strategies, with the purpose of suggesting which one should be the basis of national policy. Our national policy at this writing seems to be drifting (mostly as a result of decisions evaded or decided for relatively minor technical reasons) toward accepting a strategy between Finite Deterrence and Counterforce as Insurance. It is one of my main arguments that at least for the immediate future we should be somewhere between the Preattack Mobilization Base and the Credible First Strike Capability. This posture would have, at least, enough capability to launch a first strike in the kind of tense situation that would result from an outrageous Soviet provocation, so as to induce uncertainty in the enemy as to whether it would not be safer to attack us directly rather than provoke us. The posture should have enough of a retaliatory capability to make this direct attack unattractive. It should have enough of a Preattack Mobilization Base to enable us to increase our first strike and retaliatory capabilities rapidly enough so that, if international relations deteriorate seriously, we will be able to acquire sufficient power in time to control or influence events. There should be enough Counterforce as Insurance so

that if a war occurs anyway--perhaps as a result of accident or miscalculation--the nation will continue and unnecessary death and destruction will not occur. And lastly the posture should include enough Arms Control and Limited War Capability to deter and correct "minor" conflicts and to make the day-to-day course of international relations livable until more permanent and stable arrangements are set up.

Williams, Chester S

June 4, 1951

Dear Chester:

Belated thanks for yours of May 2. This time the booklet arrived and we shall undoubtedly make plenty of use of it. Again my best thanks.

As ever yours,

Mr. Chester S. Williams
United States Mission to
the United Nations
2 Park Avenue
New York 16, New York

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

2 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK 16, N. Y.
MURRAY HILL 3-6810

16.

May 2, 1951

Dear Ed:

Here is another copy of the booklet I sent to you on January 23 and which was apparently lost in transit. You might find it useful in scrounging around for your "word for today". Also, the text of Ambassador Austin's speech on the occasion of Benjamin Franklin's anniversary contains a pretty useful statement from Franklin's last speech at the Constitutional Convention. Americans seem to be getting pretty hysterical over the rather obvious fact that, when you gather men from many different countries and languages "to have the advantage of their joint wisdom", it takes a lot of discussion to find a common course. They do not jump forward to accept every proposal which bears the label, "Made in America". Far too many Americans take the impatient view that, if they can't agree with us but quick, let them go to Hell--without realizing that we would follow close on their heels.

Sincerely,

Chet

Chester S. Williams
Deputy Chief of Public Information

Mr. Edward Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

ADVANCE RELEASE
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Press Release #1117
January 18, 1951

AMERICA'S FUTURE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

By

Ambassador Warren R. Austin

Remarks at the Luncheon of the International Benjamin Franklin Society, presenting him with the Gold Medal Award of the Society, Hotel Commodore, Saturday, January 20, 1951.

It gives me unusual pleasure to accept the Gold Medal Award of the International Benjamin Franklin Society on this occasion of his 245th anniversary.

Dr. Franklin was our first great diplomat, and truly a world citizen. A modern practitioner of the arts of international conference will do well to model himself after this world statesman.

"America's Future in World Affairs" is the subject of my brief discourse. I propose to concentrate on one, vital question, namely: how shall we treat with our friends and enemies to assure ourselves a democratic future in a free and peaceful world?

I take for my text a significant paragraph from Benjamin Franklin's last address to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, 1787:

I quote: "When you assemble a number of men, to have the advantage of their joint wisdom you inevitably assemble with those men all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views. From such an assembly can a perfect production be expected?"

You will recall that Dr. Franklin is here commenting upon the consumation of the American Constitution. He goes on to say: "It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish our enemies, who are waiting with confidence to hear, that our councils are confounded like those of the builders of Babel, and that our States are on the point of separation, only to meet hereafter for the purpose of cutting one another's throats." End of Quote.

How timely an utterance! It needs to be repeated at the United Nations in New York and in the Congress of the United States in Washington.

In the United Nations we are negotiating continuously with both friends and enemies. The avowed enemy of the free world has tried his best to divide the majority. So far his tactics have actually helped to unite the many and to isolate the aggressive few.

MORE

America's future depends upon how wisely it carries its responsibilities of leadership in the United Nations. In the midst of this crisis, instead of helping to keep the central point clear, some Americans are spreading confusion by distorting and belaboring every subordinate issue which arises in the course of coping with complicated world problems.

The central point is the unification of the free world in the face of aggression and threats of aggression. The aim is peace. The method is collective action.

Each member of the free world, standing alone, is too weak to resist the pressures or the attack of a powerful empire. Not one of them, counting the United States, can make itself powerful enough for separate self-defense. Collective measures are dictated by necessity. As Dr. Franklin put it: "Unless we all hang together, we most assuredly will hang separately."

But acting together the members of the free world constitute a two-to-one preponderance of power. Their expressed determination to build up their united strength through the Collective Measures program, which they adopted in the United Nations a few weeks ago, is the last best hope of peace. Division among them would be an open invitation to aggression.

We shall never effect that unity and avoid that division by carping criticism of our friends, questioning their motives, denouncing their defects, and berating the United Nations through which they are consulting and trying to reach a consensus.

Each nation in the free world is searching its soul as we push forward with our planning for collective measures. Each faces the inescapable question: Do we choose to stand aloof and alone, relying solely upon our own strength for our security and independence?

I am convinced that not a single government in the free world is prepared to answer "yes" to that question. On every issue involving that question by implication the votes in the United Nations have been overwhelmingly on the side of collective security, usually 53 to 5.

Of course every member needs and wants the collective support of all the others. They want that support organized and coordinated.

Some may want to "eat their cake and have it too" - want the benefits of collective support without the responsibility of contributing to the collective power. But it must now be clear: he who wishes to stand aloof risks standing alone. The price of protection by the many is full participation by each in proportion to his ability in the system of collective security.

This is the central point and core of United Nations' policy. Let us never be diverted from it. Every other question must be put in its proper relation to this over-riding necessity.

We are plagued today, as Ben Franklin was in his day, by arrogant claims of infallibility. Franklin admonished his wrangling colleagues against this form of egotism.

He said, "Though many private persons think almost as highly of their own infallibility as that of their Sect, few express it so naturally as a certain French lady who in a dispute with her sister said, 'I don't know how it happens, sister, but I meet with nobody but myself that's always in the right.'"

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Most of the delegates at the United Nations have become weary with the raucous speeches of certain apostles of infallibility. In contrast, the American delegation has won confidence by its respect for the opinions of others, and its policy to join in deliberation rather than to dictate. I trust that we shall not fall into the serious error of our adversaries who hold that a differing opinion is not only wrong but also dishonest.

When I listen to the voices of certainty in our own country expounding the one and only way of salvation, I recall the mellow wisdom of Dr. Franklin. In the beginning of his historic speech to the Constitutional Convention, he said: "Having lived long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged by better information or fuller consideration to change opinions, even on important subjects.... It is therefore that, the older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment."

It is in that spirit we must treat with our friends, seeking always to avail ourselves of their wisdom and experience.

At the same time, we owe to them a forthright expression of our own views. We must at all times argue stoutly for the right as we see it.

Recently in the United Nations we have been laboring with our friends day and night to find a common course of action. In this endeavor we and they have at all times agreed on the goal toward which we chart this course.

The United States has not always shared the hopes and beliefs of many of our friends concerning their peace-making proposals. We have said so plainly. But we have recognized their sincerity in trying to leave no stone unturned in seeking a peaceful solution.

The rebuff of the Peiping regime, and its arrogant demands upon the United Nations, should be a sufficient answer, both to those who had hopes the Communists would accept a peaceful procedure, and those who feared the proposals would be accepted as a bribe and a sell-out.

With the "better information and fuller consideration," the United Nations now confronts the next steps. We can now move forward in greater unity.

Among friends who so desperately depend upon each other there must be respect and understanding. Else we shall lose the great goal, and fall one by one into the hands of the enemy.

We must also treat with the enemy. In this we must be alert to his purposes, thoroughly conversant with his methods, and acutely aware of his vulnerability. Let us not assume that he is either less intelligent or more intelligent than we are.

Our object here is to restrain the enemy, to warn him away from the step which would cause general devastation even though it would bring about his own downfall.

So we must not be afraid to confer and negotiate. Nor should we underestimate the great values of contending with a powerful adversary in open conference. He must be given opportunity to test the unity of the free world; for it is this unity which may deflect him from an act of miscalculation.

Negotiating with a recognized enemy to avoid a conflict is not appeasement. Going to Munich was not the appeasement; what came out of Munich was. Let us be clear about this as we treat with friends and enemies in the days ahead.

MORE
1117

If you start with the necessity for friends, you will begin with the heart of policy. Then you have the acid test to apply to each line of action: does it unite or divide; in effect, does it strengthen the hand of the enemy, or tend to stay the hand of the enemy?

America's future in world affairs is decided to some extent by each citizen; for we are guided and ultimately controlled by public opinion. Let that opinion rise to the challenge of our times. Let it reflect the appealing phrase from the Declaration of Independence which reads, "with a decent respect for the opinions of mankind."

* * * * **

Williams, Chet

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

2 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK 16, N. Y.
MURRAY HILL 3-6810

January 23, 1951

Dear Ed:

It has been a long time since we have met face-to-face, though Elizabeth and I feel that we have almost daily contact with you through the 7:45 show.

We sold our place in Great Neck and now have an apartment at 431 East 20 Street. Let's get together soon - sometime after I get back from a cruise in February.

Meanwhile, it occurs to me that you might find the enclosed booklet useful in scrounging around for your "word for today". Also, the text of Ambassador Austin's speech on the occasion of Benjamin Franklin's anniversary contains a pretty useful statement from Franklin's last speech at the Constitutional Convention. Americans seem to be getting pretty hysterical over the rather obvious fact that, when you gather men from many different countries and languages "to have the advantage of their joint wisdom", it takes a lot of discussion to find a common course. They do not jump forward to accept every proposal which bears the label, "Made in America". Far too many Americans take the impatient view that, if they can't agree with us but quick, let them go to Hell--without realizing that we would follow close on their heels.

Best wishes to the family.

Sincerely yours,

Chet

Chester S. Williams
Deputy Chief of Public Information

Mr. Edward Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

Williams, Chester

September 7, 1948

Mr. Chester S. Williams
Public Liaison Officer
United States Mission to the
United Nations
2 Park Avenue
New York 16, N. Y.

Dear Chet:

Many thanks for yours of the 1st. The best of luck to you in Paris; I may see you there yet!

Best regards to Elizabeth.

As ever yours,

UNITED STATES MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

ARK AVENUE
YORK 16, N.Y.
RAY HILL 3-6810

September 1, 1948

Dear Ed:

Thanks for your note of August 25. I sent you a copy of my letter to Bryson simply because I thought you would be interested in the idea. It appears that there will be one or two such broadcasts and NBC is having a special assembly program on the 22nd of October directed to several thousand high school assemblies being set up by the NEA.

Of course, we have a number of plans in the works for cooperation with the commentators of the various networks in Paris.

I am afraid last-minute preparations will preclude acceptance of your kind invitation. It would seem to me that you would run out of "words for the day" unless you fly over to Paris for a fresh supply. Elizabeth is accompanying me. Why don't you bring Janet over and we will have a drink there?

Best wishes to you both.

Very sincerely,

Chet

Chester S. Williams
Public Liaison Officer

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Williams, Chester S.

August 25, 1948

Dear Chet:

Thanks for the copy of your letter to Bryson. As you know, I no longer have anything to say regarding CBS programming. I hope they follow your suggestion, but I don't think they will.

Come and have a drink before you push off for Paris.

As ever yours,

Mr. Chester S. Williams
United States Mission to the United Nations
2 Park Avenue
New York 16, New York

U.S. Mission to the U.N.
2 Park Ave N.Y.16

August 23, 1948

Dear Mr. Bryson:

The United States Mission to the United Nations has made arrangements to provide liaison services for approximately forty or fifty American organizations. I am enclosing a list of the organizations and representatives at present registered with us for this purpose. I believe there will be another dozen organizations and individuals added to this list before we leave for Paris on September 13.

This group of organizations and individual leaders is quite representative of the American people, having composite memberships of many millions.

The constituents of these organizations, as well as radio listeners, generally would appreciate an opportunity to hear reports from Paris by short-wave over various American networks during the General Assembly. Our thought is that perhaps four such reports could be planned with three or four leaders of the organizations represented participating in each program. One might be broadcast in late September, a couple in October and one in November.

If you feel that your network would be interested in arranging such a program, please let me know and put me in contact with your representative in Paris so that I can assist him in arranging a program. If you would like to carry such a program please propose alternative dates and times.

Very sincerely,

Chester S. Williams
Public Liaison Officer

Mr. Lyman Bryson
Columbia Broadcasting Company
485 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y.

P. S. You remember I wrote to Wells Church with a copy for you sometime back about this idea. Subsequently, I had a conversation with Bill Nelson, who felt that CBS might be interested in doing three or four such programs in view of

the pending plans fora CBS American assembly this year, involving participation of most of these national organizations. A few reports from the leaders of these organizations in Paris would certainly be grist for that mill. I believe you were taking the matter up with the News Department and felt that the details would be worked out by the CBS representative in Paris. The plan, of course, should be outlined to him in some detail as soon as possible.

cc:
Mr. W. Nelson
Mr. Victor Rattner
Mr. E. Murrow

ORGANIZATIONS TO BE REPRESENTED AT PARIS

Name, Address of Organization	Tel. Number	Executive in Chg.	Name, address of Paris Rep.
American Farm Bureau Federation Munsey Building Washington, D. C.		Mr. W. R. Ogg Dir. of Dept. of Int'l. Affairs	William Raymond Ogg
American Federation of Labor 570 Lexington Avenue New York, N. Y.		Matthew Woll	Irving Brown Major William Rutz
American Friends Service Comm. 20 S. 12th St. Philadelphia 7, Pa.	Rittenhouse 9372	Clarence E. Pickett Exec. Secy.	William Huntington, 17 Ru Notre Dame de Champ, Paris
American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc. 1 E. 54th Street New York 22, N. Y.	El 5-1759	Edward O. Carter, Exec. V. P.	Miss Virginia Thompson (Mrs. Adloff) Mr. Richard Adloff, Villa Ez des-Roses, Eze Bord-de-Me Alpes Maritime France
American Jewish Committee 386 4th Avenue New York 16, N.Y.	MU 5-0181	Simon Segal	Joel D. Wolfsohn 30 Rue La Boetie Paris 8
American Jewish Congress 1834 Broadway New York 23, N. Y.	CI 6-1900	Samuel Caplan, Secy.	Dr. David Petegorsky
The American National Red Cross National Headquarters Washington 13, D. C.		P.E. Ryan, Dir. Int'l. Activities	Mr. William L. Gower 5 Place Vendome Paris
American Peace Society 1712 H Street Washington 6, D. C.	National 7409	A.J. Peaslee, Pres.	Dr. Franklin Dunham
Association of the Junior Leagues of America, Inc. The Waldorf-Astoria New York 22, N. Y.	EL 5-4380	Miss Dorothy W. Greer, Exec. Secy.	Mrs. Howard B. Passel
B'nai B'rith 1003 K St., N.W. Washington 1, D. C.		Maurice Bisgyer Int'l. Secy.	Maurice Bisgyer
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 405 E. 117th Street New York 27, N. Y.	UN 4-1850	Alger Hiss	Dr. Howard Wilson B. Trowbridge Erik Trancy Miss Helen Scanlo Mme. Perreux Anne Winslow
The Church Peace Union 170 E. 64th St. New York 21, N. Y.	RE 7-3703	R.W. Sockman, Pres.	Dr. Henry A. Atkinson Mrs. Edgerton Parsons

Name, Address of Org.	Tel. Number	Exec. in Charge	Name, address of Paris Rep.
Commission to Study the Organization of Peace 45 E. 65th Street New York 21, N. Y.	BU 8-8000	Prof. J.T.Shotwell Hon. Chairman	Clark M. Eichelberger Cyril Bath Howard Wilson Dr. O. Frederic Nolde Dr. Henry Atkinson, etc.
Committee on Women in World Affairs 300 Park Avenue New York, N. Y.		Mrs. W. H. Davis, Chairman	Mrs. Edgerton Parsons Highover Hadlyme, Conn. (Paris) Reid-Hall Rue de Chevreus Paris 6
Congress of Industrial Organizations 718 Jackson Pl., N. W. Washington 6, D. C.	Executive 5581	Michael Ross, Dir. Int'l. Affairs	Mr. Elmer Cope 3 Rue du Recher. Suresnes (Seine Paris
Cooperative for American Remittances to Europe, Inc. 50 Broad Street New York 4, N. Y.	HA 2-6484	Paul C. French Exec. Dir.	Mr. Jackson Wright CARE Mission 149 Rue de Grenelle Paris 7e
Country Women's Council USA 1706 E. Washington Street Bloomington, Ill.		Mrs. Spencer Ewing Chmn.	Represented by Associated Country Women of the World
The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America 297 Fourth Avenue New York 10, N. Y.	GR 5-3475	C.P.Taft, Pres.	Rev. Walter W. Van Kirk (tentatively) Hotel Farnese 32 Rue Hamelin Paris 32
Foreign Missions Conference of North America 156 Fifth Avenue New York 10, N. Y.	CH 2-3230	Miss Gloria Wysner, Secy.	Rev. Walter W. van Kirk Hotel Farnese 32 Rue Hamelin Paris 32
Foreign Policy Association, Inc. 22 E. 38th Street New York 16, N. Y.	MU 5-5740	Miss Frances Pratt	Herbert L. May 12 Grand Mezel Geneva, Switzerland
General Brotherhood Board Church of the Brethren 22 South State St. Elgin, Ill.	5010	W. Harold Row Secy.	Dr. M. R. Zigler Church of the Brethren 20 Rue du Cendri Geneva, Switzerland
General Federation of Women's Clubs 511 Madison Avenue New York, N. Y.		Mrs. Charlotte Payne	Mrs. W.D.Sporbor Boson's Forest House Enfield, New Ham Mrs. M. W. Ambor 1070 Park Ave., N Mrs. W. H. Boardley Summit St. Springfield, Vt.

Name, Address of Org.	Tel. Number	Exec. in Charge	Name, Address of Paris Rep.
Lions International 332 S. Michigan Ave. Chicago 4, Ill.		Melvin Jones, Sec.-Gen.	Fred W. Smith
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 20 W. 40th Street New York 18, New York	LO 3-6890	Walter White, Secy.	Walter White
The National Board of the YWCA's of USA 600 Lexington Avenue New York 22, New York	PL 3-4700	Dorothy Groeling Secy for Int'l Ed.	Mrs. G. Beresford Fox World's YWCA Quai Wilson 37 Geneva, Switzerland
National Catholic Welfare Conference 17 E. 51st Street New York 22, N.Y.		Miss Catherine Schaeffer	Richard Pattee 14 Rue de Romont Fribourg, Switzerland
National Council of Jewish Women, Inc. 1819 Broadway New York 23, N.Y.	CI 6-3175	Mrs. J.M. Welt Nat'l.Pres.	Mrs. Adolf Robison Box 158 Ocean Beach Fire Island, N.Y.
National Council of Women of the United States 501 Madison Ave. New York 22, N.Y.	PL 5-6513 PL 9-4870	Mrs. W.B.Parsons, Jr.	Mrs. Edgerton Parsons (summer address) Highover-Cove Acres-Hadlyme,Con (Paris) Reid-Hall 4 Rue de Chevreus Paris 4
National Federation of Business and Professional Women's Clubs Inc. 1819 Broadway New York 23, N.Y.	CO 5-3934	Mildred Burgess, Dir.Int'l Reltns.	Mildred Burgess
National Jewish Welfare Board 145 East 32nd Street New York 16, N.Y.	LE 2-4949	Frank L. Weil, President	Rabbi Samuel Gordon
National Order of Women Legislators 626 W. Kalamazoo St. Lansing, Michigan		Mrs. Elizabeth L. Belen, Pres.	Mrs. S. Grover Rich 271 Ninth Ave. Salt Lake City Utah
National Peace Conference 8 W. 40th Street New York 18, N.Y.	CH 4-6236	Mrs. Bertha V. Louis, Secy.	Rev. Walter V. Van Kirk Hotel Farnese 32 Rue Hamelin Paris Mrs. Edgerton Parsons Reid-Hall 4 Rue de Chevreus Paris 4. Miss Helen Kittredge

Name, Address of Org.	Tel. No.	Exec. in Charge	Name, Address of Paris Rep.
Pan-Pacific Women's Assn. 555 Park Ave. New York 21, N. Y.		Mrs. Edgerton Parsons, Chmn.	Mrs. Edgerton Parsons Reid-Hall 4 Rue de Chevreuse Paris 4 Mrs. Pearl F. Richardson
Synagogue Council of America 3785 Broadway New York 32, N. Y.	WA 6-8930	Rabbi W.F.Rosenblum President	Rabbi Simon G. Kramer
The United Council of Church Women 156 Fifth Avenue New York 10, N. Y.	CH 2-3230	Miss Mabel Head	Miss Helen Kittredge c/o Compagnie Elect Comptable 3-5 Place Vendome Paris 1 Mrs. C. B. Fox c/o LeFoyer des Etudiantes 93 Boulevard St. Michel Paris 5
United World Federalists, Inc. 7 E. 12th St. New York 3, New York	OR 3-9000	Cord Meyer, Jr.	Mr. Edgar Mowrer 3301 Garfield St NW Washington, D. C. Cord Meyer, Jr.
Women's Action Committee for Lasting Peace 1 E. 57th Street New York 22, N.Y.	EL 5-3142	Mrs. Dana Converse Backus, Interim National Chmn.	Mrs. L.H.Fradkin Hotel Bedford Rue de L'Arcade Paris Mrs. Edgar Mowrer 146 Rue de L'Université, Paris 7 Miss Mary Dingman Foyer International des Etudiantes 93 Boulevard St. Michel, Paris
Women's International League for Peace & Freedom 41 Greenwich Avenue New York 14, N. Y.	CH 2-4267	Gladys D. Walser Field Rep.	Mrs. Ruth Gage Colby International Union for Child Welfare 43 Quai Wilson Geneva, Switzerland
World Alliance for International Fellowship 170 E. 64th St. New York 21, N. Y.	RE 7-3703	R.W.Sockman, Pres.	Dr. Henry A. Atkinson Mrs. Edgerton Parsons
World Federation of YMHA's & Jewish Community Centers 145 E. 32nd St. New York 16, N. Y.	LE 2-4949	F.L.Weil, Pres.	Samuel H. Gordon Hotel Continental 3 Rue de Castiglione Paris

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American Women's Voluntary Services, Inc. 99 Park Avenue New York 16, N. Y.	LE 2-1722	Mrs. Ogden L. Mills, Pres.	Mrs. Alfred F. Hess

[Ernst, Morris]
Worthy, Wm., Jr.
ERM Personal Confidential
'47-'59

LAWRENCE S. GREENBAUM (1915-1951)

EDWARD S. GREENBAUM
HERBERT A. WOLFF
MORRIS L. ERNST
LEO ROSEN
HARRIET F. PILPEL
WILLIAM F. WOLFF, JR.
WIRTH H. KOENIG
MAURICE C. GREENBAUM
HERBERT A. WOLFF, JR.
JOHN A. WIENER
CHARLES E. HEMING

CASSRELL GREENBERG
PLATT V. KETCHAM
JULIA PERLES
FREDERIC S. NATHAN
BARRY LEE COHEN
RICHARD M. ADER
MARY MOERS WENIG
NANCY F. WECHSLER
MORTON DAVID GOLDBERG
ALAN U. SCHWARTZ
NORMAN W. ARNHEIM

GREENBAUM, WOLFF & ERNST
285 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.

TELEPHONE MURRAY HILL 5-1582

CABLE ADDRESSES:
GREWOLFERN, NEW YORK
MORERNST, NEW YORK

January 15, 1959

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Ed:

Re: Worthy

I enclose a rough draft of the Amicus brief in the Worthy case. Please look it over for mood, to see whether we are on the right track. Once we get your overall opinion, we shall proceed accordingly and shall strengthen it with some necessary citations and the like without which lawyers feel unarmed. You will note that the brief has been drafted in your name only, but this of course can be changed if you do get the desired people to file it with you.

I have been in contact with the Justice Department, who seem to be somewhat concerned about this case. They have been rather sticky about giving consent for you to file this brief, claiming that if they let you file, why shouldn't they let every other reporter file. Needless to say this is something of a phony argument and is not in line with their previous precedence. We are certainly prepared to file a motion asking the court for leave to file the brief, but we think it would be most preferable from every point of view if you might not give Rogers or someone else at the top a ring to see whether you can get the consent directly. This is a neater, simpler, and quicker way to proceed.

The fact that the Justice Department is somewhat worried about your brief is encouraging. They know that they have a fight on their hands in the case as a whole and they are defending themselves already. It seems to both Morris and myself that this issue is of vital importance right now. We are sure you agree.

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.

January 15, 1959

I hope you get a chance to look this over shortly since time, although not of the essence, is rather short. I would be more than happy, as you well know, to meet you at any time to discuss the thing further, and would love to have your comments. Please let me know.

Morris has asked me to remind you about getting your secretary to put your manuscripts in order, so that they may be given away as tax deductible gifts. Although you certainly are very busy, you should not forget about this since it will be of some use to you financially. I am of course always available to help out with this when the time comes.

Morris is off to London and points East tomorrow morning and things here have been rather hectic. He has asked me to send you his best, as always.

I thought lunch on Saturday was wonderful and I was proud to be there.

Sincerely yours,

Alan

Alan U. Schwartz

bmo

enc.

DRAFT

BRIEF OF EDWARD R. MURROW

Amicus Curiae

Edward R. Murrow, appearing herein as amicus curiae with the consent of both parties, filed with the Clerk of this Court, has a special interest in this case by virtue of his long professional experience in gathering and dissemination of news to the American public. Since the issues here involved relate necessarily to restrictions upon the source of news available to the American people, amicus is particularly grateful for this opportunity for the expression of his views in the hope that they may be of some aid to the Court.

I

In the early days of our Republic when newspapers were few and movies and radio and television were not even thoughts in the minds of the most imaginative, our constitutional guaranties of free speech and free press were designed for the benefit of the disseminators of information, such as the printer, the publisher, or the soap box orator. As our country grew both in size and complexity, so did its need for the dissemination of news. Word of mouth or even a small pamphlet every now and then would no longer suffice. The gap in communication between the American in Oregon and

the American in New York was bridged by an intricate and constantly expanding network of newspapers, movies, radio and television.

In this way was molded our informed citizenry of today, essential, we believe in constitutional terms, for our democracy. And with this process of evolution came a new interpretation by our courts of the constitutional protections of free speech and free press. Holmes and Brandeis pointed out that in modern society the ultimate value of free speech and free press lies not so much with the disseminators of ideas and facts but with the ideas and facts themselves. If truth were to be discovered it would be discovered only by competition of ideas in the marketplace, in a community where fact and theory alike were available for consideration, debate and selection by the public. In constitutional terms the First amendment now protects the right to hear, to see and to read. Because of the increased recognition given to the value of an informed public, it is now well settled law that the protection given by the Constitution to free speech and free press attaches to the eventual recipients of this information rather than to its disseminators.

The main concern of amicus in this case, then, is not primarily with the rights of appellant or any other individual. The application of the principles of freedom of speech and press to the appellant in this case is a result not of his position as an individual, but of his particular function as one who gathers and disseminates news to the American public. For purposes of

this case he must be considered as a faceless individual whose own particular merits are immaterial. It is his function, not his person, which must be considered. As a news reporter he is acting as the servant of the people in fulfillment of their basic constitutional right to be informed. This is not the case of a merchant or ordinary pleasure traveler who desires complete freedom to travel for his own ends. Nor should this situation be confused with the possible constitutional right to deny passports in cases such as persons escaping judicial orders, running from fraudulently created debts, or persons suffering from communicable diseases, and the like. This is the case of one who must be free to travel, not for his own sake or even because of his own rights as a citizen, but in order to provide the American people with what they are constitutionally entitled, namely, information in the search for truth.

The right to information is not an abstract right. In areas of general human understanding democratic government cannot survive unless the electorate has at its disposal all available information on which to reach intelligent conclusions about the future of our country, and indeed, our world. A leadership responsible only to an uninformed or partially informed electorate can bring nothing but disaster to our world.

The State Department takes the position that foreign policy is within its exclusive jurisdiction. We do not draw

an issue on this position. Amicus does not deem it necessary to urge that the Legislative branch of the Government has the power to make foreign policy in this Passport area. Assuredly, foreign policy is not within the province of the Judicial branch of our Government. In simple terms, the problem facing the Court is whether, in the light of the First Amendment to the Constitution, the people of our Republic can be denied knowledge gathered by our citizens -- in this case, in China -- as not only an individual right of citizens to travel throughout the world but, more particularly, as a right of our people to have the potential power to reflect public opinion so that the foreign policy of our nation, enunciated by the Secretary of State, rests, at least in part, on the reflexes and reactions and debates of the people of our Republic.

The present debate in the marketplace is slanted and distorted in violation of the Constitution by the denial of the people to be informed through the eyes and cultural attitudes of our citizens travelling in China. It may be that the State Department would have the power to appraise and enunciate a foreign policy, in total disregard of even a unanimously expressed position of our people, after reading reports from our citizens traveling in China. It may even be that such debate in our marketplace of thought might be totally wrong in fact and that the secret reports to our State Department

might properly indicate a different foreign policy than that derived by the people of our Nation as informed by our citizens reporting out of China.

Amicus suggests that the rights under the First Amendment should not be curtailed so as to deny our people the right to have information indigenously arising out of our cultural attitudes through reporters in China. In no way does this basic right imply that the people have the power to make the foreign policy.

Amicus does not mean to suggest that all documents of secret diplomacy be made available to the American public. He recognizes in these times more than ever the vital need for sober and unpublicized debate around the conference table. He is concerned only with the gathering and dissemination to the American public of the vast amounts of non-secret information which awaits discovery by perceptive reporters in Communist China and elsewhere around the globe.

The action of the Secretary of State in the instant case puts out of reach of the American public sources of non-secret first-hand information without which it is impossible for them to exercise intelligently their democratic responsibility, and such action is clearly violative of the constitutional right of the people to be informed.

II.

The Secretary of State contends that the Department's prohibition on travel to Communist China has not substantially

limited the scope of news available to the American people. This is hardly a tenable contention. Because Communist China is closed to American newsmen, the American public is put in the anomolous and dangerous position of having to learn about that country from reporters of foreign countries, foreign governments (usually the Communist Chinese government itself) and perhaps an occasional "turncoat" United States soldier.*

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* The irony of this situation is best illustrated in the recent issue of LIFE MAGAZINE (January 5, 1959). At p. 44 of this issue appears one of the few articles by LIFE on Communist China under the title, "Misery-Oppression" by James Bell. The extensive photographs which accompanied the article were taken by a Frenchman, Cartier-Bresson. When asked why the article by Mr. Bell was written from Hong Kong while the photos by Mr. Cartier-Bresson were taken in Communist China itself, a spokesman for LIFE said, rather unhappily, that Mr. Bell is an American who couldn't enter the country while Mr. Bresson was French and could enter as he pleased. It is important also to note that the overwhelming majority of important articles on Communist China which have appeared in American magazines in recent years were based either on second-hand information, or first-hand information grown stale with age. Moreover, our largest television networks have had to rely for recent programs on Communist China upon films supplied to them from non-United States sources. And, finally, and what is perhaps most indicative of the fallacy of the Secretary of State's position in this matter, when television station WNEW-TV in New York showed a two-part series on Communist China on October 22nd and October 29, 1958, it relied solely upon comments made by appellant in this case and upon comments made by two of the students recently in Red China in violation of the ban of the Secretary of State. It is not hard to realize that these three participants were the only first-hand sources of information available for dissemination to the public.

3 years - former Canadian Reporter

It is folly to assume, as does the Secretary in this case, that information about Communist China gathered by non-United States sources can be of real benefit to the American public. Clearly information received from the Peking Government or from United States "turncoats" is tainted with self-interest conscious or unconscious. In addition news obtained from other foreign sources, whether governmental or reportorial, is generally misleading to us since it is news reported and screened by individuals who are necessarily less than intimate with the needs, aims and objectives of American foreign policy. The First Amendment right of the people to be informed is rendered impotent if Americans are made to view information through foreign eyes only. For the public is thereby given a synthetic, rather than real, marketplace in which to test for truth.

III.

The Government contends, among other things, that the State Department may control the travel of its citizens, including newsmen, since it must bear the burden of their protection in foreign lands. However, informed people everywhere, and especially newsmen, know that this burden is not very great. We are past the days of sending gunboats into shallow foreign inlets. Amicus makes no constitutional or statutory claim that our Nation must protect the life of every citizen traveling abroad. He claims no implied contract between the Government

and its citizens in this regard. Indeed, a traveler could be easily disabused of any idea to the contrary at the time he is issued his document of introduction, which is the passport. The protection theory is the result of a view of the passport as a document of privilege. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have overruled this view and have made it clear that a passport evidences a right rather than a privilege.

In addition it should be kept in mind that the collection of news is often a hazardous business in itself, and a reporter accepts such risks as a part of his function and duty to the public. The constitutional right of the people to be informed cannot be subsumed under the niceties of safety or convenience, especially when the newsmen themselves are willing to take the risk. Indeed, the most important news generally emanates from troubled areas, as our Government, which has sanctioned the presence of newsmen in many shooting wars, well knows.

IV.

It cannot validly be contended that observance of the First Amendment guarantees owed by the Government to its electorate stops at our shores. In a world shrunk by the technical ingenuity of man it is more important than ever that the information owed to the public be collected from all over the globe. Especially is this true of information which emanates

from powerful countries antagonistic to United States interests. It is only by the clear flow of news from these countries that the American people can best evaluate how to proceed in their own behalf. By setting aside prohibitive areas of travel, "in the interests of foreign policy", as he has done in this case, the Secretary of State has deprived the American people of their constitutional rights without due process of law. Moreover it is futile to consider the due process required to be that of a hearing the sole function of which is to determine whether an individual such as appellant has violated the area restrictions imposed by the Secretary of State. Although Amicus does not herein concede that any hearing based upon a determination by the Secretary of State as to what is "in the interest of foreign policy" would provide sufficient due process for restricting the movements of a newsman, whether he work for a newspaper, radio, television or the newsreels, he does contend that in order for there to be at least a semblance of due process there must be a public hearing on the merits of excluding each respective area. So long as the Secretary of State is allowed to determine, in his absolute discretion, those areas to which American newsmen are prohibited from travelling there is no legal safeguard which would prevent him from abusing his discretion in the most outlandish terms. For example, travel to the Arctic could be prohibited without recourse simply because the Secretary felt that people should not run the hazards of snow and ice or because of explorations on that ice. Such a result would indeed

be possible under the present situation where no procedure is established for questioning the geographical limitations imposed by the Secretary of State. In this way the constitutional right to travel and to free speech and press may be rendered useless by the work of one man. Surely, our democracy cannot be said to rest upon such filmsy supports.

CONCLUSION

Appellant stands before this Court as a faceless person in a representative capacity. He is a newsman, and while fulfilling his function he is acting as an arm of the American people in the furtherance of their fully protected right to be informed. To restrict his movement is to restrict the information received by the American people and is therefore to allow them less than they are entitled to under the Constitution. It is further to hamper the United States in its dealings with other nations since, as modern man has learned from history, to deal from ignorance is to deal from weakness.

Worthy

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT

IN THE

United States Court of Appeals

For the District of Columbia Circuit

No. 14,807

WILLIAM WORTHY, JR.,

Appellant,

vs.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES, Secretary of State,

Appellee.

Appeal From the United States District Court for the District of Columbia

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

Statement of Questions Presented

1. Whether the Secretary of State has the statutory authority to refuse to renew a passport to prevent the appellant from traveling to certain countries with which the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations.

2. Whether the Secretary's passport regulations (22 C. F. R. §§ 51.135-51.170, hereinafter referred to as "the passport regulations") and, in particular 22 C. F. R. § 51.136, are invalid because they are not authorized by Congress and because they conflict with controlling statutes, viz., Section 6 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 993, 50 U. S. C. § 785; and the Expatriation Act of 1868, 15 Stat. 223-224, R. S. § 1999.

3. Whether the passport regulations, on their face and as applied to appellant, abridge First Amendment rights of speech and travel; constitute a bill of attainder and an *ex post facto* law in violation of Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution; and deprive appellant of his right of travel and to due process under the Fifth and Ninth Amendments.

4. Whether the foreign policy considerations advanced by the Secretary of State as reasons for his refusal to renew the appellant's passport to prevent him from traveling to countries with which the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations, justify the abridgement of his constitutional right to travel.

5. Whether the refusal by the Secretary of State to renew applicant's passport is an abridgement of the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of the press.

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III. Alternatively, to the extent that the power to deny a passport to prevent appellant from traveling to countries with which the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations is based on the Executive power over foreign relations, it is still subject to applicable constitutional provisions: and the reasons given by the Secretary for the denial in this case do not warrant the abridgement of constitutional rights 31

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Jurisdictional Statement

The judgment of the District Court was entered on October 6, 1958 (J.A.). The notice of appeal was filed on October 16, 1958 (J.A.). The jurisdiction of the District Court rested on D. C. Code, Secs. 11-305 and 11-306, on Sec. 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. Sec. 1009, and on 28 U. S. C. Sec. 2201 as set forth in the complaint (J.A.). The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U. S. C. 1291 and 5 U. S. C. 1009.

Statement of the Case

On February 25, 1957, the appellant, William Worthy, Jr., applied to the appellee, John Foster Dulles, through his agent, the United States Passport Office, for renewal of his United States Passport No. 558363, which was due to expire on March 4, 1957 (J.A.). On March 29, 1957, through his agent, the Director of the Passport Office, appellee tentatively denied the application for renewal (J.A.).

After an informal hearing on April 29, 1957, pursuant to § 51.137 of the Passport Regulations (22 C. F. R. § 51.137) at which the appellant appeared and gave testimony, the appellee, on September 18, 1957, through his agent, the Acting Director of the Passport Office, advised the appellant that the original decision denying the application for renewal would stand (J.A.).

The appellant then appealed to the Board of Passport Appeals of the Department of State, pursuant to § 51.138 of the Passport Regulations (22 C. F. R. § 138) (J.A.). Following a hearing on December 10, 1957, at which the appellant was represented by his attorney, the passport renewal application was again denied on March 24, 1958 (J.A.).

On April 9, 1958, the appellant filed a verified complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, praying for a decree ordering the appellee to renew the appellant's passport forthwith (J.A.). On

June 9, 1958, issue was joined by the filing of appellee's answer (J.A.). On June 23, 1958, the appellant filed a motion for summary judgment and on July 16, 1958, appellee cross-moved for summary judgment in his favor (J.A.). After a hearing on these motions before District Judge Edward M. Curran of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, on October 2, 1958, the appellant's motion was denied and appellee's granted from the bench (J.A.).

Statement of the Facts

Appellant William Worthy, Jr. has served in China, Russia, Hungary, Africa and other parts of the world as a foreign correspondent for the Afro-American Newspapers, the New York Post, the Columbia Broadcasting System, and other news media (J.A.).

On March 4, 1955, he was issued United States Passport No. 558,363, which contained endorsements purportedly invalidating it for travel to those countries with which the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations, including Communist China and Hungary (J.A.).

On December 6, 1956, the appellant obtained a transit visa for Hong Kong from the British Consulate in Boston, Massachusetts; on December 20, 1956 he obtained a visa for Hong Kong, valid for six months, at the British Consulate in New York City, after having received a cablegram on December 16, 1956 from the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Peking authorizing him to visit China (J.A.).

Appellant left the United States on December 22, 1956, arriving in Hong Kong on December 24th (J.A.). Later that day he departed for Communist China, entering that country at Sumchon. His passport was not required as a condition of entry or stay in Communist China, which, for the sake of brevity, will be henceforth referred to as China (J.A.).

During a forty-one day stay in China, appellant obtained visas from the Soviet and Hungarian Embassies in Peking. The visa for Hungary was stamped on a separate piece of paper.

On or about February 3, 1957, appellant arrived in Moscow. On February 7th he arrived in Hungary, which he left on February 8th returning to the United States on February 10, 1957 (J.A.).

On February 25, 1957, appellant applied to the State Department Passport Office for renewal of his passport, which was to expire on March 4, 1957 (J.A.). On March 29, 1957, the Director of the Passport Office tentatively denied the application for renewal (J.A.).

After hearings before the Passport Office and the Board of Passport Appeals, renewal was again denied upon the grounds that the appellant had violated previous restrictions in his passport, and that appellant would give no assurance that he would not use his renewed passport in violation of such restrictions (J.A.). The refusal to renew appellant's passport was based on 22 C. F. R. § 51.136 in that such violations would be "prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign relations" (J.A.).

The appellant then sought relief in the District Court for the District of Columbia, arguing that under the Supreme Court decision in *Kent* v. *Dulles,* 357 U. S. 116 (1958), the grounds for denial of his application for passport renewal were invalid and without statutory authority (J.A.). The District Court denied relief on the ground that within the exercise of foreign relations the executive had the power to restrict the travel of citizens to certain geographic areas of the world (J.A.).

Statutes and Regulations Involved

The statutes involved are the Act of July 3, 1926, c. 772, § 1, 44 Stat. 887, 22 U. S. C. § 211(a); the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 215 (a), 66 Stat. 190, 8 U. S. C. § 1185; and the Expatriation Act of 1868, 15 Stat. 223-224, R. S. § 1999. The pertinent provisions of these statutes are reproduced in the Appendix, *infra,* pp. 51-53.

The principal regulations involved are 22 C. F. R. § 51.136, and 22 C. F. R., § 53.8, which read as follows:

> "SEC. 51.136. Limitations on issuance of passports to certain other persons. In order to promote and safeguard the interests of the United States, passport facilities, except for direct and immediate return to the United States, will be refused to a person when it appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State that the person's activities abroad would: (a) violate the laws of the United States; (b) be prejudicial to the interests of the United States; or (c) otherwise be prejudicial to the interests of the United States."
>
> "SEC. 53.8. Discretional exercise of authority in passport matters. Nothing in this part shall be construed to prevent the Secretary of State from exercising the discretion resting in him to refuse to issue a passport, to restrict its use to certain countries, to withdraw a passport already issued, or to withdraw a passport for the purpose of restricting its validity or use in certain countries."

Other pertinent passport regulations are reproduced in the Appendix, *infra,* pp. 56-57.

Statement of Points

1. The District Court erred in denying appellant's motion for summary judgment.
2. The District Court erred in granting the Secretary's motion for summary judgment.

Summary of Argument

I

The denial of a passport is a denial of the right to travel. It is unlawful to travel to almost all countries without a passport. Even where lawful, it is, as a practical matter, a requisite for admission to most countries. Accordingly, a denial of a passport must be justified as a denial of the right to travel.

This right is protected by the Constitution. It is an attribute of personal liberty. In many instances, as in the case of appellant, it is important to the pursuit of a livelihood and the furtherance of a career. The educational value of travel and the opportunities it affords for the exchange of ideas and experiences justifies its characterization as an exercise of First Amendment rights. It is important also for the creation of an informed citizenry which, on the basis of its own independent observation of countries abroad, can critically participate in the formation of our government's foreign policy. Finally, the action of the Government in preventing the citizen from leaving the country is tantamount to imprisoning him.

II

The 1952 regulations under which the Secretary of State denied a passport here were the first regulations in American history to establish political, or any substantive, qualifications for a passport other than citizenship. The Secretary, however, lacked the authority to issue these regulations.

The regulations purport to find their source of authority in the provisions of 22 U. S. C. § 211(a) enacted in 1926. This statute, however, was merely a reenactment with minor revisions of the first Passport Act enacted in

1856. Its limited purpose was to centralize the issuance of passports in the Department of State. The statutes were enacted in a period when passports were not a mechanism for the control of travel and hence Congress could not have intended by this legislation to control travel in any respect. The legislative history of the statutes demonstrates that the sole discretion vested in the Executive under them was to issue regulations of an administrative and routine nature; and not to establish classes of eligibility for passports. This has been the construction given the statute for almost a century prior to the 1952 regulations, and deference must be accorded to this administrative construction.

Moreover, the construction given to the 1926 statute by the government would render it unconstitutional. If viewed as a grant of power to the Executive to control travel, the absence of any standards as a guide to the exercise of that power would constitute an invalid delegation of power.

Nor can any authority for the regulations be found in the provisions of 8 U. S. C. § 1185(b). This statute makes it unlawful during a national emergency, proclaimed by the President, for a citizen to leave the country without a passport. But this statute contains no standards whatever for determining to whom passports should be denied, and it does not grant authority to the Executive to make such determination.

Furthermore, the regulations conflict with Congressional policy as set forth in the Expatriation Act of 1868 favoring freedom of expatriation. Expatriation is not possible without freedom to depart from one's country.

The regulation permitting geographical restrictions upon travel is an exercise of law-making authority beyond the power of the executive branch. Under our constitutional system the Executive has no power to make law in any field, whether it be that of foreign relations or otherwise.

III

Secondly, the denial of the right to travel is not the conduct of foreign affairs. It involves the relationship of the government to its own citizens and constitutes a restriction upon their liberty. Such a power cannot be considered to be an inherent power of the Executive.

IV

a. The regulations as written and applied violate the First Amendment because the interference with appellant's right to travel is explicitly based upon the vagaries of foreign policy which are much too vague and fluctuating to justify the abridgement of a constitutional right.

If there are any circumstances under which this fundamental liberty of movement may be curtailed, they could only be such as present a substantial threat to the security of the state. No such threat exists in the exercise of the right of travel generally or by appellant whose legitimate reason for travel is not contested by the government.

The government's alternative suggestion that a passport is a kind of diplomatic document guaranteeing protection is neither a correct construction of the passport nor a justification for its denial.

The explanation of the court below that travel to certain areas of the world may be restricted when claimed to be necessitated by foreign policy considerations is not a justification for so drastic a limitation upon movement.

b. The regulation denied due process in fundamental respects. It employs such vague criteria as "prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign relations" and "prejudicial to the interests of the United States." 22 C. F. R. § 51.136. Such vague terms are particularly pernicious where they adversely affect the exercise of First Amendment rights.

c. The regulation also violates the Ninth Amendment inasmuch as the Secretary's denial of appellant's renewal application is based upon past conduct and is a denial and disparagement of one of the most fundamental of unenumerated rights retained by the people, that of free movement.

V

The refusal to permit responsible and accredited newsmen to travel to certain areas of the world is an abridgement of the First Amendment guarantee of the freedom of the press. If the news cannot be gathered, it cannot be published. If publication were the only criterion, then it would be possible, as a practical matter, to prevent it by merely prohibiting the gathering of the news. As the New York Times editorialized on May 3, 1957: "Would Mr. Dulles contend that freedom to produce a blank page is 'freedom of the press'?"

ARGUMENT

I

The right to travel is a constitutional right, and like other constitutional rights it may be limited or abridged only when there are overriding considerations of the public safety.

In the United States, the right to travel has recently been judicially recognized as a constitutional right. See *Kent & Briehl* v. *Dulles,* 357 U. S. 116, 125, 130 (henceforth cited as *Kent* v. *Dulles*). However, it has long been held in England to be a most important aspect of the personal liberty of individuals:

> "Next to personal security, the law of England regards, asserts, and preserves the personal liberty of individuals. This personal liberty consists in the

> power of locomotion, of changing situation, or removing one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law." 1 Blackstone, Commentaries 134 (1st Worcester ed. 1790).

See also Jaffe, The Right to Travel, Foreign Affairs, October, 1956; Comment, Passports and Freedom of Travel, the Conflict of a Right and a Privilege, 41 Georgetown L. J. 63, 70 (1952); Parker, the Right to Go Abroad; To Have and to Hold a Passport, 40 Virginia L. R. 853, 868 (1954); Chafee, Three Human Rights in the Constitution, 162-213 (1956); Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 Columbia L. R. 47 (1956).

Recent historical analysis has shown that this right is a part of the word "liberty" as used in the Fifth Amendment:

> " * * * [I]n light of the history of the common law, of the freedom which English subjects had enjoyed for two centuries before Blackstone's time, of the complaint against the King in the Declaration of Independence, and of the freedom of travel guaranteed by the Articles of Confederation, there would seem to have been little place for doubt that 'liberty' in the Fifth Amendment means freedom to go any place, whether it be another state, another country, or another planet." Comment, Passports and Freedom of Travel; The Conflict of a Right and a Privilege, *supra,* at 71-2.

See also, Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 Iowa Law Review 6 (1955); Parker, the Right to Go Abroad, *supra.*

With respect to movements between states, the Supreme Court early recognized the right to travel as a constitutional right. See *Crandall* v. *Nevada,* 73 U. S. 35, 44, 47; *Williams* v. *Fears,* 179 U. S. 270, 274; *Edwards* v. *California,* 314 U. S. 160. In *Bauer* v. *Acheson,* 101 App. D. C. 247, 106 F. Supp. 445, 451, involving a foreign correspondent

whose passport had been summarily revoked by the Secretary of State, the three-judge court said:

> "* * * It is difficult to see where, in principle, freedom to travel outside the United States is any less an attribute of personal liberty. Especially is this true today, when modern transportation has made all the world easily accessible * * * Personal liberty to go abroad is particularly important to an individual whose livelihood is dependent upon the right to travel * * *"

This recognition of the constitutional right to travel abroad was reaffirmed by this Court in *Shachtman* v. *Dulles,* 96 App. D. C. 287, 225 F. 2d 938 where it held unlawful the refusal of a passport on the ground that the applicant was chairman of an organization on the Attorney General's list; and more recently by the Supreme Court in *Kent* v. *Dulles, supra,* where refusal of a passport on grounds of belief in or association with Communist causes was held to be without statutory authority. "Freedom to travel", said the Supreme Court, "is, indeed, an important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty' " and "is basic in our scheme of values", 357 U. S. 116, 127, 126. Cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13 (2), 43 Am. J. Int'l L. 127, 129 (1949 Supp.); Treaty between United States and the Italian Republic, Feb. 2, 1948, Art. 1 § 1, 2 U. S. Code Cong. Svc. (1948) 2814; Vestal, Freedom of Movement, *supra,* n. 61.

It is conceded that no constitutional right, however, is an absolute right. At various times the courts have sustained the limitation or abridgment of constitutional rights when the security and safety of the nation have demanded such action. The theory upon which such limitations have been sustained is that constitutional rights may not be asserted in a way which threatens to destroy the government which is entrusted with their protection. If there is no government, the rights themselves will be destroyed. Accordingly, it is preferable to limit constitutional rights until the threat to security shall pass rather than to allow

unlimited exercise until these rights are totally destroyed. See *Korematsu* v. *U. S.*, 323 U. S. 214.

Clearly, however, the situations which demand the curtailment of constitutional rights must be of an exceptional and severe emergency nature. See *Thomas* v. *Collins*, 323 U. S. 516 and *Bridges* v. *State of California*, 314 U. S. 252. The alleged existence of an "emergency" must not be used as a guise for the suppression of individual rights. The courts have recognized the difficulty in setting down any rigid or fixed standards to balance the conflicting interests here involved. In an effort to furnish rough and ready guides, the Supreme Court has relied, to some extent, upon such standards as "clear and present danger," *Schenck* v. *United States*, 249 U. S. 47, 52, "gravest imminent danger to the public safety," *Korematsu* v. *United States, supra*, at 218 and "that the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger," *United States* v. *Dennis*, 183 F. 2d 201, 212, adopted in *Dennis* v. *United States*, 341 U. S. 494, 510. Admittedly such standards are difficult to apply, but they are nonetheless expressive of the very minimum threat which may be used to justify the limitation of constitutional rights. In *Kent* v. *Dulles, supra*, at 128-129, the Court, in distinguishing the *Korematsu* case, stated:

> "There the Congress and the Chief Executive moved in coordinated action; and, as we said, the Nation was then at war. No such condition presently exists. No such showing of extremity, no such showing of joint action by the Chief Executive and the Congress to curtail a constitutional right of the citizen has been made here."

The Secretary's quarantine of the appellant can be no more justified under the above or under any other tests than were those of Walter Briehl, Rockwell Kent and Weldon Bruce Dayton. *Kent* v. *Dulles, supra; Dayton* v. *Dulles*, 357 U. S. 144.

II

The Secretary of State does not have the statutory authority to deny a passport to prevent travel to countries with which the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations.

A. The Primary Function of the Power Over the Issuance of Passports is the Control Over Exit.

Section 215(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 190, 8 U. S. C. § 1185(b) (1952) makes it unlawful after a prescribed Presidential proclamation, for anyone to enter or depart from the United States without a valid passport. The required proclamation has been made. Presidential Proclamation No. 3004, 67 Stat. c. 31 (January 17, 1953) entitled "Control of Persons leaving or entering the United States by the President of the United States of America." Whatever may have been the significance of a passport prior to the effective date of Section 215(a), this statute necessarily makes control over the issuance of passports tantamount to control over exit. The Supreme Court has clearly recognized this fact. In *Kent* v. *Dulles*, the court said, "Its [a passport's] crucial function today is control over exit." 357 U. S. 116, 129.

Even if it were not a crime to go abroad without a passport, it would not be possible as long as most foreign countries require the presentation of such a document, a practice not likely to be discontinued for many years to come. See Travel Abroad—Frontier Formalities (a joint publication by UNESCO and International Union of Official Travel Organizations). *Bauer* v. *Acheson*, (*supra*, at 451) made it quite clear that the factual impossibility of traveling abroad without a passport is tantamount to being legally prevented from traveling.

Incidentally, it might be appropriate at this point to indicate that as early as 1868, Congress recognized that "the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right

of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness". Expatriation Act of 1868, 15 Stat. 223-224, R. S. § 1999. See also *Savorgnan* v. *United States,* 338 U. S. 491, 498-499. Although this statute has never been repealed, it is, as a practical matter, nullified by appellee's action based on passport regulations which are invalid because they conflict with the Act of 1868. See also 9 Op. A. G. 356-363.

B. Whatever Power the Secretary of State Has Over Exit of Individuals From the United States, He Has Solely by Virtue of an Act of Congress.

The underlying assumption of the appellee's position is that the power over the issuance of passports is primarily a tool of foreign policy, and that the Secretary of State has the right to use private individuals and their constitutional rights as pawns of diplomacy. In his press conference of May 14, 1957, the Secretary indicated that he would not permit "American correspondents with American passports into areas where they would involve or conflict with the United States foreign policy". New York Times, May 15, 1957.

There is an easy fallacy in the assumption that, because the Secretary of State is the officer of our government chiefly concerned with foreign relations, and because he has been given the power to issue passports pursuant to 22 U. S. C. § 211(a) (1926), there is a necessary connection between foreign relations and passports. As will be shown, the power to issue passports was given to the Secretary of State merely to centralize and administer the procedure of passport issuance. To that end this power could just as easily have been given to every federal marshal, or to the Secretary of Agriculture. See Note, The Passport Puzzle, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 269 at 272, n. 25 (1956); Doman, a Comparative Analysis: Do Citizens Have The Right to Travel?, 43 A.B.A.J. 307, 308 (1957); Barnett, Passport Administration and the Courts, 22 Oregon L. R. 193, 194

(1953). Surely such an arrangement would not lead one to say the primary purpose of a passport is an adjunct to law enforcement or crop control.

However, it is argued that a passport implies the intention of the American government to extend diplomatic protection to the bearer, and that requests for and extensions of protection involve negotiation with foreign governments. Therefore the issuance of a passport necessarily involves foreign relations, a contention that was denied by this Court in *Dayton* v. *Dulles,* 99 App. D. C. 47, 254 F. 2d 71 and which Judge Bazelon, in *Briehl* v. *Dulles,* 101 App. D. C. 285 , 248 F. 2d 561, 596, called "mere pretense". Such an argument places an undue significance upon the passport itself. One has a privilege of diplomatic protection because he is a citizen and not because he bears a passport. See Diplock, Passports and Protection in International Law, 32 The Grotius Proceedings, 42, 45 (1946). The passport is merely indicative of citizenship or allegiance. And although an American passport bears on its face a request for protection, it is doubtful that such a request has any legal significance whatever. *United States ex rel. Keefe* v. *Dulles,* 99 App. D. C. 8, 101 App. D. C. 266, 222 F. 2d 390, 393-94, cert. denied 348 U. S. 952.

If indeed there is a connection between foreign relations and passports, the nature of this connection is wholly unclear; and to base the abridgement of constitutional rights upon such a tenuous relationship results in extreme doubt as to the validity of any such abridgement. The real meaning in the Secretary's cross-indexing of foreign relations and passports can be divined from his spokesman's statement in discussing the ban on travel by newsmen to China that:

> "The Secretary of State's power to withdraw or withhold a citizen's passport * * * is designed as an instrument of foreign policy."

O'Connor, the State Department Defends, Saturday Review, Jan. 11, 1958, 11, at page 12. Clearly, the control over travel is thus utilized to stifle criticism or promote espousal of a particular foreign policy which is subject to sudden and frequent change at the whim or caprice of one official. It is China today which is off limits—tomorrow it may be Argentina, France or Indonesia.

Control over exit is significantly distinguishable from the sort of situation which courts have placed in the foreign policy area. See dissenting opinion, Bazelon, Circuit Judge, *Briehl* v. *Dulles,* 101 App. D. C. 285, 248 F. 2d 561, 589-590; Passport Refusals for Political Reasons, Constitutional Issues and Judicial Review, 61 Yale L. J. 171, 187 (1952). The Supreme Court, in *Kent* v. *Dulles, supra,* after recognizing that the crucial function of a passport is the control over exit, went on to say:

> "* * * as we have seen, the right of exit is a personal right included within the word 'liberty' as used in the Fifth Amendment. If that 'liberty' is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the lawmaking functions of Congress" 357 U. S. 116, 129.

The Secretary of State must find his authority to issue and deny passports, not in the uncertainties or vagaries of whatever foreign policy he may have at any one moment, but within the limits of the power given to him by Congress.

In *Kent* v. *Dulles, supra,* the government relied upon the argument that the Secretary has inherent foreign relations power under the Constitution to deny passports to petitioners.

Since a passport is no longer merely a "political document" evidencing the fact of American citizenship (see *Urtetiqui* v. *D'Arbel,* 34 U. S. 692, 698-699) but has, extralegally, subtly evolved into a tool with which the Department of State can prevent the presence of any American citizen in a foreign country (*Kent* v. *Dulles,* 357 U. S. 116, 121-122), the power claimed is truly formidable.

The government's contention is untenable for two reasons: First, the regulations constitute law-making, which is beyond the Executive's power; and, second, the denial of a passport to petitioner has nothing whatsoever to do with foreign relations.

The Supreme Court's decision in *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.* v. *Sawyer,* 343 U. S. 579, is decisive on the first point. Presidential "power must stem either from an Act of Congress or from the Constitution itself" (*id.* at 585); the President is constitutionally empowered to execute the laws, not to make them (*ibid.*).

The Secretary's establishment of certain "off limits" countries is a plain exercise of law-making authority beyond the power of the Executive Branch.[1] The subject of foreign relations is not an exception to the constitutional restriction upon Presidential law-making. Even the President's great power in the field of foreign relations has been exercised only in such clearly non-legislative matters as the recognition of foreign governments, *United States* v. *Belmont,* 301 U. S. 324; *United States* v. *Pink* 315 U. S. 203; and the determination as to whether an embargo authorized by Congress should be invoked, *United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,* 299 U. S. 304.

Secondly, it has been recognized that "the issuance of a passport is not the conduct of foreign affairs". *Dayton* v. *Dulles,* 99 App. D. C. 47, 254 F. 2d 71, 76. For as the

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[1] We have treated the regulations as if they had been promulgated by the President. However, any power to control travel, whether it stems from a statute or otherwise, would reside not in the Secretary of State but in the President. As noted by Judge Bazelon in *Briehl* v. *Dulles,* 101 App. D. C. 285, 248 F. 2d 561, 580-582, the President has never delegated to the Secretary any of the powers that he may possess as President to control travel. Assuming that so drastic a power were capable of delegation under 3 U. S. C. §301, 65 Stat. 712, there has been no effort to apply or conform to that statute. (Cf. the Executive Orders in 3 U. S. C. § 301, 1957 Supp.)

regulations show, and as Judge Bazelon said: "Travel is being controlled today for purposes of internal security. To call it a matter of foreign relations is mere pretense" (*Briehl* v. *Dulles, supra,* at 596). In reality, travel control is thought control and intellectual control.

The decision to close off certain foreign countries to travel by American citizens involves the relationship of the government to its own nationals and a restriction upon their liberty. This is not a matter of foreign affairs as it would be if it involved relations between this country and foreign powers.[2] In the Court below, appellee argued that passport control must be classified as part of the conduct of foreign relations over which the Executive has unusual powers and cited *United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., supra,* as controlling authority. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a statute which authorized the President to prohibit the sale of arms and ammunition to foreign countries when he believed that such prohibition would contribute to the establishment of peace was not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because it involved foreign relations. However, it must be remembered that the case involved to a greater degree the relations between the executive and legislative branches of government whereas the passport problem involves to a greater degree the relations between the government and the individual. See The Right to Travel and United States Passport Policies, A Staff Study prepared for the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (1958) p. 3.

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[2] An example of foreign relations is the abrogation in 1913 of our commercial Treaty of 1832 with Russia because of its discrimination against American Jews. See Learsi, The Jews in America; A History (1954) 224-229; The American Jewish Year Book—5672 (1911), 19-128. See also Judge Bazelon's enumeration in *Briehl* v. *Dulles,* 101 App. D. C. 285, 248 F. 2d 561, 589.

Finally, as Judge Bazelon said in his dissent:

> "In our complex world there are very few pure internal affairs. Foreign problems cast their shadows on the domestic scene and internal events influence foreign policy. The Department of State has declared 'That there is no longer any real distinction between "domestic" and "foreign" affairs.' If that is so, the inherent power doctrine could produce an extension of the executive power beyond any limits theretofore conceived; and the President, through his Secretary of State could preempt the internal security functions of Congress." *Briehl* v. *Dulles, supra,* at 591.

A brief historical analysis is helpful in understanding the extent of the authority Congress has given to the Secretary of State with respect to the issuance of passports:

In earlier times the passport was conceived to be a "political document" which entitled the bearer to recognition in foreign countries as an American citizen and insured whatever advantage or protections might be his as a result of such citizenship. *Urtetiqui* v. *D'Arbel, supra.* Prior to 1856, a multitude of petty local, state, and national officials had issued certificates of identity or citizenship, or the functional equivalents of passports. See Hunt, The American Passport, 36-40 (1898). To prevent the many abuses which had arisen in the issuance of such documents (see 9 Op. A. G. 350 (1859); III Moore, International Law Digest 863 (1906)), Congress, in 1856, enacted what remains today our basic passport statute. Act of August 18, 1856, 11 Stat. 60. Later revisions and codifications made four unimportant changes in the basic statute. As codified by 44 Stat. 867, 22 U. S. C. § 211(a) (1926), this provision reads:

> "The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports * * * under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports."

This statute, which is the basic enabling statute for the issuance of passports by appellee, obviously was meant to establish uniformity in the issuance of passports. Congress did not intend in any way to grant to the Executive power to formulate substantive conditions in the issuance of passports. Rather, this statute merely enables the executive to prescribe the required procedural formulae. See Doman, Do Citizens Have the Right to Travel?, *supra*; Parker, The Right to Go Abroad, To Have and To Hold a Passport, *supra*; Comment, The Passport Puzzle, *supra*.

The statute neither grants nor was intended to grant any additional authority to the Executive. Former Assistant Secretary of State Carr, testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs with respect to the nature of the rules contemplated by the 1926 statute, stated that:

> "these rules are administrative rules * * * [governing] * * * the different things that must be provided for that will come up from time to time under different conditions, different modes of travel and various things that arise in the course of a period of time * * * the object [of the Secretary's rule-making power] being to provide for administrative rules to be issued by the Secretary of State so as to avoid troubling the President with many details."[3]

And the stated reason for the delegation of rule-making power to the President was so that Congress "would not be bothered with all these small administrative changes." Id.

The regulations issued pursuant to the 1856 and 1926 statutes were of that routine administrative nature. These regulations, whether Presidential or departmental, prescribed the identifying information required on an application, the size of passport photographs, the contents of the affidavit of a supporting witness as to the citizenship of an applicant, etc.—all clearly matters of administrative

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[3] Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. R. 11947, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), pp. 5-6.

routine.[4] The first regulations of a substantive character issued by the Secretary of State were the regulations of 1952, § 51.136 of which is herein in issue.

Thus, for almost one hundred years, the Executive construed the passport statutes as authorizing only the power to issue regulations of an administrative character. It was not until 1952 that the statute was invoked as a source of authority to define classes of citizens ineligible for passports. In determining the meaning of the 1856 and 1926 statutes, deference must be accorded to this century of administrative construction. *Swendig* v. *Washington Water Power Co.,* 265 U. S. 322; *National Lead Co.* v. *United States,* 252 U. S. 140; *Five Per Cent Cases,* 110 U. S. 471. The failure of successive Secretaries to assert any power to make substantive regulations for so long a period is a persuasive indication that no such power was ever granted. *Federal Trade Commission* v. *Bunte Bros.,* 312 U. S. 349.

The classical statement on the power of Congress to delegate authority to co-ordinate branches of the government was made by Chief Justice Marshall in *Wayman* v. *Southard,* 10 Wheat. 1, 43. " * * * [I]mportant subjects [he held] must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself [while as to matters] of less interest * * * a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details."

But "before another agency can 'fill up the details', Congress must enact something to be thus supplemented.

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[4] See Department of State, The American Passport, Chapter IV (1898); Executive Order No. 654, June 13, 1907; Executive Order No. 4359-A, Dec. 19, 1925; Executive Order No. 4392-A, Feb. 12, 1926. Executive Order No. 4488, August 3, 1926; Executive Order No. 5960, June 22, 1932; Executive Order No. 6650, March 23, 1934; Executive Order No. 7856, March 31, 1938; Departmental Order No. 749, March 31, 1938; Departmental Order No. 366, Feb. 12, 1926 (recited in Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H. R. 11947, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926), pp. 25-28; Departmental Order No. 749, March 31, 1938, 22 C.F.R. 51.101-51.134 (Passport Regulations, Department of State Publication 1165 (1938), pp. 20-25).

In the current idiom, the law makers must first adopt a policy or set up an 'intelligible standard' to which administrative action must conform". The Constitution of the United States of America (ed. Corwin, 1953), Sen. Doc. 170, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., p. 75, citing *Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.* v. *Adkins,* 310 U. S. 381, 398, and *United States* v. *Rock Royal Cooperative,* 307 U. S. 533, 576. Thus, if viewed as a grant of power, the absence of standards would render the statute unconstitutional as an invalid delegation of law-making power, since Congress cannot delegate to the Executive the power to make judgments and issue regulations which are legislative in character. *Miller* v. *United States,* 294 U. S. 435. And since the right to travel is "an attribute of personal liberty", *Williams* v. *Fears, supra,* at 274, such standards, totally lacking here, would have to be especially precise. *Saia* v. *New York,* 334 U. S. 558, 560; *Cantwell* v. *Connecticut,* 310 U. S. 296; *Lovell* v. *Griffin,* 303 U. S. 444; *Hague* v. *C. I. O.,* 307 U. S. 496; *Niemotko* v. *Maryland,* 340 U. S. 268, 271; *Burstyn* v. *Wilson,* 343 U. S. 495.

The uncontrolled discretion which the view of the Court below would vest in the Secretary insofar as foreign relations are concerned, would render the statute clearly unconstitutional. "It is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that [a statute] which, like this one, makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution guarantees contingent upon the uncontrolled will of an official—as by requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the discretion of such official—is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint upon the enjoyment of those freedoms." *Staub* v. *City of Baxley,* 355 U. S. 313, 322.

Statutes must be narrowly construed to avoid, rather than to create, constitutional problems, particularly where the suggested construction will, as here, concededly infringe upon fundamental rights. *United States* v. *Rumely,* 345 U. S. 41, 46; *United States* v. *Witkovich,* 353 U. S. 194.

For all of these reasons, the 1856 and 1926 statutes must be construed as authorizing the Secretary to issue regula-

tions only of an administrative character. Accordingly, the statute on which § 51.136 of the regulations expressly relies does not authorize it.

In an effort to avoid the dilemma of the 1926 statute, the government in its argument in *Briehl* v. *Dulles, supra,* placed reliance for the Secretary's power to issue the passport regulations upon the provisions of 8 U. S. C. § 1185(b). This statute provides that during the existence of any national emergency proclaimed by the President "it shall, except as otherwise provided by the President, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport". The difficulties of justifying the passport regulations under this statute are even greater than under the 1926 statute.

In the first place, the regulations themselves do not claim authority from this statute but rest exclusively on the authority claimed to be conferred by 22 U. S. C. § 211(a). The reasons for this are plain. The regulations were issued on August 28 of 1952. 17 F. R. 8013, 22 C. F. R. §§ 51.135-51.143. 8 U. S. C. § 1185 did not become effective until December 24, 1952. The statute which it replaced, the Act of June 21, 1941, was limited in its operation to time of war or to the duration of the emergency proclaimed on May 27, 1941. This emergency had been terminated on April 28, 1952 by Proclamation No. 2974, 66 Stat. c. 31. Thus, at the time of the issuance of the regulations there was no statute forbidding the departure of citizens without a passport.[5]

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[5] A state of emergency had in fact been proclaimed earlier on December 16, 1950, Proclamation No. 2914, 64 Stat., A 455, but could have had no obstructive effect on the travel of citizens since at that time the travel control statute was operative only in actual war or during the specified emergency of 1941. 22 U. S. C. § 223 (1952 ed.), repealed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, *supra.*

The statutory authority granted by 8 U. S. C. § 1185(b) was expressly invoked by the President on January 17, 1953, Proclamation No. 3004, 67 Stat. c. 31. This proclamation by its terms expressly incorporated and confirmed the existing regulations of the Secretary relating to the necessity of a passport for travel to particular countries during war or national emergency proclaimed by the President; these, which appear at 22 C. F. R. §§ 53.1 to 53.9, had been issued pursuant to the 1941 statute. The proclamation made no reference whatsoever to the regulations allegedly made pursuant to the 1926 statute, viz. 22 C. F. R. §§ 51.135 to 51.170 which prescribe those persons who are ineligible for passports.

In the second place, § 1185 contains no standards whatever for determining to whom passports should be denied. Although it forbids citizens to travel without passports, it nowhere contains a grant of authority to either the President or the Secretary of State to determine which categories of citizens might and which might not receive passports. On the contrary, Congress itself had made that determination two years earlier in the Internal Security Act. 64 Stat. 993, 50 U. S. C. § 785. Any attempt to base the substantive regulations of the Secretary on § 1185 would stamp that section as an invalid delegation of legislative power, for the reasons which apply to the 1926 passport statute itself.

The courts cannot supply this omission on the theory that Congress intended to grant such power to the Executive. This would be judicial legislation rather than statutory construction. *Ebert* v. *Poston,* 266 U. S. 548.

Leaving aside the vagueness of the standards suggested, the failure of Congress to speak on a question cannot be remedied by judicial legislation. The present case is not one of a broad or vague grant of power with ambiguous standards which under certain circumstances might conceivably be construed in such a way as to save constitutionality. In the present case there was no grant of power

at all, and there are no standards for the exercise of the power, not even vague and indefinite ones. (See cases cited, *supra,* pp. 20-21).

C. Congress Has Not Authorized the Secretary of State to Deny Passports for the Reasons Given.

Despite the above historical analysis, Secretaries of State have recently relied upon the broad language of the statute to buttress their claim of absolute discretionary power. However, the Supreme Court has now expressly rejected this position. In *Kent* v. *Dulles,* the Court said:

> "Since we start with an exercise by an American citizen of an activity included in the constitutional protection, we will not readily infer that Congress gave the Secretary of State unbridled discretion to grant or withhold it." 357 U. S. 116, 129.

The Court then made an historical investigation of administrative practices to discover under what circumstances the Secretary of State might have discretion to withhold or deny a passport. Its examination disclosed two categories of circumstances, established by administrative practice for the denial of passports; one ground of refusal related to questions of citizenship and allegiance; the other to questions of criminal or unlawful conduct. Neither category of circumstances is present here:

> "Freedom to travel is, indeed, an important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty'. We need not decide the extent to which it can be curtailed. We are first concerned with the extent, if any, to which Congress has authorized its curtailment.
>
> "The difficulty is that while the power of the Secretary of State over the issuance of passports is expressed in broad terms, it was apparently long exercised quite narrowly. So far as material here, the cases of refusal of passports generally fell into two categories. First, questions pertinent to the citizenship of the applicant and his allegiance to the United States had to be resolved by the Secretary, for the command of Congress was that 'No passport shall

be granted or issued to or verified for any other persons than those owing allegiance, whether citizens or not, to the United States.' 32 Stat. 386, 22 U. S. C. S. 212. Second, was the question whether the applicant was participating in illegal conduct, trying to escape the toils of the law, promoting passport frauds, or otherwise engaging in conduct which would violate the laws of the United States? See 3 Moore, International Law Digest (1906), § 512; 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1942), § 268; 2 Hyde, International Law (2d rev. ed.), § 401.

"The grounds for refusal asserted here do not relate to citizenship or allegiance on the one hand or to criminal or unlawful conduct on the other. Yet, so far as relevant here, those two are the only ones which it could fairly be argued were adopted by Congress in light of prior administrative practice. One can find in the records of the State Department rulings of subordinates covering a wider range of activities than the two indicated. But as respects Communists these are scattered rulings and not consistently of one pattern. We can say with assurance that whatever may have been the practice after 1926, at the time the Act of July 3, 1926, was adopted, the administrative practice, so far as relevant here, had jelled only around the two categories mentioned. We, therefore, hesitate to impute to Congress, when in 1952 it made a passport necessary for foreign travel and left its issuance to the discretion of the Secretary of State, a purpose to give him unbridled discretion to grant or withhold a passport from a citizen for any substantive reason he may choose. More restrictive regulations were applied in 1918, and in 1941 as war measures. We are not compelled to equate this present problem of statutory construction with problems that may arise under the war power. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579." Id., 127-128.

The apparent grounds for the Secretary's refusal to renew appellant's passport in this case are based on 22 C. F. R. § 51.136:

> "Limitation on issuance of passports to certain other persons. In order to promote and safeguard the interests of the United States, passport facilities * * * will be refused to a person when it appears that the person's activities abroad would * * * (b) be prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign relations; or (c) otherwise be prejudicial to the interests of the United States."

Such a regulation denies procedural due process by its hopelessly vague criteria. What are acts which are "prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign relations" or "to the interests of the United States"? These standards are no more definite than the terms "un-American" or "subversive", language condemned by the Supreme Court as not susceptible of definition. *Watkins* v. *United States,* 354 U. S. 178; see also *Sweezy* v. *United States,* 354 U. S. 234. The use of a term that is so vague and indefinite that "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law". *Connelly* v. *General Construction Company,* 269 U. S. 385, 391; *Small* v. *American Sugar Refining Company,* 267 U. S. 233, 238-240. The vagueness of the regulation is especially pernicious where, as here, First Amendment rights are involved. *Burstyn* v. *Wilson, supra; Winter* v. *New York,* 330 U. S. 507; *Niemotko* v. *Maryland, supra; Kunz* v. *New York,* 340 U. S. 290.

Moreover, in light of the decision in *Kent* v. *Dulles, supra,* it is appellant's position that any denial of a passport based on this provision lacks statutory authority. There is no question in his case of either criminal conduct on the one hand, or citizenship or allegiance on the other. The decision in *Kent* v. *Dulles* makes it mandatory that the appellee renew appellant's passport.

The State Department has itself conceded that the effect of the Supreme Court decision in *Kent* v. *Dulles* is to curtail its discretion. While testimony was being received before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on

proposed passport legislation, the following colloquy took place between Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy and Senator William Fulbright:

> "Fulbright: As I understand it, you seek to have legislation which would make it very difficult to upset your findings.
>
> Murphy: As the matter now stands, we have no right to exercise discretion at all.
>
> Fulbright: Under the Supreme Court decision?
>
> Murphy: Under the Supreme Court decision." Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Passport Legislation, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 32-33 (1958).

In his earlier prepared statement, Mr. Murphy admitted that, in the absence of new legislation, the Secretary had no authority to deny a passport to a non-criminal American citizen. In his own words:

> "But the need for action to remedy this situation is urgent. The President in his personal message last week to the Congress, emphasized the urgent need for action. The need is urgent because, as the President pointed out, the Supreme Court's decision of June 16 severely limited the authority of the Secretary of State to deny passports. The Supreme Court specifically said that the Secretary has no authority, in the absence of statute, to deny passports." Id., 21.

Appellant's position is that this Court is bound by the decision in *Kent* v. *Dulles, supra,* and has no alternative but to reject this attempt on the part of the Secretary of State to circumvent it, and to order him to renew appellant's passport.

D. Area Restrictions, as Applied by the Secretary of State, Lack Statutory Authority.

Area bans first appeared during the war of 1812 and were imposed, in one form or another, in every subsequent war in which the United States has been involved. No objection is raised here to the understandable practice of closing

off warring countries to the travel of United States citizens even though this country is not directly involved in the conflict. However, it must be remembered that, even during hostilities, broad exceptions to the general prohibition have been made. For example, during the Italo-Ethiopian war in 1935, the State Department permitted such travel by "Recognized representatives of American newspapers, press associations, magazines and motion picture companies", as well as "well-known writers who are not directly associated with any of the foregoing organizations". Freedom to Travel, Report of the Special Committee to Study Passport Procedures of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1958, 16 (hereinafter cited as Freedom to Travel). In large measure, this was also the case during the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939.

After the close of World War II, area restrictions were lifted until May 1, 1952 when the State Department announced a new policy that henceforth passports would not be valid for travel to:

> "Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics unless specifically endorsed under authority of the Department of State."

At the same time, the Department stated that this was not a travel ban. In its own words " * * * [T]his procedure in no way forbids American travel to those areas * * *." See Press Release No. 341, dated May 1, 1952.

On October 31, 1955, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Russia were opened to travel while "those portions of * * * Korea and Vietnam under Communist control" were added to the interdicted list.[6]

This marked the beginning of the official policy to disapprove travel to countries with which the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations. However, it has

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[6] Passports have been stamped, "Not valid for travel in Hungary" since November, 1956.

operated on a somewhat uneven basis. In 1957, for example, travel to Albania and Bulgaria by selected persons having compelling reasons for such travel was authorized. See Washington Post and Times Herald, Nov. 15, 1957; New York Times, Sept. 6, 1957. With reference to China, passports were validated for three mothers of Americans held prisoner in that country (New York Times, Dec. 7, 1957) and for an attorney (Id., Nov. 21, 1957). Furthermore, the State Department validated passports for twenty-four newsmen, but the Chinese government refused to issue visas (Id., Aug. 23, 1957). Other relaxations of appellee's policy will be referred to hereinafter.

While the arguments already advanced apply equally to area restrictions, it is thought that some elaboration of them is appropriate at this time. Authority for their imposition is claimed under the statute of 1926 (*supra*) and Executive Order No. 7856, 22 C. F. R. § 51.75 (1938) which reads in part as follows:

> "124. The Secretary of State is authorized in his discretion to refuse to issue a passport, to restrict it against use in certain countries, to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued, and to withdraw a passport for the purpose of restricting its validity or use in certain countries."

Accordingly, the Secretary issued regulations providing:

> "Discretional exercise of authority in passport matters. Nothing in this part shall be construed to prevent the Secretary of State from exercising the discretion resting in him to refuse to issue a passport, to restrict its use to certain countries, to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued, or to withdraw a passport for the purpose of restricting its validity or use in certain countries." 22 C. F. R. § 53.8 (1938).

It is conceded that the power of the Secretary to impose such restrictions has not been the subject of judicial determination except insofar as *Kent* v. *Dulles, supra,* is controlling. See testimony, Roderic L. O'Connor, House Com-

mittee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on H. R. 13760, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), p. 17. In the words of the Special Committee to Study Passport Procedures of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, henceforth referred to as the Special Committee:

> "The power to prohibit travel by all American citizens to particular countries is a broad and far-reaching power. The impact of a decision by the Secretary of State to invalidate passports for travel to a particular country may severely affect those individuals who wish to visit that country. In addition to the individual effects, the United States as a whole is affected by the fact that all of its communication through its citizens with the country to which travel is proscribed may be interrupted." Freedom to Travel, *supra* 50-51.

It is also conceded that the Executive, as the major organ of the federal government in the field of international relations, possesses powers in that area which do not require an Act of Congress for their authorization. *United States* v. *Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., supra,* at 319-320. However, even the Special Committee, which is not unsympathetic to certain area restrictions, feels that they should be employed "only in situations of gravity and seriousness" (Freedom to Travel, *supra,* 53), and in the words of its Chairman, "only in situations of exceptional gravity". Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, July 28, 1958, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 105.

The only two types of conditions which the Special Committee felt would clearly justify area restraints were (1) to punish or prevent aggression, and (2) to prevent or end hostilities or to avoid American involvement. Freedom to Travel, *supra,* 56. Obviously, none of these conditions now prevails in any of the countries presently on the Department's Index. Furthermore, the reasons advanced by the Secretary for his ban on China travel do not measure up to the "gravity and seriousness" or "exceptional gravity" necessary to support the subversion of a constitutional right.

The Special Committee has adequately pointed out the self-defeating nature of area restrictions:

> "It becomes a close question, too often, whether the *real* penalty is imposed upon the foreign government which is the target of the area prohibitions or upon the people of this country, both those who choose to stay at home and those who desire to travel abroad. Those who remain at home through choice are denied information from their fellow citizens and local news sources about the proscribed country, and those who wish to travel, but are denied passports to their areas of choice, are prevented from directly informing themselves and their associates." Freedom to Travel, *supra,* 54.

See also Wyzanski, Freedom to Travel, Atlantic Monthly (October, 1952), 66.

The State Department itself apparently feels that area restrictions stamped in passports by it do not prohibit the travel itself. See Dept. State Press Release, No. 341, May 1, 1952, *supra*; Hearings Before Sen. For. Rel. Comm. on Dept. of State Passport Policies, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. at 59 (1957).

III

***Alternatively,* to the extent that the power to deny a passport to prevent appellant from traveling to countries with which the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations is based on the Executive power over foreign relations, it is still subject to applicable constitutional provisions: and the reasons given by the Secretary for the denial in this case do not warrant the abridgement of constitutional rights.**

Granting, *arguendo,* that there is a connection between the foreign relations power and the power over passports, the exercise of the power over foreign relations is nonetheless subject to applicable constitutional provisions. In

Bauer v. *Acheson* (*supra*) the District Court for the District of Columbia said:

> "It is true that the conduct of foreign relations is a political matter within the discretion of the legislative and executive branches of the government, and that the courts recognize the plenary power of the President and of Congress, singly or in combination, to perform acts peculiarly within the realm of political affairs without judicial interference. There is, however, the recognized limitation on the power of the political departments of the government that their acts must be within the Constitution and not in conflict with any provision thereof." 101 App. D. C. 247, 106 F. Supp. 445, 449.

And in *Shachtman* v. *Dulles,* Judge Fahy said:

> "Even though his [passport] application might be said to come within the scope of foreign affairs in a broad sense, it is also within the scope of the due process clause, which is concerned with the liberty of the individual free from arbitrary restraint." 96 App. D. C. 287, 225 F. 2d 938, 944.

In addition to the due process rights of the individual under the Fifth Amendment referred to by Judge Fahy, the appellant has the special property interest in his occupation as a foreign correspondent of which he has been deprived without due process. His right to travel, furthermore, is clearly one of the unenumerated rights protected by the Ninth Amendment but here denied and disparaged by the appellee.

The Secretary's arguments to justify his refusal to renew appellant's passport to prevent him from traveling to countries with which the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations are, in the main, two. First, he says that diplomatic protection of the United States cannot be extended to American citizens traveling in such countries. By itself, this statement is undoubtedly true. But even so it can in no way be said to justify the limitation of a

constitutional right. To assert that the privilege of benevolent, paternalistic protection is paramount to the constitutional right to travel is to take a step down the road to oppression.

Furthermore, the argument is an extremely weak one on which to base the subversion of a constitutional right.

> "However, it seems clear that the existence of diplomatic relations does not necessarily improve the ability of a country to protect its citizens in another country. For example, diplomatic relations were in effect with Czechoslovakia in 1951 at the time an American newspaperman was subjected to a denial of justice and imprisoned many years. Furthermore, the Department has not consistently invalidated passports for travel to countries with unrecognized regimes. Passports were issued for travel to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from 1923 to 1933, during which period the Soviet government had not yet been accorded recognition by the United States, for travel to Spain after the Civil War in 1939 and prior to recognition of the Franco government." Freedom to Travel, *supra,* p. 53.

Here the Secretary's argument is particularly dangerous. Since the appellant is a foreign correspondent, he serves the important function of providing for those who cannot travel the opportunity of at least a minimum of knowledge of other countries. However, appellant is not at this time arguing the existence of any special privileges which are his because he is a member of the press. Rather, his position is based on the broader ground that the deprivation here is one of his rights as a private citizen.

> "The right of individuals to go abroad and gain their own impressions of people and events in other countries is a matter of importance to them as citizens and to a government which draws all its powers from their votes. The First Amendment, and indeed the entire conception of effectively functioning democratic society, rests on a belief in the need for a free and fully informed exchange of opinion prior to the

> making of decisions. Travel abroad contributes to that exchange and thereby can help both our own nation, and the world community of which it is a leading member, to make decisions wisely." 61 Yale L. J. 171, *supra,* at 191.

If it were true that the extension of protection to a citizen traveling abroad would necessarily and inevitably involve the government in foreign relations, there would be no reason why a citizen-traveler cannot waive this privilege of protection. Assertions to the effect that this privilege cannot be waived fly in the face of history. For example, in 1939 the State Department called upon citizens to refrain from their right to travel on foreign vessels. The implication of this request was clearly that those who did so would thereby waive any protective privileges. 1 Dept. State Bull. 345 (1939).

The second argument of the Secretary is generally that the isolation of Communist China is a useful adjunct to foreign policy. He argues that to allow persons to travel to China would result in a lowering of our prestige in world opinion. Yet what greater effect is there on our prestige abroad when we confine a citizen of unquestioned allegiance and integrity within the borders of our own country! The Secretary says that a cultural exchange with Communist China would result in an implied recognition of that "illegal" regime, which we must avoid at all costs. Even if this were true, it would not follow that the Secretary has the right to use United States citizens as tools of foreign diplomacy. And surely such a reason cannot be said to meet the minimum test of "gravest imminent danger to the public safety." *Korematsu* v. *United States, supra.*

The other reasons advanced by the Secretary for his action in denying appellant's application for a renewal of his passport do not merit the denial to the American public of its right to on-the-spot reporting of news developments

in China. These reasons (with brief parenthetical rebuttals) are, in the main, set forth in the margin: *

To allow the Secretary to use such foreign policy considerations as the justification for abridging constitutional rights is to allow such rights to be turned off and on at the discretion of a single man. Tomorrow the Secretary may decide that the United States has been gravely insulted and its prestige is threatened by, for example, the

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* 1. No peace treaty has ended the Korean War and a quasi-state of war still exists, necessitating the continued application of the Trading-With-The-Enemy Act. (The United States was never at war with Communist China and the gathering of legitimate and important news was never encompassed by the Act, a fact implicitly recognized by the Secretary in his failure to prosecute appellant and other correspondents.)

2. Communist China poses a threat to Formosa. (So does Russia to Pakistan, allied to us through SEATO, and to Norway, allied to us through NATO.)

3. There are no United States facilities to protect travelers in China. (The same is true, in a practical sense, in other Iron Curtain countries.)

4. The return of prisoners held by the Chinese would be jeopardized by the presence of American reporters. (This is ridiculous on the face of it and, if Chinese statements are to be believed, their presence would have the opposite effect.)

5. China has violated the Korean Armistice Agreement. (So has Russia the Yalta agreement.)

6. The United States would be yielding to Chinese blackmail. (The alleged purpose of the "blackmail" is to open news sources to American reporters, in other words, to lift the Bamboo Curtain.)

7. America's world leadership would be endangered. (Hardly likely.)

8. Communist China's prestige would be enhanced and that of Nationalist China weakened. (An extremely speculative and unrealistic argument that has been further weakened by our willingness to sit at the conference table with Chinese representatives during the recent Quemoy crisis and as early as 1951 at Panmunjom as well as at Geneva beginning in 1955.)

9. The entry of newsmen would cause a general influx of Americans into Communist China. (Easily controlled by the State Depart-

action of our Norwegian ally in recently refusing to allow an atomic submarine to make port there. To repair this damage to our prestige, we must cut off all cultural exchange; and thus another area of the world is placed behind an Iron Curtain of our own making.

> "In some ways the intrinsic social detriment is maximal when geographical restrictions are invoked. Denial of a passport to an individual affects only that one person directly; the larger community only incidentally. But a prohibition enjoining all citizens from travelling in a proscribed area imposes a gen-

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ment as with Egypt, Syria and Israel in the 1956 Suez crisis. See State Dept. Dep'tal Regulation 108.303, 21 Fed. Reg. 8577 (1956).)

10. American opposition to Communism would appear to be weakened. (If so, to be logical, we should withdraw permission for travel in Russia and other Iron Curtain countries instead of signing cultural exchange agreements. See New York Times, Jan 28, 1958, p. 8.)

11. The presence of American reporters might precipitate a war-provoking incident. (Unreasonable speculation.)

12. The Chinese might insist on certain reporters only. (In their original invitation on August 5, 1956 they named twenty-two anti-Communist correspondents including top reporters of the New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, radio and television networks and wire services.)

13. The United States does not recognize China. (This has never been used as a reason to bar the press before and is without logical foundation, e.g., travel was permitted in Franco Spain prior to recognition. III Hackworth, Digest of International Law 534 (1942).)

See Dulles letter to Sulzberger, New York Times, May 2, 1957.

As for Hungary, the Secretary's reasons in the Court below are equally weak. In the main they are as follows:

1. The Hungarian government is engaged in a systematic persecution of Hungarian employees of the United States legation. (Hardly a reason to abridge appellant's right to travel.)

2. The safety of American citizens cannot be fully protected in Hungary. (Rebutted above.)

3. Atrocities committed during the Hungarian revolt of October and November, 1956. (Never used to deny passports before, e.g., Nazi Germany.)

> eral harm." Statement of the American Jewish Congress, Hearings, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *supra,* p. 142.

The constitutional rights of persons are gravely impaired by the limitations which the Secretary has attempted to impose upon the travel of citizens abroad; such limitations can be justified only by a showing of "the gravest imminent danger to the public safety." None of the argument advanced by the Secretary disclose this minimum standard of justification for the abridgement of constitutional rights.

IV

The Secretary's refusal to renew appellant's passport is an abridgement of the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of press.

Freedom of speech and freedom of press are fundamental personal rights and liberties (*Konigsberg* v. *State Bar of Cal.,* 353 U. S. 252) which are the corner stones of Anglo-Saxon institutions. (*State* v. *Pierce,* 163 Wis. 615, 158 N. W. 696.)

> "It is recognized in England, Canada and in America, in fact, in every English speaking government that the press is one of the most potent factors in the establishment and maintenance of free government known to an enlightened civilization. The Framers of the Constitution of the United States * * * were not unmindful of this fact when they wrote into these instruments the provisions guaranteeing the freedom of speech and of the press. A free government has never tolerated the muzzling of the press or the stifling of free speech. At most, it has only held those who enjoy this freedom answerable for an abuse thereof." *State* v. *Pierce, supra,* at 700.

It is a truism that neither the United States (*Watkins* v. *U. S., supra*) nor any state thereof can infringe the free-

dom of speech or of the press. (*Hughes* v. *Superior Court of California,* 339 U. S. 460). This is no less the case when a governmental agency is involved (*Buxham* v. *City of Riverside,* 29 F. Supp. 3).

It is only when these freedoms must be subordinated to the greater rights of general public interest and to the right of government to maintain and protect itself that they lose their preferred position in the hierarchy of the constitutional guarantees. (*United States* v. *Dennis, supra.*) However, as has been indicated, only a showing of the greatest and most immediate danger to interests which the government may lawfully protect can justify their subversion (*West Virginia State Board of Education* v. *Barnett,* 319 U. S. 624). Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can justify a limitation on free speech (*Thomas* v. *Collins, supra*), and the substantive evil that will result must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high (*Bridges* v. *State of California, supra*).

The Secretary has not, by law, custom or tradition, the right to prohibit accredited press representatives from visiting either friendly or unfriendly countries in peacetime. Such a ban is an administrative invasion of the freedom of press guarantees of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The courts have consistently held that, even when an absolute power of Congress was involved, it had to yield to the provisions of the First Amendment. See *Latva* v. *Nicolls,* 106 F. Supp. 658; *United States* v. *Rumely, supra.* It would seem that this should be no less the situation where the Executive Branch is concerned.

The Secretary of State does not seem to understand the breadth of the freedom of the press portion of the First Amendment. In a letter dated April 30, 1957, addressed to Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the publisher and chairman of the board of The New York Times, reprinted

in The New York Times, May 2, 1957, Mr. Dulles stated as follows:

> "You [Sulzberger] suggest that our policy with respect to Americans going to China 'abridges the freedom of the press'. The constitutional 'freedom of the press' relates to *publication*, and not to the gathering of news." (The italicized portion is the Secretary's emphasis.)

This statement, if implemented, would amount to a complete perversion of the freedom of the press guarantees of the Constitution. As The New York Times editorialized on May 5, 1957, "In other words, we are free to publish the news provided we do not insist on our rights to get it." According to Mr. Sulzberger (and most, if not all, American newspapers) "I cannot escape the feeling that the Administration is abridging the freedom of the press and using the press as an instrument in its diplomacy. I agree that other principles are involved, but in the long view this one seems to me to be fundamental." (Letter, Arthur Hays Sulzberger to John Foster Dulles, April 23, 1957; reprinted in The New York Times, May 2, 1957.)

Furthermore, not only is the Secretary treading unconcernedly in the sands of unconstitutionality, but he is contradicting his own professed convictions. For example, in his press conference of April 23, 1957, he stated that "The more the American people know the facts about Communist China, the better pleased we are." New York Times, April 24, 1957. As Arthur Krock stated on April 25, 1957, in The New York Times:

> "Access to news sources both here and abroad is not a 'privilege' granted through government favor or caprice and thus something to be extended, withdrawn or denied on the same basis. It is the only orderly means by which the people of this Republic can be assured of their right to know in peacetime all that is happening around them."

And it hardly seems necessary to emphasize that this is precisely what the framers of the Constitution had in mind when they prohibited Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of the press."

In his press conference of April 23, 1957, the Secretary stressed the fact that he was afraid of a mass demand from Americans, other than newsmen, for permission to travel in China. He overlooked the fact that he has in the past, even during actual hostilities, established a dual policy with respect to other countries (such as Israel, Syria and Egypt) by which correspondents were permitted to travel in those nations while the general public was not. We do not concede his "dual policy" power.

The Secretary's reasons for refusing to permit American newsmen to travel in Communist China have been condemned by every responsible press facility. Moreover, they have been labeled "nonsensical" by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (New York Times, April 3, 1957) and severely criticized by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Hearings, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. As Senator Estes Kefauver stated on April 24, 1957, "I am in favor of letting American reporters go to Red China without any limitations. It is better to get our news from there through our own people than from canned information from some Communist bureau. Our people are entitled to know what is going on in Red China." (New York Times, April 25, 1957.) In addition, the United Press reported, on May 13, 1957, that mail received by the Department was running better than three-to-one against its ban on travel by newsmen. (New York Herald Tribune, May 14, 1957.)

Not only has the Secretary been inconsistent in his reasons for barring newsmen from the Chinese mainland, but he has been equally inconsistent with reference to

those who have violated his prohibition. For example, to the best of our knowledge, no action of any kind has been taken against Messrs. Edmund Stevens and Philip Harrington, the Look magazine reporter-photographer team, who visited Communist China at the same time as did appellant. After Mr. Stevens arrived in Moscow following his visit to China, he was asked by U. S. Ambassador Bohlen, on February 6, 1957, to bring his passport to the American Embassy so it could be stamped valid only for immediate return to the United States. He refused to do so without a hearing and, through his employer, requested one either in Moscow or in Washington. To date, no answer has been received from the Department by either Mr. Stevens or his employer, and he is apparently still in possession of his passport.

Mr. Harrington's passport was renewed at the American Embassy in Stockholm just prior to his visit to Communist China, and he is presently back in the United States. At no time has he received any communication from the State Department with reference to either his trip or his passport. Furthermore, it is our understanding that Senator George Malone (R., Nev.) openly violated the Department's ban against travelling in Bulgaria during the summer of 1955 without any apparent adverse effect. In addition, as has been stated previously, the Secretary has validated the passports of a lawyer who took depositions in China (New York Times, November 21, 1957) and three mothers who visited their prisoner-sons in that country (New York Times, December 7, 1957). On August 22, 1957, the Secretary announced that 24 American newsmen could enter China because "* * * [N]ew factors have come into the picture making it desirable that additional information be made available to the American people respecting current conditions in China." (New York Times, August 23, 1957.)

Moreover it is contended that the Department does not have the right to use access to news sources as a license

or a privilege which can be extended or withdrawn at its pleasure. The press cannot constitutionally be used as an instrument of foreign policy. To permit it to be so used is to threaten a watering-down of the First Amendment in that the Department could close any foreign source of news in peacetime by a "finding" that such action would be beneficial to even the most nebulous foreign policy. News coverage cannot be regulated by foreign policy fluctuations without laying the cornerstone for governmental press control, too tragically often in the recent past the first step on the road to tyranny.

On the positive side, there are many cogent arguments in favor of permitting newsmen to enter Communist China and other off-limit countries. Under the present restrictions, American news media must rely on Peking sources, which are usually only propaganda relay stations, or dispatches from foreign reporters who are not particularly concerned with American interests. The Secretary at one time recommended the latter as a solution to the problem, a proposal which The New York Herald Tribune classified as "unthinkable". The only other alternative is to rely on State Department news releases unless the press is willing to ignore China completely. Whichever tack is taken, the American public must remain woefully ignorant as to a major area of foreign policy application. As the Writer's Guild of America wired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April of 1957:

> "This act of censorship means that American audiences, if they are to get first-hand reports from China, must get them from writers of other lands. A veil is thrown over China—not by others, but by our own government." New York Post, April 2, 1957.

Furthermore, the Communist world has been given a convenient and an effective propaganda drum to beat, one which they are exploiting to the fullest.

These and many other reasons have been advanced so persistently and so often by the newspapers, the press associations and the radio and television networks that repetition here is patently unnecessary. It is sufficient to call the Court's attention to the remarks of speakers at the American Newspaper Publishers' Association meeting in New York City in April, 1957. William Dwight, the then president of the A. N. P. A., in his presidential address on April 24, 1957, summed it up as follows:

> "The A. N. P. A. has asked that newspapermen who are American citizens and employed by American publications and news-gathering services to gather and write news or express opinions on facts, be accorded by our government freedom to travel for that purpose in any country in the world with which the United States is not at war. The A. N. P. A. has in mind particularly the granting of the right to go to Red China and report back to the American people. The Bamboo Curtain now hangs by order of our government between us and Red China. Arguments based on the evils of the Peiping regime have been advanced to bolster the decision to keep us from finding out for ourselves what is taking place over there. They should not prevail over the majestic principle of the people's right to know, a precious right inherent in our way of life." (New York Times, April 25, 1957)

To buttress his weak constitutional position, the Secretary informed his press conference on May 14, 1957, that the United States Supreme Court has not interpreted the First Amendment to give "newspaper people in exercise of the freedom of the press the right to freely travel everywhere." New York Times, May 15, 1957. After this press conference, the Department cited four Supreme Court opinions and two by the highest courts of New York and Pennsylvania, respectively, purporting to uphold the Secretary's constitutional views (*Id.*). None of the cited cases is concerned with the question of whether the control of news-gathering, as differentiated from the right of publication,

violates the First Amendment. *Near* v. *Minnesota* (283 U. S. 697) involves the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute designed to abate "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" publications. The only issue before the Supreme Court, which held the statute's application to be unconstitutional, was prior restraint on publication. In *Pennekamp* v. *Florida* (328 U. S. 331), the convictions of the editor and publisher of a newspaper for contempt because of articles impugning a court's integrity were reversed. In *Associated Press* v. *National Labor Relations Board* (301 U. S. 103), the court held that the gathering and dissemination of news by the Associated Press involved interstate commerce and that it was therefore subject to the National Labor Relations Act. In *Associated Press* v. *United States* (326 U. S. 1), the Associated Press was held subject to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The two state cases cited by the Department concerned the right of Pennsylvania courts to prohibit the taking of photographs within forty feet of a courtroom (*In re Mack,* 386 Pa. 251), and that of a New York court with the consent of the accused to close the courtroom to the press (*United Press* v. *Valente,* 281 App. Div. 395). Not a single one of the above-cited cases, relied upon by the Department to support its view that it may control the gathering of news, supports that contention. The Secretary clearly recognized this by relying in the court below on a dissenting opinion in *In re Mack, supra,* which referred only incidentally to the "right to gather news."

Incidentally, the Secretary was asked the following question at the above-mentioned news conference:

> "If you can control the sources of news, of what value is the right to publication, since you have nothing to publish? * * * Isn't that the classic way to stop the publication of news?" New York Times, May 15, 1957.

He answered his questioner by stating that there were "ample ways" of obtaining news from China "without

sending American correspondents with American passports into areas where that would involve a conflict with the United States foreign policy." He stated that publishers who desired to obtain news from the Chinese mainland "can send anybody there if they do not have a United States passport." This, he argued, would not violate the spirit of his ban. Furthermore, he again insisted that he was willing to let the "news gathering community" devise a plan for sending a small group of reporters to China on an experimental basis. He justified this experiment on the ground that "there are some cases where pure logic has to give way before a measure of compromise" (*Id.*).

The obvious paradox of these remarks is readily apparent. If his arguments for refusing to permit American newsmen to enter China had validity, then none should be allowed to do so. If the Secretary is willing to admit "a chosen few," then it is an admission that the arguments he has offered to sustain his absolute prohibition are without substance.

Furthermore, he seems to feel that permitting newsmen to visit China would be a discrimination in their favor. As Arthur Krock pointed out in his article in The New York Times on April 25, 1957, newsmen have always enjoyed greater rights than the private citizen to visit areas where news was being made. A reporter's press card has by tradition been honored everywhere, giving him the right to cross police and fire lines and to visit battlefronts. The Secretary recognized this fact of life when he permitted newsmen to visit Egypt, Syria and Israel while closing those countries to other American travelers. As the New York Times editorialized on May 3, 1957, "Full and free information is the very lifeblood of democracy; and we submit that there is a difference in principle between a reporter sending back information from China and a business man sending back goods and dollars."

Conclusion

Obviously, the professional work of the appellant is interfered with by the restrictions imposed on the places where he can perform it, his earning power as a foreign correspondent is being curtailed and his professional standing impaired.

The educational value of travel is as real today as it was for those who, in an earlier day, took the Grand Tour.[7] The close relationship between intellectual progress and freedom of movement is virtually an axiom in the scientific field today. Hence, the vigorous criticism by educational, scientific and government leaders of our restrictive passport and visa policies.[8]

Judge Wyzanski has brilliantly related travel to the exchange of ideas and experiences protected by the First Amendment:

> "This travel does not differ from any other exercise of the manifold freedoms of expression—from the right to speak, to write, to use the mails, to publish, to assemble, to petition. In all these liberties the principal element is the stretching of the mind to accommodate the growing spirit." Wyzanski, Freedom to Travel, *supra,* at 68.

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[7] See e.g. C. P. Brand, Italy and the English Romantics (1957); Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man (1951) 112-150; Karamazin, Letters of a Russian Traveler (1789-1790) (1957).

[8] See e.g. the testimony of Dr. Warren Weaver, Vice-President of the Rockefeller Foundation, before a House Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Information (N. Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1958, pp. 1, 9); also the testimony of Godfrey F. Chew, Chairman, Passport Committee, Federation of American Scientists (Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Hearings, Nov. 15-16, 1955, 84th Congress, 1st Sess., herein called the "Hennings Hearings", pp. 86-103; Berkner, Earth Satellites and Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1958, 221 at 226, 229-30; Shils, The Torment of Secrecy (1956); Grundfest, Science and the Department of State, Science, Oct. 12, 1956, p. 687.

It is essential, in a democracy, that citizens acquaint themselves at first hand with the effects aboard of our government's policies, foreign and domestic, and with conditions abroad which might affect such policies. Chafee, *supra,* at 196; Comment, 61 Yale L. J., *supra,* at 191.[9]

Moreover, travel is an aid to the free interchange of ideas among nations, to the increased knowledge of foreign countries and to the better understanding of one's own country. One of our national objectives is "to lower the barriers which now impede the opportunities of people to travel anywhere in the world for peaceful, friendly purposes, so that all will have a chance to know each other face-to-face."[10]

Finally, to prevent a citizen from leaving the country is *pro tanto* to confine him within the limits of the United States, and is accordingly a restriction on his liberty. Cf. *Walker* v. *Chief Quarantine Officer,* 69 F. Supp. 980. According to Blackstone, one of the attributes of personal

---

[9] See, for example, the remark of Senator Allen J. Ellender that impressions he gained first hand on a trip abroad "differ sharply" from those he received from the State Department. New York Times, Sept. 6, 1955, p. 4, col. 3.

[10] President Eisenhower, quoted in The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government (1955), 63. And President Truman wrote to Nikolai M. Schvernik, President of the Soviet Presidium, that "peoples who are denied the normal means of communication will not be able to attain that mutual understanding which must form the basis for trust and friendship. We shall never be able to remove suspicion and fear as potential causes of war until communication is permitted to flow, free and open, across international boundaries." N. Y. Times, July 8, 1951, p. 5, col. 1. This policy is expressly set forth in the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act, Public Law 402, 80th Congress, 2d Sess. (1948). See also Colligan, J., Americans Abroad, State Dep't Bulletin, May 3, 1954, Vol. 30, No. 775; Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges in the Cultural, Technical and Educational Fields, N. Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1958, p. 8.

liberty at common law was the "power of locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatever place one's inclination may direct", 1 Commentaries 134. And it has been observed that "the distinction between restriction to a jail, to a city, to a state, or a nation is merely one of degree." Comment, 61 Yale L. J. *supra,* at 190.

All of the above considerations apply in the case of the appellant. He desires to go abroad in order to further his livelihood and his career and, in particular, to visit such countries as China where news of far-reaching importance is occurring. He has shown a creditable concern with public issues, and his travel abroad would enhance his ability to fulfill his responsibilities as a citizen.[11]

This case represents a new type of interference with civil liberty—liberty of movement. The Government has never presented any adequate justification for its wholesale denial of so vital a right of American citizens. The Secretary has arrogated this power to himself without either legislative or constitutional justification.

His passport regulations, substantively and procedurally, go far beyond anything authorized by the Congress or the President. They openly seek to prevent the future exercise of First Amendment rights because of governmental disapproval of the manner in which such rights were previously exercised.

In conclusion, one of the most articulate condemnations of our passport policies was expounded by Prof. Louis L. Jaffe, almost two years before the decision in *Kent* v. *Dulles,* when he wrote in the October 1956 issue of Foreign Affairs:

> "It is intolerable, I think, that a bureau should thus trammel the individual on grounds no more palpable than 'the interests of the United States.' The right to go abroad may not be of so exalted a nature as the right to move about, to associate and to speak within

[11] See Chafee, op. cit. *supra,* 196.

one's country; thus to participate in the community's life is the paramount opportunity and duty of the citizen. But it is nevertheless a right of great moment; it is liberating for the individual and fructifying for his own community."

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court should be reversed, and the appellee ordered to issue a passport to appellant.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER,
511 Fifth Avenue,
New York 17, N. Y.

WALTER E. DILLON, JR.,
1625 Eye Street, N. W.,
Washington 6, D. C.,
Attorneys for Appellant.

ROWLAND WATTS,
% American Civil Liberties Union,
170 Fifth Avenue,
New York 10, N. Y.,
of Counsel.

APPENDIX

22 U. S. C. § 211(a)

The Act of July 3, 1926, 44 Stat. 887, 22 U. S. C. § 211(a) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

> "The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause passports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign countries by diplomatic representatives of the United States, and by such consul generals, consuls, or vice consuls when in charge, as the Secretary of State may designate, and by the chief or other executive officer of the insular possessions of the United States, under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the United States, and no other person shall grant, issue, or verify such passports."

22 U. S. C. § 212

The Act of June 14, 1902, 32 Stat. 386, 22 U. S. C. § 212 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

> "No passport shall be granted or issued to or verified for any other persons than those owing allegiance, whether citizens or not, to the United States."

Internal Security Act of 1950, § 6

Section 6 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 993, 50 U. S. C. § 785 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

> "(a) When a Communist organization as defined in paragraph (5) of Section 782 of this title is registered, or there is in effect a final order of the Board requiring such organization to register, it shall be unlawful for any member of such organization, with knowledge or notice that such organization is so registered or that such order has become final—
>
> (1) to make application for a passport, or the renewal of a passport, to be issued or renewed by or under the authority of the United States; or

(2) to use or attempt to use any such passport.

(b) When an organization is registered, or there is in effect a final order of the Board requiring an organization to register, as a Communist-action organization, it shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the United States to issue a passport to, or renew the passport of, any individual knowing or having reason to believe that such individual is a member of such organization."

8 U. S. C. § 1185

Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 190, 8 U. S. C. § 1185, as codified, provides in pertinent part:

"§ 1185. Travel control of citizens and aliens during war or national emergency—Restrictions and prohibitions on aliens.

(a) When the United States is at war or during the existence of any national emergency proclaimed by the President, * * * and the President shall find the interests of the United States require that restrictions and prohibitions in addition to those provided otherwise than by this section be imposed upon the departure of persons from and their entry into the United States, and shall make public proclamation thereof, it shall, until otherwise ordered by the President or the Congress, be unlawful—

(1) (There follow restrictions enumerated (1) through (7) not here pertinent.)

(b) After such proclamation as is provided for in subsection (a) of this section has been made and published and while such proclamation is in force, it shall, except as otherwise provided by the President, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may authorize and prescribe, be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport."

The Expatriation Act of 1868

The Expatriation Act of 1868, 15 Stat. 223-224, R.S. § 1999, 8 U. S. C. § 800 (1940 Supp.) reads as follows:

> "Whereas the right of expatriation is a natural and inherent right of all people, indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and whereas in the recognition of this principle this government has freely received emigrants from all nations, and invested them with the rights of citizenship, and whereas it is claimed that such American citizens, with their descendants, are subjects of foreign states, owing allegiance to the governments thereof; and whereas it is necessary to the maintenance of public peace that this claim of foreign allegiance should be promptly and finally disavowed: Therefore,
>
> Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That any declaration, instruction, opinion, order, or decision of any officers of this government which denies, restricts, impairs, or questions the right of expatriation, is hereby declared inconsistent with the fundamental principles of this government."

Proclamation 3004

The pertinent portions of Presidential Proclamation No. 3004, January 17, 1953, 67 Stat. c. 31, entitled "Control of Persons Leaving or Entering the United States By the President of the United States of America," are as follows:

> "A Proclamation
>
> Whereas section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, enacted on June 27, 1952 (Public Law 414, 82nd Congress; 66 Stat. 163, 190), authorizes the President to impose restrictions and prohibitions in addition to those otherwise provided by that Act upon the departure of persons from, and their entry

into, the United States when the United States is at war or during the existence of any national emergency proclaimed by the President * * * and when the President shall find that the interests of the United States so require; and

Whereas the national emergency the existence of which was proclaimed on December 16, 1950, by Proclaimation 2914 still exists; and

Whereas because of the exigencies of the international situation and of the national defense then existing Proclamation No. 2523 of November 14, 1941, imposed certain restrictions and prohibitions in addition to those otherwise provided by law, upon the departure of persons from and their entry into the United States, and

Whereas the exigencies of the international situation and of the national defense still require that certain restrictions and prohibitions, in addition to those otherwise provided by law, be imposed upon the departure of persons from and their entry into the United States:

Now, therefore, I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and by section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, do hereby find and publicly proclaim that the interests of the United States require that restrictions and prohibitions, in addition to those otherwise provided by law, be imposed upon the departure of persons from, and their entry into, the United States; and I hereby prescribe and make the following rules, regulations, and orders with respect thereto:

1. The departure and entry of citizens and nationals of the United States from and into the United States, including the Canal Zone, and all territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, shall be subject to the regulations prescribed by the Secre-

tary of State and published as sections 53.1 to 53.9 inclusive, of title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Such regulations are hereby incorporated into and made a part of this proclamation; and the Secretary of State is hereby authorized to revoke, modify, or amend such regulations as he may find the interests of the United States to require.

5. I hereby direct all departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate with the Secretary of State in the execution of his authority under this proclamation and any subsequent proclamation, rule, regulation, or order issued in pursuance hereof; and such departments and agencies shall upon request make available to the Secretary of State for that purpose the services of their respective officials and agents. I enjoin upon all officers of the United States charged with the execution of the laws thereof the utmost diligence in preventing violations of section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and proclamation, including the regulations of the Secretary of State incorporated herein and made a part hereof, and in bringing to trial and punishment any persons violating any provisions of that section or of his proclamation.

To the extent permitted by law, this proclamation shall take effect as of December 24, 1952."

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 7856

Executive Order No. 7856, 22 C. F. R. §§ 51.1-51.74 is entitled and constitutes the "Rules Governing the Granting and Issuing of Passports in the United States." Several typical excerpts from that extensive document are set forth to indicate that it relates to procedural rather than to substantive matters:

* * *

"3. Unless a request is made by the parental or other guardian that a passport be denied, passports may be issued to minors upon their own application.

4. Children may execute applications in their own behalf when of sufficient intelligence to understand the statements, and the meaning of the oath of allegiance to the United States, contained in the application.

* * *

10. A minor brother or sister may be included in the passport of an older brother or sister.

* * *

39. The applicant must submit with his application duplicate photographs not more than 3 by 3 inches and not less than 2½ by 2½ inches in size, unmounted, printed on thin paper on a light background, showing the full front view of the features of the applicant, and taken within six months of the date they are submitted.

40. When the applicant applies for a passport he should be accompanied by one credible witness who is an American citizen, has known the applicant for a period of two or more years, and has a definite place of residence.

* * *

119. The Secretary of State may require such additional evidence of citizenship as in his judgment may be necessary to establish the citizenship of an applicant for a passport."

* * *

REGULATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE 22 C. F. R. § 51.136

On August 28, 1952 the Secretary adopted the passport regulations herein involved with the following preamble (17 F. R. 8013):

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by paragraph 126 of Executive Order No. 7856, issued on March 31, 1938 (3 F. R. 681; 22 C. F. R. 51.77) under authority of Section 1 of the Act of Congress approved July 3, 1926 (44 Stat. 887; 22 U. S. C. 211(a)), the regulations issued on March

31, 1938 (Departmental Order 749) as amended (22 C. F. R. 51.101 to 51.134) are hereby further amended by the addition of new sections 51.135 to 51.143 as follows:

§ 51.136, as amended, reads as follows:

> "§ 51.136 * Limitations on Issuance of passports to certain other persons. In order to promote and safeguard the interests of the United States, passport facilities, except for direct and immediate return to the United States, will be refused to a person when it appears to the satisfaction of the Secretary of State that the person's activities abroad would: (a) violate the laws of the United States; (b) be prejudicial to the orderly conduct of foreign relations; or (c) otherwise be prejudicial to the interests of the United States."

22 C. F. R. § 53.8

§ 53.8 Discretional exercise of authority in passport matters.—Nothing in this part shall be construed to prevent the Secretary of State from exercising the discretion resting in him to refuse to issue a passport, to restrict its use to certain countries, to withdraw or cancel a passport already issued, or to withdraw a passport for the purpose of restricting its validity or use in certain countries.

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* Prior to the Secretary's amendment of January 18, 1956, 21 F. R. 336, this section read as follows:

> § 51.136 Limitations on Issuance of Passports to Persons Likely to Violate Laws of the United States. In order to promote the national interest by assuring that the conduct of foreign relations shall be free from unlawful interference, no passport, except one limited for direct and immediate return to the United States, shall be issued to persons as to whom there is reason to believe, on the balance of all the evidence, that they are going abroad to engage in activities while abroad which would violate the laws of the United States, or which if carried on in the United States would violate such laws designed to protect the Security of the United States."

Worthy, Bill

October 8, 1958

Mr. Ronald Shilen
Executive Secretary
Mass Media Fellowships
The Fund for Adult Education
200 Bloomingdale Road
White Plains, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Shilen:

I write in support of the application of my friend, Bill Worthy, for a fellowship in the mass media. Worthy is a good reporter highly respected by his colleagues, both in print and radio.

He has told me in general terms about his project, and I should think that there are few people who, working in association with Harold Isaacs, would be more likely to produce results consonant with the Fund's purpose. He is honest, industrious and agreeable. He is also, as you know, the victim of a passport ruling which I would assume will in due course be righted by the courts.

Sincerely yours,

KRM:skh

Washington Post and Times Herald
October 3, 1958

Court Upholds State Dept. Power to Refuse Passports

By James Clayton
Staff Reporter

The power of the President and the Secretary of State to curtail the travel of American citizens overseas was upheld yesterday by District Judge Edward M. Curran.

Curran ruld that the State Department was justified in refusing a passport to William Worthy Jr., a reporter for the Baltimore Afro-American, on the grounds that he is likely to break the travel restrictions stamped on all passports. Worthy has already been to Red China once in violation of the restrictions and won't promise not to go again.

"The President may properly restrict travel to geographical areas when necessitated by foreign policy considerations," Curran said in a ruling from the bench.

Worthy's attorney, William M. Kunstler of New York City, had argued that the Supreme Court stripped the State Department of any power to refuse passports in its decision last year in the cases of Walter Briehl and Rockwell Kent.

In those cases the Court said that passports could not be denied to American citizens because of their beliefs or associations. Justice Department Attorney F. Kirk Maddrix told Judge Curran that the principle does not apply to Worthy because his beliefs are not involved.

Worthy was denied renewal of his passport last year shortly after he returned from a trip to Red China, Russia, and Hungary. His trip was in open defiance of a State Department ban against travel in China or Hungary.

Worthy has insisted that the refusal of the State Department to give him a passport is an abridgement of the freedom of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment. The refusal, he said, has barred the press from obtaining news about Red China and the other proscribed areas.

Maddrix replied that freedom of the press is not involved in the case because there is no barrier imposed on the press which is not also imposed upon everyone else. Worthy, he said, "can get his news anywhere in the world. Just (so he doesn't) go to Red China."

If Worthy will promise not to go there, Maddrix told Judge Curran, "he'll get his passport."

Kunstler said Curran's ruling will be appealed.

WILLIAM WORTHY
210 EAST 19TH STREET
NEW YORK 3, NEW YORK

SPRING 7-6346

Boston Telephone: HIGHLANDS 5-2844

October 5, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
CBS News
New York 22, New York

Dear Ed:

The good Catholic judge in Washington last Thursday made it certain, the ACLU and Government lawyers agree, that I'll be without a passport until 1960. The crowded Circuit Court and Supreme Court calendars make it impossible to get a final decision until the spring of 1960. Naturally I haven't the slightest intention of caving in, promising not to travel to forbidden areas and thereby getting a passport in five minutes.

In anticipation of this adverse decision and of being grounded, I worked out with Harold Isaacs (now at M.I.T. Center for International Studies) a plan to apply to the Fund for Adult Education for one of their 1959-1960 fellowships in the mass media. Purpose of the awards: "to broaden and better the contribution of the media to liberal adult education; to enable a small number of individuals to engage in study or training likely to improve the quality and effectiveness of their output; to help establish bonds between the mass media and the adult education movement."

Harold has carefully checked and found that, if successful in winning one of the twenty-odd fellowships, I could tie in with the Center's program in the field of international communications and also with his own current project: a study of Americans' images of Africa (which will be material for another "Scratches on Our Minds" type of book by him).

I wonder if you would be willing to send the Fund a letter of recommendation, citing my work for CBS News in Russia, Eastern Europe, Africa and China. A word about the importance and significance to the press of my passport case might also be in order.

October 15th is the deadline. The address is:

Ronald Shilen
Executive Secretary
Mass Media Fellowships
The Fund for Adult Education
200 Bloomingdale Road
White Plains, New York.

I know that a letter from you would weigh heavily with the selection committee. Besides Harold Isaacs, another reference whom you probably know is anthropologist Ethel Alpenfels.

Best personal regards. I'm happy to see that you're going to have my favorite author, Aldous Huxley, lead off next Sunday.

Sincerely,
Bill
Bill Worthy

Worthy

87 Howland St.
Boston 21, Mass.
May 29, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N.Y.

Dear Ed:

With appropriately knocking knees I somehow got through the Nieman Committee interview last Friday night and then resigned myself to getting a letter, a week or so hence, "We regret to inform you, etc..."

But apparently I underestimated the power of your telegram -- to which Louis Lyons, the curator, referred. Anyway, he phoned me yesterday to say that I'm among the lucky dozen.

I'm lost for a new way of saying "thanks", so I hope you'll realize that my sense of gratitude is no less sincere for being expressed in this unflowery and succinct paragraph. I know that the year at Harvard is going to mean a great deal in my own development, and I also am keenly aware that after so much kicking around the world I really need this time out to evaluate and digest and gain perspective on my variety of experiences.

It's difficult to envision how a Bill Worthy will ever be in a position to do something for an Ed Murrow. But should the unlikely ever materialize and the opportunity to reciprocate arises, be assured that I'm on call.

Sincerely,

Bill (Worthy)

Worthy

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C.B.S. TRAFFIC DEPT. N.Y.

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ITHACA NY APR 5 356PME

PRESS CBS INC

BURKE FOR MURROW. PLEASE ADD TO STATEMENT EXCHICAGO

WITH EQUAL IRRELEVANCE TO THE ISSUE OF RENEWING MY PASSPORT, STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS NEGLECTED TO REVEAL THE SKELETON TO BEAT ANY FAMILYS SKELETONS IN CLOSET.

IN 1916, FIVE YEARS BEFORE I WAS BORN, MY GRANDMOTHER, WHO HAS BEEN DEAD SINCE 1935, WAS ARRESTED IN BOSTON FOR PICKETING THE MOTION PICTURE "BIDXXXBIRTH OF A NATION".

SHE WAS ALSO CHARGED WITH SLAPPING A COPS FACE WHILE PROTESTING THIS FILMED GLORIFICATION OF WHITE SUPREMACY.

BY THE LOGIC OF THOSE WHO CURRENTLY DISPENSE PASSPORTS ONLY TO THE SIMONPURE. THIS INCIDENT FOUR DECADES AGO NO DOUBT MAKES ME DOUBLE INELIGIBLE FOR A PASSPORT IN 1957.

REGARDS

WORTHY

501P

19161XXX 1916 1935 1957..

APRIL 17, 1956

LOUIS LYONS, CURATOR,
NIEMAN FOUNDATION
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

HAVE JUST LEARNED ABOUT BILL WORTHY AS A CANDIDATE FOR NEIMAN FELLOWSHIP STOP MY OPINION OF HIM BASED ON CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IS THAT HE IS A THOUGHTFUL, ABLE AND CONSCIENTIOUS REPORTER WITH A REAL FUTURE STOP REGARDS.

EDWARD R. MURROW

414-43

fc

New York
DAILY NEWS, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1958 • 30

Uphold Passport Ban For Red China Visitor

Washington, Oct. 2 (NEWS Bureau).—Federal Judge Edward M. Curran today upheld the State Department's refusal to grant a passport for travel to Red China by William Worthy Jr., who went there without permission last year.

Curran said the President and Secretary of State have the power to ban travel by Americans to Communist and other countries when it is "necessitated by foreign policy considerations."

William Worthy Jr.
He would not promise

Attorney's Plea Overruled

He disagreed with a contention by Worthy's attorney, William M. Kunstler of New York City, that the State Department's power to restrict travel was denied by the Supreme Court ruling last June in the case of artist Rockwell Kent, which held that the right to travel cannot be taken away because of a person's belief or associations.

Justice Department Attorney F. Kirk Maddrix said the Supreme Court ruling did not apply to this case because Worthy's beliefs were not involved.

Worthy went to both Red China and Hungary as a reporter for the Baltimore Afro-American in 1956-57 without a State Department okay. The department then refused to renew his passport.

Maddrix said Worthy's passport was not denied because he went to China but because he wouldn't promise not to go again.

Just in case the original of this gets buried on your desk, I'm taking liberty of sending this copy to your home address.

October 5, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
CBS News
New York 22, New York

Dear Ed:

The good Catholic judge in Washington last Thursday made it certain, the ACLU and Government lawyers agree, that I'll be without a passport until 1960. The crowded Circuit Court and Supreme Court calendars make it impossible to get a final decision until the spring of 1960. Naturally I haven't the slightest intention of caving in, promising not to travel to forbidden areas and thereby getting a passport in five minutes.

In anticipation of this adverse decision and of being grounded, I worked out with Harold Isaacs (now at M.I.T. Center for International Studies) a plan to apply to the Fund for Adult Education for one of their 1959-1960 fellowships in the mass media. Purpose of the awards: "to broaden and better the contribution of the media to liberal adult education; to enable a small number of individuals to engage in study or training likely to improve the quality and effectiveness of their output; to help establish bonds between the mass media and the adult education movement."

Harold has carefully checked and found that, if successful in winning one of the twenty-odd fellowships, I could tie in with the Center's program in the field of international communications and also with his own current project: a study of Americans' images of Africa (which will be material for another "Scratches on Our Minds" type of book by him).

I wonder if you would be willing to send the Fund a letter of recommendation, citing my work for CBS News in Russia, Eastern Europe, Africa and China. A word about the importance and significance to the press of my passport case might also be in order.

October 15th is the deadline. The address is:

Ronald Shilen
Executive Secretary
Mass Media Fellowships
The Fund for Adult Education
200 Bloomingdale Road
White Plains, New York.

I know that a letter from you would weigh heavily with the selection committee. Besides Harold Isaacs, another reference whom you probably know is anthropologist Ethel Alpenfels.

Best personal regards. I'm happy to see that you're going to have my favorite author, Aldous Huxley, lead off next Sunday.

Sincerely,

Bill

Bill Worthy

Worthy Bill

March 5, 1958

Dear Bill:

Thanks for the script. Let's talk about it when we meet again. When are you coming to town?

Sincerely,

Mr. William Worthy
210 East 19 Street
New York 3, New York

mcc

WILLIAM WORTHY
210 EAST 19TH STREET
NEW YORK 3, NEW YORK

SPRING 7-6346

Boston Telephone: HIGHLANDS 5-2844

February 23, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
CBS News
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N.Y.

Dear Ed:

As you suggested, I had a good talk with Morris Ernst. He's all in favor of my making the trip provided everything is completely open, with advance notification to State prior to my departure -- this for the sake of public opinion. When I see you I'll give you details of what he said.

You said you'd be interested in seeing a script on the 450 captured and missing Korean War GIs. I've tried to get across some of the haunting, on-going tragedy.

Sincerely,

Bill

enclosure

(The hijacking of the South Korean plane by the communists provides a possible news peg for this story.)

Tonight in America, when it comes time to retire, 450 unremembered women will be unable to sleep.

For them this sleeplessness is nothing new. During the past five years they have tossed and turned for night after night. No doctor can help them; no medicine will cure their chronic insomnia.

These 450 women are the mothers of prisoners of war who never came back from Korea. With only one known exception the communists have consistently denied all knowledge of the men and have refused to account for them. In that sole exception the straight-faced Chinese and North Koreans belatedly claimed that a seriously wounded Army captain, who had to have both legs amputated after his capture, "escaped" from their custody.

As recently as two months ago Joseph C. Grew, former Under Secretary of State, reminded the country that "our government has definite proof that these American boys were alive and in communist POW camps <u>after</u> they were captured. For all we know," Mr. Grew continued, "they may still be alive and suffering in communist prisons or slave labor camps."

The 450 men on this U.S. Government list did not disappear without trace. After being captured by the Chinese or North Koreans they were seen by other GIs. Some of them, like Negro Corporal John D. McDonald of Chester, Pa., sent letters home in their own handwriting from the prison camps. Others

were mentioned as prisoners-of-war on propaganda broadcasts by the gloating communists who in some cases distributed photographs taken after the men were captured. The Nashville, Tennessee mother of Air Force Major Samuel P. Logan showed me one such picture -p- a clear, unmistakable likeness of her son whom the communists now deny ever having held.

Without the slightest effort the mothers can recite all the details they have laboriously picked up largely on their own: when and where their sons were captured, who saw them in the prison camps or in the North Korean hospitals, who read their names pitifully scratched on the walls of solitary confinement huts, or who on the camp dish-washing details found messages smuggled out of those huts amidst scraps of uneaten food. In one such message, long classified and kept secret by the Pentagon, the prisoner gave his name, rank and serial number and stated that he was "getting the works" from the communist brainwashers during the so-called "germ warfare" campaign.

Apparently the communists never intended to release some of the men. These disappeared from general circulation early in their captivity. But Mrs. E. M. Riddle of Pontiac, Michigan learned that, on the day of repatriation in August, 1953, her son, among other unlucky prisoners, just happened to climb onto one of a number of trucks that, without warning, turned north toward China and the Soviet Union, never to be heard from since. By an equally capricious fate his more fortunate campmates climbed aboard adjacent trucks

that headed in the opposite direction for Panmunjom and freedom. A State Department spokesman confirmed this: He told me that only after the massive confusion of repatriation was over did many of the freed captives realize that some of their closest buddies, riding on trucks directly behind them, never crossed the armistice line to Freedom Gate.

Thus the Chinese or North Koreans or Russians could tell all, but won't. On May 5, 1954, nine months after the Korean truce was signed, Washington sent a diplomatic note to Moscow accusing the Russians of having shipped some of the men from Korea to the Soviet Union. As expected, the Kremlin indignantly denied the charge. A Pentagon official gave me one explanation for the tight-lipped stance of the communists. "This," he said, "is a blackmail operation. When we recognize China, perhaps then the communists will render an accounting of the men."

The mothers levy two major charges against the Pentagon. They say that much of the available data on their sons is classified as secret and withheld from them. They also say that the American prisoners-of-war who did come home -- the most likely sources of direct information -- were actively discouraged by their military superiors from contacting the families of the missing men.

When pressed, Pentagon officials admit to withholding data from the men's families. The officially offered justification is that the Government must be extremely careful to make sure that what is given to the relatives is

"truly information and not misinformation." This policy has cumulative consequences -- such as the four-year wasting away of one Tulsa, Oklahoma mother from 160 pounds down to 70. She is the mother of Army Capt. Harry D. Moreland, the double amputee mentioned earlier. Not until last May, when a Congressional committee held a hearing, did Mrs. Moreland and her husband learn from a Pentagon witness that the communists had gotten around to admitting the capture of their son. Following this grudging admission the communists added their fantastic claim that, with both legs amputated, the man had "escaped".

In the past five years 450 lonely, resolute mothers have done a quasi-professional detective job of running down leads on the fate of their sons. A few have literally scoured the globe, despite the State Department's reluctance to issue passports to any of them. Mrs. R. H. Shaddick of Coral Gables, Florida and several others have managed to journey to Hong Kong, next door to the communist heartland. All the mothers say that, if Washington would permit them, they would carry the search into China and North Korea itself. Every day they scrutinize English-language newspapers from all corners of the earth. They have corresponded with countless strangers who might conceivably have a little light to shed.

In desperation for information about their sons a few of the mothers have turned to mediums and spiritualists. Others have been in contact

with anti-communist undercover agents in Asia -- no doubt at a very steep price. Kept from seeing the files on their sons at the Pentagon, up against the bland "we-know-nothing" replies from the communists, seldom these days finding any promising leads to track down, each of the mothers faces a stark struggle just to keep going.

Some have escaped into insanity. Others I have met are tottering on the brink. Where lies the breaking point for each individual woman? The only reality for all of them today is the return of their sons if alive, conclusive proof of death if dead.

Left alone in the still of night to guess and guess again about the Top-Secret Pentagon files, how long can even the bravest mother and the strongest personality oscillate fitfully between dim sparks of flickering hope and lengthening valleys of black despair?

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Worthy, Bill

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May 31, 1957

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Bill Worthy suggested that I send you a copy of the memorandum submitted to the Department of State in his passport case. It is enclosed. If you have any questions about the memorandum, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely yours,

Alan Reitman

Alan Reitman
Assistant Director

Enclosure

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

In the Matter of Passport Renewal Application of WILLIAM WORTHY, JR.	APPLICANT'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND FACT

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

This memorandum of law and fact is submitted on behalf of WILLIAM WORTHY, JR., the applicant in the within proceeding, pursuant to permission granted by ASHLEY J. NICHOLAS, ESQ., Hearing Officer, Department of State, at the informal passport hearing conducted in this matter on April 29, 1957, in Washington, D. C.

THE FACTS

WILLIAM WORTHY, JR., a newspaper reporter, employed by the Afro-American Newspapers, applied for and was issued United States Passport No. 558363, on March 4th, 1955. Prior to this passport's expiration date on March 4th, 1957, Mr. Worthy applied for a renewal thereof on February 25, 1957, which application was denied by the Department of State (hereinafter referred to as the Department), on March 29, 1957. The denial was contained in a letter to Mr. Worthy signed by Miss Frances G. Knight, the Director of the Passport Office, and indicated that it was based on two grounds, viz.:

1. His travel in Communist China and Hungary in violation of restrictions placed in his passport;

2. The Department's reason to believe that he would not abide by "geographical limitations of general applicability which may be placed in the passport."

It is conceded that Mr. Worthy entered Communist China at Shumchon on December 24, 1956 and departed from that country by air from Peking on February 2, 1957, arriving in Moscow, U.S.S.R., on the next day. He left Moscow on February 6th and arrived in Budapest, Hungary, the following day. He left

Hungary on February 8th, arriving back in the United States on February 10th. Prior to his departure from Peking, Mr. Worthy obtained transit visas from the Russian and Czechoslovakian Embassies in the Chinese capital.

His passport (Exhibit A-9) contains no Chinese or Hungarian visas or any writing of any sort attributable to officials of those countries in connection with the visits under scrutiny. In his testimony at the informal hearing, he stated unequivocally that neither Hungary nor Communist China required that he hold a United States passport as a condition of entry. Moreover, the Department did not introduce one shred of evidence to indicate that Mr. Worthy's passport was used or was necessary for such entry. The only testimony in the record relating to the use of the passport in Communist China and Hungary had to do with its exhibition for identification purposes in those countries. It was employed to identify Mr. Worthy to bank cashiers, inquisitive policemen and hotel clerks. In neither Communist China nor Hungary was its production a condition of admission.

Furthermore, Mr. Worthy testified at the hearing that if his passport were renewed he would not use it in violation of any restrictions placed therein. However, he indicated that, if a country in which a United States passport was not valid for travel permitted him to enter without requiring him to have or produce his passport, he would, in peacetime, do so if necessary to fulfil a reportorial assignment.

THE LAW

In addition to the fact that Mr. Worthy does not think that his visits to China and Hungary are violative of any laws or regulation affecting the use of passports, it is his considered opinion that the Secretary of State's refusal to permit American newsmen to travel in those countries, or anywhere else for that matter, is not only arbitrary, unreasonable and unwise, but that it violates two fundamental constitutional concepts, namely, the freedom of the press and the right to travel.

Both of these concepts are inextricably intertwined with the Department's tentative refusal to renew Mr. Worthy's passport. In the first place, as a native-born American citizen, he is being deprived of his right to travel in those countries which required a United States passport as a condition of entry. Since most of the countries of the world require a passport, this, in effect, restricts his travel to a small area of the globe. Secondly, in his capacity as a reporter and, in particular, as a foreign correspondent, he is now

unable to visit countries requiring a passport in order to gather and report back to his employer news as it develops in those countries. Thus the Department has effectively curtailed freedom of the press by making it impossible for a foreign correspondent to gather the news from vast areas of the world.

A. The Right To Travel - From Magna Carta to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the right to travel has been frequently declared to be a natural right. Most international law authorities (e.g., Grotius) for the last several centuries have spoken of it as guaranteed by the laws of nations. It is claimed by Mr. Worthy that a citizen's right of international locomotion is a constitutional as well as a natural one.

Since 1856, American secretaries of state have insisted that the granting of passports is a matter of absolute discretion for the Executive Branch of the government. Thus, without any expressed delegation of such authority, the State Department has become the supreme arbiter as to whether a person should be permitted to travel abroad for legitimate purposes of his own. The basis for usurping this authority is the Department's position that the issuing of passports is within the exercise of foreign policy.

However, Mr. Worthy does not take the position that the Department's function with respect to the issuance of passports is purely procedural. He concedes that reasonable limitations, under special circumstances, may be imposed. These limitations include:

1. Restriction in time of war to protect the individual or national interest;

2. Restrictions upon fugitives from justice, or those seeking to avoid the jurisdiction of a court; and

3. Restrictions upon persons in such physical or mental condition as to jeoparize the health or safety of persons with whom they come in contact.

But Mr. Worthy does feel that outside of the above situations, the Department is guilty of unconstitutional administrative action when it prevents travel by refusing to issue a passport.

Since 1952 the federal courts have been curtailing the Department's absolute discretion with reference to the issuance of passports. In 1952 the Department was ordered to set forth the reasons for denial and grant a hearing according to announced and clearly defined standards. In subsequent cases it was ordered to produce the grounds for refusal, to make appropriate factual findings against an applicant and to conform to all the requirements of procedural due

process. Most recently, the courts have insisted that they have the right to investigate the grounds advanced by the Department for a denial and to overrule it where they feel that the substance of grounds are insufficient to support the denial.

The net result of these cases has been to emphasize that the federal courts are inclined to regard the right to travel abroad as a constitutional right rather than a privilege bestowed upon the citizen in the Department's discretion. In one case, Chief Judge Charles Fahy, of the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, stated that "the denial of a passport accordingly causes a deprivation of liberty that a citizen otherwise might have" and the Secretary of State may not "in his discretion deprive a citizen of liberty without due process of law." He went on to emphasize that a citizen's "Freedom to leave a country or a hemisphere is as much a part of his liberty as freedom to leave a State." Fifty-five years before, Chief Justice Fuller of the United States Supreme Court had stated:

> "Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another, according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from and through the territory of any state is a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution."

It is Mr. Worthy's contention that the Secretary's action has deprived him of this constitutional right to travel, as defined by the courts, and that the Department's refusal to renew his passport is in violation of our democratic concept of freedom of movement.

B. Freedom of the Press - It is also contended by Mr. Worthy that the Department has not, by law, custom or tradition, the right to prohibit accredited press representatives from visiting either friendly or unfriendly countries in peacetime. Firstly, it is felt that such a ban is an administrative invasion of the freedom of press guarantees of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The courts have consistently held that, even when an absolute power of Congress was involved, it had to yield to the provisions of the First Amendment. It would seem that this should be no less the situation where the Executive Branch is concerned.

The Secretary of State does not seem to understand the breadth of the freedom of the press portion of the First Amendment. In a letter dated April 30, 1957, addressed to Arthur Hayes Sulzberger, the publisher and chairman of

the board of The New York Times, reprinted in The New York Times, May 2, 1957, Mr. Dulles stated as follows:

> "You (Sulzberger) suggest that our policy with respect to Americans going to China 'abridges the freedom of the press'. The constitutional 'freedom of the press' relates to publication, and not to the gathering of news." (The underlined portion is the Secretary's emphasis.)

This statement, if true, would amount to a complete perversion of the freedom of the press guarantees of the Constitution. As The New York Post editorialized on May 5, 1957, "In other words, we are free to publish the news provided we do not insist on our rights to get it." According to Mr. Sulzberger (and most, if not all, American newspapers) "I cannot escape the feeling that the administration is abridging the freedom of the press and using the press as an instrument in its diplomacy. I agree that other principles are involved, but in the long view this one seems to me to be fundamental." (Letter, Arthur H. Sulzberger to John Foster Dulles, April 23, 1957; reprinted in The New York Times, May 2, 1957)

Furthermore, not only is Mr. Dulles treading unconcernedly in the sands of unconstitutionality, but he is flying in the face of his own expressed convictions. For example, in his press conference of April 23, 1957, he stated that "The more the American people know the facts about Communist China, the better pleased we are." As Arthur Krock stated on April 25, 1957, in The New York Times:

> "Access to news sources both here and abroad is not a 'privilege' granted through government favor or caprice and thus something to be extended, withdrawn or denied on the same basis. It is the only orderly means by which the people of this Republic can be assured of their right to know in peacetime all that is happening around them."

And it might be added this is precisely what the framers of the Constitution had in mind when they prohibited Congress from making any law "abridging the freedom of the press."

Secondly, the reasons advanced by the State Department for its action in denying Mr. Worthy's application for a renewal of his passport do not merit the denial to the American public of its right to on-the-spot reporting of news developments in Communist China. These reasons (with brief paranthetical rebuttals are, in the main as follows:

1. No peace treaty has ended the Korean War and a quasi state of war still exists, necessitating the continued application of the Trading-With-The-Enemy Act. (The United States was never at war with Communist China and the gathering of legitimate and important news

was never encompassed by the Act.)

2. Communist China poses a threat to Formosa. (So does Russia to Pakistan and Egypt to Israel.)

3. There are no United States facilities to protect travelers in Communist China. (The same is true, in a practical sense, in other Iron Curtain countries.)

4. The return of prisoners held by the Chinese would be jeopardized by the presence of American reporters. (This is ridiculous on the face of it and, if Chinese statements are to be believed, would have the opposite effect.)

5. China has violated the Korean Armistice Agreement. (So has Russia the Yalta agreement.)

6. The United States would be yielding to Chinese blackmail. (The purpose of the "blackmail" is to open news sources to American reporters, in other words, to lift the Bamboo Curtain.)

7. American world leadership would be endangered. (Hardly likely.)

8. Communist China's prestige would be enhanced and that of Nationalist China weakened. (An extremely speculative and unrealistic argument.)

9. The entry of newsmen would cause a general influx of Americans into Communist China. (Easily controlled by the State Department as with Egypt, Syria and Israel in the past.)

10. American opposition to Communism would appear to be weakened. (If so, to be logical, we should withdraw permission for travel in Russia and other Iron Curtain countries.)

11. The presence of American reporters might precipitate a war-provoking incident. (Unreasonable speculation.)

12. The Chinese might insist on certain reporters only. (In their original invitation they named twenty-two correspondents but there is no evidence that they would insist only on reporters favorable to China.)

13. The United States does not recognize Communist China. (This has never been used as a reason to bar the press before and is without logical foundation.)

The Secretary of State has emphasized one or more of the above reasons from time to time and it is impossible to ascertain which he considers most

important. In his press conference of April 23, 1957, he stressed the fact that he was afraid of a mass demand from Americans, other than newsmen, for permission to travel in China. He overlooked the fact that he has in the past established a dual policy with respect to other countries (such as Israel, Syria and Egypt) by which correspondents were permitted to travel in those nations while the general public was not. Furthermore, American newspaper men have been allowed to visit Russia and other satellite countries for some years.

Mr. Dulles' reasons for refusing to permit American newsmen to travel in Communist China have been condemned by every responsible press facility. Moreover, they have been labeled "nonsensical" by one United States Senator and severely criticized by members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. As Senator Estes Kefauver stated on April 24, 1957, "I am in favor of letting American reporters go to Red China without any limitations. It is better to get our news from there through our own people than from canned information from some Communist bureau. Our people are entitled to know what is going on in Red China." In addition, the United Press reported, on May 13, 1957, that mail received by the Department is running better than three-to-one against its ban on travel by newsmen.

Not only has the Secretary been inconsistent in his reasons for barring newsmen from the Chinese mainland, but he has been equally inconsistent with reference to those who have violated his prohibition. For example, to the best of our knowledge, no action has been taken against Messrs. Edmund Stevens and Philip Harrington, the Look magazine reporter-photographer team, who visited Communist China at the same time as Mr. Worthy. After Mr. Stevens arrived in Moscow, following his visit to China, he was asked by Ambassador Bohlen, on February 6, 1957, to bring his passport to the American Embassy so it could be stamped for return to the United States only. He refused to do so without a hearing and, through his employer, requested one either in Moscow or in Washington. To date, no answer has been received from the Department by either Mr. Stevens or his employer and he is still in Moscow in possession of his unrestricted passport.

Mr. Harrington's passport was renewed at the American Embassy in Stockholm just prior to his visit to Communist China and he is presently back in the United States. At no time, to date, has he received any communication from the State Department with reference to either his trip or his passport.

Furthermore, it is our understanding that Senator George Malone R., Nev.) openly violated the Department's ban against travelling in Bulgaria during the summer of 1955 without any apparent adverse effect.

Thirdly, it is contended that the Department does not have the right to use access to news sources as a license or a privilege which can be extended or withdrawn at its pleasure. The press cannot constitutionally be used as an instrument of foreign policy. To permit it to be so used is to threaten a watering-down of the First Amendment in that the Department could close any foreign source of news in peacetime by a decision that such action would be beneficial even to the most nebulous foreign policy. News coverage cannot be regulated by foreign policy fluctuations without laying the cornerstone for governmental press control, too tragically often in the recent past the first step on the road to tyranny.

On the positive side, there are many cogent arguments in favor of permitting newsmen to enter Communist China and other off-limit countries. Under the present restrictions, American news media must rely on Peking sources, which are usually only propaganda relay stations, or dispatches from foreign reporters who are not particularly concerned with American interests. The Secretary recently recommended the latter as a solution to the problem, a proposal which The New York Herald Tribune classified as "unthinkable". The only other alternative is to rely on State Department news releases unless the press is willing to ignore China completely, Whichever tack is taken, the American public must remain woefully ignorant as to a major area of foreign policy application. As the Writer's Guild of America wired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee some months ago:

> "This act of censorship means that American audiences, if they are to get first-hand reports from China, must get them from writers of other lands. A veil is thrown over China - not by others, but by our own government."

Furthermore, the Chinese Communist and the Soviet world have been given a convenient and an effective propaganda drum to beat, one which they are exploiting to the fullest.

These and many other reasons have been advanced so persistently and so often by the newspapers, the press association and the radio and television networks that repetition here is patently unnecessary. It is sufficient to call the Department's attention to the remarks of speakers at the recent Associated Press and American Newspaper Publishers' Association meeting in New York City last April. William Dwight, the president of the A.N.P.A., in his presidential address on April 24, 1957, summed it up as follows:

"The A.N.P.A. has asked that newspapermen who are American citizens and employed by American publications and news-gathering services to gather and write news or express opinions on facts, be accorded by our government freedom to travel for that purpose in any country in the world with which the United States is not at war. The A.N.P.A. has in mind particularly the granting of the right to go to Red China and report back to the American people. The Bamboo Curtain now hangs by order of our government between us and Red China. Arguments based on the evils of the Peiping regime have been advanced to bolster the decision to keep us from finding out for ourselves what is taking place over there. They should not prevail over the majestic principle of the people's right to know, a precious right inherent in our way of life."

To buttress his weak constitutional position, Mr. Dulles informed his press conference on May 14, 1957, that the United States Supreme Court has not interpreted the First Amendment to give "Newspaper people in exercise of the freedom of the press" the right "to freely travel everywhere." After this press conference, the Department cited four Supreme Court opinions and two by the highest courts of New York and Pennsylvania, respectively, purporting to uphold the Secretary's constitutional views. None of the cited cases is concerned with the question of whether the control of news-gathering as differentiated from the right of publication violates the First Amendment. Near v. Minnesota (283 U.S. 697) involves the constitutionality of a Minnesota statute designed to abate "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" publications. The only issue before the Supreme Court, which held the statute's application to be unconstitutional, was prior restraint on publication. In Pennekamp v. Florida (328 U.S. 331) the conviction of the editor and publisher of a newspaper for contempt because of articles impugning a court's integrity were reversed. In Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board (301 U.S. 103) the court held that the gathering and dissemination of news by the Associated Press involved interstate commerce and that it was therefore subject to the National Labor Relations Act. In Associated Press v. United States (326 U.S. 1) the Associated Press was held subject to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The two state cases cited by the Department concerned the right of Pennsylvania courts to prohibit the taking of photographs within forty feet of a courtroom (In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251) and that of a New York court with the consent of the accused to close the courtroom to the press (United Press v. Valente, 281 App. Div. 395). Not a single one of the above-cited cases, relied upon by the Department to support its view that it may control the gathering of news, supports that contention.

Incidentally, the Secretary was asked the following question at the above mentioned news conference:

> "If you can control the sources of news, of what value is the right to publication, since you have nothing to publish? .... Isn't that the classic way to stop the publication of news?"

He answered his questioner by stating that there were "ample ways" of obtaining news from China "without sending American correspondents with American passports into areas where that would involve a conflict with the United States foreign policy." He stated that publishers who desired to obtain news from the Chinese mainland "can send anybody there if they do not have a United States passport." This, he argued, would not violate the spirit of his ban. Furthermore, he again insisted that he was willing to let the "news gathering community" devise a plan for sending a small group of reporters to China on an experimental basis. He justified this experiment on the ground that "there are some cases where a pure logic has to give way before a measure of compromise."

The obvious foolishness of these remarks are readily apparent. If his arguments for refusing to permit American newsmen to enter China had validity, then none should be allowed to do so. If Mr. Dulles is willing to admit some, then it is an admission that the arguments he has offered to sustain his absolute prohibition are without substance.

Furthermore, he seems to feel that permitting newsmen to visit China would be a discrimination in their favor. As Arthur Krock pointed out in his article in The New York Times, on April 25, 1957, newsmen have always enjoyed greater rights than the private citizen to visit areas where news was being made. A reporter's press card has by tradition been honored everywhere, giving him the right to cross police and fire lines and to visit battlefronts. The Secretary recognized this fact of life when he permitted newsmen to visit Egypt, Syria and Israel while closing those countries to other American travelers.

The Secretary of State reiterated at this May 14th press conference his opinion expressed one month earlier that he was now prepared to modify his absolute ban against newsmen travelling in Communist China in favor of a pool of reporters to be sent to that country on an experimental basis. This is a radical departure from the remarks of Robert Murphy, his Deputy-Undersecretary of State, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 2, 1957, when he stated that no relaxation was possible. This new proposal has been uniformly condemned by the news media but it does indicate an attempt to retreat from an untenable position. Perhaps Mr. Worthy's case, which presents a ready made opportunity to remove the ban completely, will be so used by Mr. Dulles.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that Mr. Worthy's application for a renewal of his Passport No. 558363 be granted.

WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER
Attorney for William Worthy, Jr.
511 Fifth Avenue
New York 17, N. Y.

ROWLAND WATTS
Of Counsel

NEWS RELEASE

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 170 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 10, N. Y.

E. B. MAC NAUGHTON
Chairman
National Committee

ERNEST ANGELL
Chairman
Board of Directors

EDWARD J. ENNIS
OSMOND K. FRAENKEL
BARENT TEN EYCK
General Counsel

PATRICK MURPHY MALIN
Executive Director

ORegon 5-5990

Alan Reitman, *Assistant Director*
In Charge of Public Relations

May 31, 1957

FOR RELEASE: TUESDAY A.M. NEWSPAPERS, JUNE 4, 1957

(ADVANCE) NEW YORK, N. Y., June 3.--Secretary of State Dulles' refusal to permit American reporters to travel to unauthorized countries is "arbitrary, unreasonable, and unwise and violates two fundamental constitutional concepts, freedom of the press and the right to travel," newsman William Worthy, Jr. argued today.

Attorneys assigned by the American Civil Liberties Union submitted a memorandum of law and fact to the State Department's Passport Office urging reversal of the Department's refusal to renew Worthy's passport. The Baltimore Afro-American correspondent lost his passport following his travel to Communist China and Hungary last winter, despite the State Department's ban on visits to those countries. He appealed the decision and was given an informal hearing on April 29. The memorandum, prepared by ACLU cooperating attorney William M. Kunstler and ACLU staff counsel Rowland Watts, supplements the oral argument at the hearing. The ACLU has pledged Worthy full legal assistance in challenging the State Department's decision.

Asserting that since 1865 the State Department considered the granting of passports a matter of absolute discretion within the executive branch of government, the memorandum notes that "without any expressed delegation of such authority, the State Department has become the supreme arbiter as to whether a person should be permitted to travel abroad for legitimate purposes." However, the ACLU attorneys argued, since 1952 the federal courts have been curtailing the Department's power and "the net result of these cases has been to emphasize that the federal courts are inclined to regard the right to travel abroad as a consitutional right rather than a privilege bestowed upon the citizen in the Department's discretion."

The Worthy memorandum contends that the State Department's action is an "administrative invasion of the freedom of press guarantees of the Constitution," denies the American public access to news developments about Communist China and improperly uses the press as an instrument of foreign policy.

The memorandum rejects Secretary Dulles' statement that freedom of the press relates only to publication of news, not the gathering of information, expressed on April 30 in a letter to New York Times publisher Arthur Hayes Sulzberger. "This statement, if true," the memorandum asserts, "would amount to a complete perversion of the freedom of the press guarantees of the Constitution."

(more)

Arguing vigorously against the press being used as an instrument of foreign policy, the memorandum said that to permit this is "to threaten a watering down of the First Amendment in that the Department could close any foreign source of news in peacetime by a decision that such action would be beneficial even to the most nebulous foreign policy.

"News coverage cannot be regulated by foreign policy fluctuations without laying the cornerstone for governmental press control, too tragically often in the recent past the first step on the road to tyranny."

On the positive side, the memorandum stated, there are many cogent arguments in favor of permitting newsmen to enter Communist China and other off-limit countries. "Under the present restrictions American news media must rely on Peking sources, which are usually propaganda relay stations, or dispatches from foreign reporters who are not particularly concerned with American interests. The only other alternative is to rely on State Department news releases unless the press is willing to ignore China completely. Whichever tack is taken, the American public must remain woefully ignorant as to a major area of foreign policy application."

Noting Secretary Dulles' statement that he was prepared to modify his absolute position to allow a reporters pool to enter Communist China as an experiment, the memorandum said that while this has been uniformly condemned by the news media it is an attempt to retreat from an untenable position. "Perhaps Mr. Worthy's case, which presents a ready-made opportunity to remove the ban completely, will be so used by Mr. Dulles," the memorandum stated.

# # #

WILLIAM WORTHY JR.

210 East 19th Street, New York 3, N. Y.

April 12th, 1956

Dear Ed,

Miss Holder a week ago said she'd put a note on your desk for your return, but I'm writing this because I thought the note might get buried in a pile. What I told her was that I'd be very grateful if you would write a letter of reference to Louis Lyons, curator, Nieman Foundation, Harvard University, Cambridge. Applications and letters of reference are supposed to be in by April 15th, but my guess is that a letter from you a day or two late would be read.

My reasons for applying for a Nieman for next year are no doubt quite ordinary: a felt need to take a year off and evaluate my experience while doing a lot of long-neglected reading and taking a course or two. Besides last year's Moscow trip and coverage of the Bandung conference there was a previous round-the-world trip in 1952 and 1953, winding up with my coverage of the Korean truce signing. By the time that the academic year begins in September I'll also have been over a good bit of Africa.

For your information, my school background is Boston Latin School and Bates College, plus University of Oslo Summer School and a year at a Danish folk school. I majored in sociology.

Over a long period I expect that my main interest will be Africa, and I was indeed glad to hear from John Day (who is also writing a letter of reference) that in his future planning for CBS News he has projected a bureau in southern Africa within the next five years. If lightning strikes and I do wind up at Harvard next fall I may brush up on my French in order to have it as a working tool in Africa in the future.

Tonight I am going up to Boston and, should you wish further info, I'll be at 87 Howland Street, Boston 21 (phone: HIghlands 5-2844) for about a week. I went to see Lyons at Christmas and may see him again in the next few days.

I'll be watching SIN on the 23rd. I've heard you've done a terrific job.

Sincerely,

Bill

87 Howland St.
Boston 21, Mass.

phone: HIghlands 5-2844

December 28, 1955

Mr. Fred Friendly, Producer
See It Now
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Fred Friendly:

After I showed you my visas to South Africa, Kenya and the other countries of Africa I recall your saying that I should see you again about the time that Alexander Kendrick was due back in New York.

I came to my mother's home here in Boston for Christmas and unexpectedly have had to stay longer than I had planned. As of now I expect to be back in New York by Saturday or early Sunday. If by chance you should want to see me before that, I can arrange to leave here earlier.

When I spoke to John Day after you and I had talked, I mentioned what you had said, and he indicated that maybe something vis-a-vis Africa could be worked out jointly since, as he put it, I am now familiar with CBS News operations.

The season's greetings.

Sincerely,

Bill

Bill Worthy

cc: Ed Murrow

210 East 19th Street
New York 3, New York
March 4, 1954

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Yesterday on the telephone Miss Holden told Mr. Peter White that you and Mr. Friendly were discussing my idea concerning repatriated Negro POWs.

Meanwhile, I should like to raise initially another matter, the details of which are largely explained by the enclosed letter to Mrs. Shipley at the State Department. Last summer in Korea Bob Pierpoint and other American correspondents told me that, because of "race discrimination in reverse", I might have a considerably better chance of getting a visa to Red China than would they. Therefore I took the matter up with Alan Winnington (and also once briefly, on the day the truce was signed, with Wilfred Burchett). Now with the Geneva Conference in the offing The Crisis magazine and I are pressing ahead with visa applications to China, Russia and Hungary -- the latter because of the current "Indian summer of freedom" in Budapest.

If Peking, Moscow and Budapest should see fit to let me in, I shall journey to those countries as Crisis correspondent with a special eye out for news of particular interest to Negro Americans. However, because the NAACP is not at present in a position to shoulder my heavy expenses, I shall be obliged to make arrangements with other press, radio and television media for my travel expenditures and remuneration.

Naturally I have no way of predicting the success or failure of my visa applications. I have written critically of world communism, and that fact may weigh more heavily against my chances than the accident of being Negro may count in my favor. In any event, as a long-time admirer of the objectivity of CBS news coverage I thought first of informing you at this stage. You might like to know what at least may be in the wind. In a personal letter this weekend to Alan Winnington at his Peking address I shall remind him of our July conversations at Panmunjom and mention that above all I should now like to interview in Peking the Viet Minh diplomatic mission.

Sincerely yours,

William Worthy

William Worthy

enclosure

17

Worthy

VK

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PRESS CBS INC

NYK

BURKE FOR ED MURROW. MY STATEMENT IN ANSWER TO STATE DEPT TESTIMONY IN WASHINGTON TODAY. AT THIS LATE DATE THE STATE DEPT IS TRYING TO BECLOUD THE ISSUE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS BY RAISING AN IRRELEVANT MATTER ON WHICH I PUBLICLY TOOK A PRINCIPILED POSITION.

IN 1943 I WAS CLASSIFIED AS A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR. AFTER DISCUSSING THE CASE WITH A. PHILIP RANDOLPH, PRESIDENT OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF SLEEPING CAR PORTERS AND THE LATE WALTER WHITE OF THE NAACP, I REFUSED TO ENTER A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS CAMP BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT WAS ASSIGNING MEN GEOGRAPHICALLY ON THE GROUNDS OF RACE AND COLOR.

THERE WAS NO REPEAT NO CHARGE OF "DRAFT DODGING" OR EVASION, AND MY STATEMENT OF REFUSAL TO THE GOVERNMENT WAS FULLY PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS, INCLUDING THE BALTIMORE

AFRO-AMERICAN.

RATHER THAN FACE A COURT TEST ON THE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ISSUE, THE DEPT OF JUSTICE NOLLE PROSSED THE CASE AFTER IT LEARNED THAT I WAS ELIGIBLE FOR A R-F EXEMPTION BECAUSE OF A DUODENAL ULCER. MY MEDICAL RECORDS ARE AVAILABLE AT THE PRATT DIAGNOSTIC CLINIC IN BOSTON AND AT THE EPISCOPAL HOSPITAL IN PHILADELPHIA.

CONTRARY TO TODAY"S TESTIMONY OF ROBERT CARTWRIGHT, ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE STATE DEPT"S BUREAU OF SECURITY AND CONSULAR AFFAIRS, I DID NOT REPEAT NOT SERVE ONE DAY OR ANY LONGER TIME IN JAIL AND I NEVER REPEAT NEVER WENT TO A CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS CAMP.

THE RECORDS WERE AVAILABLE TO THE STATE DEPT IN 1951, 1953 AND 1955 WHEN I PREVIOUSLY OBTAINED PASSPORTS WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. IN MARCH 1955, MRS RUTH SHIPLEY, THEN CHIEF OF THE PASSPORT OFFICE, PERSONALLY VALIDATED MY PASSPORT FOR TRAVEL TO THE SOVIET UNION. MY RECORD PRESUMABLY HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY REVIEWED FOR THIS PURPOSE BY THE DEPARTMENT. WHEN I WAS CLEARED FOR PERMANENT PENTAGON ACCREDITATION SEVERAL YEARS AGO FOR VISITING MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN KOREA AND ELSE-WHERE, I LISTED ALL THE FACTS OF THE CASE. REGARDS

WORTHY

723P..

(THE CRISIS

organ of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

20 West 40th Street

New York 18, New York)

COPY

March 2, 1954

Mrs. R. B. Shipley, Chief
Passport Division,
Department of State
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mrs. Shipley:

On Wednesday, February 24, 1954, from the Hungarian Legation in Washington, Mr. William Worthy Jr. (Passport #416680) spoke by telephone with Mr. Hibbs of the Passport Division. Mr. Worthy informed Mr. Hibbs that on that day he had paid visits to the Russian Embassy and the Hungarian Legation to apply for visas to those countries as a correspondent for The Crisis magazine of New York City. Incidentally, we are also writing the Chinese Foreign Office in Peking in an effort to obtain a visa for Mr. Worthy to visit Communist China.

We are particularly anxious that Mr. Worthy be in the Communist countries, especially China, at the time of the Geneva Conference on Korea and Indo-China.

Last summer Mr. Worthy was our Pentagon-accredited correspondent in Korea and our readers, both white and Negro, were intensely interested in what he had to report. Just now more than ever objective reporting is needed on news from Asia, Africa and Latin America in order to let both white and Negro Americans know what these people are really thinking and feeling. And the 250,000 members of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People have a keen interest in the views and policies of the Communist governments on colonial problems and issues, and especially the truce in Indo-China and a peace settlement in Korea.

This is why we are seeking for Mr. Worthy the specific endorsement of the Department of State for travel to the Communist countries. For obvious reasons we believe that the United States Government need have no concern for the personal safety of any Negro American traveling in any of the Iron Curtain lands. We also feel certain that a correspondent for The Crisis would be treated with courtesy. I as editor find it difficult to see how the sociological, cultural and political information thus gathered and published would be detrimental to the best interests of the United States.

We should appreciate expeditious removal of the standard restriction now in Mr. Worthy's passport. His passport, renewed a year ago at the American Embassy in Djakarta, Indonesia, is valid until February 16, 1955.

Very respectfully yours,
/s/
James W. Ivy
Editor

JWI:rds

Petr Zenkl
2651 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

June 26, 1964

Mr. and Mrs. Edward R. Murrow
Glen Arden Farm
Pawling, New York 12564

Dear Friends:

You were so very kind to remember me by your wire at my eightieth birthday. Please accept our sincere thanks and be assured that we too wish you all the good and best success. Particularly of course the fullest possible recovery and the return of former strength which has meant so much for us and also for our efforts to fulfill the aims of our hard exile.

I can add the news that I have finally come to the point of starting systematic work on my memoirs. I am beginning to hope that I shall really complete this work, although the goal of my life endeavors still remains unfinished.

Pavluška and I send our best thoughts.

Cordially,

Petr and Pavla

July 31, 1959

Dear "Epsy":

Many thanks for your cordial note of July 9th. This is merely a note to tell you that I have most regretfully had to decline President Morrill's kind invitation to do the Gideon Seymour Memorial Lecture.

Present plans call for me to be out of the country for most of the coming year, during which time I will try to learn rather than talk.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. E. W. Ziebarth
Dean
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis 14, Minnesota

mcc

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
MINNEAPOLIS 14

DEAN OF THE SUMMER SESSION

July 9, 1959

Personal

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
CBS
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Ed:

I am embarrassed to have delayed writing about your sabbatical until you have actually left the air, but I do hope that this will be a time of rest and genuine relaxation for you after a long period of not only distinguished service, but extreme pressure.

This note has another purpose, however. You will be receiving in a very short time a letter from President J. L. Morrill inviting you to deliver one of the Gideon Seymour Memorial Lectures at the University of Minnesota. Such distinguished people as T. S. Eliot, Walter Lippman, and Scotty Reston have already appeared in the series, and audiences have been among the largest gathered for any lecture series given anywhere in America. It is my hope for personal as well as professional and academic reasons that you will accept President Morrill's invitation when it comes.

Have a fine sabbatical, Ed, and I hope I have the good sense to follow your example and take one eventually!

Most cordially

"Ziebarth"

E. W. Ziebarth
Dean

EWZ:ms

To Leo
How much?
Arthur

EDWARD R. MURROW
485 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, N.Y.

December 19, 1958

Dear Arthur

I don't think you have met Petr Zenkl. He was Lord Mayor of Prague before the war. No municipal official in Europe did more in the field of housing, health, and education. He was truly in the tradition of Thomas Masaryk.

I found Zenkl in the Buchenwald concentration camp in 1945. He had spent six years in Nazi concentration camps and had been listed for execution as the American armies approached. He hid in a sewer pipe, and emerged with his spirit unbroken and his faith in democracy unshaken. Zenkl returned to Prague and was Deputy Prime Minister under Benes. When the Communist coup occurred in Czechoslovakia, Zenkl was again arrested and, after many months, managed to escape by the simple process of persuading his Communist guards to go with him. He is one of the few men who have been incarcerated by both the Nazis and the Communists. He now lives in exile in Washington, and is one of the toughest and most gallant men I have ever met.

K.C.
the uncle.

I am asking you for some money for Petr Zenkl - but not for Zenkl personally. His modest needs are provided for, and not a dime of the money will be spent for his maintenance. It will be spent for the following purposes: To aid in the resettlement of the more than four thousand Czechoslovak escapees still in Europe. These are people who managed to make their way across the barrier that separates Czechoslovakia from the free world.

Here 'Tis
Leo

They had to cross through mine-fields and elude the armed guards in the watchtowers, the police dogs and electrically wired fences. Many of them carried only hope as their baggage and the belief that freedom in the West was worth the risk they ran. Many of them have found that being in the free world means a miserable existence in a refugee camp or shack.

Some of the money will be used to encourage the preservation of the Czech language among the children of the Czech exiles and to aid directly in particularly difficult cases of urgent need among the escapees. So far as the language instruction is concerned, please try to imagine yourself in exile from your own country, say in Germany or in France, with your children unable to receive any instruction in English.

I am sending this letter to fifty people. This is an unorthodox appeal. It will not be repeated. And I guarantee that no part of your contribution will be used for "administrative expenses or overhead."

If you are disposed to help in this project, please make your check payable to "The American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees" and send it to me. You will receive the usual receipt for tax deduction purposes. — $100 —

It is not my practice to write such letters, nor will it become my habit. Thank you for reading this one.

Mr. Arthur Godfrey
49 East 52nd Street
New York 22, New York

gw

Zenkl, Dr Petr

November 25, 1958

Dr. Petr Zenkl
2651 - 16th Street N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

My dear Petr:

I must apologize to you. This schedule that I am attempting to carry causes me to appear more rude and churlish than I really am.

If you will please tell me when you are next planning to be in New York, I will certainly see to it that we have an opportunity to talk. Friday is not a very good day for me but, aside from that, I will meet your convenience.

As ever yours,

ERM:skh

Petr Zenkl
2651-16th Street,N.W.
Washington D.C.9
November 20,1958

My dear Ed,

For some time now I am trying to arrange an appointment with you through your secretaries, however,without success.I understand fully the pressure under which you are working,and also the fact that even a very short visit means loss of valuable time to you.

However,I desire so sincerely and so urgently to see you and hear you again in person,and not only over the radio or on television,that I have decided to send you this letter.Please be so very kind and let me know,at my Washington address,when it may be possible for you to spare few minutes for me and shall come to New York.

I hape that this time the answer will be a positive one,and I promise not to bother you with my personal worries.

With all my love yours

Petr

AIR MAIL

Zenkl, Peter

May 1, 1957

Dear Peter:

Many thanks for your note of April 20 enclosing your proposal which was put in the Congressional Record by the Honorable Henry Reuss.

If I see an opportunity do do anything with it, you may be sure I shall do so.

Sincerely,

Dr. Peter Zenkl
2651-16th Street, N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

fc

Peter Zenkl
2651-16th Street,N.W.
Washington 9,D.C.
April 20,1957.

My dear Ed:

I am enclosing a proposal of mine,which was put in the Congres sional Record by the Hon.Henry Reuss,April 15th,1957 and I will appreciate if you could give this matter your kind attention.

It would immeasurably support the cause if you would be willing to endorse it by mentioning its importance.

I hope that I shall soon have the opportunity to see you.

Cordially yours,

Peter

Peter Zenkl.

cause there is only one thing in which we are all equal. We are equal in nothing, in appearance, in height and weight, or intellectual attainment, or social background, or wealth. In this alone are we equal, that each one of us is endowed with an immortal spirit within us. That is what Jefferson knew, and that is what no materialist could ever hold. "We hold it self-evident that men are endowed with inalienable rights." No positivist teaching in our secular law schools could subscribe in good conscience to that statement, for the simple reason that his very philosophy of positivism holds there are no such things as inalienable rights, since all rights come from the state and the state if it wishes can take those rights away. And so for the other details you will find in the Constitution, in the first 10 amendments especially because those amendments deal largely with those inalienable rights, give fuller expression and enumeration to them.

Fortunately, there has been some little revival of interest in scholastic philosophy. Some years ago Robert Maynard Hutchins, who may be lamentable for other things, did this job well. He introduced scholastic philosophy almost single-handed at the University of Chicago and created something of a sensation at the campus. The ideas he proposed to his students from Thomas Aquinas and Bellarmine and the other writers caught on like wildfire. The Daily Maroon had nothing in it at all for weeks and months but quotations from the Summa Theologica and from other great scholastic works. He was joined there by Mr. Mortimer Adler. A man named John Wild attended Chicago in those days and he went back to Harvard to teach something that approaches scholasticism. A man named Vetch down at Indiana has been doing something in a limited way.

The lawyers have had second thoughts. When they put the Nazi criminals on trial at Nuremberg, Germany, right after the war, they were faced with this problem: On what basis could they try them? Should they go upon the principle of ex post facto legislation, a principle repudiated in our own Constitution and recognized to be unsound by every good lawyer? If they did not, they had no way to rest their case. It was only then that they came to realize that while there was no international code that Hitler and the others had violated and while the laws of their own country had not prohibited their actions there still remained one law that did forbid their acts and under which those men could be punished, the natural law. This idea was developed first by Zeno and then by Aristotle and brought to the fullness of its perfection by the modern scholastic writers. There is some hope now. The law journals have carried articles about the natural law. We can expect, however, that it will be some time before the positivists die out and scholasticism once more gets a hearing in our State and secular institutions.

Now to return to Walter Lippmann. His great point was this: That unless America is reintroduced through its universities to the public philosophy, the very heritage by which we live will be lost. Because once a people gets away from the essential philosophy that lies behind its fundamental documents, then though those documents may remain in force, and the words may still be there on the paper, but the spirit will no longer be in the hearts of the people. Then it is only a question of time until the very vital lesson, the very living idea would be lost completely. Why hasn't it been lost before? We can attribute it to two great factors, one the inherent good sense of Americans and the fact that these basic documents have been taught as compulsory in our grammar and our high schools for so long. Every youngster has read the Declaration, every youngster has read the Bill of Rights, and they speak so forcefully, so nobly of the things that men believe in that boys and girls in our schools could not help but be impressed. The second factor that has saved us, and here is the point of pride for us, is our Catholic high schools and universities. Year after year, in their quiet way they turn out men and women imbued with the philosophy that inspired the Declaration and the Constitution, men and women, who still keep alive the public philosophy in their minds and hearts. Some of them may not understand it too well perhaps, we know that; some of them flunked their exams in it once in a while. Nevertheless they were exposed to it and are convinced of it.

What is the hope for the future? Very briefly, this country is waking up to Catholic scholarship. This country is waking up in the philosophy departments, at least in some areas, to the possibility of introducing and teaching a scholastic philosophy. Yale had Father Courtney Murray teaching there a year or two ago. Pennsylvania has invited Father Paul Henri, who is teaching now at Iowa. Perhaps in time we will see that kind of thing everywhere, though there is still great prejudice. Philosophers have their prejudices just as well as religious people, and no positivist wants to see a scholastic philosopher teaching in the same institution with him, because he knows well that within a year or two he is going to have to look for another job. You can't fool the kids. Just as two men down at the University of Chicago set the whole institution on its ear because they brought to the place the "public philosophy" for the first time, so these people know very well that as this philosophy is introduced into their colleges they are either going to have to learn it themselves and teach it or they are going to have to get out. There is where the prejudice chiefly lies. It is another cause to pray for.

Help Keep Alive the Spirit of Freedom in Eastern and Central Europe

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. HENRY S. REUSS

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, March 5, 1957

Mr. REUSS. Mr. Speaker, an excellent way for the United States to help keep alive the spirit of freedom in the enslaved countries of Eastern and Central Europe would be to assist the democratic patriots of these lands to publish their writings in their own national languages.

At present the exiles from the satellite nations have little opportunity to publish their works in their native tongues. And there is almost no possibility for the underground opponents of Soviet oppression and Communist dictatorship to have their manuscripts printed after they have been smuggled through the Iron Curtain.

Yet the importance of an active cultural output by writers and poets dedicated to national independence and democracy cannot be underestimated. From the author's pen can come—as at the time when our own land became a free nation—the words which will keep alive devotion to liberty, confidence in a common cause, and consciousness of a national destiny. Both those who are refugees and those still enslaved, whom these words will certainly sooner or later reach, will receive new inspiration and feel new pride in their country.

The Soviet Union knows well the significance of a nation's cultural life in keeping alive the spirit of resistance. A massive campaign has long been underway in the satellite countries to destroy independent culture and thus to produce a new generation unacquainted with its own cultural heritage and out of touch with any of the current writing and thinking of its democratic leaders in exile.

The case for a United States publications assistance program has been well presented by one of Czechoslovakia's most distinguished patriots, Dr. Peter Zenkl. Dr. Zenkl—three times lord mayor of Prague, and one of the stanchest anti-Nazi and anti-Communist democrats in Czechoslovakia before and after World War II—now honors the United States by his residence here. As Edward R. Murrow recently said: "Technically, I presume Dr. Zenkl is now classified as a refugee. But he will be at home wherever freedom flourishes and men are prepared to fight for it."

I am glad to present below a memorandum in which Dr. Zenkl expands on these ideas and on other proposals for preserving and strengthening the cultural vitality of the Eastern and Central European nations. Some of these proposals might appropriately be carried out by Government, others by our great foundations or other private organizations. Certainly Dr. Zenkl's thesis deserves careful attention by all of those who are concerned about the ultimate liberation of these captive peoples.

Dr. Zenkl's article follows:

Modern historiography stresses more and more the study of individual cultures and civilizations in contrast to the old historiography which primarily described the political, economic, and social situation (of different countries). According to the opinion of modern historians, the vital force of nations is not their momentary political power or economic prosperity, but their spiritual reaction to the challenge of the cultural world around.

The correctness of this modern conception can be convincingly demonstrated on the history of the central European nations. In their case—more than in the case of any other nation—the cultural and moral collapse always preceded the political downfall and the loss of freedom and, conversely, the cultural boom was always foreshadowing the coming of political freedom. The cultural workers and genii of these nations—such as Mickiewicz, Smetana, or Petofi—were political heroes and forebears of national freedom in the noblest sense of the word. Even the latest events in the countries behind the Iron Curtain demonstrated that the first flames of the political liberation—or of the fight for the liberation—originate frequently just among the cultural workers, among the writers, and the students.

It is one of the seeming paradoxes of Marxism, which has been perfected by the technique of Soviet imperialism and colonialism, that it attacks most violently and bitterly the intellectuals and the culture in general, in spite of the theoretical claim that the cultural activities are only a reflection and consequence of the economic situation or the status of productivity. I repeat that it is only a seeming paradox, because in the Lenin-Stalinist Marxism every detail is weighed very thoroughly: Marxism has to

declare in theory that the whole culture is a matter of secondary importance in order to lead away the interest of the nations from the cultural activities, in order to break the ties of cultural cooperation among the members of the cultural and political community so that they would become an easier prey and victim of the imperialistic intentions of the Soviet dictators.

It is a well known fact that the highly cultivated (cultural) nations of Central and Eastern Europe—the nations between the great nations of Russia and Germany—are exposed after the inhuman and devastating 5 years of Nazi occupation to another 9 to 15 years of the most brutal and cruel oppression of their 1,000-year culture which gave so many noble products at all times to Europe and to mankind. Communism, by using a sheer physical force, forbids all kinds of free cultural expression in order to cram into this forcefully created vacuum its own cultural monstrosities. In Central Europe, the Communists burned the books of scientific nature and belles lettres; they plundered the public and private libraries; they stopped the cultural influx from the West; they destroyed the excellent literary and scientific publications, the societies and the museums; they corrupted the cultural upbringing of the children, youth and adults from the nursery schools up to the world-famous universities; they occupied and monopolized the theater, the film production, the broadcasting and television; they even transcribed and changed the whole history of these nations in such a way that they disrupted the centuries old hierarchy of national values and brought in to this once so promising cultural world only lies and chaos. We wish to mention as a little example that one single state-operated publishing house in Czechoslovakia (there is no private publishing enterprise in Czechoslovakia), Artia, published during the last 5 years about 5 million Communist books in different languages which were used to flood other countries with Communist propaganda. During the first 9 months of the year of 1955, Soviet Union imported in tiny Albania 100,000 books and countless numbers of newspapers and magazines.

The purpose of this Communist large-scale effort of the worst kind is not only the interruption of all cultural ties of the satellite nations with the West, but also destruction of their own national tradition. A nation without the roots can be easily subjugated by the Communist doctrine of the so-called historical materialism.

HOW DOES THE FREE WORLD REACT ON THIS CULTURAL OFFENSIVE OF THE SOVIETS?

The free world fights in many ways the political and economic advances of communism. The free world also does a great work on the human side of this problem by giving the possibilities of a new life to many refugees from these countries. But we have to state with regrets that nothing, or almost nothing, is being done in order to preserve the individual cultures of these countries. The Soviet offensive meets with an easy success, because there is no defense. Its rich arsenals as well as new sources had been destroyed by the barbarian Communists. And so the totalitarian occupation of these countries—first the Nazi occupation and now the Communist occupation—aimed primarily at the destruction of all the cultural treasures of the occupied nations in order to have free elbow room for its own activities and in order to be able to conquer the souls of the capitive peoples and to deepen the abyss between them and the West by the mass production of totalitarian culture. In the Communist-occupied countries the Muses are sadly silent. It is certain that many an invincible member of this Nation creates in secrecy, but his products are locked in the bottom of a drawer. They must not be known to the public, because the authors would be thrown in jail. On the other hand, there are many cultural workers from the occupied nations living in exile, and they may indeed enrich by their work in their own language the cultural riches of their own nations, but they are also forced to hide their writings in the bottom of the drawers, because these works cannot be published abroad. It is quite impossible for them to cultivate on a limited basis the free creative forces of their nations which should serve as a bridge between the rich, free past, and the promising creative activities in the future. And so it happens that these rich cultural sources rest unused to the loss of all.

This tragic interruption of the free cultural development of the satellite European nations, this complete interruption of the thousand-year western tradition in the countries situated between the Black Sea, the Adriatic Sea and the Baltic Sea, this interruption will be a shameful spot on the history of the Free World which is losing in this way not a small and unimportant element of its own strength.

It would be a great merit of the United States of it would grasp this problem in its full meaning and if it would help to save the desperate efforts of a considerable number of the Central and East European cultural workers now living in exile. It is rather obvious to me that this kind of help would bring the most beautiful harvest to America and at the same time it would win for the United States a deeper and more permanent gratitude than can be expected in the field of economic or political help. For in this field, that is, in the field of economics, the temporary products only are of concern, but in the field of culture the products are almost of eternal value. Only a tiny fragment of the economic or political subsidy would be needed to save the cultural life itself of these nations. After all, even many Americans derive benefits from the creations of these cultures. It would certainly be an outstanding merit of the young United States of America would render help to the old cultures of the occupied nations in these difficult times.

This proposal is not concerned with any kind of propaganda, not even in the best sense of the word. It does not follow any political goals, either, even if the realization of this proposal would be of highly political nature. The meaning of this proposal is as follows:

1. To make possible the publishing of belles lettres and of the scientific literature of numerous writers from behind the Iron Curtain living in exile, and to publish these writings in the mother tongue of individual nations. These authors, who had great possibilities to publish their works in their homelands, were deprived of this privilege by their anti-Communist demonstration. They have a certain possibility to publish in the language of the country where they live as exiles, but they have no opportunity to publish in their national language. Many people in the free world are able to read the literature in the languages of the satellite countries, and if no worthwhile literature will be published in exile, these people will turn to the books published behind the Iron Curtain, and it certainly would not serve the interest of the free world. After all, the books published in exile will get, sooner or later, legally or illegally, into the countries behind the Iron Curtain, where they are awaited with great anticipation, as we have learned in the most authoritative way.

2. There is also a need to publish belles lettres and scientific books smuggled out from the satellite countries by the authors—anonymously, of course—so that all valuable writings from these countries would not be doomed to decay in the drawers, but that they would become a new source of strength for a new and better thinking.

3. Another problem is the translating of the prominent books of the western literatures into the languages of the occupied nations, so that they would be ready when the cultural Iron Curtain will be torn down. These translations would be readily available for publishing in these countries in order to speed up the desirable cultural contact of these nations with the contemporary western civilization.

4. And it is also desirable that the prominent essays, scientific treatises and belles lettres of these countries were translated into the great western languages, so that the free world would get acquainted with the thinking and the desires of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain and thus to gain knowledge about them. As of now, this knowledge is rather limited in the West.

5. There is also a need for the publishing of the new literary and scientific publications in the national tongues of the exiles, and for the support of the existing publications. They have to struggle with financial and other problems, which cannot be overcome without the outside help that would enable them to compete in quality, print, and general appearance with the richly decorated Communist publications.

6. This kind of aid should not be limited only to the literary arts, but it should be analogously extended to the other branches of cultural activities such as music, painting, sculpture, architecture, film industry, theater, ballet, etc.

President Nasser's Resentment

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. ABRAHAM J. MULTER

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, April 9, 1957

Mr. MULTER. Mr. Speaker, I commend to the attention of our colleagues the following editorial which appeared in the New York Herald Tribune of April 1, 1957:

PRESIDENT NASSER'S RESENTMENT

President Nasser's point of view, as expressed to a group of American newspapermen in Cairo, is discouraging. This is not because of his negative position on current issues. That is well known. But his patent resentment at the United States, and the reasons he gives for it, offer very little hope of working out a reasonable modus vivendi in the Middle East.

The Egyptian leader harks back to the brusque withdrawal of proferred American aid to the Aswan Dam project—which is understandable. He also charges that the United States is now taking Israel's side without one word about the rights of the refugees. But he completely overlooks the fact that the United States did offer to help build the Aswan Dam and that there would now be no question about Israel's rights in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal if Israel, Great Britain, and France had not, under strong urging from Washington, pulled their troops out of Port Said and Sharm el Sheikh. In other words, President Nasser's question to the United States is (as the old joke has it): "What have you done for me lately?"

The United States has made errors in its dealings with Egypt. It has been dilatory when speed was called for (notably at the time of the Egyptian arms deal with the Communist bloc) and too hasty when suavity would have been in order—as in the Aswan Dam decision. But it has never been moti-



PER VLIEGTUIG
PAR AVION

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Ave
New York City
USA

Ern. Thill, Bruxelles, n° 237

STEN

Antwerpen Koningin Astridplaats en Middenstatie.
Anvers Place Reine Astrid et Gare Centrale.

My dear Ed,

Sincere greetings from Europe.

It brings me back many memories and makes me feel more homesick than ever. Cordially yours

Peter

Bunkl

Zenkl, Petr

March 21, 1957

Mr. Petr Zenkl
2651 16th St., NW
Washington 9, D. C.

Dear Mr. Zenkl:

I am afraid that I have reached the end of the road. Under date of March 18 I have a letter from the Ford Foundation saying they "have not been able to get anywhere" with the suggestions I made about your situation. This exhausts my ideas. Have you any notions about what might be done? I confess that I am deeply disappointed in this outcome, for I thought certainly there would be some affirmative response from some one of the many organizations I got in touch with.

Please tell me what if anything I can do now.

Best regards,

W. H. Ferry

cc: Edward R. Murrow

Zenkl

The following is from Dr. Zenkl

I must bother you once more. As you know, I was approached as to whether I were willing to appear on television in the program, THIS IS YOUR LIFE. I thanked them for this offer and I refused to do it as I was advised by you. Now I have some information from Mr. Papanek, former Czechoslovakian representative to the UN and the President of the American Fund for the Czech Refugees; and I got a letter from Mr. Ballaint, a good friend of Jan Masaryk. They informed me that the TV program was not meant for my personal benefit, but for the benefit of the Democratic Czech Exiles and I would be only a representative of the Czech Exiles and the show would end with an appeal: "Please help the Czech Exiles through the American Fund for Czech Refugees." The question I was asked was could you personally refuse a helping hand to the American Fund for Czech Refugees. I was informed that they are willing to do it with me but they are not willing to do it with somebody else. Here is my question: Could I refuse it now when it is not at all for my benefit, but for Exiled children and culture, etc I would like you to give me your advice on the matter. Could you write me a letter, or phone me.

In view of circumstances
should accept

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This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION

TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

1201

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter

NL = Night Letter

LT = International Letter Telegram

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

C124CC 8R DH NL

NEWYORK NY JUL 14 1956

REBECCA HOLDER SCRETARY TO MR MURROW

WUX CBS NYK (DELIVER)

YOUR TELEGRAM JUL 13 #35 TO DR PETER ZENKL 2651

15 ST NORTHWEST WASHINGTON DC IS UNDELIVERED NOW

REPORTED ADDRESSEE GONE TO NEW YORK.

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH CO
SERVICE BUREAU WORTH 27300

945P

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

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This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION

TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

1956 JUL 14 AM 8 28

1201

SYMBOLS

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NA005 DH= NEWYORK NY JUL 14=

REBECCA HOLDER SECRETARY TO MR MURROS=

NET WORKS OPERATIONS 21ST FLR = (DELR)=

YOUR TELEGRAM JUL 13 DR PETR ZENKL 2651 15TH STREET NORTH WASHINGTON DC IS UNDELIVERED UNKNOWN TRIED 2651 16 ST NORTHWEST NOT AT HOME=

WESTERN UNION SERVICE BUREAU=

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

JULY 13, 1956

DR. PETR ZENKL
2651 16 STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MR. MURROW SAYS DUE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES HE THINKS YOU SHOULD ACCEPT TO APPEAR ON THE TELEVISION PROGRAM.

REBECCA HOLDER
SECRETARY TO MR. MURROW

414-43

Zenkl

2651- 16th St. NW.
Washington, D.C.

Edward R. Murrow
C B S, New York

Dear Ed:

As I did not find you at your office last week I spoke with your secretary who called my attention to the fact that the galley proof of Brackett Lewis' manuscript has been mislaid. I am sending you another, therefore, and am including also the foreword written by Prof. James T. Shotwell introducing my work on Thomas G. Masaryk.

I am very grateful to you for complying with my request to write a preface and am looking forward to your MS.

Hoping to see you soon,

I am

Yours,

Peter

Peter Zenkl

Zenkl, Petr

MARCH 7, 1956

DR. PETR ZENKL
2651 16th STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

REGRET EXCEEDINGLY CANNOT MEET WITH YOU
ANY OF THE DAYS YOU WILL BE IN NEW YORK
DUE TO UPCOMING SEE IT NOW PROGRAM STOP
LET ME KNOW WHEN YOU'LL BE HERE AGAIN
AND PERHAPS WE CAN GET TOGETHER THEN.
BEST REGARDS.

ED MURROW

414-43

2651- 16th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
March 2, 1956

Dear Ed:

I beg you to read this letter when you can spare ten minutes of your precious time to think it over. I am writing today to you as a last resource as there is no one else to whom I could turn.

First of all, I am enclosing Brackett Lewis' booklet with your foreword which I treasure. If you think I should send the brochure to certain people, please give me their address.

As I see, my idea has not been received favorably in high places and yet I feel that it would be the best answer and counter-move to Moscow's economic assistance to Burma and similar moves if the United States were to propose to the international forum total or at least partial disarmament under international control on condition that a good part of the money saved be used in helping to build up the countries that choose the democratic order and are in need of assistance, and if the United States were to stress their willingness convincingly and clearly.

I see no other way but to launch a crusade for freedom and democracy, but not under wornout vague slogans. It would have to be stated specifically what the new anti-communist social order is to be like; what the basic living minimum and the working, economic, cultural conditions of the individual are to be, naturally without bloodshed, revolution, brutal force but by a revolution of the mind and heart. Such a clear declaration would resurrect the faith of millions of those already oppressed and also of those in danger. It would slow down Soviet consolidation, making the captive nations even less reliable than hitherto. Have you any idea, dear friend, to whom this idea could be presented for consideration?

I am enclosing the text of two of my recent speeches, should you have time to glance at them.

Now for my personal problem. In view of existing conditions it has become exceedingly difficult for me to accept the $400 monthly stipend. Despite all my efforts on all sides (Social Security, public education, municipal administration, selling insurance and encyclopedia Britannica, hotel administration) , it has been impossible for me to find a way of earning my livelihood. Are there any sources which you could suggest that would be acceptable from the human standpoint, for instance Dupont, Nelson Rockefeller etc? As you know, it is not easy for me to write these lines. I want to continue working for freedom and democracy for my people and others, but I can do so only if I am free in spirit and unbowed. Perhaps a way could be found so that the amount given me would be deductible from the donor's income tax.

can't see him

If I were not assigned a specific task for the monetary compensation by the donor, I would devote all my time, as hitherto, to fight communism in my lectures and writing, to work for democracy, and to give all the results of my labor to the donor for his use.

2 And lastly: I have an idea which you will find explained in the enclosure. While I realize that prayer is no fitting substitute for a return of freedom and human dignity, it would, nevertheless, give renewed hope and a feeling that the people are not alone and that, in itself, is something.

If you think well of the idea, the next move is to find someone to present and plead for the idea at the proper sources, and secondly, to present the idea to the various churches so that the campaign would not be limited to one faith, or to one language, or to one nation alone. It is not to be a prayer of the captive peoples alone, but of all peoples threatened with the loss of freedom.

If you think the idea has any merit, dear friend, would you, yourself, sponsor it? Please give it some thought.

I shall be in New York on March 12, 13, and 14 and would welcome the opportunity of seeing you. May I ask you to let me know by letter whether and when I could see you?

fu
Gratelly yours,

for your kindness and forbearance,

Peter

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Ave.
New York City

People behind the iron curtain picking up leaflets from balloons, passing them on, spreading information, or listening and repeating foreign broadcasts are subject to persecution. If copies or notes of the foreign broadcasts or balloon leaflets are discovered on their person or in their home, the victims are severely punished. They cannot approach other non-Communists, except for a few closest friends, to share their ideas and hopes. They cannot give even a hint by any visibl sign that they reject communism, that they are loyal to democracy and yearn for freedom. Thus they often feel cruelly isolated, forsaken, an forgotten.

There are moments in everyone's life when even the strong of heart need to be reassured tht they are not alone. They desperately need to know that there are millions feeling as they do, all around them, and that together with those in other lands there are hundreds of millions them, a tremendous family beyond all bounds. Although they cannot join outwardly in any open manifestation, like joining hands in a visible circle, they can, nevertheless, form an endless invisible chain.

A silent prayer could be the chain joining them all in spirit, giving them strength not only in words, but in the knowledge that millions of people in various lands and in various tongues, yes, even of various religions and races, are saying the same prayer.

Such a prayer could be put into words since all religions preach the same moral truth, freedom of man as against slavery, love of one's fellow man instead of hatred. For this reason it is quite possible to agree on the words of a prayer for those who believe in God, in human dignity, human rights, and freedom.

The prayer would then be made known to the whole world through all channels, by the churches, press, radio, leaflets etc. For a long time it would be repeated constantly until it entered the life stream of the countries concerned.

I realize that it would take time and careful study to choose the words for a prayer for all. It would then be translated into many foreign languages and would have to be clear, concise, very expressive, and very short (no longer than the Lord's Prayer or the prayer of St. Francis of Assissi). In order to be forceful it would have to be restricted to the main thought so that it could be memorized easily and its meaning clearly understood. It would have to be a prayer of universal appeal.

Our Father who art in heaven,
Hallowed be Thy name,
Thy kingdom come,
Thy will be done
On earth as it is in heaven
Give us this day our daily bread and
Forgive us our trespasses
As we forgive those who trespass against us
And lead us not into temptation,
But deliver us from evil
For Thine is the kingdom,
and the power and the glory forever. Amen.

Suggestion

Our Father, Hear us who seek you to give us strength in the great struggle of good against evil, of freedom against slavery. Comfort us and help us, your children, all, in many lands and speaking many tongues, who know not one another, but have one heart, one great desire to be free! Save our hearts and souls from slavery! Let us not weaken on our road to freedom! See, Oh Lord, our humiliation. We speak not aloud, yet you hear the voice of our conscience. Dry our tears, and lead us to freedom. Let good triumph over evil! [Our Father, hear the prayer of millions, all over the world!]

1)

A TWICE CRUCIFIED DEMOCRACY WARNS THE FREE WORLD

Address by Peter Zenkl to the American Legion

Washington, D.C., February 2, 1956

There is a country in Central Europe, twice crucified, my country. Once a democracy, enslaved Czechoslovakia now sounds a warning to the free world.

Czechoslovakia has a long record of struggle for human and national freedom. In 1918, after centuries of enslavement, Czechoslovakia at last became a free state again. While it was Thomas G. Masaryk, a great democrat, who led the Czechs and Slovaks to freedom ~~to become their first president,~~ it was your great President Woodrow Wilson who played a decisive role.

In the twenty years of her existence between the two world wars, Czechoslovakia was an island of peace and order, of social justice and Western democracy amidst European chaos. Today this Republic is a Soviet colony.

I speak today as one of the humble disciples and co-workers of Thomas Masaryk, who was not only a teacher but a living embodiment of democracy put to practice. What I have to say today is not from books but from experience for which I had to pay a heavy price. First of all, it was the Nazi occupation, six years of it, which I spent

as prisoner in Germany. No sooner had Hitler, a scourge as great as the Huns or Avars, made war on Europe, I was thrown into a concentration camp. The whole six years was a dreadful struggle for survival against two enemies, my Nazi jailers and my Communist co-prisoners. As the war was finally coming to an end and the victorious American army was advancing toward Buchenwald, the Nazi director decided it was necessary to squelch any possible revolt of the thousands of prisoners since it would have placed him and his men in a precarious vise between General Patton's liberating army and the rioting prisoners. He therefore ~~selected~~ singled out 46 prisoners for executio as a warning. I was one of them. I saved myself only by ammiracle. It is a horrible story about what went on the last six days and nights in the Nazi concentration camp.

Upon returning home after six years' imprisonment, I had another great struggle on my hands. The Communists, using the basest tricks, tried to outmaneuver me from the office of Lord Mayor of Prague and any vantage position I held and to block every effort of mine on behalf of my country, as I tried with all my might to thwart their plans to subjugate my country. The Communists resorted to a plot to remove me forcibly. Two other Cabinet ministers and I received packages with time-bombs. This plot was discovered in the nick of time. Finally, the Communists seized the government by force and I had to flee for my life. I managed to escape across the border with my wife and your country has given me asylum. Eight years of exile have already passed. Have you any idea how much longing and sadness there is for an exile?

Once again I am far removed from my people but I feel that as long as I live I must never leave the battlefield wherever freedom

a thousand years and that it is to Europe's advantage to re-establish it as a free state. Wilson has been criticized for helping our nation to be free and for breaking-up the Austro-Hungarian empire, which, in the eyes of many, was thought to be a political blunder. Why, may I ask? Because so called little Czechoslovakia alone could not stand up to Hitler or to Moscow? Tell me, would anyone else have resisted with better success? And had there been no Czechoslovakia, would not the West have sacrificed someone else to the insatiable totalitarian powers?

Czechoslovakia was crucified for the first time at Munich in 1938, at the altar of peace in Europe like a sacrificial lamb to Hitler, when he assured the world it was his last demand. Czechoslovakia's sacrifice was in vain, except that it gave the West one precious year for arming.

The second time Czechoslovakia was crucified was in February 1948 at a time when the West, including America, was at its lowest ebb in military power having disarmed and demobilized its soldiers, and when re-arming against the Communists had barely begun to take shape on paper. It was not until after Communist destruction of Czechoslovak democracy that the Marshall Plan for Europe was rushed through; that the Americans intervened in Greece; ~~the Communist crusade that Truman's doctrine~~ that attempts were made to create a European political community, an Atlantic defense pact known as NATO. The twice crucified Czechoslovakia Republic once again has served the free world. By their firm resistance the captured peoples, together with the other subjugated nations of Central Europe, have given the free world badly needed time in which to arm and line up its forces. It is often said

that the Russian drive westward to the Atlantic Ocean was stopped by the atomic bomb. While I do not wish to underestimate its importance in the slightest, I raise the question: Why didn't it prevent the Russians from communizing China? - and the Communists from attacking Korea? Why didn't it prevent the war in Indo-China? These events illustrate the point that the theory that American possession of the bomb has saved Western Europe is only partly true. One day future historians may discover in Bolshevik archives that Moscow nad needed time to undermine the resistance and to assimilate the brave nations of Central Europe before launching new adventures.

It is only natural for everyone to think his affairs are most important and it is difficult to foresee what political event of our times will be adjudged the decisive one. In my opinion, we cannot go wrong if we rate the ten years since World War II as the decade in which colonialism played the leading role; paradoxically, it is going in two diverse directions at the same time. On the one side, the free world is witnessing the last stage of old colonialism and the freeing of ~~xxxxxxx~~ even the retarded ~~xxxx~~ nations. In the past decade hundreds of millions on this side of the Iron Curtain have become independent and free, for instance India, Pakhistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, a number of Arab states, formerly mandates or colonies. But behind the Iron Curtain we see the exact opposite is taking place: once free and famous nations are being enslaved by Russia: Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Rumania, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Albania, China, North Korea, part of Indo-China, East Germany have become colonies in the worst sense. Do you see the two opposite trends? Do you see the colonialism that is taking over and where Do you not feel the tension created by the two trends, the two conflicting powers? On our side is freedom but also ~~diversification; on the other~~ dismemberment.

side, strong and concentrated strength; on our side is the decline of the great colonial powers, England and France; on the other, there is under way the greatest empire of all times.

This tragic tension is often known as the "cold war." I personally do not like to hear it called that because it seems to minimize and belittle the tremendous political problem. I do not like the name because one is apt to speak of reducing or stepping up the cold war, depending on whether Khrushchev smiles or not, or whether or not a few poor prisoners are sent home from Communist China. As a member of a nation that knows what communism means, I beseech you not to take this view, not tofall for carefully planted Soviet propaganda which knows when to smile or frown, when to pay indemnity for a shot-down American plane or when to shoot down another. The Soviets know only too well what is at stake in this world struggle betwen good and evil.

For the Czechoslovaks, the outcome of the second Geneva conference came as no surprise. Communists smile and promise only in vague terms and on general issues. They are capable of repeating endlessly and of promising disarmament until one mentions the word "control." They are willing to discuss lifting the Iron Curtain but what they have in mind is an open door to the West for their spies and a flow of strategic material from the West. Of course they are for a united Germany, Korea, Indo-China provided the Soviets can take over the whole country. It was clear to us from the beginning that the Communists can never permit free elections in East Germany for they would lose the elections. They know this to be true of anyelections in Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, beyond any doubt. To ask them to permit elections is to ask that they turn democrats. One might as well ask the elephant to fly and the hyena to live on candy.

And yet we must keep on asking for free elections. It is a mistake, however, to think that the Soviets will give up voluntarily anything they have seized by force. The Soviets were the ones to gain by the treaties of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam; they gained at Geneva too. It is possible to wrench the captives from them not by a world war - which obviously no one wants - but by a revolution, one that would take place in a number of captive nations. Such revolutions would not bring on a world war; in fact, they might prevent war by lessening the terrible tension between the two diametrically opposed forces that might otherwise eventually lead to a world conflict, despite the fact that no one wants war.

Soviet aggression has been arrested for a time in Europe but is pushing forward in Asia. World statesmen are now concerned with the problem how to stop further Soviet expansion. In my opinion - and I say this in all humility- it is a mistake to leave the European problems, that of liberating the European nations, somewhere in the rear. Why leave the decision always to the enemy where the next blow is to fall? Is not the fact that Soviet expansion has stopped in Europe an admission that the U.S.S.R. is not as strong there as in Asia? Is it not, therefore, the very moment the West ought to launch a European offensive?

I venture to say that without the highly devellped industries of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany the Soviets could never take on any new adventure in the conquest of Asia, either militarily as in Korea and Indo-China, or by means of so called economic assistance, such as they are planning now. I claim there is a direct tie-in between the enslavement of Czechoslovakia and the dying of American boys in Korea; between the destruction of human rights in the Soviet empire and so called economic assistance to Aisa. This is not idle

talk, for in Czechoslovakia alone there are 350,000 people in forced labor camps. The same is true of the other countries of Central Europe, while in the Soviet Union there are 10 million of these modern slaves. If you figure out, ~~with pencil in hand~~, how much cheaper is the work of a captive, as compared to that of a well-paid factory worker, per day and multiply it by 300 working days, and then by the number of millions of slaves, it becomes clear that the Soviet gesture of aid to India, Communist China, and even to Yugoslavia, and to all the Communist parties in the world costs Moscow practically nothing since it is paid by the sweat and blood of the prisoners of the labor camps. Do you not see that there is a direct connection between freedom and the present policy, between the liberation of captive European nations and American interests?

In a recent speech, Prime Minister Nehru, ~~whom one certainly cannot accuse of not being a neutral~~, ~~toward communism,~~ called communism a backward movement. Misled intellectuals, please take note! It does not seem to matter to some intellectuals that communism is cruel, inhuman, bloody, and totalitarian, so long as it is progressive, so they think. In what way is communism progressive? In that people no longer decide for themselves in free elections but are ruled instead by one dictator or a group of dictators? Communism, as we know, has ruined the farmers, the white-collared class, the so called bourgeoisie, and practically everybody else. Has it at least helped the factory workers? We have accurate reports from Czechoslovakia what this "help" means. I do not intend to compare wages in the United States with those in Communist countries. We have never been as rich as you. And you have not been engulfed by war twice within a lifetime. I merely intend to compare the life of the worker in so called capitalistic Czechoslovakia, which was never quite that - with his present life. The much advertised higher

wages in Czechoslovakka are merely on paper, because working hours are longer and prices are much higher. An ordinary pair of men's shoes costs 300 ~~400~~ crowns, that is 42 ~~$60~~. And how much does the worker earn? About 1,000 crowns a month; thus he has to work 10 ~~1~~ days for a pair of shoes, unless he is a better paid miner or falls under one of the categories receiving preferrential treatment. As we know, ~~under~~ Communist classless society has created new classes and ~~new~~ privileges ~~have been created~~. Accordingly, an American earning $350. a month would pay 100 ~~$130~~. for a pair of shoes or- since in the United States an average pair of shoes costs $12., the worker's corresponding wage would be 36 ~~$30~~. a month - I repeat- a month, not a week! Is that progress? Besides, working hours are longer than here and than they were formerly in democratic Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, one cannot choose his profession; it is treason to go out on strike. The labor unions no longer serve to protect the rights of workers but instead are used to drive them to work and to step up the norms. Is this progress?

And what progress is there in other fields? In literature and arts? Communists are not building any new dwellings for the workers, not even humble homes. And is it progress not to know what is going on outside the Iron Curtain? Not to be able to order foreign publications? To read only ~~the~~ local reprints of Moscow orders? Is it progress to stifle free scientific research and to dictate what one may think and believe, and nothing but that! ?

Why did we have wars and the American and French Revolutions, if this is progress?

It is said repeatedly that the world is made smaller by airplanes, radio, and atom bombs. If so, then the people in Czechoslovakia and the other captive nations are practically your neighbors. It is not enough to say on Sunday that something ought to be done for them. They are your

allies, not only your neighbors. Why have you fought two world wars if 12 million people, your neighbors, are permitted to languish in concentration camps? The very fact that these concentration camps exist is an indictment of all free people and a threat to them as well. The lesson of twice crucified Czechoslovakia should be a warning. Let no one think it can never happen here. That is what we thought! We too turned a deaf ear to the tens of thousands of Russian escapees after World War I. True, the Czechoslovak Republic gave them asylum, as you have given us. If we are to pay our debt to you, we can best do it by warning you, in your own interest, that one can no more afford to coexist peacefully with communism than to take a nap in a tiger's cage.

We are told on high authority that America will do nothing to sanction the enslavement of the satellites, for instance by signing a treaty with the Soviets, nothing that would give the seal of approval to the present sad status quo. While we are extremely grateful for these statements of assurance, we cannot help but be sad at some of the things going on, such as admitting the Soviet satellites to the United Nations. Far be it from me to criticize American policy, whether it was a profitable move or not! But I must say that the move has buried the hopes of many and created a feeling of frustration behind the Iron Curtain, a fact commented on enthusiastically by the Communist press.

To give another example: In the "smiling period" immediately after the first Geneva conference in July, some people chasing rainbows or sensations, quite influential people at that, wrote articles to the press throwing overboard the exiles from the captive countries and asking them either to return home or to become a part of their new environment. I protest strongly against this viewpoint. Any person returning from the free world behind the Iron Curtain means a Communist victory which Communist

propaganda is bound to utilize. Do you really want these individuals to return to captivity and to bring with them new technical knowledge and information?

As to the other viewpoint: Why should the exiles be assimilated? The United States has enough students, writers, journalists of its own. Is it not better that a nucleus of young exiles, inspired by the American idea of liberty and democracy, plan to return home when the right time comes? A trusted friend in Prague, Warsaw, or Budapest is far more valuable to America than one more hyphenated citizen. Obviously, when one hears repeatedly how necessary it is to coexist with communism, one is apt to become materialistic. It leads our young people ~~toxaccept~~x many of whom are worhty and well-qualified, to make a great effort to accept and to be accepted in the new surroundings. It is not always in America's own interest.

Let me point out one more warning, ~~the warning of a man from a country twice crucified~~. It is a great mistake to be always on the defensive. We too in Czechoslovakia were on the defensive when fighting the Communists from 1945 to 1948. We were always trying to prevent the Communists from doing one thing or another, from committing this or that crime. It need be said that we could hardly do otherwise as we were sorely weakened by the war whereas the Communists had greatly strengthened their positions, backed up fully by Moscow and its active representatives. But a defensive is totally inadequate.

An offensive is the answer. But how? Where? Certainly no one wants war, I least of all. I am very much afraid of war. An offensive, however, does not mean war; it may, in fact, prevent war. Let me give you an example what I mean. At the last General Assembly of the United Nations the agenda was fully taken up by moves aimed against the West. There were proposals on Cyprus, Morocco, Algeria, South Africa etc.

Not one charge was made against the Soviet Union and the captive nations! The entire program was devoted to a weak defense of the free world against Communist charges of Western colonialism and exploitation. The Soviet Union, not America, stands out at the United Nations as the standard-bearer for freedom. Two states of the free world left the General Assembly to protest against United Nations interference in their internal affairs, against a breach of the Charter. I ask: Why doesn't the free world at long last take up the problem of the European captive nations on this forum? Human rights, as formulated by the United Nations, are trampled there no less than in darkest Africa. The colonialism practiced behind the Iron Curtain is of the worst kind. Why not protest at the next Assembly of the United Nations that free trade unions have been abolished in Czechoslovakia; that there are slave labor camps in Russia; that there is religious persecution in Hungary, and last but not least, why not ask for free elections in Central Europe? There is no reason why France or South Africa or other free states should be the ones to leave the Assembly. It is high time the attack be directed against Communist Czechoslovakia, or Communist Poland. Why not? This will not bring on war. Quite the contrary. There will be war when and if the Moscow bosses decide they are the stronger. The West must do everything in its power so that the time never comes, so that Moscow never feels strong enough to start a war. In my opinion, an offesnive is a policy of peace.

Similarly, it is possible to start an offensive practically in every field, for instance in the cultural field. We know it is essential for communism to wipe out independent thinking, art, and culture. For this obvious reason, the Communists have built up an Iron Curtain cutting off the captive nations from the sources of free culture and from participating in it. Has the free world done enough to thwart this diabolical plan?

It has done practically nothing. Free Czechoslovak culture, to give but one example, is making a desperate effort, thanks to the personal sacrifices of a few individuals. Yet there are many refugees, writers, and artists, among the Czechoslovaks, Poles, Magyars etc. who could contribute toward free culture, if given financial aid to publish their works. Sooner or later, in one way or another, their books or ideas would penetrate the Iron Curtain. Unfortunately, there is a tendency in the Anglo-Saxom world to underestimate or overlook foreign culture, especially that of small nations. It is not wise because small nations are apt to look toward communism, which puts on a friendly front in order to subjugate them ideologically later on.

There are many other vulnerable spots, where communism could be assailed without war and at no great expense. But my time is up for tonight. Probably I have repeated much of what you already know. We all seem to be waiting for a magic wand to change the course of events for the better. In my own heart I am convinced there is such magic which could bring the desired change within one generation: It is faith in ourselves, in freedom, in the infinite possibilities given us. In this respect, we are often small-minded, for we are more amazed at the figures presented by the Bolsheviks, bragging about their results, than at the miracles to be seen around us in America. Sometimes we think it serious business when, in the free world, two politicians clash in an exchange of ideas, but think nothing of it when heads roll in the Soviet Union.

We need to have faith in ourselves as the best gauge between good and evil. We must return to the principles on which is founded the free world. America must export to the whole world not only automobiles and washmachines but also its democracy, its regard for the individual as an autonomous political unit. We must export the principles of the American Revo ution, which is far more modern than the Russian, though it ~~took~~

preceded the Bolshevik Revolution by almost one-and-one-half centuries. We must be dynamic not only in production and consumption of consumer goods, but in the force of our convictions, in our belief in the dignity of man, which is Christianity's gift to man, now trampled underfoot by the Communists. We must believe that the free world will triumph over communism - provided it will not let its weapons rust, but will hold high its faith in the ideals that ~~never grow old, for they~~ are ageless.

Zenkl

With best thoughts and regards
to my dear Ed

Peter

10/I. 56

PHONE COLUMBIA 55169

DR. PETR ZENKL

2651-16TH STREET N. W.
WASHINGTON 9, D. C.

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like to see Congress take some action on this and am wondering if anyone else shares my feelings. W.J.P.

Washington.

Letters to the Editor
Wash. Post.
Jan. 10, 56

Russian Colonialism

Edward Crankshaw in *The Washington Post and Times Herald* on Jan. 3, discussed the situation of Russian colonialism and proceeded to show that the USSR appears as a champion of anticolonialism despite the fact that its empire is composed of many colonial nations. He points out that the Soviets take the line: "Resist us and we shall annihilate you. Do exactly as we tell you . . . and we shall share with you everything we have."

This is basically correct, but there are several important points that need to be added. The Soviet empire includes not only the actual, formally incorporated colonies, but also the Baltic States that had well proven their ability to live independently and to govern themselves in the short time of their state independence, before they were recaptured by the Soviets.

Furthermore, the Soviet empire factually, if not formally, forcibly annexed still other nations through devious means during and right after World War II. It made colonies of them, too, depriving them of freedom, trampling their rights, outlawing the free elections promised them many times during the war.

It makes no difference that the Soviet Union pretends these colonies are free. For these captive nations there is only the rule of sharing, but not receiving, for the Soviet Union exploits them mercilessly. They give their life strength and natural resources, uranium for instance, for which Moscow gives absolutely nothing in return. On the contrary, it forces the nations to sell their products far below price (and to pretend to enjoy it) especially armament to the countries where the Soviets are plotting to stir up fresh conflicts and unrest.

Mr. Crankshaw goes on to say "nobody would deny that Russia has brought benefits to her colonies. The reward of total obedience is a gradual raising of the standard of living." While this may be true of the incorporated countries of the Soviet empire such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenia, Khirgizia, Georgia Azerbaidjia, Armenia, etc., it certainly does not hold true of the inhabitants of the Baltic States, and exactly the opposite is true of the captive peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, some of whom had had a high economic, cultural, and social level.

These nations had to be dragged down forcibly and mightily to reduce them to the Soviet level; it was even necessary to rend asunder their sound economic structure, flourishing Western culture, and progressive social structure, so that they would not stand out in the Soviet sphere for all to see and compare.

As a consequence, these nations are very dissatisfied and they will continue to be so even should their economic conditions improve considerably to their former level, or even should these finally be surpassed. The overwhelming majority of the peoples in the captive nations place no faith in the materialistic philosophy of communism. A state of slavery is no life at all for them. Bread alone does not suffice. They attach great importance to moral and cultural values, such as they possessed in the days of freedom.

Persecution and suffering have not reduced them to accept the idea that the real meaning of life is the size of the loaf of bread. Naturally, they do want a fair and bigger slice for their family, but not at the price of enslavement, loss of freedom and human rights. Having once experienced the responsibilities and fruits of freedom, they will continue to exert their strength, such as it is, using all available means at their command, so that they can return one day into the free world where they hope to work for higher standards, for freedom and the ideals to which they remain true. The one-thousand years of history of the Czech nation, to give but one example, gives clear proof that the Czechs will not sell short their freedom for material gains, much less for foreign gain.

Why then is there so much talk in the United Nations about colonialism any time there is the slightest isolated infringement on human rights, for instance of the African nations, when at the same time the most violent form of colonialism, as practiced by the Communists with machine-like regularity, is passed over in dead silence? In the one form of colonialism there are the conflicting interests of a not entirely free nation on the one hand, and those of capitalism on the other. In the case of Soviet colonialism, however, it is a death conflict of the once-free who had enjoyed full democratic order.

Nothing but Communist propaganda can thus misrepresent and deliberately confuse ideas. Why does the free world let the Communists get away with it? PETER ZENKL,

A Czechoslovak in Exile

Washington.

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Zenkl, Peter

2651 - 16th St. NW.
Washington, D.C.
December 7, 1955

Dear Miss Holder:

I am grateful to you for your understanding and help in the matter of Mr. Murrow's foreword which, as you know, I value very highly.

Thank you also for returning the material I had sent you some time ago. I thought it was mislaid by mistake and am glad to have it back.

With sincere wishes,

Peter Zenkl

Miss Rebecca Holder
Secretary to Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N.Y.

Lewis Broadus

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REFERENCE DEPARTMENT
AIR INFORMATION DIVISION

December 1, 1955

Mr. Edward R. Murrow,
485 Madison Avenue,
New York N.Y.

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Both Dr. Zenkl and I are overjoyed at the moving foreword you have sent for the little study of his life work. It is so sincere, so well expressed that we are happy to have waited for it.

Thank you for the thought and feeling you put on those two pages. You produced a work of art.

There is one small suggestion I wish to make if you permit. The word "undramatic" in the first line may discourage some readers, although I realize you wish to convey that the story is not overdramatized or exaggerated. Would you permit me to omit that one word and leave your description with the one adjective "unadorned" ? I had to strike several more dramatic scenes and passages out of the MS because Zenkl thought them too personal or laudatory. I realize that I have not done justice to his life-long struggle for principles, but would hate to start readers off with any feeling that the subject is undramatic.

If you do not reply by the time we have to start printing, may I take that as a signal that you consent to this slight correction ?

May I add the personal information that the above letterhead indicates a job where the twenty years I spent in Europe, my knowledge of Russian and Czech are being put to good use. The information we gather for the Government is often extremely interesting and might even turn out vital.

Thank you again.

Cordially yours,

Broadus Mitchell

3112 New Mexico Ave., N.W.
Washington 16 D.C.

Zenkl, Petr

November 30, 1955

Dear Dr. Zenkl:

Enclosed herewith is the material you requested be returned.

Sincerely yours,

Rebecca Holder
Secretary to Mr. Murrow

Dr. Petr Zenkl
2651 16 Street, N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

Peter Zenkl
2651-16th Street,N.W.
WAshington 9,D.C.
September 13,1955

Mr.Ed.R.Murrow
485 Madison
New York City.

Dear Ed:

I am enclosing three things,which could be of some interest to you:

1./The full text of my article ,,Keep Smiling but Be Vigilant,,

2./Only a part of it was published in Washington Sunday Star,September 11,under the title ,,Satellite Army Cut are Nit ti Be Trusted,,

3./A very important detail from Munich days which I have knewn well.But it w as not published until now/London, 31,1955 in Czech/.

And somebody dares to say that we didnt want to fight 1938!!

Cordially:

Peter

Peter Zenkl

NB.Because I don't have another copy, return me kindly this paper.Thanks! (*)

Zenkl, Peter

2651 - 16th St. NW.
Washington, D.C.
November 30, 1955

Dear, dear Friend:

I found your foreword upon my return from New York. I lack the words to express adequately my joy and gratitude to you for finding time in your overcrowded schedule to write an introduction to Brackett Lewis' brochure. And I must add that the manner of your writing far exceeds any expectations.

You are so very kind and lenient that it is almost embarrassing for it makes me feel undeserving of your extraordinary praise. Such fine words and colors are enough to stir human jealousies.

If I am given the peace of mind to write my autobiography I shall try to justify in some small measure your opinion of the man who - like millions of others - feels great respect for you and also sincere personal devotion.

Your recognition obligates me to work for the rest of my life to be deserving of your friendship and faith in me.

I hope to thank you in person soon.

Gratefully yours,

Peter

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
C B S
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N.Y.

Brackett Lewis has written an unadorned, undramatic account of the life of Petr Zenkl. A full account can come only from the pen, the mind and the memories of Dr. Zenkl himself.

It was no accident that nearly all competent Western observers who visited Czechoslovakia in the years between the wars labelled it a "model democracy". XXXX Czechoslovakia was at the same time an inspiration and a challenge to its neighbors. And one of the principal reasons that this was so was that small, smiling and vigilant statesman known as Petr Zenkl. He was three times Lord Mayor of Prague; was Minister of Social Welfare and Public Health under President Benes - leader of the largest anti-communist party in Czechoslovakia. He witnessed the saddest sight a patriot can behold - the death of his nation without battle, when Czechoslovakia was betrayed by her Western Allies.

Dr. Zenkl is a fighting man, with as much faith in free men's ability to govern themselves as any man I have ever known. He spent six years in Nazi concentration camps, was condemned to death, but managed to survive those last few indescribable days of horror at Buchenwald. When this reporter had the honor of finding him there, he was not a broken man; he had not even bent. His faith in his country, in democratic processes, in the dignity of the individual and his right to be free, were undiminished.

Czechoslovakian communists in Buchenwald, seeing me in the company of Zenkl, warned me against him. They said: "Beware of old Zenkl. He still believes in that oldfashioned nonsense, like Masaryk, Benes and Woodrow Wilson." They hated and feared him, because, fortified with an idea, he would not break. They promised to destroy him if he returned

to his native land. It never occurred to him to do anything else. He became deputy Prime Minister under Dr. Benes. And then, for the second time, saw his country go down under the flood of a foreign tyranny. Finally he managed to escape, and now resides in this country.

Petr Zenkl knows as much about fighting communism as any man I know. He spent much of his mature life doing exactly that. He is an inspiration for all men who seek freedom. The hatred of his fellow-countrymen in Buchenwald, the fact that the communists in Czechoslovakia still fear and malign him, are both tributes to the power of the man and of the idea he cherishes.

Technically,I presume Dr. Zenkl is now classified as a "refugee". But he will be at home wherever freedom flourishes and men are prepared to fight for it.

There are "refugees" who believe that they know precisely the pattern and form of the government and society which should and must replace the present tyranny when they return to their native land. It is not so with Zenkl. This is a decision he reserves for his fellow-countrymen when, in freedom, they may determine such matters for themselves. The years in prison and in exile have served to intensify and strengthen his intolerance of injustice. He knows that in a world where there is no security for little nations, there is no security for big ones. He is a quiet man, with a truly ferocious faith in freedom. And there will come a time when school children in his own country - and I hope in mine - will read the story of Petr Zenkl, his life and his works, and will draw from it the pride, inspiration and respect for human rights which is the diet on which individuals and nations must survive.

The statement prepared by Peter Zenkl
for the hearing on 16. February 1954.
(Internal Security Sub-Com.)

I affirm my willingness to testify before the Subcommittee on Internal Security. I am all the more willing as the hearing is on Communism for I have fought Communism practically all my adult life; ever since coming to this country almost six years ago, I have eagerly grasped at every opportunity, in lectures, articles etc. to warn America of the danger.

At first I was puzzled by today's summons. However in a Czech publication called "Mired" I discovered some of the problems that the Committee was interested in for it described at some length the "secret" hearings to be held, who would be called and what the future course of the hearings would be. The publication itself and those who speak for it do not concern me because they are insignificant, with no influence neither here or in Czechoslovakia. I am concerned, however, with the danger that they might imperil the fight for Czechoslovakia's liberation.

In view of what I have learned about the probable interest of the Committee in me and my work, I have prepared a statement to assist the Committee and myself, especially as I find it difficult to express myself clearly in English.

I first started to fight communism in 1921, when the Communist Party was first originated in Earlin, a suburb of Prague, of which I was Mayor. From the beginning of my political life throughout I have belonged to the National Spcialist Party (sometimes known as the Beneš Party) which was organised 56 years ago as a non-Marxist Party.

Years later, in the thirties, during the world depression, as Lord Mayor of Prague, I was engaged in a great battle with the Communists who were bent on upsetting all our relief measures for the unemployed. Thousands of leaflets were distributed in factories by the Communists denouncing me as Enemy No.1. I was often the target of violent communist attacks.

At the outbreak of World War II I was immediately imprisoned and spent almost six years in Nazi concentration camps. Even here, in the prison cells of Buchenwald, I carried on my struggle against the Communists who managed before the war was over to worm their way into positions of trust assigned them by the unsuspecting Nazis. In the past years I have repeatedly warned against Communist infiltration tactics.

In April 1945 I was freed by General Patton's Army not only from the Nazis who had earmarked me for extermination in the days of the siege of Buchenwald, but also from the Communists who intended to infiltrate the anti-Communist leaders whom they considered most dangerous to their plans. I was high on the

Communist list of enemies and have Edward R.Murrow to thank for saving my life.

For the rest of the world the European war had ended on May 7,1945 - but not for Czechoslovakia. Prague was not yet free - worse still - the rest of the country had been "liberated" by the Red Army from the East. It had been the great hope of our people that the Americans would liberate them - and had the American Army been able to push the last few miles to free Prague, Czechoslovakia today would be a free country. I happened to be in London just when the Prague Radio called desperately for help; I was also present when members of the Czechoslovak Government in exile made frantic appeals to Churchill. In vain we hoped and prayed. Czechoslovakia's fate was sealed. (See Churchill: Triumph and Tragedy). It was the Red Army which was in control practically of all Czechoslovakia. It was a tragedy over which we had nothing to say.

Czechoslovakia was completely in the Soviet " sphere of influence." Czech and Slovak anti-Communists realized that with the Red Army at their doorstep and with Communists in control of key posts and enjoying full support from Moscow, Czechoslovakia's only chance at existence as a state depended entirely on co-existence with the U.S.S.R. The Czechoslovaks were never permitted to forget this. At that time, the free war-weary world, too hoped that co-existence between the East and the West would be possible and that Czechoslovakia would serve as a bridge. Czechoslovakia's orientation economically, culturally and politically had always been toward the West and at no time did the non-Communists wish to break their ties with the west; on the contrary, despite their tragic experience at Munich, they tried their utmost to cling to their old ties with the west. In their foreign policy, they desperately stressed the need of West and East.

Please imagine yourself in the place of the Czechoslovak anti-Communists who wanted to prevent the Communists from taking over outright the entire country already in 1945. Remember please that we did not enjoy the liberties made possible to other countries by a liberating American Army. Remember, too, that the West was disarming quickly leaving us to our own devices. We had only two alternatives - one was to refuse to participate in a coalition government (the example of Poland). The other alternative was to take our responsibility in helping to fight within the government and to win back democracy step by step, in a dragged out battle. We were playing for time, hoping that the Soviet tide would recede and working toward a free election. We make no excuse for our choice. It was the only choice left to us and we stood our ground and fought to the last.

We started out against great odds. The Communists terrorized and persecuted, and we could not strike back. Communists made use of their power adroitly by offering jobs and security to their Party members. Former Nazi collaborators were safe from justice if they joined the Party, while innocent people, who refused to join, were unjustly persecuted by imprisonment, loss of jobs, etc. Farmers were not given seed and fertilizers, owners of business enterprises were denied supplies. Communists also used persuasion by promising land to the landless and greater rights to the workingmen in the unions.

It was most difficult to oppose such concentration of power in key positions.

For instance, the Ministry of Information was in the hands of a rabid Communist, Kopecký, who controlled the paper supply and the radio. While the Communists could flood the land with their propaganda we did not have the paper for printing a leaflet. We did not have automobiles and gasoline. Worse by far, the Police "Security organs" were in the hands of the Communists and hidden from view were the NKVD specialists.

To belong to an anti-Communist party took courage.... and yet we made headway. The people, despite the hardships suffered under Nazi plunder and persecution, despite severe privations of the first post-war winter, began to rally. It should be remembered to our credit that we prevented the Communists from taking over the whole country already in 1945. They also had to slow down their bolshevization program. We anti-Communists also prevented them from carrying out a series of measures such as the Millionaire tax. For instance, we succeeded in breaking up the Socialist Bloc no sooner had it been formed.

Events soon proved that we had chosen the right and only possible way to defeat the Communists. By 1947, many American observers, including the American Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, commented most favorably on Czechoslovakia's economic recovery and inner moral recuperation. Democracy as steadily rising, despite Communist terrorization and extreme advantages; resistance to Communists was growing steadily.

Much was expected of the 1948 elections. We hoped that they would be the turning point in our uphill struggle. However, when the Communists in their secretly held Gallup poll learned that their Party would be severely defeated in the forthcoming elections, they decided abruptly to resort to force. With the help of Moscow, under the personal assistance of Zorin and his henchmen, the Communists staged the Prague putsch.

Many competent observers including the American press have reported at length on the event; books have been written on the subject. To mention but a few:

Czechoslovakia in European History,	by S.Harrison Thomson Princeton University Press, 1953
What Happened to the Czechs	by Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart London 1953
The Anatomy of a Satellite	by Dana Adams Schmidt New York Times Correspondent

And of course there is the important House Document No. 154 of the 81st Congress, March 1948.

I should like to add a personal note: In the public demonstrations during the putsch, the Communist mob carried standards through the streets: "To save the Government - Throw Zenkl out!"

To a large degree, Czechoslovakia was the victim of her geographic location, the results of Munich, and lack of unity and purpose in the free world.

After the Communist putsch in February 1948, it became necessary for every prominent non-Communist to flee for his life. Some of us were fortunate in that we succeeded in escaping with the help of the underground and in some cases with outside foreign assistance. I had to wait six months for my chance. During this time I was guarded day and night in my apartment by the Communist Police, until finally my wife and I made out escape. Many others, my closest friends and members of my Party were not so fortunate: Dr.Milada Horáková died at the gallows, Dr.Prokop Drtina is in prison. My brother and my nephew, though not involved in my political life or my escape, were punished in my stead, both are serving long prison terms.

In exile, as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, I resumed my struggle against Communism and for the liberation of Czechoslovakia. I who spent almost six years in one of the worst Nazi concentration camps, know dictatotship and tyranny from bitter, painful experience and when I oppose Communism I oppose it not as a theoretician, but with all the passion one feels who has suffered under this brutal way of life.

Naturally, my colleagues and I are subjected to constant attacks by the Communist regime over the Prague Radio and in the Communist press. We are usually called "Stooges of Wall Street", "American Mercenaries", "Tools of Wall Street" etc. The Communists, feeling that the people's trust in us and our work for their liberation remains unshaken, recently stepped up an intense campaign of hatred against us (namely: Zenkl, Ripka, Lettrich,etc.)

At the same time we are under attack from another source - on American soil. Articles appearing in "Národ" a Czech newspaper published in Chicago (and in "Der Sudetendeutsche", published in Germany) have bluntly informed us that we are on trial before the Jenner Subcommittee on Internal Security. Some of our denouncers and their charges are therefore publicly known. As the accusers have, and always have been very hostile to our concept of a Masaryk Democracy, we feel that our life-work is threatened.

If it were true, the Communists would have good reason to rejoice because what they have been trying to do all these years would finally be achieved by someone else - the result would, however, be the same. Five years of our effort in exile in keeping up the morale of the captive people would have been dissipated. Worse, by far, psychological warfare carried on in the future behind the Iron Curtain would be totally defeated. For the people would have lost faith in the West. Words would become sterile - for words are believed only when spoken by those when the people have entrusted to carry on their fight as the people's defenders of the common cause.

Zenkl, Petr

November 25, 1955

Dear Dr. Zenkl:

Enclosed herewith is Mr. Murrow's foreword he has written to Mr. Lewis's appreciation. I have sent a copy of it to Mr. Lewis. Mr. Murrow asked me to tell you how sorry he is for being so late in sending this to you.

Sincerely yours,

Rebecca Holder
Secretary to Mr. Murrow

Dr. Petr Zenkl
2651 16 Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

November 25, 1955

Dear Mr. Lewis:

Enclosed herewith is the foreword Mr. Murrow has written to your appreciation of Dr. Zenkl. Mr. Murrow has asked me to tell you how sorry he is for being so late in sending this to you.

Sincerely yours,

Rebecca Holder
Secretary to Mr. Murrow

Mr. Brackett Lewis
1912 Hamlin Street, N.E.
Washington 18, D.C.

Brackett Lewis
1912 Hamlin Street N. E.
Washington 18, D. C.

June 26, 1955

Edward R. Murrow, Esq.
Columbia Broadcasting System,
450 Madison Ave.
New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

It is several years since I last asked you a favor, and the one I ask now is more for our mutual friend Dr. Petr Zenkl than for me.

Would you care to contribute a foreword to a brief appreciation I have written about him ? My only purpose is to acquaint more Americans with the struggle he led against communism through the past 35 years, with his sterling character and his eternal faith in human ffeedom.

Your contact with him just after Patton's Third Army liberated Buchenwald is mentioned about the middle of galley 8. I also enclose proof of a foreword which Prof. Shotwell wrote for Zenkl's study of T. G. Masaryk's ideas of Federation for Europe.

I trust this request does not come just when you are overburdened or about to leave for a vacation.

With warm personal regards,

Most sincerely yours,

Brackett Lewis

Brackett Lewis

take to Cract
Lost
send more
galleys

Brackett Lewis has written an unadorned, undramatic account of the life of Petr Zenkl. A full account can come only from the pen, the mind and the memories of Dr. Zenkl himself.

It was no accident that nearly all competent Western observers who visited Czechoslovakia in the years between the wars labelled it a "model democracy." Czechoslovakia was at the same time an inspiration and a challenge to its neighbors. And one of the principal reasons that this was so was that small, smiling and vigilant statesman known as Petr Zenkl. He was three times Lord Mayor of Prague; was Minister of Social Welfare and Public Health under President Benes -- leader of the largest anti-communist party in Czechoslovakia. He witnessed the saddest sight a patriot can behold -- the death of his nation without battle, when Czechoslovakia was betrayed by her Western Allies.

Dr. Zenkl is a fighting man, with as much faith in free man's ability to govern themselves as any man I have ever known. He spent six years in Nazi concentration camps, was condemned to death, but managed to survive those last few indescribably days of horror at Buchenwald. When this reporter had the honor of finding him there, he was not a broken man; he had not even bent. His faith in his country, in democratic processes, in the dignity of the individual and his right to be free, were undiminished.

Czechoslovakian communists in Buchenwald, seeing me in the company of Zenkl, warned me against him. They said: "Beware of old Zenkl. He still believes

in that old fashioned nonsense, like Masaryk, Benes, and Woodrow Wilson." They hated and feared him because, fortified with an idea, he would not break. They promised to destroy him if he returned to his native land. It never occurred to him to do anything else. He became deputy Prime Minister under Dr. Benes. And then, for the second time, saw his country go down under the flood of a foreign tyranny. Finally he managed to escape, and now resides in this country.

Petr Zenkl knows as much about fighting communism as any man I know. He spent much of his mature life doing exactly that. He is an inspiration for all men who seek freedom. The hatred of his fellow-countrymen in Buchenwald, the fact that the communists in Czechoslovakia still fear and malign him, are both tributes to the power of the man and of the idea he cherishes.

Technically, I presume Dr. Zenkl is now classified as a "refugee." But he will be at home wherever freedom flourishes and men are prepared to fight for it.

There are "refugees" who believe that they know precisely the pattern and form of the government and society which should and must replace the present tyranny when they return to their native land. It is not so with Zenkl. This is a decision he reserves for his fellow-countrymen when, in freedom, they may determine such matters for themselves. The years in prison and in exile have served to intensify and strengthen his intolerance of injustice. He knows that in a world where there is no security for little nations, there is no security for big ones. He is a quiet man, with a truly ferocious faith

in freedom. And there will come a time when school children in his own country -- and I hope in mine -- will read the story of Petr Zenkl, his life and his works, and will draw from it the pride, inspiration and respect for human rights which is the diet on which individuals and nations must survive.

Edward R. Murrow

Zenkel. Zenkel, Dr Peter

1) All European Captive Nations were deprived of their freedom in their entity – not only partialy.

2) All European Captive Nations have been held in the slavery longer than Eastern Germany.

3) All E.C.N. were enslaved first by Germany.

4) All in Middle and Eastern Europe have suffered, without being guilty, for the cruelities of Germans.

6) There are 100 million peoples in the European Captive Nations, but only 17 million in the Eastern Germany.

Did Germany win W.W. II.?

The greater pressure concerning Germany will be shown by the West the stronger will be Soviet reaction. If the European Captive nations were liberated, automatically the Eastern Europe would be liberated too.

Certainly it would be necessary to pay an adequate price for the freedom.

gresu, v němž poukázal na to, že ve stále se zmenšujícím světě vzrůstá neustále hospodářská závislost jedněch na druhých. Hospodářská prosperita jednoho státu závisí často na hospodářské prosperitě druhého. Poselství presidenta Eisenhowera ukázalo, že hospodářství Spojených Států vzkvétalo poslední tři léta, a že to bylo právě v době, kdy rostl obchodní obrat zemí svobodného světa, a kdy také jiné státy měly příznivou hospodářskou situaci. President poznamenal, že americké dovozy byly důležitým činitelem v tomto vývoji, neboť Spojené Státy se staly největším importérem světa, předhonily v posledních letech Velkou Britanii. President Eisenhower dále připomněl, že americká pomoc, ať již ve formě soukromých investic nebo státních půjček či darů, anebo ve formě technické či jiné výchovy, hrály velkou roli v pokroku hospodářsky nově se rozvíjejících zemí.

Amerika tuto pomoc poskytuje velmi ráda, prohlásil president ve svém rozpočtovém poselství, neboť účelem politiky Spojených Států je povzbuzovat a posilovat tužby lidu rozvíjejících se zemí po zvýšení životní míry. Americká pomoc je jednak přímá, jednak nepřímá. Přímou pomoc nazývá americký rozpočet programem vzájemné bezpečnosti, a ta je pro fiskální rok 1959, který začíná prvním červencem

Zenkl, Petr

June 14, 1955

Dear Petr:

Many thanks for sending me your ideas concerning the problem of the captive countries in view of the forthcoming Big Four Meeting.

I find the material most interesting and am happy to have it on hand.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Petr Zenkl
2651-16th Street, N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

fc

Petr Zenkl
2651-16th Street,N.W.
Washington 9,D.C.
May 29th,1955

Mr.Edward R.Murrow
CBS
485 Madison Avenue
New York.

Dear Ed,

Allow me to send you a number of my ideas concerning the problem of the captive countries in view of the forthcoming Big Four meeting.

I realize that you are tremendously pressed for time but hope that you will kindly spare the time to read it through.

I enclose also a copy of a short article concerning T.G.Masaryk's Memory Today.

Yours very truly

Petr.

Zenkl, Petr

Let us Fight for a Better, Free United World of Tomorrow .

One of the basic characteristics of Communism is its totalitarianism and its constant urge to pursue imperialistic goals. All its efforts are directed towards the conquering of one country after another. The Communists prefer to do it as much as possible by means of a cold war which is the bloodless method. / We cannot very well speak about a bloodless method, for very often a cold war envolves more suffering and sacrifice than the hot war./

Communism conquers one country after another by infiltration, by the misuse of confidence, national fronts, sudden seizure of power etc. There is not one country where Communism would have achieved power through free elections and democratic procedure. On the contrary, it was the suppression of such free ways and means which helped the "Party" to power.

Wherever Communism has gained power, all possible means were employed to destroy every human right. We cannot expect therefore, that the democratic ways of life could be revived through their own effort and bring about improvement. Communists know very well that any revival of civic rights would mean the fall of their power. They will no allow any such improvement.

The Communists keep telling us that they admit the existence of other political parties and that they are ready to cooperate with them. This is only another of their misleading maneuvres. The parties they refer to are not free, non-communist political parties, but some kind of Quisling organizations intended to deceive the trusting world. They are fully under the command of the Communist party and its secretariat.

Any co-existence of another political party by the side of the Communist is a myth. Different political parties existing next to each other and cooperating with each other would have to share at least some of their basic principles. How could they exist next to a Communist party which does not understand cooperation, but insists under all circumstances on ruling over the others? The same is true about the co-existence of different states and regimes. The Communists will admit them only to conquer them and replace them later by communism. Their constant, never changing plan for an imperialist conquest of the world must be carried out at any price. This is the center of their thinking. Their methods are infiltration and zig-zagging, both adjusted repeatedly to time and environment and used with success in countries selected for conquest. Communist agents in many forms are being introduced into those countries and the fifth columnists there are given great support. There is no doubt about the fact that the Communists have their fingers in many strikes the political aims of which can not always be recognized at first sight. Infiltration ensures

the least risk and helps to keep hot war at a distance. The Communists do not want hot war. They are badly prepared and cannot depend on their organized forces.

In the meantime the Communists keep deceiving the world by their false peace operations and continue conquering new countries or their parts by means of a cold war. They destroy all potential enemies and oponents in countries already conquered. They integrate the populations, industries and agriculture extensively and ruthlessly into their own economy. Such countries are being converted into Communist arsenals and military warehouses in preparations for all eventualities. This way the Communists build up their military and police forces, their war production and the war reserves for their homeland. Other interests of the people must remain in the background. At the same time the develish Communist propaganda of lies and hatred tries to stimulate resentment against democratic nations and to strengthen the domain of Communist ideology.

Should the free world believe the misleading tactics and intriques of the Communists, it would mean a disaster. We must remember that the real aim of Communism was clearly outlined in the works of Marx. Lenin and Stalin, that they will not and cannot give up any part of it unless they would want to commit suicide. Everything else they offer as their program is a smoke screen, deceiving, conceiling. They may very well advocate the co-existence and cooperation and use it as a transition stage during which to prepare more adequately and faster for the consumption of another victim.

While the Communists advance towards their goal by all means and forces - in order not to be cought unprepared - the free world must keep pace with them. Since the Communists increase their productive power, their reserves and their armed forces, the free world has to do the same. They should not be allowed to add another advantage to the one they already enjoy in their ruthless exploitation of manpower.

The free world will have to organize its military forces as soon as possible not only to prevent further aggression but to be able to resist such aggression wheresoever it may strike next.

Should the free world limit itself only to prevention of aggression and violence, its efforts would remain insufficient and further losses of free countries could not be avoided. We have to consider the utmost impossible idea of co-existence of Communist and non-Communist regimes. The free world program will have to include also the restitution of freedom in countried deprived of it by the Communists. As long as freedom loving nations will be kept under forceful domination, the liberty of other countries still free will be in danger. In order to achieve full freedom it is necessary to plan the frustration of systematic violence and communisation

of conquered countries - in other words - to maintain the old democratic anti-Communist traditions alive. Thus the spirit of resistence and the opposition against Communist rage will be strengthened and stimulated. It is further necessary to encourage the peoples of conquered countries in their sabotage against Communist activities and to nourish in them their desire for freedom and victory over the Communist tyrants. This too will help to provoke action at the earliest opportunity. We cannot say whether such opportunity will come from the outside or whether it will generate inside the country. Preparations for both cases are the same as far as the people are concerned.

People in the free countries know very well what a precious possession their freedom is and that it has to be defended. But even here the values of life and rights have to be stressed. The people have to visualize them as compared with the Communist reality. Leaders of free countries will have to prove by acts of wisdom and statesmanship their good will to bring about the highest possible degree of improvement represented by the welfare of all classes, without discord, revolution or bloodshed. It will mean in the first place improving the conditions of the underprivileged, those who are most vulnerable. Above all the aged, the unemployed, those who need good housing at a reasonable price and good medical care. The most advanced improvements in these fields of human welfare would demonstrate the farthest reaching results. The citizens of free countries should have the steadily rising standard of living before their eyes. Under such conditions all Communist promises would sound like empty words and remain without an echo.

However, to operate only with actual reforms in the free countries is not sufficient. It is not effective enough to talk to the people in Communist dominated countries only about the return of freedom and human rights. We cannot promis only the return to some past after the liberation from Communism. Slogans are not enough. Our words have to be based on concrete facts. We know that the return to any given date in the past history is impossible. We have to admit that in many places the pre-Communist conditions were so bad that the people would not wish them to return. On the contrary, some of the Communist introduced reforms meant improvements which the people would regret to lose. It would therefore be much sounder to proclaim that the free world in its effort to help the enslaved nations - does not want to impose on them after their liberation some new regime or simply help them reinstall their own old regime. It should be clearly said that the newly gained freedom would enable the nations to introduce regimes to their own liking. The new regimes should not only ensure human dignity and civic rights for the people. They should create conditions for the return of human understanding and respect and should eliminate hatred and envy. These conditions should be definitely defined and clearly understood. Among the basic principles of

this plan should be mentioned the relations of man to man and man to religion. They should contain statements about labor conditions and the insurance of citizens against all risks of life - working hours, living wage, social protection of all kinds, family welfare, education, medical care, care for old age etc., etc. A charter of well insured minimum human rights should be contructed firmly in order to form a basis for peaceful international life. The program should indicate clearly what its aims are - the reactivation of human and international solidarity, the elimination of poverty, starvation, unemployment, illiteracy, the unification of the world in its interdependency similar to that of a family. This should be done without violence and bloodshed, without destruction and murder, through spontaneous voluntary efforts. Against a Communist world unified by force and violence, against an enslaved world we have to create a world unified by human understanding and the acceptance of differences - real freedom, a world of free people. It is up to us to develop endless effort and lead crusades in our struggle for a better united world of tomorrow. If we wish to advocate and realize such program and make it successful, we have to outline it in concrete, understandable terms. Otherwise it would remain an empty slogan. We have to point out the values that are being destroyed by the present rearmament, the economic advantages of limiting or discontinuing the rearmament. We should illustrate by figures what the needs of people are to-day, what shortages are most (beeing) felt and how much of this could be bought with the money saved on armament. Plain figures must speak - how many housing units, schools, hospitals, roads etc., could be built with that money.

The free nations should issue a proclamation stating that their savings would not be used only for improvements in their own countries. They should say that a part of those savings /e.g. 50%/ be used in underdeveloped countries for at least a period of 10 years. This would prove the fastest way to help these countries to develop and become capable to face world competition.

The planning for a realistically conceived program - if publicized behind the Iron Curtain or in countries threatened by Communism, would have far reaching consequences. People would not only realize what they have been and still are being deprived of by the Communist aggressor, but their desire for the realization of such plan would grow. The enslaved nations would become increasingly conscious of their deprivations and their resistance would become stronger. Their potential power to participate on the construction of a new world would grow as well, together with their desire to see it all realized. More willingness and more success would accompany acts of sabotage. The increasing inner tension in Communist dominated countries would become more meaningful. The consciousness of mental ties with the free world would become

livelier and livelier in the minds of people. A concrete plan would supply many subjects for conversation in the fields, factories etc. The Communists would not be able to talk such plans away with slogans and clichés. They would have to offer more definite concepts, for the people would keep comparing existing conditions with the suggested plans.

If nations were thus prepared, the free world could face Moscow with a suggestion to realize the plan in a peaceful manner without bloodshed. If the ideas of this plan would already have been planted in the minds and hearts of the enslaved nations, the Communist situation and their counter propaganda would become much more difficult. The effects of Communist propaganda in countries designated for domination would also be weakened. Communist forces would not be able to consolidate and grow. They would suffer inner decomposure. Finally the Communists would be compelled to really enter negotiations in order to ease up inner tension or they would have to disclose their own plans and engage in an open counter-action weakened by the low morale of their own forces.

PETR ZENKL
2651 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON 9, D. C.
TELEPHONE: CO 5-5169

June 12, 1955.

My dear Ed:

I am enclosing my article which was just published.

Needing your advise and help I shall try to come to see you for a few moments June 15 or 16, when I am in New York.

Cordially yours
Peter.

Refugee Leader Urges Reds To Free Satellite Nations

By PETER ZENKL

When the Big Four chiefs of state meet "at the summit" in Geneva this summer, there undoubtedly will be substantial pressure for some positive Soviet sign that Russia's East European satellites have reasonable hope for eventual freedom.

There is no way of telling before the event what form such pressure will take. But one technique immediately suggests itself. That is the old stratagem of making one's opponent eat his words.

And words aplenty there have been from the Kremlin in past years. All these words have been directed to making the world believe that Soviet Russia wants peace and freedom for all. Perhaps the Communist leaders at Geneva might be persuaded to prove at last that they mean what they have been saying.

Soviet Pronouncements

Here is a catalogue—by no means complete—of remarks made or subscribed to by Soviet leaders on the subject of peace and independence:

● Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov in 1945 signed the United Nations Charter, which says in its preamble that "the peoples of the United Nations are determined to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." The Charter itself adds that the U. N.'s organization "is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members."

● Josef Stalin, on November 6, 1941, spoke directly to the point in a revolution anniversary proclamation: "We have not and cannot have such war aims as the imposition of our regime on the Slavs and other enslaved peoples of Europe who are awaiting our aid. Our aim consists in assisting these peoples in their struggle for liberation from Hitler's tyranny and then setting them free to rule in their own lands as they desire.

"In all countries liberated from Fascist tyranny the Red Army, in accordance with the statements of the Soviet government, is setting an example of respect for the honor and dignity of liberated peoples, for their state system, culture, national traditions, and the great monuments of their past. The Red Army in no case prevents the liberated peoples from living their lives on their lands as they see fit."

[This statement, of course, was made at a time when the Red Army, far from "liberating" any one anywhere, was on the run before the advancing Nazi armies inside Russia itself.]

● Stalin again, a year later, said in a speech "On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union": "The program of action of the Anglo-Soviet-American coalition is abolition of racial exclusiveness, equality of nations and integrity of their territories, liberation of enslaved nations and restoration of their sovereign rights, the right of every nation to arrange its affairs as it wishes."

● Also from Stalin, in November, 1943, came these words: "Together with our allies we shall have to—

"(1) Liberate the peoples of Europe from the Fascist invaders and help them reconstitute their national states. . . . The peoples of France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Greece and other states which are under the German yoke must again become free and independent;

"(2) Give the liberated peoples of Europe the full right and freedom to decide for themselves the question of their form of government."

● Another high-flown declaration to which Russia was a party was the Yalta conference's declaration on liberated Europe. Along with the other great powers, the Soviet Union pledged itself "to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people."

● By February, 1948, when Izvestia printed an article entitled, "On Guard for World Peace," most people were beginning to wonder. The article said: "The Soviet Army stretched out a brotherly, helping hand to the peoples of Europe languishing in Fascist slavery. The European peoples have to thank the Soviet Army for their liberation."

● Even seven years ago when the foregoing article appeared, that tune was an old one. In 1939, at the Fifth Supreme Soviet session, Molotov defended Russia's aims in the Baltic. "The special character of these mutual assistance pacts in no way implies any interference . . . in the affairs of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania. . . . On the contrary, all these pacts . . . strictly stipulate the inviolability of the sovereignty of signatory states and the principle of noninterference in each other's affairs. . . .We declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization of the Baltic countries is only to the interest of our common enemies. . . ."

[Today the Soviets do not even observe the satellite fiction in the case of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These are now officially part of the Soviet Union.]

Record Is Clear

Such is the contents of the catalogue. The record of Russia is clear —16 years or more of preaching freedom and self-determination, 16 years or more of practicing slavery and external domination. The words of Stalin and Molotov stand in sorry contrast to Russia's deeds in the great arc that stretches from the Baltic states through Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Albania and Bulgaria all the way to the frontiers of Greece.

Last week, Secretary of State Dulles said, "Russia will be asked at the coming meeting . . . to live up to the Yalta, Potsdam and Moscow agreements pledging democratic freedoms for those nations which are now Moscow's European satellite nations."

It will be difficult, on the basis of Russia's record, for the Soviet leaders to convince anyone of good intentions by mouthing the same old, tired platitudes. As President Eisenhower said to the American Society of Newspaper Editors more than two years ago, deeds, not words, will be necessary. One obvious deed tending to prove Russia's good intentions would be the long-overdue liberation of her satellites. Such action would indicate to millions in East Europe and elsewhere that perhaps, after all—as Stalin said in an order of the day on May 1, 1942—"the Soviet Union's aim is clear and noble."

Dr. Zenkl is a former Mayor of Prague and was Deputy Premier of Czechoslovakia at the time of the Communist coup.

Canadians Oppose Plan

Zenkl, Petr
May 29, 1955

The unexpected Soviet turnabout in the case of Austria is fresh proof how extremely important it is to them to bluff the world by simulating a desire for peace. One does not have to prove that their conception of "peace" is quite different from the meaning of the word in the civilized Western world. In the same way the Communists misuse the words "democracy," "liberty," "non-interference," "a friendly neighbor" etc.

The main purpose of the Soviet move in the case of Austria is to sway the citizens of West Germany to demand the unification of their country and the neutralization of all of Germany. This would throw the blame on the West, should it ignore the German clamor, for having prevented the unification of Germany and the consolidation of peace in Europe.

Obviously, a unified but unarmed and neutralized Germany, withdrawn from Nato, would be powerless, subjected to direct Soviet influence from the countries along her border; it is easy to see she would inevitably be victimized. No Soviet guarantee or agreement could save Germany in the long run just as no treaty or grand assurances could save unhappy Czechoslovakia in 1948. It is no secret what would be her fate. The only thing one does not know is what road the Soviets would finally decide on, what subterfuge they would concoct, and what timing would seem most opportune to them.

Naturally, no Soviet soldiers would be stationed either publicly or officially on German soil; the army would be shifted a bit to the east there to wait and make ready for Moscow's thoroughly prepared plan.

Should the Soviets succeed in manoevering West Germany out of Nato and in unifying her, they would first try to win her over by promising to settle her frontiers to her advantage, namely the German- Polish line.

It would be possible, however, to make it much harder for the Soviet Union to line up Germany by neutralizing not only a unified Germany but also other countries behind the Iron Curtain, in particular Czechoslovakia and Poland. That these countries are loyal friends and allies to the West need not be stressed.

Should the Soviets come up at the contemplated Four Power meeting with a proposal to unify Germany and to hold free elections, why not answer with a proposal that free elections- as we understand them in the West and under careful international guarantees- be held not only in East Germany but also in other countries behind the Iron Curtain and that these countries too

be neutralized! This would be a fair equalization, but not what the Soviets have in mind. The Soviets by releasing East Germans lose 19 million people to the 50 million West Germans the West stands to lose.

If the Soviets are truly interested in peace, non-interference and in carrying out the Yalta agreement, this is an excellent opportunity for them to prove it. If they accept (contrary to expectations) it will be welcomed enthusiastically by all participants.

Should the Soviets turn down the offer, however, the bitterness over their refusal in the countries behind the Iron Curtain would be focused on them. Their rejection would prove to the captive nations and to the world that the Soviets are not for peace and the easing of international tension, but that they are looking for the best way how to pry open the door to further territorial conquests and how to gain control of West Germany.

The effect of the Allied proposal to hold free elections on the people behind the Iron Curtain would certainly be very important especially at this time in view of the existing dissatisfaction, anti-Soviet tensions, and unmistakable Soviet difficulties.

Peter Zenkl

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H. EVERETT CLEMENTS.
Rochester, N. Y.

11 miles an hour.

Those who may be injured by such disregard of well-posted speed limit signs are victims of lawlessness whether the offender be a Senator, a hot-rod enthusiast, or a maniac.

HENRY T. MONCURE.
Alexandria.

Masaryk's Memory Today

Today in Chicago Americans of Czechoslovak descent are dedicating a monument to Thomas G. Masaryk.

In Czechoslovakia, in the two decades between the two World Wars, a grateful nation had erected several monuments made of stone and metal to honor their President liberator, while millions enshrined him in their hearts.

Thomas G. Masaryk was their teacher, guardian, and first President who for 17 years guided the democratic, independent Czechoslovak state in the postwar years. The people knew that it was in no small measure through his tireless efforts that a free Czechoslovakia had come into being at the close of war under the sponsorship of Woodrow Wilson.

When in 1948 the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia, they aimed to exploit the love and respect the people bore Masaryk. But the people were quick to see that Masaryk had worked all his life against the very things communism stands for. That is why the Communist ruse misfired completely.

The Communists struck back with a campaign of lies: It was not Masaryk with the help of the West, particularly of the United States, who founded the republic, they told the people; you owe your independence to Red Russia's October Revolution. And stealthily, usually at night, they removed Masaryk's monuments.

Finally, they gave the people instead a monstrosity—a gigantic figure of Stalin, the tyrant. The recently unveiled statue commands a view of the former seat of Czech kings which was also the residence of the Presidents of the once free republic. Could anything be more cynical, more insulting to the freedom-loving Czechs?

How different are the ways of a dictatorship and that of a democracy!

In Moscow, the dictators ordered their stooges and servants in Prague to erect "with proper elation" a monstrous monument to Stalin out of the state funds extracted from the exploited people. In America, citizens of Czechoslovak descent collected a fund of love, penny by penny, to erect a monument to Masaryk.

Stalin's statue in Czechoslovakia serves to show the world that Czechoslovakia has ceased to exist, for the time being, as a free state, that it is a province of the Soviet Union, the empire built on class hatred and the exploitation of the common man and the small nations.

The monument to Masaryk, the apostle of love and social justice, is in America to show the world that America is leading the world in his struggle for democracy, for equality of people and nations, that America is the hope of the vilified and the oppressed.

There is not the slightest question where Masaryk would stand were he alive today. It is Czechoslovakia's great tragedy that it took Munich to awaken the world to the danger, and that 10 years later Czechoslovakia had to be overcome once more, this time by the Communists, before the West aligned its strength.

In no other country do the Communists have as tough a job as in Czechoslovakia. Nowhere are they as insecure.

The Czechoslovak people firmly believe that they will soon have a monument to Masaryk in Prague. For the present, the monument is here, in the United States. But this, too, is in the old tradition for it was in America, in 1918, that the independence of Czechoslovakia was declared, before it could take place in Prague. Besides, Masaryk was in America while the battle was still raging, and came home until after the war, as the victor. Today, too, the battle is on, but Masaryk, through his learning and ideas, shall return home once again as the victor.

PETER ZENKL.
Washington.

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Washington Post, 29.V.55

Dear Edi, Zinnel

October 28, is the Czecho-
slovak National Holiday.-
Didn't you forget me?
With all my heart yours,
Peter.

28.X.56.

PHONE: COLUMBIA 5169

Dr. Petr Zenkl

2651-16TH STREET N.W.
WASHINGTON 9, D.C.

28. X. — the Czechosl. Independ. Day.

WHEN COMES CZECHOSLOVAKIA?

A Prague Revolt Seen As Slow but Strong

By PETER ZENKL

The rapid rhythm of events in Poland and Hungary has already clarified the real portent of the tempest blowing over Eastern Europ. In Poland Wladyslaw Gomulka, the anti-Stalinist and anti-Moscovite; in Hungary, Imre Nagy, the Titoist, came to power only a short while after leaving jail.

In the two countries the population gave them at the outset

The author, Peter Zenkl, now a resident of Washington, is a former deputy premier of Czechoslovakia, former Lord-Mayor of Prague and member of the Assembly of Captive European Nations, General Committee.

PETER ZENKL
Writes on Czech Outlook

a cordial welcome, leaving little doubt, however, as to what brought them to their side. It was Gomulka's fiery statement of independence from Moscow and Nagy's Titoist record.

Yet what the Poles and Hungarians expect is more than independence from the Soviets. It becomes evident that what they really hope for is freedom from communism as such. When they claim freedom of press and elections, they claim political freedom incompatible with communism; when they shout for the release of still imprisoned cardinals and clergy, they want freedom of religion incompatible with active atheism; when they claim improvement of wages and working conditions, they want in fact freedom of employment, equitable wages, effective trade unions, and all these are incompatible with the omnipotence of the one and exclusive employer, the Communist state.

Enthusiasm Lacking

In Warsaw the crowd listening to Gomulka manifested by absence of cheering and applauding its doubts about the leader who, for reasons of his own, found it necessary to implore the people to restrain themselves in their manifestations of enthusiasm for big changes. The crowd suspected they were too big for Mr. Gomulka.

In Hungary, there seemed to be a quick realization that Imre Nagy is not the man to bring what the people are waiting for. On a slight provocation from the police, the population turned against the government and is confronted with a horryfying sight of the Titoist and "patriotic" Imre Nagy calling in the Russian troops to subdue his own people, and we see what very few people expected to see—a Titoist held in power by Soviet troops. Within days the picture has changed. After having arisen Moscow, Mr. Gomulka justifies the presence of Soviet troops in Poland and Mr. Nagy uses them.

The situation in Central and

meetings and a great many suffered for their courage. The Czech writers assailed openly the hypocrisy of the Communist rule. I have no doubt that broader masses of Czechs and Slovaks will manifest their sentiment at the appropriate moment. One thing, however, has to be remembered: Both in Poland and Hungary, things started moving under the impulses given by Communist leaders. In this respect the situation in Czechoslovakia is less favorable since the Czechoslovak Communists have been less inclined to flirt with Titoism. The reason for that is their awareness that the nation hates the Communist regime at least as heartily as the dependence on the Russians which, one has to admit, is less visible there than in other countries. In other words, a change in Czechoslovakia may be more difficult to start, but once it is begun, it will go a long way.

Singapore Riot Deaths Total 14

SINGAPORE, Oct. 27 (AP).—The death toll in the Singapore riots rose to 14 today, and police reinforcements from Johore and Malaya were rushed to this British island colony to stamp out the disorders, now in their third day.

More than 150 persons injured in the fighting were in hospitals. Rioting in scattered parts of the city continued all day, but not on a large scale.

Police fired volleys to break up several minor charges by rioters, including one attempt to raid a police station. Nearly 600 persons, including 159 Chinese secret society members, had been rounded up by nightfall. It was on similar secret society mem-

22 Scientists Stress Danger Of Bomb Tests

WORCESTER, Mass., Oct. 27 (AP).—Twenty-two Worcester and Shrewsbury scientists, including 18 at the world-famous Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology at Shrewsbury, today declared the possible danger in hydrogen bomb tests is "a real problem which must be faced and should be discussed openly."

In a joint statement, the researchers said the H-bomb test hazard "is not just a campaign issue."

Also among the signers were two Clark University professors and two researchers at the Worcester State Hospital.

Recount Perils

The statement made the following points:

"1. Explosions of atom and hydrogen bombs produce ionizing radiation which, in the form of fall-out, is distributed throughout the world.

"2. The amount of atmospheric radioactivity released by any single explosion is negligible, the distribution is uneven and small, but measureable increases have already been noted in many parts of the globe, including the United States.

"3. The effects of radiation are cumulative.

"4. The fall-out, including strontium-90, one of the deadliest isotopes which can cause cancer and blood disorders, is washed out of the atmosphere by rain and incorporated into grass and vegetables.

"5. There exist in nature mechanisms which concentrate the harmful radioactivity. For example, cattle grazing over a large area may concentrate radioisotopes spread thinly over the pasture and transmit them in milk or meat. In fact, traces of strontium-90 have been found in milk supplies thousands of miles away from H-bomb explosions.

Hint Danger Ahead

"Recent studies have shown that while there is no immediate threat from this source, there are indications that there may be danger ahead if there were any substantial increase in the contamination of the atmosphere

"6. According to Sir John Cockcroft, director of the Atomic Energy Establishment at Harwell, England, the most important source of contamination is the H-bomb, since it produces from 100 to 1,000 times more radioactive materials than the atomic bomb."

String Quartet to Play At Teachers' Assembly

Polish Catholics Demand Primate's Return to Duty

WARSAW, Oct. 27 (AP).—Leading Polish Catholics today demanded in print for the first time the return to duty of Poland's Roman Catholic primate Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski.

A letter splashed over the front page of Warsaw's Catholic newspaper Slowo Powszechne said "In all conscience we appeal to the government to sort out differences between the church and the state.

"In accordance with the views of all Catholics, we request the return of Cardinal Wyszynski to his duties as primate of Poland as quickly as possible.

"We appeal to the government to accept the church's jurisdiction over church affairs. We demand that the government help settle the problem of spreading Catholic ideas, especially the problem of teaching religion in the schools."

First Published Request

It was the first published request for the primate's release. It was signed by a score of prominent Polish priests and laymen. It included a promise of support for the political and economic policies of Wladyslaw Gomulka.

Cardinal Wyszynski was removed from his duties in 1953 and confined to a monastery.

The military newspaper Soldier of Liberty carried the routine army order of the day which for the first time was signed by the newly-appointed Deputy Defense Minister Gen. Marian Spychalski.

It pointed up his new importance.

Normally, such orders are signed by Defense Minister Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, Polish-born Soviet marshal.

Marshal Rokossovsky's future has been a matter of constant speculation here since his removal from the Polish politburo during the upheavals which restored Mr. Gomulka to supreme power.

Transfer to Moscow Seen

Some Polish observers believe Marshal Rokossovsky soon will be transferred back to Moscow as commander of the Warsaw pact military alliance.

Any outright dismissal was considered unlikely.

Prime Minister Josef Cyrankiewicz, speaking in Parliament, denied rumors of Marshal Rokossovsky's influence over the Polish army and said he accepted Polish government orders during the last Polish-Soviet crisis over the last week end.

Radio Warsaw said Gen. Spychalski presided over a political conference of Polish army and political leaders, attended by Mr. Gomulka. Details of the discussion were not given. Marshal Rokossovsky's name was not mentioned.

German Army Bars Unity, Russia Says

MOSCOW, Oct. 27 (AP).—The Soviet government, in new notes sent to the United States, Britain and France, has charged that West Germany is building the largest standing army in Europe.

It said this blocked German unification.

The notes, made public tonight, accused the Western Powers of one-sided action in permitting German rearming and said it violated "most of the important agreements relating to German unification."

France Grants Saar Control to West Germany

LUXEMBOURG, Oct. 27 (AP).—France and West Germany signed a treaty here today restoring the rich Saar Valley to German control.

The signers were Foreign Ministers Christian Pineau of France and Heinrich von Brentano of West Germany. They also indorsed a score of related agreements and said "the last problems standing between the two countries" now had been settled.

Under the treaty, which must be ratified by the parliaments of both nations, the Saarland will revert to German political control next January 1 and will come completely under German sovereignty, as West Germany's 10th state, on December 31, 1959.

In the intervening three years of transition, France will keep certain financial and economic rights in the territory. It has had the Saar since 1945.

The region covers only 991 square miles, about half the size of Long Island, but it is one of Europe's most thickly populated and highly industrialized localities, crowded between Germany, Luxembourg and France.

Under its rolling hills are 10 billion tons of coal—enough to keep its miners busy for more than 500 years. Saar mines produce more than 17 million tons of coal and Saar mills 3 million tons of crude steel yearly. Manufactures include steam engines, pumps, transport equipment, machine tools and mining and farm machinery.

In a joint declaration, Mr. Pineau and Mr. Von Brentano said the agreements they had signed were the result of a long and difficult negotiations and of important concessions from both sides. They said these sacrifices "open a new phase toward a better future."

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

OPEN EVENINGS in Silver Spring & Arlington Monday thru Friday

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The situation in Central and Eastern Europe is still grim and we cannot but bow to the heroic men of Hungary who rose against the formidable monopoly of physical power wielded government. For some time one of the main goals of the Soviets has been to win over the neutral world, especially the young nations of Asia and Africa. Riding on the sentiment of anti-colonialism Russia has been doing its utmost to make herself into a liberator of the enslaved.

A few Asian statesmen have warned the continent that Russia is in fact the biggest existing colonial power in both Asia and Europe. But few seem to listen to these warnings and we have been startled by statements of prominent men from these areas which seemed to show that the Russian propaganda was taking root. We still remember a great Asian saying that Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary were free nations. The bluff has been called for everybody with eyes to see although it may take some time for the truth to sink in.

Red Promises Recalled

In the light of these events, the Soviet promises of helping people along to freedom become entertaining reading.

Izvestia: In all countries liberated from Fascist tyranny the Red Army in accordance with the statements of the Soviet Government is setting an example of respect for the honor and dignity of liberated peoples, for their state system—. The Red Army in no case prevents the liberated peoples from living their lives on their lands as they see fit . . . July 11, 1945.

Pravda: We stand for the scrupulous and punctilious observance of the facts on the basis of complete reciprocity and we declare that all the nonsensical talk about the Sovietization . . . is only to the interest of our common enemies and of all anti-Soviet provocateurs . . . November , 1939.

Bolshevik: The Soviet Union is fighting to have the United Nations as effective as possible . . . No. 22 of November 1946.

Not Quiet in Czechoslovakia

This is the time to invite the Soviets to follow the recipes!

Many people ask me why Czechoslovakia keeps quiet. The answer is very simple: Things are far from being quiet and in fact they have not been quiet since 1953. In that year a few Czechoslovak cities revolted against the regime—the first workers' rebellion in satellite Europe. Last spring, students of Prague and other university cities manifest stormily their condemnation of the regime in open

on similar secret society members that British authorities blamed rioting in Hong Kong recently which claimed 43 lives.

Camalier to Speak

Former District Commissioner Renah F. Camalier will address the Sertoma Club of Washington at their regular weekly meeting at 12:15 p.m. Tuesday at the Hamilton Hotel.

The National Symphony String Quartet will perform at a general assembly at District Teachers College at 10 a.m. Wednesday.

Last year, the college sponsored the National Symphony's woodwind quintet and later this year will hear the percussion quartet. Players discuss their instruments and the music before playing.

Monday thru Friday
Hours—12:30 to 9 p.m.
Saturdays—9:15 to 6

A good selection of spinets, consoles, grands and uprights are being offered at large savings! Included are some new instruments, a number of rental returns, floor samples and a few trade-ins. Every one is a fine make instrument and carries our full guarantee. At the prices we're asking these pianos will go quickly, so come in tomorrow while the selection is complete.



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Strad-O-Glosilk. A blend of imported long-staple cotton and silk. Lustrous cross-weave texture in bronze, dark green, blue, grey. **$10**

Strad-O-Classic. Washable imported cotton and rayon blend with a nubby slub finish that looks like silk. Light blue, white, beige, grey. **8.95**

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CHEVY CHASE, MD.: **Wisconsin near Western Avenue**

Petr Zenkl
2651- 16th St. NW.
Washington, D.C.
May 4, 1955

7

Dear Friend:

Listening to your Tuesday program (which is a must to me), I thought that you might be interested in a Communist propaganda trick on the theme Lidice and an interesting incident which took place in London recently.

On the Lidice anniversary, June 19th, the Prague regime is preparing a great demonstration "for peace and against German rearmament." Symbolic is to be "the Rose Garden of Peace" planted in Lidice. In London the "Lidice Shall Live Committee" has been organized and rose bushes have already been sent from Britain. The first public meeting of the Committee was held in London on April 21st. It was presided by Barnett Stross, Member of Parliament, and ended as a fiasco for the Communist guests from Czechoslovakia (including Professor Hromadka) and their London friends.

The Czechoslovak anti-Communist colony in London, about 300 strong, greeted the guests with placards: Free Elections in Czechoslovakia- Free Archbishop Beran- End to Slavery etc. and practically took over the meeting. The Prague guests did not appear on the stage and Stross asked the non-Communists to remove the placards and to clear the hall, otherwise the meeting could not begin.

Thereupon a young girl, holding 5 red roses in her hand, came up to the Chairman and asked if she could present them to the Czechoslovak delegation. Stross, presuming she was on his side, invited her to the mike whereupon she said clearly and in full possession of the seene:

> "I ask that you give place the first rose on the grave of the Lidice martyrs; the second rose on the grave of President Masaryk and his son Jan; the third on the grave of the martyr Milada Horáková; the fourth give to the Archbishop Beran in prison; the fifth is for all the suffering people of Czechoslovakia."

Stross was too stunned to stop her. Someone gave the signal to the audience which started to sing the Czechoslovak hymn and God Save the King. The meeting was quickly adjourned.

And that's the "Story of the London Roses." Perhaps you may find a place or the mood for it sometime.

Always yours,
Peter.

1) The girl's name is Hana Sirotková.

2) * Former Member of the Parlament, who spent years in Nazi Prison and was hanged by Communists in Prague.

Zenkl, Petr

LAW OFFICES

ADLAI E. STEVENSON
W. WILLARD WIRTZ
WILLIAM Mc C. BLAIR, JR.
NEWTON N. MINOW

231 SOUTH LA SALLE STREET
CHICAGO 4, ILLINOIS

FINANCIAL 6-5180

March 25, 1955

Dear Ed:

Governor Stevenson is working at his home in Libertyville this week and for that reason has asked me to acknowledge your letter of December 24, which was just forwarded to him by Dr. Petr Zenkl, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia.

I am enclosing a copy of the letter the Governor has written to Dr. Zenkl, telling him that he will be glad to see him some time in the near future.

Your programs get better and better!

Sincerely,

Bill

William McC. Blair, Jr.

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Enclosure

LAW OFFICES

ADLAI E. STEVENSON
W. WILLARD WIRTZ
WILLIAM Mc G. BLAIR, JR.
NEWTON N. MINOW

231 SOUTH LA SALLE STREET
CHICAGO 4, ILLINOIS

FINANCIAL 6-5180

March 25, 1955

COPY

Dear Dr. Zenkl:

I am grateful indeed for your very thoughtful and gracious letter and look forward to seeing you some time in the near future.

I shall be in Washington for only a few hours on April 16 and, unhappily, my schedule is already hopelessly crowded. However, I shall make every effort to see you either in Washington or in New York on my next trip East. I have some speaking commitments which will keep me in the East between May 21 and June 8, so am afraid that I shall miss you when you are in Chicago, but I am sure that we can get together before then.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Adlai E. Stevenson

Dr. Petr Zenkl
2651-16th Street, N. W.
Washington 9, D. C.

cc: Edward R. Murrow

Zenkl

March 8, 1955

Dear Petr:

Many thanks for your note of January 17th and for sending me a copy of Half Century of Struggle Against Marxism which I read with great interest.

I hope we shall be able to meet again soon.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

Dr. Petr Zenkl
2651 Sixteenth Street, N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

fc

Petr Zenkl
2651-16th Street,N.W.
Washington 9,D.C.
January 25,1955.

Miss Rebecca Holder
Secretary to Mr.Murrow
CBS
New York City.

Dear Miss Holder:

Thank you for your letterof January 20 and for sending me the CBS broadcast of January 2nd and for obtaining for me the book CRISIS.

The book,I know,would be coveted by many,but for me it has special value.I am grateful to you for getting it for me.

I appreciate your information about where the records ,,I Can Hear It Now,, are to be had.I passed on the information to all interested parties.

When I come to New York I shall bring you a small token of my appreciation a lapel emblem pin /the Czech lion/which was the symbol of our struggle for a free Czechoslovakia during World War II.

With best wishes to my dear E.R.M.,

I am,

Sincerely yours,

Zenkl

Peter Zenkl.

PETR ZENKL
2631 SIXTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON 9, D. C.

January 24,1955.

Mr.Ed.R.Murrow
CBS
New York City.

My Dear Ed:

,,Half Century of Struggle Against Marxism,,is offered as a contribution to our common struggle against Communism.

As Chairman of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party I am sending you a copy of this publication,hoping that it may be of some interest to you.

I would like to inform you,that I am no ore the Chairman of the Executive Committe of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia.

With all my heart

Petr.

Half Century of Struggle Against Marxism

Who are the Czechoslovak National Socialists?

Half Century of Struggle Against Marxism

WHO ARE THE CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL SOCIALISTS?

Published by the Executive Committee
of the
Czechoslovak National Socialist Party

NEITHER MARXIST NOR NAZI.

Czechoslovak National Socialists have nothing in common with either Nazism or Marxism. The party was founded in 1897 under the name of the National Labor Party. In 1898 the name was changed to the National Social Party and again in 1920 to the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party.

It was Hitler who used the same name and abused it. The Czechoslovak National Socialists always fought Hitler.

Nor have they anything in common with those who, under the name of the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, are collaborating with the Communists in Czechoslovakia at the present time.

True adherents of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party are steadfast in their underground struggle against the Communists and their stooges, and have already made great sacrifices in property, liberty, and life in the cause of democracy.

Those Czechoslovak National Socialists who managed to escape from captive Czechoslovakia can and do fight freely and openly for the resurrection of freedom and democracy in Czechoslovakia.

Ceaseless attacks on the representatives of these Czechoslovak National Socialists in exile by the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia best serve to prove that this fight is effective.

WHO ARE
THE CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL SOCIALISTS?

When an American asks a Czechoslovak political exile to explain the program of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, the exile can give several realistic illustrations.

He can tell, for instance, how Hitler cried to the world in 1938 "Entweder Herr Beneš oder Ich" (Either Beneš or I). Eduard Beneš, then President of Czechoslovakia, had been Vice-President of the Czechoslovak National Socialists until 1936, and was co-author of the party program. When Hitler occupied Czechoslovakia in 1938, previous membership in the "Beneš-Partei" was sufficient reason for arrest by the Gestapo. In fact, the Nazis found the National Socialist program obnoxious enough to execute 2,400 party members and to place 10,000 others in concentration camps.

Or the exile can relate how the Communists seized the office and printing shops of the Czechoslovak National Socialists three days before the February 1948 putsch. All along the Communists had tried to weaken the party's influence by depriving thousands of National Socialists of their jobs and offices. Loyalty to the party program has cost many members their lives. Even before the death of Jan Masaryk, the miner Herod, a National Socialist, fell or was pushed from a window of the Ostrava police station and was killed. Another National Socialist, a member of the Cabinet, Minister of Justice Prokop Drtina, was seriously injured by a fall from his window in an attempt to commit suicide.

On the list of National Socialist heroes belong the names of Milada Horáková, a national martyr, who was

executed by the Communists; Member of Parliament Jaroš and trainman Zajíček. Nor is possible to forget the martyrdom of František Loubal and that of many others now in Communist uranium mines, concentration camps and prisons.

The National Socialist Party continues to be a nuisance and threat to all Czech and Slovak fascists, to these "pathological dregs," as President Masaryk so aptly called them in 1927—a threat, too, to the various separatists and to the Nazis among the transferred Germans. Because the party is a source of threat to these people, Peter Zenkl, Chairman of the Party, Hubert Ripka, former member of the Government, and other National Socialists are continually denounced before the American authorities. This goes on in spite of the fact that, ever since 1945, Zenkl is considered enemy No. 1 by the Communists who attack him and his party ceaselessly in the Czechoslovak press and radio.

This brochure is addressed to those interested in the history of the party and in the National Socialist program.

FOR A CZECH STATE AGAINST MARXISM

The National Socialist Party was founded in 1897 by Czech workingmen, who stated in the very first sentence of their program: "We want to live in freedom both as members of the working class and as a nation." Another sentence was directed against the national and political oppression of the Hapsburg monarchy: "We want the Czech nation to live as an independent and equal member among the European nations, not as a downtrodden nation languishing in bondage."

The party was founded in opposition to the Marxist policy of the Czech Social Democrats, who were dependent, ideologically and politically, on the German Social Democrats of Austria. The Czechs living in Austria-Hungary could never forget that they had once had an in-

dependent state. Since the nineteenth century they had struggled, first against Hapsburg centralism and then against Austro-Hungarian dualism, to assert their state rights. The Czech Social Democratic Party, until 1897 the sole representative of the Czech working class, was ruled by the Viennese Central Committee of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party. It fell under the influence of the Austro-German party members and gave up the program for state rights. The National Socialist Party was founded in protest to this situation. The National Socialist workingmen even then realized that the Hapsburg monarchy, and Austria-Hungary as well, had forsaken the cause for which they had come into being and that the Czech nation must look to safeguarding its existence outside the confines of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

The first program of the Czechoslovak National Socialists of 1898 was an expression of certain aims rather than of a dogma. It showed the feeling and ideas of the Czech workingmen in that it was clearly anti-Marxist and national. It has remained so to this day. It is absurd if the reactionary and especially the fascist groups, in an attempt to hide a pro-Nazi past behind a false and chauvinistic front, point out the "socialist" character of the National Socialist Party. The genuine patriotism of the National Socialists has always stood in the way of these groups. Even more paradoxical are certain Social Demcrats who, taking advantage of uninformed Americans, pose as mild social reformers and proclaim that the National Socialists are radically opposed to private ownership.

THE IDEALS OF THE FRENCH AND AMERICAN REVOLUTION AGAINST FEUDALISM

Ever since its new form in 1902, the National Socialist program has stood clearly for national self-determination. The National Socialists were proud and grateful to the United States of America when at the close of World War I, largely due to President Woodrow Wilson, self- deter-

mination of nations became the spiritual heritage of civilized man.

The National Socialist program had as its aim the resurrection of the Czech State with full legislative powers. As early as 1905, Františka Zeminová, Vice-Chairman of the Party, spoke publicly of an independent Czechoslovak Republic. (Later, in the days of the Republic, she was elected to Parliament as a National Socialist; recently she has been condemned to prison by the Communists).

Prior to World War I, the antimilitarism of the National Socialist Party weakened considerably the war machine of the Hapsburg monarchy and consequently the Prussian military potential. In this way it contributed to the victory of the Western democracies; moreover, thousands of party members fought in the foreign legions, alongside the Allies, in France, Italy and Siberia.

As mentioned earlier, opposition to the Marxist theory of inevitable class warfare has always been the main tenet of the National Socialist Party since its beginnings in 1897. In its early life, the party checked the disruptive anti-national and anti-humanitarian tendencies of Marxism in the Czech working class by establishing, in 1903, its own trade union headquarters — the Czechoslovak Workingmen's Trade Union—whose basic principles were very similar to the corresponding American. The National Socialist Union headquarters was suppressed by Hitler in 1939. After the war, the Communists with the left-wing of the Social Democrats prevented the re-establishment of this trade union.

The Czech National Socialists have worked for over fifty years in organizing and educating the citizens of Czechoslovakia, especially the working class. It is no exaggeration to say that this party is in large part responsible for the failure of Nazism in Czechoslovakia, and likewise for the failure of Communism to this day. Moreover, Communism can never take permanent possession of Czechoslovakia. The National Socialists have kept alive in the hearts of the common people the tradi-

tion of humanitarian democracy and the ideals of the French and American revolutions.

FOR CONSTRUCTIVE WORK AGAINST RADICALISM

In reviewing the work and achievements of the National Socialist Party in the years 1918 to 1938, it can be seen that the party, formerly a radical opposition party, committed itself wholly to the constructive state policies of Presidents T. G. Masaryk and Eduard Beneš. In the interest of peace in Europe and that of cooperation within the League of Nations, it never permitted itself to be provoked by other parties to national radicalism.

Until the coming of Hitler, the Czechoslovak Republic had no serious conflict with the Weimar Republic of Germany. The National Socialist Party was responsible in no small measure for a policy of peace. It supported President Masaryk when, in view of national, chiefly German minorities, he wisely recommended that the Czech and Slovak language be considered the official, but not the state language.

It was the chairman of the formerly anti-militaristic National Socialist Party who, nevertheless, became the Republic's first Minister of National Defense; the army organized by him, together with the Sokol volunteers, drove back Béla Kun's Communist invasion of Slovakia and thereby checked the expansion of postwar communism in Central Europe. This formerly radical party willingly served T. G. Masaryk's humanitarian ideals and worked toward religious tolerance. With the support of this political party Eduard Beneš, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, negotiated in 1928 a modus vivendi with the Vatican, despite the fact that only a few years earlier "Away from Rome" had been the party's revolutionary motto expressing the program of the first Czechoslovak Government viz., to separate the church from the state.

The party rejected radical nationalism and likewise refused to follow the social radicalism spread by the Com-

munists. When the Communist Party was established in 1920 following the split in the Social Democratic Party, the National Socialists might have profited from this split. They directed their efforts, however, toward consolidating the disorganized Social Democratic Party. As a consequence, they suffered a loss in the elections. For the National Socialists, the welfare of the state, not party aggrandizement, was the prime consideration, and in support of its ideals the party sacrificed its own interests to stem the growth of the Communist Party.

FOR FREEDOM AGAINST HITLER

During the occupation the Czechoslovak National Socialists were foremost in the struggle against the Nazis. The present chairman of the party, Peter Zenkl, was one of the first to be arrested; like thousands of other members of his party, he was held prisoner for six years in Nazi concentration camps, until liberated by the American Army. Abroad, in the London Government in exile and in the State Council, members of the party played an important part; Hubert Ripka directed the entire propaganda and participated in every diplomatic negotiation of importance. Thousands of rank and file members voluntarily joined the Czechoslovak Foreign Army and the Allied Armies to fight in the Middle East and in France. At home, the National Socialists were strongly represented in the non-Communist underground, in which Vladimír Krajina played an important part. For instance, their regular secret information service, transmitted by radio, was given full recognition by Winston Churchill and Lord Vansittart for its importance to the Allied Supreme Command.

The toll of Czechoslovak National Socialists in the struggle against Nazism was heavy. More than 10,000 party members were held prisoner in Nazi prisons and concentration camps; 2,400 members were executed, among them Member of Parliament Františka Plamínko-

vá, one of the co-founders of the International Council of Women. Of the twelve members of the Board of Directors only three survived, two of whom had spent the entire war in concentration camp. Of the ten women members of party headquarters, four were executed. When the Prague uprising took place in 1945, Otakar Machotka, a National Socialist, was the Vice-President of the National Council of the Revolution leading the uprising.

The Communists made it practically impossible after 1945 to evaluate the part played by non-Communists in the national struggle against Nazism. It is clear, nevertheless, that the Czechoslovak National Socialists have always stood in the front ranks in the liberation of their country. Proof of this is the fact that as soon as they were free of the Nazi oppressor, they took on the struggle for the preservation of democracy against Communist dictatorship. This explains why there are more National Socialists among the political exiles than members of any other party and why the National Socialists at home are subjected to a most cruel Communist persecution.

FOR DEMOCRACY AGAINST STALIN

The roots of Czechoslovak postwar difficulties go back to the period of Munich in 1938, to Teheran in 1943, and to Yalta in 1945. Another factor was that Prague had been "liberated" by the Red Army, with the American forces standing nearby. In May 1945, President Beneš and his London Government returned from London to Prague via Moscow, not via Paris, and as a result, the so-called Košice Government and the Košice Program were forced upon Czechoslovakia by Moscow.

From the beginning of the struggle, the National Socialists stood clearly on the side of freedom. Minister Jaroslav Stránský, a National Socialist, resisted the Moscow dictate to the Czechoslovak Government until the very end of the negotiations. As early as May 28, 1945, with the Red Army still in the land, National Socialist

Youth, 100,000 strong, manifested their will at a public demonstration in Prague. This anti-Communist demonstration gave new courage to the citizens, frightened by the atrocities of the Red Army. It was a signal to arms in the battle against the Communists.

The political situation being what it was, there was nothing left for the National Socialist Party but to join the National Front formed in Moscow. Since the working and lower middle classes asked that all Socialists stand together, the party entered the so-called Socialistic bloc. The life of this political bloc, however, lasted for one meeting only, as the National Socialists were quick to see through the Communist ruse and by their abstention made its further existence impossible. It should be pointed out, moreover, that Peter Zenkl and Hubert Ripka, who are now attacked with particular vehemence, were not present at the negotiations of the Košice Program, either in Moscow or in Košice.

The results of the 1946 elections, in which the Communists polled 38% of the votes, were in no way the fault of the National Socialists. In fact, these results came as a very disagreeable surprise, especially in the villages. Despite terrorization and the concerted attack of the Communists, the National Socialist Party received 18.02% of the total vote, that is, 1,290,000, becoming thereby the strongest anti-Communist party in Czechoslovakia.

How the Communists felt about the National Socialists is best illustrated by the plot framed in September 1947 by Alexej Čepička, the present Communist Minister of National Defense. Besides Jan Masaryk, he singled out two other victims for assassination, two National Socialists—Peter Zenkl and Minister Prokop Drtina. The chairman of the Communist Party, Klement Gottwald, best described the course of action of the National Socialists between 1945 and 1948 when he said in November 1947: "The leaders of the National Socialists actually ask to be judged by their fellow members not only by what they have accomplished in the government but by what they

have prevented. In other words, they are blocking us deliberately."

Communist Minister Vlado Clementis expressed his party's feelings even more pointedly in 1949: "The non-Communists accepted the Košice program with reluctance. They could not oppose the program openly unless they knowingly were willing to commit suicide. What they could not do openly, however, they did secretly; they weakened and loosened our bonds of alliance with the Soviet Union and bound us by political and economic agreements to the West, which, to them, was their real ally. Their representatives in the government made use of every opportunity to worsen our relations with the Soviet Union."

For this policy the National Socialists are now being attacked by those whose only contribution to the struggle at the time was silence. The National Socialist Party never gave up the idea of alliance with the West, to which Czechoslovakia has always been bound culturally and politically. The party did its best to promote close ties with both East and West, in the spirit of the public declarations of American and British statesmen at that time.

The National Socialists never did reconcile themselves to communism; on the contrary, they repudiated communism completely. It was the National Socialist Party which impeded Communist forces and undermined Communist positions, until the day the enemy finally took complete control under the shadow of Soviet bayonets in February 1948.

At the jubilee party convention in 1947, the chairman, outlining its program, stressed that the party would pursue a democratic course in the Czechoslovak tradition, according to the teachings of Thomas Masaryk.

Although years have elapsed and new situations have arisen since the 1947 party convention, there are not many principles requiring change. Obviously in the international field, policies are formed on the basis of existing conditions; yet, throughout, the policies of the National Socialist Party have been—and are—in accord

with those of the Western powers. The present fate of all states behind the Iron Curtain raises the question as to whether there were any other means of saving democracy. Each of the states tried its own way and each succumbed.

The program adopted at the party's jubilee convention of 1947 was the program of a democracy, not of pseudo-socialistic totalitarianism. From the ideas of the French Revolution the party stressed the word "fraternité" in contrast to the communist motto of class warfare. It was a program of evolution, not a dogmatic program of force. It was, above all, a program which placed the national idea and the pluralistic economic system first. Both ideas were planned to serve humanitarian democracy.

FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE NATION AGAINST COMMUNISM AT HOME AND ABROAD

Two days before the Communist putsch in 1948, the chairman of the Communist Party Gottwald declared, "On the basis of bitter experience I cannot trust—and here I shall name one person—Zenkl; I cannot be with him in the Cabinet. And logically, I cannot be in the Cabinet with anyone whom Zenkl would trust."

To this day the Czechoslovak National Socialists in exile are the chief target of Communist assaults, while the National Socialists at home are the victims of the worst kind of Communist terror. Plain figures tell the cruel story:

In the last election in 1947, there were twenty-six members on the Board of Directors. One of these members died and one has failed the party by collaborating with the Communists. Of the remaining twenty-four members eight were or still are, in prison; eleven are in exile (Political Secretary Julius Firt, Ivan Herben, Ota Hora, Secretary General Vladimír Krajina, Deputy Chairman Alois Lysý, Otakar Machotka, Růžena Pelantová, Hubert Ripka, Deputy Chairman Jaroslav Stránský, Peter Zenkl, Jarmila Batková-Žáčková). Nothing has

been heard of the last five members. This means that at least 80 percent of the Board members have been persecuted by the Communists.

Of the fifty-five National Socialists who were Members of Parliament, one died, eighteen are in exile, and nineteen are in prison. Two members of Parliament, Milada Horáková and Alois Jaroš, were executed. Thus of the fifty-five Members of Parliament thirty-nine, or 75 percent are victims of Communist persecution. As of today, fifty-five Members of Parliament from all non-Communist parties have escaped from the country. Of these, eighteen, the largest number from any party, are National Socialists.

It is not possible to ascertain exactly how many National Socialists have escaped from Czechoslovakia. According to the questionnaire of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia in 1951, Czechoslovak exiles in the area surveyed were divided among the different political parties as follows:

Czechoslovak National Socialists	62.3%
Czechoslovak Social Democrats	13.3%
Czechoslovak People's (Catholic) Party	13.7%
Czechoslovak Agrarians	1.7%
Czechoslovak National Democrats	1.0%
Czechoslovak Businessmen's Party	1.2%
Slovak Democrats	4.1%

From these figures it is apparent that the Czechoslovak National Socialists are numerically the strongest component of the exile. They do not, however, ask for privileges or advantages on the strength of this numerical preponderance though they are fully aware of the responsibility devolving from the fact. Nonetheless, the party members would be justified if they were to complain of the undeserved and unfair criticism and the denunciations heaped upon them.

In the spirit of our tradition, outlined here in brief, the Czechoslovak National Socialists in exile wish no better than to perform faithfully their duties in the struggle against Communism and to work for the early and **complete liberation of the people of Czechoslovakia.**

7-B-13

PETR ZENKL
2651 SIXTEENTH STREET N. W.
WASHINGTON 9, D. C.
TELEPHONE: CO 5-[illegible]69

January 17,1955

Mr.Ed.R.Murrow
CBS
New York City.

Dear Ed:

,,Half Century of Struggle Against Marxism,,is offered you as a contribution toward our common struggle against Communism.

As Chairman of the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party,I am sending you this copy,hoping that it may be of some interest to you.

Cordialy

Petr

Zenkl, Petr

January 20, 1955

Dear Dr. Zenkl:

I am very happy to enclose the script of the January 2nd broadcast, "Years of Crisis" and also the book you request, "Crisis," which is now out of print and a collectors item.

The phonograph records can be obtained in any record shop. The title is "I Can Hear It Now" and they are Columbia Records.

Sincerely yours,

Rebecca Holder
Secretary to
Mr. Murrow

Dr. Petr Zenkl
2651 16 Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

rh

2651- 16th St. NW.
Wash ington, D.C.
January 4, 1955

Miss M. Holmer
Secretary to Mr. Ed. R. Murrow
C B S
485 Madison Ave.
New York City

Dear Miss Holmer:

Forgive me for taking up your time again. First of all, I express my thanks for Ed. R. Murrow's letter concerning the visit with Mr. Adlai Stevenson.

1) At this time, I take the liberty of asking you to send me a copy of the discussion Ed.R. Murrow had on TV with his co-workers on January 2nd from 4 to 5 oclock.

2) Please be so very kind and ascertain whether it is possible to obtain or purchase a copy of the remarkable book (which I saw recently for the first time): The Crisis, a report from the Columbia Broadcasting System which contains all the CBS broadcasts in the tragic pre-Munich days in 1938.

3) Lastly, may I ask you where I could buy the unusual phonograph records from the second world war made by Mr. Ed. R. Murrow.

I am afraid that I am asking for too much but I hope you will pardon me for you undoubtedly know how important it all is to me.

With sincere thanks and well-wishes,

Petr Zenkl

Zenkl, Peter

October 13, 1954

Dear Dr. Zenkl:

This is merely a note to say my thanks for your kind words about the Freedom House Award.

It was indeed good of you to wire me as you did.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Peter Zenkl
2651 16 Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

fc

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EDWARD MURROW

YOU KNOW ED HOW HAPPY I AM ABOUT FREEDOM HOUSE AWARD

PETER ZENKL

314P..

Zenkl, Peter

December 16, 1953

Dear Dr. Zenkl:

Thank you for your letter of November 25th. At the moment I am doubtful as to whether Mr. Wheelock's suggestion has any merit but I need more time than I have had recently to think it over. I am leaving for Korea on Saturday, but expect to be back two weeks later at which time I will get in touch with you again.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Peter Zenkl
2651 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

rh

2651- 16th St. N.W.
Washington, D.C.
November 25, 1953

Dear Friend:

In yesterday's letter I forgot one detail of my conversation with Mr. Wheelock who has in mind what I think is an excellent idea: a series of five minute anti-Communist broadcasts. Each would be a true life story (about 3 and half minutes) told by a person from actual experience with communism. The narrators would be from various countries and from all walks of life, of all ages, the young and old. Although coming from so many sources the stories would have one common thread: the unmasking of communist methods of operation. Your closing words would be the climax to the story.

I do not think I am acting against Mr. Wheelock's intentions by writing you of his idea and in offering you " a sample" of my own, a story which I have written on the spur of the moment to illustrate the point. If you think the idea a good one please let me hear from you sometime in the future. I would be happy to help you with suggestions as to possible participants etc. If the idea does not appeal to you please forget the matter.

Very sincerely yours,

Peter Zenkl

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Ave.
New York 22, N.Y.

Peter Zenkl

Forty years of my life have been devoted to social welfare. I fully recognize the great beneficiary advantages brought about by industrialization, but, at the same time, I have always felt the need to help the underprivileged, weaker members of society who have been dislocated by the new social order and who have been caught by the wheels of the speeded-up industrial progress. I believe that we should apply Christian principles in our technical age; that we should prevent and treat social ills systematically and deliberately and that we should give this aid in time and in a way which does not humiliate. In Prague, in the short span of twenty years between the two world wars, I was able to help in organizing a wide network of social services: day nurseries, feeding stations, playgrounds, kindergartens, hostelries, homes for the aged, thousands of small aprtments for the low income group; I also helped in promoting old age pensions, social and other kinds of insurance.

The living standard of our industrious citizens was rising steadily until unfortunately Czechoslovakia, a highly industrialized state, was caught in the world depression. Hundreds of thousands lost their jobs and the situation became very serious. Conditions were all the worse as we had not as yet succeeded in organizing adequate unemployment benefits.

The Communists were delighted. "Now," they thought, "our chance has come." Unemployment, hunger, suffering, eviction from homes, the despair of parents would play into their hands. Prague, the capital, was to be the chief target of their attack.

We quickly organized an over-all drive under the motto: "No worthwhile person, capable of work, wants alms; he wants work." We had large

scale projects for tens of thousands. Everybody was put to work regardless of his previous occupation and training. We campaigned for funds to finance our extensive programs. Tens of thousands of children were fed until the unemployment tide began to recede.

At every step, however, we were blocked by Communists who sabotaged our efforts. They attacked us with false accusations in the City Council, the Goverment and the press. They tried to disrupt the work and undermine people's faith in our good intentions.

For instance, Zápotocký, then a Communist small-fry organizer, now the President of Czechoslovakia, took workmen out of their jobs from the near-by mining town of Kladno and herded them into the Lord Mayor's office in Prague, all clamoring for jobs. His reason was to embarass us and ~~to~~ disrupt our work.

One day I asked one of the prominent Communists, a woman now dead but still admired by her Party: "Why do you Communists pretend to be genuinely interested in the aleviation of suffering when you deliberately try to wreck every effort of ours to help those in need?"

Javůrková was surprisingly outspoken: truthful: "That's easy to understand. We don't mind the do-gooders who talk about helping. But you actually do things; you carry out your plans and that is why you are our real enemy. You help people in need. You remove social evils. But we need social injustice and discontent. You give people a roof overhead whereas we want them to live in cellars and under bridges. You build homes for the aged whereas we want old parents to be destitute and homeless so that their sad plight would drive their children into our ranks.

We need incendiaries and social bombshells; you put out the fire instead. That is why you are so dangerous. We need people to suffer and in their suffering to turn to us as their only saviours. Then we shall build a better life for them."

Edward R. Murrow's Conclusion:

Zenkl, Petr

November 27, 1953

Dear Dr. Zenkl:

Thank you for your letter of November 23 and for letting me see the outline of your article. It does indeed have merit. I am pleased that the meeting with Mr. Wheelock has been accomplished and shall hope that something fruitful comes of it.

About the Ford Foundation, I enclose a copy of a letter I received last week from Mr. Don Price. I am sorry the reply is negative.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Petr Zenkl
2651 16th Street, NW
Washington, D.C.

dm

COPY File

25 November 1953

Dr Peter Zenkl
2651 16th Street NW
Washington D C

Dear Dr Zenkl

Your letter and material read with great interest.

I have discussed this with the Board of Help Inc, and while we are small and with very limited funds, it is our intention to use them to help people and projects that are worth while on a temporary basis.

It is our opinion that you should have time to develop your book which can be a very important factor in meeting our major problem - Communism.

It has been decided that Help Inc will send you $500 a month for five months (the first check herewith and subsequent ones on the first of January, February, March and April). This in the hopes that it will permit you to develop and publish your book, the outline of which is so interesting and powerful.

I am sending your outline for a magazine article to Mr Hibbs - and shall advise you of his comments.

And I am looking forward to our next meeting - and the pleasure of meeting your wife.

With great appreciation that such as you live, I am

Very truly yours

Signed - Ward Wheelock

Ward Wheelock:C

COPY

copy - Mr Dunn

2651- 16th St. NW.
Washington, D.C.
November 23, 1953

Dear Friend:

Thanks to you I recently had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Ward Wheelock and his wife, with whom I discussed subjects of deep concern to both of us. I appreciate the contact and shall be very happy if we meet again. I presume Mr. Wheelock will tell you of our meeting.

There is this which I should like to bring up to you: In your TV broadcast from East Berlin you recalled what I had said upon my escape from my country; as I listened to you and shared your message with you, I pondered again how difficult it is for citizens of a free country to understand the Communist peril. Daily I am confronted with the question of why and how Americans fail to understand the danger of Communist methods. I got the idea of writing an article (since I still have not ventured out to writing a book on my concentration camp experiences) in which I would show, on the basis of my actual experiences, how Communists, following a carefully prepared plan, systematically and deliberately take over a structure: in this case a Nazi concentration camp, although themselves nothing more than prisoners.

I made an outline of the contemplated article (or articles) which, providing I do them justice, should be interesting and to all practical purposes more instructive than other, less direct accounts.

I am sending a copy of the outline also to Mr. Wheelock who has promised to interest your mutual friend, Mr. Ben Hibbs, editor of Saturday Evening Post.

I would be very grateful if you could devote a few minutes of your scarce time to reading my outline and if you think the idea has merit to recommend it to Mr. Ben Hibbs or to someone else, as you see fit.

I have not heard from the Ford Foundation as yet.

Mr. M.
See Nov. 19
letter from Alan
Price.
Dm.

With sincerest wishes,

Yours gratefully,

or if you allow Peter

Peter Zenkl

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N.Y.

Peter Zenkl

O U T L I N E

The author knows Communists and communism from practical experience in public life from the day the Party was founded in Czechoslovakia in 1920. More than that, he has had the unique opportunity of watching Communists unfold their sinister, complicated and highly organuzed plot in Nazi concentration camps in Germany during his six years imprisonment.

Living with them in close confinement in Buchenwald in the same prison cells, Zenkl saw them develop deliberately a wide network which finally enmeshed the entire Nazi camp. The author is convinced that Communists are capable of penetrating, undermining, converting to their purposes or seizing outright any body or organization unless the proper means are used to check them. To be able to accomplish this one must know how Communists operate, how they bore in from without, branch out and finally take over.

The subject could be written up factually as an article or in narrative form, preferably with real, not imaginary characters, giving actual scenes and events. It would help the writer to know beforehand the desired length of the article or story.

The title should convey the idea that Communists could outwit even the devils by taking over hell itself.

It would contain the following ideas:

There were tens of thousands of prisoners in Buchenwald, the most motley mess of human beings imaginable. Over twenty-five nations were represented; the widest range of religions and creeds; all strata of society, people from the humblest to the social cream of their country; the humble, the noble and the vile, all piled in together. Some prisoners were there because they were anti-Nazis, but the Nazis were there too; war prisoners as well as war objectors; saboteurs and shirkers; professional criminals as well as men inspired by purest motives of religious fervor.

Despite these vast differences, they had one thing in common: misery. They formed one mass of abject suffering, but otherwise they were not united. Even among political prisoners of the same nationality there were differences and cleavages carried over from past experience in political ~~life~~ or social life at home. There were only two exceptions of rare unity, though a world apart in thought and purpose: Jehovah's Witnesses and the Communists. The first group was bound together by incomitable religious fanaticism; the other group by Communist intoxication.

First the Communists formed cells among the national groups (the French, Czech, Polish, German etc); later on, they joined the national cells into one over-all international unit. From then on, they proceeded according to a detailed, minute plan, step by step, with ant-like diligence, to accomplish the following:

a) They did their utmost to place Communists in jobs about camp. No menial job, no matter how lowly, was overlooked. In fact, lowly jobs often afforded excellent opportunities as observation posts, footholds and prongs for future penetration.

b) Communists tried to win over new accomplices and adherents in an infinite variety of ways, for instance by bribery, favors and protection.

c) Naturally Communists worked on young people to indoctrinate them ideologically.

d) Communists liquidated political opponents and even potential opponents.

e) Communists ferreted out inside information as knowledge of Nazi plans was highly important in planning Communist counter-measures.

f) It was done with one purpose: to achieve Communist goals.

g) In the midst of war when all others had only one goal in mind- to end the war victoriously- Communists were far ahead planning already how to take over the concentration camp at the decisive moment and how to eliminate permanently undesirables who could be expected to oppose communism after the war.

h) Throughout the war groundwork waslaid for postwar international cooperation of Communists. The system of National Committees under Communist control in the liberated countries was organized long before the end of war.(As it turned out, it brought disaster to Czechoslovakia).

First of all, Communists had to organize systematic knock-out drives against any other group of prisoners which might for some reason or other endanger or block Communist plans. In Buchenwald they had the professional criminals to contend with whom the Nazis had entrusted with the policing jobs and other tough duties about camp. It took sinister scheming to outwit and overthrow the rule of professional thieves and killers.

1. Bit by bit, from one lowly job to another, Communists worked themselves up from Zimmer Elteste (the prisoner held responsible for the cell) to Blok Elteste (responsible for the block) and finally to Lager Elteste and to Capo (the head). For that matter, every menial job afforded opportunities in and around camp: a Kolfaktor (handy-man) and Laufer (messenger) were actually very important. A Kolfactor sweeping the prison yard was in a strategically important position because from his vantage ground he could watch what was going on and pass on the information to another Kolfaktor or Laufer. Thus Communists were able to pass on important news in an incredibly short time and it was amazing what they knew. In time, by their efficiency, coordination and trickery, Communists "relieved" unsuspecting Nazi masters of various duties until finally they succeeded in planting cells in practically every department of every building. Having inside knowledge of what was being planned, they could protect their Communist members in time and sometimes even wreck Communix Nazi plans. For instance, they substituted other victims from non-Communist ranks and alleviated the suffering of their own members by giving them extra food and privileges at the expense of others etc.

2. By swindling and stealing in the kitchens they were in a position to give or withhold food from prisoners.

3. Their unseen control of workshops gave them tremendous opportunities. Here they favored, protected and hid their own. They conducted forbidden activities, organized, plotted, secretly made articles for their own use and sabotaged Nazi efforts. Best of all, they ingratiated themselves to the Nazis by producing coveted articles and special gifts for Nazi masters.

   For instance there was the Communist shoemaker who made unusually fine riding boots for the Nazi commander and his friends. As a fine craftsman he was permitted to chose his assistants which gave him the opportunity of getting rid of non-Communist workers by sending them to the death quarry and by planting Communist accomplices in their place.

4. In the office of political management Communists learned what was being planned and took effective counter-measures by hiding their members and by substituting non-Communists for various Nazi death projects.

5. In this way Communists liquidated former political enemies and those they hated. For instance, they earmarked the French industrialist Michelin for extermination. Zenkl managed to save him twice from the March of Death but failed the third time.

6. The prison hospital was a beehive of Communist activity where the Communists had a heyday of hiding, scheming and liquidating. They arranged it so that Communists received better medical treatment (if it could be called by that name) while undesirable non-Communists were left to die or were even put to death. Here among the sick and dying they hid under false names the Communists on the Nazi black-list.

7. No less important was the morgue and the pathology department. A Communist hiding from the Nazis was given a dead man's identity. It worked this way: an unimportant fellow died. Before his corpse was done away with, his number and card in the files were exchanged with that of a living Communist who continued to live in the camp under the dead man's name.

8. Camp warehouses of furniture, laundry, clothing and medicine meant on the one hand alleviation to Communists and sometimes even to non-Communists, provided it served a purpose. By controlling supplies Communists had the power to do favors or to victimize anti-Communists. In the life of a prisoner a small tin cup can be tragically important.

9. By the end of war they had an underground armed force and also control of the electric power used to charge the barbed wires enclosing the camp. They actually had control of the camp police.

The entire intricate network had been craftily planned. From one foothold and outpost to another the Communists had advanced. Nothing was left to accidental improvisation (such as the non-Communists at best had to resort to). For a long time the fine threads of the web were not discernible. Not until the whole apparatus was complete, with all the cogs fitted in and functioning, did it become apparent what had happened and by then it was too late to uproot the Communist structure. The system functioned like a series of huge sieves, one fitting into the other, the lower one catching whatever might have fallen through the sieve on top, and so on down the line.

The power of the Communists was such that they ~~cank~~ held services for the German Communist leader Thaelmann in the very heart of the Nazi concentration camp with all the Communist functionaries present.

The Communists had been preparing well in advance for the liberation of the camp and when that day finally came, the American commander was given a Communist welcome, for although the great majority of prisoners was anti-Communistic, the administration of the camp, especially the camp police, was in the hands of Communists.

In the days just before the liberation of Buchenwald, the camp went through a double reign of terror: the Nazis were out to kill and so were the Communists. The Nazis singled out forty-eight leading prisoners for execution in the hope of terrorizing the prisoners into submission and squelching a revolt as news of the approach of the American Army surged across the entire camp. Zenkl was picked out as one of the forty-eight. For days he hid,

hounded from place to place. He took on the identity of a "dead man" and finally was saved by the criminals who hid him in their block in a mud hole under their barrack. In the final stage, as Nazi rule deteriorated and the Communists began to take over, the Reds started a manhunt on their own after Zenkl, the democrat, because it was clear to them that should he survive he would resume his life-long struggle against the Communists.

When peace finally came and the tired world was longing for a rest from strife, the Communists were again far ahead with their plans.

In conclusion: Communism is not a political movement, but a world conflagration led by fanatics who have absolutely no sense for moral values. The greatest danger lies in their ability to infiltrate and undermine any organization, society, church or army. If the fortification proves unassailable, Communists wear down and crumble the rock on which the fort stands. They are tireless in their efforts. Often their activity has nothing outwardly in common with their goal. They sometimes hide their real purpose by pretending to have other ambitions entirely. They can work, for the time being, with their enemy in seeming harmony. They take on many a guileless mask while getting ready for the knock-out blow. There is no weapon to which they would not resort.

To fight communism it is necessary to understand the complexity and intricacy of their methods (of which the concentration camps serves as an example). It is not enough to be mortally afraid of communism and through fear to work at crosspurposes.

To fight dynamic communism requires also a dynamic program.

THE FORD FOUNDATION
655 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

DON K. PRICE
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

November 19, 1953

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I am sorry that you were unable to get to the meeting of the Board on Overseas Training and Research yesterday. The Board plunged me, as the new man with a responsibility in the international programs of the Foundation, into a thorough discussion of the Board's own role which I hope was helpful all around.

In addition, I wanted particularly to tell you that we have given careful consideration to the proposed research program of Dr. Peter Zenkl. After consulting with our best advisers in the East European Fund, however, I am afraid that we have had to come to the decision that we cannot give Dr. Zenkl any assistance on his project.

I hope very much that I can make up for my failure to meet you this week by getting together at some early opportunity.

Yours sincerely,

Don Price

Don K. Price

Zenkl, Petr

October 30, 1953

Dear Ward:

I should like to make a contribution of $2500, check enclosed, to Help, Inc.

If the directors of Help, Inc. share my view that a study detailing how the communists took over Czechoslovakia has merit, I would like to suggest that a preliminary grant in the amount of $2500 be made to Dr. Petr Zenkl, formerly Lord Mayor of Prague and Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia at the time the communists took over that country. Should the directors of Help require details regarding this project, I should be glad to supply them.

You will appreciate that this contribution is in no way contingent upon the directors' decision to make a grant to Dr. Zenkl. His address is 2651 16th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Ward Wheelock
Lincoln-Liberty Building
Philadelphia 7, Pennsylvania

dm

Zenkel, Peter.

Inc.

LINCOLN-LIBERTY BLDG.,
PHILADELPHIA 7, PENNA.

6 November 1953

Dear Ed

Thanks for your contribution of $2500 to Help Inc.

The Directors meet next week - and I will put before them your suggestion for a grant to help fight Communism. I do know their sympathy to the idea - and I will tell them of your opinion that this project is a practical help at a cost within our means.

I'll advise you of the results.

Wood

Mr Edward R Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York N Y

WW:C

HELP *Inc.*, is incorporated under the laws of the State of Pennsylvania as a charitable organization

Zenkl, Peter

October 28, 1953

Dear Dr. Zenkl:

Thank you for your letter of October 26th. I certainly hope for a favorable outcome of the Ford Foundation matter.

I thought your recording on the program last night sounded very well indeed. It seemed to us a good idea to present your message on the eve of the anniversary rather than wait until the day itself was almost over. Thanks again for doing it.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Peter Zenkl
2651 16 Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

rh

2651- 16th St. NW. Washington
October 26, 1953

Dear Mr. Morrow:

I am very grateful to you for your kind words of October 20th and especially for your information from Mr. Don K. Price Jr. Associate Director of the Ford Foundation. It would make me very happy if it would turn out to be a harbinger of a favorable outcome of the whole matter. At this very moment my own situation is coming to a head. I did not want to bother you with my difficulties, but the time has come when I am terribly hard pressed for financial independence so that I could act as my conscience dictates along the principles for which I have fought all my life for the cause of my country.

I too am very sorry that I could not see you on my last visit. Once again I thank you most sincerely for making it possible for me to speak of my country on the sad occasion of its national anniversary.

Toward the end of the week I shall be in New York and shall try to reach you on the telephone to thank you for your never failing understanding.

Very gratefully yours,

Peter Zenkl

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Ave.
New York 22, N.Y.

...l
...16th St., N.W.
Washington D.C. 9

October 28, 1953
(Thirty fifth Anniversary of the Czechoslovak Republic)

3.55

Thirty-five years ago the Republic of Czechoslovakia came into being. It was founded with the help of the Allies but chiefly by the blood and sweat of its own sons and daughters <inspired by their thousand-year old tradition of love of liberty, independence and the Western orientation of their national culture.>

<Despite the difficulties of the times,> the first twenty years of the Republic were happy years. Under the guidance of the first two presidents, <Thomas G.> Masaryk and <Eduard> Beneš, political life showed extraordinary stability. The nation adopted and lived up to a modern constitution. Human rights were safeguarded to all citizens. <The rights of minorities were conscientiously protected.> With a stable economy and currency, industry and agriculture prospered and trade flourished. There was a healthy balance between agriculture and industry. The trademark "Made in Czechoslovakia" had an excellent reputation. <The living standard of Czechoslovak citizens was good and rose steadily.> Czechoslovak schools were progressive; courts were just. There was great cultural and social progress. In her foreign policy Czechoslovakia strove for peace and upheld scrupulously all treaties. As one of the most loyal members of the League of Nations Czechoslovakia defended the principle of collective security until the very day of Munich which turned this principle into mockery and led directly to World War II.

From 1938 onward fifteen tragic years followed: first the partition of the Republic, then the Nazi occupation and the massacre of the finest Czechoslovak men and women. Then followed the so-called "liberation" by the Red Army which gave the Communists such a head-start that the struggle by democratic means was lost before-

hand.

The Communist putsch by force in February 1948 has meant the end to democracy in Czechoslovakia; it has also meant the beginning of a new struggle for the restoration of the values for which the Czechs and Slovaks have been fighting for a thousand years; for freedom and humanitarian ideals.

Czechoslovak democracy was not defeated because of inner weakness: both times it was conquered by enemies from without: first the Nazis, then Moscow. It took the whole free world almost six years to defeat the Nazis in war. As to Moscow, it has swallowed up 600 million people since 1939.

It should be remembered that it was Czechoslovakia which, though surrounded by dictatorships long before Munich, nevertheless resisted fascism the most. After 1945 she held out against communism at her doomed outpost for three years. Her subjugation was not Czechoslovakia's fault, but the fault of short-sighted world politis. In 1939 the policy led straight to the attack on Poland and to world war. After the war it led to the present situation: Moscow now has the atom bomb made from the uranium of the Jachymov mines of Czechoslovakia and in Indochina weapons made by the Škoda Works of Pilsen are being used against the French.

Whenever the Czechoslovaks are not masters in their own house, things are not well with the world. Czechoslovakia has been a beacon light to freedom and justice pointing the way to peace. There cannot be peace unless and until the beace is lighted again and Czechoslovakia celebrates her birthday anniversary in her own family and in the family of free nations.

Zenkl

October 20, 1953

Dear Dr. Zenkl:

Many thanks for your note enclosing copy of your address which we have recorded for use on October 28th. I am sorry to have missed seeing you last Friday. I was unduly delayed at a previous appointment and returned to the office shortly after you had left.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter just received from Don K. Price, Jr., Associate Director of the Ford Foundation, which I think you will like to see.

With best regards.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Peter Zenkl
2651 16th Street N.W.
Washington 9, D.C.

rh

THE FORD FOUNDATION
655 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

DON K. PRICE, JR.
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR

Copy to Zenkl

October 16, 1953

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I appreciate very much your sending me the paper from Dr. Peter Zenkl and am looking forward to studying it carefully and consulting with the other officers of the Foundation about it.

The Czech experience is certainly worth analysis. I recall one or two documents written by other Czech emigres on the subject, but they by no means exhausted it.

I am looking forward very much to meeting you in connection with the work of the Board on Overseas Training and Research.

Yours sincerely,

Don K. Price

Don K. Price

DKP:jm

Zenkl
1 16th Street N.W.
Washintton D.C.9

5:00 - 5:15

Washington D.C.,October 9,1953.

Mr.Edward R.Murrow
c/o Columbia Broadcasting System
New York City.

My dear Mr.Murrow,

Pursuant our conversation and your kind permission I am enclosing a copy of my address that I expect to deliver on October 28th.The occasion is the 35th anniversary of the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic.

Awaiting your kind decision whwn and where I can record my speach, I am,with best thoughts

Sincerely Yours

Zenkl

October 9, 1953

Dear Mr. Price:

The enclosed from Dr. Petr Zenkl speaks for itself. I should very much appreciate your consideration of his proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Don Price
The Ford Foundation
655 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

dm

Zenkel, Letr.

THE FUND FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF EDUCATION
ESTABLISHED BY THE FORD FOUNDATION
575 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.

OFFICE OF THE
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT

October 2, 1953

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting Company
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Ed:

I finally tracked down the information you wanted. The person to whom you should speak about Mr. Zenkel's project is Don Price, who was formerly head of the Public Administration Clearing House and has just joined the Foundation as Associate Director in Charge of All International Programs. I am sending Mr. Price a copy of this note and he will be expecting to hear from you.

Don't tell anybody, but you didn't miss a thing by being in Berlin for the last BOTR Board meeting.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

John K. Weiss
Assistant Vice President

cc: Mr. Don Price

Whose office is at 655 Madison

Zenkl, Peter

Peter Zenkl

Born: June 13, 1884, in Tábor, Czechoslovakia.

Studied philosophy and sociology at Charles University where he received a PhD degree in 1907. He was professor at a commercial college and in 1918 joined the Ministry of Social Welfare where he was most concerned with the care of youth and aged. He later became Director for the Central Social Security Insurance Administration.

His political career started in community life. He was Mayor of Karlin, which is a section of Prague, and later for three terms he served as Lord Mayor of Prague. During his terms of office, many social welfare projects were realized and a number of institutes developed to care for the aged and youth, especially students.

He was a leading member of the Czech National Socialist Party, called Benes Party here. Appointed by Benes in 1938 he joined two cabinets but after the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Germans he was arrested and held for almost six years in the camps of Dachau and Buchenwald. Finally he was sentenced to death, but escaped by hiding for a few days and was finally liberated by General Patton's troops in the Spring of 1945.

After returning to Prague, he was elected Chairman of the National Socialist Party which turned out to be the largest and most important non-communist party. Was again elected Lord Mayor of Prague, which post had been seized previously by a Communist in the turmoil of liberation days.

In 1946 was appointed Vice-Premier. Throughout the three years 1945-1948 he was an outspoken opponent of Communism and was regarded as a central figure of the Nation's opposition.

He fought desperately to keep the nation in the Marshal Plan which, however, proved impossible in view of undisguised Moscow pressure.

In the Fall of 1947 an attempt was made on his life and on the lives of the late Jan Masaryk and Dr. Drtina, Minister of Justice. In November, 1947, he held firm against the Communist attempts to force a non-parliamentary cabinet.

After the Communist coup in February 1948 he was put in confinement and escaped with his wife six months later, in August 1948, when God and the good people helped him get across the border to the U. S. zone of Germany.

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Zenkl, Petr

October 9, 1953

Dear Mr. Price:

The enclosed from Dr. Petr Zenkl speaks for itself. I should very much appreciate your consideration of his proposal.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Don Price
The Ford Foundation
655 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

dm

The Evening Star
With Sunday Morning Edition
WASHINGTON 4, D.C.

Slave Labor in the Twentieth Century

(Dr. Peter Zenkl was last Deputy Prime Minister of free Czechoslovakia and former Mayor of Prague. He resigned in protest against the Munich agreement and the Nazis subsequently imprisoned him at Dachau and then at Buchenwald. He was under death sentence when liberated by Patton's 3d Army. After World War II he again became active in the Czech government until the Reds took over and he was forced to flee to the United States. He is chairman of the Executive Committee, Council of Free Czechoslovakia.)

By Peter Zenkl

WHEN THE AMERICAN army finally penetrated into the Nazi concentration camps in the last days of World War II and when reports and photographs first appeared in the press, the free world shuddered at the atrocities. It felt that perhaps being at war was not enough, that more should have been done to save the prisoners and to succor degraded humanity. But today the free world is not at war with the Communists. On the contrary, it has retained diplomatic relations with the Communists and meets with them at the United Nations. Yet for many years there have been concentration camps in the countries behind the Iron Curtain, where millions of people are being tortured and murdered in a way which can be likened to the methods of the condemned war criminals who were executed for their crimes. In the case of the Nazis, the free world could ease its conscience by saying that it had not known of these concentration-camp horrors. Does it have the same excuse now? Can it hide behind the excuse that perhaps all reports on Communist atrocities in concentration camps are only concoctions of warmongers and anti-Communist exiles?

The Economic and Social Council of the United Nations together with the International Labor Office have formed a special Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor which, upon concluding investigations and hearing witnesses over a period of one year, has published a unanimous report which is a terrible accusation and casts a shadow on the 20th century. The chairman of the committee is a citizen of India, a state of which it cannot be said that it does not adhere to neutrality. The world now has an objective document which it can no longer ignore in silence.

In the technical meaning of the word, forced labor is only a more severe form of the unbearable working conditions prevailing in countries behind the Iron Curtain, while concentration camps are only an intensified form of forced labor. Concentration camps are the logical consequence of the Communist slave system; they can be compared to a dark cell in a prison in a country which has become nothing but a prison. From the Communist standpoint they are the most profitable, positive feature of the state budget, which is geared to arm the Soviet Union against the United States of America. They are also a solution by which the Communist state "solves" the unemployment problems. America is a reactionary state in the opinion of Communists because it does not know how "to solve" unemployment in the Communist manner.



—Star Staff Photo.

DR. PETER ZENKL.

There are concentration camps for prisoners who have to work in mines, especially in the uranium mines; there are concentration camps for factory workers; there are concentration camps for young people and for women; for the army; even for priests and nuns. In a memorandum submitted in May of last year the Council of Free Czechoslovakia gave an accurate picture of prevailing conditions in Czechoslovakia (conditions have worsened since then); there were at the time 247 concentration camps with 350,000 prisoners. That is a high per cent for my small nation! As the population of the United States is 12 times that of Czechoslovakia, the number of prisoners in my country corresponds to about 4 million people in America. Should not this number arouse the interest of the entire world, at least as much as the Communists have stirred up for the 11 Communists imprisoned in the United States?

Although the large number of imprisoned and tortured has reached tens of millions behind the Iron Curtain, it does not fully express the tragedy of this inhuman system. To understand its import we should take into account that the best citizens of the nations behind the Iron Curtain are held prisoners in the concentration camps, the people who could neither be bought nor frightened into submission. These are the people who should be the leading citizens of their nations in time of oppression and upheaval, for they are the democrats who have played an important part in public life and who, as world citizens, have worked all their lives for co-operation between nations and for world peace. In the concentration camps are university professors, scientists, writers, artists, technical experts and industrial promoters, priests and former high state officials. These people are systematically and quickly liquidated; they are being destroyed physically and morally only because they have refused to advocate and practice communism.

Can it then be said that this is an internal problem of the Iron Curtain countries? Is it true, then, that America is on one side and Czechoslovakia, for instance, on the other side and that the problems of the two states are alien to one another? Should it not rather be said that on one side is the free world and on the other side the Communist-enslaved world? Do not these unfortunates in the concentration camps belong to America's democratic ranks? Is not the systematic destruction of human rights a matter for the whole world? Is not their protection one of the most important tasks of the United Nations?

This summer the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations postponed—I point out that the United States voted against the postponement—the above-mentioned report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor as evidently the matter did not seem urgent to people as yet free. The United States proposed that the report be placed as one of 80 points on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. Let us hope that with the exception of the Communist delegates no other state will vote against placing the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the agenda. It is high time that the United Nations, mindful of its Charter, takes up the problem of human rights as it is indivisibly tied up with the problem of war and peace. Closing one's eyes to the horrors which inevitably sooner or later would lead to war is not serving peace. For a certainty, the horrors and not the effort to correct them would lead to war. World public opinion should make this clear to the fearsome souls who, in an effort to save peace, do not wish to save man. What is the meaning of war and peace? Can the methodical murder of millions be called peace?

The time is opportune to show the Soviet Union that the free world has not forfeited its own self. Communism is passing through a severe crisis and at this time it is again—as often before—making a bid to the free world for several years' respite for its recuperation so that it could continue its aggression with renewed vigor later on.

The question actually is: Will it be possible to buy off the free world by releasing two or three of its journalists and by permitting a few wives of citizens of foreign countries to leave the Soviet Union? Or will the free world insist on the liberation of millions of its best allies behind the Iron Curtain?

December 24, 1954

Dear Adlai:

The purpose of this letter is to introduce an old friend of mine, Dr. Petr Zenkl who is chairman of the Executive Committee, Council of Free Czechoslovakia.

Dr. Zenkl was last Deputy Prime Minister of free Czechoslovakia and former Mayor of Prague. He resigned in protest against the Munich agreement and the Nazis subsequently imprisoned him at Dachau and then at Buchenwald. He was under death sentence when liberated by Patton's 3rd Army. After World War II he again became active in the Czech government until the Reds took over and he was forced to flee to the United States.

I have known Dr. Zenkl for many years and I feel sure that you would enjoy talking with him.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Mr. Adlai Stevenson
11 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois

fc

December 23, 1954

Dear Petr:

Thank you for sending me your proposal about the cold war.

I have not been able to make use of this and I am therefore returning the material to you.

I take pleasure in enclosing a letter of introduction to Adlai Stevenson.

Sincerely,

Dr. Petr Zenkl
2651 16th Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.

fc

Mr. Zenkl BU 80908 - Zenkl, Petr 48 3/5

E.M. At the microphone is Petr Zenkl whom you remember from my reports on Czechoslovakia. Mr. Zenkl is known for his cultural and social work as the co-worker of the first president and Liberator Thomas Masaryk, of his successor Eduard Beneš, and of the son Jan Masaryk. As a staunwh defender of democracy he was held prisoner by the Nazis for almost six years in concentration camps. Eight years ago I was happy to announce that miraculously his life had been saved not only from the Nazis, but also from the Communists in Buchenwald who also had marked him for extermination as an outstanding fighter for civil liberties and a free form of government. And again, almost five years ago, I was able to broadcast news of his escape from Communist terror to the free world.

Mr. Zenkl, five years ago the Communists took over Czechoslovakia by force in a coup détat. Would you say that in the five years they have achieved their purpose entirely?

Z. Communists have succeeded in seizing all control. The army, police, government, local management, workers militia, courts and judges, institutions, organizations, including trade unions, all media of information and education, schools, theaters, moving pictures, publications are in their hands They have complete control of production and business enterprise, the entire economic life including communications. Economically and even culturally Czechoslovakia has been firmly integrated into the Soviet orbit. The Communists have seized all the material wealth of the country. They have nationalized all production and private enteprise from factory to barber shop and taxi stand. They are collectivizing

farms and punishing those who might impede the ~~progress~~ process. Light industry and production of consumer goods has been converted to heavy industry which is to serve enti ely the Moscow tyrants. Czechoslovakia has become an arsenal for Soviet imperialism. The regime is forcing hundreds of thousands of anti-Communists to slave for Communist goals in concentration and forced labor camps while millions have to work tirelessly for the exploiters. In five years the Communists, merciless slavedrivers of millions, have become masters of all property and material values.

E.M. That means that whatever can be had by brutal force, even human bodies, the Communists have already taken.

Z. Yes, and I must add that the Communists are also exerting all their strength and machinations to gain possession of the human soul as well. Any suspected resistance or semblance of something which might eventually contain seeds of dissension is ruthlessly wiped out. Potential enemies are purged in staged mock trials; the condemned confess to non-committed crimes; people are terrified by the examples of functionaries who stood high in favor yesterday and today are sent to the gallows; even ~~the~~ very young offenders receive long prison sentences . Trusted servants of the regime are rewarded with good living quarters, sufficient food, clothing and fuel; all the others suffer from want. No outward attempt at resistance is permitted. Nevertheless even those who have no thought of disobedience knowing the futility of resistance are envertheless thrown out of their jobs, ~~shipped out~~ and subjected to persecution because at one time they had owned a farm or a factory or had been government employees.

E.M. In other words, the Communists prepare the ground materially for their ideological battle, unprecendented in history in its scope.

Z. Again they have all totalitarian methods at their command: all media, radio, publications, theaters, moving pictures, and schools. The people are swamped with Communist literature and propaganda. Competent teachers have been dismissed and replaced by Communist agitators. The nation's history has been perverted; Stalin has become the object of veneration. Great hatred for the West, especially of the United States, is taught. Textbooks have been replaced with propaganda trash. Parents have been deliberately deprived of any influence on their children. The regime decides who shall study and designates vocations and place of work. Only children of Communists are permitted to attend higher schools of learning. All schools from kindergarten up to and including universities are like assembly lines for producing Communist fanatics; in former "workshops of humanity" hatred and vilest instincts are aroused.

E.M. If Communists are fighting parents for control of children, what must family life be like in Czechoslovakia?

Z. Nothing remains of the former friendly ties between parents and the school. The father and mother are waging a great secret struggle for their child's soul, but they are fighting against odds. Both are exhausted from the daily grind, as even women are given strenuous jobs and heavy labor. Children are taken from their parents at an early age and placed in Communist nurseries where they are taught to spy on and report their own fathers and mothers. In the evening the father must attend meet-

ings and indoctrination courses and on week-ends he is ordered to work in voluntary brigades. After an exhausting day in the factory or so-called public sector, the mother spends hours in queues in her search for food and other household necessities to supplement inadequate rations. Not even in church can people be sure of finding solace because in many instances their priests have been sent to prisons and agents, appointed by the Communists, have taken their place in the pulpit. There is no peace anywhere, not even in the inner family circle. Fear and uncertainty penetrate everywhere. Under such circumstances foreign broadcasting which reaches behind the Iron Curtain has tremendous power and consequently carries not only weight but also responsibility.

E.M. In such a tense atmosphere resistance is bound to grow. Where is it felt most?

Z. In my estimation at least 80 percent, perhaps 90 percent are anti-Communists at heart, but Communist terror is great, so great that it is beyond the imagination of the free world. People in Communist countries have no choice other than to say "Tes" or "I agree." Despite the terror, there is a growing number of anti-Communists; besides the former anti-Communists the factory workers are now turning away from communism because they realize they have been misled by false promises and that the so-called "people's democracy" is by far the most mercenary and heartless exploiter. Thus resistance is growing in factories, workshops and on farms. It is naturally the silent resistance of the clenched fist of an empty hand. People have no weapons.

It is rather an atmosphere of resistance, the lull before a storm.

E-M. In your closing remark could you tell us, Mr. Zenkl, whether, in your opinion, the rest of the world is immune and whether we can help the captive countries?

Z. Communism is like the plague: it can infect anyone and penetrates everywhere; no nation is safe from its poisonous infiltration. The free world should always be mindful of the real aim of communism: that is world domination. When Communists offer to cooperate they are merely trying to mislead their future victims to slacken their vigilance. The free nations should tirelessly unmask the true face of communism and call attention to examples of Communist transgression.

If the free nations hope to liberate the captive nations, thereby insuring their own freedom, they must have for their program more than the defeat of communism. Humanity has gone through terrible suffering; hope for a better world has been trapled. Slogans and promises are not enough to pacify the convulsions through which the world is passing. It was hatred which caused man's present anguish. Only a complete reversal, love of fellow man, friendly cooperation and faith can bring about a change. The world must be made aware of its need for solidarity and of its interdependency.

America is blessed with peace and prosperity; her citizens enjoy freedom and dignity like air and water. Yet they have come from many far-away lands, speaking different tongues, to

create one nation.

This program could be extended to other nations; it should be applicable even if people are not all transferred to one country; they should, nevertheless, be able to become citizens of one world with one program and determination: to build for all a world without force and upheaval, without the hardships of past life, so that people, in possession of human dignity and human rights would not hate one another and would not live in constant fear of enslavement. Such a world would insure not only a decent life but also a solution of recurring economic and social crises.

Liberation of nations implies a rebirth of man. Communist oppression should be followed by freedom; the road should lead from darkness to light, from misery to human solidarity, from hatred to tolerance and understanding. Toward such a goal which is dictated not by altruistic motives but in our own self-interest, we should all join forces.

Zenkl

Zenkl, Peter

Christian Science

24. I 53

Peter Zenkl,
Chairman of the Executive Committee
of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia:

WHY CZECHOSLOVAKIA HAD TO BE DESTROYED

In looking back on the Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia five years ago and on the three preceding years of struggle, the struggle against odds which Czechoslovak democracy had waged from 1945 to 1948 against international Communism, we see more clearly as time goes on that from the start the U.S.S.R. had set out with determination and by design to destroy Czechoslovak independence - unfortunately without having to meet any countermove from the West. The Soviet Union had very important reasons for liquidating the Czechoslovak Republic which the free world did not grasp at the time and which we ourselves are beginning to understand more fully in retrospect. As we weigh the reasons we understand why Moscow was more interested in destroying Czechoslovakia than for instance Finland or Austria, and that it was Czechoslovakia's misfortune to be the first and most important obstacle in the way of Communist plans. As it is little known in the free world, especially in the United States, why Czechoslovakia HAD to be destroyed before the others, it is an opportune time to discuss the matter on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Communist tragedy.

First of all, strategically Czechoslovak territory is extremely important for the defense and conquest of Europe. Bismarck's words still hold true: "Whoever is the master of Bohemia(the land of the Czechs) is the master of Europe." Hitler likewise could not have

launched his attacks on Poland and the West without destroying the Czechoslovak stronghold. From the Soviet point of view the possession of Czechoslovakia, bulging out beyond the line Stettin and Trieste, is a conditio sine qua non for holding Berlin and Vienna, a prerequisite for any drive westward. Through Czechoslovakia run the vital railwaylines from north to south connecting not only Warsaw with Budapest but also Berlin with Vienna. Besides, Czechoslovakia has many air bases far to the West.

Furthermore, Czechoslovakia is very important from the standpoint of armaments. The Skoda Works of Pilsen and the Steel Works of Brno, Moravia, are generally known, but few people realize Czechoslovakia's tremendous war potential in all important military fields, especially in the technical and chemical industries, from the manufacture of railroad cars, tracks and ballbearings to the production of essential army textiles and footwear.

There is also this question to answer: Has Finland uranium mines? When the American army seemingly disregarded the uranium mines of Jachymov, the greatest in Europe, what was more logical than that the Red army should take over these mines?

Moreover, Czechoslovakia was a country with Western culture, very developed social legislation and a high standard of living for workigg men and peasants alike. International Communism was tempted to experiment whether it could communize by force this ~~exemplary~~ democratic state in which, due to the strength of its wide middle class the class struggle was not as pronounced as elsewhere (in contrast to Poland, Hungary etc). In this respect Czechoslovakia was to serve as a guinea pig, a pattern, for testing methods which could later be applied in

communizing the other countries of Western Europe. Czechoslovakia, which for twenty years between the two world wars had really been a democracy, certainly the most advanced democracy east of Switzerland, was a thorn in the flesh of the U.S.S.R.; Moscow could not suffer such a democracy in the are which, in fact, (if we do not wish to say "by agreement") had been placed in her sphere of influence. What is more, Czechoslovakia is a Slav state; throughout history the Czechs have had considerable influence on the other Slavs: it was impossible to permit Prague to remain the cultural center of the Slavs when Moscow had usurped this role for herself.

This last reason why Moscow had decided to liquidate Czechoslovakia has not been taken sufficiently into account and has not been given its due interpretation. One reason for this is the fact that the relationship and association between Slav nations seems to have no bearing on the West: it is not a point to be overlooked, however

The influence of the Czech nation on the other Slavs dates back to early history. The Czechs were converted to Christianity in the ninth century by Cyril and Methodius, missionaries from Byzantium, who had brought to ~~our~~ Czech countries from Macedonia ~~the Slavonic~~ a language which became the language of the church. This so-called Old Slavonic, which reached a high degree of perfection throughout the Great Moravian empire of Svatopluk, became the language of mediation of the educated Slavs and the Slav nations; the liturgic Old Slavonic is used to this day by the Orthodox Church. Soon Christianity spread eastward. The Western world is not aware that the second bishop of Prague, Adalbert, a Czech, brought Christiniaty to Hungary and Poland where he is revered to this day as a national saint. Adalbert's

shrine in Gniezno, Poland, is one of the most sacred Slav pilgrimages of the Catholic Church.

In the Middle Ages under the Czech King Przemysl Otakar II the Bohemian empire extended across Poland to the Baltic sea; this explains the Czech cultural influence in this territory for a long period of time. Besides the Old Church Slavonic, which in its early stage had been linked with our land, the Czech language was the only really developed Slav language; this accounts for its great influence on the grammar and literature of the other Slav nations. In 1412 Jan Hus, known to the West only as a religious reformer, published his "Orthographia Bohemica," which had a decisive influence in developing the written language of several Slavic nations. During the reign of the Luxemburgs, many Slavs from the East came to study at Charles Univeristy at Prague, the first university in Central Europe (1348); it was this university which gave rise to the first university East of Prague, the University of Cracow. It is little known that through the influence of Hus a Hussite sect (derisively called "židovstujuščie") originated in Orthodox Russia; its members attempted the first translation of the bible into Russian. Printing, which had come to the Czechs from Germany, was passed in turn by them to the whole Slav world. In Prague the first Russian translation of the bible was printed, published by František Skoryna in 1517-1519. The first White Russian and Ukrainian translations of the Song of Solomon were from the Czech language. Besides, the old Czech legend of Brunclik

introduced the culture of knighthood to Russia. Even after the battle of the White Mountain and the loss of Czech independence, Czech influence continued under the Jesuits who made Prague the center for their eastward expansion. The Czech Jesuits also wrote the Russian and Lusation Serb grammar in Prague.

At the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, Dobrovský, a Czech, and Šafařík, a Slovak, published their great works, and Prague became the center of Slavonic research. In 1848 the Slav Congress convened in Prague: it too left a deep imprint on Slav politics. Havlíček, the Czech journalist and man of political influence, advocated the liberation of Ukraine from the Czars; Palacký, the Czech historian, also asked for the independence of the Ukrainian nation which was recognized as an independent nation by the Slav Congress.

Are not these facts important today?

In the nineteenth century the Czechs had considerable influence on the Southern Slavs. I could name hundreds of Czech and Slovak engineers, technical and production experts, writers, artists, musicians who were active among the Slovenians, Croatians, Serbs and Bulgarians. As an example I shall mention at least one name: Constantine Jireček, the founder of the Serbian science of history, a historiographer of the Bulgarian nation, who upon becoming Minister of Education in Bulgaria introduced the Czech educational system. It should also be said that while the Southern Slavs looked to the Czar as their powerful political protector against the Turks, they thought of the Czechs as their cultural leaders.

The outstanding influence of the Sokol (a patriotic gymnastic organization) which originated and had ~~until now~~ its headquarters in Prague, is apparent. The Sokol meets held periodically in Prague were always a political manifestation, and one may add, a "Western democratic manifestation," of all the Slavs. Here the american Sokols met the Sokols from Russia.

I shall not speak of Masaryk's influence on Southern Slavs, including even the Russians, as these facts are widely known.

Briefly: While Moscow and Petrograd were the focal centers of Slav power, Prague was the Slav center of culture. When Moscow proclaimed her ~~sovereign~~ absolute control over all culture, it followed that she could not permit the existence of a rival. As Prague with her outlying Czechoslovak area had always been, since the days of the distant past, a bridge for higher Western culture eastward, the Communists had to tear down the bridge, if they were to drop the Iron Curtain on all the Slavs.

Upon the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Communist coup d'état I should like to show: that five years ago Czechoslovakia was destroyed not because she was small and weak, but because she was important and from the cultural standpoint famous, and therefore, that she had to be destroyed. All the facts mentioned earlier by me were only too well known to the Communists. Unfortunately, the West was often not well informed about the Slav world. The present growing interest in Slavonic studies and ~~Slavic~~ Slav languages in the United States is very encouraging. It gives us at one more reason to hope that the West will gradually realize what the loss of Czechoslovakia has meant and that this realization will eventually be the reason for its liberation.

Zenkl, Peter

February 3, 1953

My dear Mayor Clark:

I am of course not competent to express an opinion as to whether Dr. Zenkl could fit into a useful position in your city government. In response to your question, however, I have seen him several times within recent months. There is no doubt that he is emotionally upset and deeply apprehensive about the trend of world affairs. He has, I think, received some rather callous treatment by some of our people responsible for Czechoslovakian affairs and this has added to his sense of bewilderment and frustration. But in spite of this, I would think him capable of sustained and effective work if a position could be found where his talent and experience could be used.

Sincerely yours,

Honorable Joseph S. Clark, Jr.
Mayor of the City of Philadelphia
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

JOSEPH S. CLARK, JR.
MAYOR

CITY OF PHILADELPHIA
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

PHILADELPHIA 7, PA.

January 23, 1953.

Mr. Edward R. Murrow,
485 Madison Avenue,
New York 22, New York.

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Thank you very much for your letter of January 15th about Dr. Petr Zenkl. I share your admiration for Doctor Zenkl and the enormous sacrifices he has made for the cause of freedom. After talking to him, however, I am somewhat concerned about his present ability to fit into a useful position in our City government.

I am wondering if you have seen him recently and whether you share my impression that his personality and manner, perhaps also his age, would make it extremely difficult to find a spot where he could be of real use, even in fields where his experience is very great.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph S. Clark Jr.

Joseph S. Clark, Jr.
Mayor

JSCJr-mc

Zenkl, Peter

January 15, 1953

Dear Mr. Clark:

I trust you will not regard this letter as presumptuous. Having learned that you are giving consideration to appointing Dr. Petr Zenkl to some post in your administration, I am impelled to write you about him.

I have known him since he was Lord Mayor of Prague, in 1937, and found him seven years later in the concentration camp at Buchenwald. As you are undoubtedly aware, he then returned to become Deputy Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia; was placed under house arrest when the Communists took over, and finally managed to escape. Zenkl is no ordinary refugee. He is loath to be subsidized by refugee funds; he was, and is, one of the greatest exponents of democratic principles to be found anywhere in Europe.

I cannot speak for his professional skill in any post for which you may be considering him, but I felt obligated to give this brief testimony regarding the man himself. He is entirely in the tradition of Masaryk and Benes, and I commend him to you without reservation.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable John Sill Clark, Jr.
Mayor of the City of Philadelphia
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Zenkl, Peter

Dr Petr Zenkl
265[illegible] - 16 Street, N.W.
Washington D.C.

December 21,1949

Dear Sir,

In keeping with my promise I am sending you in the meantime the following particulars :

1./ My curriculum vitae - should there be any need for it,

2./ Several small items of different character,

3./ Several events from the Nazi concentration camp,

4./ An example how the Communists prepared their after-war activity whilst in Nazi concentration camps / Could be worked out in detail /.

5./ Particulars about the torture to death of Col. Lukas, former Czechoslovak military attache in Washington.

6./ Broadcast meditation „A sentenced priest."

I shall send you other items in the near future.

I am looking forward to see you soon again and remain in the meantime with kindest personal regards,

Sincerely Yours,

Zenkl

P.S. Could you kindly notify me which of the about items you cannot use, so that I could utilize them otherwise.

Z E N K L Petr: born June 13, 1884 in Tabor, Bohemia, Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak citizen.

Education: Elementary School and Junior College, Tabor, Bohemia. Graduate studies at the Faculty of Philosophy at the Charles University of Prague.

Degree: Doctor of Philosophy, Charles University of Prague, 1907; Honorary Doctor of Philosophy degree of the University of Strasbourg, France, 1947.

Occupation:
(1907-1918)- Teaching at Commercial College, Graduate School of Social Service, Praha, Agricultural University in Tabor, Bohemia, Commercial University, Prague.

(1918-1926)- Ministry of Social Welfare, Chief of the Division for the social welfare of children especially of underprivileged, and for the Public Assitance of the aged.

(1926-1948)- General Manager of the Czechoslovak Social Security system.

Public Activity - Educational

(1910-1918)- Organization of educational courses and lecture series for the general public, particularly labor. Organization of educational activity for the working youth. Lectures, courses, pamphlets, editing of popular educational symposia (particularly in matters relating to social welfare, social policy, public health, care of the poor and so on).

Literary Activities: Published High school textbooks on literature and language, many articles, pamphlets and books dealing with the problems of Social Welfare and Social Policy.

Public Administration and Politics:
From 1911-1921 member of the City Council of Karlin. Chairman of its Committee for Public Welfare, particularly for the assistance to the needy; later Mayor of the town Karlin.

(1939-1946)- In Nazi Concentration Camps.

(1921-1946)- With the enforced interruption, while jailed in Nazi Concentration Camps, member of the Administration of the City of Prague, member of the City Council, Chairman of its Central Committee for Social Welfare and public assistance to the needy; for three terms Lord Mayor of the City of Prague.

(1932-1936)- Member of the Provincial Diet of Bohemia, Chairman of its Committee for Social Welfare and public assistance to the needy.

(1938) - Member of the Czechoslovak Government, Minister of Social Welfare and Public Health.

1946-1948 - First Deputy Prime Minister until the February Communist coup.
August 12, 1948 escaped from Czechoslovakia; September 17, 1948 arrived in the United States.
From March 1949 to date Chairman of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia.

In the Field of social welfare, was a functionary in the years 1907 1948 (secretary, chairman and other positions) in various voluntary associations, corporations and institutions, dealing with the welfare of infants, disabled children, mothers, children with physical or mental defects, minor factory youths, welfare of young male and female workers, welfare of the aged, poor, sick and disabled. Further, in organizations dealing with occupational guidance, recreation centers, institutions fighting tuberculosis and other diseases. He was chairman of the Associati of Social Health Institutions of Czechoslovakia and chairman of similar Czechoslovak-Yugoslav association. He extended his activities on an international scale, in particular by participating in many conferences, planning organizations and institutions in this field in other countries, by giving lectures, or directly participating in the establishment of such institutions in Poland, France, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, Switzerland, Austria Greece, Latvia and Lithuania.

Many reviews and articles were written, as well as studios made abou his activities in the field of public administration, social policy and social welfare (in Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Bulgaria, France, U.S.A. and elsewhere).

For such activities he was awarded many honors by various government and foreign institutions.

During the war he spent almost 6 years in a Nazi concentration camp.

His 40 years in the field of public administration, social welfare, public health and care for the needy, encompassed nearly all the sectors of private welfare activity, as well as all sectors of public action in this sphere; whether it was the sphere of activity of the community of the district, the province or the state.

He was active in all these sectors either as a professional worker, or government public officer. His activities extended both to theoretical preparation, practical field work, organization, as well as its propagatio among the public, in particular to arouse its interest and to get support for such projects. His theoretical findings were applied in the wide praxis of daily life, particularly in actual case work, but above all in legislation. Through his extensive lecturing and publications, he spread understanding and achieved support for an orderly systematic solution of the problems of modern social welfare and for a progressive social policy. At the same time, by thorough research of the social conditions of various sections of the country or groups within the community and by an analysis of the problems, particularly of the city of Prague, prepared a reliable foundation for the practical solution of the problems. Simultaneously by giving lectures and courses at the Graduate School for Social Workers, he educated a considerable number of trained social service personnel to carry out in practice his ideas and proposals in these fields.

Among his greatest achievements is the model social welfare system of the city of Prague. To achieve this it was necessary to combine into one administrative unit the various social agencies of some 45 communities of which Prague consisted. This project, which combines most modern agencies of all sectors of social service and social welfare, he utilized his experience with both public and voluntary social welfare agencies in the city of Karlin, in the years 1911-1921. During the 15 years of work in the city of Prague he succeeded in establishing a model system of child welfare, particularly a system of nurseries, kindergardens, guidance clinics for pregnant mothers, playgrounds, out-of-town health and recreation centers, vacation centers for needy children, juvenile courts, professional guidance, care and supervision of working youths, In the same system the establishment of a network of lodging houses for needy transients and cheap housing projects for the poor, as well as homes for the aged, should also be included. In this respect his project of the Masaryk Housing Group earned acclaim throughout Europe. It is a unit of social welfare institutions established and built by the city of Prague, containing 4.000 beds. There are hospitals for children whose health is in danger, health institutions for children with chronic incurable diseases and homes for the old.

His experience in the field of social welfare was also utilized in the establishment and management of the Czechoslovak Social Insurance System of which he was an organizer and later the General Manager. His previous experience and constant research enabled him to bring into harmony the functions and activities of the social insurance system with those of private welfare organizations with great success in all the sectors of social welfare.

Indecorous maneuver of the Germans evicted from Czechoslovakia.

Everybody remembers well how many tens of thousand Czechoslovaks were innocemtly sent to Nazi concentration camps and forced labor camps, how many were tortured and killed, how many were kept prisoners for many years under the most cunning conditions, how their property was looted and robbed etc.

And now some Germans believe, especially those who came to Germany from Czechoslovakia, that they will bring about the oblivion of all those terrible horrors committed by the Nazis, by enlarging some events which happened during the mass transportation of Germans from Czechoslovakia. Certainly nobody will find excuses and give his consent any irregularities which are understandable but not excusable even during such a large scale movement, but which are nothing in comparison with all the horrors committed by the Nazis against their opponents. It would be better even for the Germans not to liven up these events ! How could it stand comparison with gas chambers, mass murders, death injections, hanging etc.etc.

A sentenced priest.

No doubt, you know that in Czechoslovakia the Communists convicted and sent to prison priests, and probably will continue to do so in the future, who have refused to serve the sacraments of his church to a Communist. I am asking you to-day to think with me about this reality which is worth while for reflection. Because hardly anything shows so well the complete horror, degeneration and - I must also add - thoughtlessness of the communist regime.

Why does the church refuse to serve the sacraments to Communists ? Because it believes rightfully that they cannot be of any use to a believing Communist. Because the sacraments without faith in God, without repentance over committed crimes and without the wish to corect them, are not only dead , but according to the learnings of the church even harmful, because it is done sacrilegiously. And are Communists not approaching the sacraments sacrilegiously ? Communism teaches that there is no God, that religion is an opium for people, that the church is an invention of capitalists etc. I ask you, can a person who believes all this and declares it, have any profit in receiving the sacraments ? You would believe that every priest who refuses a bad Communist the sacraments would receive from the Communists, from the true believers of communism, a praise that he is not aiding the superstition of a bad Communist. You would believe that such a priest would be praised that he is not trying to gain an erring Communist for his camp. If religion is the opium for people - as is written on the church at the Red Square in Moscow - then the Communists should welcome if their own followers are not poisoned by this poison. This is, of course, the way every logical person would be thinking. And this is the way it would be in reality, if ..... yes, if it were only a case for the Communists to slander religion and not only a mean to gain and keep their power.

Religion, my dear listeners, is the expression of relationship between God and the human being. And the Communists cannot possibly stand it that a person could have other relationships than with them; even to have perhaps some duties and obligations, which would precede obligations which they themselves impose on people.

Stalin himself wants to be a God and therefore his portrait is being carried as a large ikon in parades and processions. The Communists are against religion, because they do not want that that which belongs to God to be given to God. And what does belong to God ? First of all the soul. And the Communists desire even the human soul - the same way as the devils want them in tails, the way Mefistofeles in Goethe's Faust. They want for people to sign a bond with their blood. They even want to steal the human soul, to "nationalize it ", as if it were a shoe repair shop, or a wholesale business. Because they know that if they do not posess the human soul, their kingdom is not complete and not eternal.

Now I come to the most important : The Communists are modest - if they cannot have everything immediately. If they cannot have immediately the whole person with his heart and soul, they are content for the time being with his hands and back. They prefer, if it is not possible from the beginning, a miserable Communist who slaves for them even if he does not believe their teaching, to a free man. Therefore they do not like the question whether they are for religion or against it. For the time being they like the shadow of uncertainty in which they can fish - just like the devils of all times and ages. Therefore, and only for this reason suddenly, against their better conviction, they begin to state, that even a good Christian can be a good Communist. They suddenly feel weak and do not wish people to think and once and for all to decide either for God or for communism, or for communism and against God.

And therefore, dear listeners, I ask you not help the Communists to preserve this twilight which they like so much and in which they intend to foil your mind. Ask them specific and clear questions whether they are for religion or against it. Ask them why the communist newspapers write that the refusal to serve the sacraments to a Communist is a hateful action ? Ask them whether they believe that the acceptance of the sacrament decides whether the soul of the dying person will go to heaven or to hell. And if they do not believe it, what wrong did that priest commit ? Ask them firmly : do you believe or not ? Make them answer yes or no ! Make an end to their evasivness. If the performance of a priest is fraud, then why do they

imprison him if he is not committing a fraud ? Force them that once and for all their language should be : " Yes,Yes - no, no ! "

Dear listeners ! The imprisoned priest for refusing to serve the sacraments to a Communist is a sign of a great moral and idealistic misery of our time. But mainly it is a great admission of the communist weakness, communist fear of religion, fear of undestructable believe even of the ordinary human being in something higher than communist talk. The Communists themselves must see the absurdity and lack of logic of their brutal action. But fear, as is known, brings about lack of logic and mistakes, a fearful person never thinks clearly - if he thinks at all. And so, dear listeners, the imprisoned priest is an examplary declaration to the wide world of communist helplessness and thoughtlessness caused by thei panic fear. A fear every devil has of the cross, of that cross on which a man died but who has proved most famously the immortality and ever lasting free human soul.

From the end of the war until 1947, Col.of the General Staff, Karel LUKAS, was in Washington, attached to the Czechoslovak Embassy as Military Attache. No doubt many people remember him well who were in touch with him during his activity in the United States of America. Lukas / read : Lukass /, was a regular military man and active during both foreign resistance movements during the first and second world war and among others also took part in Montgomery's African offensive. This Col.Lukas was imprisoned by the Communists without any reason, tortured and tortured to death. Eye witnesses have stated that he was tortured with the use of methods employed during the questioning of political prisoners, i.e.democrats, which makes people with normal feelings shudder.

He was beaten with clubs from the sole of his feet up to his knees which caused the renewal of his war injury and both legs transformed into pillars due to swellings. The soles of his feet were exposed to continuous blows from all directions so that the nails were torn off. In the same way the whole body was exposed to blows and also pricked with clubs until the skin was penetrated. Fist blows caused heavy injuries to his lips and eyes. The body was beyond recognition.

During his questioning methods were used very common for to-day's Prague regime :

1./ The play called bear : Approximately 6 police members are posted in a circle and beat the helpless Colonel who had to walk past them in a circle blindfolded. He was beaten with clubs on all parts of the body. Then he had to walk on his toes which strains the muscles which were receiving blows even more painful.

2./ Then followed a five minutes "rest" for him to think it over. Refusing to respond to the wishes of the police he had to kneel on a chair and place his hands on the support The legs were then securely fastened to the chair. Blows followed to the soles of his feet, alternately along and across until the nails were torn off.

When he fainted cold water was thrown at him and the torture continued.

In this way he was tortured to death and died of interior hemorrhage. This was the death of the courageous Col.Karel Lukas only because he was a democrat and refused to to serve the communist oppressors of his own nation. This case is testified by eye witnesses and the names of the barbarian servants of the murdering regime are known.

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Nazi concentration camps - school for communist practice after the war.

The Nazis - the Communists ! Two extremes ? Not quite. Two extremely similar systems. Similar in aims, totalitarian, imperialistic interests, even in weapons and means, dishonest propaganda, half truth, lies, creation of fear, torture, forced admission of crimes never committed, torture of prisoners, forced labor, artificial court procedure with false documents etc.

The Communists as prisoners of Nazi concentration camps used even these camps in order to follow their aims. To be able to do this they had to win the favor of the Nazis and then persecuted their democratic co-prisoners, their adversaries, who were also held prisoners in those camps. Many democrats perished in Nazi concentration camps through such communist action. Many outstanding personalities of the communist political world, many members of communist regimes in people's democracies are former prisoners of Nazi concentration camps / as an example the French Minister Marcel Paul, the Polish Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister Zapotocky and others /. Very few people know that a great part of communist after-war co-operation began and was tested already during the war in Nazi concentration camps.

The Communists realized the opportunity to misuse the Nazi camps for their own aims. They took over part of the Nazi's duties in the administration and running of the camp and thereby of a part of the Nazi's power over the prisoners; decisions over the fate the life and death of prisoners, namely those of democratic, anti-communist attitude.

Misusing of power for Communist aims of post-war internationale co-operation :

1./ Buying of souls,
2./ Rewarding of party members,
3./ Removing of democratic opponents,
4./ Dealings with informers and spies,
5./ Rescue of Communist agents,
6./ Ingratiation with the Nazis by means of special services / gifts,handicraft work, drawing up of scientific papers for doctors degrees etc./
7./ Struggle for the youth,
8./ Preparation of the so-called underground movement and of liberation activities. Trumping-up of legends designed for the mystification of the public opinion.
9./ Intelligence work and contact with the world outside the camp,
10./Setting up of communist National committees,
11./Setting up of communist international committees,
12./Creation of national action committees disguised under social aid activities,
13./Preparation of international co-operation among Communists,
14./Instructions from outside and working program of post-war policy,
15./Exploiting the liberation of the camp by the 3rd Army of General Patton for communist propaganda.
16./The communist camp police.
17,/Speedy return of Communists from camp.
18./Creation of unrest in the camp after its liberation and of disorder in the camp papers.
19./The Communists after their return from the camp.
20./Organizing of campaigns of lies and distortions against democratic inmates of the camp.
21./Misuse of the so-called retribution proceedings against Nazi administrators who knew Communist misdeeds.
22./The same on the international field during the trials of Nazi administrators of the camp.
23./Glossing over of Communist offences.
24./Why can we not read the truth about the Communists in the literature concerning concentration camps.
25./The pupils surpassing their teachers ; Communists - Nazis.
   a./ examples of infiltration
   b./ the method of provoking fear
   c./ the breaking of adversaries by creating uncertainty
   d./ the method of lies and frauds
   e./ rewarding of fellow-travellers
   f./ the methods of censorship.

A perfect evidence that the Communists act according to the principles that the aim justifies the means. The change of the methods of Communist camp propaganda during the

war an unmistakable evidence that the Communists are capable of substituting one extremist principle to another one, supposing it serves their ultimate objectives. These they pursue by means of deceits, frauds, lies, intrigues as well as murders and through removals of opponents by the most insiduous methods.

At the same time they cover up their abominable doings by slogans about liberators, fighters for freedom and democracy.

Under the cloak of a propaganda about their being the propagators of true culture they aim at the destruction of all culture and civilization, being ruthless fanatics of an insane ideology.

ADDRESS BY DR. PETR ZENKL
AT THE
ONESTO HOTEL - CANTON, OHIO
MONDAY EVENING, NOVEMBER 22, 1948.

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WILLIAM E. UMSTATTD, PRESIDING

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MR. UMSTATTD

We are just a little bit behind time, so I am going to start at once with the few remarks that I want to make before we hear the main speaker of the evening.

These meetings started, as you may recall, sometime in the Fall of 1946. For many years we, at The Timken Company, have been very cognizant of the fact that there has been a Communist penetration in the United States in many different walks of life and in many different types of activity.

The labor unions have had trouble with Communists; the Churches in this country have had trouble with Communists; the business establishments and political bodies have been bothered by Communists, and nothing much was being done about it until in May, 1946, Cardinal Spellman published an article in the American Magazine and called to the attention of the United States that Communism was a real and existing menace. Undoubtedly, Cardinal Spellman had sources of information that were not only authentic, but quite extensive. His article was exceedingly well prepared and he has since written several others along the same line.

After as eminent a churchman as Cardinal Spellman made the attack on Communism, it became a little more popular for people to express their distrust and apprehension about the penetration of Communism in our political bodies. Up to that time it seemed to be a rather dangerous thing to speak out against Communism. One was called a "Red baiter" and other names that are hardly fit to be mentioned here this evening. However, after Spellman's article, other people wrote articles. The F.B.I. made pronouncements and the Department of Justice commenced to get on the trail of some of the known and most outspoken Communists, and I think they uncovered quite a few others.

But our company felt that it would be a wise investment to bring some people to Canton who could speak authentically about Communism. The first man we brought was Howard Rushmore, who at one time was City Editor of the Daily Worker and who, after denouncing the Communist Party, became Labor Editor of the Hearst Publications in New York City. We brought Louis Waldman, who was quite prominent in labor circles in New York and probably represents today more labor unions than any lawyer in the world. He was Socialistic at one time and later renounced Socialism because he felt it was too closely parallel with Communism. He was a very interesting speaker. We also had former Representative Pettingill, who at one time was on the Democratic side of the House of Representatives in Washington and recently has been making quite a name for himself

as a radio commentator. We invited Louis Budenz, but our wires got crossed and he was brought to Canton by the American Legion and the Breakfast Club of St. Johns Church, I believe - one of the Catholic Churches, at least. And we intend to keep on with this program of apprising people of the Communist penetration in the United States, despite the attack we have had from several labor leaders in this city, castigating the company and me in particular for having these men come to Canton to speak out against Communism.

I can't get over one statement that has been quoted at great length, not only by our company, but many other companies throughout the United States and by various radio commentators, and that is a known statement recently made by William Z. Foster, who is the head of the Communist Party in the United States. He made this statement before a Committee on Un-American Activities in the United States House of Representatives. I presume he believed what he was saying - he made it under oath.

> "No Communist, no matter how many votes he should secure in a national election, could, even if he would, become President of the present government. When a Communist heads the government of the United States - and that day will come just as surely as the sun rises - the government will not be a capitalist government but a Soviet government, and behind this government will stand the Red Army to enforce the dictatorship of the proletariat."

That to me is an intriguing statement. It is a forerunner of what we might have in store for us if the Communist penetration becomes more effective than it is today. One Communist in a group of one hundred or even one thousand can be very effective, and I am sure the speaker of the evening will touch on that subject, because he happens to be a victim of Communist penetration. At present he is a man without a country.

He was Vice-Premier of Czechoslovakia, a country of some 12,000,000 people, that was set up after World War 1 as the ideal Republic of the world, headed by Thomas Masaryk, a great politician and statesman and a man of extremely high character. The speaker this evening was a very close friend of Thomas Masaryk and his son, Jan Masaryk, who died in Czechoslovakia not long ago from either falling or being forced from a window in a place where he was incarcerated by the Communist Party.

The speaker was at one time Lord Mayor of Prague. He has been an instructor and professor in several Universities in Czechoslovakia and throughout other places in Europe, and has acted as an advisor not only to his own Government, but to other Governments in Europe on matters such as social progress and things of such nature. He has been extended high honors by these Governments whom he has served and is a wearer of the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor of France.

I think it is particularly fitting that he be with us tonight to speak upon this vital subject. He gave an extremely interesting talk today at noon. He is a most brilliant man. I think you will enjoy his talk, and it gives me great pleasure to introduce Dr. Petr Zenkl, former official of Czechoslovakia, not only in the City of Prague, but of the Federal Government. He was, as a

matter of fact, the last Democratic Vice Premier of that ill-fated country before the Cominform and the Communists took it over and pulled down upon it the Iron Curtain.

It gives me great pleasure to introduce Dr. Petr Zenkl.

APPLAUSE

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DR. ZENKL

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: I must beg you to excuse my bad English, because it is not easy for me. I know you are too kind to me and say "take it easy", but it is easier said than done.

First of all, I want to give you my heartfelt thanks for having made it possible for me to come and talk about certain things which I consider it my sacred duty to tell about. I feel this duty as a man who believes in humanity and who respects the civilization of our time, and I feel it also as a believer in democracy who respects man.

It seems to me that fate has given me a certain mission. It was my lot to live under five governmental regimes in the same country. The first was under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, then in the young, democratic republic under the leadership of T. G. Masaryk, then under the cruel and violent Nazi protectorate, then under the semi-democratic regime which followed the second World War, and finally under the intolerable Communist dictatorship which came after February, 1948. I was three times Mayor of Prague. I was three times a member of the Government nominated by my friends. It was my lot to spend six long years in a Nazi concentration camp and to be sentenced to hang by the Nazis. It was six days before the camp was liberated by the Army of General Patton.

An attempt was organized by Communists last year against my life and against Jan Masaryk, also my friend, and from the first day of the coup I was put in confinement. They didn't dare to imprison me, because I was too popular for them, so they watched me day and night by a group of sixty Communist watchers and when I walked through the streets, when I visited my doctor, my barber, when I visited the grave of my father in the cemetery, when I visited in the Church, they were always with me with pistols and with revolvers. And still my life was always saved and freedom given back to me - twice at the hands of your countrymen, for which I shall always be grateful to them.

But perhaps I was allowed to live through all those horrors and survive, in order that I might help to open people's eyes in this time of confusion and chaos, so that they might realize that they are living on the edge of an abyss. Perhaps I was spared in order to speak to their consciences and arouse them from their carefree calm so that they might understand that democracy, too, must be dynamic if its antagonist, Communism, is so.

I regret that fate did not endow me with the kind of eloquence which would arouse the attention and concentration of every nerve in my listeners, for I myself am so intensely aware that there is terrible danger in delay. I know, too, that I am laying myself open to the danger of being accused of exaggeration. But I assure you that with Nazism and Communism - two completely similar evils which only have different names, different colors and different emblems - the truth is so bad that it is not possible to exaggerate.

Throughout my whole life I have tried to work in the service of humanity, in the struggle for the freedom of my people, for constructive patriotism, for social peace, for international democracy and cooperation.

After six years of faith in and longing for a lasting peace and a free country, after six years of suffering in a concentration camp, and three years of exhausting struggle for the salvation of democracy in Czechoslovakia before the rape of my country in February, 1948, after six months of being under Communist surveillance in my own home in Prague, of which I was three times the Mayor and to whose welfare I had devoted a great part of my life work, after six months of a Communist paradise which were worse for me and my wife than six years of the Nazi hell, I escaped to the free democratic States, to a free, democratic people.

I want to tell you something about my life. I have spent forty years in the field of social welfare and I have done everything that was in my power to better the situation of others. I felt it was my duty to do everything and we must try to better the situation by social progress to safeguard the social freedom in all countries. I was creator of the greatest institution of social welfare for all people in Czechoslovakia, only because I loved my country, only because I loved my nation, only because I was not a Communist and because I was a No. 1 enemy of Communism I was imprisoned by the Nazis and now the Communists.

I must plead for an understanding of my heart. I am the son of a nation which has often bled for freedom and truth, a nation from which issued a great fighter for freedom of conscience and for the truth, Jan Hus, who was not moved in his resolve even by death at the stake, and today the representatives of the governmental regime of this very people use as the main instruments of attaining their goals, lies, deception, half-truths and fraud.

I am the son of a nation which hates oppression, slavery and subjugation, and which has been or was led to freedom by Thomas Masaryk, Edvard Benes and Stefanik, with the help of the great free nations, and today the Communist usurpers are trampling the freedom of that people mercilessly, using the most despicable methods of mastering them.

I am the son of the nation whose King George of Podebrady, five hundred years ago, was seeking the way to peace among the nations, and which today is being used utterly against its will for the spreading of lying propaganda against the world democracies, which stand for world peace.

Humanity has had a terrible lesson in what is freedom and what is slavery, what is democracy and what is totalitarianism, whether under the Swastika or

under the Red Star, no matter what name masks it, and today so many act as if they did not understand all this, or had forgotten it. Things are forgotten very quickly, dangerously quickly. Beware, lest that forgetting be fatal! After three short years there has been a shortening of the sentence of that cynical wife of the head of the concentration camp at Buchenwald, Ilse Koch, as a mockery of everything that is just.

I have not spoken about things that happened to me and to my fellow-prisoners in the concentration camp because I considered the Nazi chapter of history finished. And so I didn't speak about my experience in Nazi concentration camps. But in three years, from 1945 to 1948, I gained experience of Communist behavior and of a Communist regime, and I saw an eloquent similarity between both Nazism and Communism. I think that they are not strangers to each other, but they are brothers. Communists assert publicly that they are the greatest enemy of Nazism, but their leaders have the same task and use the same methods and the same weapons as the Nazis did. There is difference only in the names, in the colors and in the emblems of those two totalitarian systems. And here I see my responsibility and the responsibility of all democrats. After the liberation of the camp the American Commander ordered Germans, Nazis and non-Nazis to visit concentration camps and see all their equipment, prisons, gallows, crematoriums, lamp shades made of tattoed human skin, and so on. And he said to them, "You, all Germans are responsible, not only the Nazis. You had the obligation to be interested in everything that happened under the Nazis." And now I see and understand that not only Communist leaders and Communists, but all of us, and especially all democrats in the world, are responsible for the future. And so I would like to tell you a few stories from my own experiences that will show you that with Nazis, as with Communists, the same weapons and means are used - lies and lying propaganda, suppression of freedom of speech, of the press and of broadcast, hypocrisy, terrorizing, intimidation, and so on.

I have spoken about passing some years in the camp. There was a man, General Koch, who was, I am sure, the greatest brute in concentration camps. His wife was second. His wife was Ilse Koch. I knew Ilse Koch. It would be, however, more correct to say that I was afraid to meet her and that I avoided meeting her, since she was one of the most feared persons in the camp. She lived and profited, together with her notorious husband, from what they squeezed out of the administration of the camp, out of tens of thousands of miserable prisoners and from embezzlement. She loved, among other things, to ride on horseback, either in the neighborhood of the camp or in the large riding academy in which later on innocent prisoners were executed. There was even a music band, composed of prisoners, which had to participate in entertaining her. To meet her was bad luck for any prisoner. Sometimes she became furious because he did not greet her, sometimes because he dared greet her, sometimes because he looked at her and sometimes simply because she was in an ill mood. She turned over his number to the administration of the camp and the prisoner was publicly beaten on his nude body in the face of thousands of other prisoners. Some prisoners considered the necessity of looking at these public beatings as an additional punishment. When they were not watched they closed their eyes, so as not to see the blood streaming from open wounds, and closed their ears so as not to hear the heartbreaking cries of the punished. But Mrs. Koch was made of tougher stuff. She used to stay at the camp fence and look at these brutal tortures with keen interest.

I did not see her within the camp, that is to say, on the territory where the barracks of the prisoners were located. But I met her often enough and even more often I quickly turned about when I saw her coming across the territory surrounding the camp itself where the buildings of the camp administration and the workshops for prisoners were located. Nearby were the villas of the overlords of the camp. In the villa of Kochs there was, allegedly, also a lampshade made of tattoed human skin. To say if it is correct is difficult for me, as for thousands of my fellow-prisoners. It could be answered reliably by those only who have been personally in that villa. Those were Koch's colleagues - and which of them would be willing to testify - maybe against himself? - or those prisoners who had to do the cleaning in that villa. Did they survive all their sufferings? Are they alive today? Or don't they feel some of the blame is on them and wouldn't they be afraid to step forward, since somebody could point his finger at them? How much information on concentration camps has been hidden, how many things have been distorted! Many legends have been built up about concentration camps to obliterate so many crimes not only of the Nazis, but also of the Communists.

I never have been in Ilse Koch's villa and thus I couldn't have seen that lampshade there. But I heard about it from fellow prisoners who asserted that the Koch's had in their home not only a lampshade, but even other articles covered with tattoed human skin, and I saw with my own eyes such articles in the concentration camp as, for example, book binding, pocket knives, and so on, and I heard people say that some of them were taken from Kochs' villa. And I remember that we showed these articles to the American soldiers after our liberation.

In the so-called pathological department I saw a large exhibition of pathological items, for example, the head of a prisoner reduced by an elaborate method to the size of a fist and a whole collection of tattoes in one or several colors. Many of them, especially those with obscene illustrations, were taken away by members of the camp administration and by prominent visitors of the camp. It has been said in the Press that such a lampshade no longer exists. This would be really a mystery, but this cannot change the fact that such lampshades have been produced, a fact which can be proved by thousands of people.

Who knows if Ilse Koch ordered such lampshades for herself? Whom would she have asked directly? Did she inform her husband? Whom did the camp Commander order to provide the lampshade? If she denies having had such a lampshade in her home, could she admit ordering it? Or did she receive it as a gift? I realize, of course, there is not a lot of difference between ordering a product of such vile sadism or taking a fancy to it and using it as interior decoration. I do not know where the lampshades were produced. I was in the pathological department since January 1943 to April 1945. During this period I did not observe the production of lampshades of human skin, but I remember that some time in 1940 an order was broadcasted according to which all prisoners with tattoes had to go to the camp hospital. This concerned as well political as criminal prisoners. Their tattoes were described, measured and even photographed. It was asserted that one of the S.S. physicians wrote a paper on them. Many scholarly papers of different kinds were prepared in the camp. For which many prisoners paid with their lives.

Who could prove now, if some prisoners were killed because of their tattoes? One who ordered it? Would he admit it? Would it be admitted by someone who carried out such an order? I observed the working on such tattoed human skin in the pathological department in 1943 and 1944. Rarely thought, but I still observed it. I took even two such items to Prague, but we who were fortunate enough having survived are insufficient witnesses, and the thousands of dead and killed people are silenced forever and cannot talk eloquently and as warning to the conscience of mankind. But their voice should still be heard. Woe to all of us if their sacrifice should have been in vain! It would be a catastrophe for mankind and its culture if anyone should misuse the fact that the dead cannot speak.

I was invited as a witness to Dachau to the trial of the criminals of Buchenwald. I was invited not to testify on single persons, but to give the court an overall picture of the concentration camp and the life in it. I said what I knew, experienced or heard. I distinguished all these sources of information carefully. I shall do the same thing whenever I shall be asked to discuss this matter. I am a guest in this country, and a grateful guest, since I live here after my escape from my country as a free man. I lost everything, but thus I saved my freedom. As a guest I do not expect to criticize the decisions of the authorities of this country which reduced the life-sentence of Ilse Koch to four years. I do not know in detail what they certainly know and what, as I hope, was not known, also, to the judges when they made their decision. But I know from my own experience that hundreds of my fellow prisoners in my country considered the original sentence on Ilse Koch just. They thought she was not sentenced to death because of her pregnancy. I do not doubt, not in the least, that the reduction in her punishment - while no serious changes in the material used against her have been published - will make a very bad impression, indeed, all over the world on thousands and thousands of people, not only prisoners, but all people. They will interpret it unfavorably. And this evil will be used and misused by those who do not shrink from the distortion of truth, if this only serves their purposes. It is self-evident for me that democracy, democracy of the western type, will never degrade itself by using false accusations, falsified confessions in protocols, 'vanishing' of documents, judicial orders and so on, like those systems which pay a noisy lip-service to justice, but are founded on lies and subterfuge. But with every change of a sentence or even with every amnesty its reasons, sufficient reasons, have to be announced publicly. Punishment must not only, if possible, reform the culprit, but also educate society.

Many people in the world know that the Nazis held a special hatred for wealthy people and that they gladly took their lives. They took a noteworthy pleasure in sending them out of the camps in transports which very seldom returned. They liked to destroy their lives with murderous experiments, injections, etc. But far fewer people know that in the later years the Nazis shared part of their power with inmates of the concentration camps, and that by far the most of those who took part in this sharing, in Buchenwald for example, were Communists. And these people used their power first of all against their fellow-prisoners in whom they saw enemies to their ideology. Therefore, the Communists sent on the transports of death also many democrats, therefore they wasted the lives of many with killing work, and with various other hidden methods when they were ill.

When I was in the concentration camp at Buchenwald, I was investigated for distributing anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi literature. The investigating S.S. man sent a Communist prisoner to get me. At the time he was working in the library and enjoyed the confidence of the Nazi supervisors. His name was Jindrich Vesely.

At the time after my resignation from the Government, when the Communist Minister of the Interior, formerly my colleague in the Government, had me guarded in my home by a whole series of secret police, he also sent to me his confidant, the man who heads the secret police in Czechoslovakia today. By chance, his name also was Jindrich Vesely.

However, what is not chance is the fact that it was the self-same Vesely, a man who was the confidant of both the Nazis and the Communists. And so in all the popular democracies today you will find amongst the chief Communist leaders many former prisoners in the concentration camps. They went to school there, they got practice, they entered into international collaboration which today it is possible to detect very accurately. So-called non-partisan, unified organizations of political prisoners, that is Communist auxiliaries, in Czechoslovakia, Poland, France and so forth, here do very valuable work.

Also in the concentration camps some of the prisoners conducted religious services, in spite of all the rules forbidding it. They would have been severely punished had they been discovered. Nazi law was very strict. The Nazis had an intense hatred of Priests. They tried to humiliate them, if possible. So, for example, my friend - my best friend from the camp - was a Priest. And this Priest, it was decided to send him on a transport and it was dangerous to be transported.

And in the concentration camp at Buchenwald the Nazis constructed a brothel for good prisoners, using women from the other camps.

The Nazi overseers were brutal and knew no limits or moderation in their punishing and tormenting of the prisoners without any reason at all. They laughed cynically at their tears and laments, not stopping beating and kicking them in the most brutal fashion. The armed men were heroes as they opposed the unarmed. But when General Patton's American Army drew near and the order came over the loud speaker that all the S.S. men should leave camp at once, they fled like cowards, they crept fearfully around the prison and ran out of the camp with everything that they still had a chance to steal. Some of the Nazis, who otherwise had spoken with the prisoners only with their hands and feet, in the last days when the American Army was drawing close, begged civilian clothes from the prisoners, in order that they might conceal their origin.

To my dying day I shall never forget the horrible impressions I experienced when I first saw tanned human skin with tattooing on it. Or the helpless prisoners being torn apart by maddened dogs and the tearing of the gold from the mouths of the poor dead prisoners. I shall never forget the experience of determining the identity of the terribly emaciated human bodies that lay in camp in piles of hundreds. When large shipments arrived with thousands of bloodied civilian garments and undergarments sent from other camps, especially from Poland, nothing upset me more than when I saw a child's silk dress pierced by bullets in several places, and how many hundreds of those there were.

When I was head of the social security in Czechoslovakia, according to my plan we started to build a large modern sanitorium in the mountains of Slovakia for those injured people who had tuberculosis. The work had gone so far that before the war the sanitorium was almost ready to take patients. Nothing remained but to add a few supplies. The sanitorium was named for the President of the Republic, T. G. Masaryk. Delegates of specialists from foreign countries came to inspect the sanitorium. The war made it impossible to start activity in it at once. When it did become active during the war in about 1944, there was a special announcement about it which asserted that the Germans brought with them progress and culture wherever they went. So even in Slovakia, in what they claimed was a God-forsaken land, immediately after their arrival, they built this sanitorium whose plans were worked out by German doctors and architects and where all the machines and instruments were of German origin. Lie upon lie. And still hundreds of thousands of eye witnesses knew it was not true.

In the camp there was a doctor without a doctorate. His name was Hoven. He was the chief of a great hospital in the concentration camp, but he was not a doctor. He did not finish his studies. In his hands rested the fate of thousands of prisoners, but he was not prepared for this task. It did not matter, for at the same time the chief of the surgical department of the hospital was a typesetter or lathe operator, and the chief of the internal department was a carpenter or something else. But how is it possible in such a case to use the words hospital and treatment? In the majority of cases it was beating, torture, maltreatment, and murder by the most cruel and most refined methods. There were vivi-sections, different experiments with poisonous teas, injections, and operations without anaesthetic. And this doctor without his doctorate commanded prisoners who also were untrained in medicine, to write scientific treatises for him about the treatment of tuberculosis with coal dust, on the basis of many experiments on prisoners. He learned these treatises by heart in three days and made his examinations at the University at Freiburg with honors. Nobody will ever count how many hundreds or maybe thousands of prisoners were murdered by this cynical doctor.

As I said before, the Nazis had an intense hatred of Priests. They tried to humiliate them in the worst ways. So, for example, a certain Catholic Priest saved his life in Buchenwald because he escaped being transported to another camp by making dissections of corpses as a specialist. The Commander of the camp left him in the camp with a sarcastic remark that "there in the company of the corpses he was in closer touch with God." And the truth is that the Priest saved by his activity in the dissection room the lives of some prisoners even though that may seem paradoxical. How did he do it? For instance, it would become known that some prisoner who died that day was dissected and declared to be the threatened person, and the threatened man was sent to another camp under the name of the dead man.

This Priest also conducted religious services secretly even though it involved the risk of his life. Other Priests who were not able to use the Nazi greeting or who forbade children to use it during their religious lessons, were obliged under the lash, day by day, to mark time in front of a box on which lay an S.S. cap, and tip their caps to it.

Communists oppress and subjugate one nation after another and they are boasting about bringing them freedom and "popular" democracy. They destroy their culture and boast that they are spreading cultures. They assert that they create a workers' paradise and they enslave workers and destroy all solid social reform. They spread evil and boast that they are doing the contrary - the same as the Nazis did.

I remember that I sat in the pathology department at my work table listening, as my duty, to the broadcast to hear if the number of some fellow-prisoners would be called by the administration of the camp. And so I heard from Berlin one day about noon: "The Nazi Germans are a noble nation, indignant at the maltreatment of animals. They create associations against the maltreatment of animals and they reward persons who have merited it by their actions. A decoration was given to a woman and to a university professor."

What sensitivity! And at the same moment in which I heard this boasting I could see through the window how a group of armed S.S. men escorted a group of unarmed prisoners of different nationalities. Some minutes after I heard shooting by which the lives of those innocent prisoners were lost.

Against human beings the Nazis were cruel and inhuman; they destroyed their lives with hunger, but to the animals which they kept in the camps they were really kind. When the prisoners were dying of hunger and starvation, animals were getting milk, meat, honey and so forth.

I saw with my own eyes how an S.S. man sicked a dog on a prisoner who was helplessly bound to the window bars because he tried to escape from the camp. I saw how dogs leaped on people and tore their clothes and bodies. The cries of the wretched prisoners, the laughter of cruel Nazis and the barking of the excited dogs blended into an unforgettable horror.

If the dog of an S.S. man died the prisoners had to stuff him for his apartment. But I received blows because I refused to put a prisoner into the crematorium who was still alive.

I shall never forget the horror which was aroused in us by the horrible cries of prisoners who were hung in trees by their hands tied behind them in the so-called "singing forest." And now you can read and hear of so many cruelties which Communists or their agents are using against the enemies of Communism.

In 1938 I had made for myself in Prague a grey suit. On the first of September, 1939, on a nice, warm day, I was wearing the suit in my office. At half past seven in the morning, two Gestapo men in civilian dress entered my room and ordered me to follow them for a few minutes for a statement. And those minutes lasted almost six years. They took me in a cab to the greatest prison in Prague. An interesting remark: When I organized the social service of the City of Prague, the greatest institution for the old, poor and chronically ill in Europe was named the Masaryk Home because people loved their liberator, Thomas Garrigue Masaryk. And now the same people gave to the greatest prison in Prague the name Gottwald's Home as the proof of its feelings towards him. And so I came into this prison. After some days I was transported to the concentration camps Dachau and then Buchenwald. Immediately after my

arrival they took my clothes and put them into a storeroom. They cut our hair, shaved us and dressed us in prisoner's garb. And I had fortune in misfortune.

In the last weeks before the end of the war the Nazis began to steal and transport the clothes of the living prisoners. But they did it according to numbers, beginning with the highest, and I was in the camp almost six years, so they did not come to my low number. When the American Army of General Patton liberated the camp, I received after six years my grey suit in which I had passed the last days of my freedom before the war and now the first moments of my regained liberty after the war. In this suit I came in the care of American soldiers to London to escape the persecution of Communist fanatics in the camp, because they considered me as the No. 1 enemy of Communism. In this suit I returned after six years imprisonment to Prague, to my country which had regained its freedom, unfortunately, only seemingly.

In the month of February, 1948, when I resigned as Deputy Prime Minister because I refused to help the Communists in their efforts to introduce totalitarian police regime in Czechoslovakia, the Communists did not dare to imprison me and so they gave orders that I should be watched by groups of Communist volunteers, fanatics and agents. They accompanied me at every step, on my walks, on my visits to the doctor, to the barber, to Church, to the cemetery and so on. They were armed with revolvers and pistols, but they watched me, as they said, only for my own protection.

At last, after five months of terrible mental suffering, I succeeded in escaping with my wife. I did not escape my watchers. It was not possible without hurting them and I couldn't bear to pay for my escape by doing harm to another person. And so I escaped with my guards who were also not able to endure life without freedom. Three men and the wife of one of them are now waiting in the American Zone in Germany until I shall find for them a job in democratic America. This is also one of my tasks in America, a debt that I owe for my freedom.

But I must finish with my suit. When I prepared my escape I decided to escape from my enslaved country into a free foreign country in the same grey suit in which I already once before had escaped from slavery to freedom. In this suit I left my shackled country and I came as a free man to the free United States. I have only one desire - to return in that suit soon to my liberated country.

We wanted the world to judge our nation by Masaryk and Benes, that is, by those representatives who stood uncompromisingly for a free vote. For this reason, the Czechs and Slovaks must not be judged today by the actions of the present usurpers who seized power by force and held it against the will of the majority of the people.

Just as happened before, our people again are under foreign domination and are thrall to a foreign power and kept in this state by force. In the Czechoslovak Republic the Czechoslovak people do not govern, not even the Communist people govern, but only a handful of Communist usurpers who rule according to the directions of strangers, of Moscow and the Cominform.

In Czechoslovakia there is no democracy, there is a sham democracy, boastfully called popular. In Czechoslovakia there is neither political nor personal

freedom and safety. There is only force, oppression and terror. In Czechoslovakia there is no freedom of information, of the Press and of speech. There are only the controlled releases of the Communists. In Czechoslovakia there are no human rights, no human dignity and equality - but only surreptitiousness, the caste system, class hatred and the spoils system.

The slogan of the Czechoslovak Republic - "Truth Prevails" - does not proclaim a reality of the present, but is only the expression of the hope and faith of millions in the future. This slogan was betrayed by the sons and daughters of the nation who were seduced by red ideology, foreign to the national tradition of Czechoslovakia. Because of their loyalty to the national ideals of Czechoslovakia, thousands of her courageous sons and daughters are expelled from schools, discharged from work, arrested and thrown into jail. They are falsely accused and sentenced on the basis of false testimony and in the course of fixed trials.

There is an unbelievable amount of cynicism and hypocrisy which knows how to make use of so much falsehood, fiction, untruth, half-truth, rumor, loaded reports, rigged up trials, attempts at assassination and so forth. It is spreading like the plague, unheeded, stealthily. If the world does not take heed in time, it will be overwhelmed by this plague.

In the Czechoslovak Republic free newspaper men are sentenced to silence. Active journalists in the "popular" democracies are the grave-diggers of freedom and human rights, they are the cowardly ravishers of truth and human dignity, they feed on man's moral poverty.

We call upon the free journalists of the real democracies to aid us in our fight for truth and for the freedom of our sorely suffering nations. Our nations suffer immeasurably, but they are conducting themselves courageously. They are insulted, dulled, persecuted, but they do not give in. In spite of all the lies and deceptions of the regime, there is no doubt about the real thinking of the people. The nation showed it at the elections, really sham elections, at the sokol celebrations in Prague, at the funeral of its beloved President Benes. The people show it by their listening to foreign broadcasts, especially from London, Paris and America. They show it by their exclamations and slogans. They show it by the glances they exchange with one another. They show it by the red and white flowers in a black vase. They show it by their tears at the grave of the unknown soldier and when they glance towards the President's residence, dishonored once by Hitler and now by Gottwald, They show it by their words and by their silences. They suffer, they suffer terribly, but they hope and have faith. The underground is once again the altar of their faith. That faith must not be betrayed.

All good people must become helpers in its realization. Not even the freest nation can enjoy its freedom if it must have the consciousness that there are nations in the world who long for freedom and democracy, but have been deprived of them by force by oppressors.

The interests and the security of the world democracy are indivisible. Czech and Slovak democrats, in the very instant when it was clear that their majority in the nation was irresistibly growing, were thrown into the streets with sly and brutal force. Faith in democracy and democrats gives them

strength in their suffering and in their resistance. They believe that the world democracies will achieve that state in which it will be impossible for anyone to trample on the idea for which the terrible war was fought and won, so that even small nations will be able to live freely according to their wishes and so that the agreements of non-interference are not broken. A bit of happiness will bloom for everyone in this world only when the gluttons are satisfied with their share.

The Czechs and Slovaks long for peace with all their souls. They are weary to death from the centuries-long thralldom to the Austro-Hungarian rule, from the first World War, the six years of Nazi occupation and the three years of struggle in the defense of democracy. Even though they were free for only a few years after the first World War, they made a demonstration, in spite of some mistakes, through their young democracy, that they could run their own affairs, that they wanted to create social justice, that they wanted to erase from their character the results of not being free, that they wanted to go the way of progress and to work honorably with others, to be sure as the small work with the great, but still as the free working with the free. They believe that freedom must not be only a privilege of the great and powerful, and that democracy equals freedom and totalitarianism equals slavery. For them life without freedom is not life.

For all these reasons the present condition of Czechoslovakia is a heavy indictment of the world and an appeal for an effective solidarity of the democracies. It is not the Czechs and Slovaks calling for their freedom. Their lips call all democrats to the defense of all democracy and human rights.

I can realize that it must be hard for the citizens of democratic states to understand the horror in a dictatorship and a totalitarian popular democracy. They are, to tell the truth, unbelievable things. But this makes the danger all the greater, and also increases the responsibility of the free Press and of representatives in public life, to tell the people the unvarnished truth. To tell them that under the idea of popular democracy is concealed Communistic totalitarianism. A usurpers' Government of Communists and quislings obeying the commands of Moscow and the Cominform, is called a democratic Government! Under the slogan of freedom of speech all the free printing presses are suppressed and nothing is left but the Communist Press, with the Communist state broadcast, with a Communist ministry of information, with a Communist state film monopoly, and with Communist supervision of all production of literature and art. Under the slogan of freedom of education, all education is seized by the Communists and children made stupid by the Communists from their earliest years. Seized and subordinated by the Communists were the powerful sokol gymnastic organization, the labor unions, the youth groups, women's organizations, organizations of political prisoners, participants in the national struggle from both World Wars. Next in turn will come the Church, farmers and the intelligentsia. Everything, every single thing, is being put in a refined way to the service of Communism aiming at mastery of the whole world, as the Czechoslovak Minister Nejedly, lackey of Moscow and the Cominform, only recently proclaimed again.

Experiences like those I have told you about were the hardest burdens of punishment and imprisonment. I was reaching the extreme point of feeling that I could not, with all the moral strength I had, endure any more and that the

time had come when I should reach for the poison which I had carried with me for the worst hours since the Nazis had rolled into Czechoslovakia, and the supply of which I renewed when the Communists forced their way to power in February of this year.

In Buchenwald there was an underground organization of prisoners. Its real object was Communism. It helped the Communists, if it was necessary to eliminate political opponents. It got control of the so-called camp police, of most of the leading positions in the so-called self-government of the prisoners, and so forth. The greatest majority of important positions in the camp were in their hands. Woe to him who tried to stand in the way of their efforts. Many even of the democratic prisoners of the camp saved their lives only by serving them or by collaborating with them. The same system which now prevails in the popular democracies. The Communists were not ashamed to use a Nazi concentration camp as a protection against their anti-Communistic fellow-prisoners, and now they organize new concentration camps.

Six days before the arrival of the American Army the Nazis feared that some of the prisoners might influence the others and that it might come to some kind of demonstration of resistance. For this reason 46 prisoners were chosen and called to the political section. They were to be executed. Amongst them was one single Czech. That honor belonged to me. I saved my life by hiding from the Nazis and their bloodhounds night and day under a square of floor, in a sewer, then in the hospital ward for typhus patients, dysentery patients, etc. Naturally I had to make over my face and my expression, and live under the strange name and number of a dead fellow-prisoner. If the liberating American army had not come, there would have been no rescue for me.

Those six years of imprisonment. That constant uncertainty about tomorrow. The uncertainty about the fate of those dear to me. The uncertainty of life and death day after day and night after night, that looking of death in the face for six whole years, and especially those last days and nights, taught me to look at life differently. It spurred my sense of responsibility to society. It obliges me to arouse the conscience of the world and call attention to the danger which threatens humanity. It did all that. I experienced those so-called last moments before death, when it seemed that every second would be the last. And I know that the greatest comfort in such an hour is if a person can say to his own conscience that he has fulfilled his duty as a man. Rich or poor, a clean conscience is the greatest riches and in the end the only comfort. And all of us have the judgment of our own consciences in our own hands. Can there be anyone who would not want this judgment to sound well?

American citizens, I know quite well what the United States has done already twice for the liberation of Czechs and Slovaks. And so I consider it my duty to tell you of some ways to avoid the danger so that I would not have on my conscience the thought that I have not been sincere to you. Americans, you don't realize how rich you are! You don't realize how happy you are that you have freedom and democracy. This is the greatest wealth of mankind.

And this is what I would advise the Americans. Maintain your wealth, your freedom, your democracy. Maintain it, protect it and safeguard it. Perhaps you think this is not necessary, but I say to you that neither your freedom

nor your democracy are safe while other nations who believe in democracy and human rights, too, are oppressed and enslaved by the Communists. The interests of democracy are indivisible. If democracy is to be saved, it is not only necessary to protect what has not yet been touched, but to remedy what has already been affected. If all democracies are not protected, all will be lost. This is the very imminent moment of danger.

The Communists assert that the United States doesn't want peace. It is the practice of the Communists always to suspect others of doing or preparing what the Communists themselves, even secretly are doing or preparing. So they said, for instance, that the Czechoslovak democratic parties intended to organize a putsch in the Czechoslovak Republic, but it was not true. The Communists prepared and organized the violent putsch and took the power into their hands. And so it is with their statements that the Western democracies would attack others.

Only the Communists, the Soviets and their satellites, are aggressive and imperialistic, and all the democrats throughout the world know that the Western democracies are willing to do everything possible in their power for a lasting, just peace. The USSR is acting against the ideals for which the terrible war against Nazism was undertaken. The Soviets are interferring in the internal affairs of other nations in spite of all the promises of Stalin and Molotov. They have the same plan and goal and are using the same methods as Hitler did. They say that they don't wish to wage war or be aggressive against anybody, but they are doing so and are becoming masters in one country after the other. It is so much cheaper and more favorable than a regular war would be for them.

Thank you, Gentlemen.

- -

MR. UMSTATTD

It is getting a little late and I don't think that I can add anything to the message that Dr. Zenkl has given us, but despite the fact that it may be repetitious, I want to read something to you just once more. This is what the Communists say in a sworn statement made by William Z. Foster, head of the Communist Party in the United States:

> "No Communist, no matter how many votes he should secure in a national election, could, even if he would, become President of the present government. When a Communist heads the government of the United States - and that day will come just as surely as the sun rises - the government will not be a capitalist government but a Soviet government, and behind this government will stand the Red Army to enforce the dictatorship of the proletariat."

Sometime, at some date, there must have been a group of business and professional men who sat down at a dinner in Prague or some other city in Czechoslovakia.

Perhaps it was in the 20's or early 30's, and I dare say none of those men felt that they would ever be under the heel of a Nazi ruler or a Communist ruler, but they were under the heel of the Nazis for a matter of years and they are under the heel of the Communists now and may be for a number of years to come.

So, when we become a little too smug and we think it can't happen here, just remember one thing, that there are Communists in the City of Canton who openly hold meetings and have visiting speakers come from New York, Chicago and San Francisco and address those meetings. They openly boast in the Daily Worker and in the Sunday edition of that paper, the Worker, that they are making great strides in securing new members for the Communist Party in the United States, and that they have secured many new members in the City of Canton, Ohio, where such persons as Elizabeth Flynn and others of the Communist Party have spoken to open meetings of the Communists.

So don't get too smug and say it can't happen here. It is happening here now. It is just a question of how far it is going to go. I don't know how many Communists it takes to dominate an organization. In a conversation I had with Dr. Zenkl at lunch today, he was fearful that if one Communist would get in the Cabinet of France that the entire democratic French Government would be imperiled.

I don't know how many Communists it would take in our political bodies to control the situation, or how many it would take in a business organization, in a labor Union, in a Church, in a woman's Club, but I can tell you this, that Communists are prodigious workers. They are tireless workers. They are zealous. They never give up. They can change face from day to day, without any embarrassment at all, as witness the fact that the Daily Worker was screaming against the Imperialistic government of the United States one day when Germany and Russia were allies and the next day when Russia had been invaded by the German Army, the United States ceased to be an Imperialistic government and was the Savior of the world because it advanced lend-lease material to the USSR.

So I think it is only intelligent selfishness on our part to fight the inroads of Communism. That is what our company believes in doing. That is what I believe personally in doing. That is what I hope the large majority of the people in this audience believe in doing. Some people may disagree with me and think that Communism is not so bad, and that, of course, is their right in a country such as ours, but I do believe if a person had the opportunity to see the workings of Communistic States, you would most certainly say that we want none of it in the United States.

And I want to thank Dr. Zenkl personally and on behalf of our company and on behalf of this audience for the message that he has so ably delivered and I hope that it will go a long way towards advancing our preparation and our vigilance against the penetration of Communistic influences in this country of ours.

Thank you very much.

APPLAUSE

The satellite countries of communism had to co-ordinate their economic plans in accordance with a unified plan. The leading slogan is : All for the good of the Soviet Union ! The own interests of the individual satellite and its inhabitants mean very little. Even against the predominant majority of that nation these interests have to be sacrificed for the Soviet monster. The individual 2 and five year plans also look accordingly. The consequences are often against their own interests of the individual country which has to produce only such articles which are suitable for the complete frame of the economic and imperialistic interests of the USSR.

So for example a Czechoslovak factory produces automobiles TUDOR. The production costs according to the official ~~tate~~ rate of exchange are $ 1.370.- and the selling price $ 1.720.- The sale to satellite countries only achieves $ 1.140.-/Poland/ and in some other countries even as low as $ 760.- ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ / Irak,Pakistan, Ceylon etc./ After the devaluation even as low now as $ 420.- That ~~xxxx~~ means that upon exporting one automobil TUDOR there is a loss of up to $ 1.000.- from the original production cost of $ 1.370.-

Only a country with a communist regime can ~~afard~~ afford this, with a communist nationalized industry, with an enslaved worker's class without rights which are natural in a democracy and with tens of thousands of democratic citizens engaged on forced labor in mines and forced labor camps. This is what the so-called ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ communist heaven of the working people looks like.

w the Communists camouflage their activity with democratic slogans.

One Slavic saying states : When they are catching the bird, they sing for him nicely." In accordance with this the Communists always try to gain the broad masses with pleasant slogans and to organize them unifically. As soon as they succeed to get them together in this fashion, they only change the covering shield for the communist one. Many people find it too late to get off there and this for various reasons. When they finally see through it, it is usually too late.

One of the leading Hungarian Communists, Josef REVAI, stated not long ago in the official Hungarian communist paper /official Communist Party periodical of which all issues had been recalled by the Hungarian Government / that at first the Hungarian Communists masqueraded merely as an "Anti-Fascist" group, hiding their real intentions. / Enclosed document Christian Science Monitor . Please return/.

Similarity according to the example :

The Communist regime in Czechoslovakia gave permission not long ago to organize a German minority which declared that they have not organized a German communist committee, but an Anti-Fascist committee. The slogan, of course, is : Proletarians of all countries, unite ! and also " For peace and people's democracy ! "

Exactly like the Nazis ;: deceit, fraud and lying propaganda.

It will not take long and the covering shield will be painted communist.

ONITOR

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Tactics Self-Exposed

An Intimate Message from Washington

Registered in U. S. Patent Office

By Neal Stanford

WASHINGTON

The Hungarian Government recently recalled all issues of the official Communist Party periodical containing a speech made by Jozsef Revai, one of Hungary's leading Communists. Unfortunately—or fortunately—it could not get its hands on a few copies in the hands of some Americans.

These copies have found their way to Washington and it is more than clear after a glance at them why the Hungarian Communist regime tried so hard to suppress the issue. For Comrade Revai had been brutally frank in detailing how the Communists had taken over Hungary and then in outlining what further measures were in store.

Comrade Revai freely admitted the truth of some of the important charges against the Hungarian regime made by Britain and the United States, charges that Soviet and Hungarian Communist diplomats have formally and indignantly denied.

The Hungarian Workers Party gets its real guidance from the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., from the teachings of Stalin, and from the Cominform, says Revai. The 1947 election was won by the Communists only because they controlled the police and because of the presence of Red Army troops in the country, he declared.

Looking ahead, Revai explained that the current tasks of the Communists in Hungary were to end the coalition with the other parties; "reorganize" the parliament; and transform the country into a genuine dictatorship of the proletariat. The farmers would have to be communized, he stated, and if any help was needed to crush the resistance of the Hungarian people, the Red Army would furnish it.

Seldom have Communist tactics been more clearly exposed than in Revai's speech. He showed that the formation of a "Peoples' Democracy" (a phrase invented to describe the Communist-dominated coalition governments of eastern Europe) is simply a first phase leading to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

He related how in this first phase the Communists masqueraded merely as an "anti-Fascist" group, hiding their real intentions. Progressively, though, their platform was transformed into "a fight against big fortunes and then against the whole bourgeoisie, into a fight against capitalism, aiming first at the expulsion of capitalistic elements and of the capitalistic class and then at their liquidation." In describing this process, Revai recounted the difficulties in restraining the hotheads in the party who would have revealed their true plans.

After the few remaining large estates had been broken up, then, as Revai put it, "the Kulak became the enemy"—the smaller landowners became the target of the Communists.

Industrial and banking "reforms," he explained, had been championed by the Communists with the objective of advancing communism.

At the start of their campaign for power the Communists thus posed as a legitimate liberal group, and sought to create the impression that Hungarian Communists were "different" from the Soviet Communists.

The Communists, however, could not win a fair election.

Turning to what he called "the second phase" of making a Communist state, he frankly admitted that the party was "aided" at the crucial moment by the Kremlin. "We must emphasize that we received the decisive stimulation and assistance for the clarification of our future development from the Communist part of the Soviet Union, from the teachings of Comrade Stalin. The Cominform was of fundamental help to us."

He then went on to explain that the Communist Party must be more "decisive" in its use of force to achieve its ends, for, he explained, "dictatorship also means exercising force in oppressing enemies." The enemies were presumably to be the resisting peasants who had obtained some land through the land "reforms" voted by all parties in Hungary.

The party, however, need not fear a revolt, he continued. "In our case, we can rely upon the Soviet Union and so can be spared from a civil war."

Revai's speech is one of the frankest admissions yet made by a spokesman in any of the satellite nations that they pledge allegiance to Soviet policy. The lesson it contains for free countries, if not already learned, is that no political party can make an alliance with the Communists and survive.

The leaders of the Communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe are supplying daily a irrefutable evidence as regards both the methods and the real objectives of their subversive activities, as well as the location of the only real authority behind the façade of the so called popular democratic Governments.

Let me quote at random a few passages published in two American papers within not more than two days. They are conclusive.

The Christian Science Monitor of November 2, 1949 brought an editorial entitled "Tactics Self-Exposed". According to this editorial the Hungarian Government recalled recently all issues of the official Communist Party periodical containing a speech made by Jozsef R e v a i, one of Hungary's leading Communists. Out of one of the copies salvaged from this tardy ban the Boston paper brings some extracts from Mr. Revai's speech. Mr. Revai admitted that:

The 1947 election was won by the Communists only because they controlled the police and because of <u>the presence of Red Army troops in Hungary.</u> As regards the future, the Communists in Hungary were to end the coalition with the other parties, "reorganize" - as he calls it - the parliament; and transform the country into a genuine dictatorship of proletariat. The farmers would have to be communized and if any help was needed to crush the resistance of the Hungarian people, <u>the Red Army would furnish it.</u> Mr. Revai divides the activities of the Hungarian Communist Party into 2 phases: In the first phase the Communists masqueraded merely as an "anti-Fascist" group, progressively, however, their platform was transformed into what he calls verbally "a fight against big fortunes and then against the whole bourgeoisie, into a fight against capitalism, ~~aiming~~ first at the expulsion of capitalistic

elements and of the capitalistic class and then at their liquidation". After the few remaining large estates had been broken up, "the Kulak became the enemy".

In "the second phase" - that of making a Communist state - Mr. Revai frankly admits that the Party was "aided" (his word) at the crucial moment by the Kremlin. I quote him:

"We must emphasize that we received the decisive stimulation and assistance for the clarification of our future development from the Communist part of the Soviet Union, from the teachings of Comrade Stalin. The Cominform was of fundamental help to us".

He further specified, and I quote him, that "dictatorship also means exercising force in oppressing enemies", has, however, no fears of a revolt, because, in his own words " We can rely upon the Soviet Union and so can be spared from a civil war". Changing the scene and drawing on the W.P. of November 3, to Prague we hear Mr. Klement Gottwald, the Communist President in Czechoslovakia, declare in an inaugural speech opening the Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship week that only Russia's what he calls "mighty protection" made it possible for the Communist Party to seize power in Czechoslovakia in February last year. Displaying further symptoms of the sudden frankness-and, perhaps, of the rather wide-spread anxiety to reassure Moscow as to his utmost loyalty - he further stated that the small nations of Eastern Europe never would have been able to maintain their independence without "political and economic help" from Russia. Spurning his own presidential independence, Mr. Gottwald concluded with an impassioned "long live the beloved leader of laboring people of the entire world - Comrade Stalin."

Priloha A./

Pod formou proletarske organisace dochazi se svolenim cs. vlady k organisovani nemecke mensiny v CSR, k organisovanemu prosazovani jejich pozadavku a k priprave nemeckeho denniku. Pripojen obeznik teto organisace. ()p. 10/7/1949):

Zemekoule s praporem
a pismeny AFA.

ANTIFASCHISTISCHE AKTION.

LESEN UND WEITERGEBEN.

Informationsblatt der Deutschen Antifaschisten in der CS.

PROLETARIER ALLER LANDER VEREINIGT EUCH.

FUR FRIEDEN U/ VOLKSDEMOKRATIE.

Werte Genossen und Freunde.

Die ausserordentlich grossen politischen Ereignisse im Februar 1948 haben politisch-wirschaftliche und kulturelle Umwalzlung auch fur deutsche werktatige Bevolkerung in der CSR gebracht. Die endgultige Ausseinandersetzung zwischen der tschechoslov. Bourgeoisie hat mit einer vernichtenden Niederlage der Burgertums geendet. Das Burgertum und seine Trabanten waren die Trager des bourgeouisen Nationalismus und Deutschenhasses. Durch seine Niederlage wurden die Voraussetzungen fur die Lozung des Nationalitatenproblems in der CSR geschaffen. Dem proletarischen Internationalismus wurde an diesem Denkwurdigen Tage eine Bresche geschlagen. Fur uns deutsche Werktatige ergeben sich aus dieser historischen Tatsache grosse Entwicklungsmoglichkeiten von weittragender Bedeutung. Diese Ereignisse haben die Richtigkeit der Generallinie der KPC in vollem Umvang bewiesen. Einen klaren Beweis hiefur erbrachte der IX. Parteitag der KPC, bei dem unter a. auch eine strarke Delegation der Deutschen Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Ostdeutschlands mit Wilhelm Pieck an der Spitze anwengend war. An diesem denkwurdigen und historischen Parteitag wurde der erste Schritt zur systematischen Beseitigung des bourgeoisen Nationalitatenhassen zwischen der tschechoslov. Volkern und dem deutschen Volke getan.

Erwahnungswart ist die Stellungsnahme des tsch. Informationsministers zur deutschen Frage. Ein kleiner Ausschnitt aus seiner Rede: " Wir mussen uns dessen bewust werden, dass die Entwicklung von uns die Uberprufung unserer Gefuhle zum proletarischen Internationalismus und unseres Verhaltnisses zu den demokratischen fortschriftlichen Elementen und Volksteilen Deutschlands fordert, deren Sprachrohr die Soz. Einheits-Partei Deutschlands ist. Auch in Ostdeutschland sind

tiefe politische,

wirtschafliche, zociale and kulturelle Umwalzungen vor sich gegangen, welche die Macht der Junker, Bankiers und Kapitaristen in ihrer Wurzeln ausgerottet haben. Die Ergebnisse der letzten Wahlen in Ostdeutschland haben gezeigt, dass die Entscheidungen dort in die Hand der Arbeiterklasse liegen. Wir sind verpflichtet die Bedeutung der Arbeit der sogenannten sozialistischen Einheitspartei Ostdeutschlands und der kommunistischen Partei Westdeutschlands voll and ganz zu erkennen. Wir sind aber nicht nur verpflichtet, das richtige einzuschatzen und zu werten, sondern auch im ureigendatenem Interesse uns solidarisch zu erklaren mit jedem Kraften welche gegen der Wiedererrichtung eines agressieven deutschen Kapitalismus entschieden Kampfen und fur den Frieden fur Demokratie und Sozialismus arbeiten. Wir wunschen uns alle, dass die herrliche Sympatie-kundgebung, die man unseren Delegationen aus der CSR entgegenbringt, als ein Zeichen gewertet werden, dass sich das Deutsche und Tschechoslovakishe Volknie mehr feindlich gegenuberstehen werden und dass sich die proletarische Internationale Verbruderung im Sinne DES GEMEINSAMEN Marschierens zum Socialismus verwirklichen wird."

Die neue Entwicklung erforderte die Neuwahl eines deutschen Antifaschistischen Kommitees auf dem Prinzip des demokratischen Zentralismus. Die Adresse des neugewahlten Komitees leutet:

ANTIFASCHISTISCHES KOMITEE (PROTIKOMUNISTICKY VYBOR)
Brno, Koblizna 15/17 I. posch. Tel. 14053.

Das Komitee richtet an jeden deutschen Werktatigen in der CSR dringenden Appel, sich in eigenem Interesse, der neuen Bewegung anzuschliessen und tatkraftig mitzuhelfen, unsere Arbeit erfolgreich zu gestallten. Nicht nur jene, die heute noch Sorgen, Schwierigkeiten haben und irgendwie unter dem Ausswuchsen des bougeoisen Nationalismus zu leiden haben, sondern auch alle anderen Deutschen wenden sich vortrauensvoll an das Antifaschistisches Komitee. Unter den Parolen "Proletarier aller Lander vereinigt euch" "Fur dauerhaften Frieden und Volksdemokratie" "Fur den proletarischen Internationalismus" "Gegen den bourgeoisen Nationalismus." "Fur den Sozialismus" wollen wir gemeinsam mit der werktatigen tsch. Bevolkerung marschieren.

Unser Informationsflugblatt - zum erstenmale seit Jahren wieder eine Deutsche Mitteilungsblatt - soll im Laufe der Zeit einer deutschen sozialistischen Tageszeitung ausgebaut werden, die die politischen, sozialen und kulturellen Interessen der werktatigen Deutschen vortreten soll. Sie soll das Sprachrohr des. tsch. deutschen Proletariats werden. ACHTUNG. SEHR WICHTIG.

Dieser Tage hat die tsch. Regierung eine Verornung herausgegeben, derzufolge alle Deutschen in der CSR, die bisher die tsch. Staatsburgerschaft no h nicht besitzen, oder abgewiesen wurden, um diese ansuchen konnen. Die Frist der Uberrischung der Gesuche lauft vom ersten Juli bis 30. Nov. 1949. Wir fordern die staatenlosen Deutschen sowie die abgelehnten auf, sich in ihrem ursigentlicheten Interesse in unseren Amtsraumen Brno, Koblizna 15/17, I Stock einzufinden. Gesuche und Uberreichungen werden durch unsere Kanzlei durchgefuhrt. ....

WERDET UND WERBET MITGLIEDER FUR DIE BEWEGUNG.

Jeder Deutsche findet sich in eigenen Interesse in unseren Kanzleiraumigkeiten ein. Das Antif. Komitee bereitet die Einrichtung einer

deutschen Buchrei

fur seine Mitglieder vor, in der unter anderem auch deutschen Zeitungen und Zeitungschriften aufliegen werden. Die deutsche werktatigen Bevolkerung wird aufgefordet uns bei der Sammlung deutscher fortschriftlicher Literatur behilflich zu sein.

Herausgeber: Antifaschistisches Komitee, Brno, Koblizna 15/17
Redaktion: verantwortlich O. Brichta, Brno, Koblizna 15/17.

ad 2.

All the communist countries

ntries are preparing toadying actions for the celebration of Stalin's 70 th birthday. For this reason the Communists in Czechoslovakia decided to erect a Stalin statue of such dimensions as there is no comparison. The statue will be placed on such a spot that it will be visible from near and far and will face the memorable castle of Prague, the seat of the Bohemina kings and also President Masaryk and President Benes. The height of this statue will reach the roofs of this memorable castle which is a kind of shrine for the Czechoslovak nation. On the other hand Prague has no statues of Masaryk and Benes, their liberators. But it will have a statue of that man who is the highest representative of those who have taken away the nation's freedom.

There cannot be any greater cynism.

The Ministry of Post in Czechoslovakia is preparing to issue a special stamp with Stalin portrait in honor of his birthday. Would it not be better to use the space which the portrait will occupy for reproducing the texts of all the solemn promises with which Stalin promised to the Czechoslovaks repeatedly to preserve their independance and not to interfere into their domestic affairs. This ,at least, would be in accordance with the feelings which the absolute majority of Czechoslovaks have for Stalin.

The Communists are building ad 2

ıg one big,large family whose members are solidly unitied by the slogan : one for all and all for one. So far this can be seen only in such a way that exemplary they are caring each for themselves, for their relatives and nearest. So for example in Czechoslovakia : Notorious is the Minister of Justice and chief of church and religious matters, Dr.Alexej Cepicka / read /, son-in-law of President Gottwald. He excells by his ruthless persecution which he probably learned during his stay in a Nazi concentration camp in Germany. His wife, the daughter of President Gottwald, occupies one of the highest posts at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, without the proper education and special qualification.
The son-in-law of the communist Prime Minister Zapotocky, Communist Kaiser, also without the necessary qualification for his office, as well as other extremely unqualified communist agitators, were sent to important posts as Ministers and Ambassadors. It was sufficient in their case to be avarage editors, salesmen in book shops, doctors in charge of prostitutes in the brothel of the Nazi concentration camp in Buchenwald etc. The Communists are one family ! So far, of course, prosperity only for the nearest family circle !

According to the latest

ad 2

confidential reports the Czechoslovak regime is preparing new court cases , this time also against some of his democratic opponents who managed to escape from the communist hell to western countries, in order to be able to work for the liberation of their country and evade communist persecution. It is a matter of course that the Communists have confiscated all their properties. And once again thruth and justice will be twisted by the prosecutor, by the communist radio and the press will publish false accusations, reproduce falsified documents and protokols and and false admissions. Perhaps there will again be executions, life time and long term sentences ! What a repulsive and even to the middle ages unbecoming inquisition ! There are not sufficient many strong words to condemn such barbaric action ! But the Communists would have a possibility to convince us that we are not saying the truth : They should hold the cases publicly, why don't they admit foreign observers from democratic countries where a free press exists and let them show their documents and evidence to representatives of the United Nations !

Insofar the democratic world cannot find enough strong words to condemn the barbaric, communist methods. But if they believe that they are being wronged then they should by means of producing truth force their critics to revoke even the mildest words of condemnation.

Giesen, Edna J.

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COLUMBIA LECTURE BUREAU INC.

113 WEST 57th STREET
NEW YORK 19, N. Y.
Circle 7-6900

EDNA J. GIESEN
Director

HOLLYWOOD
CHICAGO

October 26, 1948

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. Murrow:

The advertising association which was interested in presenting you as a speaker, and about which I talked to you recently, has decided that they might wish to present an entertainment attraction rather than a speaker. Should they change their minds again I will be in touch with you. Thank you for considering the matter.

I had a very nice talk with Dr. Zenkl. I think he would do very well as a speaker and we look forward to representing him. I appreciate your sending him to me, and hope you will continue to keep me in mind should other interesting possibilities occur to you. I plan to add about a dozen speakers to my list for 1949-50.

Sincerely yours,

Edna Giesen

ejg:g

Gieson, Edna

September 13, 1948

Dear Miss Gieson:

Thank you for your letter of September 9th. I am very happy to know that you are definitely interested in Peter Zenkl, but I think it would perhaps be better to wait until he gets here when you will have an opportunity of talking with him and making up your own mind before considering him a definite possibility for Spring engagements.

I shall have him get in touch with you as soon as he arrives. Again, many thanks.

As ever yours,

Miss Edna Gieson
Columbia Concerts Lecture Bureau
113 West 57th Street
New York 19, New York

CCLB

COLUMBIA CONCERTS LECTURE BUREAU

Division of COLUMBIA CONCERTS, Inc.

113 WEST 57th STREET

NEW YORK 19, N. Y.

Circle 7-6900

EDNA J. GIESEN
Director

HOLLYWOOD
CHICAGO

September 9, 1948

Mr. Edward Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Just a note to thank you for telephoning me and to confirm my definite interest in Peter Zenkel.

My sales representatives will be starting out on their Fall booking trips in another week or so, and if you are definitely sure that he would lecture this Spring, and that he would definitely sign a contract under our management when he arrives, I wonder whether it would be safe for our representatives to present him as a possibility for engagements this Spring. We do not ordinarily do this until a management contract is actually signed, but I would be willing to go ahead upon your personal assurance that there would be no embarrassment later.

We could not book a long actual tour for him, but I know there would be a good many spot engagements for him.

I should appreciate your giving me a ring and letting me know what you think about this.

Cordially yours,

Edna Giesen

ejg/rwk

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY

Ottawa, Canada, December 28, 1948.

My dear Dr. Zenkl:

In reply to your letter of December 23rd requesting a letter from me containing my observations of your political activities in Czechoslovakia from 1945 to 1948, it gives me great pleasure to express my profound respect for your activities as Lord Mayor of the Greater City of Prague, Deputy Prime Minister, and particularly as Leader of the National Socialist Party. The outstanding role played by you in the rehabilitation and recovery of Czechoslovakia from the effects of the World War and your courageous struggle against Communism will always be regarded by me as identifying you with the great patriots of Czechoslovakia. The struggle conducted by you to preserve democracy for the people of Czechoslovakia was in the best tradition of all true democrats. The fact that the struggle has been temporarily lost does not in my opinion diminish in the slightest degree the credit to which you are entitled for the fearless manner in which you sought to preserve for the people of Czechoslovakia the way of life and traditions of the great Liberator-President Masaryk.

With every good wish for the New Year to Mrs. Zenkl and yourself, in which my wife and daughter join me,

Cordially yours,

Laurence A. Steinhardt

Laurence A. Steinhardt.

Dr. Petr Zenkl,
2651 Sixteenth Street, N.W.,
Washington 9, D.C.

U.S.A.

Copy of an information given by Peter Zenkl to Hon. Senator W. H. Knowland.

FOR OUR COMMON CAUSE

Most of the Czechoslovak anti-Communist political escapees who succeeded in escaping from their Communist dominated country have come to the United States of America.

They have established here a Czechoslovak anti-Communist movement which works closely with American authorities in their struggle against communism and for the liberation of their country.

From the day of their arrival, they have been under attack by Communists (American and Czechoslovak both); by Germans, especially the Sudetens; by enemies of President Masaryk's and Beneš concept of Czechoslovak democracy; by Czech separatists; by Slovak separatists and former collaborators with the Nazis. Their past and background may be different but their goal is the same: to undermine any effort at reinstating the Czechoslovak Republic.

Whereas members of the former anti-Communist parties in Czechoslovakia are persecuted, jailed and hanged by the Communist regime;

Whereas the anti-Communist political escapees are the target of unceasing attacks by the Communist press and radio as "traitors, American mercenaries, tools of Wall Street" etc., and whereas they are denounced at mass demonstrations and tried in contumation by the Prague regime;

Here the same anti-Communists are under another vicious attack by other enemies ever since their arrival to the United States in 1948. A number of the denouncers is on the list of war criminals; because of their past the anti-Communists have refused to accept them, hence their wrath.

The anti-Communists in exile are not as fortunate as their enemies who always seem to have ample funds for their activities. They could not, for instance, defend themselves in court. Moreover, they feared such publicity would affect adversely the Czechoslovak cause by bringing undesirable emigrés and their accomplices before the American public. More than anything, they trusted the American public to be able to differentiate between them and to draw the right conclusion, especially as Americans have always played an important part in Czechoslovakia's democratic cause and have always been well informed on Czechoslovakia's admirable twenty-year record as a democracy, and on her valiant effort at rebirth, despite Munich, during and right after World War II.

Despite the fact that enemies to Czechoslovakia's democratic cause have loud spokesmen in various American institutions and organizations, the anti-Communists are firm in their belief that the United States officially have not changed their stand and understanding of the Czechoslovak people and their aspirations.

In this regard, American authorities have given us repeated assurances. Czechoslovaks place all their trust in the United States and derive fresh courage from these assurances to resist the Communist regime. Thus the great majority of our people behind the Iron Curtain are, in fact, a part of the anti-Communist world front.

Although our enemy camp, despite the common bond of hatred toward Czechoslovakia's democratic cause, is such a pell-mell, one thing stands out; there are two sources for the diversified action; the German and the Communist. It should be quite clear that even the acts seemingly originating from anti-Communist institutions, by their destructive work serve the Communist purpose in the end.

For a long time Czechoslovak anti-Communists tended to overlook the attacks, even though the enemy had succeeded in reaching high official places in the United States and other democratic Countries. They presumed the case was clear and that American officials were no doubt well informed as to the background and aims of the denouncers.

The situation, however, took a dangerous turn on the day the enemy succeeded in getting into the Senate. This move is important not only to the democratic cause of the Czechoslovak exiles but even to American policy.

The instigators had long announced the forthcoming Senate investigations in their press. Their plotting and denunciations finally were the subject of a hearing by the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security. I am not breaking my oath when I say that the very anti-Communists most hated and earmarked for liquidation by the Prague regime are the ones who were accused of pro-Communist acts and Communist collaboration.

Viewed objectively, the mere fact that the anti-Communist exiles are actually accused will have serious repercussions. Of course the Communists will not be misled but they will use the fact effectively in their psychological warfare against the United States. Their chief objective has been to discredit the anti-Communist exiled leaders in the eyes of the people at home. For over five years they have tried in vain. The people at home are not bluffed by words; they judge by deeds. To them it will be utterly incomprehensible that their anti-Communist spokesmen in the United States should find themselves under suspicion and in the position of the accused. There is the danger that the

people's absolute faith in United States policy could be shaken as they might interpret the recent event as an expression of new and different tendencies in American policy. To them, the Senate has always been a forum where Czechoslovakia's ideals are defended - and they simply will not understand.

Herein lies the danger to the democratic cause. If unchecked, it could do irreparable harm to the anti-Communist struggle on the world front. It becomes imperative to get at the truth and to hold the perpetrators fully responsible for their denunciations.

I was careful not to take any steps until after my hearing because I did not wish to create the impression of asking for personal protection. I cannot remain silent any longer, however. Although the secret hearing may seem preferable, I would have preferred an open hearing in some ways. A course must be found which would not imperil our struggle against communism. American prestige must not suffer. Nations behind the Iron Curtain must be saved from dilemma and American intentions must not be misinterpreted. Political tension in the United States must be averted - for this all would play into the hands of the Communists.

I am not speaking in defense of Czechoslovak interests today: I ask that the good name of anti-Communist exiles of other countries also protected.

As a foreign guest of this great country, I avoid scrupulously taking part in American political life, although my enemies have tried to accuse me even on this score. Nevertheless, permit me as a guest and old admirer of your great people, to point out one important idea: The fact that we political exiles receive American financial support has been criticized by some Americans, yet this outlay is insignificant in comparison with the large sums spent by the United States on other undertakings in this battle against communism. Unless a recurrence of the matter under discussion is avoided in the future and unless steps are taken to undo the damage, the value of the other anti-Communist, far greater investments is in jeopardy.

Peter Zenkl

Washington, D.C.
February 19, 1954

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

For Mr. Ed. R. Murrow.
March 7, 54

I am here concerned with Czechoslovak political exiles in the United States but the matter can apply as well to exiles from other countries behind the Iron Curtain.

The United Nations have on their agenda the charge that the Communists, following their world imperialist goal, have subjugated one country after another and are threatening the whole world.

The Congress of the United States is investigating how the Kremlin succeeded in subjugating one Baltic country after another; it has now announced its intention to extend the investigation to other countries behind the Iron Curtain.

Individuals who have succeeded in escaping from countries subjugated by the Communists are received in the United States with open arms. Their courage and yearning for liberty is made much of in various drives.

It is stressed that highest American official places should publicly declare that the U.S. Government would support anyone who, in his dash for freedom, would help the free world in its struggle against Communism by bringing documentary proof of the danger of Moscow's world imperialism.

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A number of anti-Communists, men active in political and public life, escaped for the very same reason. They fled because they did not wish to be Moscow stooges; because they could not live without freedom. They, too, ~~hax~~ came to the United States to inform the West of Moscow's plans, to warn and to fight Communism. They are the real and potential co-fighters in the free world struggle.

As an example, I have in mind members of one anti-Communist and anti-Marxist Czech political party founded over 30 years ago. Its Board, freely elected in 1947, included 26 members. Of these 11 have escaped and are living in exile; 8 were imprisoned; 1 died and the fate of 5 is unknown; only 1 is a traitor, now in the Communist regime.

Unfortunately, Czechoslovak democratic exiles did not ~~meet~~ find only understanding in this country. Many of their political enemies also managed to escape to the United States. Among them are people who have always opposed the concept of Masaryk democracy and the idea of an independent Republic of Czechoslovakia; during the years, they opposed Masaryk's son and President Beneš; some even collaborated with the Nazis, Fascists and Communists. A number of them are determined to wreck any effort at re-establishing a Czechoslovak Republic. Some of them would prefer the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia; after Munich they welcomed the creation of the so-called Slovak State, Hitler's puppet state - this despite the fact that the Slovak State later declared war on the United States.

Their list is increased by American and other Communists and by German extremists and those who are not in favor of peaceful co-existence between a democratic Germany and a democratic Czechoslovakia. They are concocting various schemes against Czechoslovakia and Czechoslovak democratic exiles.

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Though these enemies of Czechoslovak political democratic exiles may have different aims, they are united in their hatred and often participate in hostile acts, against the democrats. They seem to be amply supplied with funds not only from their members but also from foreign sources or regimes. While the democrats are hard pressed for funds to defend themselves and their work, the enemy has money enough to flood public and government offices and individuals with propaganda. They know how to make full use of totalitarian methods such as signed petitions, letters, half-truths etc.

In this way they have managed to penetrate into high places. They have won the support of several Congressmen and senators. Finally, through their tireless efforts, three+ (to date) leading members of the Czechoslovak democratic exile were subpoenaed by the Jenner Subcommitte on Internal Security and brought before a one-man committee (Senator Welker) in executive session. What irony that anti-Communists, elected by their people at home in free elections - the peoples rightful spokesmen in exile, should be investigated for pro-Communist activities in the Senate of the United States! Fortunately, other Americans took up the cause of the Czechoslovak democrats in exile.

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It is beside the point whether any member of the United States Senate has the right to question foreign political representatives on their political record at home. The fact that the hearings are "secret" makes the matter all the worse because the supoenaed are not able to defend themselves and protect themselves from the mudslinging in the press which is going on unabated. The subpoenaed victims would prefer by far an open hearing.

The crux of the wole matter is this: Is this the way to fight Communism? Is it the way the right of political asylum should be respected? What can be the reaction of the anti-Communist people living behind the Iron Curtain when they hear that their elected spokesmen in exile are running the gauntlet of suspicion and shame? Is this the way to strengthen the will to resist of the unhappy millions who could be America's most reliable allies? Is this the way to strengthen their faith in the United States?

+ Hubert Ripka
Mikuláš Feršenčík
Peter Zenkl

They were not yet invited to appear in the Foreign Aff. Committee, but in the Internal Security Com!

No matter who may be back of these hostile attacks against the Czechoslovak anti-Communists in exile - no matter who may be financing the campaigns, there is no doubt but that he is supplying the Communists with dangerous weapons. Perhaps it is done without Moscow's initiative and backing- but it is playing straight into Moscow's hands.

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Are the men who organize and conduct American anti-Communist campaigns, especially those beamed behind the Iron Curtain, aware of the gravedangers? It should be clear that the millions of dollars spent on radio broadcasts could be entirely wasted. "Balloons" and other messages would really be "up in the air," for under such conditions anti-Communist statements and promises would become mere utterances.

Where are we slipping?

Those of us who have experienced the initial stages of Fascism, Nazism, and Communism, who can evaluate the situation psychologically, feel that something in the air which poisoned the minds and weakened resistance of even strong men in the advent of the Fascist plague.

To replace Satan with the devil is utter folly.

Sen. Welker Accused Of Smearing Czech

A top CIO official yesterday charged that a Senate subcommittee has permitted itself to be made a tool in a political fight among Czech emigres, with consequences that make fine grist for the Communist propaganda mills.

James B. Carey, CIO secretary-treasurer, in a letter to Vice President Richard M. Nixon, made the charge against Sen. Herman Welker (R-Idaho) as a one-man subcommittee acting for the Jenner Subcommittee on Internal Security.

Carey said that Welker, at a closed hearing held on February 2 accused Hubert Ripka, Czech Foreign Trade Minister prior to the Red coup, of being a Communist as head of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia.

The council, Carey asserted, is recognized by the State Department as anti-Communist.

Welker, he said, permitted Czech political enemies of Ripka to attend the otherwise closed hearing, and these foes even assisted Welker in interrogating Ripka.

Carey told the Vice President that even though the hearing of February 2 was in secret, the "full story" was printed in a Czech-language daily printed in this country. The CIO official said another member of the council had already been subpenaed by the subcommittee for a further hearing Tuesday.

"If the most respected and authoritative leaders of the democratic forces of Czechoslovakia are to be brought before a star-chamber hearing as virtually prejudged, common criminals and if their political enemies are able to use such a committee of the United States Senate to destroy their usefulness, we will have given the greatest possible assistance to the Communists," Carey declared.

It is almost certain that reports of the secret subcommittee hearing have been "gleefully" transmitted by the Reds to Czechoslovakia, Carey said, "to demonstrate what happens when people flee from Communist domination to the United States."

Carey said no one could have read Ripka's "Czechoslovakia Enslaved," published in 1950, without having a great deal of admiration and sympathy for those who fought the Communists for three years.

TURNER'S
FINE FURNITURE

Dr. Ed

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the number as 1,456. The list has since grown to 2,200.

A check with Government personnel offices showed that any person who left the Government's employment at present received a copy of his "personnel action sheets," the original of which is on file with the Civil Service Commission.

This sheet notes, for example, whether an employe left voluntarily, such as for personal reasons; whether he was separated for economy reasons in a reduction-in-force program, or whether he was discharged.

Inquiry Funds Voted

Meanwhile, on Capitol Hill, the economy drive of Senator Allen J. Ellender, Democrat of Louisiana, apparently ran out of steam, and the Senate appeared ready to invest nearly $500,000 in its two subcommittees that investigate Communists and subversives.

Without objection, the Senate passed a $228,000 appropriation to finance the work of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, headed by Senator William E. Jenner, Republican of Indiana.

At the same time, the Rules Committee unanimously recommended to the Senate an appropriation of $214,443 for the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, headed by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin. Floor action on the fund is expected tomorrow or Friday.

Senator Ellender challenged duplication and extravagance by the investigating groups, but did not raise a formal objection when the money for the Jenner group was voted by unanimous consent.

In a formal report to the Senate, Mr. Jenner said that his subcommittee "will continue its inquiries into education, the United Nations and interlocking subversion in Government departments." It also will look into subversive influences in Latin America as they affect this country's security.

Specifically, he listed fourteen continuing investigations as follows:

1. Alleged Communist control of the United Furniture Workers of America.
2. Alleged Communist control of the Distributive, Processing and Office Workers of America.
3. Alleged Communist control of the American Communications Association.
4. Alleged Communist activities of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc.
5. Reported Communist activities of Czechoslovak national groups in exile in the United States.
6. Communist activities in the Washington, D. C., area.
7. Alleged Communist control of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union—Southern industrial area.
8. Alleged Communist domination of the maritime and longshoreman industry—East and West Coast areas.
9. Alleged Communist influence in teachers union—Philadelphia area.
10. Alleged Communist activities in the Federal Shorthand Reporters Association, New York.
11. Alleged Communist penetration in the United Steelworkers Union.
12. General investigations of communism in labor organizations.
13. Alleged Communist influence in the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, independent—Philadelphia area.
14. Communist infiltration of United States Consulates and Embassies—employment of naturalized United States citizens and citizens of Soviet satellite nations.

Senator Jenner declared in a statement that "we haven't caught up with the leadership of the Communist underground in these United States," but "we are still on its trail."

This I Believe

N. Y. Herald Tribune
FEB 16 1953

"Belief Is Not an Evangelical Matter," Declares a Prominent American Author

This is one of a series of statements prepared for broadcast by people in all walks of life on the things they believe in. They are heard in a program presented by Edward R. Murrow over WCBS at 5:55 p. m. Monday through Friday.

By Wallace Stegner
Novelist, Teacher, Author, "Big Rock Candy Mountain"

It is terribly difficult to say honestly, without posing or faking, what one truly and fundamentally believes. Reticence or an itch to make public confession may distort or dramatize what is really there to be said, and public expressions of belief are so closely associated with inspirational activity, and in fact so often stem from someone's desire to buck up the downhearted and raise the general morale, that belief becomes an evangelical matter.

In all honesty, what I believe is neither inspirational nor evangelical. Passionate faith I am suspicious of because it hangs witches and burns heretics, and generally I am more in sympathy with the witches and heretics than with the sectarians who hang and burn them. I fear immoderate zeal, Christian, Moslem, Communist, or whatever, because it restricts the range of human understanding and the wise reconciliation of human differences, and creates an Orthodoxy with a sword in its hand.

I cannot say that I am even a sound Christian, though the code of conduct to which I subscribe was preached more eloquently by Jesus Christ than by any other. About God I simply do not know; I don't think I can know.

However far I have missed achieving it, I know that moderation is one of the virtues I most believe in. But I believe as well in a whole catalogue of Christian and classical virtues; in kindness and generosity, in steadfastness and courage and much else. I believe further that good depends not on things but on the use we make of things. Everything potent, from human love to atomic energy, is dangerous; it produces ill about as readily as good; it becomes good only through the control, the discipline, the wisdom with which we use it. Much of this control is social, a thing which laws and institutions and uniforms enforce, but much of it must be personal, and I do not see how we can evade the obligation to take full responsibility for what we individually do. Our reward for self-control and the acceptance of private responsibility is not necessarily money or power. Self-respect and the respect of others are quite enough.

Turns to Conscience

All this is to say that I believe in conscience, not as something implanted by divine act, but as something learned from infancy from the tradition and society which have bred us. The outward forms of virtue will vary greatly from nation to nation; a Chinese scholar of the old school, or an Indian raised on the Vedas and the Bhagavad Gita, has a conscience that will differ from mine. But in the essential outlines of what constitutes human decency we vary amazingly little. The Chinese and the Indian know as well as I do what kindness is, what generosity is, what fortitude is. They can define justice quite as accurately. It is only when they and I are blinded by tribal and denominational narrowness that we insist upon our differences and can recognize goodness only in the robes of our own crowd.

Man is a great enough creature and a great enough enigma to deserve both our pride and our compassion, and engage our fullest sense of mystery. I shall certainly never do as much with my life as I want to, and I shall sometimes fail miserably to live up to my conscience, whose word I do not distrust even when I can't obey it. But I am terribly glad to be alive; and when I have wit enough to think about it, terribly proud to be a man and an American, with all the rights and privileges that those words connote; and most of all I am humble before the responsibilities that are also mine. For no right comes without a responsibility, and being born luckier than most of the world's millions, I am also born more obligated.

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THE EDWARD R. MURROW CENTER
OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

TUFTS UNIVERSITY
THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY
Administered with the cooperation of Harvard University

MEDFORD
MASSACHUSETTS 02155

MEMORANDUM

TO: Joseph S. Komidar, University Librarian

FROM: Eleanor G. Horan, Curator, Murrow Collection Eleanor Horan

DATE: October 31, 1973

SUBJECT: Edward R. Murrow Memorial Library Collection - Safekeeping of Letters in Wessell Vault

Attached are valuable letters from the Edward R. Murrow Collection. I would ask that they be placed in the Wessell Vault with those sent you previously. They are identified as follows:

1. Lady Clementine S. Churchill's letter to Edward Murrow dated April 16, 1949.
2. Lady Clementine S. Churchill's letter to Mrs. Janet Murrow dated March 3, 1965.
3. Lady Clementine S. Churchill's letter to Mrs. Janet Murrow dated April 28, 1965.
4. Anthony Eden's letter to Edward Murrow dated November 25, 1954.
5. Albert Einstein's letter to Edward Murrow dated April 21, 1954.
6. Hubert H. Humphrey's letter to Edward Murrow dated March 19, 1965.
7. Lyndon B. Johnson's letter to Edward Murrow dated November 15, 1955.
8. Lyndon B. Johnson's letter to Mrs. Janet Murrow dated April 29, 1965.
9. John F. Kennedy's letter to Edward Murrow dated May 28, 1958.
10. John F. Kennedy's letter to Edward Murrow dated June 10, 1958, signed "Jack."
11. John F. Kennedy's letter to Edward Murrow dated July 2, 1958.

12. Krishna Menon's letter to Mrs. Janet Murrow dated December 6, 1965.

13. Robert Oppenheimer's letter to Edward Murrow dated December 30, 1954.

14. Eleanor Roosevelt's letter to Edward Murrow dated October 3, 1950.

15. Eleanor Roosevelt's letter to Edward Murrow dated March 7, 1955.

16. Eleanor Roosevelt's letter to Edward Murrow dated March 31, 1955.

17. Eleanor Roosevelt's letter to Edward Murrow dated November 10, 1955.

18. Eleanor Roosevelt's letter to Edward Murrow dated October 9, 1956.

19. Albert Schweitzer's letter to Edward Murrow dated December 1, 1955 and translation.

20. Harry S. Truman's letter to Edward Murrow dated February 16, 1954.

21. Harry S. Truman's letter to Edward Murrow dated February 23, 1954.

22. Harry S. Truman's letter to Edward Murrow dated September 21, 1955.

23. Harry S. Truman's letter to Edward Murrow dated January 7, 1958.

24. Harry S. Truman's letter to Edward Murrow dated January 16, 1958.

25. Harry S. Truman's letter to Edward Murrow dated February 4, 1958.

26. Harry S. Truman's letter to Edward Murrow dated February 5, 1958.

27. Harry S. Truman's letter to Edward Murrow dated May 13, 1958.

28. Harry S. Truman's letter to Edward Murrow dated May 21, 1958.

29. Harry S. Truman's letter to Edward Murrow dated August 8, 1958.

30. Harry S. Truman's letter to Edward Murrow dated November 24, 1958.

31. Harry S. Truman's letter to Edward Murrow dated November 29, 1958.

32. Harry S. Truman's letter to Edward Murrow dated December 12, 1958.

Bob Komidar
10/31/73

WESTERN 1617.

28, HYDE PARK GATE,
LONDON, S.W. 7.

16 April, 1949.

My Dear Mr. Murrow,

I did so much enjoy seeing you and Janet during our brief visit to New York.

I think it was charming of you to send me the records of your "Chronicle of the War". I am taking them down to Chartwell and we shall play them, as also "Kiss Me Kate", during the Easter weekend.

Please give Janet my love, and please do not forget to let me know when you come to England.

Yours very sincerely
Clementine S. Churchill

March the 3rd 1965

CABLES
TREEFERN
BARBADOS

HERON BAY
ST. JAMES
BARBADOS, B.W.I.

My dearest Janet,
I am grieved to hear your sad news about Ed. I send you both my dear love.
Please tell him if he is well enough for a message.
I am so so

Sorry dear Janet

Love from your

very affectionate

Clemmie

BARONESS SPENCER CHURCHILL

April the 28th 1965

Lady Churchill
28, HYDE PARK GATE,
LONDON, S.W.7.
KNIGHTSBRIDGE 7171.

My Dearest Janet,
After the letter I got from You in Barbados, I felt there was no hope & I prayed that the struggle would not be too long. That is nearly 3 ~~two~~ months ago -
I am more grieved for You than words can tell.
He was so young to die. But what did he not achieve in those

Yours. I really believe he brought America into the War.

I send you my love dear Janet; and my prayers are for you in this sad and solemn hour.

Yours very affectionately

Clementine S. C.

Foreign Office,
S.W.1.

November 25, 1954.

My dear Ed,

I have been shown the letter which you wrote to Howard Smith on November 16 about my interview with him for the programme "See It Now".

I am so glad that you thought it a success. Such praise coming from you is great encouragement.

With best wishes,

Yours ever,

Anthony Eden

Mr. Edward R. Murrow.

April 21,1954

Mr.Edward R.Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System,Inc.
485 Madison Ave.
New York N.Y.

My dear Mr.Murrow:

I am sending you this letter to invite you cordially to visit me at my home if your time permits. I would not have the courage to do so if I would not have the hope that,in doing so,you could serve a very good cause. My good friend,Mr.Alexander Sacks,who will bring you this letter will explain it to you in detail.

Aside of the good purpose I should be happy to meet again a man of so outstanding merits in our difficult and troubled times.

Yours very sincerely,

A. Einstein.

Albert Einstein.

April 21,1954

Mr.Edward R.Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System,Inc.
485 Madison Ave.
New York N.Y.

My dear Mr.Murrow:

I am sending you this letter to invite you cordially to visit me at my home if your time permits. I would not have the courage to do so if I would not have the hope that,in doing so,you could serve a very good cause. My good friend,Mr.Alexander Sacks,who will bring you this letter will explain it to you in detail.

Aside of the good purpose I should be happy to meet again a man of so outstanding merits in our difficult and troubled times.

Yours very sincerely,

A. Einstein.

Albert Einstein.

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1965

Dear Ed:

Thinking of you and hoping the doctors will give you the best of news.

Will be looking forward to seeing you here -- hale and hearty.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Hubert

Hubert H. Humphrey

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
New York Hospital
525 E. 68th Street
New York, New York

LYNDON B. JOHNSON
TEXAS

United States Senate
Office of the Democratic Leader
Washington, D. C.
Hye, Texas
November 15, 1955

Dear Ed:

I was very happy to learn from your note that I am to receive an album of excerpts from Winston Churchill's speeches. I can't think of anything that would be more stimulating than to be able to listen again to those wonderful words from one of the greatest men of our or any generation.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 29, 1965

Dear Mrs. Murrow:

It was with deep sorrow that Lady Bird and I received the news of Ed's death.

I know that we need not reiterate to you our profound respect and sincere admiration for Ed and all that he accomplished in his rewarding life. You and Casey have all our sympathy, and our prayers that God may bless you and enable you to persevere throughout these difficult days.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mrs. Edward R. Murrow
Glen Arden Farm
Pawling, New York

JOHN F. KENNEDY
MASSACHUSETTS

COMMITTEES:
FOREIGN RELATIONS
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 10, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Ed:

Many thanks for your letter of June 3.

I understand perfectly about the postponement of this year's project; and I look forward to hearing from you about the new program which you have in mind.

What is this I hear about your entering the political arena?

As always, I am grateful for your interest and friendship.

With every good wish.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy

JFK:gl

JOHN F. KENNEDY
MASSACHUSETTS

COMMITTEES:
FOREIGN RELATIONS
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 28, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
CBS
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Ed:

Inasmuch as I am now under some pressure to firm up my schedule for this fall, I am writing to inquire whether you have set any tentative dates for the overseas project we earlier discussed. Being fully aware of the vicissitudes of your profession as well as mine, I would understand completely if you have found it necessary to postpone this project until some other year. If, however, you are still interested in going ahead, it might be desirable to agree on a time schedule now and for members of our respective staffs to meet during the summer.

As one who continues to admire greatly your craftsmanship as well as your news analysis, I am grateful to you for your cooperation and understanding.

With every good wish.

Sincerely,

Jack Kennedy

John F. Kennedy

JFK:gl

JOHN F. KENNEDY
MASSACHUSETTS

COMMITTEES:
FOREIGN RELATIONS
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 2, 1958

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Dear Ed:

Your new project sounds fascinating indeed. Let me know any time I can be of help, and we can get together on a date.

Meanwhile, if you are ever in Washington and have a free moment, come by for a chat.

With every good wish.

Sincerely,

Jack Kennedy

John F. Kennedy

JFK:gl

KRISHNA MENON

19, TEEN MURTI MARG
NEW DELHI.

12/6/65

My dear Janet-

I was very grieved to learn from a rather belated press report that my very good friend, your beloved husband had. to no more. It is sad for you, and I know may not convey sadness. He was a great man and a friend, rare these days. The acquaintance with him, who was introduced to me by Harold Laski, is among the few treasures one carries to nurse at this advanced age in one's life! He left a mark on whatever he did and no one could fail to be swept into his vitality and affection. I could bear so. But how can I hope to console you. Time alone can do that.

Oppenheimer, Robert

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

30 December 1954

Dear Mr. Murrow:

It was good of you and Mr. Friendly to come to talk with me yesterday. As you will surely know, I have from the first been most grateful for your interest in undertaking a story about the Institute, knowing you both as a great craftsman, and a man of great courage and spirit. It is thus natural that I should readily defer to your own judgment, and understand your decision to present an account of the Institute almost wholly through the conversation that you and I had about it.

Perhaps I ought to add a word. Had you, a month ago, offered to devote one of your programs to a sketch of one Robert Oppenheimer, even my great respect for you would not have overcome my own certainty. I would have refused. I thus take courage to ask you again to make the program that you are planning for next week as much as it can be a story about the Institute for Advanced Study, and as little as it need be a portrait of one man.

With the warmest good wishes,

Robert Oppenheimer

Robert Oppenheimer

Mr. Edward Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

2 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK 16, N. Y.

MURRAY HILL 3-6810

UNITED STATES DELEGATION
TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS

October 3, 1950

Dear Mr. Murrow:

The heightened interest in the United Nations since the meetings have been televised is again in evidence, this time by the attached letter.

It certainly is wonderful, and I hope the broadcasts will continue.

Sincerely yours,

Eleanor Roosevelt

[Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt]

Mr. Edward R. Murrow,
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
485 Madison Avenue,
New York, New York.

MRS. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
211 EAST 62ND STREET
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

March 7, 1955

My dear Ed:

I have had a young secretary in the country for several years and she wants now to come to New York and find a job so that she can complete college. She is interested in the kind of work that you are doing and would especially like to have an opportunity to join your staff in some capacity. Her name is Miss Doris Muller and she will be here at my apartment until the 31st of March. She would like to see you at any time that is convenient for you if this is possible. My telephone here is TEmpleton 8-0330.

I talked to Dr. Fromm and think he will try to see you too. I think they will need a great deal more advice on what they hope to accomplish.

Very cordially yours,

Eleanor Roosevelt

MRS. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
211 EAST 62ND STREET
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

March 31, 1955

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Thank you very much for your letter regarding Miss Muller. I deeply appreciate your interest in finding an opening for her.

With my good wishes,

Very sincerely yours,

Eleanor Roosevelt

MRS. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
211 EAST 62ND STREET
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

November 10, 1955

Dear Mr. Murrow:

I am so pleased to have the recordings by Sir Winston Churchill and I want to thank you warmly for thinking of me.

With deep appreciation and the hope we will be able to arrange a mutually convenient date soon.

Very sincerely yours,

Eleanor Roosevelt

MRS. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
211 EAST 62ND STREET
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

1

October 9, 1956

Dear Mr. Murrow:

You probably remember Mr. Louis Bean the government economist who made the successful predictions about Mr. Truman. He has some interesting things to say, I am told, about the health issue in the present campaign which he would like to discuss with someone.

Is there any chance that you might interview him on the health situation of both candidates?

Very cordially yours,

Eleanor Roosevelt

Mr Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New-York 22 NY USA

Docteur Schweitzer
Gunsbach. Haut-Rhin
France 1 déc 61

Cher Monsieur Murrow

Vous êtes bien aimable de me faire l'honneur de vouloir me faire parler sur les choses africaines. Mais, j'ai le principe de ne pas parler en public sur les ces choses là. Je suis un simple médecin qui vis depuis plus de 50 ans dans la forêt vierge africaine, et y travaille. Ce que j'ai eu à dire, je l'ai dit dans mon récit de mes activités Dans les Forêts vierges Primaires Forêt, ils y a de longues années. Il me faut que je dois rester dans mon rôle d'humble médecin et de ne pas parler des politiques et des opinions du public. Excusez-moi, je vous prie.

Votre dévoué Docteur Schweitzer

Veuillez excuser aussi le retard de ma réponse. J'étais en voyage et pendant des semaines et tout mon courrier est devenu en chaos.

Par principe je ne pose pas non plus pour la télévision et je ne fais pas enregistrer des discours. Je suis vieux et veux simplifier

Translation ---

Dear Mr. Munro,

You are very kind to
with your invitation to speak about Africa
But, helas, principally I do not speak pu
about these things. I am a simple doc
for more than 40 years in the equatorial
there I work. What I have had to say - I
in my book "On the Edge of the Primeval Fo
been many years. I believe that I have to
my rôle as simple doctor and not speak
political African affairs. Excuse me, p
Yours devotedly

Please excuse also the late reply to your let
travelling during several weeks and my correspond

to honor me
can affairs.
publically
doctor who lives
l forest, and
I have said —
Forest" — it has
to stay in
eak about
please
tally
A.S.
letter. I was
ondence is in a class.

By principle I also ~~pose~~ let myself not be taken by television cameras or make sound recordings of speeches. I am old and want to simplify life.

by on
by my

Truman, Harry

HARRY S. TRUMAN
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK BUILDING
KANSAS CITY 6, MISSOURI

February 16, 1954

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Thanks a lot for your telegram of the thirteenth. I appreciate the opportunity you gave me very much and enjoyed the show.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Person to Person CBS New York
485 Madison Avenue
New York City, New York

Truman, Harry

HARRY S. TRUMAN
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK BUILDING
KANSAS CITY 6, MISSOURI

February 23, 1954

Dear Ed:

Thank you very much indeed for the book and the record THIS I BELIEVE. It was certainly kind and thoughtful of you to send them to me and I more than appreciate it. I am going to enjoy both of them.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Person to Person CBS New York
485 Madison Avenue
New York City, New York

Truman, Harry

HARRY S. TRUMAN
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK BUILDING
KANSAS CITY 6, MISSOURI

September 21, 1955

Dear Ed:

October third would be more convenient for me than any other day, and I believe the office would be the proper place in which to do the job. I hope I will have an opportunity to discuss the situation with you before the program starts.

I have refused to do this sort of thing for the rest of the gang for the reason that if I started, I couldn't stop. But because you are in a class by yourself, we'll go ahead with it.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Truman, Harry S

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

January 7, 1958

Dear Ed:

I wish you would tell Eric Sevareid, Winston Burdett, Peter Kalischer, Alexander Kendrick, Ernest Leiser, David Schoenbrun and Daniel Schorr that I more than appreciated the privilege of listening to their reports from at home and abroad. I only wish it had been possible for me to talk personally to everyone of them.

That was a wonderful luncheon at the Overseas Press Club; too much Truman was its sole fault.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Truman, Harry

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

January 16, 1958

Dear Ed:

Thank you very much for the Holiday greetings from you and your staff. It was kind and thoughtful of you to remember me.

Mrs. Truman joins me in the hope that 1958 will be a year of great success and great contentment for you.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

I'll never forget Florida — and I won't forget the Over Seas Press meeting!

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
585 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Truman,

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

February 4, 1958

Dear Ed:

Enclosed is a letter I received, signed by a Jane Hendrix. The envelope was postmarked Ontario, California.

As my pencilled note indicates, I am pleased to welcome you into my club.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
585 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Enc.

Truman, Harry S.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

February 5, 1958

Dear Ed:

I hope you read Dave Lawrence's article this morning. It made me feel good.

Here is one boot-licker whose column is based solely on statements after the fact, and I am sure now that we touched them where it hurts most.

If we had not had something like this, I would have been worried to death about the value of our project.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Unless the opposition squeals we've missed our objective!

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
585 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

May 13, 1958

Dear Ed:

Thank you very much for your telegram of the 7th.

You were kind and thoughtful to remember my birthday, and I am sorry that you could not join us for the celebration.

I know that you got a fine interview with Prime Minister MacMillan, and I will look forward to seeing and hearing it.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

I'm still hearing from ours. The only thing wrong is that everyone of the communications is for office & I'm not accustomed to that!

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

May 21, 1958

Dear Ed:

Thank you very much for your thoughtfulness in sending me that editorial from the Manchester Guardian.

Clippings of editorials from several Canadian papers, this one from England and the various comments I have heard expressed in this country, indicate that appreciation of our joint efforts approaches the universal.

It's an old story for you but new and unique for me.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Truman, Harry S.

Sent script to Mr Robbins, N.C. 8/11.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

August 8, 1958

J

Dear Ed:

Mr. Jhan Robbins of This Week magazine is writing an article based on a few talks with me and certain statements I have made in the past.

He believes it would be of help to him to read a written transcript of your recent interview with me on television and will call at your office in the next few days to see if such a transcript is available.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI
November 24, 1958

Dear Ed:

Thanks a lot for your letter of the 7th, enclosing the check for the Attlee broadcast.

I more than appreciated it and I am looking forward to a view of it because I want to be sure that you got your money's worth out of it.

I hope everything is going well with you and that it will continue to go well.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N.Y.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

November 29, 1958

Dear Ed:

Thank you very much for your telegram of the 26th.

I'm looking forward to seeing that interview with Attlee and will be more than pleased to have a print of the film for my Library.

I expect to be in Washington on December 3rd and 4th and again on the 6th, 7th and 8th. If you happen to be in that neighborhood at the time, I would be very happy to see you.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Truman, Harry

HARRY S. TRUMAN
INDEPENDENCE, MISSOURI

December 12, 1958

H. wants to call him,

Dear Ed:

I expect to arrive in New York on the 22nd and stay there until the 27th.

Perhaps we can get together then for a discussion of some of those things in which we are both interested.

I will be at the Carlyle, as usual.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Haven't had a chance to See Lord Attlee as yet but I hope to run it here in the Library soon.

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

TUFTS UNIVERSITY
MEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS 02155

TO: Joseph S. Komidar, University Librarian

FROM: Gregory Henderson, Acting Director, Murrow Center of the Fletcher School

DATE: December 3, 1970

SUBJECT: Edward R. Murrow Memorial Library Collection -Safekeeping of Letters in Wessell Vault

We very much appreciate your keeping in your archives the following valuable letters which are part of the Edward R. Murrow Memorial Library Collection until such time as our Murrow Memorial Library facilities are available:

1. Sir Winston Churchill letter to Edward R. Murrow, Esq., dated December 17, 1945.

2. Howard Smith letter to Edward Murrow, dated April 23, 1953, attaching Churchill letter of December 17, 1945.

3. Sir Winston Churchill letter to Edward R. Murrow, dated 10 February, 1955.

4. Clementine S. Churchill letter to Edward R. Murrow, dated February 10, 1955.

5. Edward R. Murrow letter to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, dated April 8, 1954 (carbon).

6. Dwight D. Eisenhower letter to Edward R. Murrow, dated October 16, 1954.

7. Dwight D. Eisenhower letter to Edward R. Murrow, dated November 9, 1954 (Note: President Eisenhower must be refering to the kinescope of Benson PERSON TO PERSON sent to him.).

8. Dwight D. Eisenhower letter to Edward R. Murrow, dated April 21, 1955.

9. Edward R. Murrow letter to President Eisenhower, dated April 27, 1955 (carbon).

Received 12/3/70 Florence Forsyth
Wessell Library

WESTERHAM 93.

CHARTWELL,
WESTERHAM,
KENT.

December 17, 1945.

Dear Mr. Murrow,

I regret the unavoidable delay in replying to your letter of December 5, but as my Secretary has explained over the telephone, I cannot undertake to broadcast to America on Christmas Day, as you have so kindly suggested. I thank you nevertheless for your courtesy in writing to me.

Yours sincerely,

Winston S. Churchill

Edward R. Murrow, Esq.,
The Columbia Broadcasting System Inc.

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.
EUROPEAN OFFICES
26 HALLAM STREET, LONDON, W.1

OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN DIRECTOR
HOWARD K. SMITH

TELEPHONE LANGHAM 1166 & 1167
TELEGRAMS COLBROSYS LONDON

23rd April 1953.

Dear Ed,

I could not bring myself to bind this letter into my Churchill books. Save it for Casey. The old reprobate (not Casey; Churchill) is undeniably a great man, and the value of having known him will increase with the years.

See you soon.

Howard

Howard Smith.

Mr. Edward Murrow,
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,
485 Madison Avenue,
New York 22 New York.
U.S.A.

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

10 February, 1955.

My dear Mr. Murrow,

I feel I must tell you how much I appreciate your moving broadcast tribute on my birthday, and your kindness in sending us a recording of it so that we could hear it. I value deeply the sentiments you expressed, and I was touched and pleased by all that you said.

Yours sincerely,

Winston S. Churchill

Mr. Edward R. Murrow.

February 10. 1955

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

My dear Ed. Winston and I
listened to the master
Recording which you collec
arranged a broadcast for
his birthday. We are mov
that you should have sent
your genius. Knowledge -
understanding to know
him - We felt sad pa
of the time because of
the situation which is

unfolding & developing
such grim mystery – so
the War one hopes –
much that our War
comradeship with Russia
would continue & we
shall not to work
us at all but to
in their immensity.
sufficient to themselves.
I do think you
much for having done
this for Winston in
your own country.
Please give Jane
my love. Yours ever
Clementine S.
Churchill

Edward R. Murrow

EDWARD R. MURROW
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

April 8, 1954

Dear Mr. President:

I think it was Shakespeare who once said, "Beggar that I am, I am even poor in thanks".

Permit me to take this opportunity to repeat what I said when you first arrived in London: that if there is any capacity in which I can serve my nation, I am yours to command.

As ever yours,

President Dwight D. Eisenhower
The White House
Washington, D.C.

BC: MR. PALEY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 16, 1954

Dear Mr. Murrow:

It was especially good of you to send me greetings on my birthday. I want to express my sincere thanks for your friendly thought.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
C.B.S.
485 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 9, 1954.

Dear Ed:

To my chagrin I find I never acknowledged the pictures you sent me back in September. I hope you will forgive my bad manners, and know that I was truly appreciative of your thoughtfulness.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Mr. Edward R. Murrow,
485 Madison Avenue,
New York, New York.

Personal

DDE

THE WHITE HOUSE

April 21, 1955

Dear Ed:

I wonder if it would be convenient for you to come to an informal stag dinner on the evening of Monday, May sixteenth. I hope to gather together a small group, and I should like very much for you to attend if it is possible for you to do so.

Because of the informality of the occasion, I suggest that we meet at the White House about half past seven, have a reasonably early dinner, and devote the evening to a general chat. While I am hopeful that you can attend, I realize that you already may have engagements which would interfere. If so, I assure you of my complete understanding.

I shall probably wear a black tie, but business suit will be entirely appropriate.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

P.S. As a personal favor to me, would you keep this reasonably confidential until after the event?

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Corl.

April 27, 1955

Dear Mr. President:

As my British friends would say, "It is not without considerable pleasure and appreciation that I accept your gracious invitation to dine at the White House at half past seven on Monday, May sixteenth."

Sincerely yours,

President Dwight D. Eisenhower
The White House
Washington, D.C.

rh

THE FLETCHER SCHOOL OF LAW AND DIPLOMACY

MEMORANDUM TO: Joseph S. Komidar, University Librarian DATE: July 3, 1974

FROM: Eleanor G. Horan, Curator, Murrow Collection E G Horan

SUBJECT: Edward R. Murrow Memorial Library Collection - Safekeeping of Letters in Wessell Vault

Attached are valuable letters from the Edward R. Murrow Collection. I would ask that they be placed in the Wessell Vault with those sent you previously. They are identified as follows:

1. Charles A. Lindbergh's letter to Mr. Murrow dated April 29, 1953
2. Helen Keller's letter to Mr. Murrow dated March 13, 1954
3. Harold Macmillan's letter to Mr. Murrow dated June 6, 1958
4. Dag Hammarskjold's letter to Mr. Murrow dated November 9, 1955
5. Harry Truman's letter to "Ed" [Murrow] dated November 16, 1955
6. John F. Kennedy's letter [Jack] dated November 19, 1955
7. Adlai E. Stevenson's letter to "Ed" [Murrow] and signed "Adlai" dated November 21, 1955

Received 7/3/74 Shirley B. Johnson
Wessell Library

Noted and returned

File

Scotts Cove
Darien, Conn.
April 29, 1953

S/10

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Your March 18th letter arrived just after I had left on a month's trip which kept me almost entirely out of contact with office and mail. I want you to know how much I appreciate your invitation to appear on the television program. I hope you will understand when I say that I am most anxious to continue living and working quietly, and have therefore, for some years, declined all invitations to speak or take part in public occasions.

It was very considerate of you to write. Many thanks.

Sincerely,

Charles A. Lindbergh

Charles A. Lindbergh

A.

S/N

March 18, 1953

Dear Colonel Lindberg:

The Saturday Evening Post people were in to see me about doing a portion of our television program, See It Now, in conjunction with your forthcoming series of articles. We told them we would be very interested in doing something with Colonel Lindberg and that if that would help them so much the better. They are all for it, but feel the invitation to you must come from us.

It is my suggestion that you and I could sit down around a table and chat for an hour or so about your Paris flight. It would be my intention to film the entire conversation and then you and I could view it together and determine which sections would make the best historical document. If you so desired, the entire interview could be done at your home in an hour or two. We have done similar interviews with President Eisenhower and Senator Taft and feel we are equipped to do it with a minimum of inconvenience to you and your household.

I shall hold myself in readiness to discuss this with you further and should be delighted to come talk to you.

Sincerely yours,

Colonel Charles E. Lindberg
Scotts Cove
Darien, Connecticut

nic

Keller, Helen

ARCAN RIDGE
WESTPORT, CONN.

Dear Mr. Murrow,

Words cannot express my high admiration of the valiant attitude you have adopted in the present crisis of American history.

I am with you heart and soul in your defiance of hostile elements that would impose the yoke of fear upon a free people. You are right -- there can be no neutrality in matters concerning freedom any more than in other matters which regard public welfare, and that is possible only when voices speak out against the vicious endeavors of demagogy.

Also I should like to salute your sponsors, the Aluminum Company, who have so bravely stood behind you in your supreme adventure.

With warmest congratulations, I am,

Cordially yours,

Helen Keller

March thirteenth, 1954.

Macmillan

10 Downing Street
Whitehall

June 6, 1958.

Dear Mr Murrow

Press comment and letters which I have received have left me in no doubt that the television interview with you and Mr. Collingwood was remarkably well received. This is just to say thank you very much to you both for the way you conducted it. You did a first-class job and I am most grateful.

Yours very sincerely
Harold Macmillan

Mr. Ed Murrow.

SECRETARY-GENERAL

9 November 1955

Dear Mr. Murrow,

I wish to thank you very much for your kindness in sending me the record album, which you and the staff of PERSON TO PERSON have put together, containing excerpts from some of Sir Winston Churchill's speeches.

With best personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Dag Hammarskjold

Mr. Edward R. Murrow,
485 Madison Avenue,
New York 22, N. Y.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK BUILDING
KANSAS CITY 6, MISSOURI

November 16, 1955

Dear Ed:

I am grateful to you and your staff for sending me the record album of excerpts from several of Sir Winston Churchill's speeches.

The photographs in the album are extraordinarily good and augur well for the record itself. I am very anxious to play it.

Sincerely yours,

Harry Truman

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

JOHN F. KENNEDY
MASSACHUSETTS

COMMITTEES:
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

1702 Federal Building
Boston (9), Massachusetts
November 19th - 1 9 5 5

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

This is to acknowledge and thank you for your very nice letter of November 3rd advising me that you have put together, with Sir Winston Churchill's authorization, a record album containing excerpts from some of his speeches.

I am most happy to receive this album and it certainly will serve to stimulate memories of days that are past.

With warmest personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

Jack

John F. Kennedy.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON
231 So. LaSalle Street
Chicago

November 21, 1955

Dear Ed:

Thanks so much for that splendid recording of excerpts from Winston Churchill. I shall play it at once, and if you perceive any improvement in my utterances, well, you are to blame. Or do I mean Churchill!

Yours,

Adlai

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

G.H.

TUFTS UNIVERSITY

File.

MEMO

TO: Gregory Henderson, Acting Dir., Murrow Center

FROM: J. S. Komidar

DATE: 4 May 1971

SUBJECT: Edward R. Murrow Memorial Library Collection-
Safekeeping of Letters in Wessell Vault

A Sir Winston Churchill letter to Edward R. Murrow, dated 6 August 1965, has been added to the other nine items listed in your memorandum of 3 December 1970.

JSK:ffk

TUFTS UNIVERSITY
MEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS 02155

TO: Joseph S. Komidar, University Librarian

FROM: Gregory Henderson, Acting Director, Murrow Center of the Fletcher School

DATE: April 30, 1971

SUBJECT: Edward R. Murrow Memorial Library Collection - Safekeeping of Letters in Wessell Vault

Enclosed you will find an original letter dated 6 August, 1955 from Sir Winston Churchill to Edward R. Murrow. Would you please add this to others sent you on December 3, 1970 from the Murrow Collection for safekeeping.

Thank you for your help to us as custodians of this valuable collection.

Received 5/3/71 Shirley Johnson
Wessell Library

WESTERN 1617.

28, HYDE PARK GATE,
LONDON, S.W. 7.

6 August, 1955

Confidential

My dear Murrow,

I am afraid it is no longer open to me to entertain your suggestion of a five-hour personal television talk, as I had already made certain arrangements with Sir Alexander Korda several months ago.

Let me express my thanks to you for making this proposal to me.

Yours very sincerely,

Winston S. Churchill

Mr. Ed Murrow.

TUFTS UNIVERSITY
MEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS 02155

TO: Joseph S. Komidar, University Librarian

FROM: Gregory Henderson, Acting Director, Murrow Center of the Fletcher School

DATE: December 29, 1971

SUBJECT: Edward R. Murrow Library Collection - Safekeeping of Letters in Wessell Vault

Attached is a valuable letter written by Clementine S. Churchill to 'Ed' Murrow dated October 28, 1954 about Senator Margaret Chase Smith. I would ask that it be placed in the Wessell Vault together with those sent you previously.

Received 12/29/71

Wessell Library

October 28th 1954

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

My dear 'Ed',
Thank-you to me
for cabling
about Senator Chase
Smith. What an
agreeable and
intelligent woman!
I met her at
luncheon with
Lady Singh.
She

Came & saw Winston
in the Cabinet Room.
I was impressed by
her energy & quickness
in travelling all the
way to Blackpool
for the Tory Conference.
I hope you & Sarah
& your little son
are all well.
Ever
yours
Clementine S.
Churchill

TUFTS UNIVERSITY
MEDFORD, MASSACHUSETTS 02155

TO: Joseph S. Komidar, University Librarian

FROM: Gregory Henderson, Acting Director, Murrow Center of the Fletcher School

DATE: June 4, 1971

SUBJECT: Edward R. Murrow Memorial Library Collection - Safekeeping of Letters in Wessell Vault

Attached are valuable letters from the Edward R. Murrow Collection. I would ask that they be placed in the Wessell Vault with those sent you previously. They are identified as follows:

1. Eleanor Roosevelt's letter to Mr. Ed Murrow dated May 19, 1950, with his response.

2. Lyndon B. Johnson's letter to Mr. Edward R. Murrow dated June 6, 1957, "The Open Curtain, and Mr. Murrow's response.

3. John F. Kennedy's letter to Mr. Ed R. Murrow dated August 30, 1958, "Who Killed the Kennedy-Ives Labor Reform Bill?" and Mr. Murrow's response.

4. Helen Keller's letter to Mr. Murrow dated April 16, 1959, and his response.

Received 6/4/71 [signature]
Wessell Library

Belongs in folder # 9
File 2 Drawer A

SP
ONA

May 22, 1950

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

I'm very sorry, but I won't be able to attend the meeting on May 28; I shall be in Berlin.

However, I have had a letter from Mr. Landau and expect to see him tomorrow to learn more about his interesting plan.

Sincerely yours,

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The Park Sheraton Hotel
202 West 56th Street
New York, New York

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The Park Sheraton Hotel
202 Fifty Sixth Street West
New York 19, N. Y.

May 19, 1950

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Mr. Jacob Landau came to see me the other day. He feels very strongly that one of the greatest causes of trouble in the world today is lack of understanding among nations and the lack of real world-minded reporters to give the kind of background material to newspapers that is needed for a world point of view. He is very anxious to start a miniature AP, not to provide actual news of the day, but to provide background material that has a world outlook.

Mr. Landau wants to get an advisory committee together to help him and asked me if I would ask a few people to let him talk about it. I told him I could not undertake to sponsor anything of this kind or do any real work, but I would be willing to ask a few people if he would send me a list.

You are on his list and I hope very much if you are free on Sunday, May 28th, at 9 P.M. you will come to my apartment here in the hotel. It need not be a long session, but I think it may be of real interest to you.

Very sincerely yours,

Eleanor Roosevelt

Mr. Ed Murrow
CBS
485 Madison Avenue
New York City

Johnson, Lyndon

July 2, 1957

Dear Lyndon:

Belated thanks for sending me your speech of June 8th. As usual, you talked more than a lot of sense.

I would have written earlier, but I am just back from Yugoslavia where I filmed a fairly long session with Tito.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable Lyndon B. Johnson
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

fc

(Dictated but not signed by Mr. Murrow)

LYNDON B. JOHNSON
TEXAS

STATE OFFICE:
207 U. S. Courthouse
Austin, Texas

United States Senate
Office of the Democratic Leader
Washington, D. C.

June 6, 1957

Dear Ed:

I wanted you to have this copy of the speech I am making in New York Saturday night, June 8th, because I thought you might be interested.

Best regards.

Sincerely

Lyndon B. Johnson

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York, New York

ADDRESS BY SENATE MAJORITY LEADER LYNDON B. JOHNSON
BEFORE THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL
New York City, New York June 8, 1957

FOR RELEASE IN AM'S OF SUNDAY, JUNE 9, 1957

THE OPEN CURTAIN

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Guests:

I am here tonight with a basic premise in my mind.

It is that you -- the members of the United Jewish Appeal -- are men and women who have dedicated your lives to helping your fellow man.

I do not assume this lightly -- merely from the desire of a speaker to flatter his audience. It rests upon your enviable record.

I raise the point only as a predicate to the remarks which I plan to make tonight. This is the place and you are the people to whom I wish to define a new proposal.

The World We Live In

Never before in history have people been so badly in need of help. And the only kind of help that will serve today is the kind that the people supply for themselves.

There is no need to recite once more the realities of the modern world. We are all only too familiar with them -- the cold war, the armaments race, atomic fallout, international misunderstanding.

Most of these factors have appeared before in history. There have been "cold wars." International misunderstanding has been a normal state of affairs for centuries. There is nothing new about an armaments race.

But for the first time, we now face the prospect of destroying ourselves -- not as the result of an armaments race but merely by indulging in the race.

The Atomic Rain

For several weeks our newspapers have carried daily headlines about the effects of atomic fallout. The scientists disagree as to the amount of damage that is being done to humanity by our nuclear test explosions.

But even the most conservative state flatly that there is "some risk."

I am no nuclear physicist. I do not pretend to have the scientific knowledge that would entitle me to pass judgment on genetics or the effects of Strontium-90.

But I do know that the experts are talking about my children and your children. And it gives me no comfort to be told that some scientists think the risk to them is "slight."

No Monopoly

It is even less comforting to assess the probable future of the armaments race even assuming that our children escape the fallout danger -- whether slight or tremendous. If it continues, the future is bleak.

The intercontinental ballistics missile with a hydrogen warhead is just over the horizon. It is no longer just the disorderly dream of some science fiction writer.

(more)

We must assume that our country will have no monopoly on this weapon. The Soviets have not matched our achievements in democracy and prosperity; but they have kept pace with us in building the tools of destruction.

With such weapons in a divided world, there will be little choice. We will return to the caves of our remote ancestors and burrow underground like the prairie dogs of West Texas.

Reasonable Alternatives

There are reasonable alternatives to this unreasonable prospect. They are alternatives which are available to mankind -- providing that mankind will adopt them.

Our present situation could have been avoided. Twelve years ago -- when we had a monopoly on the atomic bomb -- the United States offered to share the secrets of the atom with the entire world.

We asked in return only reasonable guarantees that the atom would never again be used in warfare. This offer had no parallel in history -- and it would have converted the atom from an implement of death to an implement of life.

Two years later, this plan was approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations. It was blocked only by the Soviet Union and its satellites.

There is no point in reliving the past. I am not going to waste your time and my time in proving that the Soviets were wrong. Free people who have had access to the truth are already aware of the facts.

We live in the present. We no longer have a monopoly on atomic power. But there is a sound reason for recalling the events of 1946 and 1948. One aspect of those events may point the way to the future.

The Russian people have never had an opportunity to weigh the free world's proposal for the control of atomic energy. They were never informed about it openly and frankly. They never knew that Stalin provoked an arms race that, if continued, must end in the total elimination of mankind.

Today humanity is a great deal closer to self-destruction than it was ten years ago.

The Threat and The Hope

And yet, because we are close to the threat, we may also be closer to hope. I do not foresee any quick Utopian solutions. A happy ending to the atomic-hydrogen menace will not be easily found.

But I am convinced, to borrow Churchill's phrase, that if we cannot see the beginning of the end, we can at least see the end of the beginning.

There are pathways of peace and progress open to all humanity. The statesmen of the world have one over-riding duty -- to help light those paths.

Where lie the signs of hope? They lie in the realm of reason.

The Challenge

The challenge is truly immediate. It involves actions that can and must be taken this year, now -- during the remaining 206 days of 1957.

Our basic need goes by the technical name "disarmament." That long, rather dull-sounding word represents a host of complicated problems. The answer -- even a beginning to the answer -- represents the hope of all mankind.

(more)

We must initiate action on five objectives.

1. Controlled reduction of military forces by all countries.

2. A start on a mutual "open skies" fool-proof inspection system.

3. A frank and open search for a method of suspending tests of the bigger nuclear weapons, under air tight conditions which give full protection against violations.

4. A reduction of everyone's stockpile of nuclear weapons under copper-riveted methods of mutual inspection.

5. And this is the key to ultimate hope: A world-wide agreement -- backed by absolute safeguards -- that no nation will make any new fissionable materials for weapon purposes -- neither the three present nuclear powers nor those who may soon have the capacity.

Let The People Judge

How do we launch this program? We do so in the only way possible -- in the only way that accords with American traditions.

We must create a new world policy. Not just of "open skies" -- but of open eyes, ears, and minds, for all peoples of the world.

I call for the "open curtain." Let truth flow through it freely. Let ideas clease evil just as fresh air cleanses the poisoned, stagnant mass of a long-closed cavern.

Mankind's only hope lies with men themselves. Let us insist that the case be submitted to the people of the world.

A few years ago this would have been utterly impractical. But great events have recently stirred the world. We must seize the hopes they suggest. We must not be blinded to those hopes by rigid reflections of the past.

Only four years ago the brutal Stalin died. Only a year ago the world learned that the new Russian leader, Krushchev had found it necessary to expose the depths of Stalin's evil. And only six days ago Krushchev took advantage of America's facilities to come into our homes and state the communist case.

I am glad that he did so. I have complete trust and faith in our people.

They will not be contaminated by open communist propaganda.

We should welcome this example of direct argument.

But we must -- I think -- go much farther than this. Let us take Krushchev's technique and turn it back upon him. Let us use the program as the means to open the iron curtain.

As he has used our TV screens for his appeals, let us demand to use his screens for our appeal -- the appeal of truth undefensive and undismayed.

We should ask Krushchev to provide us with Soviet-wide uncensored radio and TV facilities. We should call on him to allow us to come into Russian homes and state our case -- the American case -- to the Russian people.

(more)

Return to Fundamentals

Let us get back to fundamentals. Let us return to the principles which made America strong and great and free.

The most important of these principles is that truth can be found in the free marketplace of ideas.

It is not secret to any of you that I am a Democrat. My political faith can be traced to many sources. One of them -- and the most important of them -- was Thomas Jefferson, who said:

> I know of no safe depository of the ultimate power of society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion by education.

This is an elegant and graceful way of putting a basic truth that I learned in Johnson City, Texas. Stated more simply, it means: Never underestimate the intelligence of the people.

Sometimes they are misinformed. Sometimes the truth is withheld from them. But when they have the facts, their judgment will be good and fair and honorable.

Faith in the People

I have a deep and abiding faith in the judgment of the people who ride the range in the Texas Hill Country. They may not have the ease of expression and the grace of manner of those who were reared in more settled parts of our land.

But no demagogue is going to lead the lean, spare Texan who runs the cattle on my ranch into the paths of bigotry. And Nikita Krushchev is not going to convert him into a communist.

He's just plain got too much sense. And I don't think that he is unusual. I believe that most Americans are like that.

They may speak with a different accent. They may plow corn land in Iowa or sew clothes in New York City. They may work on the docks in Seattle or run a department store in Kansas City.

They may be Northern Yankees or Southern Rebels. They may be Catholics, Protestants, or Jews. It makes no difference because they are all Americans.

I am not afraid to have them listen to Nikita Krushchev or Karl Marx or Nicolai Lenin himself. They have the intelligence and the independence to make up their own minds.

I know there are some who are fearful of the effects of communist propaganda upon our people. I am a Jeffersonian. I do not share those fears.

(more)

Welcome Competition

I favor granting Krushchev or Bulganin or Molotov or any Soviet leader television time in America every week of the year. I demand in return only that they grant us equal opportunities for reaching the Russian people.

Let the Russians say what they wish. Let our people hear it to the bitter end. I have faith in them. I do not believe that there will be any communist converts.

Krushchev, in his broadcast, called for competition between socialist and capitalist states. There is one form of competition -- the clash of ideas -- that Americans would welcome with delight.

I am not talking of a "propaganda offensive" or "waging peace." Those are the terms of advertising and this country is not interested in making a mercantile item of peace.

I am not talking of merely one reply to Krushchev by the President or some other official.

I am calling for an open curtain for full discussion of the immediate, urgent problems facing our people. We should insist on the right to state our case on disarmament in detail to the Soviet people. We should have weekly appearances during this year on Soviet radio and television, and we should offer similar facilities here.

The Truth Shall Make You Free

Can Krushchev find any reasonable objection to this procedure? Can he advance one logical reason why his people should not hear our proposals advanced from our lips as our people heard his proposals advanced from his lips?

Krushchev said last Sunday: "We have to live on one planet." Let him show that he is willing to make this possible.

I am a man who trusts people when they have the facts. I believe in the Biblical injunction: "You shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free." The Russian people are capable of recognizing the truth when it is offered to them.

We should not let a single day pass without raising this issue. We should call it up in the United Nations; we should make it a basic proposal in all disarmament talks; we should insist upon it every time a Russian representative is within earshot.

Why not allow Soviet labor leaders to talk to our people in return for our labor leaders talking to theirs? Why not allow Soviet industrial managers to talk to our people in return for our industrialists talking to theirs?

Is there any good reason why American and Soviet farmers should not exchange views -- in the plain sight of the whole world? Is there any reason why our scholars and our professional men should be barred from mutual exchanges

with their Soviet counterparts?

Let the people know!

Let truth shine through the open curtain!

And when the people know, they will insist that the arms race, the nuclear explosions, the intercontinental missiles all be banished. They will insist upon systems that safeguard us against world suicide.

(more)

The Path of Peace

Once again we will place our feet on the path of constructive activity. We will look forward with joy rather than with dread to our children's future.

We live in a world where over two-thirds of the people are "ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished." When the madness of the nuclear arms race is halted, mankind's creative efforts can be turned to their relief. We shall survive this century only if we find how to substitute human dignity for human degradation.

The people in this room tonight are dedicated to the cause of helping -- rather than destroying -- humanity. You have worked through the years to bring a measure of security and a measure of decency to your fellow humans.

Sanctuary

You have been associated with many humanitarian causes -- and one of them is creating a sanctuary for the oppressed. That sanctuary, Israel, stands today -- permanent and enduring -- in the midst of what was once desert.

Creating that sanctuary meant that rivers had to be dammed; fields had to be tilled; houses had to be built; the resources of nature had to be tapped.

These are the tasks to which all of humanity should be dedicated.

We have had enough of oppression and wars; of trouble and turmoil; of the frustration of every normal human impulse. We have seen noble impulses thwarted and turned to ignoble ends. We have watched the fruits of genius warped and turned into the paths of destruction.

This is not the work of the people of the world. It is the work of the small groups of selfish and twisted men who withhold from their fellow human beings the indispensable tool of freedom -- the truth.

As you go about your humanitarian work, I want to leave you with one thought tonight.

You are people who seek to build; not to tear down. And when doors are opened so the people of the world can find the truth for themselves, we can all turn to building -- building a better life for ourselves and our children.

The people can be trusted. It is time the case be turned over to them.

# # # # #

Kennedy, John

September 8, 1958

The Honorable John F. Kennedy
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Jack:

I have just re-read your speech on "the Gap". I meant to write to you about it shortly after it was delivered. Without doubt, it is one of the most penetrating and courageous speeches delivered on the floor of the Senate in a long time. It will not offend you for me to say that it was worthy of Senator Vandenberg in his better and enlightened days. More power to you!

As ever yours,

ERM:skh

N.B.
"Gap" Speech given to Leo de Orsey 22 Sept 0.

LISTER HILL, ALA., CHAIRMAN
JAMES E. MURRAY, MONT.
JOHN F. KENNEDY, MASS.
PAT MC NAMARA, MICH.
WAYNE MORSE, OREG.
STROM THURMOND, S. C.
RALPH YARBOROUGH, TEX.
H. ALEXANDER SMITH, N. J.
IRVING M. IVES, N. Y.
WILLIAM A. PURTELL, CONN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
GORDON ALLOTT, COLO.
JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, KY.

STEWART E. MC CLURE, CHIEF CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE

August 30, 1960

Mr. Ed R. Murrow
CBS
485 Madison Ave.
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Murrow:

The Research Division of the Democratic National Committee has requested me to distribute to all key Democrats, party leaders, and public officials the two enclosed speeches. Although these issues -- of national defense and labor reform -- may not at present be crucial in your particular area, these materials are sent in the thought that many Democrats may wish to be prepared on these subjects which will certainly figure in political debates across the nation.

A variety of statements by Republican officials make clear their intention to use the "labor" issue against the Democrats in this campaign. Actually, our party need not be on the defensive. It was the vote of approximately four-fifths of the Republicans in the House of Representatives that killed the bill which I had sponsored, which every Democratic Senator supported, and which more than two-thirds of the House Democrats supported. In the enclosed speech, I attempted to demonstrate the unreasonableness of those who opposed a basically strong bill.

The other enclosed address has been requested by several candidates because it attempts to summarize the lag in our defense preparedness over the last six years of Republican rule, and the future implications this holds for our military and foreign policies. While some Republican Senators objected to such a warning's being sounded on the floor of the Senate, I am convinced that these are facts the public needs to know.

I hope this material will be of assistance to you. I welcome your comments -- and hope you will let me know if there is anything further I can send you.

With every good wish, I am

Sincerely,

John Kennedy

John F. Kennedy

JFK:jl

(Not printed at Government expense)

Congressional Record

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 85th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION

Who Killed the Kennedy-Ives Labor Reform Bill?

SPEECH

OF

HON. JOHN F. KENNEDY

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Friday, August 22, 1958

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, only the Jimmy Hoffas and the Nathan Shefermans can find satisfaction in the failure of this Congress to pass the labor reform bill, generally known as the Kennedy-Ives bill. Honest union members, informed business men, responsible labor leaders, law enforcement officers, and the general public—all of these will suffer as the result of this bill's death in the House of Representatives.

Those who voted against the bill and those who lobbied for its defeat must bear a heavy responsibility during the coming months when racketeering and gangsterism in the labor movement continue unchecked. I cannot believe that the American people will accept some technical or procedural argument offered by way of excuse for the defeat of a bill which would have put Mr. Hoffa and his ilk out of business.

No two experts in labor affairs could probably agree on a draft bill in this controversial and sensitive area. Therefore, it was natural that criticism and controversy should surround it. As the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] put it during the debate in the Senate:

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Each Senator, no doubt, feels that if he were privileged to write it he could improve on this measure.

In the same colloquy, he expressed what I believe all of us felt, when he said:

I say let us take what we know all of us want, and pass the bill, and then move on.

And the Senate did just that, and passed the bill by an 88-to-1 vote.

That this bill displeases extremists is not surprising, for these same extremists have been the ones who have prevented the enactment of any progressive labor legislation since 1947. But this bill passed the Senate precisely because the members of this body demonstrated, in the words of Business Week magazine, how "wise guidance in the public interest can be substituted for concern over wide apart partisan positions."

The Kennedy-Ives bill, as it passed the Senate, was a strong, bipartisan measure. Whatever may be said about what the Congress might do on some other bill at some other time, this bill represented a real opportunity for effective labor reform in this Congress. The failure to enact it only means that Hoffa and the handful of irresponsible and arrogant labor leaders who plague an otherwise clean labor movement will continue to operate.

Of one thing we may be sure: Next year, there will be more scandals, more racketeering, more abuses by the hoodlums who have infiltrated a tiny fringe of

the American labor movement. But we shall lack an effective remedy to stop them; and those who defeated this bill are apparently willing to assume responsibility for tying our hands.

More union funds will be embezzled or otherwise misused next year, and the members and the public will know nothing about it.

More union elections will be rigged next year, and nothing will be done about it.

More exconvicts will serve as union officers; more Nathan Shefferman middlemen will take payoffs; more picket lines will be set up for extortionate purposes; more trusteeships will be used for Jimmy Hoffa-type power plays; more Johnny Dio paper locals will be established to front for racketeers; but we shall be able to do nothing about it.

The results of nearly 2 years of McClellan committee hearings, of several weeks of hearings, discussion, and drafting by the Labor Committee, of long, constructive debates on the Senate floor; all this is to go for naught, because of the short-sighted opposition stemming mostly from one party and one interest group.

PROVISIONS OF THE KENNEDY-IVES BILL

No one who thoughtfully examined the Kennedy-Ives bill could doubt its effectiveness as a labor-reform measure. The key provisions of the bill, as passed by the Senate, included the following:

First. Comprehensive detailed disclosure to members, press, public, and law enforcement agencies of union financial data.

Second. Full reports by union officers on any personal conflict-of-interest transactions.

Third. Criminal sanctions for embezzlement of union funds, false reporting, false entries in books, failure to report, or destruction of union books.

Fourth. Suits by union members for recovery of funds embezzled or misappropriated by union officers.

Fifth. Prohibition of loans by employers or unions to union officers.

Sixth. Secret ballot for the election of all union officers or of the convention delegates who select them.

Seventh. Due notice of all union elections, and real opportunity to nominate opposing candidates.

Eighth. Requirement that union officers be elected by secret ballot every 4 years, by international unions; and every 3 years, by local unions.

Ninth. Prohibition on the use of union funds to support candidacy of any union officer.

Tenth. Prohibition of service as union officers of persons convicted of felony.

Eleventh. Power to Secretary of Labor to institute court action to set aside improper elections, and conduct new elections.

Twelfth. Limit on union trusteeships to 18 months.

Thirteenth. Mandatory annual report to Secretary and union members on every trusteeship, the reasons for its establishment, continuance, and operation.

Fourteenth. Prohibition on counting votes of delegates of trustee bodies unless delegates elected by secret ballot, and on transfer of funds from trusteed local union to international except normal dues and assessments.

Fifteenth. Power to Secretary of Labor to begin a court proceeding to break improper trusteeships.

Sixteenth. Prohibition of picketing for extortion or to secure payoff from employer.

Seventeenth. Prohibition of solicitation or payment of fictitious fees for unloading cargo from interstate carriers.

Eighteenth. Public financial reports of the operations of Shefferman-type middlemen; and a prohibition of channeling bribes and improper influence through such middlemen.

Nineteenth. Elimination of the "no man's land" problem which prevented NLRB action on local labor racketeering,

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by directing the NLRB to exercise its full jurisdiction under the Taft-Hartley Act.

A STRONG LABOR REFORM BILL

It will be noted that this bill would have implemented every one of the McClellan Committee's legislative recommendations not yet acted on, inasmuch as the welfare fund protection bill had already been passed.

The McClellan committee legislative recommendations were as follows and I quote from the report:

LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and Management Field recommends that the Congress of the United States give attention to the passage of legislation to curb abuses uncovered in five areas during our first year of hearings.

These recommendations are—

1. Legislation to regulate and control pension, health, and welfare funds;

2. Legislation to regulate and control union funds;

3. Legislation to insure union democracy;

4. Legislation to curb activities of middlemen in labor-management disputes;

5. Legislation to clarify the "no man's land" in labor-management relations.

It must be noted that the committee has explored a number of other areas in labor-management relations and plans to present legislative proposals covering those areas at a future time. For instance, much testimony has been heard during past months on the infiltration of gangsters and racketeers into the labor movement. Additional testimony on this subject will be heard during the coming year and this, along with other subjects of committee interest, such as some phases of organizational picketing on which we have already had some testimony, will provide the basis for further legislative recommendations.

The bill rejected by the House implemented all but the first of these recommendations which was already far advanced in the legislative process. This bill would have accomplished the following:

First. It provided for complete financial disclosure by unions, with broad investigative powers for the Secretary of Labor to insure compliance;

Second. It imposed strict standards of union democracy, including free elections by secret ballot and the regulation of trusteeships;

Third. It curbed labor-management middlemen;

Fourth. It provided an effective solution to the "no man's land" problem.

The bill, as passed by the Senate, was recognized by knowledgeable men on both sides of the aisle as an effective instrument of labor reform. The Senator from Arkansas [Mr. McCLELLAN] said of the bill:

If enacted, and properly administered, it will drive many unreformed ex-convicts, racketeers, gangsters, and crooked officials out of the union movement and strengthen the position of honest, decent unionism, and its leaders.

Senator Knowland, the distinguished minority leader, indicated that the bill marked "real progress" and said, "In the final analysis, the workers will be the ones who will suffer if Congress does not finally act on legislation of this sort at this session." And the ranking Republican member of our Senate Committee on Labor, the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH], has termed the bill "one of the important landmarks of this Congress."

TAFT-HARTLEY AMENDMENTS

There have been objections that this bill does not go far enough—that it does not restrict labor's rights in the field of collective bargaining or political activity. But the Senate demonstrated repeatedly that it regarded this as a labor reform bill, designed primarily to carry out the recommendations of the McClellan committee—and that it should not be loaded down with broad new measures in the various areas of industrial relations.

The Taft-Hartley amendments contained in the bill were placed in it at the repeated urging of administration spokesmen. The Secretary of Labor in his appearance before our committee insisted on the inclusion of these amendments as did the ranking minority member of our committee, the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] both in committee and on the floor of the Senate.

The following excerpt, for instance, is taken from page 32 of the hearings before our committee:

Senator KENNEDY. I will say to the Secretary, the Secretary knows quite well that I would be delighted to see reforms in the Taft-Hartley law, which are long overdue.

The legislative recommendations of the McClellan committee include five areas: Legislation to regulate control of pension, health, and welfare funds, which, as I have said, we have done something about.

Second, to legislate to regulate control of union funds; and three, legislation to insure union democracy; and four, legislation to curb activities of middlemen in labor-management relations; and five, legislation to clairify the "no man's land" in labor-management relations.

I will say that if it is the desire of any member of the committee to offer amendments on any question, when the subcommittee finally meets to decide on legislation, that, of course, is his privilege.

I am merely hoping to the extent possible that we will attempt to confine ourselves to this immediate challenge.

From our experience since 1947, I am aware of the error of attempting a full-scale revision of the Taft-Hartley Act which, I believe, ought to take place.

Now, it may be possible, if the subcommittee could reach a consensus, we could do something about matters like non-Communist affidavits, and the right of economic strikers, and the problem of the building trades, and matters about which I think there is quite general agreement.

However, I am anxious that we do not get into too broad a field, because the result will be that nothing will be done.

Secretary MITCHELL. Certainly, in my answers to questions, I will abide by the chairman's ruling.

Senator KENNEDY. It is not a ruling. It is just an expression of hope.

Secretary MITCHELL. I would like to say it is the reason why I thought it was to the interest of all concerned to unfold a complete labor-management program, in my opinion this program should be approached in the broadest way.

All of the recommendations we have made, we think, are needed reforms.

And again, on page 278, the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH] had this to say:

I do want to emphasize the importance of giving serious consideration to the entire program contained in S. 3097, S. 3098, and S. 3099 which I introduced for the administration. * * *

For this reason I agree with the distinguished chairman, Mr. KENNEDY, that in the time available, it is impossible to write a major revision of the Taft-Hartley Act, especially if consideration is to be given to the recommendations of the McClellan committee dealing with the urgent problems of racketeering and union democracy, and such testimony as we received from Senator KNOWLAND yesterday, and Senator MCCLELLAN yesterday in their splendid presentation before this committee.

However, although the administration's proposals do not contemplate a major revision of Taft-Hartley, some of them are directed at specific, long-standing inequities and deficiencies, the correction of which are of immediate urgency.

This being so, I hope that it will be possible for us to deal with these proposals at this time.

The only major recommendations of the administration not included in the bill related to organizational picketing and secondary boycotts. But the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. MCCLELLAN] has clearly indicated that the question of secondary boycotts and picketing would be the subject of future investiga-

tions by the committee, and consequently, action on these two specific areas was deferred. I refer the Members of the Senate to page 10259 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD where this whole matter was discussed, and I quote from Senator MCCLELLAN'S speech on that page:

> Our committee has only begun to investigate that particular area. We have received some testimony regarding it, and I have repeatedly stated that the secondary boycott problem must be dealt with.
>
> But it is my theory that if we are to have good legislation, we must give it some care and thought. That is all I am asking for.
>
> If the Senate is now to try to legislate at this session, by means of this bill, in the entire labor and management field, then the select committee should be discharged, because then there would be nothing left for it to do.
>
> I want to have good legislation enacted, and I want the Senate to go into this field. But I repeat that I want these proposals properly investigated and considered, rather than to take hasty action and get bad legislation enacted.

OTHER CRITICISMS

Exaggerated criticism came from some quarters about the provisions of the bill requiring reports from employers concerning deals with labor-management middlemen. This provision of the bill prohibited nothing; it merely required information to be reported from employers concerning dealings with what the McClellan committee report called shadowy figures. Neither did this provision in any way interfere with normal employer-employee relations, nor was it ever intended to do so.

Another provision of the bill, clearly designed to prohibit bribes by employers to prevent unionization, was requested by National Labor Relations Board representatives when they appeared before the McClellan committee. This unambiguous antibribery section certainly did not preclude normal wage or other payments as was charged by some.

KENNEDY-IVES STRONGEST AVAILABLE BILL

The hard facts of the matter are that the Kennedy-Ives bill was not only the strongest bill which could pass the Congress—and the only bill which could be enacted at this Congress—it was also the strongest bill available. In most key areas it was much stronger than the proposals of the administration. Permit me to list some of them:

First. The administration proposals contained no effective regulation of trusteeships. This bill set strict standards and provided means by which union members could protect themselves against arbitrary imposition of trusteeships by international unions.

Second. The administration's bill contained weak and ineffective provisions to protect union members' voting providing only a report from a union that it follows its own rules for elections. The Senate-passed bill, on the other hand, would have required secret periodic elections of all important union officers. It went further and provided machinery to upset improperly held elections and established a method by which new elections could be held.

Third. The administration's bill merely reenacted present law dealing with union financial reports while the Senate-passed bill contained a comprehensive reporting requirement including reports by union officers of conflicts of interest.

Fourth. The administration bill contained a very limited provision requiring employers to report only payments to any union officer or employee. This is already covered by section 302 of Taft-Hartley. The Senate-passed bill, on the other hand, contained a strong, detailed provision requiring employers and middlemen to report transactions and arrangements as well as payments and expenditures for activities intended to influence or affect employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by the Labor Act.

Fifth. The Senate-passed bill contained a strong specific provision against "shakedown picketing" in general and against unlawful exactions from interstate truckers. These safeguards were not specifically covered in the administration bill.

Sixth. The Senate-passed bill specifically prevented convicted criminals from holding union office. This subject is not covered by the administration bill.

Seventh. The Senate-passed bill contained a specific prohibition against using union funds to influence union elections. The administration bill was silent on this subject.

Eighth. The Senate-passed bill contained specific provisions making it a criminal offense to refuse to submit to the Secretary of Labor records, and to refuse to permit the Secretary of Labor to enter and inspect books and accounts. The administration bill would have required the Secretary to resort to protracted court proceedings for this purpose.

Ninth. The Senate-passed bill contained strong criminal penalties against false entries in union books and against destruction of records. The administration bill was either silent or contained much weaker provisions dealing with this subject.

Tenth. The Senate-passed bill contained provisions designed to encourage unions to enforce strict codes of ethical practices binding upon affiliates and members. The administration bill was silent on the subject.

Eleventh. The Senate-passed bill contained a strong provision directing the Labor Board to exercise its jurisdiction in situations warranting such action and presently not covered by reason of the Board's refusal to exercise its statutory jurisdiction. The administration bill would have perpetuated the present Board-created "no man's land" by ceding jurisdiction to States, 36 of which have no State labor relations laws. This would mean applying greatly dissimilar State labor laws ranging from New York's prolabor, closed shop law to restrictive right-to-work statutes on the books in several States. More importantly it would have left thousands of employers and employees in such major industrial States as California and Illinois without the protection of a uniform national labor law.

THE ROLE OF THE REPUBLICANS

Mr. President, neither Senator IVES nor I have ever sought to make this labor reform measure a partisan political issue. We knew that there was too much at stake. I have cited these comparisons with the administration bill to demonstrate that the bill rejected by the House yesterday was a strong and effective measure.

Until this week, it was never a party measure. The bill had a bipartisan origin and sponsorship, and included the recommendations of the President as well as those of the bipartisan McMcClellan committee. It was reported by the Senate Labor Committee with only one dissenting vote. It passed the Senate with only one dissenting vote. It received the endorsement of those members on both sides of the aisle who have taken a special interest in labor affairs.

But now partisanship has killed the labor-reform bill. Two-thirds of the Members were required to pass the bill in the other body. More than two-thirds of the Democrats supported the bill. More than three-fourths of the Republicans opposed it.

This is a fantastic performance. The Republicans have long assailed the Democratic Party for its supposed labor ties. They have long cried out for labor reform. They have long assailed the Democratic congressional leadership for not passing a bill to implement the findings of the McClellan committee. Now, finally given an opportunity to vote for

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labor reform—for a bill that would have crippled the free-wheeling operations of Mr. Hoffa and his ilk—they chose to defeat the bill and preserve the issue.

I have already commented on the false propaganda campaign against this bill, initiated by the NAM, Retail Federation, and United States Chamber of Commerce. Their success in planting fear and confusion on the Republican side—regarding a bill thoroughly and carefully considered here before it passed 88 to 1—has now been demonstrated.

But none of this would have been possible had it not been for the sabotage of the bill effectively worked by the official Republican spokesman on labor affairs, Secretary of Labor James Mitchell.

Mr. Mitchell has talked long and piously about the need for labor reform. He has sought to give the credit for action in carrying out the McClellan committee recommendations to the Republican administration. He has sought to place the blame for inaction upon the Democratic congressional leadership. But the facts of the matter are that the chief stumbling block to labor reform legislation in this Congress has been Secretary Mitchell.

At no time has he lifted one finger in favor of this bill. At no time has he urged his party members in either house to vote for the bill. He first attempted to sabotage the bill from Geneva, calling it "weak and ineffective," after it had been reported out of committee by a nearly unanimous vote. He has continued these negative and misleading comments up to this very week. Finally, at the crucial moment in the House debate, just before the vote on the measure, he authorized a statement on the floor of the other body calling the bill a "bad bill". The inevitable result of his intervention followed: 79 percent of the Republican Members voted against the bill.

The reason is plain: Mr. Mitchell did not want a labor reform bill. His contradictory public statements about the legislation were designed to kill the only bill that could pass, appease those anti-labor elements in his party that wanted a more restrictive bill, and maintain a synthetic political issue. For Mr. Mitchell's true attitude on labor reform was disclosed at an academic seminar some months ago. The opposition to labor reform legislation which he expressed at that meeting has since been reported in the press, and I have independently checked these quotations and found them to be accurate. At that meeting Mr. Mitchell opposed democracy in labor unions, stating it could lead to "anarchy." He opposed receiving authority to disclose union financial reports, saying he would "prefer to defer this." He opposed effective labor reform legislation, stating that he did "not think anybody is going to be able to write and pass legislation that will correct the evils that the McClellan committee has uncovered. My job is to quiet the hysteria so we do not get the kind of legislation that would be dangerous to the American labor movement. Maybe the right way to put it is: Feed a little innocuous legislation to the lions, and this may give us the time to put the thing in the right perspective."

The President is reported as having stated yesterday that the bill had four shortcomings. However, Mr. President, examination of the record indicates that the President has been inadequately briefed.

First, contrary to the President's contention the bill does contain very adequate power to enforce the standards imposed in it. Under the bill, the Secretary is authorized to make investigations, enter and inspect records and is specifically directed to compile the reports required by the bill when any person responsible for making a report neglects to do so. The bill also contains stiff criminal penalties which if properly

administered will compel adherence to standards.

Second, contrary to the President's statement the bill does deal with shakedown picketing in section 603. The problems of secondary boycotts I have already discussed.

Third, the President complains about the Taft-Hartley amendments in the bill. The fact of the matter is that the Taft-Hartley amendments contained in this bill, as I have already pointed out, are all based on recommendations in the President's own labor message of last January, or have been recommended in the past by prominent Republican labor spokesmen. That message called for restoring the right of economic strikers to vote—so did this bill. It called for prehire contracts in the construction industry—so did this bill and so on.

Fourth, the President mentions the no-man's-land problem. The solution proposed by the administration was at first favored but later rejected by our committee, for it would have turned over to the States jurisdiction in interstate labor matters where no labor law exists. Thousands of workers and employees, under the administration proposal, would have been left without the protection of a uniform national labor law.

It is unfortunate that misleading charges and analysis which ignored the many sections on which there was general agreement, has killed a bipartisan bill desperately needed by the American working people and public, regardless of party. I can only say that constructive labor reform legislation will be brought forward again next year; and I can only hope that it will pass the Congress in 1959 with the same constructive spirit that enabled it to pass the Senate by 88 to 1 this year.

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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958

Keller Hel

ARCAN RIDGE
WESTPORT, CONN.

April 16, 1959

Dear Mr. Murrow:

It is a marvelous experience such as God makes possible -- the way in which you are helping to fulfill the dream that has given energy and purpose to my life. When Anne Sullivan Macy and I began working for the blind, I hoped that we might be instrumental in kindling inner light for the blind of America, but I did not expect to live to see a movement started for the deliverance of the blind throughout the world, and behold, the miracle is being wrought through your generosity! I cannot thank you as deeply as I feel, but my heart glows and will always glow with the beauty of your joining the Crusade for the blind of the world.

With affectionate appreciation, I am,

Sincerely yours,

Helen Keller

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Counterattack

January 15, 1954
Vol. 8, No. 3

Dear Subscriber:

"CHINA EXPERT" NOW PRESCRIBES DANGEROUS US POLICIES.

THEODORE WHITE is the author of the recently published book "Fire In The Ashes: Europe in Mid-Century" (William Sloane Associates.$5). WHITE was head of the Time magazine China Bureau during the years 1939-45.

The Book of the Month Club made WHITE's book its selection for Nov, 1953. EDWARD R MURROW featured WHITE...and plugged his book...on his nation-wide "Person to Person" TV show (NBC). The NY Times and NY Herald Tribune gave WHITE's book the full page-one treatment in its Sunday book review sections. The Saturday Review raved about it. It has been praised highly by CHARLES SEYMOUR, former Pres of Yale Univ, Columbia U's Prof HENRY STEELE COMMAGER, RAYMOND GRAM SWING and many others.

Obviously this is a very important book...or so these critics and publicists will have the world believe. Now here is WHITE's background on the subject of Communism.

Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, speaker (with AGNES SMEDLEY, the late Soviet spy; ALBERT E KAHN, leading pro-Soviet propagandist; HUGH DEANE, CP fronter and Far Eastern "expert" for the defunct Communoid "Daily Compass"; former OSS Sgt and Army Capt GEORGE S WUCHINICK, who recently refused to tell Senate Internal Security subcommittee if he was a Communist Party member, and former Congressman HUGH DE LACY, who has been identified as a Communist Party (CP) member.

Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences and Professions, speaker, radio show.

Testimonial Dinner for the Hollywood Ten, sponsor.

Insitiute of Pacific Relations, honored by testimonial luncheon.

WHITE co-authored "Thunder Out of China" with ANNALEE JACOBY. Both the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy and "Amerasia" magazine (the office of which was used for photographing and storing stolen U S secret documents) offered this book as a premium to prospective subscribers. Amerasia praised the book as "required reading" for anyone who (in 1946) wanted to understand current events in China. The Daily Worker also praised the book, as did JOHN K FAIRBANK, LAWRENCE K ROSINGER, and EDGAR SNOW, "China experts" who have been identified as Communists (FAIRBANK and SNOW deny the charge, ROSINGER has taken refuge in the Fifth Amendment).

WHITE also edited "The Stilwell Papers" (1948), another book which was slanted on the question of China. The Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy, cited as subversive by the Dept of Justice, distributed this book and sent out special literature promoting it.

WHITTAKER CHAMBERS has cast some light on the role WHITE played at Time magazine. In his book "Witness", CHAMBERS described what happened when he became editor of Time's foreign news section and started telling the truth about the Kremlin gangsters. A group of Time foreign correspondents who were

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5-C-12

June 30, 1955

Dear Ted:

Enclosed you will find, on several hand-typed, smudge-stained sheets, the copies [illegible]ce I had with CounterAttack which I promised you the other evening. I assume that if you are able to pursue the matter, you wi[illegible] worried and [illegible] only my reply over at CBS, yo[illegible] January 15, 19[illegible]

I want [illegible] points about the stuff herewith:

a) On [illegible] kind of namby-pamby. I wrote [illegible] legal action [illegible] operate, possi[illegible] what they are [illegible] to get down, [illegible] charges.

b) Although they replied with rather cold courtesy, they never did send a later explanation as they promised.

c) The reply of a year ago stands today with one slight amendment: On page [illegible], Item 4, I replied to them that I couldn't remember a specific testimonial luncheon [illegible] by the IPR [illegible] that in 1948 Ned Carter of the IPR threw a luncheon in my honor. The Carter-- may his soul rest in peace-- was a dear old man. I [illegible] present than [illegible] enough time to give a luncheon in my honor. [illegible] the IPR was ever taken over by the Communists. I replied this not [illegible] Mr. Theodore H. White [illegible] 239 Central Park West [illegible] New York 24, New York [illegible] Yes, I [illegible] luncheon with Carter [illegible] Dear Teddy: [illegible] I have been beating the bushes and I can't find any affirmative indication as to your being in any sense blacklisted in this shop. I will pursue my inquiries and come the autumn we shall find an opportunity to put this matter to the test in the manner I suggested to you earlier.

Please forgive my long delay in writing, but as we both know, these questions do not answer themselves. I merely wanted to send you this before I depart for the summer. Perhaps in the autumn we will both be less concerned with the urgent and have more time for the important, such as evenings of civilized conversation.

As ever yours,

THEODORE H. WHITE

239 CENTRAL PARK WEST, NEW YORK 24, NEW YORK

March 24, 1955

Dr. Ed Murrow,
Columbia Broadcasting System,
New York.

Dear Ed:

Enclosed you will find, on several hand-typed, smudge-stained sheets, the correspondence I had with CounterAttack which I promised you the other evening. I assume that if you are able to pursue the matter, you will find the CounterAttack blast at the bottom of CBS' worries and , therefore, you should have my reply. I am enclosing only my reply to them and their response to me, for I assume that, over at CBS, you have a file of CounterAttack including the blast of January 15, 1954 against me.

I want to make a couple of points about the stuff herewith:

a) On re-reading my reply it strikes me now as kind of namby-pamby. I wrote it to them, however, not to pick a fight or threaten legal action but in the hope that I might get to know how they operate, possibly meet their personnel and write a story on just what they are up to and their techniques. My reply was simply intended to set down, factually, the data refuting each of their specific charges.

b) Although they replied with rather cold courtesy, they never did send a later explanation of their action as they promised

c) The reply of a year ago stands today with one slight amendment: On page 2, Item 4, I replied to them that I couldn't remember a specific testimonial luncheon to me by the IPR ---- which was quite true. Nancy and I have since been unpacking our cases and our old letters and files and I learned that it is true that in 1946 Ned Carter of the IPR threw a luncheon in my honor. Ned Carter-- may his soul rest in peace-- was a dear old man, I was deeply fond of him, am still fond of his memory and it is a pleasant thought that he thought enough of me to give a luncheon in my honor. Old Ned was never a Commie in any way, nor do I think that the IPR was ever taken over by the Communists. I point this out simply for the sake of testimony because today I would testify, yes, I did have a luncheon with Ned Carter and so what. There were so many luncheons, speeches, banquets, broadcasts in the busy year 1946 of so many kinds that I feel I can be excused a slip in memory.

It was great seeing you the other night. I wish New York were arranged so that people who like each other could see each other more often. We watched the show after dinner with heightened pleasure and, like all the Murrow shows, it was grand. Take care and don't work too hard and let's try to make contact when I have less melancholy matters to discuss. Bestest.

Teddy

Teddy

certain decency requires that you list them all; and report what they said.

2. Yes, I did speak at the Independent Citizens Committee of Arts, etc. But the transcript of that evening's remarks should be available to you. If you examine them, you should note that my remarks were in the nature of a eulogy of the heroism of the soldiers of Chiang K'ai-shek.

3. You say I sponsored a dinner for the Hollywood Ten. That is totally untrue-- so untrue as to be a pure product of imagination. The records again should help you correct this statement. I lived in Europe continuously from June, 1948 to October 1953. That case developed while I was overseas. I know nothing of it except from my recollection of old news dispatches. I was never approached, do not know who the men are, never took any part in their defence and was not, repeat, not a sponsor. If any letterhead or statement bearing my name in their defence appears in your files I would appreciate having a photostat of it. For then I could sue whoever it was who so violently and without permision made free of my name and abused my reputation.

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5. I shall not debate Thunder Out of China with you. But if you mention the Daily Workers Comment, you should note that their review called the book "anti-Communist". If the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy or Amerasia used the book as a premium it was done without my knowledge. There is no law I know of to prevent them from buying books and using them as bait.

6. You quote correctly from Mr. Chambers, but Mr. Chambers was in error. I never at any moment signed any round-robin letter against Mr. Chambers when we worked at TIME. I was never even asked to. If necessary, I am willing to testify to that effect under oath of law. If such a letter can be produced with my signature I shall make out a check for all my royalties from my current book and donate it to your favorite charity.

7. On my relations with Time Inc. You say I was fired. I left Time Incorporated in July of 1946. I quit after a series of discussions with Henry Luce which made it obvious we were too far in disagreement to continue working together. But it was I who made the final break. On

THEODORE H. WHITE

239 CENTRAL PARK WEST, NEW YORK 24, NEW YORK

COPY COPY COPY COPY COPY

April 24, 1954

The Editors of CounterAttack,
55 West 42n Street,
New York 16 New York.

Gentlemen:

I have only now, after much traveling and long delay received from a friend ofmine a copy of your attack on myself in your issue of January 15th. Had a copy been sent to me directly I would have answered you at once.

Let me say at once that I seek neither apology nor retraction from you. As a journalist myself, I know how easily error creeps into the public record; and, for the purpose of this letter, I assume that what you have presented here is an attack based on error and misinformation rather than out of malice. Whether or not you correct your records is a matter of conscience. I feel that it is my primary duty only to set you straight, for thereafter a repetition of these statements can be interpreted only as malice.

It is obvious that you and I represent fundamentally divergent political views. In our form of democracy I must respect and protect your right to express your views as much as it is incumbent on you to protect those with whom you disagree .

The following points are, therefore, corrections of fact or omission which should be in your files if you desire to re-Open attack on me in any honest form.

1. Committee For a Democratic Far Eastern Policy. I was never a member; nor a sponsor; nor lent my name to any of its committees. The dinner to which you refer did take place at the Hotel Roosevelt. And I did speak.It occurred only a few months after I had returned from the war and befor I thoroughly understood the purposes and control of that Committee.

The fundamental fact that you leave out is that the principal speaker of that evening meeting was Senator Tobey of New Hampshire. I was asked to appear for a few minutes on a program with that distinguished Senator whom I had never met; and, wanting to meet him, I accepted the invitation.

I make this statemat with no slightest intent to injure Senator Tobey's reputation whom you must consider, as I do, a Republican of highest integrity. Yet if you list the speakers at that meeting a

239 CENTRAL PARK WEST, NEW YORK 24, NEW YORK

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8. Mr. Burnham's review is the expression of his opinion. He did not like my book. I did not like his review. In our country that's the way liberty operates and we can boh go on talking.

9. You claim I wrote exclusive dispatches for the Daily Compass as Chief Correspondent for the Overseas News Agency. This is not true. The Daily Compass was one among several score clients of theOverseas News Agency (among others: The New York Times, the Buffalo Courier-Journal, the Louisville Courier-Journal, the Milwaukee Journal, the Washington Post, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch etc, etc). I was never asked to and never did write an exclusive dispatch for them. the Compass Your error is partially excusable forthe Compass did, without our permission, slug some of the Agency's dispatches as "exclusive". The mangling and distortion of the Overseas News Agency copy by the Compass was so flagrant that ultimately it led to a breach, and the cutting off of our news copy from them.

I present these facts hoping that if you attempt again to trace the difference between my point of view and yours, you will do so with accurate information.

This difference between us is deep and real. As a foreign correspondent, I have seen more of Communism in power and action than, I think, anyone on your staff. I know, far better than you, how wicked, dangerous and malevolent it is. I know its tactics and cruelties. I believe the only strategy of our defence is twofold-- the first being the preservation of our material strength, by arms, the second being the preservation of our spiritual strength, which is liberty. It is my profound belief that Communism thrives in an atmosphere of suspiciion and fear, of rumor and lie. I believe thatyou, inadvertently, may be playing directly into the hands of the Communists and weakening our entire fiber of resistance to the threat.

Should you ever find yourself in need of material about me, I can assure you of my whole-hearted cooperation. You need only call to check whatever you wish to say.

Sincerely Yours,

Theodore H. White

THEODORE H. WHITE

239 CENTRAL PARK WEST, NEW YORK 24, NEW Y

REPLY TO MY LETTER OF [redacted] 4/29/54
COPY COPY COPY COPY

COUNTERATTACK THE NEWSLETTER OF FACTS TO COMBAT COMMUNISM, 55 WEST 42nd Street, New York 36, New York, Longacre 3-4608

Mr. Theodore H. White,
239 Central Park West,
New York 24, New York.

May 14, 1954

Dear Mr. White:

This is simply to acknowledge receipt of your letter of April 29, 1954.

Due to an unusually heavy workload here, I have not had an opportunity to acknowledge your letter before.

Our present rushed condition is due to the departure of Frank McNamara, our editor, to assume the job of National Director of the Veterans of Foreign Wars Un-American Activities Commission. Under the circumstances, I have not had a chance to check the points you raise in detail and compare them with the documentation used in our issue of January 15. We will do so at the very earliest opportunity and I will write you at greater length as soon as possible afterwards.

Cordially Yours,

Arthur E. Cullen,
Vice-President.

****

NOTE: The subsequent letter promised by Cullen was never sent to me and, presumably, never written.

White, Theodo

June 30, 1955

Dear Teddy:

I have been beating the bushes and I can't find any affirmative indication as to your being in any sense blacklisted in this shop. I will pursue my inquiries and come the autumn we shall find an opportunity to put this matter to the test in the manner I suggested to you earlier.

Please forgive my long delay in writing, but as we both know, these questions do not answer themselves. I merely wanted to send you this before I depart for the summer. Perhaps in the autumn we will both be less concerned with the urgent and have more time for the important, such as evenings of civilized conversation.

As ever yours,

Mr. Theodore H. White
239 Central Park West
New York 24, New York

rh

THEODORE H. WHITE

239 CENTRAL PARK WEST, NEW YORK 24, NEW YORK

March 24, 1955

Mr. Ed Murrow,
Columbia Broadcasting System,
New York.

Dear Ed:

Enclosed you will find, on several hand-typed, smudge-stained sheets, the correspondence I had with CounterAttack which I promised you the other evening. I assume that if you are able to pursue the matter, you will find the CounterAttack blast at the bottom of CBS' worries and , therefore, you should have my reply. I am enclosing only my reply to them and their response to me, for I assume that, over at CBS, you have a file of CounterAttack including the blast of January 15, 1954 against me.

I want to make a couple of points about the stuff herewith:

a) On re-reading my reply it strikes me now as kind of namby-pamby. I wrote it to them, however, not to pick a fight or threaten legal action but in the hope that I might get to know how they operate, possibly meet their personnel and write a story on just what they are up to and their techniques. My reply was simply intended to set down, factually, the data refuting each of their specific charges.

b) Although they replied with rather cold courtesy, they never did send a later explanation of their action as they promised

c) The reply of a year ago stands today with one slight amendment: On page 2, Item 4, I replied to them that I couldn't remember a specific testimonial luncheon to me by the IPR ---- which was quite true. Nancy and I have since been unpacking our cases and our old letters and files and I learned that it is true that in 1946 Ned Carter of the IPR threw a luncheon in my honor. Ned Carter-- may his soul rest in peace-- was a dear old man, I was deeply fond of him, am still fond of his memory and it is a pleasant thought that he thought enough of me to give a luncheon in my honor. Old Ned was never a Commie in any way, nor do I think that the IPR was ever taken over by the Communists. I point this out simply for the sake of testimony because today I would testify, yes, I did have a luncheon with Ned Carter and so what. There were so many luncheons, speeches, banquets, broadcasts in the busy year 1946 of so many kinds that I feel I can be excused a slip in memory.

It was great seeing you the other night. I wish New York were arranged so that people who like each other could see each other more often. We watched the show after dinner with heightened pleasure and, like all the Murrow shows, it was grand. Take care and don't work too hard and let's try to make contact when I have less melancholy matters to discuss. Bestest.

Teddy

Teddy

THEODORE H. WHITE

239 CENTRAL PARK WEST, NEW YORK 24, NEW YORK

COPY COPY COPY COPY COPY

April 24, 1954

The Editors of CounterAttack,
55 West 42n Street,
New York 16 New York.

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Sincerely Yours,

Theodore H. White

Returned by Mr. Paley - 12/2

Paley

CBS TELEVISION

Office Communication

to: MR. PALEY and MR. STANTON

from: Edward R. Murrow

Accept Regret
Appropriate action
Background?
FYI File JSM
Note & return
Phone WSP
Reply direct
Return to sender
Status?
Suggest reply
To discuss
Comment or recommendation
Copy to WSP
URGENT f/u

November 24, 1953

I am informed that Bill Leonard desired to invite Theodore H. White, author of the November Book-of-the-Month club choice, "Fire in the Ashes", to appear on his program "This Is New York". Mr. Leonard was told, apparently by one, Al Berry, that Mr. White could not appear on the program. This action I understand was taken subsequent to White's appearance on "Person To Person". Being unaware of Mr. Berry's status and authority in the company, I should like to inquire (1) whether he is authorized to prohibit, without stated reasons, the appearance of an author of a Book-of-the-Month selection on CBS; (2) whether I am expected in future to clear guests with Mr. Berry.

If you have not had an opportunity to read White's book, I commend it to you as one of the best on Europe in the last decade. This is an opinion that seems to be shared by a considerable number of conservative reviewers.

Ed

E.R.M.

dm

(Nizer, Louis
re John Faulk)

LOUIS NIZER
LOUIS PHILLIPS
ROBERT S. BENJAMIN
CHARLES BALLON
ARTHUR B. KRIM
WALTER S. BECK
SEYMOUR M. PEYSER
JEROME EDWARDS
LEON ALEXANDROFF
SIDNEY M. DAVIS
EUGENE M. KLINE
PAUL MARTINSON
GERALD MEYER
SEWARD I. BENJAMIN
MORTIMER B. WOLF

FRANK P. GREENBERG
JEROME P. PHILLIPS
SEYMOUR SHAINSWIT
JEROME J. WALLNER
JACOB M. USADI
GERALD F. PHILLIPS
BERNARD ROTHMAN
JULIUS S. CHASE
HERBERT T. SCHOTTENFELD
SIDNEY SHEMEL
JON M. KAUFMAN
HERBERT S. SCHLOSSER
HERBERT N. BOBROW
EDWARD J. BECKER
JULIAN S. PERLMAN

PHILLIPS, NIZER, BENJAMIN & KRIM
1501 BROADWAY
NEW YORK 36, N.Y.

ATTORNEYS
AND
COUNSELLORS
AT LAW

TELEPHONE
WISCONSIN 7-7600

PARIS OFFICE
21 AVENUE GEORGES V
PARIS VIII FRANCE
TELEPHONE
ELYSEE 82-67

CABLE ADDRESS
PHILLNIZER

<u>By Hand</u>
<u>Personal and Confidential</u>

October 29, 1956

Mr. Edward R. Murrow,
CBS Broadcasting Company,
485 Madison Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

<u>Re:Faulk</u>

My dear Ed Murrow:

John Faulk has conveyed to me the problems which have arisen from Charles Collingwood's withdrawal from the middle-of-the-road ticket to a so-called independent candidacy. The confusion arising from the fact that the middle-of-the-road now appears to be on the side of the road with Collingwood in the center, prompts the first inquiry - whether John Faulk should continue his candidacy and risk a possible defeat.

I have weighed such a defeat, if it eventuates, upon the fortunes of his litigation. I come to the con-

clusion that it would not be serious, and the telescoped reason for that conclusion is that the issues in the litigation do not depend upon whether John Faulk is popular with the union membership or not.

However, having faced the consequences of defeat, it is, of course, important to take every step possible to assure victory. Here, too, we must not over-state the value to the litigation, but the psychological effect and the litigation effect, combine to make this a desirable end.

Two suggestions come to mind, as to how to buttress the campaign for victory - one, is to attempt to win back Collingwood, by pointing out to him that the middle-of-the-road program does not require a destructive attitude towards the opposition. On the contrary, it is designed to prevent destruction by boycott and blacklisting of any member of the union - middle-of-the-roader, or otherwise. It is possible that if Collingwood feels the middle-of-the-roaders have come over to him, rather than that he has reversed his position, he may see the issues in clearer light, and with less personal caution.

The second thought is that, if you would sponsor

the middle-of-the-road group by some statement (this does not mean becoming a candidate), your enormous prestige would go very far, and perhaps almost make certain the election of the middle-of-the-road group, even if Collingwood stood aloof.

I have been reluctant to write this letter for two reasons:

First, I do not wish to meddle in the political campaigns of the union.

Second, I feel that you have been such a bulwark of strength that it is not fair to place additional burdens upon your strong back. However, as between too heavy a burden and a stronger back - there are some who prefer the latter.

I resolved my reluctance to write, because it was conveyed to me that you would be pleased to talk to me about Faulk's problem. Of course, I shall be willing and eager to do so, but I thought I would put down my present thinking in writing, for your consideration in advance.

My kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

Louis Nizer

LN:S

PHILLIPS, NIZER, BENJAMIN & KRIM

Vincent Sheean

MILANO August 15 1956

Dear Ed,

My candidate for the presidency of the United States, which means the world, is you. I say this because of your vast international experience and because of your sound domestic policies.

However, I am perfectly willing to compromise on Adlai. Will you tell him so the next time you see him? I have been telling him for about eight years that he is next best to Abe Lincoln, so he won't mind being next best to you.

Health,

Jimmy

Give Adlai my best, and Franklin and damned near everybody around there except our old friend.

Sheean

August 10, 1956

Dear Mr. Sheean:

Before Mr. Murrow left for the convention in Chicago on August 8th, he asked me to send the enclosed check to you.

Sincerely yours,

Rebecca Holder
Secretary to Mr. Murrow

Mr. Vincent Sheean
c/o American Express Company
Via Monte Di Pieta
Milan, Italy

$200

Shean, Vincent

EDWARD R. MURROW
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

February 9, 1954

Gentlemen:

I enclose my personal check for $375.00 for the current school fees of Miss Ellen Sheean. I do this at the request of her father, Vincent Sheean.

Sincerely yours,

The Seering Tutoring School
22 East 60 Street
New York, New York

rh
cc: Mr. Vincent Sheean
Mrs. Vincent Sheean
Mr. Alexander Scheer

Vincent Sheean

3 W 52

Thursday

Dear Ed,

Ellen failed in the tests for Brearley. Best advice is that she should go to a tutoring school for the next few months so as to catch up with her contemporaries at the Brearley standard. Latin, French and algebra---all disagreeable to her, since she is interested only in literature and drama, particularly Jean-Paul Sartre(her idol). The advisors at Brearley say it would be fatal for a child of this kind to go to the public high school--not only because of marihuana and juvenile delinquency, but because the sheer weight of numbers and collective rudeness would overwhelm her.

It is a disaster psychologically because the child is afflicted by some terrible superiority-inferiority feelings: that she has to be first in everything, that she can't, that she suffers from not being first, and nevertheless is first in some things, which makes it worse. She has not yet been told of this latest horror.

The tutoring school costs $15 a day, that is, $5 an hour for the individual lessons. (Latin French and algebra). I could ask Professor Einstein to give her the algebra lessons but he lives at Princeton and it would cost more to get there and back than it would to pay here. Besides which, I am not at all sure that Professor Einstein remembers algebra. He certainly does not remember arithmetic, to my personal knowledge.

My idea was that you might pay for five weeks of tutoring, which would come to $375 unless I am quite wrong in multiplication. At the end of five weeks if I am not able to make the payments myself I ought to be dead anyhow. As soon as I know about these things I will tell you. Dinah has an appointment with the headmistress of the tutoring establishment this afternoon.

I also have an appointment this afternoon at the same hour(2:30) with my lawyer, who has this morning been with the counsel for the collector in the 3rd District of New York for internal revenue. Perhaps there has been some kind of settlement of my tax troubles. If there is, it will take some time to get it all in order legally, but there will be funds available to pay you for your wondrous loans. It seems that I will have to have a trustee from now on to administer every penny I receive, and it will be percentaged away to nothing, but in any case I will be able to go on living. At times this has seemed improbable.

The settlement may be(I hope) for 10% of the gross on arrears plus a hold-back, maybe 25% or 30%, for current taxes, with Curtis Brown as trustee. Whatever it is will be an immense relief. I do not like being outside the pale of the law.

Yrs ever James

Sheehan, Vincent

EDWARD R. MURROW

November 18, 1953

First National Bank and Trust Company
Montclair, New Jersey

Gentlemen:

Enclosed please find my personal check in the amount of $1000 for deposit to the account of Vincent Sheean.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ E.R.Murrow

bc: Mr. Sheean

From Vincent Sheean
Wednesday Nov.18

3 West 52nd Street Eldorado 5-8314 (8134)

Mu 8-1971

Dear Ed,

I am in the very devil of a hole---tax liens on all sources of income. Can you lend me a thousand dollars?

You may know that the difficulty is great by the mere fact that I ask. I had no lawyer but have now ~~xxx~~ returned to Stern and Reubens, the firm of literary lawyers who took care of all my affairs for many years. They are taking things in hand but it will require a little time. Meanwhile, although there is money coming to me, nothing can be paid until the tax levy is lifted, compromised or otherwise arranged. Dinah is in a similar fix, and although we are separated now, I still dislike the thought of involving her, and would like to share this with her. As you know, we both have what would pass for large incomes, but have fallen into arrears through sheer incompetence.

If you can come to my aid in this emergency I should try to pay you back during the early months of 1954, when some payments are due me(if they're allowed to be paid!) And if you can do it, the sooner the better, I should like you to send the money to the First National Bank and Trust Company, Montclair, New Jersey, to my account. The bank is not subject to the tax levy but of course they fell heir to part of the trouble in that I(not knowing of the levy) had counted on certain payments last week and have overdrawn my account.

Pretty, isn't it?

I turn to you because most of my close friends(John Gunther for example) are in hardly better condition ~~than~~ than I, and I just can't borrow money from Dorothy---it isn't possible, somehow. You and I haven't met for a long time but I somehow count on you always, whether I see you or not, as one of the steadfast. This is a real emergency, Ed, an 18-carat one.

Yrs ever

Jimmy

This house where I am staying is a regular London lodging-house, run by an Englishwoman, quite like the one in Curzon Street where I lived in the days of my youth. Decayed gradeur---you know. But they do take messages!

Vincent Sheean

Gray, Gilson

GILSON GRAY
530 EAST 86TH STREET
NEW YORK

Sunday 15 May 1955

Dear Ed:

I hope you have some idea of how much I appreciate the letters you have written for me.

I had intended to go to Washington last week. But instead, Neff and I flew to Fort Benning (Georgia) where Gilson, who had taken a 280 mm. battery from Fort Bragg for a big JCOC demonstration, had been in a bad auto accident.

He and two of his men, in a jeep, were hit head-on by a drunk civilian in a pick-up truck who came around a curve so much too fast that he was clear over on the wrong side of the road. All of them were pretty well smashed up. But Gilson is even tougher than I thought. He was ambulant when we returned on Friday and is well on the road to complete recovery.

So I'm driving to Washington tomorrow. If all goes as expected and they fly Gilson back to Bragg at the end of the week and he gets sprung for some convalescent leave (damn well better!) I'll drop down and bring him back with me.

Have a good trip to London and give Janet our love. I'll hope to see you soon after your return and give you a report on my Washington trip.

Best, as always,
Dick

June 3, 1955

Dear Wallie:

I am just back from London, where it was pleasant to see many old friends of yours and mine.

Briefly, about Gilson Gray. You will be aware of his Service record. I have only known him here over the last twenty years with, of course, a nine year interruption while I was abroad. But I have seen both Gray and his family on a considerable number of social occasions and have seen him operate under difficulties here. He had about as loyal a crew of subordinates as I have ever seen. He was respectful but never servile to his superiors. I would regard him as both tough and tactful -- have seen him on his own initiative throw out advertising copy which was contrary to company policy, thereby risking considerable loss of income to the company and without ever bothering his superiors about it. He can certainly stand the gaff of long hours and high pressure and do it with good humor. I would say that around this shop he had very few intimates and no enemies although his job was the kind likely to attract enemies. I have never known him to engage in gossip or idle chatter. His judgment of world affairs is not, I should think, profound. I think maybe this better be just an informal note to you, although if it's useful I have no objection to any of your colleagues seeing it.

Hope we can make a rendezvous soon.

As ever yours,

Mr. Wallace Dueul
3026 Cambridge Place, N.W.
Washington 7, D.C.

rh

3026 Cambridge Place, N. W.
Washington 7, D. C.

May 25, 1955

Dear Ed,

I've had two good talks with Gilson Gray and have been much taken with him. Thank you for sending him to us.

There aren't places available every day of the week--or every week of the year, for that matter--for a man of his qualifications, as you can well imagine. He's too damned good for any but damned good jobs. At the moment, as Allen and I told him, there just isn't a place fit to offer him.

Jobs good enough for Gray do become available from time to time, though, and this is where you come in:

> Would you please write me everything you can think of about Gray that would help us in judging his suitability for work here?
>
> Would you also tell me the kind of work you consider him best qualified for?

This is not a formal, official request. Make your letter as personal and informal as you like. Mark it "Eyes Only" and "Destroy When Read" if you don't want your comments to be passed on.

If and when a job becomes available that looks like the kind he'd be suited for, there'll be all kinds of formal, official, inquiries. But it would be helpful to know more about Gray now in deciding whether--and when--to set the wheels of official inquiry in motion.

We have, of course, all the "Who's Who" sort of data Gray has provided. What you can help us with is character, temperament, personality, special gifts and capacities, and that sort of thing.

Does he run a taut ship? A happy ship?

How does he treat subordinates? Superiors?

How tough is he? How forceful? How gentle? How adroit? How tactful?

How is he on long, hard, dull grinds? On crash, crisis operations? On being rooted out of bed in the middle of the night? On coping with vivid, colorful types? With dull drones?

Can he endure red tape? Frustration?

How good is his judgment of world affairs? His discretion?

How would he react to service which in some ways is a little like taking holy orders--being sworn to silence (or at least secrecy), to poverty, to obedience, and to long, long, long, long hours of extraordinarily hard work?

How are you?

All the best.

Yours,

Bonnie

3026 Cambridge Place, N. W.
Washington 7, D. C.

15 May 1955

Edward R. Murrow, Esq.,
485 Madison Avenue,
New York 22,
N. Y.

Dear Ed:

Gilson Gray hasn't got in touch with me yet, but if and when he does there'll be at least one Servant of the Republic in our establishment who'll see him--namely, me. Or, as the tourist lady said, "C'est je."

My work grows more exacting by the day, but since it also grows more exciting and rewarding, I complain not. With Allen here, it's the best job I've had since Frank Knox died. Beyond that, what's the point of trying to imagine things?

Old Man Beattie says he's coming to town some time this Summer. Are you (pl)?

All the best.

Yours,

Wallace

Dulles, Allen

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

9 MAY 1955

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

Many thanks for your note of May 3 concerning Mr. Gilson Gray.

When Mr. Gray comes to Washington, if you will be good enough to have him call my office, EXecutive 3-6115, Extension 601, I will be very happy to see him and refer him to the appropriate people here in line with his interests.

Faithfully,

Allen W. Dulles
Director

Talbott, Harold

THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1955

My dear Mr. Murrow:

I have been on the lookout for your friend, Mr. Gilson Gray.

I will be glad to have a visit with him.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Talbott

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, New York

Sent to Gray

Conf - Gray, Gilson

May 3, 1955

Dear Carl McCardle:

Occasionally, a reporter encounters an American of confidence and experience who is willing and eager to serve his Government not because he is unable to find a position in private industry, but because of a real desire to be of service. Gilson Gray is such a man who will be calling your office shortly, and I hope someone in your organization can see him.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Carl McCardle
Assistant Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

rh
Also sent to Wallace Deuell, Allen Dulles, Harold Stassen, and Harold E. Talbot

Amana Refrigerators. — Nancy Lee + Mahan

National Fd. For Preventive Med. —

Prevent disease

— Gilson Gray. — Prof Wenth

State dept. + Mr Cadle

C. I. A., Wally Orell. — Allan Dulles

Talbot. —

Harold Stassen

Next Wed day. —

Muecke, C. A.
Conf. M.

April 29, 1955

Dear Mr. Muecke:

This is in reply to your letter of April 19. I am not acquainted with your client or his wife.

Regarding the organization, "International Student Service," may I say that I was associated with this organization from 1930 to 1937, at which time I went abroad for a period of nine years and therefore lost touch with the organization and its activities. During the period with which I was familiar with the organization's work, there was never the slightest trace of communist activity or influence. Of those persons which you state were named on the letterhead I am personally acquainted with the following; by which I mean I have had sufficient association and conversation with them to have some measure, or rather some opinion of their political and social orientation. These persons are: Mary A. Cheek, Alfred E. Cohn, Stephen Duggan, Clyde Eagleton, Harry D. Gideonse, Alvin Johnson, Mrs. William Paley, George N. Shuster, Thomas K. Finletter, George D. Stoddard, and Arnold Wolfers.

To suggest that the above named persons would have been associated with any subversive or communist organization is grotesque and ridiculous, if not libelous. They represent

individuals of great stature and distinction in the academic world; scientists, college presidents, a former Cabinet member, and others.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. C. A. Muecke
Parker & Muecke
Attorneys at Law
310 Luhrs Tower
Phoenix, Arizona

rh

PARKER & MUECKE
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
310 LUHRS TOWER
PHOENIX, ARIZONA

DARRELL R. PARKER
C. A. MUECKE

TELEPHONE
ALPINE 8-3404

April 19, 1955

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Murrow:

Our firm has been engaged to represent a Mr. Maxwell H. Norman of this city in a security hearing. Mr. Norman, until recently, was a civilian employee of the U. S. Army Air Force at Williams Air Force Base, Chandler, Arizona. At the air force base Mr. Norman was an instructor in navigation until he was suspended for security reasons in February of this year pending a final decision in his case.

Among the charges made against Mr. Norman by John F. Freeman, Jr., Assistant Executive Secretary, Central Security Board, is the charge that "you have maintained a close continuing association with...your wife, Enid Kass Norman,... reported to have been affiliated or sympathetically associated with communist organizations and the communist movement."

The Communist organization or movement that Mr. Norman's wife is accused of having been associated with is the "International Student Service". Mrs. Enid Kass Norman was a member of and active in this organization during 1946 and early 1947 when she was a student at Hunter College. Ann Anthony, Dean of Students at Hunter College, and George N. Shuster, President of Hunter College, have both been apprised of these same facts and have both given Enid Kass Norman a clean bill of health. We have affidavits from both in our files. We are gathering their affidavits and affidavits of everyone that was connected with the International Student Service in any way in preparation for a hearing that will be held in this matter on May 12, 1955, in Phoenix, Arizona.

You are being sent this letter because your name appeared on the letterhead of Student Service of America, Inc., United States Committee of the International Student Services, 2 West 45th Street, New York 19, New York. Other persons named on this letterhead include: Charles G. Bolte, Mary A. Cheek, Alfred E. Cohn, Herbert J. Davis, Stephen Duggan, Clyde Eagleton, R. H. Edwin Espy, Edgar J. Fisher, Harry D. Gideonse, Alvin Johnson, Walter M. Kotschnig, Mrs. William Paley, George N. Shuster, Mrs. Quincy Wright, Bradford Abernethy, Malcolm Davis,

J. Huntley Dupre, Thomas K. Finletter, Laurence M. Gould, Walter C. Langsam, John W. Nason, James G. Patton, George D. Stoddard, Harold Taylor, Mrs. Harrison Thomas, Henry P. Van Dusen, Howard Wilsonand Arnold Wolfers,

We would be profoundly grateful to you if it would be possible for you to send us an affidavit relating to your knowledge of the above-mentioned organization. We are particularly interested in any statement you could make regarding the non-communist or non-subversive nature of this organization if that be your recollection. We would also appreciate it very much if you could conveniently contact any of the other persons listed above to help us receive as many affidavits as possible.

Naturally, anyone whose patriotism is under attack is in a very difficult and precarious position. Mr. Norman is very much interested in doing anything possible to clear his name. Your help will be deeply appreciated.

Mr. Norman, incidentally, has never at any time been accused of being a member of any subversive organization. The International Student Service, I might add, has never appeared on the list of subversive organizations as listed by the Attorney General of the United States.

If you desire any further particulars please do not hesitate to write to this office. You may also wish to check on this matter with Ann Anthony, Dean of Students, and George N. Shuster, President of Hunter College of the City of New York, 695 Park Avenue, New York 21, New York.

Whatever you may do, we would appreciate your keeping in mind the deadline of May 12, 1955, which is the date set for hearing in this matter by the Government.

Very truly yours,

C. A. Muecke

C. A. Muecke

CAM/brs

Conf. Reynolds
Nizer, Louis

LOUIS NIZER
LOUIS PHILLIPS
ROBERT S. BENJAMIN
CHARLES BALLON
ARTHUR B. KRIM
WALTER S. BECK
SEYMOUR M. PEYSER
JEROME EDWARDS
LEON ALEXANDROFF
SIDNEY M. DAVIS
EUGENE M. KLINE
PAUL MARTINSON
GERALD MEYER
SEWARD I. BENJAMIN
MORTIMER B. WOLF

FRANK P. GREENBERG
JEROME P. PHILLIPS
SEYMOUR SHAINSWIT
JEROME J. WALLNER
DANIEL GLASS
JACOB M. USADI
GERALD F. PHILLIPS
BERNARD ROTHMAN
JULIUS CHASE
BENJAMIN ROCKMORE
HERBERT T. SCHOTTENFELD
MAURICE SHIRE
JON M. KAUFMAN

PHILLIPS, NIZER, BENJAMIN & KRIM
1501 BROADWAY
NEW YORK 36, N.Y.

ATTORNEYS
AND
COUNSELLORS
AT LAW

TELEPHONE
WISCONSIN 7-7600

PARIS OFFICE
21 AVENUE GEORGES V
PARIS VIII FRANCE
TELEPHONE
ELYSEE 82-67

CABLE ADDRESS
PHILLNIZER

June 29, 1954.

Mr. Edward R. Murrow,
Columbia Broadcasting System,
485 Madison Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

My dear Ed Murrow:

The purpose of this letter is not to advise you of the good news for, with your facilities, you probably had it simultaneously with the utterance of the words by the foreman of the jury.

Rather, it is to express, on behalf of Quent and myself, our gratitude for your cooperation in the high principled cause.

Not by way of compliment, but as a lawyer evaluating the bearers of his facts, I can tell you that your appearance on the stand, your demeanor and customary felicity of expression deeply impressed the court and jury.

As an old admirer, it was good to have this professional contact with you, particularly since it was tinged with sentiment and friendship between you and Quent.

My affectionate regards,

Sincerely yours,

Louis Nizer

LN:GS

PHILLIPS, NIZER, BENJAMIN & KRIM

Conf. S.
De Orsey & Leo

LAW OFFICES OF
DE ORSEY AND THOMPSON
NATIONAL SAVINGS AND TRUST BUILDING
WASHINGTON 5, D.C.

April 26, 1954

C. LEO DE ORSEY
ROBERT K. THOMPSON

No answer

AIR MAIL

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
c/o Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York City, New York

Re: Eric Sevareid

Dear Ed:

As I told you - Eric already is bound by a contract with CBS to February 1, 1955, so that an attempt by NBC to secure his services was as much value in negotiating as is a wet cigaret that will not cause cancer.

However, I've discussed the situation several times - made counter suggestions and came to New York last Tuesday to button it up.

We have arrived at an agreement on all points and the final draft is being prepared by CBS attorneys.

I am really of the opinion that he has a good and profitable contract. He will have a FIVE YEAR FIRM contract. Only one other commentator has such a long term firm contract, according to the CBS officials, and they said "You know who that is." It further provides for TEN years of security.

All I can say is - Eric had better take time out and in his prayers say "Thank you Ed Murrow."

Regards.

Sincerely,

Leo

CLD/c

Smith, H.

personal

Mr. Edward R. Murrow.

March 9, 1954

84 Hallam Street, W.1

Dear Ed,

Something of a rather grave nature has just happened to me. I think it is important for you to know about it. I dislike being mysterious, but would prefer not to write you about it. Have you any plans to come over here soon? (I have heard rumors of you having an interview with Churchill, for example).

If you have no such plans I will, reluctantly, write you about this matter. Meanwhile, I think it might be wise to suspend any negotiations to get me back to the States to settle this year: this matter rather changes the aspect of things.

I am sorry to adopt this tone, but I am sure you will see the necessity for it when I have talked with you. If that is not possible, then I will write you about the whole thing. Please let me hear from you.

Best wishes,

Howard Smith

Circle 7-2690

Leonard Bill

THOMAS L. STIX & J. G. GUDE
30 Rockefeller Plaza
NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

Corres.

April 8, 1953

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
CBS
485 Madison Avenue
New York 22, N. Y.

Dear Ed:

Paragraph 16 is the clause in a proposed renewal contract for Bill Leonard that has been in dispute.

Clearly, this so-called "morality clause" is not restricted to moral turpitude, scandalous behaviour, etc., but also entitles CBS to abruptly cancel the program in the event of a complaint, legitimate or otherwise, by any organized group. Organized group is not further defined, and admittedly (by CBS's Legal Department) could be the owner of a chain of Syracuse, N. Y. supermarkets who didn't happen to approve of Bill Leonard's reporting over either the radio or television facilities of CBS.

As you know, Bill is not a member of the CBS news staff, but even so his reporting on "This is New York" is rightfully subject to the editorial supervision of WCBS management, and his work on the "6 O'Clock Report" on television is under the supervision of the network TV news operation. Therefore, to all intents and purposes, he functions in exactly the same way as any regular member of the network news staff.

I have made these points with CBS in my discussions of this contract clause:

1. Leonard has been broadcasting "This is New York" and other radio and television programs six days a week, uninterruptedly for more than seven years. In that time, it seems to me, he has demonstrated his reliability and responsibility as a producer and reporter.

2. Both he and I, although we object to this type of morality clause in principle, concede the possibility of organized groups, crackpot or otherwise, exercising pressure in such a way that it would become intolerable.

3. Rather than insist that CBS completely delete what they say is now a standard clause in all contracts, we have merely asked that they amend the clause in one of these two manners:

(a) Include an arbitration clause in the contract, which WCBS management has been unwilling to do, or

(b) Instead of the 30-day cancellation notice, that CBS exercise its contractural right as stated in paragraph 14, to terminate the contract on 13 weeks' notice, and whether Leonard performs during this period or not, he will be paid in full on the basis of his commercial schedule at the time notice is given.

The latter proposal, in a sense, asks CBS to provide "an insurance policy" which we feel very strongly anyone of Bill Leonard's long and responsible service with CBS is entitled.

CBS's position to date is that this clause, characterized as "a matter of top-level management policy," may not be deleted or amended in any manner whatsoever.

Sincerely,

JGG

J. G. Gude

December 16, 1952

Mr. William Leonard
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Leonard:

The following, when signed by you and by us, will constitute a complete and binding contract between us and will likewise constitute a cancellation effective this date of the existing contract between you and us dated May 7, 1947.

We hereby engage you, and you hereby agree, to render your services in connection with a series of radio programs (hereinafter called "the Programs") presently entitled "This is New York" to be broadcast substantially in their present form over Radio Station WCBS, on the following terms and conditions:

1. You will assist in the gathering of appropriate material for the Programs and will help in the writing of the scripts for the Programs to the same extent as you have during your previous employment by us in connection with the same series. You will also read the commercial announcements on the Programs, and act as Narrator and Master of Ceremonies.

2. The Programs will be broadcast over WCBS only, from approximately 9:00 to 9:30 AM, CNYT on Monday through Saturday of each week of the term of this contract; provided, however, that we may, at any time and from time to time, on one day's notice to you, change the

days of the week and the hours of the day on which the Programs or any of them are broadcast but in no event shall the Programs exceed thirty minutes in length each nor be broadcast more than six times per week. It is specifically understood that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, we may at any time and from time to time sell the 9:00 to 9:05 AM news broadcast with the services of another announcer for commercial sponsorship. In the event we should at any time reduce the schedule of broadcasts of the Programs hereunder to less than five half-hour programs per week, you may cancel this contract by giving to us at least thirty days prior written notice within ten days after notice of such reduction is given to you, it being understood that for the purpose of computing the length of the Programs hereunder the period from 9:00 to 9:05 AM shall be considered part of each of the Programs even if said period shall have been omitted from the same and sold for commercial sponsorship as aforesaid.

3. You will devote your best talents, efforts and abilities in connection with your services hereunder and will attend all rehearsals, reasonable program conferences and publicity photographic sessions, if any, and you will perform services subject to our direction and control.

4. You represent that you are, and agree to remain during the term of this contract, a member of the American Federation of Radio Artists in good standing.

5. You acknowledge that the services to be rendered by you hereunder are of a special, unique, unusual, extraordinary and intellectual character which gives them a peculiar value the loss of which cannot reasonably or adequately be compensated for in damages in an action at law, and breach by you of any of the provisions contained in this agreement will cause us irreparable injury and damage. We shall be entitled as a matter of right, without further notice, to injunctive and other equitable relief to prevent the violation of any of the provisions of this agreement by you. Neither this provision nor the exercise by us of any of our rights hereunder shall constitute a waiver by us of any other rights which we may have to damages or otherwise. You warrant that you are free to enter into and fully perform this contract.

6. You agree that we own all rights and title in and to the Programs as presently constituted, whether by you or by us, including, but not limited to, their name, idea and format, and that any future developments of the same, whether by you or by us, shall vest solely and completely in us as soon as they come into existence. You further agree that as between you and us, all ideas, creations, literary, musical and artistic materials and intellectual properties (hereinafter called "materials"), whether or not furnished by you, used on or in connection with any of the Programs, shall be our sole and absolute property for any and all purposes whatsoever, and you

agree that you do not have, and will not claim to have, either under this agreement or otherwise, any right, title or interest of any kind or nature whatsoever in or to any such materials.

7. You warrant that all materials furnished by you hereunder will be your own and original creation, except for matters in the public domain, and said materials and the use thereof will not violate the right of privacy of, or constitute a libel or slander against, or violate any rights of any person, firm or corporation.

8. You will at all times indemnify and hold us, the sponsors, if any, their advertising agencies, if any, and station WCBS harmless from and against any and all claims, damages, liabilities, costs and expenses, including counsel fees, arising out of (a) any breach by you of any warranty or agreement made by you herein, (b) the use of any materials furnished by you for the Programs, or (c) any acts done or words spoken by you in connection with the broadcast of any of the Programs unless such acts or words shall have been authorised by us.

9. During the term of this agreement you will not

(a) be connected, directly or indirectly, with any radio or television broadcasts of any kind or nature, either live or recorded, other than the Programs hereunder or other programs for which your services may be required by us or such other programs on which you may render services with our written consent; provided that we may withhold our consent to the rendering of your services on

other programs in our sole discretion and under no circumstances will you render services on any radio or television program which will be broadcast at the same time as the Programs hereunder;

(b) be connected, directly or indirectly, with any activity of any kind or nature whatsoever, or authorize the use of your name, likeness, voice or endorsement in, advertising, promoting or publicizing in any manner any product or service competitive to any product or service of any sponsor then currently sponsoring or otherwise participating in the Programs hereunder;

(c) engage in any activity which shall interfere with the performance of any of your obligations hereunder.

10. You agree that we, the sponsors, if any, and their advertising agencies, if any, and station WCBS shall have the right and may grant to others the right to disseminate, reproduce, print and publish your name, likeness, voice and biographical material as news or informative matter, and in connection with advertising and for purposes of trade; provided, however, that in no event may we, the sponsors, if any, or their advertising agencies, if any, or station WCBS use, or grant to any person the right to use, any direct endorsement by you of any product or service without your written consent. This right shall terminate with the termination of this agreement, except for any material authorized or released by us, station WCBS, the sponsors, if

any, or their advertising agencies, if any, prior to the termination of this agreement. We, the sponsors, if any, and their advertising agencies, if any, and station WCBS may open all correspondence intended for you which we receive and may answer or cause to be answered any correspondence relating to the Programs.

11. The Programs hereunder may be broadcast with or without commercial announcements and we may at any time and from time to time change the number of or eliminate all such commercial announcements.

12. You agree that you will not render your services in connection with the Programs hereunder, or in connection with any substantially similar programs, for a period of six months after the cancellation or termination of this contract unless such program is broadcast over Radio Station WCBS.

13. We agree that you may take a vacation for a period not exceeding two consecutive weeks once during each year of the term of this contract at a time to be mutually determined. During each such vacation as aforesaid, we will pay you the weekly compensation provided for in Paragraph 15 hereof and you will furnish at your sole cost and expense a substitute satisfactory to us to appear for you during the period when you are on vacation. In the event of your incapacity you may, for a period not to exceed three (3) weeks during each year of the term of this contract, furnish at your sole cost and expense a substitute satisfactory to us to appear for you and we shall during

said three-week period continue to pay to you the compensation provided for in paragraph 15 hereof. Should your incapacity continue for a period in excess of three (3) weeks during any one (1) year of the term of this contract, the compensation payable to you for such period in excess of three (3) weeks shall be the subject of renegotiation between us. The term "incapacity" shall mean any material, physical, mental or other disability incapacitating you from fully performing all services required to be performed by you hereunder, or any material impairment of your voice. You agree to pay such substitute furnished during your vacation or incapacity not less than the then current minimum union scales provided in our collective bargaining agreement with AFRA.

14. The term of this contract shall be for a period of five (5) years commencing January 1, 1953 subject to our right to cancel at any time by notifying you in writing on thirteen (13) weeks prior written notice to you.

You shall have the right to cancel this agreement effective at the end of any year of the term hereof by giving us at least thirteen (13) weeks prior written notice.

15. The compensation payable to you for the services to be performed by you hereunder and for the rights granted by you to us hereunder shall be $400 for each week during which the Programs are broadcast without any commercial announcements or with not more than one (1) commercial announcement. For any week during which more than

one (1) commercial announcement is broadcast on the Programs we will pay to you the sum of $400 plus $6 for eachadditional announcement broadcast on the Programs, it being understood that if five (5) additional announcements shall be broadcast on any of the Programs on any day on which the period from 9:00 to 9:05 AM shall have been omitted from the Programs and sold as provided in paragraph 2 hereof, said period shall be considered the sixth announcement made on such day for the purpose of computing the compensation payable to you hereunder.

If any of the Programs hereunder are omitted or prevented for any reason whatsoever, we shall not be obligated to pay you for any commercial announcements scheduled for, and not broadcast on, said omitted or prevented program unless, at our request, you "stand by" for such program in which case we will pay you for all announcements which were scheduled to be broadcast. Any payments due you pursuant hereto shall be made not later than the Wednesday of the week following the week for which such payment is made. Payment of your compensation as provided for in this paragraph 15 shall fully discharge our obligations to you hereunder.

16. You will at all times act with due regard for public morals and conventions. If at any time you shall have done or shall do any act or thing which shall be an offense involving moral turpitude under federal, state or local laws, or which might tend to bring you

into public disrepute, contempt, scandal or ridicule, or which might tend to offend the community or any organized group thereof, or which might tend to reflect unfavorably upon us, station WCBS, the sponsors, if any, or their advertising agencies, if any, or injure the success of the Programs, we shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon notice to you at any time prior to the expiration of thirty (30) days after the date on which we acquire knowledge thereof.

17. Notwithstanding any provision in this contract to the contrary, it is specifically understood and agreed by and between us that:

(a) We are each bound by all the terms and provisions of the AFRA CODE OF FAIR PRACTICE FOR COMMERCIAL BROADCASTING MINIMUM TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR RADIO ARTISTS, but nothing in this provision shall affect terms, compensations or conditions provided for in this contract which are not covered by said Code or which are more favorable to members of AFRA than the terms, compensation and conditions provided for in said Code.

(b) You are a member of AFRA in good standing and will remain in good standing for the duration of this contract.

(c) Any controversy or claim between you and us arising out of, or relating to, the said AFRA Code or any contracts or engagements (whether over-scale or not) governed by the said Code, or the

breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration, in accordance with the rules then obtaining of the American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in the highest court of the forum, State or Federal, having jurisdiction. The procedure for such arbitration shall be the same as that specified in the said AFRA Code. AFRA's written consent to any arbitration requested by you must first be obtained.

This contract contains the whole agreement between us and no change or modification thereof shall be effective unless made in writing.

Very truly yours,

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.

By_____

ACCEPTED:

_____
William Leonard

EXCERPT - Proposed renewal contract for Bill Leonard

16. You will at all times act with due regard for public morals and conventions. If at any time you shall have done or shall do any act or thing which shall be an offense involving moral turpitude under federal, state or local laws, or which might tend to bring you into public disrepute, contempt, scandal or ridicule, or which might tend to offend the community or any organized group thereof, or which might tend to reflect unfavorably upon us, station WCBS, the sponsors, if any, or their advertising agencies, if any, or injure the success of the Programs, we shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon notice to you at any time prior to the expiration of thirty (30) days after the date on which we acquire knowledge thereof.

Lawrence, Jock

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

APO No 55
NEW YORK, NEW YORK

19 November 1951

Mr. Edward R. Murrow
Columbia Broadcasting System
485 Madison Avenue
New York City, N.Y.

Dear Ed:

You will remember that I talked to you about General Eisenhower's former assistant, Kevin McCann, who has taken on the difficult job of being President of Defiance College at Defiance, Ohio. You very kindly said you would try to help him in some way. Before the end of this year, if he can raise a small sum of 25,000 dollars, it would be a tremendous thing and would help him very much. Personally, and please do keep this to yourself, I have a feeling that, if he raises only that amount, we would have an opportunity to bring him back over here for temporary duty again, as General Eisenhower's Assistant.

Could you possibly telephone him at Defiance College, in Ohio? He would come on to New York and talk with you, I am sure. But just the idea of you telephoning to him would be a great help.

I would be deeply grateful, dear Ed. Of course, General Eisenhower obviously knows nothing of things like these and I would be doubly grateful if you keep it strictly on a basis where it never can be attributed wrongfully.

Sincerely,

Jock

J. B. L. LAWRENCE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Deputy for Plans & Public Affairs
Public Information Division, SHAPE

Conf. Huntley

EDWARD R. MURROW

January 7, 1955

Dear Chet:

I have delayed answering yours of December 6th hoping that I could dredge up some tangible or believable information on the subject you raise, but I regret to say I could not.

I have not, repeat not, been able to discover anything that would lead me to believe that you are "persona non grata" so far as CBS is concerned. My own impression, and merely my own, is that the whole situation was confused with Hollywood and New York offices; but I am not even sure about that. Sorry to be so unenlightening, but I have done my best.

As ever yours,

Mr. Chet Huntley
American Broadcasting Company
1539 N. Vine Street
Hollywood 28, California

rh
bc: Mr. Mickelson

Chet Huntley
American Broadcasting Co.
1539 N. Vine Street
Hollywood 28, California

Dec. 6, 1954

Dear Ed,

I have hesitated to write to you about this, for fear you might permit it to encroach upon your time and generosity. On the other hand, in view of our conversations in the past, it seemed you might be interested; and it continues to haunt me sufficiently that I would appreciate a word of counsel from you should you ever stumble upon the key to this slight confusion.

A couple months ago, CBS-TV here approached me relative to joining them. I was most unhappy with ABC-TV, anyhow; and proceeded to make myself a free agent in television. At that time there was no question raised about my commitments on ABC-radio, from which I plan, however, to extricate myself over a period of time.

However, the negotiations with CBS have been called off rather suddenly and somewhat inexplicably. From one source I am told that the "hitch" was the continuing identification with ABC radio for a time. Another source says I just simply am "persona non grata" with CBS New York!

The first explanation I find much easier to understand and adjust to than the latter reason. As you may understand, it constitutes an anxiety and source of wonderment.

Therefore, Ed, please don't make this a project; but if the truth of this should ever become apparent to you, I would certainly appreciate a clue. Not that I want to get revenge on the "culprit" but it's surely a comfort to know your friends from your enemies.....if there be some; and it could help a lot in making my future plans.

I still feel like a "you-know-what" in annoying you with this; but maybe I do so in hope of the small solace of knowing just what the hell happened.

Thanks, Ed, and again my apologies.

Sincerely,

Chet